Peace & Security Briefing Nr 1 September 2009

Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk Consequences of the Crisis for Peace and Democracy

By Tom Kramer

In August 2009, the Burma1 army occupied Conclusions & Recommendations the Kokang region after several days of fighting, ending two decades of cease-fire  Ethnic conflict must be resolved in order with the National Democratic to bring about a lasting political solution in Alliance Army (MNDAA). Led by Kokang Burma. If ethnic minority needs and goals leader Pheung Kya-shin, the MNDAA was are not addressed peace and democracy are the first of over nearly 20 armed opposition extremely unlikely to be achieved in Burma. groups to conclude a cease-fire agreement  Instead of isolating and demonising the with the military government that assumed cease-fire groups, all national and power in 1988. The recent fighting forced international actors concerned about peace 37,000 people to flee across the border to and democracy in Burma should actively . Will the Kokang breakdown be where engage with all ethnic opposition groups Burma’s cease-fire unity ended? (including cease-fire and non-ceasefire The resumption of fighting in northern Burma forces) and involve them in discussions raises speculation about the other cease-fires. about political change in the country. Tensions are rising and the cease-fire groups  Priority should also be given to have put their armed forces on high alert. addressing the humanitarian and social They are preparing for battle but say they will crises that underpin Burma’s long-standing continue to seek political change through political and economic malaise. Actions dialogue, and will not fire the first shot. needed include support for primary health The tensions come amidst pressure by care programmes and efforts to address Burma’s military regime, known as the State tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS, as Peace and Development Council (SPDC), to well as community-based development transform the cease-fire groups into Border projects to assist marginalised communities Guard Forces (BGFs) and efforts to organise such as former opium farmers. a general election in 2010, the country’s first  The international community should also since 1990. Widespread opposition to the engage with the SPDC, the democratic BGF proposal increases uncertainty about the opposition led by the National League for future of the cease-fires and peaceful trans- Democracy, and new political parties formation to a lasting political settlement.2 contesting the 2010 election, on the THE KOKANG CRISIS importance of solving ethnic conflict in Burma. On 8 August, Burma army troops based in the Kokang region3 wanted to search what capital Laukai, and opposite the Chinese bor- they claimed was an illegal arms factory in the der town Nansan. When Kokang troops refu- small town of Long Zhai (Yan Lon sed permission, a confrontation developed. A Kyaing or Yanglongjai) near the Kokang resumption of fighting was feared and several

Transnational Institute | 1 Ethnic Conflict in Burma

Burma is an ethnically diverse country, with Many cease-fire groups are based along the ethnic minorities comprising about 40 percent China border, notably the Kachin Independence of its estimated 56 million inhabitants. Ethnic Organisation (KIO) and New Democratic Army minorities in Burma have long felt marginalised - Kachin (NDA-K) in Kachin State, and the and discriminated against. Armed rebellions Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army began at the country’s independence in 1948 in (MNDAA), National Democratic Alliance Army response. The situation deteriorated after the (NDAA) and United Army (UWSA) military coup in 1962, when minority rights in . The New Mon State Party were further curtailed. (NMSP) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) are the main forces with cease- Since 1989 the majority of the ethnic armed fires on the Thai border. opposition groups have signed cease-fire agreements with the military government. In Other groups along the Thai border, such as the many border areas, the cease-fires subsequently (KNU), the Karenni brought an end to the fighting, curtailed the National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the most serious human rights violations, and South (SSA-S) are still fighting created a suitable environment for community guerrilla wars. These groups say they want to development projects. The main shortcoming of reach political agreements first before entering the cease-fires has been the lack of an inclusive into a cease-fire arrangement. The most serious peace process and political development as a human rights violations take place in these follow-up to the agreements to build reconci- areas. Some 130,000 ethnic minority refugees liation and peace throughout the country. from Burma presently live in camps in .

thousand people fled into China. Many of released. Pheung and his troops were un- them were Chinese businessmen and certain how to proceed. The SPDC sent police shopkeepers in the Kokang capital Laukai, units into Kokang on 22 August, occupying but local inhabitants left as well. the MNDAA arms factory. Pheung’s position was further weakened when a faction of The Burma military authorities subsequently MNDAA troops led by the Bai family rebelled issued arrest warrants for Pheung Kya-shin, against him and joined the SPDC. This forced two of his sons, and his brother Pheung Kya- Pheung and his troops to abandon Laukai fu and under the Arms Act, the Export/ and withdraw to the China border near Yang Import Act, and the Emergency Provisions Long Zhai and Chin Shwe Haw. Act. The SPDC claimed it had been informed about the arms factory by the Chinese On the morning of 27 August Kokang troops authorities.4 loyal to Pheung detained 36 Burma govern- ment policemen at Yang Long Zhai. The MNDAA leader Pheung Kya-shin responded SPDC ordered their release. Pheung’s group that the SPDC had long been aware of the demanded the government drop the charges factory’s existence, even visiting it previously. against him and his family members. Fighting He argued that the factory belonged to the broke out on the same day near Yang Long MNDAA, and not to individual leaders, as Zhai and Chin Shwe Haw between Kokang the SPDC claimed, and that the regime was troops loyal to Pheung Kya-shin and Burma just looking for an excuse to occupy the army and police units, supported by the Bai Kokang region.5 mutineers. Each side accused the other of initiating hostilities. The situation was very tense. Pheung and his family refused to surrender to the SPDC if it Fighting ended 29 August with the Burma would not the drop the charges against them army effectively taking control of the Kokang and guarantee their security. A number of region. An estimated 700 Kokang troops loyal Pheung’s family members were arrested in to Pheung crossed the border into China, Burma and China, although some were later handing over their weapons to the Chinese

2 | Transnational Institute authorities. Kokang sources report they ran fled to China during the fighting, leaving the out of food, water and ammunition.6 town almost empty. Many of them found their property destroyed and looted upon On 1 September the SPDC set up a “Leading their return.12 According to the deposed Committee for Development in Kokang Pheung Kya-shin: “There were many report- Region”, consisting of high-ranking SPDC ed cases where [government] soldiers com- leaders. The MNDAA mutineer Bai Xuoqian, mitted robbery, rape and killed civilians. not listed in the new committee, announced Many people are still afraid to go back home. that he had agreed to transform his group Most of the shops owned by Chinese busi- into a Border Guard Force and would take nessmen were either destroyed or robbed. 7 part in the 2010 election. Pheung Kya-shin The prosperous environment of Kokang of went into hiding, his property confiscated in only a few months ago no longer exists. both Burma and China. People are living in deep distress.”13

IMPACT OF THE FIGHTING About 100 workers from international NGOs and UN agencies based in Kokang gathered in The outbreak of hostilities in Kokang left the World Food Programme compound in unknown numbers of combatants and Laukai during the fighting. They were evacua- civilians dead or wounded. According to ted 3 September. These organisations suspend- Pheung Kya-shin, 14 of his troops were killed ed activities, including projects to assist former in the fighting, and 27 Kokang youth, forced poppy farmers to find alternative livelihoods to join the Bai defection, were disarmed and following the 2003 ban on opium cultivation.14 killed by the Burma army when they refused The MNDAA and other cease-fire groups such to fight the MNDAA.8 The SPDC claims 11 as the Kachin Independence Organisation Burma army soldiers and 15 policemen were (KIO) have urged international NGOs in the killed, and another 34 soldiers and 13 areas under their control to continue their policemen wounded. There are also reports of activities should their cease-fires break down.15 some 200 civilians killed in various parts of 9 the Kokang region. None of these claims can FRAGILE AGREEMENTS be independently confirmed. A Chinese police officer stated that one Chinese citizen The breakdown of the Kokang cease-fire was killed and two wounded by shells that clearly demonstrated the fragility of the landed in China. He also said a Chinese agreements and that the SPDC does not rule citizen was killed and 13 wounded in Kokang out a resumption of fighting. What little trust during the violence.10 there was between the cease-fire groups and the regime is now gone. Trust had already As mentioned above, 37,000 civilians fled decreased significantly following the purge of across the border into China. Authorities former Military Intelligence chief Gen. Khin there provided temporary shelter and food to Nyunt in 2004. was the original 13,000 refugees. Other displaced persons architect of the cease-fire movement in the found shelter with relatives living there. By late 1980s and had developed personal early September, Chinese government relationships with many cease-fire leaders. sources said that 9,000 people had left the The new Military Affairs Security chief Lt. temporary camps in province and Gen. Ye Myint is now responsible for returned to Kokang. Some of them wanted to relations with the cease-fire groups but he has return to their shops and property. Many failed to build confidence and personal others may have been “persuaded”, as China rapport with them.16 does not welcome refugee populations along its borders.11 The Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front, an alliance of cease-fire groups that used to be There were various reports of widespread part of or close to the now defunct Communist looting of shops and other property by Bur- Party of Burma, stated during the Kokang ma army units. Most inhabitants of Laukai crisis that the “existing cordial relationship

Transnational Institute | 3 and the SPDC is now tarnished and fallen According to UWSA leaders, Lt. Gen. Ye under a dark period of animosity.” The allian- Myint claimed the Kokang troops opened fire ce urged that “through trust, respect and first and detained the Burmese police, and negotiations all efforts be made in contribu- that this incident had nothing to do with the ting to the path towards the successful build- Wa. However Ye Myint also warned them ing of a peaceful and developed nation.”17 that, should the UWSA allow Pheung Kya- shin or his family to enter the Wa region, this During the fighting there were many rumours would provide the military government a about cease-fire groups, especially the United reason “to take action”.19 Wa State Army (UWSA), supporting the Ko- kang army. Wa sources refute this, claiming The UWSA says that it stationed one battalion they did not fire a single shot. Instead, they of its soldiers between troops loyal to Pheung say, the UWSA sent troops to the Kokang Kya-shin at Chin Shwe Haw (bordering region to mediate between the SPDC, Pheung China and the Wa region) and the Burma and Bai, calling for a peaceful solution to the army troops based nearby. The UWSA called conflict. “We asked for the Kokang to release on the two sides not to fight, and it claims the detained Burmese police, and hoped that that the mediation effort was accepted by the SPDC could be tolerant and drop the both sides. The UWSA says that it withdrew charges against Pheung Kya-shin, and allow its troops from Kokang on 28 August after him to resume his leadership, and ensure the judging that its mediation had failed, but left safety of him and his family and property.”18 UWSA soldiers to protect the important

4 | Transnational Institute bridge at Chin Shwe Haw between the viral treatments for people living with HIV Kokang and Wa regions.20 and support for former opium farmers.

A statement surfaced, detailing a new military Burma army regional commanders were alliance between four key cease-fire groups dispatched to warn the cease-fire groups not along the China border: the KIO, UWSA, to become involved in the Kokang fighting, MNDAA and National Democratic Alliance and to concomitantly assure them they would Army (NDAA).21 However, when the fighting not be attacked. But the dispatch of Burma in Kokang started, none of them came to the army reinforcements, including tanks, to aid of the MNDAA. This raises questions areas adjacent to cease-fire regions only fuel- about the strength of the alliance should an- led suspicions about the regime’s intentions. other member face attack by the Burma army. Of the alliance members, only the KIO and The Burma army regional commander in UWSA have a significant number of troops. in the eastern Shan State told the Mongla-based NDAA that it should not The military government now accuses worry about an attack by the Burma army Pheung Kya-shin of the “illegal production of “because the situation in Kokang was very narcotics drugs and smuggling, and also the different” and criticised the NDAA’s policy of manufacturing of arms and smuggling of telling ethnic Burmans to leave their region.25 weapons.”22 In the past, when it was politi- cally convenient, the SPDC presented the The KIO had several meetings with represen- Kokang region as a showcase of drug-control tatives from the Burma army and the SPDC. efforts in the country. Several diplomatic They, too, were told not to join the Pheung’s missions were flown into Kokang to meet Kokang group and not to worry about the 26 Pheung Kya-shin and to observe “drugs crisis. eradication activities in Kokang region, Should the SPDC decide to attack the KIO or cultivation of opium substitution crops and UWSA, the situation would be very different development of the region.”23 from Kokang. While the strength of the Pheung Kya-shin has continued to defend MNDAA is estimated at 1,000-1,500 troops, himself, arguing that, while cease-fire groups the troop strengths of the KIO (5,000-6,000) such as the MNDAA, UWSA and the NDAA and the UWSA (15,000-20,000) are signifi- have all implemented opium bans, poppy cantly larger. Both organisations have clear political goals and nationalist agendas, with a continues to be cultivated in SPDC- notable degree of popular support. Further- controlled areas.24 more, the Burma army does not have a EFFECTS FOR OTHER CEASE-FIRES presence inside KIO or UWSA cease-fire areas, as it does in Kokang. Government All other cease-fire groups in Burma followed troops would have to fight their way in, as the events in Kokang region closely. Specula- well as risk further spread of conflict. tion was rife about which group would be the next target of SPDC pressure, especially MILITARIZATION among those based along the Chinese border. Every group was putting its troops on high The Burma army’s strategy in Kokang follows alert and civilians were sending family mem- a long and consistent pattern. Given the coun- bers and valuables into safety across the try’s turbulent history of internal violence, the border. Sources in the NDAA capital Mongla military regime has focused on “managing” say that half the town’s population left for conflict rather then solving it. The aim is not China. International and local NGOs sus- to eliminate armed opposition and insurgent pended many of their activities in cease-fire groups, but rather to contain and divide areas. A breakdown of the cease-fires would them. Stimulating a wide variety and number threaten many critical humanitarian projects of armed groups has further contributed to a in the region, including life-saving anti-retro high degree of militarization in the country.

Transnational Institute | 5 Inevitably, the civilian population has suffer- Most cease-fire groups have rejected the ed the most from this, especially in areas with SPDC’s proposal. So far, only the NDA-K, a presence of different armed groups. Pao National Organisation, DKBA and two other break-away groups from the KNU have Instead of an all-out military offensive against accepted the BGF proposal. Exactly how this all cease-fire groups, the Burma army is more military and territorial transformation will be likely to take them on one by one, focusing put into practice has yet to be worked out, on weakening them by military, political and and negotiations are ongoing. economic means, hence stimulating the frag- mentation of groups. When internal divisions Militias, such as the RRF, say that they have within opposition groups develop, the army told by the regime that they do not have to subsequently allies itself with breakaway transform into a BGF but that they can factions. An example of this is the creation of continue to exist in their present form.27 the Democratic Buddhist Army (DKBA), The KIO has proposed to the regime that it which broke away from the armed opposition should become a Kachin Regional Guard Karen National Union in 1995 following an Force (KRGF), remaining a single organisa- internal conflict between Buddhist and Christian leaders. tion under a central command. The KIO argues that the BGF proposal is too limited, The SPDC will also probably continue to only dealing with the transformation of its strengthen various pro-government militias military wing, the Kachin Independence in areas near cease-fire groups and attempt to Army (KIA). The KIO has a large admini- use them as a buffer. It has recently stimula- strative structure with many civilian ted the formation of new groups, such as the departments, including health, education, Rebellion Resistance Force (RRF) in the culture and justice. Said one KIO official: northern Kachin State, which challenges both “We explained that we have different the KIO and New Democratic Army - Kachin departments and thus different things to (NDA-K) presence in the strategic N’mai transform. So why only talk about trans- 28 Khu area. The RRF group, led by a Kachin forming the KIA? We also have the KIO.” businessman, describes itself as a “people’s Given the critical importance of resolving militia”. Some of the many other militias in Burma’s political and ethnic problems, the the country date back to the 1970s, establish- KIO is opposed to dealing with issues sum- ed to counter the threat posed by the Com- marily, proposing they be negotiated after the munist Party of Burma. Others in the Shan 2010 election. “It is not possible to make a state were formed by remnants of ’s transformation within a limited time frame,” Mong Tai Army, which agreed a “surrender” said a KIO leader. “We need more time and cease-fire with the military government in negotiation for such a transformation pro- early 1996. cess, and will need to do this step by step.”29

BORDER GUARD FORCE (BGF) The cease-fire groups are adamant they will not be the ones to resume hostilities. “We do The SPDC wants all the cease-fire groups in not prefer fighting,” says a KIO source. “It is Burma to transform into Border Guard not supported by the international community Forces (BGF). This would effectively break up and Burma’s neighbouring countries. But if cease-fire groups into small separate units of the SPDC does not consider our demands, and 326 soldiers, divorced from their present does not give concession to our rights, and if ethnic administrations and military they approach the KIO with their arms, we will structures. Each BGF would include 35 stick to self-defence. The KIO will not fire first, members of the Burma army, including one so it depends on what the SPDC will do.”30 of the three commanding officers in each unit. The SPDC has given the groups a 15 The civilian population fears the future. “We October deadline to agree to this proposal. are worried the fighting will break out again,

6 | Transnational Institute and can’t even sleep at night because of the sidering their political demands and humani- situation,” says a villager in a KIO area. “We tarian concerns. Hence the strong opposition have had the experience of war, of those diffi- to the SPDC’s BGF proposal and the recent cult times, when our villages were burnt down. fighting in Kokang caught the international If the fighting will break out again, the civilians community by surprise. There is now some are the ones who will suffer most. If war will renewed interest in and a slightly less start, many people will flee to China.” 31 condemnatory view of the cease-fire groups.

2010 ELECTIONS China has been more supportive of the cease- fires. It wants peace and stability along its The breakdown of the Kokang cease-fire and borders. However when the Kokang fighting the rejection by most cease-fire groups of the broke out, China made an unusual public BGF proposal poses many questions and statement, calling on the Burmese authorities uncertainties for the upcoming 2010 election. to "properly handle domestic problems and The SPDC has neither set a date nor maintain stability in the China-Myanmar published the election law. border region…” the foreign ministry urging the regime “to protect the security and legal The SPDC has told the cease-fire groups they 34 can participate in the elections, but must form rights of Chinese citizens in Myanmar." new political parties. Members of such parties China has denied any interference in Burma’s will not be able to hold positions in existing internal affairs. armed or political wings of cease-fire groups. A U.S. State Department spokesperson urged Most cease-fire groups are therefore waiting the SPDC to “cease their military campaign for the election law to be published before and to develop a genuine dialogue with the deciding on their future courses of action. ethnic minority groups, as well as with 35 In Kachin State the KIO, in cooperation with Burma's democratic opposition." the NDA-K, the Kachin Defence Army and representatives of Kachin civil society, set up a temporary Kachin State Interim Commit- NOTES tee. Upon promulgation of the election law, 1. In 1989 the military government changed the they plan to register as the Kachin State Pro- official name of the country from Burma to gressive Party (KSPP) to contest the 2010 Myanmar. Using either has since become a highly election. In anticipation, six KIO leaders, politicised issue. The UN uses the latter, but it is not including KIO Vice-Chairman Dr. Tu Ja, commonly used elsewhere in material written in English about the country. Therefore Burma will be were allowed to resign from their KIO duties 32 used throughout this publication. This is not meant in September 2009. to be a political statement. In Mon State, four former central committee 2. See: Tom Kramer, Neither nor Peace, the Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in Burma, TNI July 2009. members of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) http://www.tni.org/reports/drugs/ceasefire.pdf and several Mon community leaders set up an 3. Unlike the situation in other cease-fire areas, the “election working committee” to prepare a Burma army had already occupied a number of political party to participate in the 2010 elec- strategic hilltops in MNDAA-controlled territory, tion. The NMSP will not run, but it will allow following an earlier internal conflict in the MNDAA members to resign in order to join the party.33 between the Pheung and the Yang families in 1995- 96. Interview with Pheung Kya-shin, 3 March 2009. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 4. Clarification of Brig.Gen. Phone Swe, Deputy Minister for Home Affairs, Concerning with Kokang The international community, especially Incident, document circulated to diplomats visiting Western governments and campaign groups, Kokang region, 7 September 2009. largely ignore the cease-fire agreements in 5. Confidential communication, and: Chinese blood Burma. Instead, critics have demonised these on Burmese soil, Irrawaddy, 14 September 2009. groups – either as being “pro-SPDC” or 6. Communication with sources close to Pheung “narco-trafficking armies” – rather than con- Kya-shin, August 30 2009.

Transnational Institute | 7 7. Myanmar claims Chinese intelligence led to Kokang Myanmar Peace and Democratic Front, 21 August conflict, DPA, 9 September 2009. 2009. 8. Chinese blood on Burmese soil, op.cit. 22. Clarification of Brig.Gen. Phone Swe, op.cit. 9. Hannah Beech, Inside Burma's war, Time, 23. The participants of the Fourth International September 21, 2009. Conference, for instance, were all flown to 10. Myanmar border inhabitants begin to return from the Kokang capital Laukai for a one-day field trip. China as situation calms, Xinhua, 31 August 2009. The Fourth International Heroin Conference Record Book, 23-26 February 1999, , Myanmar, 11. Refugees wary of returning from China, Reuters 31 pp.60-61. August 2009, and communication with sources in Kokang, August-September 2009. 24. Chinese blood on Burmese soil, op.cit. See also Tom Kramer, Martin Jelsma and Tom Blickman, 12. Ng Han Guan, Myanmar refugees leave China as Withdrawal Symptoms in the Golden Triangle, A battles ending, Associated Press, 31 August 2009; Drugs Market in Disarray, TNI, January 2009. Refugees wary of returning from China, Reuters 31 August 2009; and Saw Yan Naing, Laogai is a Silent 25. Interview with representative of the NDAA, 4 Capital, Irrawaddy,, September 1, 2009. September 2009. 13. Chinese blood on Burmese soil, op.cit. 26. Interviews with representative of the KIO, 1 September 2009. 14. Lawi Weng, Aid workers safely evacuated from Kokang fighting, Irrawaddy, September 4, 2009. 27. Interview with source close to the RRF, 2 September 2009. 15. Interviews with representatives of cease-fire groups, September 2009. 28. Interview with KIO official 1 September 2009. 16. Interviews with representatives of several cease- 29. Interview with senior KIO leader, 1 September fire groups, February-March 2009. 2009. 17. Declaration on the Kokang 8.8 Disturbances by the 30. Interview with KIO official 1 September 2009. Myanmar Peace and Democracy Front, 21 August 31. Interview with 50-year-old woman in a village in 2009. The front consists of the UWSA, MNDAA, KIO area, 31 August 2009. NDAA, NDA-K and SSA North. 32. Interview with Dr. Tu Ja, 2 September 2009. 18. Briefing of UWSA Vice-Chairman Xiao Min 33.Lawi Weng, New Mon party forming for election, Liang to international NGOs in the Wa region, Irrawaddy, September 8, 2009. Panghsang, 29 August 2009. 34. Tim Johnston, China urges Burma to bridle ethnic 19. Ibid. militia uprising at border, Washington Post Foreign 20. Ibid. The UWSA added that this bridge had cost 6 Service, August 29, 2009. million RMB to build. 35. US urges Myanmar to halt ethnic attacks, AFP, 31 21. Declaration on the Kokang 8.8 Disturbances by the August 2009.

The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an independent, international research and policy advocacy institute, with strong connections to transnational social movements and associated intellectuals concerned to steer the world in a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable and peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that solutions to global problems require global co- operation. Transnational Institute TNI’s Peace and Security Project brings together cutting- PO Box 14656 edge analysis of critical conflicts, including Burma, the 1001 LD Amsterdam Middle East and Afghanistan. It allies itself with a growing De Wittenstraat 25 international movement challenging foreign military bases, 1052 AK Amsterdam and is pioneering research on the little-publicised spread of The Netherlands new security infrastructure in Europe and worldwide. Tel: +31-20-6626608 TNI’s Drugs and Democracy Programme has been Fax: +31-20-6757176 analysing trends in the illegal drug economy and e-mail: [email protected] international drug control policy, and effects on conflict www.tni.org situations and democracy in Latin America and Asia. www.tni.org/drugs

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