henry a. kissinger chair korea chair

...... July 2009 ...... Prospects for U.S.-Korean Relations in Obama Administration ...... CSIS-Chosun Ilbo Forum ...... June 2, 2009 ...... The third CSIS–Chosun Ilbo Forum, entitled “Pros- nontraditional security challenges. These proceed- ...... pects for U.S.-Korea Relations in the Obama Admin- ings reflect the rapporteur’s best effort to capture the ...... istration” and held on June 2 at the Willard Intercon- highlights of the presentations and discussion at the ..... tinental Hotel in Washington, D.C., brought together forum, which was conducted on a non-attribution ...... prominent officials from the United States and the basis...... Republic of Korea (ROK or ), lawmakers, ..... The North Korean Nuclear and Missile ..... and experts on a series of panels to address develop- ..... Crisis and DPRK Leadership Transition ..... ments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ...... (DPRK or ), prospects for the KORUS The discussion about the challenges of North Korea’s ..... Free Trade Agreement, and opportunities and chal- nuclear and missile programs was particularly timely ...... lenges for the bilateral alliance. The conference came and relevant, given the dramatic escalation of the cri- ...... just days after provocative North Korean nuclear and sis in the preceding week as North Korea conducted ..... missile tests, as well as reports of new leadership suc- its second nuclear test in three years and test-fired ...... cession plans in , and two weeks before several missiles...... a planned White House ..... summit between Presi- ...... dents Lee Myung-bak ...... and Barack Obama...... The conference under- ..... scored the need for close ...... allied consultation on ...... approaches to North ..... Korea, revealed contin- ...... ued differences in views ...... toward the trade agree- ..... ment, and highlighted ...... a growing consensus ...... on the need to broaden ..... the foundations of the ...... alliance and expand the ...... alliance’s contribution Opening Session, from left, President and CEO, CSIS, Dr. John Hamre; Senior Vice Presi- ...... to regional, global, and dent and Henry A. Kissinger Chair, CSIS , Dr. Stephen Flanagan; and President and CEO, ..... The Chosun Ilbo, Mr. Sang-Hoon Bang...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... 2 | ...... Speakers at this session agreed that domestic de- to regional and global stability. The North Korean ..... velopments in North Korea help explain the coun- nuclear program further imperils the nonprolifera- ...... try’s recent aggressive tactics, namely Kim Jong-il’s tion regime by encouraging Iran and other states ...... poor health, his reported choice of his third son to to pursue their own programs; stimulating debate ..... succeed him, and the need for a pretext to tighten in countries like Japan over acquiring a nuclear ca- ...... internal control in a time of power transition. But pability; and heightening the risk that North Korea ...... participants also pointed to an apparent desire by will sell nuclear supplies or technology abroad. In ..... Pyongyang to solidify its nuclear status and to crip- , some lawmakers have proposed that South ...... ple the Six-Party Talks in favor of a preferred bilat- Korea should declare its “nuclear sovereignty”— ...... eral arms control process with Washington. Prevail- retaining a capability to reprocess spent fuel. The ..... ing sentiment at the forum was that North Korea is dangers presented by terrorists, failed states, and ...... determined to keep at least a residual nuclear capa- violent nonstate actors are greatly amplified by ex- ...... bility, possibly with an eye to future recognition as panded access to weapons of mass destruction...... an established nuclear power. It was noted that the ..... Predictions were mixed on whether Pyongyang ..... factors underlying North Korea’s insecurity—its ..... would continue to escalate or seek to return to ..... dependence on other countries for fuel and other the negotiation table soon, but no participants at ..... resources and its geographic position surrounded ..... the forum offered optimism about any dramatic ..... by several more powerful countries, two of them ..... changes for the better in the short term. There was, ..... nuclear—endure, and that North Korea’s leaders however, concurrence that North Korea’s external ..... ultimately desire a relationship with the United ..... behavior had created greater cohesion among the ..... States that includes positive security assurances in ..... other five parties and that the five parties share an ..... which Washington guarantees support for the ex- understanding that North Korea should not be al- ..... isting regime in Pyongyang. In the shorter term, ..... lowed to become a de facto nuclear weapons state...... Session One, from left: Mr. Frank Jannuzi, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Vice Minister Kak-Soo Shin, ...... South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Dr. Seung-Hwan Kim, CSIS; Dr. Samore, National Secu- ..... rity Council; Amb. Byung-Kook Kim, Korea University; and Dr. Victor Cha, CSIS...... North Korea’s actions were seen as an attempt to ..... Some expressed optimism that U.S. and Chinese ..... enhance its bargaining position in potential bilat- negotiators would reach a compromise on a new ..... eral negotiations with the United States...... UN Security Council resolution that would expand ...... The speakers were united in viewing the recent nu- sanctions and facilitate the enforcement of punitive ..... clear and missiles tests, which were more success- measures in previous resolutions. Most on the pan- ...... ful than those in previous years, as serious threats el expressed continued support for the Six-Party ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... | 3 ...... Talks as still being the best way forward, consider- ■■ Coordinate a strong UN Security Council reso- ...... ing the forum’s success in halting additional pluto- lution and enforce what is agreed. Most partici- ...... nium production and encompassing the interests pants favored a resolution that holds each party ..... of the relevant regional stakeholders. responsible for enforcing new and existing im- ...... port and export restrictions. An additional pos- ..... There was broad consensus that the Obama ad- ..... ministration, having recently come to power with sibility is inclusion in the resolution of a high- ..... seas inspection regime, though participants ..... a message of dialogue and unburdened with blame ..... were pessimistic that Russia and China would ..... for the downturn in relations, is well positioned ..... diplomatically to craft a response to North Korea. agree for fear of triggering a military conflict...... Participants were united in the view that the Obama ■■ Place a priority on maintaining unity among the ...... administration should search for a novel approach five parties, both in a Six-Party Talks context ..... to the nuclear crisis; maximize coordination with ..... and in negotiations for a UN Security Council ..... Seoul; reject North Korea’s attempts to wreck the resolution...... Six-Party Talks; and refuse to offer new incentives ..... for North Korea to adhere to its abrogated com- ■■ Maintain the Six-Party Talks mechanism. One ...... mitments, including the dismantling of the Yong- participant argued that this should not necessar- ..... ily preclude bilateral talks...... byon nuclear facilities. Speakers reiterated the need ..... to demonstrate to Pyongyang that its brinkman- ..... ■■ The United States, South Korea, and Japan ..... ship will be met not with reward but with punitive ..... should craft a policy to persuade China to be ..... measures and for a strong UN Security Council re- fully in sync with their approach to dealing ...... sponse. The crux of a new approach, it was argued, with North Korea, as China has the greatest ..... should be to focus on securing irreversible steps to- ..... leverage in persuading North Korea to pursue ..... ward denuclearization and to identify what incen- negotiations. To do so, the United States and ...... tives the United States might reasonably table that other parties might recognize and work to ac- ..... do not compromise the interests of its allies...... commodate certain Chinese national interests ..... as a means of building trust, which could have ..... One speaker noted that while North Korea may not ..... have made a “strategic decision” to abandon its nu- a positive impact on China’s response to North ...... clear program, the best course forward is one that Korea’s aggressive behavior. It was noted that ..... a fresh source of Chinese leverage is emerging ..... shapes North Korea’s choices over time, addresses ..... the country’s security concerns, keeps the door from Pyongyang’s desire for Beijing to endorse ...... open to dialogue, and preserves avenues to denu- its leadership transition...... clearization. Another speaker added that short of ..... ■■ Explore the merits of a potential Five-Party ..... denuclearization, limiting North Korea’s nuclear ..... Talks arrangement (without North Korea) or a ..... capacity is an important objective in itself, because ..... 5+2 arrangement (adding the United Kingdom ..... a North Korean regime with only a handful of nu- ..... and France, the two P-5 countries who are not ..... clear weapons and questionable delivery systems ..... Six-Party Talks members)...... is still significantly less dangerous than a North ...... Korea with a robust nuclear capability. However, ■■ Bring about and maintain U.S. and South Ko- ..... several panelists observed that stakeholder coun- ..... rean domestic political consensuses on each ..... tries should steer the process away from an “India country’s policies toward North Korea. In South ...... deal”–type outcome in which North Korea retains Korea, where such issues can become politically ..... hope of eventually being recognized as an estab- ..... polarizing, the leadership must bring in party ..... lished nuclear weapons state. leaders as shareholders in North Korea policy...... Numerous proposals were put forward by speakers ..... ■■ Maintain flexibility in applying principles of ..... and audience members, which were met with vary- reciprocity to the North Korean negotiation ..... ing degrees of concurrence: ..... process. Rigid insistence on reciprocity can play ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... 4 | ...... into North Korea’s hands and give the regime Prospects for the KORUS Free Trade ...... pretexts to escalate; instead, the stronger par- Agreement ..... ties would do well to be patient, prudent, and ..... Signed nearly two years ago, the Korea–United ..... confident, remembering that North Korea is in ..... States Free Trade Agreement remains unimple- ..... a considerably weaker position...... mented, having yet to be approved by either coun- ...... ■■ Be prepared to seize moments of opportunity. try’s legislature. KORUS is Korea’s most significant ...... To do this, the United States, South Korea, and and comprehensive trade agreement, the United ..... States’ largest since NAFTA, and the United States’ ..... the other parties need to think strategically ..... about their options, consult closely about what first with a rising East Asian power. South Korea is ...... packages of incentives might be assembled, and set to become a more visible international trading ..... power with its assumption of the G-20 chairman- ..... be prepared to conduct Track 1 and Track 2 dia- ..... ship in 2010...... logues...... ■■ In response to North Korea’s second nuclear Most speakers highlighted the benefits of the trade ..... agreement for both countries and potential costs ..... test and Pyongyang’s refusal to halt its nuclear ..... weapons development program, some discussed to the United States in not following through on ...... that it might be necessary to strengthen and implementation. Korean proponents saw the deal ..... as a vehicle to increase Korea’s global market ac- ..... expand the nuclear umbrella provided by the ..... United States to South Korea. cess, enhance domestic competition, and render ..... its economy more efficient in ways that benefit the ...... ■■ Uphold a division of labor in which South Korea consumer. They pointed to benefits in the form of ..... bears a major share of the burden to bring about ..... significant GDP gains for both countries; expansion ..... a deal while the United States plays a supporting of markets for U.S. agricultural goods; and reduc- ...... role. This strategy helps preserve domestic con- tion of nontariff barriers that have been a source ..... sensus in both countries. Seoul is thereby spared ..... of complaints from U.S. producers. They attempt- ..... domestic discontent over a perceived “bad cop” ed to address detractors’ concerns by highlighting ...... role, and Washington is spared domestic criti- KORUS’s labor and environmental provisions and ..... cism that its policies are too soft...... an unprecedented dispute mechanism that would ..... protect U.S. automakers in the case of Korean non- ..... ■■ Craft policies that aim to persuade the North ..... compliance with the agreement’s stipulations. On ..... Korean regime that it cannot achieve de facto ..... a more fundamental level, these speakers argued, ..... recognition as a nuclear weapons state, a peace ..... passage of the trade agreement would demonstrate ..... agreement that secures withdrawal of U.S. troops ..... both countries’ commitment to open markets and ..... from the Korean peninsula, or other long-term ..... willingness to counter growing protectionist sen- ..... goals the leadership might harbor that severely ..... timent. In addition, it was said, KORUS has sig- ..... compromise the security interests of the United ..... nificance beyond Korea in that its comprehensive, ..... States and its allies...... high standards offer a model for emulation by other ...... ■■ Consider North Korea’s worldview and its stra- Asia-Pacific countries. Furthermore, it was argued, ..... tegic and economic isolation and recognize that trade growth could act as a free stimulus in this ...... it has national interests, so as to better shape time of global economic downturn...... its interests and persuade Pyongyang of better Several participants argued that KORUS would sow ..... ways to achieve them. Such an approach is not ..... strategic as well as economic benefits for the United ..... composed only of pressure and sanctions, as ne- ..... States and Korea by solidifying the alliance, thereby ..... gotiations are not successful unless both sides helping the partnership to address a broader range ..... come away feeling that they received something ..... of regional and global challenges. A Korean partici- ..... they needed. Such an approach will also eventu- ..... pant illustrated this point by holding up KORUS ..... ally include positive security guarantees. passage or failure as a gauge of U.S. commitment ...... and friendship toward Korea. One speaker invoked ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... | 5 ...... top trading representatives in coming months, ef- ..... the North Korean threat as a reason to strengthen ..... the bilateral relationship, starting with its econom- forts will pick up steam. Additionally, it was noted, ...... ic component. The same participants also identified President Lee’s economic policies are in line with ..... efforts to promote trade growth, and Seoul has ..... potential strategic costs to the United States if the ..... Congress does not approve KORUS. It would un- avoided a turn toward protectionism during the ...... dermine U.S. authority in promoting trade across crisis and instead viewed trade expansion as a tool ..... for economic recovery...... the globe and represent a setback to global trade ..... liberalization, and it would put the United States at ...... a disadvantage as the prolifer- ...... ation of free trade agreements ..... (FTAs) continues worldwide ...... and as Korea pushes forward ...... with trade deals with the Eu- ..... ropean Union, Peru, Austra- ...... lia, New Zealand, India, and ...... others. One speaker reasoned ..... that with the uncertain future ...... of the Doha multilateral trade ...... negotiation round, engaging ..... in bilateral trade agreements ...... is key to remaining competi- ...... tive...... The panel also included Session Two, from left: Deputy Minister Hye-Min Lee, South Korean Ministry of ..... Foreign Affairs and Trade; Ms. Wendy Cutler, Office of the U.S. Trade Repre- ..... speakers who did not support ..... immediate passage of KO- sentative; Rep. Earl Pomeroy, U.S. House of Representatives from North ..... Dakota; Dr. Hye-Hoon Lee, South Korean National Assembly; Mr. Myron ..... RUS in its current form. They ..... Brilliant, U.S.-Korea Business Council; and Dr. Hichung Moon, formerly of ..... deemphasized the danger Special Committee on KORUS FTA...... of a challenge to America’s ..... leadership role in promoting ...... global trade liberalization and noted the risk that KORUS must still pass a floor vote of a plenary ses- ..... sion of South Korea’s National Assembly. One par- ..... increased trade under KORUS-type deals could ex- ..... acerbate unsustainable growth in trade imbalances. ticipant said that a majority of legislators and the ...... And because the United States and Korea are such public support passage of the FTA, although few ..... favor immediate action. Timing remains key, both ..... important economic partners, it was said, the need ..... to get the agreement “right” is paramount; this will because some feel that Korea’s interests would be ...... entail thorough review to make sure measures in damaged if the deal were to be approved in Seoul ..... the agreement go far enough toward leveling the but not Washington and because sensitivities sur- ...... playing field, particularly considering the health of rounding former president Roh Moo-hyun’s re- ..... U.S. companies in this struggling economy and the cent suicide could overshadow or jeopardize an ...... sharp downturn in the auto market. FTA vote that comes too early. Korean proponents ..... of KORUS repeatedly raised the point that a U.S...... The remainder of the discussion on KORUS fo- ..... insistence on renegotiation of the deal would open ..... cused on the political constraints in both coun- ..... the floodgates for Korean interest groups seeking ..... tries and prospects for moving the FTA forward, as ..... to make new demands, unleash a host of political ..... Presidents Lee and Obama have agreed to do. A few ..... constraints to concluding a new deal, and be seen ..... participants were optimistic that with the upcom- ..... as inconsistent with U.S. trade promotion princi- ..... ing presidential summit in Washington, as well as ..... ples. One American speaker echoed this sentiment, ..... several planned meetings between the countries’ ..... arguing that material changes to the negotiations ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... 6 | ...... with Korea or other countries with which the Unit- of the deal, consult with relevant stakeholders and ..... ed States has recently concluded trade agreements both countries’ legislatures, and address problem- ...... would set a bad example for the conduct of future atic pieces of the agreement...... negotiations. Prospects for the U.S.-ROK Alliance and ...... Prospects for KORUS passage in the U.S. Congress East Asia: Challenges and Opportunities ..... were seen as much dimmer in light of the wrench- ..... The final panel considered recent security develop- ..... ing economic crisis, the recent bankruptcy of major ..... ments in Northeast Asia and how the U.S.-ROK al- ..... U.S. auto manufacturers, and skepticism of trade ..... liance might be adapted to meet future challenges...... deals in the House Democratic Caucus that reflects ..... Overall, there was strong agreement on the endur- ..... concern in representatives’ districts about rising ..... ing value of the alliance and what the future rela- ..... unemployment. Past and pending FTAs, it was ..... tionship might look like...... said, represent to some opponents all that seems to ...... be wrong with U.S. trade policy, and some in the Participants applauded the alliance’s success in ..... preventing war on the peninsula, allowing South ..... U.S. public associate past FTAs with unsustainable ..... trade deficits, a shriveling manufacturing sector, Korea to grow economically and evolve into a de- ...... and markets flooded with imports. One speaker ar- mocracy, and guaranteeing peace and stability in ..... the region. They also noted its enduring strength, as ..... gued that Americans need to take a fresh look at the ..... United States’ terms of trade with countries across underscored by the fact that the United States was ...... the world, put a check on boundless faith in trade the only country to send a presidential delegation ..... to attend the funeral services for former president ..... deals as they are currently negotiated, and ensure ..... that future deals produce clear gains for the U.S. Roh Moo-hyun—a delegation that included two of ...... economy and advance U.S. interests. That partici- the speakers at the CSIS–Chosun Ilbo Forum. The ..... major theme of this session, however, was that the ..... pant called 2009 a “very bad year” for KORUS in ..... Congress, but ventured that there would be a time alliance is at a crossroads and needs to undergo ...... in the not-so-distant future when the deal could transformation as regional power configurations ..... shift and security threats evolve. It was widely ex- ..... be satisfactorily received after key criticisms are ..... pected that Presidents Lee and Obama would artic- ..... addressed. In discussing executive branch dynam- ..... ics, it was noted that vigorous and creative efforts ulate a new vision for the alliance at the June 2009 ...... would be made to move KORUS forward, but the White House summit...... administration still needed to continue its review ...... From left: Dr. Mike Green, CSIS; Mr. Derek Mitchell, Department of Defense; Dr. Stephen Flanagan, CSIS; ...... Mr. Kyu-Hyun Kim, Korean Embassy; and Dr. Young-Sun Ha, Seoul National University...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... | 7 ...... The most prominent change in the regional security cating that the original intent of the alliance was for ...... dynamic identified by the panelists was China’s rise a Pacific or even global relationship; that same par- ...... and the question of how to convince China to be- ticipant warned that Washington and Seoul must ..... come a responsible regional and global stakehold- not allow Pyongyang to obstruct the future course ...... er. In particular, rapid growth in Chinese defense of the alliance...... spending was seen as putting its neighbors in a state Korea has recently taken steps toward expanding ..... of unease. Additionally, speakers noted the newly ..... its contribution to off-peninsula security chal- ..... perceptible limits to U.S. influence worldwide, the ..... lenges, with its assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan, ..... relative decline in U.S. economic power, and the involvement in antipiracy missions off the coast of ..... fact that the Obama administration will necessarily ..... Somalia, announced participation in the Prolifera- ..... have to pour enormous energy and resources into ..... tion Security Initiative, active involvement in ad- ..... resolving the economic crisis and conducting the dressing the global financial crisis, initiatives on ..... wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—Washington would ..... climate change and green growth, and plans to en- ..... now need to utilize smart power and broad multi- ..... hance its capability to deploy peacekeepers...... lateral cooperation to achieve its objectives. Final- ..... ly, North Korea’s brinkmanship was continuing to One topic that received considerable attention was ...... generate uncertainty in the region about the pos- the question of how China fits into a twenty-first– ..... century U.S.-ROK alliance. One participant argued ..... sibility of a regional arms race or further damage ..... to the nonproliferation regime. In addition to these that China is an important partner for the United ...... regional developments, panelists identified a host States and Korea on many issues, including the ..... North Korean problem, but cautioned that China ..... of nontraditional security challenges that require ..... the alliance’s attention. The speakers were united requires close observation and that one role of the ...... in calling for the transformation from a Cold War alliance should be to work carefully with Beijing to ..... ensure that China’s transition is smooth and peace- ..... alliance to a more comprehensive, twenty-first– ..... ful and that Beijing’s engagement in the region and ..... century alliance better suited to this modern stra- ..... tegic environment. globally is constructive...... Another subject that generated significant discus- ..... The discussion of what form a more comprehen- ..... sive alliance might take was rooted in a consensus sion was the transfer of wartime operational con- ...... that South Korea is in a better position than ever to trol of ROK troops (OPCON) to South Korea, ..... scheduled for April 2012. Several present expressed ..... contribute to collective security and has a respon- ..... sibility to take on a more substantial regional and unease with this timetable and remarked that South ...... global role. The United States’ and Korea’s shared Korean public sentiment is largely in favor of delay- ..... ing the transfer. One American speaker responded ..... values, trust, complementary capabilities, and ..... common security interests were identified as as- with confidence that the transfer could be com- ...... sets to the partnership. Speakers differed as to how pleted in a timely and responsible manner, but this ..... speaker also acknowledged that the crafting of a vi- ..... much emphasis they placed on the centrality of the ..... North Korean problem to alliance objectives, with sion for the future alliance was necessary to provide ...... some calling attention to North Korea’s recent nu- context for the transfer and assured detractors that ..... Washington would not push the transfer forward ..... clear and missile tests as a reminder that deterring ..... Pyongyang should remain the fundamental goal. if Seoul did not feel ready. That participant also ...... Others argued that a future-oriented alliance ought noted that OPCON transfer and the reconfigura- ..... tion of U.S. troops on the peninsula would amount ..... to be focused on issues beyond North Korea and ..... engage on issues beyond its traditional purview, to a stronger, more sustainable posture that will ...... for instance maritime safety, humanitarian causes, maintain the deterrence effect that the alliance has ..... always had...... energy security, the environment, Afghanistan, and ..... mutual economic recovery. One participant noted Panelists noted the importance of domestic un- ...... that the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty derstanding and support in both countries for al- ..... does not actually mention North Korea at all, indi- liance transformation and offered ideas for how ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ...... 8 | ...... to secure it. Both governments, it was suggested, Finally, one participant recounted recent remarks ..... should actively nurture public opinion about these by Robert Gates, U.S. defense secretary, in which ...... efforts and work to create a legislative consensus he affirmed the enduring U.S. commitment to the ...... that would support new alliance objectives. One region but also spoke of the need to better lever- ..... speaker noted the fortunate reality that, according age the assets of U.S. alliances. For South Korea, ...... to polls, the United States remains the most popu- this means the United States will increasingly look ...... lar country among South . Another speaker to its ally as a partner rather than a patron. Gates ..... observed that the elevation of Korea’s status in the would also like to see bilateral alliances augmented ...... U.S. Foreign Military Sales program and the addi- by multilateral cooperation and a fostering of ties ...... tion of Korea to the U.S. visa waiver program both among U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia, Southeast ..... served to promote trust and further cooperation; Asia, and Australia...... congressional ratification of KORUS, this speaker ...... said, would be another example of a step that would ..... help consolidate the relationship and foster public Rapporteur: Alyson Slack ...... trust in the relationship...... From left: Mr. Yong-Shik Byun, The Chosun Ilbo; Amb. Byung-Kook Kim, Korea University; Dr. Young-Sun Ha, ..... Seoul National University; Mr. Sang-Hoon Bang, The Chosun Ilbo; Dr. Seung-Hwan Kim, CSIS ...... 1800 k street nw, washington dc 20006 | p. 202.887.0200 | f. 202.775.3199 | www.csis.org ......