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ACC. z.o ll / 0 l q5 I . . . INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE .. .. ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA .. . . . Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10
Office of the Co-Chairmen
CRYPTOFAX TRANSMITTAL IMMEDIATE
PAGE 1 OF 2 TO: The Secretary-General
COPY: Goulding/Annan/Gharekan, New York Akashi, Zagreb ____ -,,-, ,------_,. r l)_r- ,--;-- - FROM: Thorvald Stoltenb~~g/1~:lfA 1d(.c l , DATE: 26 July 1995 /
SUBJECT : Meeting with Sarinic
1. I had a meeting this morning with Minister Sarinic, President Tudjman's Chief of Staff, who was passing through Geneva, to discuss the planned talks between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs and to review the current situation generally . Highlights of our meeting follow:
2. Regarding the planned talks between the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs, Minister Sarinic said that while they would like to meet as soon as possible because of the deteriorating situation in the area, it was important to get a dialogue with a person representing the Serbs that had influence enough to implement what they might agree upon. President Tudjman felt that the talks should not take place before there was a Government in Knin with whom Zagreb could deal. That did not mean people who agreed with Zagreb, but who could talk to Zagreb and deliver agreement. Neither Martic nor Babic was considered to fall into the latter category. Mikelic had indicated that he would be given a mandate to negotiate with Zagreb but his mandate had so far not materialized. In the circumstances, some more time should elapse before the talks in Geneva . To a question from me, Minister Sarinic said they could meet with the Serbs any time provided it was with the "right" person.
3. On the situation in Bihac, Sarinic was extremely worried. He said that at the moment "contrary to other reports" the Croatian Government did not have forces in the Bihac area, but they did assist the HVO with logistics. However, they had three brigades on standby to send them into Bihac, if need be, to secure the Bihac area. He said that the Croatian Government would under no circumstances accept a Serb-Abdic takeover in Bihac, which would be directly - 2 -
detrimental to Croatian security. Sarinic said he was concerned that Milosevic and Belgrade themselves also considered Bihac crucial to Serb security. Hence, Bihac could be the situation that brings Croatia and Serbia into conflict once again. This situation makes the planned Geneva meeting between Zagreb and Knin even more important.
4. Against this background, Sarinic and I agreed that it would be important for me to go and see Milosevic for his evaluation of the situation in Knin, the prospects for a new Government, and his views concerning an appropriate Croatian-Serb interlocutor for the planned talks. 5. During our conversation, the serious situation in Osijek came up. Apparently, three Croatian garbage collectors were arrested by the Croatian Serbs following which the Croatian Zuupan Glavas had ordered that garbage be thrown into the river with serious polluting effects. Sarinic said that he would ask Glavas to stop the pollution if we managed to get the Croatian garbage collectors out of prison. This issue will be raised at a meeting Ambassador Eide will have in Knin on 27 July. 6. I have asked to see Milosevic at his earliest convenience.
++ C'( CY ++ 1995-0 7-26 02: 35 56 0 4 UNITED NATIONS HOS NE W YORK
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PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEOERAL·RE?UBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 8!5'\ FlrTH AVENUE, NEW '!'OAK. N . Y. 10021 TEL (2121 879•870014 FAX (212) 879•8705 ;l>PI< 0 ~o-oOll~ ( -:r~ "'1 r
21 July 1995
Your Excellency,
I have the honor to transmit, enclosed herewith, a letter of His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, addressed to you. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of Lhe General Assembly under item 114c of the provisioanl agenda and of the Security Council. ~ Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
QPKO-OUS(l INCOMING MAIL Bratislav Djordjevic Minister Plenipotentjary Charge d'affaires a.i.
•,.,,,_,..,...... to CM,traJ/other: ---
His Excellency nr. Boutros Boutros-Gh~l i Secretary-General ot the Uni.ted N~tions N e w Y o r. k
- .J +fr CYCY +fr 1 '.395-07-26 0 2: :36 56 0 4 UNITED NATIONS HQ S NE W YORK
651 CYZ 677 F3/4 CNZ r . ·. ! I~ 7°F. -·~-.! JJg. ff __~ -: • t . f . . !i ;j . I_. , .. :1_UL ?. I ~Jei FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ·...... :LlliL~ -.: : -_._. FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAffiS -
Belgrade, 20 July 1995
Excellency,
_ I am writing to draw your attention to the events in the region of Gorski Kotar, part of the Republic of Croatia with the majority Serbiim population in 8 local communities (175 villages) living outside the United Nations protected areas. Over the past three years, the Serbs in Gorsl
H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali SecretRry-Creneral United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 . ++ CYCY ++ 1995-0 7-26 02 : :3? 56 0 4 UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK oo-
CNZ 651 CYZ 677 P4/4 2 I
All Serbs eligible for military service in all 8 Serbian communities refused the summons for military duty they were sent on 9 February and 12 March 1993 and the mobilization was called off after an urgent intercession by Serbs' representatives with UNPROFOR and EC1\1M". However, the Croatian authorities did mobilize forcibly those Serbs who had found shelter in Gorski Kotar as refugees. In 1994, the Croatian authorities continued the forcible mobilization of Serbs by abducting them from their homes and places of work and by checking their identity in streets and on public roads. On 13 August 1994, for instance, all Serbs eligible for military service from Gomirje, Srpske Moravice, Jasenak, Dreznica and PoniJ...-ve were forcibly mobilized and sent to the firing line to fight their fellow Serbs from the Republic of Serbian K.rajina. The mobilization led to a mass exodus and abscondence of Serbs in the woodli and mountains of Gorski Ko tar. Since 6 May 1995, the Serbs from the areas of Srpskc Moravice, Gorrurje, Jasenak, Dreznica, Gomje and Donje Dubrave are being forcibly mobilized all over again. They are being taken to serve in the units of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnia-Herzegov.ina or the units of the Croatian regular forces in the territory of former Bosrua-Herzegovina So far, all Serbs eligible for military service from Brestovac and Vitunja have been mobilized; l O Serbs from Musulinski Potok; 15 Serbs from Gomirje and Srpskc Moravice and 5 Serbs from Dreznica, Jasenak and Gornje and Donjc Dubrave. The mobilization is carried out by night by brealcing into people's homes and with brutal use of force. These instances provide abundant evidence that the Croatian authorities carry out a continued and forcible mobilizat1on of Serbs in this region, as well as that they have stepped up these actions recently despite the existing agreements. I wish to recall, Excellency, that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. informed the United Nations of these problems on two occasions, as well as of the, generally, very difficult situation of 6 000 Serbs living in Gorski Kotar in the immediate vicinity of the war zone. They are exposed to enormous pressure and the Croatian authorities continue to violate their basic human and national righb Therefore, the Yugoslav Government views the acts of forcible mobilization in the context of the continueu efforts of the Cmat1an authorities to compel the Serbian population to leave their ancestral homes and to ethnically clean.c;e this region, as was the case with Western Slavonia (UNPJ\ Sector West). For that purpose Croatia h.ls deployed 20 000 troops towards the Serbian villages in Gorski Kotar with 3 5 tanks and 20 APCs, while Ton1LSlav Mercer men , notorious for their mas~ crimes against the Serb in Western Slavonia, are ciuartered at Drez.nica and Jasenak AL this difficult juncwre for Llic Serbi;,n peoµlc in Gorski Kotar, J call on Your Excellency to do everything within your capacities to stop the forcible mobilization of Serbs. Your actions, I am confident, will hdp preserve peace in Gorski Kotar ;i.nd facil ita te the overnll peace efforts uf the intcrm1tional community.
Yoms sincerely,
Vli!dislav Jo v~novic (signed)
1995- 0 7-26 0 3 : :3 9 PAGE= IS C\t; ~L-._
MISSION PERMANENTE ti~°' DE LA REPUBUQUE FEDERALE DE YOUGOSLAVIE t\Z - AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES AGENEVE
5, chemin Thury - 1206 Geneve Tel. 839 33 44- Fax 839 33 59 Telex 42 77 64
Geneva, July 24, 1995
Distinguished Co-Chairmen, I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter His Excellency Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has sent to the United Nations Secretary General, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, concerning forcible mobilization of the Serbs, carried out by the Croatian authorities in the Gorski Kotar Region, where Serbian population lives. Please accept, Distinguished Chai rmen, the assurances of my highest consideration.
Their Excellencies Mr. Thorvald STOLTENBERG and Mr. Carl BILDT Co-Chairmen International Conference on the former Yugoslavia Geneva FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Belgrade, 20 July 1995
Excellency,
I am writing to draw your attention to the events in the region of Gorski Kotar, part of the Republic of Croatia with the majority Serbian population in 8 local communities (175 villages) living outside the United Nations protected areas. Over the past three years, the Serbs in Gorski Kctar have been exposed to the threat of forcible mobilization and are in fact being forcibly mobilized to which the international community continues to turn a blind eye. These acts of the Croatian authorities constitute a blatant violation of the oral agreement reached between the Serbs and the Croatian authorities in August 1991 on the maintenance of the status quo in the area of Gorski Kotar pending a general political solution. These acts are also contrary to the agreement signed by the representatives of the Serbs and Croatian authorities on 6 July 1992 which, inter alia, envisages that the Croatian authorities will not mobilize the Serbs from this region into the Croatian military. The first threats of the Croatian authorities to mobilize all Serbs aged between 16 and 60, may I recall, date back to January 1992. On his visit to the municipality of Dreznica on 26 May 1992, Croatian Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac requested a list of all Serbs aged between 16 and 60 eligible for military service. Mobilization of Serbs was subsequently suspended after they complained to UNPROFOR. The mobilization in the villages of Brestovac and Vitunja of 8 June 1992 and in all other Serbian villages of 20 June 1992 was also suspended after the complaint of Serbs to UNPROFOR and ECMM representatives. But already on 29 August 1992, 5 Serbs from Dreznica were forcibly mobilized. On 1 November 1992, 20 16-year old young men from Jasenak, Srpske Moravice, Gomirje and Dreznica were summoned for military duty, while a number of Serbs were mobilized also on 28 December 1992. All Serbs eligible for military service in all 8 Serbian communities refused the summons for military duty they were sent on 9 February and 12 March 1993 and the mobilization was called off after an urgent intercession by Serbs' representatives with UNPROFOR and ECMM. However, the Croatian authorities did mobilize forcibly those Serbs who had found shelter in Gorski Kotar as refugees.
H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali Secretary-General United Nations New York, N.Y. 10017 In 1994, the Croatian authorities continued the forcible mobilization of Serbs by abducting them from their homes and places of work and by checking their identity in streets and on public roads. On 13 August 1994, for instance, all Serbs eligible for military service from Gomirje, Srpske Moravice, Jasenak, Dreznica and Ponikve were forcibly mobilized and sent to the firing line to fight their fellow Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Kraj ina. The mobilization led to a mass exodus and abscondence of Serbs in the woods and mountains of Gorski Kotar. Since 6 May 1995, the Serbs from the areas of Srpske Moravice, Gomirje, Jasenak, Dreznica, Gornje and Donje Dubrave are being forcibly mobilized all over again. They are being taken to serve in the units of the Croatian Defence Council in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the units of the Croatian regular forces in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina. So far, all Serbs eligible for military service from Brestovac and Vitunja have been mobilized; 10 Serbs from Musulinski Potok; 15 Serbs from Gomirje and Srpske Moravice and 5 Serbs from Dreznica, Jasenak and Gornje and Donje Dubrave. The mobilization is carried out by night by breaking into people's homes and with brutal use of force. These instances provide abundant evidence that the Croatian authorities carry out a continued and forcible mobilization of Serbs in this region, as well as that they have stepped up these actions recently despite the existing agreements. I wish to recall, Excellency, that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia informed the United Nations of these problems on two occasions, as well as of the, generally, very difficult situation of 6 000 Serbs living in Gorski Kotar in the immediate vicinity of the war zone. They are exposed to enormous pressure and the Croatian authorities continue to violate their basic human and national rights. Therefore, the Yugoslav Government views the acts of forcible mobilization in the context of the continued efforts of the Croatian authorities to compel the Serbian population to leave their ancestral homes and to ethnically cleanse this region, as was the case with Western Slavonia (UNPA Sector West). For that purpose Croatia has deployed 20 000 troops towards the Serbian villages in Gorski Kotar with 35 tanks and 20 APCs, while Tomislav Mercep men, notorious for their mass crimes against the Serbs in Western Slavonia, are quartered at Dreznica and Jasenak. At this difficult juncture for the Serbian people in Gorski Kotar, I call on Your Excellency to do everything within your capacities to stop the forcible mobilization of Serbs. Your actions, I am confident, will help preserve peace in Gorski Kotar and facilitate the overall peace efforts of the international community.
Yours sincerely,
Vladislav Jovanovic (signed) !'- f - - +f, CYCY +f, 1'.3'35 - 0 7-22 0 1:21 i 56 04 UNITED NATIONS HOS NE W YORK I) n ·: I
D -: : : . ..., - -~ ,, ... :. . .. - r. I UIUII.) :...iJ\J · :ui J U ii lJ CNZ 628 CYZ ---657 Pl/4 ·95 Jl.J"L 22 -4 :20 OUTGOING CODE CABLE
TO AK.ASH!, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
INFO STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA . J .. FROM GOULDING, UNATIONS -··, .--.. ·-······ "·-.r·- · .__..: ~- ZI.../) DATE 21 July 1995 (/')
SUBJECT: IMPLR{ENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 49/43 ON "THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA."
1. In its resolution 49/43 of 9 December 1994 on "The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Croatia" (copy attached) , the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it at its fiftieth session a comprehensive report on the implementation of the resolulion.
2. The Department of Political Affairs is responsible for the preparation of this report. I am requesting your assistance in._ ) obtaining from UNCRO ·and tJNHCR the necessary information and other pertinent inputs that in your view should be reflected in the report.
3. It would be appreciated if this information is received by 17 August 1995 to enable us to complete the initial draft and if necessary revert to your office for additional information before the report is submitted to t:he General Assembly in September.
Your cooperation is al l tl1e more appreciated at this critical time. +Ir CYCY +Ir 1 '3'35-07-2 2 0 1: 22 56 0 4 UNITED NA TIONS HQS NEW YOR K 002
CNZ 628 CYZ 657 P2/4 VN1ftD A NATIONS
General Asse ■ bly
Di ■ tr. QDDAI. A/US/49/43 • , Peruuy 1995
Worty-ninth ••••ion Ag~nda 1t• 148
RISOLO'rION ADOPTZI> BY THI: GBHDAL ASSBMBL:l [on the report of the Special Political and Decolonization Ccalllittae (~ourth coaimitt-) (A/49/630))
49/43. lbt 1itu1t10n in the occupiad territori•• ot Croatia
tho a.nara1 A1eemb\x• B@affi:;ming th• relevant principle• of the Charter ot tha Onitad Nations and, in particular, th• principle ot inadmi ■ a1l>ility of th• acquiaition of territo.ry t~ou9h the u ■• of toroe, fl;••ting the iJliport.nce of efforts to restore peace in tha entire territory ot th• Republic of Croatia•• well•• to pre ■ erve ite territorial integrity within the internationally reo09lliEed borders, and emphaaizing in tbis regard that the territoriea oompriaing the United Nation• Protected Areas •~• integral parta ot tha ter~itory of the Republic of Croatia, a~armed and conearnad by the fact that the onqoing situation in the Sarbian-oontroll~ part ■ ot Croatia ie da facto allowinq and promotinq a state ot OCC'Upation of part ■ of tho sovereign Croatian territory, and thue ••rioualy jeopardizing th• aove:oi;nty and territorial integrity ot the Rep\lblic ot Croatia, Rejecting the odious policies and practices of ethnic cla&naing and their conaequence ■, and all other violation ■ of international humanitarian law,
Kmpha1izinq that the Serbian-controlled territoriee of Croatia mu ■ t be peacefully reintegrated into the raat of tha country, under the clo•• auperviaion ot the international connunity,
95-76651 +tr CYCY +tr _19 95-07 - 22 01 : 23 5604 I UNITED NATIO NS HO S NEW YORK 1) (i 2
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A/US/49/43 Pa~ 2
s~r•t•inq th• I.mportanee of the mutual recognition of the international bord•r• by all Stat•• in the region ot th• former Yuqo ■ lavia, and recalling all relevant s•eu~ity council r••olutiona on thia matter, 1. lxpre11•1 ite commitment to eneure reapect tor the 1overeiqnty and territorial intaqrity of th• Republic of Croatia, 2. QAll@ upon all parties and, in particular, the Federal Republic of Yuqoalavia (Serbia and Montanaqro), to comply fully with all Security council r••olutioo ■ r99ardi.ng th• ■ ituation in Croatia, and to reepec~ atrictly it• ~•rritorial inteqrity, -..,cl in thi• r99a.rd conclude• that their activitiaa aiaed at aohie-¥1ft9 the int99ration of the occ~piad territoriea ot Croatia into the admini ■ trativa, =ilituy, educational, tran ■portation and communication ■ yateaia of ihe r~eral JtepUblia ot Yugo ■ lavia . (Serbia and Montenegro) are ill99al, null and void, and muat cea•• 1Jllmediately1 J. ~BISY•Jtf th• r~ral Republic ot Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to ceaae .s.mm.diately any military and loqi ■ tic eupport to the ■ alt-proclaimed authoriti•• in the Serbian-controlled part ■ of Croatia, 4. gtrongly condtmQJ tha Serbian eelt-proolaimed authoriti•• in the Serbian-controlled territori•• of Croati~ f~r their militant action ■ that have re ■ ulted in •~hnic eleanalnQ of the Onited Nation ■ Protee~ed Az:eaa, and for their oon•tant r.tu ■ al to ccmply with the r•l~vant Security Council re ■ olutlona, 5. Reatti;:ma ita aupport for the principle that all atatamenta or commitments in th• Serbian-controlled part ■ ot Croatia mad• und ■ r duress, p•rtioula~ly thoae regarding land and property, are wholly null and void1 6. gatfirm1 the right of all retugeea and diaplaced person• from the area of the former Yugoslavia to return voluntarily to their home• aafely and with dignity, vith the aaaiatance of the international c01m1unity, and in thia raga.rd no~ea that the 1991 census ia the baaia for defining the population atruotur• of the Republic of Croatia; 7. prg11 the restoration ot the authority of tna Republic ot Croatia in its •ntire territory and urgea ~lao the utmoet raepect tor human and minority r1ghta in the territory o! Croatia, including the right to autonomy in accordance with the Conatitution of the ~apublic ot c~oatia and aat&bliahed international atandarda, and for attorta to achieve a political eolution within the frbfMWOrk of the Int•rnational confaranoe on the Former Yugoalavla1 8, ~alla for mutual recognition becwean the Rapublic of Croatia and the Fade~•l R•pu.blic of Yugoalavia (Serbia and Montenegro) within their existing internationally rac09n1~ad borders; 9. coanendt tha peraiatent efforts of the United Nations Protection ~orce in partormin9 its dutiae in the territory of the Republic of Croatia,. and in ehia regard emphaaizee the importance of ite role for the overall peace proceae and tor the succeae of the peaceful reintegration of Serbian controlled territoriee of Croatia1 10. Ala9 calla for tull reapect of the ceaee-!ira agreements in tha ta~ritory of Croatia, and urgae tha resumption ot direct negotiations in close eooperaeion with the InternationAl Conference on the Former Yugoalav1a,
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11. Raqp•tt• th• Secretary-Oen•r•l to •ubmit to the General Aaaembly at it• tiftietb ••••ion• cocaprehen•1ve report on th• unplementation of the pa:•••nt reaolution. &3rd pltotrv aetina 9 PMrtmb•r 1994 +tr C YCY +tr 19 95-07- 20 0 1: 58 56 04 UNITED NAT IONS HO S NE W YORK 004
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OUTGOING CODE CABLE
TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC/Cmdr UNCRO -- -0 -'""-- ~ = C INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA 0., G J c,·-., ~r .--:::, FROM: -cc, -- ~NAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ~'11--- N .,: ,, c :, 0 c:;_, ~ ~ DATE: 19July1995 I :::1 N = -c , Ll . c:: C/) = NUMBER: 2403 00 -
SUBJECT: CA.oA'TIA
The attached article from the Economist's Foreign Report is unusually interesting, in that its prediction of an attack on Bihac appears to have come true today. Would appreciate your comments on the rest of its analysis.
Regards. .f+ CYCY .f+ 0 04 1995-07-20 0 1:59 5 6 0 4 UNI TED NATIONS HQS NE W YORK
CNZ 618 CYZ 650 P 2 FOREIGN REPORT PUbltshed by Jane's lnfunnatton Group Ltd, Scnllnel House, 163 Brighton Ro:.d, Coulsdon. Sun·~ ca, 2NH, UK 1359 July 13th 1995
Cont.tnl5 A new off~ivc In a-Yugos/avta l11d1a·s mlsstlt thrl!dt lr~\ biologl'4l weapons Big Helmut dt:eidd Power 111 ck, wtSum hem1sphac Adriatic rl'Yalry A sad sc,m:n ,. Ht.tbullah 's secret congrtsl POJl'lttrS ".· . A new o!fensive in ex-Yugoslavia
Serbs and Croats are poised to fight In an une,cpc~t~d are.a
Hile the world's aut.ntil)n has ~en focused on the renewed fighting around W Srebrenka, u,~ 1,JN's .. safe ar~.i'' in ca,tem Bosnia close lO the Serb border, and on the e:nnunuing tcn.s1on in the easternmost part of CroaU.l occupied by w Serbs since 199 l (Foa.rn<;N RE1'0Rr June 29th). a full-scale Croat-Serb war may be about to t"nrpt tn u,c bordt'r zone between Bosnia and Croatia in the !.Outh. The flashpolnt is I he sparstiy populatttl. mostly mounttinou!I -5c:rtrhcld part of soulhem Croana, the Krajlna, whose centre ts Knln. The trigger could be a Serb offr.nsivf! mounred from I.he hug, Slunj mil, itAr)' complc:x north of Knin. IL coulJ he dh-r.rttd not agltinst a t.argc, in Cro:.ll~ but against the Bthac cndav~ next door in 'aosnia. Bihac ar.d its surroundings, a \JN "safe aru", arc CJ.'>nrrolll'.d. by ~he 5th Corp~ of the (mainly Muslim) army nf the Ikisnian govemm~1 1,lf President Allja lutht.~ovk in Si1r!IJC'VO , The Serbs have Wi'Utt:d LO capture Bihac since Bosnum gov t:rnm f'nl rnrci:_s took tt from the prv· s~rh lool lelckr. rlk"'t Abdic. tn l 99 l Now tLc; r;.pHu \: lia:s b~come
l ... CYCY ... UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK 004 19 95:07-20 01=59 56 0 4
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impcr,1liv('. Blhac !il!S i.lStride a railway line llnkiug l Tudjman lhoughl again .--· Th~ a.nival of r~inforccnients let! 10 u rcV'itw of (.roaL sttnu:gy. President Franjn ~Tudjman harJ prt!viouslr assured the r..:,-called ConhH:t Croup or major powrrs which l' i.rytng to arrangl! a peaC'c :Klllc.ml!nl thar CroaLia would hold h.t..:k from a.1tacking the Serhs llL lt'aSL unal rhe ehd of the currrm mandarc of the\., op<'rntic,n In Croatia in Novrmher. HP. ha, bcgun. io think 11gam - a.nd made new dcm~nds. He- Si\id he would ~xpei.:.t tht t:N to p~!.uad~ the Serbs to .1.llo-w monllOr~ on Croan~·s bordl!rs wllh Bosnia and Serbia (whkh is occupied by S<-rbs on both sides); to help to te-0pen the o:l pipeline pu,;tng through Lhm lt~rritory; and en help 10 re-open thC' railway lint: :inktn~ Zagrt\b (th~ Croatian rapilal) lo the Datmatt11r, roi\sl. which passts through ! Anybody's gues:; Croatia could nut ignort a Serh offensive against Bihac mouncerl from SlunJ in occupied (roaLian teTTltnry. A ~rb ofTcnsive could ~ve the C:ro~l5 an excu~ to auack l l '7" ! I UNPRo:·oR CO~i!''.ofTIONS i ; ~ .. '9J JU.. -3 14 :JO //4 ' ! STOL TEN13ERG, ICFY, GENEYA -c -~ · ~ - ~ 0 AKASHt UNPF-HQ, ZAGRI::B I:» m tr, y~~ i:e- ,, NUMBER: f= Cl. - 'I Z .. 1087 ~ --t'T: · c.,,) C") it w• c::, :z 3 3 JULY 1995 c» 3 -,Dir. ,'I = c:: I ~ == ::; LEITER FROM DP!vf/FM OF CROATIA 0 (.I) - I/ Your MSCJ2158 of 30 June 1995 refas. I' I We treat seriously the allegations in Dr. Oracle's letter of!2s June 1995 wruch acid ,:J. · lo th~ allegations contained in Sarinic's letter of24 Jurn:. 19951 a /copy of which, together -W./- with the Force Commanders reply~ was s~t to you in our Z-1004 of 28 June 1995. Due ·iV.•. to both our pr¢3ent deployment pattern and restrictions of movedient u, sengitive areas, J/ · including border cro$Sing points, we ~ not in a position to con(trn1 or deny the validity l/. ·•of the allegations, but they !:Ile consistent with the tone and contt;nt of previous reporting . .J i;:. The equir,ntent observed to date, pm1icufady the M-84 Lank.s. can be accounted for based fif • on known 1ARSK' inventory. The arrival of VJ officers and tropps cannot be confinned. x . ·. but seems credible and consistent with patterns ob~erved elsewhere. Deployments into : /: I.he lone of Sepunuion apPeat generally accurate but reflect a (op..sidoo per5pcctive. · \. · 'ARSK' deployments into the ZOS have generally paralleled ~s of .HV movements in I and near the ZOS. Who moved first is invariably urguabh:. M9 current 'ARSK.' pcrnot\nel in the ZOS exceed J.I\1O persoone1 (2,000 'ARSK\ 700 HV as of l July 1995) buL proximity of additional troops just ·outside the ZOS should also be taken into account. '. L '· i Granic's letter has several poJiti~I putposes, 1:15 well as ebrt:Ssina legitimate concm1 about continued FRY assistance to the Kndinu Scrb::i. 1The letter seeks to discredit ONCRO which is not yet in a position to 'verify cross-~rdcr movements of military pen,onneJ and eguipment. lt ai.m5 to increase pressure ion rvtilo!-i~ic and the international community hy calling for reinstitution of suspend~ sanctions, and to cast doubt:! on the C(lmprehensiveness of the reports of th<: ICFY ~der monitoring 111ission. It is a preparation tor fi.trther diplomntic lobbying in New York,!and it is a dclibernte attempt Lo detlet.-1: intemutional attcntiort awuy from Croatin's ~n .suspected cro8s-border activities, particularly in the Mt. Dinara region of Sector South. 1 I / .... " lntemm Distribution: FC, HCA, DFC, DI so-40-sss1 if if tti: CZN 1074 t _' - 2 - l ; ~L i In our earlier response to the Swinic letter we sought nbt to be diverted from the ~i key present problem which is how to begin a process of negotiations betweffl the parties. H: iCt: 'fbc full of Sector West was a precedent for' Crootia, but it wad also a !~son for thr: Serbs ; U'- ., ' \ 'J', who are determined not to allow further Ioos of territory. For :this they need Milosevic's 5j' ; help which Milosevic is supplying for his 01nn reasons. 'lhOiSt reasons probably include: to i -~ ~- avoid another humiliating defeat which has symboHc cons~enccs for alt Serbs; to ; . l4· undermine Karadzic's influence \vith Martic; to fore:;tall further moves tQww-ds 'RSK' and \ t} t 'RS' unification; and to send a clear message to Croatia to desist fi'om another attnck. \ . / \~ ! ' Within the FRY there would he little dom~tic opposition to thbe move3 particularly if it \ ( meMS reducing the numbers of Kraj ina Serbs in lhc: FRY, althi,ugh concern has been ,r,, expressed about the manner the ''oonscription 11 wa.s carried out. '. d I Our position is that alkgations, if prnven. about FRY ltjilitary involvement in Cro-'11:ia are disturbing and contribute to the danger of escalation of the present situation. i Ouly a pcace.fu1 negotiated solution to the present conflict will bring about dur~le peace. ; It is UNCROs intention to fully perform its tasks W1der its mjdate. Our first two i, \: priorities are to restvre the inteitit}' of the Ceasefire Agrecmc nnd to stabilize the ,, situation in the Mt. Dinara urea. It ·is es~tial that a process f uialogue ~ould begin ! immediately starting with a rueeting of military commanders n~~th sides to dc-e,cab1te ·i•· the present situation and advam.:e towards a peace process in wruch neither side would ~ (i: ·; attempt to violate international borders. We have eculed on both :;id~ tC'I exerci~ ,. L maximum restraint and to refrain from all provocations. ;,;~ 'y) ; , ?, j;' ·.1 t, .. '· I, ·., . I , ' ' ~'.·:·; ,., r l ' !,, /j" \ l ., . \ I , • · ,, . ' ' ;t \:" l :, • ). I ) ~; "l. ~t•o:' '~:' ,1. ·. I L ► • '. ~ ' -_ r'~ I r' ------.L.- UNPR-OFOR CZN-1098 OUTGOING CODE CABLE CIMMUNICtiTIONS CZG-891 'TT''- cA3 MOST IMMEDIAtE-5 17 :20 SSN-1654 "95 JI. -6 16 :53 Page I of 2 TO ANNAN: UNATIONS, NEW YORK i ' ///,i_. FROM JANVIER, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ~ fNFO STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEY A DATE 06 JULY 1995 NUMBER Z- 1111 I SUBJECT INEORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MEETING OF UNPF TROOP CONTR1BUTORS - CROATIA UPDATE REFERENCES: UNNY MSC 2198 dated 05 July 1995 UNNY MSC 2199 dated 05 July 1995 l. Tn response to your queries listed at references concernlng recent developments in the UNCRO area of responsiblity. we have prepared both a general and detailed military summary. 2. General Summru:y. The general situation in UNCRO AOR is tense due to general mobilization in the RSK area (all weapons taken out of WSS and troops deployed in or near the ZOS) and tbe ongoing HV troop movement, training and concentration close to the ZOS. In addition the HV/HVO offensive in the Livno Va1ley/Dinara Mountans is of concern as it is threatening Knin and one of the major supply routes to the RSK. HV Lroop movements1 especially in the area of Medak and Jusenice is significant. H\f' exercises are also ongoing in the area of Dakovo (West of Sector East) and Vrbovsko (North East of Sector North). On the border to Bihac the attack from RSK and Abdic forces against Bill (5 Corps) seems to be increasing during the last few days. At the same time unconfirmed reports indicate 5 Corps preparation for an attack against RSK held territory Ion the Eastern border just East/North East of Dvor. This is assessed as an attempt to cut ilie route from Dvor to Glina. The Restriction of Movements are still significant from both the ARSK and HV, and these restrictions are severely hampering execution of the mandate. ; 3. UNCRO intends to •••-•-•-••-re-establish full compliance with the CF A of 29 March 1994. J\s the situation permits, UNCRO will be restructured and deployed as described in Z-1099 of 5 July 1995. subject to UNNY decisions as described in paragraph 9 of that cable. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, HCA, DFC, COS ___-.,.. .._... ·v c I,, V • i.;, f.. ------··'--'-- ' CZN-1098 CZG-891 PAGE l OF 2 4. Military Summary: a. SECTOR SOUTH: (1) 30 Jun 95 : A large movement of troops, lestimated at approximately 1200 HV soldiers and vehicles, was reported in the general area of Velebit Mountains GR (WK 0400 - WK 4405). Some of these troops at Company level were reported to be conducting exercises north to .TU!ienice Crossing Point. HV Artillery haJ also been relocated in I.he V elebit Mountains ( WK21 ). ARSK moved their Artillery from Gracac GR (WK 6407) to Medak GR (WK 4123i) in view of suspected UV build up in the area. I I I i (2) 02 Jul 95 : There was a small exchange o( artillery fire in the general area of ANTI CA GLA VA GR (XJ 1969).: I I (3) Q; Jul 95: HV/HVO fired 32 artillery rouhds which impacted Cetina GR (XJ 1470). and GR (XJ 1370). ARSK ~I etaliated with three rounds of artillery fire from Civiljane towards the East. An unusual movement of HV troops in the Velebit Mountains w~ reported. I I (4) 04 - 05 Jul 95: HV/HVO fired four artillezr rounds which impacted at Cetina GR (XJ 14 70) on 04 July, and six !more artillery rounds were fired by the HVIHVO which also impacted at Celina on 05 July. ' b. SECTOR NORTH: ! (1 ) 04 - 05 July 1995 : On 04 July, approximately 500 soldiers were reported as entering the sector through Kostajnica Crossing Point GR (XK 2109) and were heading to the Nor~. During the 04 - 05 July period. intensive shelling was reported in tile northern part of the Bihal: Pocket due to a BiH activity in the general area of Gorkovaca GR (WK 9291) towards the Dvor - Glinai road. A general ASRK mobilization took place on 05 July in the area West of Dvor. ! c. SECTOR EAST: During the week. an exchange of small arms fire took place in the general area of GR (CR 1335); GR (CR 1822) and GR (CR 1723). On 03 Jul 95 , approximately 700 soldiers were reported as leaving the Sector from GR (CR 7003) towards the South. ' ++ CYCY ++ 1 '.3'.35- 0 7-0 1:3 01 : 2 3 S t3 0 3 004 CNZ 560 CYZ- 560 Pl/1 OUTCOINC CODE CABLE IMMEDIATE ::; .. , . - t ... <..1' TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB 8tt □ I SRS~~ TFC I - r.~ . I '-c:::· r- '· 1 INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA___.-- .(/ I ~o u, ~7- -· . '· .. · . • ..... 1) :r:,, ~ FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YOR1J . -·~ ,;_;; I ,::;7.. ~ ::z: (./) DATE: 5 JULY 1995 N U') -' NUMBER: MSC· 2199 SUBJECT: 1nfgrma1 CQnsultations gf the securitv CQuncll 1. Thank your for your very helpful z-1093 and Z-1098 ·of 4 and 5 July respectively. 2. In addition to the regular reporting for the security council, we would appreciate your providing Information ► on significant military events In Croatia since 30 June, especlally In but not limited to sector south; humanitarian situation of the Serb population In sector west (i.e. an up-date on the information given in tne secretary-General's report 5/1995/467>; .. on the humanitarian situation in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina statistical data on the assistance provided to the civilian population, the number of recipients reached, the kind of assistance dellvered, assessment of the current needs . 3. The latter Information would also be useful in the overall context of preparing public Information programmes (as mentioned In your Z-1096> which would, inter a11a, explaln the humanitarian tasks of UNPROFOR. some elements are already contained in the report of the secretary• General S/1995/444 paras. 25ff. 4. we would appreciate receiving your response by 8:30 a.m. New York time tomorrow, 6 July. Paris, July 3rd /995 tsote re/alive to the meeting between Mr BILDT and President TUDJMAN 1. On July 2nd from 11 .00 to 12.15, Mr Carl Bfl1JT met President TUDJMAN in ZAGREB. In add/lion, the delegarions comprised, on the Croat $ide, Mr SARINJC 1 Minister A.E. GRAN]f!C, Defence mintster J'USAK and general CERVENKO and, on the ICFY side, Mr STOLTt,'NBERG, Mr I,YRVAl,l,, Ambassador MA1TACO1'A and General de LAPRESLE. 2, Mr BILDT had mer Mr SARINIC the previous week, but this was his first meeting with President 7'UDJMAN in hi:; re,:ent capacit)' as co-presiltent of /CFY. After a few short words of welcome, />resident TUDJMAN gave straight away a clear and firm reminder of his position on the future of his country. 2./. A wish to find a raptd and pacific outcome which gives minorities, especially the Serb minority, all their international rights, in keeping with both Croat sovereignty and the legitimate aspirations of these minorities. 2.2. An inflexible determination, failing the achievement of a pacific outcome before the end of the present UNCRO mandate (30 .10.95), to re-establish the territorial integrity of Croatia "by all the means at his disposal, including his army", in the process of a rapid modernization. 2 .3. An equal determination to contribute as fully as possible co rhe solution of the Bosnian problem, intimately linked to the Croat problern. 3- Mr B/LDT then explained : - the mandate he was entrusted with by the t;uropean Union following the CANN HS summit (the five points plan, of which Croatia was a significant part). -his concern to see rapid progress in a worsening gnieral situation, e.,;pecially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If a significant improvement were not to come ahout in the coming days, it is to be feared that violence and war will prevail following an uncontrolable escalation. the idea that, to face this extreme ernergency, he might let Mr STOLTENBERG concentrate on Croatia, while he would focus his own efforH on Bosnia~II erzegovina. 4- Asked about the Croat intention IO bring back their armed forces to zhe ltnes defined '/Jy the cease-fire agreement of 29.3.1994, President TUDJMAN replied that 70 % of 1he forces remaining in the separation zone were in fact Serb and that he could not let that gap widen. 5- More widely, President TUDJMAN specified that he wished w see ihe following undertakings : 5.1. the immediate fulfilling by UNCRO of the entirety of its mandate. Failing 1hat, he would refuse to consider renewing it. S,2, 1he reopening of the Adriatic pipelines . .5.3. the reopening of the railway line wich runs alongside the morurway, possibly under the ·aegis of the European Union. 6· Prompted by Mr STOLTENBERG, /'resident 1-UDJMAN declared himself ready to take part in due time in parallel negotiations on economic and political themes. But he spcdfied : •that these negotiations could only take place in Croatia (KNJN, ZAGREB or some other location), ~that he would refuse to allow Mr MARTIC, "a war criminal who ordered the launching of ground-to-ground rockets on ZAGRJ:.,B and KARLOVAC" to join in the,r;e negotiations. -that he was ready to take part in a reunion in GENEVA where the form of these possible future negotiations (''talks on talks") could be worked out. 7- President TUJJJMAN then forcefully underlined that the key to the succe,,;s of such negotiations lays in Belgrade, where President MILOSf--V/C continues to "pull the strings of the puppets in KN/N", by designating the people in charge and providing the ARSK with men and equipment. He therefore deemed it essential that no lightening of economic sanctions against the RFY be decided before the recognition of Croatia by President MIWSEVIC and before a solution has been found 10 the problem of KRAJINA an 8- Besides, President TUDJMAN justified the victorious Croat attack against the "occupied territory" of the eastern sector by an inevitable reaction of his sovereign state, defended by its army, against the provocative assassination of five Croats by serb extremists. 9- As Mr BILDT was suggesting that the Croat military pressure on the ''occupied territories" was not conducive to increasing the trust of the Serbs, nor to the opening of fruitji,I peace negotiations, President TUDJMAN answered : - that all sovereign countries, including Sweden, would act in a similar way in comparable circumstances, · that the result of the previous, more trustful, discussions between Mr SARNIC and Mr MIKELIC was the ousting of Mr M/Kt:uc, replaced by ''extremists'' v.,f,o ·would only Rive way under the pressure of force . JO- Mr BILDT then strongly reminded the Croat pariy that Europe, which wished to extend a welcoming hand to Croatia 1 would pay careful attention to the behaviour of their country, and could only give the go-ahead to such an inte8ration in a pacific context. He then took the opponuni1y once again to underline how urgem peace negotiations were. I I- President TUDJMAN stated that he was completely aw,ire of these European criteria, but declared he was under tremendous pressure from ihe 360.000 displaced persons, half of whom had to flee ihe UNPAs and half of ·whom fled Bosnia Herzegovir,a. 12- Mr BIWT mentionned the pacific solution Finland found for the very large S·wedish population concentrated in part of this co1m1ry, after dijjicult bw fruitful negotiations. * President TUDJMAN then declared that the Serbs were already many to have completely integrated themselves in the Croat national structtJrfS, including the Parliament, and that their international rights as a minority would be scrupulously re spec red. He feared however that afler the terrible ethnic violence perpetrated in rhe KRAJ/NA ''occupied territories", the coexistence of Serbs and Croats would lmlally be mosr problematic ... In order to begin straight away this long and difficult process, he deemed it essential that Mr MILOSEVJC recognize at the earliest opportunity Croatia in its frontias, under the pressure of the international comnmnity, so as to dispel the last remaining illusions. * Worried that after having had to give up the project of a Greater Serl>ia, President MILOSEVIC may wam to return to the idea of a federation of the states of former Yougoslavia 1 President TUDJMAN forcefully asserted that each state should enjoy total sovereignty, and that it should be recognized at the earliest by all the other states. Following a remark by Mr BJLDT to the e/fecz that the notion of sovereignty had evolved because of the numerous links and interdependences caracterisric of modem states, President TUDJMAN answered that he was ready for the rype of sovereignty Sweden enjoys today. * Mr STOLTENBERG, in preparation of his meeting the following day with the authorities in KNIN, asked President TUDJMAN about the significance of the various political figures, especially Mr BABIC. President TUDJMAN repeated his certainty that the answer lay with Mr MILOSEVIC. On that subject, President TU DJ MAN asked Mr BILDT for his feeling about the previous day's meeting with Mr MILOSEVIC. • Mr Bf LDT noticed in President MILOSEVIC : - his concern for obtaining the greatest advantage frorn a possible recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of Croatia, which did nor appear imrnirienr, · no sign of a possible idea of creating an enlarged Yougoslav federation, • his obsession with the lifting of sanctions, - his worries about the dep/orableJ and worsening, stall' of the econorny of the RFY, · his clear awarenel·s of the risks of war in Bosnia, and of the urgency of reducing these risks. Bur Mr BUdt then insisted that his role was that of a mediutor between the parties, who had to negotiate a peace themselves and not expect it from tlw negotiators. • As a conclusion, and after Mr 8/LDT gave once a8ain a reminder of the wmost urgency of taking measurtl' to pµz into reverse the the worrying deterioration of the situation, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in Croatia, President 1-ULJJMAN recalled his key idea laid out in paragraph 1 above. To conclude, President 1'UUJMAN appeared to stick very firmly to a posicion which <-·an be summarized as : • a demand, in order to allow a pacific return w Croatian rule of 1he occupied territories, that the UNCRO mandate be scrupulously respectnf. But he keeps on denigrating it and hindering its action. - an assertion that, failing that, and before the end of the year, Croatia will have found, by force if need be, its terri10rial integrity once again . The margin for manoeuvre of peace-makers and of peac:e•keepers thus appears to be very limited. All the persuasion skills of the European Union, especially of Gennany, and of the United State, will be required to force /'resident TUDJMAN to more openness, moderation and realism . Failing that, thl~ military option appears almo.u inevitable. ...- CYCY ...... 1995-0 7-01 0 2 : 25 56 03 U:, >: i f' / 'Lli :' ... ._: ;t CNZ 552 CYZ 532 Pl/6 . , - ... : . \ ,-.. \ 1'\ ' ~ ,; rOOTeOINCi '-CODE CABLE TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG\TFC INFO: , TOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ,..- ;? FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW Y iK~_ /1./ 1. DATE: 30 JUNE 1995 / . / NUMBER: MSC- 2158 SUBJECT: Letter from DPM/FM of Croatia With reference to the letter from Mr. sarlnic attached to your z- 1073, please find attached for your urgent comments a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Croatia, Dr. Granlc. we would appreciate your providing any observations you may have before Monday, since the Issue is likely to come up In the security council In the context of the consideration of the ICFY border mission report...... l..., T L, l ....- 0 U l 1995-0 7-01 02 : 2 5 56 03 CNZ 552 CYZ 532 ?2/6 UNITED NATIONS AS General Assembly Distr . Security Council GENERAL A/50/260 S / 199S/SlS 28 June 1995 ORIGINAL : ENGLISH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL Fiftieth sessi on Fiftieth year Item 92 of the preli minary list• THE SITUATION IN THE OCC..-:-PIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA Letter dated 48 June 1995 from the fermanent Representative of Croatia to the united Nations addr,ssed to the Secretary-General I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 28 JWle 1995 from the Deputy Prime Mi nister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croati~. Dr. Mace Granic, addressed to you (see annex) . May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly under item 92 of the preliminary list and of the Security council . (Signed) M~rio NOB!LO Ambassador Permanent Representative A/ 50 / 50 / Rev . 1 . 9 5 - 194 1 8 ( E ) 2 8 0 6 9 5 2 9 0 6 9 5 I . .. 1111111 1111111111 lllll llm llli lllll llU 1111 ++ CYCY ++ 1 :3' 9 5 - o 7 - 0 1 0 2 : 2 6 5 6 03 r) (1 1 CNZ 552 CYZ 532 P3/6 A/50/2G.O S/1995/519 English Page 2 ANNEX The Government of Croatia is extremely alarmed and concerned by the l atest developments in the "Federal R.epublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 11 and by the dir•ct implications and consequences cf these developments for the occupied territories of Croatia . The degree of involvement of the Belgrade regime on behalf of their proxies in Croatia and the level of its intervention in the occupied territories of Croatia hae increased in a significant way recently, and in the la~t few daya in particular . Your Special Representati ve, Mr. Yaaushi Akashi, was informed of this matter of c~itical importance on 26 June 199S in Zagreb . The related developments in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 11 and the occupied territories of Croatia constitute (i) unauthorized d i rect military intervention by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 11 acroaa an international border of a sovereign State, in violacion of the Charter of the United Nationa and relevant Security Council resolutions ; (ii) a continuation of a policy of occupation pursued by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and .Montenegro) 11 in violation of Gene:ral A.ssem.oly resolution 49/4.l of 9 December l994 ; (iii) a violation by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) " of the border blockade established by the Security Council in its reeolution 943 (1994) of 23 Septem.b•r 1994 and reaffirmed by the Council in its resolution 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995; and {iv) a grave breach of international humanitarian law by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", which amount~ to a war crime . The Government of Croatia has already documented in several letters (S/1995/229, S/1995/401 and A/50/ 229) that the "Army of Yugoslavia" ia actively engaged in Croatia by sending mae~riei from Serbia and Montenegro to the occupied territories ; by directing the paramilitary unita in the oceupied territories through about ,,ooo B•lgrade-commissioned offi cers sent to these territories for that purpose; by paying the wages of thoae officers and of other members of the proxy government and military; and by forcibly mobilizing eiti:tena of the NFaderal Republie of Yugoslavia {Serbia and Montenegro)'' and ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for military service in the occupied tarritories of Croatia . The forcible mobilization is proceeding on a large scale. As at 14 June 1995 , over 4,500 mobilized men were transferred against their will while a further 500 volunteers were also tr~nsported to the occupied territories of Croatia. The transfer of military personnel from Serbia and Mont~ne9ro 1 across the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the control of Bosnian Serbs , is a direet violation of Security Council resolutions 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992 , 820 (1 993) of 17 April 1993, B71 (1993) of 4 October 1993, 943 (1994) and , in particular, 988 (1995). The soldiers are being transported in vehicles proved by the "Army of Yugo8lavia", across the Serbia/Bosnia border at ~aca , sinee 14 June 1995 , and have been entering the occupied territories o f Croatia at Dvor since 15 June 1995 . The: mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro and reinforeament of the paramil itary forces in the occupied territories is expected to continue . The majority of those mobilized in Serbia and Montenegro and s9nr. to Croatia &re civilians , but a significant number of the conscripts /, "l"'I" L,TL, I "l"I" 1 9·9 5-0 7 - 0 1 0 2 : 2 7 56 03 001 CNZ 552 CYZ 532 P4/6 A/50/260 S/1995/518 English Page .3 are members of the special forces of the "A.rmy of Yugoslavia" . Some are alao sent to Bosnia and Heriegovina. According to the information available to the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the primary goal of the Belgrade authorities in this regard is to uee the transferred special units of the "Army of Yugoalavia" to strengthen further and reinforc• th•ir atronghold in the area of Slunj in Croatia, and thereby a•cure the oc:cup&tion of this region, aa well aa to arna.as considerable forces for further engagements in the strategically important region of Bihac in Bosnia and Harzegovina , a Security Council declared "safe area". As additional evidence of the direct and increasing involvement of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in Croatia, I should like to draw your attention to the !act that the commander of the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Lt . General Mile MrkAit, prior to his present assignment , served as ASeiatant Chief of the General Staff of the "Army of Yugoslavia", and was reaponaible for ieo special forces. Lt. General MrkAic was alao the "J'N~" officer reaponsible for the siege of Vukovar. Moreover, only during the month of June l~~S the following other senior "Anny of ¥ugoalavia" commissioned offioers were asaigned for duty in the occupied territories of Croatia: l. colonel Slobodan 1arbuk from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Kragujevac c0rps transferred to the 39th corpe of the so•ealled "Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSX) " in Petrinja, Croatia, on 9 June l995 , 2 . Lt . Colonel Vu~eko'{it from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 11th corps of the so-called "Army of RSX" in C1:oatia on 23 June 199S. 3. Colonel UroA Oespotovi¢ from the "Army of Yugoslavia" transferred to the 70th paramilitary infantry brigade of the so-called "Army of RSK" in Plalki , Croatia, in June 1995, 4. Colonel Milivojevit !rorn the "Army of Yugoslavia". transferred to the 70th p~ramilitary infantry brigade of the ao-call•d "Army of RSK" in PlaAki, Croatia, in June 1995 . s . Lt . Colonel Miloi Cvjeti~anin from the "Army of Yugoslavia" transferred to the 2nd armoured brigade of the ao-c::alled ,.Army of RSK" in Croatia in Jun• 1995 . 6 . colonel Milorad Stupar from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Pan~evo special units corps transferred to the paramilitary special forces of the so-called "Army of i:tSK" corps in cro•tia in June 199S . · Furthermore, on 13 June 1995, two "Army of Yugoslavia" tank units totalling 26 M-94 main battle tank& op•rated by the "Army of Yugoslavia" Jllth armoured brigade, were sent from Nil, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina . and deployed in Slunj , in the occupied territories of Croatia in sector Glina. on 12 JW'le 1995, one unit of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) consisting of 10 vehiclee operated by the ''Army of Y'ugo.slavia" second motorized brigade was sent from Valjevo , Serbia , across the border with Bosnia and I . .. 1"'I' l, ll, l 1"'I' 1) O l 1 ':,'.3 5 - 1) 7 - 0 1 0 2 : 2 8 56 0:J CNZ 552 CYZ 532 PS/6 A/ 50/260 S/1995 / 518 English Page 4 Herzegovina, and deployed in the same region in Croatia, at Banovina. In addition, on l9 June 1995, the "Army of Yugoslavia" supplied equipage for two Mi-8 rotary-wing aircraft located at the Udbina airport in the occupied territories, sector Knin, through th@ territory of ·Bosnia and Herzegovina. I would also like to inform you that as at May 1995 a total of 320 Serb paramilitary troops remain in the zone of separation, in violation of the 29 March 199~ cease-fire agreement and Security Council resolution 994 (1~95 ) of 17 May 1995 . Of these, 70 are in sector "Vukovar", so in sector "Glina", and 2 00 in sector "Knin" . On 22 June 1995, two new platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the zone of separation in the vicinity of Kasie, in sector "Knin 11 , directly t.hrea.tening the civilian traffic on the Zadar-Maslenica highway, and, on 23 JW'le 1995, two additional platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in tha zone of separation near Osijek , The transfer of soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro may have contributed to a troop build-up in the zone of separ.:ition . The aforementioned facts clearly indicate that the Croatian Serb paramilitary forces are a proxy of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monc$negro)" - organized , equipped, controlled, trained and commanded by the "Army of Yugoslavia" . The government in Belgrade muat t;herefore be held fully accountable for conducting open mili tary intervention against a On1t$d Nations Member State and occupying parts of the sovereign cerritory of that State. In this regard, the Government of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) " must aleo be held account.a.ble !or grave breaches of internati onal humanitari~ law . The forcible mobilization of ethnic ser~ citizens ot the Republic of Croatia into paramilitary units which are hostile to their country of citizenship, and in which the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" are involved, represents a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, article Sl, and is a war crime (1945 London A~reementl. The blatant violation of international humanitarian law and violation of relevant united Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 988 (1995 1, by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavi~ (Serbia and Montenegro)" cannot be condoned. My Government hereby submits that the above information should be fully addressed in the upcoming Security Council review of the suspended sanctiona regime pursuant to resolution 988 (1995), The Government of Croatia i~ of th~ firm view that the above-cited developments constitute a serious breach of resolution 988 (1995), and, therefore, the suspended parts o! t he sanctions regime must be :,;einst:ic.uted without delay. The Government of Croatia is also oft.he view that the Council should consider , with utmost urgancy, and condemn in the strongest terms the most recent acts of interference by the ''Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)~ in the internal affairs of Croatia, and take appropriate measures i nt.he spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 49/43 and security Council resolutions 871 (1994 ) and 994 (1995 ). The condoning of this serious border violation and silence I ... ------1995-07-01 02:29 5603 001 CNZ 552 CYZ 532 ?6/6. A/ 50/260 S / 1995/ 518 English !?age S about Belgrade's intervention in Croatia would be a very serious set-back for the situation in the occupied territories of Croatia and for the peace process in the region in general . (Signed) Mate GRANIC 19 95-07 - 01 03:28 PAGE = :: # CYCY ++ 1995-06-19 14:49 5603 025 UN06 Tclecamm. UnH CNZ-514 CYZ-480 Pl/1 Palafs des NaHens Ot.rrGOING CODE CABLE TO: AKASHI,UNPF,ZAGREB MOST IMMEPlATE INFO: STOLTENBERG,GENEVA FROM: µNNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORX~J,,--,,,- :_,..,i:", c.,, ; :. ' ·,t; DATE: 19 June 1995 ~ i'f '1 I z 1:\ .. .,,Oc:::, NUMBER=; 2011 .D ri, ::r.: -~:,; .:.:• ·~;v ~ SUBJECT: Chief of Mission. Croatia ► ~Jo ~ o:r.zv, ~ U> 0:, We have just been advised by the Permanent ~sion of the Republic of . Korea that the new Chief 0£ Mission-designate for Croatia, Mr, Byung Suk Min, will arrive tomorrow, Tuesday 20 June for his familarization visit. He is flying from Prague at 10:50 a.m. on Cuch Airlines OK 816, arriving in Zagreb at 11:55 a.m. Please meet him at the airport and make all necessary arrangem~nts. He intends to stay till 27 Ju11e. DISTRIBUTION: -.... ?.[5...... J3JZ .. ···cyS·············1G~ .. ······· ·····-··············-······--· ·. ··f)•(;····················{zf\· I 1211:L .JL j ... INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE .. .. ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ...... Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10 Office of the Co-Chairmen CRYPfOFAX TRANSMITTAL MOST IMMEDIATE REF. GVA 6034 TO: Secretary-General PAGE 1 OF 2 COPY: Goulding/Annan/Gharekhan, New York Akashi, Zagreb FROM: Thorvald Stoltenberg DATE: 7 June 1995 SUBJECT: Meetings in Zagreb and Belgrade, 5 and 6 June 1995 1. Together with Lord Owen, I visited Zagreb and Belgrade on Monday and Tuesday, 5 and 6 June. We met with President Tudjman, Minister Sarinic, Foreign Minister Granic, Akashi, President Milosevic and Head of the ICFY Mission, General Nieminen. 2. We raised with Tudjman the possibilities for restarting the economic negotiations with the Croatian Serbs. Both he and Sarinic confirmed their acceptance of our invitation to meet with the Croatian Serbs in Geneva. They would, however, not meet with "President" Martic, who they consider responsible for the shelling of Zagreb. It is important to resume negotiations .. as soon as possible. The Croatian attacks in recent days on Mount Dinara have not impr~ved the situation. The Serbs demand that West Slavonia be under the exclusive control of the United Nations before their return to negotiations. 3. At the moment we also have problems in finding the right person for n<:'Ptiations among the Croatian Serbs. Martic is not acceptable to the Croats. Mikel'1c is still Prime Minister but without political power since he lost the vote of no confidence. The "Foreign Minister" in Mikelic's government - Babic - no longer has contact with President Milosevic because Milosevic does not trust him any more. Milosevic had obviously been double-crossed on more than just the vote of no confidence in Mikelic. Milosevic feels, however, that he has persuaded Martic to postpone the union between the R.S .K. and the R.S. I will continue consultations with the view to restart negotiations. - 2 - 4. Tudjman was upset that his -supposedly secret meeting in Slovakia with President Milosevic had been cancelled by the latter. Milosevic explained to us that his pre condition for meeting Tudjman was secrecy. This had failed. Milosevic believes the best way to improve Croat-Serb relations is for Tu 5. We will start increasing the Mission monitors from 154 to 200. Those expected to join the Mission next week are 6 Americans, 8 Russians and 4 Danes. On June 6th, Washington accepted General Nieminen's instructions to bring the Americans back to the borders. For some 24 hours, we had a _tense situation between the Mission and the US authorities. , There remain some EU countries with one monitor (Germany) or none (Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg). Lord Owen has appealed to them in a coreu to take their share. .++ CYC'i' ++ 199~-0 6-03 02:44 56 04 UNI TED NAT IO NS HQS NE W YORK CNZ 452 CYZ- 421 Pl/4 OUTCOINO CODE CABLE TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ✓ - FROM: µNNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK~~- DATE: 2 JUNE 1995 NUMBER: 1862 SUBJECT: Letter from the Foreign Minister of Croatia Please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self explanatory communication from the Foreign Minister of Croatia. we would appreciate your comments and advice. CNZ 452 CYZ 421 P2/4 REPUBLlC OF CROATIA MTNISTI<"Y OF FoRI!lGN A.FF AJRS M.iNISl'cJ<. Zagreb, 1 June 199.S B.E. Dr . .Boutros Boutros Ghali Secrct.ary Genentl UNITJ.:D NATIONS New Vork Your Excellency, At the: time of your preparation of the report on the jmplementatlon of the mandate. of rhe United Nations Confidence ~est.Oration Operation in Czo:i.tia (UNCRO), pursua.nt to resolution 994 (1995), I woukl llic.e to express th.at the Government of the Republic cf C11Rltia is seriously conc.mit!Q with the: mosl r~nt joint in.itiat:ive.s by the politir.-al leadership of the :Bosnian and Croatian Serus aimed at formi.!lg the so--called ~united Serbian Republic" that would · be compri~ of tli.c occupli!d re.rritori\:.S oft.he Republic of C!oaL1a and the territory of the Republic of Bosnia. and Herzegovina under Si:rb coat..rol. My Gov~menr ii. of the view that this poses a serious thl'eat to the pe3!:C process both in Croatia and Bosnia and Henegovina1 and serves as a threat to the pcacc and stabHity of the region us a whale. •unification" of the Serb occupied i.emtorics constitutes a blatant viol.ad.on of the 50vereignty and teniturial i.ut~grity of C~tin and Bos.nia and licn.egovina and negates the in~matioo~ community's peace initiatives which ~re based on full ~ec:1 for the tcrricorial integrity of these two Member St:1tes of the Unit~ Nations. Tlii:s "unification~ would be a direct violation of relevant Sc:.curity Council anrl General Assembly re.wlutions and would pur The Republic of Croatia in a position where it would be forced to undc.rtakc all appropriate meat'ls to defend it.S s.ovc.z:cignty and territorial integri~y. In order to prevent th.i~ situalion from dcvclopinf, UNCRO h~ to speedily implement il!i mandate by controlling those paru of Croatia'r. imernati.ooal borders which are not unde, the effe.::tive control of the of the kgir.i..rn.atc Crmtian authorities. Implcrocnt.tion of UNCRO's mandate would, rhercforc , act as ,1 deterr~nt to the"uni.fication ~. Ii, that regard, the Republic of Croatia wuuld support urgent action by _the Security Counci I aimed at preventing action~ which would l~d to an csca.lation of the conflict i.n the region . Further, ir i.~ t.he view of rne. Cro~rian GoveJnment that the issue af allevi.a ti on of the sanctions regime imposed on the »r-~eral Republic r'lf Yugoslavia (Serbia anri Montenegro)• W"ithout · '4kwg into consideration thi:: situation in Crnatia and the: role of the "FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)9 in m~n1ai.ning o state of occupation over a pan of Croat:i2n ler-ritory wou)d have :i deo-iment.il. effect r,n rhc peace process in th!:! n:giori. s~urity Council rc_solutioo 871 (1993) l 0 0 'r +.t CYC-1' ++ 1 '.3 '.35- 0 6 - 0 3 0 2: 46 56 0 4 UN ITED NATIONS HOS NEW YORK CNZ 452 CYZ 421 P3/4 placed a dir~t connection with the :sanctions regime and the role of the "FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)·• in the occupation of Croatian ~rritoty. In this rcgud, the Republic of Croatia has presented, inter ali.a, documentation on the direct involvl!mcnl of the "Anny of Yugoslavia" in the oa:upied temtori~ of Croatia (S/1995/229 ~d S/1995/401). My Governments appl"ud~ any mavcS by ~ 'Be.lgr;irlc authoritie:s by which it would distance irsd.f from the local Serb authorttics in Kniti and Pale. liowc.,.cr, we arc also of rhe view th.ar Belg-rade' s recognition of ~o~oia i\"d &!zReovma woultl nor by i~clf Je.3,d to a. change in ttii:: actual sicua.tion on the ground . Lifw,g cf sanction1 !houlci be: b.so:l on acruitl results and not on proclamalio11s. Furthemiore, any poHible lifting of ~ction~ impost:.d on the "FRY (S~bia a11d Mon~e~u)" which would not involve re.c-.olution at" the contlict in Croatia on the basis of rc.s~t for its sovereignty and territorial integrity would lcav~ th~ major problem in the reiiOn unsolved, lcavi!lg the potential for a greater conflic t in th~ future which could have rc:pex'cussiom: in the entirt: re.gion. My Government i.s concemc::d Lhat the lifting of sanctions against the "Federal Republic of Yugosla.vi.a. (Serbia and Montc:negro)" would not only eli.mlnare inlernadonal Jev~ge on tht= authorities ln Be.lgrade but would also encour-11ge the Belgrade authorities to seek the wuficat.ion of a.ll lands whieh ar¢ occupied or conrrolled by S~s. 111h would not only violate. che principle of temtorial integrity of Slates - an. unaerlying prim:.iple of the United Nations - but would al!:O Ll-ir~tt:n ~ a.Dd !itlbillty ;n the region. Please accept, your E,cc:elleocy, the assurances cf my highest consideration. Dr. Mate Gr'llnk Deputy Prime Mini.st.er aua Mirtist"r for .Forejgn Affairs 7.CO ~ I * CYCY ++ 19 13'5-0 6-0 :3 0 2: 46 56 0 4 UNITED NATIONS HOS NEW YORK I) 0 :3 P7 / 7 C-L· t~ ,;,,1_ -;-G .~-;·:< . CNZ 452 CYZ 421 c..-c.--·"' I e,__:_/ I - PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 201 East 42nd streer; Suite 3108 Tel: (212; 986-1585 New York, NY 10017 USA Fax : (212) 986-20JJ New York, 1 June 1995 H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali OF Secretary General UNITED NATIONS New York Your Excellency, I have the honour to enclose herewith the letter dated 1 June 1995 by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affaires Dr. Mate Granic, add_i-essed to your Excellency. I would kindly request your assistance in distributing chis letter and its Annex as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly under the item 92 of the Preliminary List, entitled "THE SITUATION IN' THE OCCUPIED TERRITORJES OP CROATIA", and of the Security Council. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. ++ CYCY ++ 1995- 05-25 02:56 5604 002 ~ • CNZ 421 CYZ 393 Pl/3 OUTCOINO_CODE CABLE IMMEDIATE TO: AKASHI , UNPF, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG\TfC INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA / 1J ":'; :-i c ..,: ~ ~ Lf; FROM: ~ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ~~-o-,,... (Ji (./) .,..J DATE: 24 MAY 1995 -- NUMBER: MSC- 178 9 SUBJECT: L@tter, from Permanent Representative of Croatia Attached for your attentlon,and comments,Please find a letter from Ambassador Nobllo alleging that FRY officers are on active dutv In the sectors In Croatia. -----·-···· ··············· · . =::: .-.., _. · :::,, -< N _·::.) :-:.. Ul .:.- :., .- I \J1 __... Ul CNZ 421 CYZ 393 P2/3 c.,.C \ '- (~ ~ ( ' l t...(_ C -- PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS 20/ Easr 42nd street; Su.ite 3108 Tel: (212) 986-1585 ,Vew 'r'ork. NY /0017 USA FCLT .' !212) 086-20JJ New York, 18 May 1995 . . . ~ .. -----·-· H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali Secretary General UNITED NATIONS New York Your Excellency, Following the restoration of Croatian authority in Western Slavonia region, I should like to inform you th:.il.t che law-enforcement authorities of the Republic of Croatia have discovered pa.yroll lists of officers commissioned in the "Army of Yugoslavia\ tbat have been detached on active duty to the occupied territories of Croatia. The "18. Corps" of the so-called n Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" in Okucani [Unit Identification Number 9162] has consistently forwarded its payroll lists to the General Staff of the "Army of Yugoslavia" in Belgrade. The said lists include names of 6 Colonels, 7 Lt. Colonels, 8 Majors, 13 Captains, 9 Lieutenants and more than 30 petty~fficers commissioned in che "Army of Yugoslavia", and paid by the Government in Belgnde. Among them are, for instance: Col. Lazo [Nikole] Babic [ID# 270594610887 4 ); Col. Slobodan (lgnjatija] Perie [ID# 2310944312508]; Col. Milan Uanka) Jerkic [ID# 25079477 I 0358]; Col. Branko (Stevana] Zebic [ID# 2310947500038]; Col. Djordje [Stevana] Miliksic: [ID# 109394831251ij]; Col. Milan [llije] Romie (ION 2901944740836]; Lt.Col. Borislav [Zdravka] Stijak (ID# 2401957501046]; Lt.Col. Milanko (Rade] Babic [ID# 2106955393101]; Lt.Col. Steve [Milana] Harambasic [ID~1109958120935]; Lt.Col. Ostoja [Djure] Dzambas (ID# 2208948710219]; Lt.Col. Veroljub [Branka] Smilja.nic [ID# 2105947741936]; Lt.Col. MjJan [SpasojaJ Popovic [ID# 2409949181710]; Lt.Col. Ilija [Ljubomira] Vuckovic (ID# 0107952782842); this is but a small smiple of Yugoslav commissioned officers. As expressed in my letter dated 28 March 1995 [A/ 50/ 124 - SI 1995/229], Croatia considers this as yet another confirmation uf direct involvement of the Belgrade regime in the military occupation of the Republic of Croatia, as ha.s already been established by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/43. This fact provides further evidence that the NFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" did noc fulfill its obligation to fully withdraw the "JN'A" from the Republic of Croatia. ++ CYCY 4+ 1:335-05-25 02:57 56 0 4 UNITED NATIONS HOS NEW YORK 002 F' ). CNZ 421 CYZ 393 P3/3 . 2 . I would also like to reiterate in this regard the importance of the Security Council resolution 871 (1993) chat establishes .i connection ~etween the involvement of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in the occupied territories of Cro.ttia. and the sanaions regime imposed on che "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993); and of the resolution 981 (1995) that provides for 1.:oncrol of intern:icional borders of Croatia not under control of Croatian authorities by Unic~d Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO. I would kindly request your assistance in circulating the text of the present letter ~ a document of the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly, under item 92 of che preliminary list entitled THE SITIJA TION rN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA, and of the Security Council. Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consider:ltion. ++ c·rcr ... 1 3 9 ~ - 0 S-1 6 1) 2 : 1 2 S 6 (1 4 CNZ 396 CYZ -372 Pl/7 d'cltcotNG cooe ;CABLE DlSJRIBUTlON: ·· ···f ~·•...... ?.e_ _ ·····r c ...... _. TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB A ;f~~:~::::::~::::;.~~: .. ~~,!J..l.X.;~.-:l:-,;.••• ~•••••• •••~ •••••••••••••• ..s:.:;...... I - .. ".:J O INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA / ' ··········-- ···········-z;;···· ? ~;-~ FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK DATE: 15 MAY 1995 NUMBER: MSC· 1 721 SUBJECT: Informal consultations of the security council - Draft resolution on Croatia 1. Attached please find for your attention the talklng points the representative of the secretary-General used for his briefing to the security council at Informal consultations this afternoon. Your Z-788 was very nelpful In preparing the briefing. 2. The President subsequently apprised the Council of his meeting with the Permanent Representative of Croatia, who had presented a copy of an order given by General cervenko according to which all HV troops would report to him by 17:00 local time on 16 May on the completion of their withdrawal from the zos. Ambassador Nobile promised that as of tomorrow, there would be no longer a need to place the subject of Croatia on the agenda of the council. 3. 1n light of the fact that the Croatian Army had not complied with the deadline contained in the statement of 14 May made by Foreign Minister Granic, which had led tt1e contact Group to postpone tabling a resolutlon, Germany, as co-ordinator of the contact Group this month, Introduced the attact1ed resolution on Croatia. Germany pointed out ... LILT ... 19 '.35-0 5- 16 0 2: 1:] 56 0 4 UNIT ED NATIONS HOS NEW YOPK CNZ 396 CYZ 372 P2/7 _ that para 11 of the draft had been overtaken by events, but that it was the intention to take action on the draft snould Croatia not comply on the zos by tomorrow afternoon local time. we would tnerefore appreciate your providing a further status update on the situation In the . ' zos in sectors East, North and south, as well as of the overall situation In sector west by 8:30 a.m. New Yori< time tomorrow, 16 May. The counc11 will consider the matter at about noon our time tomorrow (18:00 Ln. A last-minute update to cover the 17:00 deadline offered by General cercenko should therefore be provided by telephone. 4. The Russian Federation again inquired about the situation In the Posavina corridor, In particular whether there has been cross boroer shelling by the HV. we would appreciate your updating your 2-787 In this regard. Moreover, Ambassador Lavrov requested that UNCRO verify whether the local HV Commander In Osijek had stated the cease-fire agreement of 29 March was no longer valid; and whether there had been any obstructions by the Croatian authorities to United Nations efforts to monitor the human rights situation In sector west. concerning Bosnia he Inquired whether UNPROFOR had reports of cross-border shelling by the BiH from Bihac Into the area of Ornica in sector North in Croatia. s. Argentina Inquired whether any of the equipment stolen during the offensive In sector west had been returned. Ambassador Cardenas appears to be particularly interested in the status of the Nepalese equipment. Your Z-791 was not specific enough for an immediate response to this query. (It also omitted the question of the personal belongings of the Nepalese soldiersJ 6. we would appreciate receiving your response to the above queries by 8:30 a.m. New York time tomorrow...... L.,::...,· ..... J '.J '.~ 5- () 5 - 1 6 1:1 ~ : : -+ 5 6 I) 4 (t (! 2 CNZ 396 CYZ 372 P3 / 7 Note to Mr. Charekhan 15 May 1995 Croatia As of 18:00 hours local time, Croatian Army units of varying size have remained In the zones of separation In sectors East, North and south. There have been some encouraging signs of withdrawal from positions In the northern half of sector soutn, prlmarllv in the area of responsibllity of the Czech battalion. Tne details by sectors are as follows: sector East: There has been little meaningful withdrawal by tne Croatian Army The reported Serb incursions Into the zone of separation in the nortn of sector south t1ave been Investigated by UNCRO. UNCRO reports that this has been limited to small reconnaissance patrols seeking confirmation of HV withdrawal movement. No positions vacated by the Croatian Army have been occupied by the Serbs as wrongly reported In the media . -'I+ CYCY -'I+ 1995- 05 -16 02:15 5604 UNIT ED NATIONS HQS NE W YORK CNZ 396 CYZ 372 F4/7 The Chief of Staff of the Croatian armed forces has today advised UNCRO that he had ordered the withdrawal of his forces from the zones of separation to be completed by 1730 hours tomorrow, 16 May. In view of the failure by the Croatian Army to fulfil the earller undertaking given by the Foreign Minister, UNCRO w111 monitor the situation closely and keep the council Informed. · UNCRO has access to most OPs In the three sectors, except one in Sector south which had to be vacated by tne Czech battalion because of the proximity of HV troops. Freedom of movement In sector west has been largely restored, except In the area of Pa1 CNZ 396 :Yz 372 PS / 7 Bosnia and Herzegovina The situation in most areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina was relatively calm, except for Sarajevo and the Posavlna corridor. · In saraJevo, there were some 1300 firing Incidents and some 70 explosions. Four civlllans were Injured by small arms fire. The airport was open and four UNPROFOR but no UNHCR aircraft landed. In the Posavina corridor, some 1,700 explosions were recorded yesterday, There are reports of a renewed BSA attack on the orasje pocket whicn Is netd by the HVO. Bosnian Croat forces again fired rockets Into the town of src1<0. The BSA not only shelled the Orasje pocket, but also fired across the border Into the town of RaJevo Sele north west of Brcko close to the border. CNZ 396 CYZ 372 P6 / 7 May 15. 1995 .J 00 pm DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CROATIA The Security Council. Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in panicular resolutions 981 (199S) of 31 March 1995, 982 (1995) of 31 March 199S and 990 (1995) of28 April 1995, Deeply concerned that the objectives set out in the statements of the President of the Security Council of l May 1995 (S/PRST/1995/23) and of 4 May 1995 (S/PRST/1995/26) have not been implemented in aU their aspects and that the agreement reached by the panies on 8 May 1995 through the mediation of the Uruted Nations Protection Force (UNPF) have not been fully respected, in particular regarding the withdrawal of forces from the zones of separation, Emphasizing the necessity for fuU compliance by the parties v.,ith the Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367), and stressing the importance of such compliance for the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia known as UNCRO, Emphasizing further that wi thdrawal from the zones of separation 1s a necessary condition for the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO, Affirming its comrrutment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognized borders and stressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and in this context welcoming international efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia, in panicular those of the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States of America., Emphasizing that full observance of human rights, including appropriate international monitoring thereof, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence between the parties and building a durable peace, Condemninj in the strongest tenns unacceptable acts directed at the personnel of the United Nations peace-keeping forces and getermin~ to obtain strict respect of the status of such personnel in the Republic of Croatia. Reaffirmin_g its detennination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of United Nations peace-keeping operations in the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Chaner of the United Nations, 1. Reaffirms the statements of the President of the Security Council of 1 May I 995 and 4 May l 995 issued as a result of the military offensive launched by the forces of the +t CYCY +t 13 35-0 5- 16 0 2 : I:::: UNIT ED NATIONS hQS NE~ (OPK 2 CNZ 396 CYZ 372 P7/7 Government of Croatia in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West on I May 1995 in violation of the Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994; · 2. Demands that the parties, as required in the above-mentioned Statements, complete without further delay the withdrawal of their troops from the zones of separation and refrain from any fun her violations of those zones; 3. Stresses the importance it attaches to the early reestablishment of the authority of UNCRO in accordance Wlth its mandate; 4. ~quests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in order to ensure full deployment of UNCRO, after the withdrawal of the troops of the panies, as provided for in its mandate established by resolutions 981 ( 1995) and 990 ( I 99S ); 5 Demands that rhe status and the mandate of UNCRO as well as the safety and security of its personnel be respected; 6. Demands also that the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights of the Serb population including their freedom of movement and allow access to this population by international humanitarian organizations, in conformity with internationally recognized standards; 7. Reguests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross and orher relevant international humanitarian institutions, to assess the humanitarian situation of the local Serb population in sector West and to report thereon as soon as possible, 8 Fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to achieve the obje<:tives outlined in the statements of the President on the Security Council of I May 1995 and of 4 May 1995 and reg_uests the parties to cooperate fuUy to this end~ 9. Calls upQn the parties to respect the Economic Agreement signed by them on 2 December l 994 (S/1994/13 75) and in particular to take aJI necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of rhe Zagreb-Belgrade Highway and its immediate environs as provided for in that Agreement; _t."-;..v[ l O Expresses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of the Republic ou7 11• ,,...,.,w ... v.i Croatia to conclude an agreement on the status of forces and otber persoMel with the United t,.-A, Nations, and stre~ the importance it anaches to the conclusion of such an agreement without funher delay~ I I Demands that the parties refrain from any funher military measures or actions that could lead to the escalation of the situation and Y!'.~ that in the event of failure to comply with this demand it will consider further steps needed to ensure such compliance; 12 Reguests the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration within two weeks on the implementation of the provisions of trus resolution, including on the modalities for the implementation of the mandate ofUNCRO in Sect0r West~ 13 Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. +fr C Y C Y +fr t'.3 '35-1) 5- 1:3 1) 2 : 0 6 5 6 0 4 UNITED NAT IONS HO S NE W YO F< ... .' CNZ 393 CYZ 369 ?l/6 OUTGOINO CODE CABLE IMM~DIATE ·95 II;~l:,\,'! 13 -3 :o TO: AKA.SH!, UNPF, ZAGREB INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GEjAf;i FROM: / ANNAN, UNATIONS I NEW y K • ' 1 •, I :~, □ \.) DATE:: 12 MAY 1995 , ' T'" z :_._ . . .., NUMBER: . •• , •.:> ,:::, :i:, ;:r. (fl SUBJECT: (/') l, As mentioned in my 1675, yesterday afternoon I met at their request with the Permanent Representatives of Contact Group Countries plus Italy. I conveyed your view that there was a gap between the public and official pronouncements made by t he Croatian authorities and their actual implementation. Hence, further Council support would be helpful in order to obtai~ a change in the Croatian attitude towards UNPROFOR. 2. General Baril, reporting his conversation with the Theatre Force Commander of that day, explained that given the lack of the Croatian cooperation and the continued tension in the area, all 14 battalions were largely confined to their positions and were unable to begin the implementation of SCRs 981 and 990. 3. In addition to describing the present, slightly improved situation in Sector West, I emphasized that without an immediate withdrawal of the HV troops from the ZOS in the other Sectors the situation might rapidly deteriorate to the point were the "common ground 11 reported by Stoltenberg as the basis for UNCRO's ability to implement SCR 981 would no longer exist. While at this point, it did not seem to be the intention of the Knin leadership to take drastic retaliatory action , their attitude might soon change if the situation of Serbs in Sector West was not resolved and i f the HV troops did not wi thdraw from the ZOS in Sectors East , North and South without delay. ++ C-r' C r' ++ 1 :3 :3 s - 0 5- l :J 1) 2 : I) T 5 60 4 UNITED NAT IO NS HOS NE W YC F< CNZ 393 CYZ 369 P2/6 3. Germany emphasized the need to ensure that positions vacated by the HV were not subsequently taken by the "AR.SK". It was explained to them that the "ARSK" had largely honoured the.::.r commitments under the cease•fire agreement and that it was mainly the HV troops who had not only intruded into the ZOS, but in an unacceptable manner occupied UNCRO observation posts. Should this situation prevail, UNCRO would lose its credibility and thus its ability to implement SCRs 981 and 990. 4. Following the meeting, the Contact Group decided to proceed with the drarting of a resolution. Attached please find the latest version which emanated from a lengthy drafting session this afternoon. In light of the attached statement of Dr. Grani~ of today, which was reportedly underscored by assurances from President Tudjman himself that withdrawal from the ZOS in all Sectors would start immediately, the United States and Germany participated in the drafting exercise only on the condition that no action would be taken before Monday, i.e. to give the Croatian Army time to implement the Government ' s promises. 5. We will inevitably have to certify on Monday as to whe~her the Croatian Army indeed has left the ZOS in all Sectors. We would appreciate, therefore, your providing a comprehensive assessment of the situation by 8:30 a.m. New York time on Monday, 15 May. ++ Cr'C r ++ 1 '.3 :3 5 - 0 5 - l J 1) 2 : 1) ::: 5 6 0 4 I) (1 ~ CNZ 393 CYZ 369 P3/6 May 12, 1995 7 00 pm DRAFT RESOLllIION ON CROATIA The Security Council. R!;!calling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in panicular resolutions 981 ( 1995) of 31 March 1995, 982 ( 1995) of 31 March I 995 and 990 ( 1995) of 28 April 1995, Deeply concerned that the objectives set out in the statements of the President of the Security Council of l May 1995 (S/PRST/ 1995/23) and of 4 May 1995 (S/PRST/1995/26) have not been implemented ia aH their aspects and that the agreement re.ached by the parties on 8 May 1995 through the mediation of the Uruted Nations Protection Force (UNPF) have not been fully respected, in particular regarding the withdrawaJ of forces from the zones of separation, Emphasizing the necessity for fulJ compliance by the parties with the Cease.Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367), and stressin_g the importance of such compliance for the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia known as UNCRO, Emphasi.zjns further that withdrawal from the zones of separation is a necessary condition for thr implementation of the mandate ofUNCRO, [Bearing in mind reports of VlOlations of arms embargo in the Republic of Croatia. J Affi.rmjna its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the fonner Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territoriaJ integrity of all the States there within their internationally recognized borders and stressing the importance it attaches to the murual recognition thereof, and in trus context welcoming international efforts to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia, in particular those of the European Union. the Russian Federation and the United States of America. Emphasizing that full observance of human rights, including appropriate international monitoring th~f, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence between the parties and building a durable peace, Condemning in the strongest tenns unacceptable acts directed at the personnel of the United Nations peace-keeping forces and determined to obtain strict respect of the status of such personnel in the Republic of Croatia, Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of tbe personnel of United Nations peace-keeping operations in the territory of the former YugoslaV1~ and, to these ends 1 acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, .++ c r· c r· .++ 13 :3 5- 0 5- 1 :3 0 2 : 0 :3 56 0 4 UNITED NA T IONS HOS NE W YOR K f) ( .1 2 CNZ 393 CYZ 369 P4 / 6 Reaffinns the statements of the President of the Security Council of l May 1995 and 4 May 1995 issued as a result of the military offensive launched by the forces of the Government of Croatia in the area of Western Slavonia known as sector West on I May l 995 in Vlolation of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 March 1994; 2. Demands that the parties withdraw their troops from the zones of separation [in sectors North, South and East] and refrain from further violations of those zones; l Stresses the importance it attaches to the early reestablishment of the authority of UNCRO in accordance with its mandate~ 4. Reguests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in order to ensure fuU deployment of UNCRO, after the withdrawaJ of the troops of the parties, as provided for in its mandate established by resolutions 981 ( 1995) and 990 ( 1995); S Demand~ that all parties [and in particular the Government of the Republic of Croatia] respect the status and the mandate of UNCRO as well as the safety and security of its personnel; 6. Demands also that the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights of the Serb population including their freedom of movemem and aUow access to this population by international humanitarian organizations, in confonnity with internationally recognized stanadards~ 7. Requests tlle Secretary-GeneraJ, in cooperation with rhe United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant international humanitarian institutions, to assess the humanitarian situation of the locaJ Serb population in sector West and to report thereon as soon as possible; 8 Fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to achieve the objectives outlined in the statements of the President on the Security Council of I May 1995 and of 4 May 1995 and requests the parties to cooperate fully to this eod~ 9. Calls upon the panies to respect the Economic Agreement signed by them on 2 December 1994 ($/1994/137S) and in particular to ta.lee all isecessary steps to ensure the safety and security of the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway and its immediate environs as provided for in that Agreement; · [ 10. Underlines the need for a!I Member States to cooperate fully with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 ( t 991) and the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM) in strict observance of the mandatory arms embargo established by resolution 713 ( 1991) of 25 September 1991, in particular regarding the Republic of Croatia~] 11 . Ex~resses its grave concern at the failure of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to conclude an agreement on the status of forces and other personnel with the United Nations, and stresses the imponance it attaches to the conclusion of such an agreement \.Vithout funher delay; ++ CYCY ++ 1~3 135-0 5-13 0 2 : 10 5604 UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK (11) 2 CNZ 393 CYZ 369 PS /6 12. Demands that the panies refrain fi-om any further military measures or actions thar could lead to the escalation of the situation and expresses its readiness in the event of failure to comply with th.is demand to consider measures to ensure such compliance, 13 . Requests the Secretary•General to report to the Council within two weeks on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution, including on the modaJities for the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO in ~ecror West; 14 . Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. ,------~-- - ++ CYC': ++ 1 '3'.35 - 1)5 - 1 J I) ~: 11 UN I TED NAT I m~s HDS ~~E [.. .J (C'RK " r) Oc CNZ 393 CYZ 369 ?6/6 RalvJLJC OP CJlOATIA MlNISTlY OP FOll!ON AFFAinS MlNLS'l'O s1111,mwb1 D•l"'O' Prum Mfnwr .,,. Fortl,rs Mtnwr Dr. Mlll1 Grate /,1111 ]J., 1194 ' . Ic. order to nren(then tll1 stabRfty and; aec"Urlty .in th• 11,;cn ud. Ul facilitate mtenutior&.alpeaukeept4i eff01'11 ol1 tta tem~. the Republic of CJ'oat11 ii underta.mr th• tollowm, l%1C..U:U: : ~., 1, The unitl of the O-c1tia.a. Army h•"'• withdmvn from tlse r•aioii of Wotaru Slavollll,, ca.-e~t &am anu alaq th, iiit.am.a.tie,1a.1 bOTdar with the R.epublie of B01t1i& ~d H&t%eCovina. 'ne Crcatian Polfc. in Wc1tcm Sla-0:n.ia it perlor:JJ.Di itl r•culu d.utie1 and ii ud.ttmi otha rel•vant State IU tharit1ea in the proces.a of pea.:eful rcmtqratfan cf tlm r•1io.11 with the: rcai of the counuy, Th~ reltvGt i:11~~•1 orga.n£zadont, a.nd m. particular mcmben at the Uutto,;l l'J•ti,Q~ Co~celle,nondon OperaU.Ouin Croatia, or U'NCJ.O, ~ =Jcy1:1udi,turbod acca1 ud. tJ-..dom ot mov~nt in ·111• area. Th• Croat:an Amy unita are lti the procasa c,t Withdrawal from the Zeme at Soparaticm m •~r K:lm, (toz:m.-,ly South). All umts will oompleie mait whhdrlwal 'by Sunday, J 4 Ma,-. Th• Czoatian G~.rmnent h u alr••dr uncianaJwi rnm1ar •tAF• in MC.tar Glina (fczmATly North) ud 1Kt0f Eutern SllYCllit. (fcrmarly Ea1t) and will finish with witlid:rawal in a rea.tonable tbna, The Cro&twi Army had uNmed poait:10:a.1 bi these! 1cc:um u a prawauve mcuure to prote~t major cMJiu, cctan. · · 3. Tha OOCJernmeut of tA6 'Republic o!. Croatia in t.eopant:icn ~th UNCRO Civil Att~ua $eQtor ii &l.alb:l'Tll the S~?U~ of Farce Agrccmczit (SOFA), Qd qpecu to sip It b}' Mond&y, 1, May, , · · . • · Mr. Hrvoje !alini~ Head ol th• State Commi&lfon to: P.elattOlll with UNCRO is iD a ecmfiououa ccm.tact with Mr. Yuuahi A.kuhi. apacial r~rNca.tauva of S6CnWf O•nerat, r~ard.iAg implam.-ntauo1:1. ol the sl~entiOAed taab. Craatia welcomu &n active role of th, inte:rn.U0n11.J communi'ty in achicvjns 1mbility in tbe reJion and In this resud i, ready tQ cciapua.t.a fully with the Unhed Natfona and other Hlt.YU.t Dl~ ational wtfmti.CD&. Or. flMat• G / +t' C Y C Y +t' 1995-04-28 0 2=31 56 04 UNIT ED NATIONS HOS NEW YORK C'-f- Z 3l'j OUTGOING CODE CABLE IMMEDIATE ~ TO: AKASIB, UNPF, ZAGREB ATTN. SRSG!TFC INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA,... FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK DATE: April 27, 199S NUMBER: 1410 - N ... 0 SUBJECT: Visit of Foreign Minister of Japan Please find attached for your urgent attention a fax received in our office at 4:52 pm today from the Permanent Mission of Japan. Q\STR\'BU1\0N :_ ---- ~----J:1·································· IJ) I''-. ················ ...... ------···················· · P·c:·············· · ·: ::·1··········································· ···· ······· +tr C YC Y +tr 199 5-04- 28 0 2:35 56 04 u ~~ I TED NAT I m~s HOS ~~ E L,J YOR K 0 ( 1.: • ?1Ss,u.lrll:NT MJt11.lC>2' 01' J.u-.a..M SC/95/1 76 TO TH'& t::ntZ'D ~A1'tON!5 ~aw YoRK 27 April 1995 Oear Mr. Schmitz, I would li ke to inform you of a scheduled vi sit to Zagreb and Republic of Croatia by the Foreign Minister of japan, Mr. Yohei Kono, ano1her officer of the Foreign Mlni5tJ"Y, and wo\lld appre~!ate your issis1ance in fac ilitating their vi5it, Their Itinerary is as follows: ~itors Mr. Yohei Kono Foreign Minister of )apart Mr. Tuyoshi Kurokawi Ambas~dor of Japan to Austria itinerary Arrive Zagreb 28 Apri l Vliit to L NPF (Meetina witn Mr . Yasushi Akashi, Spe,ial Representative 29 Apri l of the SG and other officialsJ Visit to Refugee Camp, under the Jordanne unit in the Wtst Sector et UNPA 30 >\prll Leave Zagreb Thant< you for your assist.net and cooperation in :his matter. Sincerely yours, ~LtJ,f-,___ __ -- Norlteru Fukushima First Secretary Mr . Peter Schmitz Political officer OPKO United Nations, FAX#~63-9l Z2 +tr CYCY +tr 199 5-04 - 0 7 01 :5 8 5604 UNITED NAT IONS HOS NEW YOR K CNZ 258 CYZ 248 ; ' - ·. (' __ : :~-- . , , ._ • . '. .,_ ; Vi, U 1 OtITGOING CODE CABLE ·95 A?~ - 7 -4 :21 TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG & FC '--' INFO: STOLTENBERG, GEN_!YAIZAGREB j) I FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK , . (7 / DATE: 6 APRIL 1995 lJ -P. NUMBER: 1088 (.J"\ C) SUBJECT: Letter from Martic Thank you for sending us Martie's letter in your Z-546. Its contents, taken together with today's demonstrations in Knin .1g:1u1st UNCRO, make dismaying reading, It would be helpful if you would help us interpret it. How seriously should we take the demands it contains? .++ CYCY .++ 1'3 '35-;- 0 4-1)7 0 1: S :3 5 6 0 4 . I REPUBLIC OF SERB KRAJJNA PRESIDENT A TfN.: Mr Y1Uu.thi Akuhi SRSG :for the Former Yugoslavia ' Excellency, In fight of the Security Council Re.solution 981 of March 31 1 1995 1nd feeliag fnnkly di.upp.-,inted, I hav~ to dr.iw your .attention ro the fact that the R~olution iJ uoprincipled, biased rnd un:icceptable. Rt!5ofudon 981 h111.S ch,Jlcnged thf effective norms of l!ltt>rnationa.l bw, adYt)dted the it1terests of Rtpubbc of Cro.ui., :ind slighrcd lhose of Republic of ~rb Kraji.a.a. 1'hc Security Cou nci! ought to sliow is much respect fer RSK u it do~s for Rtpublic of Croatia because these rwo countrie.s h.1ve emerged from the bre2k-up o{ former Yugoslavia. No Uf:'1mcnl can be used co bestow the right to • int~ on Crou~ and deny it to th, Strbs. I Republic of Croui.a. has ~een 1nvokicg only it,i; intematic.inal recognjtion ,-,,Jiich is utterly groundless hcc.iusc ic ~cas Republic of Serb K.rijin~ in no wzy, CroatJ never con.scirutcd a,1 ethnic majotiry in Knjina 2nd Croatia nevef; e'ltercised powtr over its territory either. This ii why the intern,ation:tl recognition c:an ·ocly b, valid for che ::11reu in which Cro~t, are the f'thr,ic mijority md "'here their power exins. We undentuid such I recommcnda.dons wer~ also prtse"ted in the plan of Badinter Arbitl"i\rion Commission of 1991. I I -· I Funhermor~, 1 hjvf to ,dvise you that Chapter 6 of the'UN Charttr provides the existence of internationally unrecognized countries which l5 wbt we rt"qutn that Republic ol Serb Kr1jin2 be treated in tht sa.mt spirit. 1 ExceJlency, i I As • Special R~prestntarive of the Secrttary•Gener.1~ yoJ tre expte~ed to ,l)redsdy convey the position of RSK ,nd employ your influence to-.hrd$ mu.inc the United Nations consider histor;c (.icu md c.irC'\lrort11\ccs in thl! Serb.Croft dispute and obser\'e the .standuds o( intcrn:itiom.l law. _ ++ CY CY ++ UNIT ED NATIO NS HOS NE W YORK 001 1 '39'i n4 n, 02: 00 5 604 " ,.., [- - , CNZ 258 CY Z 248 P3 / 3 C.2Jll- -'?>i i I' C Z~-1'.3. 1 • 2 • ~)3 L~kewis.e1 ple2se considtr seriously our vi~ws below and Qdvise che ri:speaive UN beadqua.rters io R~public of St"rb Knjina of the following: · I. All UN p~•c:e-kceptrs deployed on RSK bor&n with Srpskil and Pederial Repubuc of Yug~lavia are to refrain from ac:tivities involving any kind of coatrol and rerulacion ol tnffic: ac c~~ border crossinp, 1 I 2. As soon ;u possibJt, the UN .~hould start negod~tions with Republic of Serb Krajina on rhe -NithdrawaJ of UN troopi from the border cros1ing1 1 b«a.use RSK js having no probl~ms either with Srpska or FR. Yugo,I1vi::i wh.ich mjght require chair deployment there. 3. The UN should witho1.1t delay pay all outstanding costs !or their u1.e u! vuiou.s facilitic-s (b:1.tracks a.nd oth~r), r~ids and utilities in KnjinA wb.ich, I under.Hmd, are I du!;: paid in Croaria. Otherwise, you will no longer be abfe co use the f.cilitits and I 5c:rvsi:ea. I I I I Yours sincerely, Milan Mutic Ij I Pte5idesu o{ the Republic I SSN - 794 G ' ..:. , ·. ::j U N P J • ~.- co M t..,, L: :\1 .- ' ':. 1 : J ;,.J s OUTGOING CODE CABLE CZN - 530 Q,¢<;" CZG - 427 '9'5 APR -6 16 :37 IMMEDIATE Page 1 of 1 TO ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK INFO STOLTENBERG.ZAGREB FROM (YANVIER, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB ~ ?iGc16-. DATE 6 APRJL 1995 ::::, -c::i .__ __ -- :::0 NUMBER Z- 542 I C'\ FILE 2020 C'\ ! ~ SUBJECT ALLEGED PRESENCE OF JA OFFICER IN CROATIA vJ Reference: UNNY MSC-1040 dated 3 Apr 95. 1. Thank you for the Reference concerning the letter from Ambassador Dr Mario Nobilo to the Secretary General of the United Nations making allegations that there are JA officers in Croatia. 2. We are unable to confirm ur deny the allegations as we db not have access to the level of information needed to make any comment. We are able:to state, from open press statements and personal admissions that a considerab)e proportion of ex JNA officers are now serving not only in the ranks of the ''ARSK'' but also in the .Croatian Armed Forces , As to any links with the AJ , we can only reiterate that we have no evidence to support the allegations made by Ambassador Dr Nobilo. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG,FC,DFC,COS ++ CYC Y ++ 13'3 5-04- 0 4 1) 2: 2 1 56 03 CNZ 244 CYZ 239 Pl/4 OUTGOING CODE CABLE '9,..J r~'."''."..r r. - 4 -4 :38 TO: A.KASH!, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG \ FC INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ·- DATE: 3 APRIL 1995 . ' NUMBER: Msc-1040 ,,_ SUBJECT: Alleged presence of JA officers in Croatia Please find attached for your attention and comments a letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia on the above subject. ++ CYCY ++ 1995-0 4-0 4 02 :2 2 5603 .... illl '· C,L,,\C.-v . ; ,...-, CNZ 244 CYZ 239 P2/4 ~•·'-'· .. PERMANE~T l\-lISSI0N OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE UNriED ~ATI0NS ~hl 201 East 42nd strut: Suitt 3108 ,~ Tel: (2J2J 986./585 ,, Ne.,..· i'ork . .VY /00!7 USA I Fa.r: 1211) 986-2011 . New York. 28 March 1995 H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali Secretary General UNITED NATIONS New York Your Excellency, I should like to draw your attention to the enclosed list of 51 former officers of the "Yugoslav People 's Acrny • JN A", presently 1;:ommissioned into the '' Army of Yugosl2via", who have been detached on 21.-i:ive duty to the occupied territories of Croatia. They continue to be compensated for rheir services b:: the Government of rhe "Feder.al Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" . In addicion to the highest ranked profession.al officers listed in .the Annex, there are approxim.acely 6000 other officers and petty-officers comm.issioned in the "Army of Yugoslavia" who Jre deuched to rhe Gener2l Headquarters of the "Serbian Army of K.njina" and other paramilicary units on rhe occupied rerricories of Croatia; of these, there are an addicional 30 Colonc:1s, 170 Lt.Colonels ~d 150 Majors. This is yet another confirmation of direct involvement of the Belgrade regime in the miliury occupation of che Republic of Croitii, ~ alrc:ady esublished 6~· rhe Gener2l A5sembly in its resolution 49/ 43, and provides further evidence that the "Federal Republic: of Yugoslavia (Serbi, and Montenegro)" did not fulfill its obligation to fully withdraw the "JNA • from Croatia. ln this regard I should also like ro dnw your attention to Securitv Council resolution 871 (1993) ch2t establishes a clear connection between the immediate demiliuriz.ation of the occupied territories and the involvement of the "Federal Republic of Yugosl:avia (Serbia and Montenegro)" co the sanctions regime imposed on the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia .rnd Moncenegro)" in reso!ucions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993). 1 would kindly request your assistance in circulating the text of the present letter md its Annex as a document of the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly, under item 92 of the preliminary lisr entitled THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROA11.A, and . of rhe Secumy Council. Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. * C Y C Y * 1 '.3'?5-0 4-0 4 0 2: 2 6 5 6 0 :3 (11) .:! > .- ..,. ·- r ,:-'.__ CNZ 244 CYZ 239 P3/4 LIST OF COMMISSI0NF.D OFFICERS OF "ARMY OF YUGOSUVIA" PERF0R.1\1ING SEM0R DtrrlES IN nm SERBIAN PARAMILITARY UNITS ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA 1. Major-General Mile Novakovic "National Security AdviserN to the "President" of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF IliI "SER.JUAN ARMY OF KRAfINA" 1. Lieuten.1nt-Gencral ~·f ilan--Celeketic Commander .,... . Major-General : Dusan Loncar' Chief-of-Scaff 3. Major-General -Mirli_Q_ sjda.nevic Deputy-Chief-of-Staff 4. Colonel Milan La.lie Assistant-Chief-of-Staff 5. Colonel Marinko Gajic Auistant-Chief-of-Staff 6. Colonel Savo Draskovic Chief Inspector 7. Colonel Vuk Obradovic Chief of Incellige11~ Service 8. Colonel Mtlan Sk.rleu Commander of Special U niu 9. Colonel Nedjeljko Bubalo Commander of Air Force 11Il:i fASilRN-SLb VQN!A.'1 ~QB.fS... . ____ 1. Major-General Dusan Loncu Commander 2. Colonel Srojm Spanovic Chief-of-Staff .3. Colonel Milojko Radakovic Assistant-Chief--0f-Staff 4. Colonel Dus~ Groz.danic Assistant-Chief-of-Staff 5. Colonel Kosta N ovakovic Assistant•Chief-of-Suff ..6 . Colonel Vcjislav Stojkovic Assisunt-Cbief-of-Staff I . Colonel Sr.2.nko Cuk Assistant-Chief-of-Sta.ff 8, Colonel Dusan Grahovac Chief of InteUigence Semce 9. Colonel Stoi.i.n Mladenovic Commander of "Baranja Brig2dc" 10. Colonel Rajko Novakovic Chief-of-Scaff of ''Ba.ranja Brigade " 1811-I WESJER.N-SLAVONIA CORPS 1. Colonel Lazo Babic Commander 2. Colonel Slobodan Perie Chief-of-Scaff 3. Colonel Ojoko Milisic Comm:mder of Artillery 4. Lt.Colonel Milan Jerkic As$istant-Chief-of-Staff 5. Lt.Colonel Ljubinko Ka.tic Asmrant-Chief.-of•Staff ++ C YCY ++ 13'35-0 4-0 4 02 : 27 5 603 ... CNZ 244 CYZ 239 P4/4~ 39rn BANTJA CORPS l. Colonel Zuko Gacic Commander 2. Colonel Milan Radmanovic Executive Officer 3. Lt.Colonel Milan Janjanin Chief of Counter-Intelligence Service 4. Le.Colonel Djoko MiJjkovic Chief of Intelligence 5. Lt.Colonel Milan Krkovic Sector Commander 6. Le.Colonel Mirko Martic In,elligence Officer 2 lSI KoRDUN CORPS 1. Colonel Veljko Bosan2c Commander 2. Colonel Cedo Radovanovic Deputy Commander ), Colonel Ljuban Ivkovic Chief-of-Staff 4. Colone! Savo Mrkonjic Assistant-Ch.ief-of-Staff 5. Colonel Dragan Kovacic Commander of 11th Brigade 6. Lt.Colonel Milos Gvozdenovic Chief of Intelligence 7. Lt.Colonel Ljubom.ir Vorkapic Al.sistant..Chief-of.Staff 15JJi WU CORPS 1. Colonel Scevo Sevo Commander 2. Colonel Djoko Djakovic Chief-of-Scaff 3. Colonel Sttv.in Mirkovic Commander of Anit-AircrafDefence . 4. Colonel Nikola Rakovic Chief of Finance Sector 5. Colonel Ilija Obradovic Chief of Communications 6. Colonel Milivojtvic Deputy Commander 7. Colonel Peur Vidakovic Assistant-Chief-of-Sta.ff 8. Lt.Colonel Nikol;1 Suput Chief of Intelligence 9. Lt.Colonel Slavko Studcn Assistant-Chief-of-Staff 7J1i !(NW CQRPS 1. Colonel Veso Kozoman. Commander 2. Colonel Tihom.ir Alavanja Chief-of-Scaff 3. Colonel Ilija Mijatov Chief of Inform~tion Sector 4. Colonel Marko \' rcelj Assistant-Chief-of-Staff l 9 '3 S - 0 4 - 1) 4 (.1 J : 2 T PAGE = -- (I ! : · , J , , ·• .· cz,.tjZ- 11w·- ; ' J ' ' •J OUTGOING CODE CABLE u r. ~ r ?C..:; 3Cf,q_J ~ 95 M,,,:; 28 i 9 :o@"IOST ™MEDIATE CO'~.f"'/ Page t o; ~ OISTRIBYJION: 'Qt=', ~ - ,~ee:: 28 \ 7 '.\ J ·t;.;-2...... A~1NAN, UNA TJONS, NEW YORK ,,_, . . c;.~IJ;:, -;-z / ··ft;··············JNFO············ STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ·_·t:J:>_ ...... f ROM...... : (JANVIER, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB :R~._6k_v ,,k__.S . ······························· •· · D.ATE...... 'i;1i(.5..<:. .... 28 March 1995 OODE RESTRICTED NUMBER MOST IMMEDL~.TE FILE 1648t SUBJECT MEETING WITH GENERAL BOBETKO - HY ARMY COMMANDER I 1. Due to the continued tension in Sector South and in particular HV activity in the I Zon~ of Separation and an:incident on 19 March 1995 wf1ere the Commander Sector I I I South was engaged with small arms fire, a meeting was held at tl,le HY Defence HQ with General Bobetko, the HY Army Commander, on 24 March 1995. . ! -, The meeting was convened at the request of Commander Croatia Command, UNPROFOR. The media :were present and filml!d the arrival and introductions with the IIV officers. Tue media also interviewed Commander Croatia Command and General Bobetko at the end of the meeting. Present for the HV were; General Janko Bobetko, his military secretary Colonel ;Godan Cacic, the COS to the N1ND 1 Brigadier General Budimir Plestina and ;mother Brigadier who was .. not identified. Major General Rodan, Colonel Pettis and Ms Naucler represented HQ Croatia Command. The setting and the conduct of the meeting was very formal. ' i 3. After introductory comments, Major General Rodan addressed four major issues; i I the significant increase in !HY intrusions into the Zone of Separation by large groups of I soldiers (platoon sized and greater), m1 increase in the restrictions on movement of lJNPROFO.H personnd1 the attitude of Commander OZ Split and the recent attack on Commander Sector South; 4. None of our concerns were answered directly . General Bobetko replied with his own list of alleg~d ARSKl transgression~. Principal among these was the ongoing use of Ubdina airfield and the presence of 4 Gakb and 4 MiG armed 'aircraft which were conducting airborne exercises. He continued with; the shelling of Dubrovnik airfield, the move of a mechanised battalion out of Benkovac (ARSK), rocket units cntel'ing Sector t-:ast and ARSK use of UN OPs . T!1 reply it was made clear that UNPROFOR had no infonnntion regarding I )ubrovnik, the move of a mechunizcd battalion at Benkovac nor rockets entering Sector East. Concerning llbdina airfield, it was pron,iseu that UNPROfOR would continue to monitor the area very closely. General Bobetko was then reminded that the purpose of this meeting wa~ to discuss problems concerning HV 1c1.ivity. H1:. made only a. cursory a.greemenL lo speak to his Commanders about better co operation v.ith UNPROFOR . INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COi\-lD CC, COS 13 9 5-03 - 28 _~--='-=--c---'"'---'-'"'--'-- 11:2 3 0134 ZAGF'EE Page 2 of 2 5. Whent!ver Commander Croatia Command tried to directly address HV violations Genera] Robetko responded! with agitated denials. When the offer of frequent meetings between COS Croatia Command and one ol' Generill Bobetko's staff, in a less formal setting was proposed, r+eneral Bobet.kc replied that he would meet with Major General Rodan only when required. ! i i 6. In summary, whili:: the meeting remained relatively 1,;ordial it was clear that there was no real desire to t.:ome ito terms with any of the problems relateu to the ongoing HV activities in or near th~ Zo~e of Separation. With regard tu improved co-operation bcrw~en lJNPROFOR and rfV ticld commanders, we can only waii for confumation that General Bobetko's commit11ent to 'speak' to his subordinates will result in a more positive climate for negotiation andl a reduction in the HV violations of thi:.: Zone of Separation. I ! I i I I ' I 0134 ZA GREB I 'dli~G IP.i c:~ unrn:. Unlt Pb\a L; ll t '3 Maii ~r. s I ~J.N~ Jl-12 L__ ... u,_"'l.i~, .1_ \ '~~ r,~ .. r z e.r: 3 s'!" -~:tnrn; CNP·.' It fu l of ~ I n1'!Uli'n[AJE ' ' .. .. q i -WVUEM...... ---- '9'; i'I~~ 2.1 1 , ,\ , ~ I TC>. ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK CODE RESTRICT. I INFO GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK fMMECIATE GOULDINQ, UNATIONS, NEW YORK STOL1EN8fRG, TCFY, GENEVA FRCM AKASHI, +ROFOR, ZAGREB y # ~ NUMBER: UNPR~ Z - # /./-J DAlE: 21 MARCH \1995 SUBJECT: ANALYSIS \OF CURRENT SITUATION IN CROATIA I I .. .. . You ma)' find the a~cd note, prepared by Vladislav Guerassev, Deputy Head of Civil Affairs, entitled "So~ thoughts on the way ahead in political approach for Croatia'' or' some interest. It is a v~ perceptive and succinct analysis of the basis of the conflict I in Croo1ia, I The note may be of :use in the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General to the Security Counci1 1 in u more\ concise fonn. Alternatively, it could be used for an op--ed type of article without any rbution. I I Regards. DISTRIBUTION: ...k .9...... ~ ······ :::.P.~ ··:::::':...... :: ...... ' ...~·· ·····························- -...... ,; _ ...... ·-J_ -~:_, I~ t.. "C, N ~.-, c:-:.1 ;-:.: ::.1c.:..:, \' .'.J :::'1 (.j i:::: N v"" :::,, No lnlemal Distribution .. CYCY .. ZAGREB 0( -9S-0:3-21 11 : 19 013 4 ...... ~ UNITED ~ATIONS PROTECTION FORCE I l'UNPROFOR CODE REs1··R1c~r~D M E M O R >,. H n tT M ~ntidenti1.'1 I TO SRSG 1 I !N.FO : HCA, Fb, SPAO I I FROM OHCA ; V . ~~~ OATE : 17 Mart h 1995 SUBJECT: s9rne tl~ought~ on the way .ahead in political a~oro~Q.h for crtati~ I Current situat10• ~I 1, we are enteting the period of a new mandate, the key feature of which !would be a trad~~off between monitoring Of ths zo~ and Croattia's borders. Alraady, the variance in Serb and Croat percep~ions of the future UN Forc~'9 operational modalitias in pe~forming the&~ tw~ !unctions is obViOU9. Zagreb hopes to •ee ~oft UN control/monitoring in the zos and a robust pres•nc~ on the bord~r, ~n~ Knin, the opposite. That does not bode we ~l for the new mandate's successful implsmentation: on th& oasis of UNPnOFOR's experiencQ, we can exp-aet accusatioris of 11 'UNFIC' s 1' f ~ilure to handle Serbs forcefully ~nd s 1ergetically to resurface in the naar futu~e. 2. LittleI com.mqnI ground between the pa.tie~' ex15tsI to underpin tha negdtiation~ slated to Qegin shortly on the rinal formula of th•ir :~ahabitation. While the gi~t of the Croatian position is that iserbg must surrendar on th&ir terffls, political forces ·that entertain thoughts of ''re-integrati'on" are conspicuousli absent on the Kr&jina political landscape. Aga~n1 one can e~pect a protracted, paintul and inconolusive nQgotiating &xer ~iee with renewed saber rattling by both sides at every dif!ieulf juncture. J. The underlying' political reason tor this daadlock, though often ignored, i ~ remarkably simple: it is the Krajina Serbs' deeply ingrained ~ist~u~t of Zagreb's attitude towards them, their profound ~o~viction that thete is no room tor their secur~ and dignif~Qd existence within a Croatian state. At ~he mo~Qnt, there is no political power base in Krajina for advocates of its ~aturn in~o the Croatian fold. Unless ~nd until such a pow~~ base is crea~cd, thero will be no stake holde:t·s in the id~a of 'Kraji11a's autonomy within its popul eo&, and the 2-1 will ~ema i n a w~ll researched dream more ralavant to a civili2gd We~tern European mili~u than to tl,e harsh political realiti~s ot Croatia. \ .... CY: Y .. 1995-03-2 \ 11:20 0 1 :3 4 ZAGREB I i CODE RES,-RICTED 2 Key to political I solution I 1. The key to a ~olitical aolution to this impasse lies in 2~greb'~ hands • . This key is tha adoptio~ and impl•~~ntation of~ fo~ceful, multi-faceted and con~istent polic¥ ot national recon~iliation tq ~onvince Se~bs that their secur~ty and aisnity in Croatia is guaranteed, and that they will partoke as equal~ in cro~tia's future economic prosperity while pre~erving ~nd sustaininq their cultural and political identity. This policy &houl~ includa ~he tried-and-true components that ~rovAd their merit in Nami~ia 1 south Africa and elsewhere: univ&rsal amnesty, freedom cf travel, r~~t~aint from hostilo propeg~nda, tree ~ccess to ~he media, the fostering o! ~raas-roots tiQ~, eto. Only persistent implem0ntation o~ this poli~y over . a reason~bla length of time ~ill oreate in K~ajina a political power base tor re-intagrstion that will allow political forces favouring the Z-4 solution to e~erga in Knin. 5. Despite thQir occasional demonstrations of goodwill, the authoriti&~ in Zagreb do not ~ppear to be considering adopting guch a pol~cy. ~~ther, Zagreb continues to in5ist that Croatia's guarantees ot h~an rights are more than adequate and that the international col1Ununity is therefore obliged to deliver Xr~jina tb Croatia in or.der to avoid a pan-European war. Z~greb roust . be disabused of its self-dQception. I The pol i cy stance I of international• community I 6. The international community, through the united Nations and Croatia's political allies, sho~ld strongly ~dvise zagreo to refocus j ts poll ti~al energies rr-C>m tJ,~ goal 0£ returning "occupisd territo:r.1es'' o~to the goal or conquering the he.irts and minds or tht!i population th~t liveg there. It sheuld be fir~ly stated that th& main ~olitieal responsibility for achieving this da~ired soiut~on lies with Zagreb; it is beyond tha int~rnational ,community's capabilit~ to relieve Croatia of tha b~rden of en9~gin9 in good faith in reconoiliation and trust building. ZagrQb Should realiz~ th~t no matter how onerou~ !orgivene~s and appa8semant ot one's forrn~r anemiGs may see~, it is ttja only possible way to ensure a unified, peaceful and pros~erous Croutia. 7. Zag~eb shoul~ not be permitted to act a~ a capricious client of intarna~ional co~munity practicing the finQ art of brinkmanship. It ~hould be encoura9ed to d@VQlop into a mature, enlightene~ and patient policy center responsible for its own political ~ate. I I 9. Zagreb should'. be unambiguously given to understand that the international community has fulrillRd its moral and political obligatibns tow~rds newly independent Croatia; it strongly upheld it$ sovareignty and integrity within the internationally repognized border~, it applied forcefully the pressure ot ~ancti?ns on its political adv•rsaries, it +t CYCY +t 19 95-03-21 11:21 013 4 ZAGRE B 00 5 F . . . - - ' ·------. _.. ', ----· COCE RESTRIG.trED I 9, The theme bt Zag~eb's responsibility to adopt in good faith a benign, 1 unambiguouc and convincing policy of national reconciliation ~nd trugt-buildinQ should become the leitmotif of the internat~onal community's p'oliey statements on th~ Croatian crisis. It should b~ parsistently highli;nted as the main component bt a political solution tor Croatia. It should be said l~ud ank clear that international community will reward any e!tot te in this dir&ction and will censura any recidivist ball~ge~ence. It is Croatia's life Rnd its country, No on~ will fight battleg on behalf of Croatia . I . Is it feasible?; Will it bear results? 10. Thi~ chang~ of heart and appr¢ech by Za9~eb, supported by continuous aconpmio pr.~gress, will have an impaot only in the long tarm. one: needs time to diepel mistrust~ confideMce building i~ alwpy9 more difficult than spreAding hate. But modern European history proves th~t it can be ~one with political will. i I 11. B•aring in1 mind the philoso~hical differences between P~esid~nt Tudjmi1 n and, say, President M~ndela, on• must ot cour1~ raeogniz that a behevolent policy of forgivehess and ~eooneiliatioh snot an entjrely natur~l choice fo~ the former. Mow•vek:, !r i &ndly but piarsisterit 1t1terna t icna l pressuro ean wo~k miracles. I have witnessed !irst"h4nd the transformation bt President Nujc~a of Namibia from ir~esolute and dogmatic Ma~xist fr~edom flghter into a fl~xfble d•rnocratic l~ad~r. I do believe that a eirnilar meta~or~hosis, guided by the irternational community, is feasible in this part of Europe, I I ! U N PP O '<: .-~, SSN-529 CO M 'v1 1 ! ~ · '·. : :~; ~,, S OUTGOING Page 1 of 3 ~ ·95 MAR -4 17 :42 JMMEQIA1E CZN-350 CZG-280 10: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK I\{~·:,- INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEY A AKASHI, UNPROFOR ZAGREB NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z - 360 DAlE: 4 MARCH 1995 SUBJF.Cf: LETTER TO iv1RMARTIC ' Pleac:;e find attached copy of a letter forwarded today to ~- ~ic on the issue of access to the Bihac pocket. Regards. \0 Vl i ...... i ·. __. -...J - ui :r U1 Internal Distribution: FC, HCA DFC, DI n 0s:c ~z ,.-:. 7J ;:~ ::c -·-=- J t, :: l O .:'.. t : .:'.. l t ,:, - :~: i) - S 5 ~; l ++ l.J l_J ++ CZN-350/CZG-280 2/3 ,. UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia 4 March 1995 Dear Mr. Martic, It is with a deep sense of frustration and dismay that I raise once again the issue of access to Bihac pocket for UNHCR and UNPROFOR convoys. In our last meeting in Knin, we agreed that interfer~nce with and obstruction of humanitarian aid are blatant violations of international humanitarian law. You will recall your commitments to honour the principles of non-interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to allow UNFROFOR and UNHCR to choose freely its point of entry into the Bihac pocket. I now learn that not only have these commitments been disregarded, but that there is a complete refusal to let in any more aid convoys to Bihac. Furthermore, the route that you insist upon, Velika Kladusa - cazin, was the site of a near tragedy for UNHCR. I wish to reaffirm to you that the policy of chronic obstruction of access to the Bihac pocket is not acceptable either to UNPROFOR or to UNHCR. This policy has, since last June, led to the grave humanitarian situation in the pocket. Furthermore, we cannot accept that convoy personnel are subjected to unacceptable risk and uncertainty. Your failure to abide by the policy of unrestricted freedom of movement and to honour your commitments can only bring us, regretfully, further down the road to humanitarian disaster. I remind you that interference with humanitarian aid and resupply could constitute breaches of the Geneva Conventions as well as other international :legal conventions. H.E. Mr. Milan Martic Knin ,. :3 t- : .:. l t7 1) - :::; 0 - S S 1=; I ,Hr .l. J l.J ,++ CZN-35O/CZG-280 3/3 - 2 - This matter requires your most immediate attention. I urge you to issue instructions allowing unrestricted movement of humanitarian aid to ~11 areas of the Bihac pocket. By doi~g so, you will help return us to the road of ; mutual cooperation. I Yours sincerely, ~-·#--I!_, Yasushi A.kashi V / . -~.,,,_~· ~---·-·-·----· ,.,....,..~,------;::7-l7i--- i: .,-·.-·;· l- i,;'('; - C i"I - S 6 6 l. :~: l i:1 I/ 1_. ... _, L.' • - •• .. ..J • ++ ),J .. l , J ++ 'TT '-, I '-, i 'TT 1 :3 '.35-C1 :3 - 27 ·! T: 0:3 • U ~-J Fr--::·... ·. IMMEDIATE oo□ E RESTRICT~tr ,17 ,. £ ZN:- '-1-?1 OUTGOING CODE CABLE '95 i~r·r: 27 1 r. ·y ~, CZ G' :::= 3fs1 IMMEDIATE _s.5JJ ~ ?I~ Page 1 of 7 TO ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK INFO GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK STOILTENBERG, ICF"\\ GENEVA FROM AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB DATE 27 March 1995 NUMBER z:: 'f9'/ l I SUBJECT HCA: MEETINGS IN BELGRADE 23 · 24 MARCH 1995 I I Attached is a summary uf the consultations undertakt!D in Belgrade by the Head of Civi1 Affairs, Mr Michel Moussalli, during 23 - 24 March 1995 . They reflect the current thinking of key interlocutors of both the FRY and the "RSK" on a number of highly pertinent issues. ' DISTR12UT!ON : I :·-J-t-·························•·:••·' .... ~ftls0······· ···················· l I I ··-·¥-;.·······························1 " & s ·························· .. · · 1 \Q Vi internal Distribution: :;,· (ZS (y I lrfc ~ -. 'PP l.,Tl.,f 'PP 1 :3'.3 ~-- 1:iJ - 2_~ _ l 7 : 1 2 ·---• (1 2 : UNPROFOR FORPRONU Ulllllld N- PM6ca4n i'ol'(c l'Ol'Ce i:IC ~oa INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM TO SRSG INFO ICFY (Amb. Matacotta), FC/DFC, DRSG/CAC BELGRADE, CAC.KNIDDHCA, SPAO FROM HCA llr f tfe ~ DRAFTER Geofr ~.:..umont, Desk Officer Croatia / ~ DATE 27 March 1995 ' SUBJECT HCA VISlT TO BELGRADE - MEETINGS WITH MIKELlC, CICANOVJC AND KOVACEVIC i I 1. My Belgrade visit was part of a programme of consultations undertaken in order to better understand inter]ocutors current perspectives with a view to seeking means of providing fresh impetus to the Economic Agreement an 2. During 23 - 24 March 1995 I undertook my follow-up visit to Belgrade, accompanied by Ambassador Matacotta, and met with Mr Milcelic, "prime minister .. of the "RSK", Mr Cicanovic, Head of the FRY Departmt:nt for Multi-lateral Relations, and Major General Kovacevic, FRY Deputy <;:hief of the General Staff. All the interlocutors proved most welcoming and informative and were clearly determined to widen the scope of the discussions significantly beyond what .I had envisaged. The opinions of Cicanovic are considered panicularly pertinent in view uf his closeness to Milost:vic and his key role in h~lping formuJatt: FRY foreign policy. I also seized the opponunity to meet with members of the Belgrade Djplomatic Corps. i 3. The meetings were also attended by Mr Kirudja, DSRSG/CAC Belgrade, Mr Beaumont, Desk Officer Croatia, and Colonel de Battista, SMA to HCA. A summary of the discussions follows. MIKELIC (23 March) 4. Mikelic, the "prime minister" of the "RSK", commenced by summarising his <.:urrent perspective: he feared tl1al time was running out, that Knin and Zagreb held diametrically opposc 1 113'35-1)3 -2 7 1 7: 1 :J to be no change of mandatt! or tasks for UNPROFOR until the current tensions were defused; however, he believcu that no mutually satisfactory compromise would he reached by 31 March and thereafter matters would become more tense and difficult. 5. On the theme of the Economic Agreement, Mike lie: - Felt that the Tudjman unilateral decision on the mandate question had not only virrually halted progress towards closer economic cooperation but had also still-born the chances of a meaningful political dialogue occUITing - a dialogue which could already have started. - Emphasised his belief and commitment to the three-stage peace process as being the only way ahead; he did not blame Sarinic for the current "freeze" and stated that but for he and Sarinic tensions would have escalated a long time ago - only economic cooperation can calm political tensions and under-cut the military hard-liners. Manic supports the military option and be, Mikelic, disagrees with him. - Agreed that rapid progress with a high-profile economic project(s) could provide the necessary conditions to assist in defusing the siruation and in creating an atmosphere more conducive for:a mandate to be agreed upon - that is why his "government" had agreed to proceed with the Zagreb/Belgrade railway project and even allow the Croats to repair the Paklenica Bridge; this project was supportt:d hy Milosevic. - He would like to proceed with other project'i, particularly the formation of the joint oil company, but both the "government" and "parliament" had decided to postpone all negotiations until the mandate issue was clarified. In this connection, the proposed border task for the 'UN was a "trap" for Knin as it would mean de facto recognition of tbe Croatian position and thereafter we could only talk about "internal relations - and we have not reached that point, ~;" if the UN had the same mandate, we could start politicaJ negotiations tomorrow - without prejudice to the outcome. After recent even~. it is essential to complete all aspect'i of the Economic Agreement, then political discussions could achieve what is inconceivable today. In this connection, the Z-4 plan is a shortrcut and short-cuts do not lead to political agreements. - He was not disinterested in the 'Glavas' proposal to fonn a regional joint economic commission in the ar~a of Sector East and possibly in other areas as well - all umler, ' i in accordance with Sarinics' wishe!>, the Central Economic Joint Commission under th~ Co-Chairmen of the Steering Group. However, he exptessed some caution about Glavas' nationalistic leanings and his true intentions to mak'-! Sector East an outpost of Osijek - factors which may undermine the concept in that particular area. He again stated that much more would be achievable if the mandate problem was accepta.bly ' I resolved. ' 6. Mikelic stated that his political position was finely balanced - Sesalj and Manic are becoming more closely a11ied and are inciting the more radical elements to consider both M ilusevic and myself (MikcJ ic) as traitors, but they "are barking up a tree". "I do not want all that T have achieved to be interpreted as my being inclined towards the Croat'i - if anyone should be an extremist it is roe as I was orphane 2 ++ C rC ( ++ 1 '395-0 :3-27 1 7 : 14 01 34 Z AGF'EE, . Subject to confirmation after further consultations, he was prepared to discuss these and other +·\ 1 issues at a low-key (no publicity) Joint Commission meeting next week on Thursday 30 March 199,, e: ~A/;: 'f 7 Comment: Mikelic appeared evasive about the meeting and was vague about the agenda. When considered with the precariousness of his position, it would not be surprising if the meeting wa:; not convened. 7. Mikelic said that he had infurme.d Mr Stoltenberg and Sarinic about his concern that "RSK" Serhs were buying fuel on the Croatian pan of the highway and then smuggling it to Serb-held Bosnia, thus undermining the Milosevic imposed (Drina) blockade on the Bosnian Serbs which was not in the interests of Serhia, the "RSK" or Croatia as it was assisting Karadzic become stronger. Ht: had proposed to Sarini, that only car fuel ranks, not jcrry cans, should be filled and that Serb police should be allowed to stop and control Serb vehicles on the highway, As an alternative, he had proposed to Sarink that the two ministers of interior should meet to discuss the possibilities of control being executed by joint UN/Serb checkpoints. Sarinic had apparently replied that he wou1d react but the siruation was not "that bad" to which Mikelic had said that it was worse than he:: thought. The formation of tht: joint oil company would not reso,ve the problem as the smuggling was to the "RS", not within the "RSK". i Comment: such control hyi the Serbs would be contrary to the modalities of the highway agreement but would be ~sible if bilaterally agreed. However, this would be difficult for I UNPROFOR to control, would he open to abuse and it is considered unlikely that the Croats would accept any form of Serh control, joint with the UN or otheiwise, on their sovereign territory. Mikelic went on to complain that: I - While Serb driver~ can buy the fuel on the highway and become rich illegally, the "RSK" coul<.I not currently buy it legally, via the proposed joint oil company, which led to hospital patients and school children suffering unnecessarily fbr lack of heating fuel. i I - The Croatian police wert: charging Serb drivers (the smugglers) Dm 1000/truck to cross; he maintained that he had discussed this with Lord Owen and would shortly mention it to Sarinic. ! I 8. 1n connection with humanitarian aid deliveries to Biha(; and to the "RSK", Mikelic maintained thal the curren~ lack of ,ooperation was as a result of the military influence! and that the civil authorities had always been more cooperative; he was against b~th the ''ARSK" decision and the UNHCR: action which lc::d to funher suffering by the civil population. Mikelic fully accepted the cat.alogue ofUNPROFOR negotiators thal had attempted to resolve the delivery issue with Knill over the last two years and promised to raise the problem with Milosevic and Martic on F.riday 24 March in an attempt to persuade them that the "RSK'' should fulfil its obligations. I 9. Mikelic also undertook to attempt to persuadt: Milosevic to use his influence with Mladic to induce him that Silajdzic's wish to go to Bihac in order to help defuse tensions in the area should be facilitated. Mikelic went on to say that normally they could do this themselves but for the military hard-liners; however, he hinted that Martie's and Celeketic's influence may soon significantly wane as a resull of current events and the fact that the two recent ministerial appointees, both Babic men, may well give Mikelic/Babic control of the "Defence Council". Mikelic stated that hoth he and the •government" were in favour of an overall ·II 3 -t+ C'rC Y -t+ 1 ::l:35-1):3 - 2 7 1 T: l S cease fire i.n the Biba(; area but the international community should really he supporting the /1 ~· most popular man in the area - Ahdic. ') \ \ CcNzt/'?i 1 l 0. Mikelic confirmed that be would inform HCA about his consultations in connection with: the Joint Commission meeting for 30 March; the Bihac convoy issue; the Silajdzic visit to Bihac . Finally, he agreed that many of the issues that he had raised should be resolved bilaterally in the Economic Joint Commission. 11. Ia answer to a query from Ambassador Matacotta. Milcelic in principle approved a visit to Knin l>y Ambassador Galbraith on 29 or 30 March 1995. CICANOYIC (24 March) . 12. Cicanovic. the Head cif the FRY Department for Multi-lateral Relations, stated the following views: ' - He fully agreed and supporte - While we hope that the current negotiations contrjbute something substantial to the peace process, one ;should be restrained in fulfilling Tudjman's desires; now, as always in the past, he wants something that makes a mandate inoperable. UNPROPOR wouldlhave to double its forces to fulfil both the ZOS and border tasks. There should be a H[mit to the degree that the UN is prepared to compromise. I ~ Wbatever is agredi now, Tudjman will renew his "blackmail" for more cuncrete concessions tu hi:s ~ishes every time the mandate is due extension. In view of lzetbegovics' stancei on the Bosnian mandate, it would appear that he has learnt this lessoa well from Tudjman. I - He expects the difficulties with the new mandate to go on for some 2 - 3 months, I or even until September, but in tht: enJ Croatia doe.~ not want UNPROFOR out and is merely manoeuvring for concessions and to silence the opposition. ! - As to the possible i role on the 'border' - formally, we do not ret:ognise the border as then: is no mutual recognition; they were never defined in the former FRY except as internal administrative borders. No procedures in accordance with international law have ever defined the borders. This is a i.:omplex problem - whlch border, for instance, do we recognise in the case of Slovenia - the one advocat~d by Slovenia or the one by Croatia. The due processes of the law have to be followed - and the same 4 13 :35-0:3-2 7 17 : 16 1) I :3 4 applies to Prevlaka. In relation to Croatia, you must be on both 'borders', pending &l ;.,, an overall negotiated settlement; do not make the same mistake as the EU and f recognise a negotiable matter prematurely. c 2 A.I:; 'I,~ • In Prevlaka, if we lose this issue we would bave no access to the sea and we would have to fight. These· issut:s must he solved by negotiation. - Croatia wants the political negotiations too soon; it is not the time for domestic ~onsumption politics or to ~all for German support • it will only lead to conflict and the Serb people of the Krajina are warriors anc.1 are prepared to die if necessary. There must be progressive dialogue in accordance with the current plan but watch for German and US pressure. - The FRY has no territorial ambitions and this is a form of recognition . - He agreed that the ZOS must be more porous, blamed Zagreb for it currently not being so. He welc~med the international community's intent to invest in capital development, should there he stability and political progress, and stated that the FRY was prepared tn help - in spite of the sanctions. i - The way to create Jan atmosphere conducive to a constructive dialogue was to cease pressuring or threatening people in tht: manner that Croatia and BiH is attempting; they wish to lure NATO into fighting for them while sanctions weaken us. Sanctions have a negative eff&t and are not conducive to peace. l - Sanctions punish innocent civilians. He claimed that of new-horn children needing I medical help t.bey used to have a 5 % mortality rate; now it was 50%. I - We believe in the pN. While we are not held by some to be members we are ab0ut to pay our 0, 11 % qontribution which is a pro-rated figure in relation to the former FRY contribution. lt is ridiculous that we are not a full member and can not use our influence positivelY: for peac~. We can not have obligations and no rightc;. In this context we will soon ht: writing to the Commissioner for Human Rights to inform him that although we w~sh to we can not cooperate under those circumstances. - With reference to their wish to fonnatise the UN presence in FRY, he stated that we would always be welcome but "we are nut here" . i I j _ KOVACEVIC (24 March)! i 13. Major General Kovacevic, FRY Deputy Chief of the General Staff, summarised his perspective on the situatio~; - We can not judge the value uf the new mandate as nothing of substance is known. However, we believe that the Vance phm is very good alld helped create the peaceful conditions essential for th~ subsequent phases which are regrettably currently frozen at the economic st.agt: and have forestalled, at least for the moment, the essential political dialogue. ' Should the new model providt! a better framework we would welcome it. · ~ The JNA wants peace, but only a just and durable peace achieved through 5 1j '35-i):3 -2 7 17 : 17 01:34 02 1 negotiations. - We did nut worry about Tudjman's decisjon, we know it was not his decision; we worried about those ·behind the decision but believed that it would happen as it has. He expres1)ed sum~ concern about the possible option of dividing UNPROFOR into distinct <.:ommands; he perceived it as a weakening of purpose and making the force more s~ceptible tu the divisive intluence of "cenain leading powers in the world" . - UNPROFORs contribution to peace has been enormous and, while there are many problems still to he resolved, the region would have even more problems withuut that presence. Thus we offer our full support to your search for a durable peace. lf the UN were lo leave, il ma~ even lead to the uestruction of the UN as an entity. I - The man.date question can not be solved between Croatia and the US alone; nor should borders that are not accepted be imposed. This is premature. ! - We highly respect trust you are consulting with both sides but do not accept Tudjman 's demand to integrate U1e Krajina too rapidly. Be aware of the strong forces he is currently concentrating against the people in the Krajina and the fear this is instilling into them J The UN must stand firm against Tudjman in the legitimate interests of the Croatian people and the Serbs~ for both peopl~s, these interests are a durable peace. We can not accept the failure of this peace keeping mission which, in our view, is ao unimplementable mandate which would only lead to fresh demands from Tudjman in tht future. - SRSG and President Bulatovic agree, as far as we know, on a possible solution to Prevlaka; if they are successful there will be no problems bur let us see how it is accomplished in pnu:tii.:~. Both Muslims and Croats often accept ai:,.-reements in principle and then violate them or do not implement them. However, we confirm that we wanl a peaceful solution and we will not provoke lhe Croats~ in this context, they need not fear our forthcoming military exercise in the Budva area. It has been notified in accordance with established procedures and is only an essential training exercise. 14. ln response to my (HCA) concerns regarding the warlike preparations in the vicinity of St!Ctor East, and the int1ux of substantial armamen~ into the Sector, the General llid not deny or confirm their presence. lnstead he suggested that we should consider what is done, not what is sail!. In the l~t 3 ~ears Croatia had attacked the Krajina 3 times but never had the Serbs attacked Croatia in tliat time. In addition, we should consider the vast and successful Croatian re-armamenl wWle under embargo. · I 15 . The Genera] amicably raised the issue of payment for the UN facility at Panacevo and I asketl if T could address the problem which they saw, considering UN practices elsewhere in the former FRY, as a conspiracy while they suffered under sanctions. Naturally, l refuted this allegation and informed him that the situation was regrettable but I knew that the problem was being actively addressed and believed that a solution could be expedited. Kovacevic humouruusly, bul perhaps not in je:st, asked if in view of the well-known UN expeditiousness we would consider paying interest. 6