Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in Desertiªcation Negotiations • Adil Najam

AdilDynamics Najam of the Southern Collective Dynamics of the Southern Collective: Developing Countries in Desertiªcation Negotiations • Adil Najam

The spate of global environmental negotiations triggered by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also called the Earth Summit), has contributed signiªcantly to reviving the importance of a “North-South” template for understanding and dealing with global environmental politics.1 While the obligatory mention is constantly made of developing countries as a singular “South,” there are very few analytic attempts to understand the nature of the so-called South, its collective interest, its collective strategies and its collective behavior in international environmental politics.2 Earlier research by this author has argued that the institutional face of the “South” is the Group of 77 (G77), which is a negotiating caucus of over 130 developing countries in the United Nations system; that as a self-professed collective of the weak, the G77 is inherently risk-averse and seeks to minimize its losses rather than to maximize its gains; that its unity is based on a sense of shared vulnerability and a shared distrust of the prevailing world order rather than a common ordeal of poverty; that it professes high aspirations for systemic change but because of its self-perception of weakness has very low expectations; and that it highly cherishes its long-term structural unity.3 Indeed, the G77’s most remarkable achievement has been the fact that it has survived as a collective for over three decades despite its many internal differences and despite repeated external assaults on its unity. This paper seeks to extend our understanding of the negotiating nature of the collective South by understanding how the South, as institutionally represented by the G77, manages its unity as a negotiating collective despite its many internal differences and in the face of external pressures. In order to empirically ground this enquiry, we will focus on the negotiations leading to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertiªcation

1. See, for example, Adams 1993; Banuri 1992; Miller 1995; Najam et al. 2002; Khor 1992; Sell 1996; and Susskind 1994. 2. Some notable exceptions include, Gupta 2000; Thomas 1992; and Williams 1993. 3. Najam 1996, 2000, and 2003. For more on collective negotiation by the South, see G77 1994; Geldart and Lyon 1980; and Krasner 1985.

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(CCD). The desertiªcation case is particularly interesting because a) it was man- ifestly South-driven, b) it saw uncommonly intense South-South bargaining within the context of a global environmental negotiation, and c) it also saw intense North-South differences. Our purpose is not to repeat the story of the desertiªcation negotiations, which has already been told rather well by others.4 Instead, this paper seeks to recast the essential elements of this story in the speciªc context of how the G77 managed its internal (South-South) as well as external (South-North) negotiations. We will use a negotiation analytical framework to derive generalizable lessons about the negotiating behavior of the collective South. Doing so not only sheds new light on how we understand the negotiating nature of the collective South, but also on how we understand the history of the desertiªcation convention. We begin our discussion with an overview of the desertiªcation negotiations with an explicit emphasis on the internal dynamics of the Southern collective during the treaty negotiations. The goal is to systematically describe the behavior of the Southern collective at various points in the negotiation process, in terms of two key variables: (a) the level of coordination exhibited by the Southern collective, ranging from low to high levels; and (b) the breadth of the issue, ranging from a speciªc focus on issues related most directly to the desertiªcation convention to a broader focus on larger concerns about North- South relations in general. These two variables then become the “data points” to be used in the subsequent analytical section. Using a conceptual framework developed by the author for studying the role of collectives in negotiation, the next section will chart the collective behavior of the G77 at various points of the negotiation. Finally, the last section highlights a set of lessons for the South, pertaining both to the challenges of managing the Southern collective and of improved North-South relations in international environmental negotiations. In keeping with the tradition of negotiation analysis developed by Howard Raiffa (sometimes called the “asymmetrically prescriptive-descriptive approach”),5 a conscious effort has been made to separate the descriptive analysis of the ªrst section from the conceptual analysis of the second section and the prescriptive analysis of the concluding section.

Descriptive Analysis: The G77 in Desertiªcation Negotiations The Desertiªcation Convention tends to evoke strong reaction among those who study it. On the one hand there are those who applaud it as the very em- bodiment of the aspirations and promise of the 1992 Earth Summit and as the ªrst “sustainable development treaty.”6 Others are less celebratory about what they describe as “Rio’s stepchild,”7 and dub as a “second class convention” and

4. Agarwal et al. 1999; Burns, 1995; Chasek 1997; Corell 1999a and 1999b; Danish 1995; Kassas 1995; Kjellén 1994; Long 2000; and Toulmin 1994 and 1995. 5. See Raiffa 1982; Raiffa et al. 2003; and Sebenius 1992. 6. Chasek 1997. 7. Sharma 1999.

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a “poor relation” to other Rio treaties.8 Yet, even the skeptics acknowledge CCD’s promise as “[perhaps the ªrst treaty that] provides the world with a framework for global and national action that is both just and bold.”9 And even its supporters acknowledge that at times (particularly on North-South ªnancial tensions), “negotiations seemed to be nothing more than a debate among ºuent tongues and deaf ears; the spirit of the Earth Summit was apparently an ephemeral spurt.”10 Whatever else they may or may not agree on, all who have commented on the Desertiªcation Convention seem to agree that it is unique among its cohort of global environmental treaties in that it is the only one that was called for by the developing countries and, therefore, saw an unprecedented level of engagement and involvement by the developing country negotiating caucus, the G77.

An Abbreviated History of International Desertiªcation Policy The history of desertiªcation as an international policy issue predates the history of the desertiªcation convention. Although the Great Sahelian Drought (1968–73) was devastating large parts of Africa at that very time, desertiªcation as an issue was not on the international environmental policy radar at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) at Stock- holm. However, given that UNEP—which was born out of UNCHE—soon became the ªrst, and still only, United Nations’ agency to be housed in Africa (or for that matter anywhere in the developing world) it was not surprising that the newly minted world organization soon turned its attention towards the environmental havoc that had been wrought by the drought. The 1977 United Na- tions Conference on Desertiªcation, held in Nairobi in September 1977, adopted a “Plan of Action to Combat Desertiªcation” (PACD) with the objectives of, a) preventing and arresting the advance of desertiªcation, b) reclaiming desertiªed land for productive use, and c) sustaining and promoting, within ecological limits, the productivity of areas vulnerable to desertiªcation in order to improve the quality of life of their inhabitants.11 The non-binding PACD not only served as the precursor to the legally- binding CCD but laid down the foundation of the latter’s substance and archi- tecture. While a number of attempts were made to create functional institutions to implement the spirit of the PACD—and while there was a brief second spurt of global interest in the issue when disaster struck Africa yet again in 1983–84— chronic disinterest by the rest of the world, institutional turf battles, and a failure to raise funds for required action doomed the PACD, which has been described as an “abject failure.”12 To those who were most affected, and therefore

8. Agarwal et al. 1999. 9. Agarwal et al. 1999, 186. 10. Kassas 1995, 177. 11. Burns, 1995, 849–850. 12. Burns, 1995, 852.

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dejected, by the demise of PACD the lessons were clear: if anything meaningful were ever to be done about desertiªcation, a) the issue would have to attain higher international proªle as a truly global issue, b) it would have to be dealt with within a legally-binding framework, and c) a dependable and sufªcient supply of funds would have to be procured. The African countries, with the support of other G77 members, launched a move to actualize such an agreement in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro. After intense, and often tense, deliberations at UNCED on whether there should at all be a global treaty on desertiªcation, the Earth Sum- mit agreed that there should, and the UN General Assembly established the intergovernmental negotiating committee for the elaboration of a convention to combat desertiªcation (INCD) in late 1992. After a ªrst organizational session, held in January 1993 in New York, the INCD met ªve times between June 1993 and June 1994 to prepare the text of the Convention, ofªcially titled the “United Nations Convention to Combat Desertiªcation in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertiªcation, Particularly in Africa.” The Convention (along with its four regional annexes) was adopted at INCD-5 at Paris, in June 1994 and opened for signature later that year. It was decided that the INCD would continue meeting until the requisite number of ratiªcations were received and until the ªrst meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP). A total of six additional meetings were held in this interim period, with the last meeting held in August 1997, right before the ªrst CoP. The Convention legally came into force when the ªftieth instrument of ratiªcation was formally received (from Chad) on 26 December 1996. Figure 1 depicts the CCD negotiation process as organized around key negotiation phases.13 Post- negotiation, CoPs were held annually from 1997 to 2001 (Rome, Dakar, Recife, Bonn and Geneva). It was decided that subsequent CoPs would be held bienni- ally, interchanging with sessions of the Committee for the Review of the Imple- mentation of the Convention (CRIC). The ªrst meeting of CRIC was held in Rome in 2002, while the sixth meeting of the CoP was held in Havana in 2003. Even more than most other global environmental negotiations, North- South differences have remained a key fault line in CCD deliberations. This was to be expected in a process that had been pushed for by the South and actively resisted by the North. However, it is equally signiªcant that the CCD negotiations were different from other recent environmental negotiations because of the intensity of South-South differences. Strong as these disagreements were, they were not signs of the much-prophesized eventual breakup of the G77. Given that desertiªcation was an eminently Southern issue, it should not be surprising that the developing countries were much more engaged and animated in these negotiations. This resulted in more intense South-South negotiation and served to bring internal G77 differences to the surface. What is surprising is that by the end of the negotiations the major South-South differences had

13. Based on Corell 1999b, 81.

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Figure 1 CCD Timeline

been meaningfully resolved but the most important North-South tensions remained unresolved. This section will focus on both these sets of tensions— North-South and South-South—and how the G77 responded to them. We will focus principally on the ªrst two phases depicted in Figure 1—pre-negotiation and negotiation—up to the actual adoption of the Convention. A brief discussion of the negotiations during the interim phase will be presented to the extent necessary.14

UNCED: How Africa got “its” Convention Even though the main proponents of UNCED were from the North, UN resolution 44/228 which sets the mandate for the conference was a creature of South-

14. The factual description of events in the next three sections relies heavily on the narrative of the CCD negotiation process available in Burns 1995; Danish 1995; Kassas 1995; Chasek 1997; Corell 1999b; Agarwal et al. 1999; and Long 2000. In addition, reports from the Earth Negotia- tion Bulletin (ENB) have also been used (see http://www.iisd.ca/vol04/).

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ern interests.15 More signiªcantly, on the insistence of African members of the G77, desertiªcation was afforded a very special place of prominence in this resolution. In fact, in speciªcally calling upon UNCED to “accord high priority to drought and desertiªcation control,” UN resolution 44/228 gave much more importance to desertiªcation than, for example, issues like climate change, biodiversity and deforestation. Despite this mandate, the UNCED preparatory process paid little attention to desertiªcation; certainly the ªrst three of the four UNCED Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) all but ignored it.16 Unhappy at the treatment that “their” issue was getting from the industrialized North and also from their G77 comrades, and realizing that the lead on desertiªcation would have to be taken by the Africans themselves, a special meeting of 40 African environment ministers held in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in November 1991 (right before PrepCom IV), adopted the “African Common Po- sition on Environment and Development” and the “Abidjan Declaration.” One of the major points in these documents was the call for an international convention to combat desertiªcation. However, the African proposal for a desertiªca- tion convention got rather lukewarm reception from the rest of the G77 when the entire Group met in Kuala Lumpur in early 1992 and failed to endorse the African call in its communiqué.17 Although the issue had not yet become an open dispute within the G77, the seeds of dissent had been sown. The issue came to a head at the fourth UNCED PrepCom at New York in March 1992. Consensus on most elements of what eventually became Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 (“Managing Fragile Ecosystems”) arose relatively easily since they were mostly “recycled” versions of arguments from the 1972 UNCOD.18 However, the African demand—which received tactical but not enthusiastic support from the G77—for a desertiªcation convention was ªercely resisted by the North. The US, in particular, was fearful that a desertiªcation convention would trigger calls for additional funding under the GEF and doubted, along with the European Community, the validity of desertiªcation as anything more than a cluster of local environmental issues.19 However, what began as a straightforward North-South tussle soon took a different twist, when the Europeans decided to “[dangle] the desertiªcation convention as a carrot to induce the South to agree to a forest convention” by openly offering to accept the desertiªcation convention in exchange for the forest convention.20 The EU move not only drove a wedge within the G77 but also split Africa, since a number of African countries, like Cameroon and Gabon, with large tracts of tropical forests were also opposed to a forests convention that would focus principally, if not solely, on tropical forests.21 The G77 leadership, which

15. Najam 1995. 16. Long 1997, 89 17. Porter et al. 2000, 133. 18. Long 1997, 89; and Corell 1996, 6. 19. Agarwal et al. 1999, 169; Porter et al. 2000, 132; and Corell 1996, 6. 20. Agarwal et al. 1999, 169. 21. Agarwal et al. 1999, 229.

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saw this as a sabotage attempt, took steps to regroup. Hectic internal negotiations were held between various G77 regional groups and, ultimately, all of them decided to support the African demand for a convention, while the entire African group decided to join the rest of the G77 in their opposition to a forest convention.

[The] African countries, supported by the rest of the developing world, force- fully pushed the desertiªcation issue against resistance from [the North]. The turning point came when the United States agreed to support the proposal and the pressure became too strong for the European Community to resist. A chapter on desertiªcation and drought was included in Agenda 21 and, on 10 June 1992, UNCED requested the UN General Assembly to establish an intergovernmental negotiating committee to elaborate a desertiªcation convention.22

Six months later, at its 47th session, the UNGA adopted resolution 47/188 estab- lishing an international negotiating committee for the elaboration of a convention to combat desertiªcation (INCD). In reºecting the sense of urgency demanded by Africa, the resolution stated that the negotiations should be ªnalized by June 1994. Various reasons have been suggested for why the US, and later the Euro- pean Community, changed its position even though they clearly had not been convinced of the need for such an instrument. These include: a) Tommy Koh of Singapore, Chairman of the UNCED PrepCom, had taken personal responsibility for the issue and used his ofªce to press for an agreement; b) the US decision was meant to deºect the negative publicity it was getting at home for its other positions at UNCED; c) the North gave in because it wanted to keep the African nations (and other developing countries) engaged in the Rio process; and ªnally and importantly, d) the African group had indicated throughout PrepCom IV and UNCED that it would insist on a desertiªcation convention before approving any other UNCED document—an African defection, could therefore, have jeopardized all other Rio agreements.23 Whatever the reasons for the North’s turnaround, the G77 emerged galvanized by the challenge. Ironically, the blatancy of the Northern attempt to “break” the G77 spurred Southern unity. Internal negotiations intensiªed in the period between PrepCom IV and UNCED and between UNCED and the De- cember UNGA session, and desertiªcation once again became a “developing country issue” rather than just an “African issue.” By the time the dust settled, a) the South was clearly happy at having resisted Northern “browbeating” and forcing the North to “backtrack”;24 b) the G77 was demonstrating a higher level of internal negotiation and coordination; and c) international action on desertiªcation, although still an “African priority,” had assumed broader support within the G77.

22. Corell 1999b, 75. 23. See Johnson, 1993, 243; Corell 1999b, 75; and Agarwal et al. 1999, 171. 24. Agarwal et al. 1999, 171.

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INCD-1: The Nightmare in Nairobi The developing countries had been fairly active in preparing for the ªrst substantive session of the INCD. In addition to the preparatory consultations that the African group and later the G77 held prior to the 1992 UNGA session, they participated actively in the INCD organizational session (held in New York, Jan- uary 1993) where Algeria submitted a 40-page outline of a convention to the African group and Egypt distributed an extensive position paper. When delegates met for the ªrst substantive session of the INCD at Nairobi in May 1993, most of them expected a rather staid and straightforward “information shar- ing.” However, neither the G77 nor the INCD Secretariat anticipated the reaction that awaited a chance suggestion that the INCD Chairman—Ambassador Bo Kjellén of Sweden—had thrown out towards the very end of the organizational session:

At the INCD organizational meeting, the Chairman proposed that the special concern for Africa be expressed in the form of an annex or protocol to the convention and that other parts of the world could have protocols or annexes in the future. However, this caused a split in the G77 . . . Latin Ameri- can and Asian delegates in particular resisted this proposal, insisting that instruments for other regions should be negotiated simultaneously. They argued that the problem was worldwide and that their efforts to combat desertiªcation deserved equal attention to those of Africa. Unless areas other than Africa received attention, the Convention would not appear to be global and thus would be unlikely to receive support from countries in other regions. The African countries thus faced a balancing act to maintain their particular role in the Convention and the support of the rest of the G77 countries at the same time. This disagreement was so strong in the last hours of INCD-1 that the entire negotiation seemed to be in jeopardy.25

The issue of granting priority to Africa became the deªning issue at INCD- 1. It caused a greater ªssure within the G77 than it otherwise might have because Colombia, which had recently assumed the G77 Chair, had not shown up for the negotiation and, in their absence, Brazil was serving as the acting Chair. Brazil, with signiªcant drylands of its own, was one of the most vocal proponents of all regional annexes being negotiated simultaneously. The Africans, already incensed at what they considered to be an attempt to highjack “their” convention, saw this as a blatant conºict of interest and refused to meet under Brazilian leadership. With the Africans refusing to meet under Brazilian leadership, the G77 was essentially immobilized as a vehicle of Southern coordination for the ªrst time ever in any international environmental negotiation. More than that, the negotiations themselves were stalled and INCD-1 ended with a huge question mark over the future of the Convention. The Earth Negotiation Bulletin team reporting on the meeting ended their summary assessment of the negotiations with this uncharacteristically emotional commentary: “...theªrst

25. Corell 1999b, 89.

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session of the INCD ended on a discordant note, exactly one year after the Earth Summit in Rio. Whatever was embodied in the “Spirit of Rio”—compromise, consensus and the desire to avoid failure—was lost in Nairobi.”26 Although the epicenter of the feud was very much within the G77, postur- ing from the North further fueled the tensions. As with the deforestation- desertiªcation linkage issue at UNCED, the US and European delegates actively prodded the African group to negotiate independently, in what some saw as an attempt to scuttle Southern unity.27 Indeed, from a Southern perspective the North continued trying to divide the South along Africa/non-Africa lines throughout the negotiations, including on issues related to ªnancing and treaty administration.28

INCD-2: Patching up the G77 The tensions from Nairobi spilled over into INCD-2 at Geneva, which started amidst much uncertainty but ended with the G77 succeeding in regrouping itself. Colombia, still the G77 chair, had originally intended not to attend the meeting but was forced to rush a delegate to the meeting once it became apparent that the G77 would not be able to meet under Brazilian leadership. Since the G77 leadership rotates regionally and it was Latin America’s “turn,” Brazil (as the next Latin American country in line) was obligated to assume the G77 chair in case of Colombia’s absence. Sensing crisis, a number of larger G77 countries—especially Malaysia—intervened to maintain group solidarity. The highlight of INCD-2 was not simply that the G77 was able to bounce back, but that intense South-South negotiation resulted in a formula that was able to break the looming impasse. Eventually, the G77 members agreed that the Con- vention and the regional instrument for Africa would be ªnalized by June 1994 and the other regional instruments would be negotiated in the interim period pending the entry into force of the Convention. This innovative solution was a win-win formula.29 It allowed Africa to retain its sense of priority while ensuring for the other regions that the Convention would remain global in character and would enter into force with multiple regional instruments in place.30 Agreement on this issue could not have come any sooner because by INCD-2 the G77 had even more compelling reasons to reassert its unity. The key item on INCD-2’s agenda was the single compilation text prepared by the Secre- tariat. The Secretariat had sifted through nearly 700 pages of comments to produce a synthesis document of 86 pages, and this became the basis of negotiation. The developing countries, particularly from Africa, contributed sig-

26. ENB 1993a. 27. Agarwal et al. 1999, 173. 28. Agarwal et al., 1999; also see ENB 1994c. 29. The “regionalization” approach adopted by the CCD is very similar to what has been suggested by negotiation analysts including Susskind 1994; and Najam 1994 and 1995. 30. ENB 1993b.

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niªcantly to this process. The Organization for African Unity (OAU) submitted a complete draft convention text; this was complimented by texts from Burkina Faso, Egypt, Mali, Senegal and Tunisia.31

[North-South] divergence occurred in discussions regarding the ‘global’ nature of desertiªcation. Southern countries supported use of the word global because it emphasized the importance of desertiªcation throughout the world and not only in Africa. Northern states opposed the term global. Northern delegates believed that the word global connoted global warming and suggested Northern responsibility for desertiªcation’s solution. Further- more, industrialized countries feared that emphasis on desertiªcation, as a global problem linked to climate change would enable anti-desertiªcation projects to access new funding via GEF. This possibility ran counter to the North’s position that efforts to combat desertiªcation should draw on existing funding and institutions.32

The discussion on ªnancing also began at INCD-2 and it became clear that the North had no inclination to agree to any additional and systematic sources of funds. In short, the issues that came to the forefront of the agenda at INCD-2 only served to remind the Southern countries of the broader goals that had brought the G77 together in the ªrst place and nudged them to reassert their unity. The G77 left Geneva bruised, but recovering.

INCD-3, INCD-4 & INCD-5: Money Matters The rationality of why the developing countries were originally sticking together under the G77 umbrella came into even sharper relief at the third, fourth and ªfth substantive sessions of the INCD held, respectively, in New York, Geneva and Paris in January, March and June of 1994.33 During these meetings, the G77—now with an African country, Algeria, as its Chair—progressively reafªrmed its role as the principal (and, often, sole) voice of the South. How- ever, and importantly, even as the G77 strengthened its coordinating role during these sessions it was able to maintain a high level of issue differentiation between regions and particular member states. Given the scare that the G77 had lived through at Nairobi and Geneva, it was important for it to maintain intense internal negotiations on issues related to regional priorities in order to ensure that the spectacle of disintegration was not repeated. Although a whole host of issues were discussed and decided over these three sessions, the most compelling debates were on state obligations and ªnancial provisions. The Convention deªnes three types of obligations—general, affected country, and developed country obligations. Under general obligations, the US and the European Union succeeded in thwarting Southern at-

31. ENB 1993b. 32. Long 1997, 94. 33. ENB 1994a, 1994b, and 1994c.

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tempts to directly link desertiªcation to concerns about international trade, debt and poverty eradication. Discussions on the obligations of affected state Parties were relatively straightforward except for some rhetorical sparring on the part of the United States which insisted that the focus not be limited to affected “developing” countries.34 Much more entrenched debate ensued in crafting the obligations of developed countries. “The trouble began at INCD-3, when Article 6 in the ªrst draft of the convention was titled ‘Obligations of country Parties in a position to provide assistance.’ The outspoken Ambassador Wen Lian Ting from Malaysia immediately . . . argued that this was a blatant attempt to expand the traditional donor community to include nondeveloped countries. Most of the Asian and Latin American countries concurred.”35 However, “for many African countries, the money was important, not its source . . . [and] many Francophone African countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal supported the Norway-UK-US proposal of expanding the source of assistance.”36 For other G77 members, however, the real issue related to precedence and maintaining the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle.37 The difference within the G77 at this point was between those most focused of the speciªc issue of desertiªcation and those more concerned about broader G77 goals as they related not just to this particular negotiation but to the larger emerging regime of global environmental treaties. The debate threatened to split the G77 once again. Algeria, the G77 Chair, acted proactively to avert the threat. Over the course of INCD-3 and INCD-4, Algeria called for and spearheaded a progres- sion of internal G77 negotiations to convince the dissenting countries that although the other G77 members were willing to support the least developed countries in anti-desertiªcation programs, accepting the proposed language would mean letting the industrialized North off the hook, would undo many of the gains of UNCED, and set a dangerous precedent. The G77 was ultimately able to arrive at compromise language, which deleted the precedent setting tone of the draft and retained an encouragement to all parties to provide “voluntary” assistance.38 This demonstrated a resolve to maintain its unity against external threats, and an ability to undertake internal negotiations in a “problem-solving” mode to deal with its members’ differentiated interests. North-South ªnancial tensions, however, proved more difªcult to resolve. The lesson from the 1977 UNCOD for the South, and for Africa in particular, was that no international effort could ever be implemented without a stable and signiªcant source of independent funding. To the G77, this was the ultimate test for CCD. Yet, every attempt they made towards this goal was shot down: seeking

34. ENB 1994b. 35. Chasek 1997, 160. 36. Agarwal et al. 1999, 175. 37. ENB 1994a. 38. Chasek 1997.

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a new GEF funding window for desertiªcation, seeking a new Fund for Desertiªcation, and seeking the actualization of the North’s Rio commitment of 0.7 percent of GNP for ofªcial development assistance. At INCD-4, the two articles on ªnancial issues contained approximately 65 sets of brackets and positions were clearly polarized along North-South lines.39 The G77 Chair (Algeria) was proclaiming that the regional annexes (and, by default, CCD) would be “pointless” without new and additional ªnancial resources and without a ªnancial mechanism that was independent, identiªable and capable of mobilizing such resources.40 On the other hand, “the industrialized countries were a united veto coalition in rejecting any provision for new and additional ªnancing.”41 With the clock set by the UN General Assembly ticking fast, INCD-5 began shrouded in thick North-South tension. The talks were deadlocked with the USA-Europe blocking coalition unwilling to budge and the G77 unable to give. The Chair’s contact group (eight members each from North and South) strug- gled with the issue, meeting round the clock for three days. With nothing else to hold on to, the group began to concoct the nebulous concept of something called a “Global Mechanism” that would be charged with promoting actions leading to the mobilization of funds.42 Although there was no clear sense of how it would do so, nor enthusiasm for whether it would be able to do so, this was the one ware the contact group had to offer when time ran out. Technically, the deadline for concluding the negotiations had already passed at midnight of June 17–18, but frantic negotiation continued on the elements of the ªnancial compromise. It was well past midnight on the ªnal day of INCD-5 that such a compromise seemed in hand:

The regional groups quickly gathered to hear the results. Although the OECD group of countries said they were, reluctantly, going to accept the contact group’s text, the African Group and the G77 had more difªculty. At one point, it looked as though the G77 was going to reject the compromise and the negotiations would end in failure, but at 3:45 a.m., the G77 ªnally emerged [from its meeting] and said that they would accept the compromise, although a number of its members had reservations. When the ªnal plenary meeting began at 4:00 a.m., Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, India, and Djibouti all stated their reservations for the record.43

As the session ªnally wrapped up at 8:00 a.m. on the morning of 18 June 1994, after having negotiated and adopted the Convention, the Earth Negotia- tion Bulletin reported that many delegates “were too exhausted to celebrate”;44 others, of course, may not have wanted to celebrate what was a compromise-

39. ENB 1994b. 40. ENB 1994b. 41. Porter et al. 2000, 134. 42. See Corell 1999b; and ENB 1994c. 43. Chasek 1997, 162. 44. ENB 1994c.

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laden Convention that left just about all parties seriously unsatisªed on at least some elements.

The Interim Phase: Going Around in Circles The CCD was negotiated in record time and at breakneck speed over a period of just thirteen months. Things slowed down signiªcantly immediately after INCD-5. It was decided at Paris that the INCD would continue to meet until the requisite 50 ratiªcations were received and the ªrst Conference of the Parties (CoP) was held. Six such meetings were held between January 1995 and August 1997. The stated purpose of continuing INCD meetings during the interim phase was to design and decide the modalities of the Global Mechanism, to ini- tiate preparations for the ªrst meetings of the Conference of Parties and the Committee on Science and Technology, to decide on a location and institutional arrangements for a permanent Secretariat for the Convention, and to fa- cilitate the implementation of the Resolution on Urgent Action for Africa.45 Much of the work was organizational but on a few key issues the substantive differences remained contentious. The issue of “particularity” for Africa versus the “universality” of the Convention as an international instrument continued to periodically raise its head. Tensions around the provision of meaningful ªnancial mechanisms were as confrontational as ever with the G77 pushing for an independent and well-endowed Global Mechanism but the US and EU insisting on limiting its scale and scope. Both sets of tensions were transported to the CoPs, which have remained mired in administrative minutia and petty squabbling rather than beneªting from the protracted preparatory meetings in the interim phase.46 INCD-6 was a relatively low-key event that focused primarily on organiz- ing for the interim phase. The session had its obligatory outbursts of North- South sparring on issues such as the role of the Secretariat (the South preferring a more empowered Secretariat), ªnancial obligations (the North preferring no mention of commitments), the relative importance of CCD in comparison to its “sister” Conventions on climate change and biodiversity (the South fearing that CCD was being relegated to a lower status), the ultimate scale and scope of the Global Mechanism (the North resisting expansion in either dimension), etc.47 INCD-7 was even less eventful, resulting mostly in procedural decisions.48 At INCD-8, negotiations became earnest. Two competing visions of the Global Mechanism were in place. Most Southern delegates supported a central fund with its own resources, while most Northern delegations sought something that “would provide motivation and be an information source that would

45. ENB 1995a. 46. Agarwal et al. 1999, 178–181. 47. ENB 1995a. 48. ENB 1995b.

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leave funds in existing bilateral and multilateral funds.”49 To the North, the developing countries of the G77 were again trying to expand the scope of the Con- vention. To the South, the industrialized countries were showing that they were less serious about desertiªcation than about issues such as biodiversity or climate change. When the delegates reassembled in September 1996 for INCD-9 in New York, they replayed the same debate, again with no resolution in sight.

Negotiations on the Global Mechanism’s function of mobilizing resources were, for many, a repeat of the experience in Paris in June 1994. The late night meetings by informal groups, frequent adjournment of meetings, and a contact group ...werefamiliar to those who had followed the same issue at INCD-5 in Paris....Onedelegate joked that [the Global Mechanism] should be restricted to an address on the World Wide Web. Others said the Global Mechanism is the heart and soul of the Convention. They com- plained that even though there is now consensus that desertiªcation is a global problem and African countries are ready to implement the CCD, the lack of decision on the Global Mechanism signiªes that there is still reluc- tance to support the Convention....Onedelegate commented that the Mechanism would forever haunt the Convention.50

INCD-10 also ended in deadlock and decided to pass on the most contentious issues—including those related to the Global Mechanism, the Permanent Secretariat, and the composition of the CoP Bureau—to the ªrst CoP. The session also decided to “resume” its meeting in August, two months prior to the ªrst Conference of the Parties, to try to resolve other pending issues.51 Feeling desperate, the G77 tried one more card. In June 1997, the so-called “Rioϩ5” was convened in New York as a United Nations General Assembly Special Ses- sion (UNGASS) to review the progress on decisions made during the Rio Earth Summit. The South hoped that this high-level meeting would “remind the Northern countries of their Rio commitments.”52 However, attempts by the G77 to try to get the North to commit to fund the CCD Global Mechanism went “unrewarded.”53 The last, resumed, meeting of the INCD only served to show that INCD-5 at Paris would not have ended differently even if there had been more time. The blocking coalition of the US and EU adamantly vetoed any proposal except its own. Not surprisingly, the G77’s search for a well-deªned and well-endowed Global Mechanism proved futile.54 Through these six sessions, the G77 remained more cohesive on the issues than it had during the negotiation phase. The decision to have regional annexes had provided an innovative mechanism to meet the differentiated interests within the G77, while the decision to give priority to the African Annex had

49. ENB 1996a. 50. ENB 1996b. 51. ENB 1997a. 52. Agarwal et al. 1999, 175; also see Sandbrook 1997. 53. Corell 1998, 223. 54. ENB 1997b.

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given the African nations the special and priority treatment that they had sought. With the collective South now able to regain its more united front, the major dynamic was of increasing North-South polarization on the issue of ªnancing with an attendant decrease in issue differentiation within the G77. Gradually, the G77 slid back into its familiar posture of a low-key negotiating collective, maintaining a united stand without the need for much formal coordination and reasserting well-established and unsurprising arguments on a short menu of well-rehearsed concerns. Arguably, the North-South polarization at the end of the interim phase was more acute than at the end of INCD-5. For the Africans in particular, time had taken its toll on the euphoria of actually having negotiated a binding Convention. The failure to raise the proªle of either the Convention as a whole or of the Global Mechanism had raised serious doubts about just how seriously the North took the CCD, or Africa. This sense of being treated like a “second class convention” became a continuing theme in the ªrst three Conferences of the Parties and has resulted in much bickering.55 In particular, it has resulted in a strong desire, particularly by Africa, to assert the CCD’s—and within it, their region’s—importance through otherwise peripheral issues such as how many seats Africa has in the CoP Bureau or whether CCD is “equal,” or even “superior,” to its sister Conventions.

Conceptual Analysis: The Negotiation Behavior of the Southern Collective The purpose of negotiating collectively is to increase the prospects of gain and decrease the potential of risk for the members of the group. However, while negotiating collectives are invariably the results of a perceived similarity in interests, these interests are unlikely to be entirely identical. Hence, a certain amount of effort and energy has to be devoted to simply holding the collective together through the negotiation process. The task of the collective is to balance the cen- trifugal forces pulling the members away from the core of the collective by en- hancing the pull of centripetal forces working to bring them back. The desertiªcation negotiations described earlier serve as a particularly useful study of the associative behavior of the Southern collective because both challenges— that of holding the Southern collective together and that of negotiating with the North—proved to be uncommonly acute. On the one hand, the very solidarity of the G77 was threatened in ways they have not been threatened before or since. On the other, the North-South character of the deliberations was more profound than in many other environmental negotiations simply because this was a uniquely South-driven initiative. This section will analyze the G77’s experience and strategies during the CCD negotiations within the context of a negotiation analysis framework developed elsewhere.56 The analytical framework is grounded in a heuristic tem-

55. Agarwal et al. 1999. 56. Najam 2001.

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plate which may be understood as the “negotiating space” within which any negotiating collective operates. This space is deªned by two axes representing complexities related to parties and issues, respectively: • Parties’ Coordination: The x-axis in the two-dimensional template represents the nature of the strategic choice that a collective makes in terms of parties management—ranging from low to high levels of coordination. • Issue Focus: The y-axis in the two-dimensional template represents how the collective manages interests and issues—ranging from broad to spe- ciªc issue focus, with the former specifying a focus on broadly deªned and commonly held interests and the latter signifying the incorporation of speciªc and differentiated concerns of various partners. The “negotiating space” deªned by such a template can then be used to plot the behavior of the negotiating collective being studied (see Figure 2). Building on negotiation theory,57 it is posited that the nature of a group’s associative behavior is a function of these two deªning variables. Importantly, the framework posits that observations of parties’ levels of coordination and issue focus could reasonably deªne the behavior of the collective at that given point in the negotiation: • Alignment-like behavior is to be expected in situations characterized by low coordination of parties and a relatively broad issue focus. One could describe such behavior as “hanging loose”—the parties are held together by broad-based similarity of interests but the bond remains tentative in the absence of explicit coordination. • Bloc-like behavior would be expected where a broad issue focus is matched with high levels of formal coordination. Characterized by solidarity, such behavior may be visualized as the members of the collective “holding tight” to each other—the parties in the collective are held together tightly because the broad set of common interests that they share are ce- mented into a common strategy through active coordination. • Coalition-like behavior is expected when parties invest signiªcantly in coordination for the attainment of well-deªned packages of issue- speciªc goals. This behavior can be characterized as “team play” because it involves the pursuit of well-deªned and often limited objectives in a well- coordinated fashion that often includes different “players” having distinct responsibilities related to their particular strengths. • Finally, there are situations where the principal focus of the parties is on their more speciªc interests and there is little opportunity or effort for coordination. This leads to deal-making behavior and parties act like “free agents”—the possibility and potential for common negotiation platforms exists but the parties (or sub-groups) are willing to entertain the best available deals for meeting their immediate, differentiated, interests. 57. See, in particular, DuPont 1996; Lax and Sebenius 1991; Olson, 1965; and Zartman 1994.

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Figure 2: The ABCD of Collectives in International Multilateral Negotiation

Mapping the G77 Negotiation Behavior In order to analyze the negotiation behavior of the Southern collective through the various gyrations of the desertiªcation negotiations we will use the framework just described to plot the observed levels of parties’ coordination and issue focus of the G77 at the various key junctures. Each plot will be marked on the template deªned by the two axes discussed above. These assessments, although subjective, are informed by close scrutiny of the South’s behavior in the desertiªcation negotiations. While the minute details of each placement may be open to dispute, the general course the G77 charted for itself through the ebb and ºow of the negotiation is much more important for our purpose, and quite apparent from the description provided in the larger literature and presented in the previous section. Based on our earlier discussion of the negotiation dynamics, Table 1 trans- lates these assessments into a coding schema for mapping the G77’s collective behavior. Figure 3 depicts the results of this mapping. Coordination is coded at one of ªve possible levels—low, medium-low, medium, medium-high, and high. Issue focus is also coded at one of ªve possible levels—speciªc, mostly speciªc, mixed, mostly broad, and broad. In both cases, greater resolution is provided by the use of plus (ϩ) and minus (Ϫ) notations, which allow for a better capture of the observed nuances within and between these levels. The set of coordinates detailed in Table 1 and mapped in Figure 3 began

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Table 1: The G77 During CCD Negotiations

Interim Fluctuating between Fluctuating between Phase Medium-Low and Medium Mostly Broad and Mixed 1995-96 G77 retreats to familiar position at a Regional annexes serve to medium-low level, occasionally institutionalize issue differentiation increasing coordination when within CCD. Concerns about negotiating important concerns with regional differentiation are North (such as the Global occasionally raised but in a now- Mechanism). routinized discourse.

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with the 1989 UN General Assembly resolution 44/228, which was the en- abling resolution for UNCED. At this point, the G77 was behaving as an alli- ance and “holding tight” (point #1 in Table 1 and Figure 3). The South presented a fairly well coordinated position on why development and poverty should be at the forefront of the UNCED agenda and, importantly, placed desertiªcation on this agenda as a quintessential “Southern” issue—rather than just “African” issue. Figure 3, therefore, depicts the G77 demonstrating a slightly higher than medium level of coordination and a mostly broad and undifferenti- ated issue focus. By 1991, however, the issue of desertiªcation was more differentiated and less coordinated within the G77 context. At the Abidjan meeting of African environmental ministers (#2) and the subsequent G77 meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the G77 was not entirely operating as a set of “free agents” but was demonstrating relatively less coordination on desertiªcation which was, by then, being viewed as an “Africa only” issue. At the Fourth PrepCom for UNCED (#3), when desertiªcation was ªnally discussed as an agenda item, the G77 tactically rallied back to Africa’s support but largely in its all-too-familiar mode as a behavioral alignment. The issue assumed a new importance once the EU tried to link desertiªcation with its call for a deforestation convention. Galvanized by the threat of possible dissent from some African members, the G77 began moving towards coalitional “team play” by increasing its levels of coordination as well as issue differentiation on desertiªcation in the run-up to, and at, UNCED (#4). This momentum was maintained at the 1992 UN Gen- eral Assembly session (#5) where the G77, under African leadership, drafted the resolution (47/188) calling for international negotiations to begin on a desertiªcation convention. Figure 3 depicts the signiªcant G77 coordination that went into drafting this resolution by plotting it at a “medium-high (Ϫ)” level. The level of issue differentiation is plotted at “mixed (ϩ)” to account for the fact that the G77 was able to craft a common position for the convention, which included a focus on its abiding broader goals while also allowing the Af- rican group to maintain its particular priority. When the negotiations formally began at INCD-1 (#6), the G77 collective was in for a shock as some Latin American countries (with the support of the Asian group) suddenly question Africa’s “particularity” on desertiªcation. The question, quite clearly, was “whose issue is this?” and, even more importantly, “whose convention will this be?” While this obviously meant that issue focus had become highly differentiated, the even bigger crisis for the G77 was that its coordinating role had reached an all-time “low” and it was effectively paralyzed as the Africans refused to meet under Brazilian leadership. The crisis spilled over into INCD-2 (#7) and required intense intervention from the G77 secretariat in New York—which sent in a delegate from Colombia to take over the Chairmanship and hence enabled the G77 to meet again. While the process of patching-up the G77 began at INCD-2, tensions—and the level of issue differentiation—was still quite high and the collective was only beginning to regain its ability to coordinate common positions. This process of moving

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Figure 3: The G77 During CCD Negotiations

out of “free agent” behavior was aided by the fact that discussions on traditional North-South issues, such as ªnancing, begin at INCD-2. By INCD-3 (#8), the Southern collective was clearly moving towards “team play” and the focus of tensions had shifted from a South-South to a North-South axis. Importantly, the question of issue focus had been addressed by deciding to negotiate a “global” convention accompanied by a set of “regional” implementation annexes, of which the African Annex would be “ªrst amongst equals.” By INCD-3, therefore, the G77 was moving out of its deal- making phase and towards more coalitional dynamics. The last two sessions of the negotiation phase—INCD-4 and INCD-5 (#9)—were marked by persistent North-South tensions over the details of the ªnancial and institutional clauses. The G77 negotiated as a more cohesive and coordinated “team” and continued to engage in high internal negotiation. In- terestingly, the regional annexes forced the G77 to maintain a more issue- speciªc focus. The regional annexes proved to be a fortuitous device for the G77 since its regional groups could now maintain a united front on common issues without compromising the focus on their regional interests. Figure 3 depicts the G77 operating as a coalition at this critical juncture in the negotiations. Figure 3 does not plot G77’s associational dynamics during the post- agreement period (the interim phase and the CoPs), principally because the

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most important substantive negotiations on the Convention had already been completed. However, the general assessment of the interim period is that the G77 returned to its all-too-familiar negotiating posture of “hanging loose” as a behavioral alignment. With the major decisions having already been made and the discourse retreating to a routinized, predictable and often rhetorical plane of North-South sparring, the level of coordination and the issue focus ºuctuated within the alignment space with the issue focus tending towards the broad and the coordination hovering at the low to medium level.

Prescriptive Analysis: Lessons for the South The ªrst and most important lesson to be derived from Figure 3 and our retell- ing of the desertiªcation story is that the most desirable outcomes for the G77, as well as for its component sub-groups, came when it was negotiating in the coalition quadrant—where group members are able to pursue their differentiated interests while still maintaining a high level of group coordination. Impor- tantly, the results achieved under such conditions were also the most desirable for the regime as a whole. Note that the two most important achievements of the regime—the agreement to actually negotiate a convention and the CCD’s ultimate adoption both happened in the south-east quadrant of Figure 3, with the G77 negotiating as an internally stable and well-coordinated coalition, “playing as a team.” The other striking thing to note in Figure 3 is that the G77 was—quite lit- erally—all over the map in terms of strategies and tactics. The story of the desertiªcation negotiation is one about the South having to respond, in real time and in quick succession, to a series of challenges to its internal unity and to its relationship with the North. Contrary to what one might expect from a collective as large as the G77, the image that emerges from this story is that of a fairly nimble collective, willing and able to respond to changing situations and potential threats to its unity. Within the context of these two ªndings, this case highlights some more speciªc lessons for the South in terms of South-South frictions as well as North- South tensions.

Managing South-South Frictions On at least two important occasions (ªrst at PrepCom IV/UNCED and then at INCD-1/INCD-2) the Southern collective was faced with an important threat to its group solidarity. In each case, the G77 was able to act quickly to avert the threat. Importantly, the South, which is generally passive and reactive in international environmental negotiations, assumed a proactive posture in these negotiations by seeking and devising innovative solutions to internal differences that threatened the collective’s existence. At least two important lessons for the South can be derived from this:

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• First, while the G77 may have been able to rise above the lowest common denominator in these instances, it did so under conditions of threat. At UNCED, it is doubtful if the G77 would have searched for a solution to its internal differences (on the importance of desertiªcation) had it not been for the European effort to link the prospects for a desertiªcation convention with those for a deforestation treaty. The implied threat of an African revolt galvanized the G77 into intense internal negotiations that ultimately led to a South-South deal whereby the African group agreed to continue opposing a deforestation convention in return for the rest of the G77 making desertiªcation a high priority. Later, at INCD-1/INCD-2, it was the prospect of the entire G77 being paralyzed—at this and at other negotiations—that forced the G77 leadership to step in and help resolve the groups internal differences. The good news is that, when pushed into doing so, the G77 is capable of meaningful internal negotiations that do rise above the lowest common denominator. The bad news is that this case does not suggest a latent disposition within the G77 for investing in more structured internal negotiations. In short, when it needs to, the G77 can “play as a team” but it would rather just “hang loose.” The lesson to highlight is about the need for systematic and routine South-South negotiations prior to the larger North-South dialogue, particularly on issues where interests within the G77 are highly differentiated. • Directly related to the above, the second lesson is that arriving at internal agreements within the group requires hard work and constant vigilance. In both instances, the G77 had to go through intense internal negotiations— in the discomfort of the deal-making quadrant—in order to arrive at a common position that fulªlled the differentiated interests of its various sub-groups. Given the chronic resource constraints that the G77 faces (and the sheer size of the collective) it is not surprising that the group is unable to invest in pre-negotiation preparation. Collective pre-negotiation preparation requires substantial investments of time, effort and resources. Playing as a team has its beneªts, but it does require signiªcant effort; much more than just “hanging loose.” It is not entirely a surprise, therefore, that the South tends to retreat to alignment mode. The alignment quadrant is a safer and more convenient place to be. While the payoffs are not high, nor are the risks and the investment. The problem arises, as it did in this case, when the alignment quadrant no longer remains a viable option because of external or internal threats. For the G77 the lesson from the desertiªcation case is that achieving the desired goals for the larger collective as well as for its component groups would require enduring the in- creased effort and vigilance of the coalition quadrant. The challenge of occupying the coalition quadrant is quite clearly the challenge of internal G77 organization and group management.58

58. For potential ways in which this may happen, see Najam 1994.

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Managing North-South Frictions In relation to North-South tensions, the debates were mostly familiar, largely on issues related to ªnancing and regime governance, and ultimately less conclu- sive. At one level, the desertiªcation case represents an important role-reversal. Unlike most other global environmental negotiations where the North is the one pushing for a treaty and the South is resisting on the grounds that there are other more pressing global concerns that should be addressed ªrst, this was a case where it was the South calling for a treaty and the North resisting for exactly the same reasons. This odd and unusual situation had at least two important impacts on the general nature of North-South relations. First, since the North has never fully accepted the rationale for a global convention, it has continued to ªght for restricting the scale and scope of the CCD at every step. The North has been far more successful in this blocking coalition role because the (im)balance of power in terms of resources and expertise is so heavily tilted in its favor. Second, and importantly, in its unfamiliar role as the regime leader, the South was no longer able to retreat to the comfortable position of simply adopting a reactive strategy. Instead, it was faced with a situation where it had to be more proactive: coming up with positive options and convincing the North of them. In retrospect, the South was only marginally successful in this task. The entire debate on ªnancing was indicative of the G77’s inability to convince the US and the European Community to adopt the South’s preferred options. While a Global Mechanism was ªnally agreed to in the dying moments of the treaty negotiation, the idea for the compromise came from the North and not the G77. The Global Mechanism is much more a vindication of the North’s position that no new institutions or funding are needed, than a response to the G77’s deeply- held belief that without a stable and signiªcant source of ªnancing the fate of this convention will be no different from that of the PACD before it. Having said the above, two noteworthy lessons do emerge from this experience: • The most important lesson, once again, is that of preparation, including systematic South-South negotiations prior to any North-South negotiation. The striking conclusion of the North-South discourse in these negotiations was not that the North refused to give in to Southern demands on ªnancing and governance, but that the South was unable to present the North with a package that the industrialized countries could accept. The sad fact is that when placed in the unfamiliar position of being the group “leading” the negotiation, the South was unable to rise to the challenge. The power differential between North and South notwithstanding, the G77 was not able to fully invest in a process of option-generation and a search for creative win-win solutions that could alter the dynamics of the North-South confrontation. Better pre-negotiation preparation is the one strategic step that would not only strengthen the G77’s internal unity but would also prepare it for more proactive negotiation with the North.

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• Second, the desertiªcation case does demonstrate that the G77 is, in fact, a fairly stable collective. Situations—either created intentionally or inadver- tently—that served to place a wedge within Southern solidarity by provid- ing an incentive to one sub-group to defect from the larger collective, failed to break Southern solidarity even when the payoffs were relatively high. This is not entirely surprising since the G77 has a track record of holding dearly to its unity. Since the group operates as a negotiating caucus in a whole array of international negotiations, maintaining long-term unity can be rationalized as being more important than the fate of any single issue in any single negotiation. The lesson, however, is not simply that breaking the G77 is not likely to be “easy”; the more important lesson is that it may not even be desirable. INCD-1 and INCD-2 demonstrated that a fragmented South is more difªcult to negotiate with than a well-coordinated and well-prepared South. From the North’s perspective, a South that is negotiating in coalition mode may well be a tougher negotiator because it is better prepared and better organized; but it is also likely to be a better partner in the search for innovative options for tricky problems, because of the same reasons.

Conclusion To summarize, the big descriptive lesson from this case study is about the desir- ability of operating in coalition mode; the big prescriptive lesson relates to the importance of negotiation preparation and internal (South-South) negotiation as a precursor to effective negotiation with the North. For the G77, the desertiªcation negotiations were a roller-coaster ride that it had not expected, for which it was not prepared, but which it did survive. The CCD negotiations demonstrated the G77’s considerable survival skills and its ability to respond to internal crises. The biggest surprise of all may be that despite the deep and divisive differences that emerged within the G77, the group did, by the end, meaningfully accommodate the competing interests within its ranks. It was less successful in arriving at a meaningful resolution to its differences with the North.59 In short, the case seems to have demonstrated that the G77 is far more adept at maintaining its internal unity than it is capable of changing the terms of the debate in its discourse with the North.xx

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59. Najam 2002; and Najam et al. 2002.

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