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The First Cavalry Army in the Russian civil war, 1918-1920
Stephen Brown University of Wollongong
Brown, Stephen, The First Cavalry Army in the Russian civil war, 1918-1920, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Department of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 1990. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/1442
This paper is posted at Research Online.
THE FIRST CAVALRY ARMY IN THE
RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR, 1918-1920.
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
from
The University of Wollongong
by
Stephen Brown B.A. (V'ollongong)
Department of History and Politics 1990 11
I hc-reby certif\ thai the work embodied in this thesis is the result of original research and has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other universitx' or institution. Ill
To the Memory of Peter Johnston, IV
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank Peter Johnston, whose enthusiasm for and knowledge of Russian and Soviet history inspired me to undertake this work. Peter was my original supervisor but, sadly, did not live to see its completion. ] must thank also my present supervisor. Associate Professor Colm Kieman of the University of Wollongong and co- supervisor. Dr. David Christian of Macquarie University who stepped into the breach following the death of Peter. Their assistance over the last two years was invaluable. I would like to thank the staff of the Inter-Library Loans section of the University of Wollongong who were able to obtain for me much valuable material from Lenin Library in Moscow. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, without whose support this work would never have been completed. Abstract
The First Cavalry Army was the most famous component of the Red Army in the Civil War of 1918-1920. This reflected its close association with Joseph Stalin and its prominence in Soviet accounts of the Stalin era. The First Cavalry Army became a legendary force that, according to Stalinist hagiography, was the most important factor in the Red Army's campaign against the White Armies in south Russia in 1919-
1920 and against the Poles in summer 1920. This thesis has the aim of determining how much substance there was to this legend, to subject to investigation the nature and achievement of the First Cavalry Army.
The conclusion reached is that there was a great deal of substance to the legend of the First Cavalry Army. The First
Cavalry Army's contribution to the Red Army's campaigns against the White Armies of general Anton Denikin and baron
Peter Wrangel and against Poland was truly remarkable. That is not to claim that the accounts of the First Cavalry Army put out at the time of Stalin can be taken at face value.
This literature contains a great many exaggerations and some monstrous distortions. Yet the First Cavalry Army was not simply a product of Stalinist myth making.
The answer to the principal question leads to other questions about why the First Cavalry Army was an outstanding military force, in Civil War terms, and what its battlefield experience tells us about the Red Army in the
Civil War. It is argued that the First Cavalry Army was a product of front-line improvisation, rather than a creature VI of the Red Army's central planners. The basic problems that needed to be solved before it could become an effective fighting force were solved at the front line.
The First Cavalry Array was formed on the basis of recruitment that took place at the front line. It contained a solid nucleus of volunteers drawn from the rural poor, chiefly peasants, but some Cossacks, from south-east Russia.
It performed in the manner of a highly-motivated force. This reflected the social origins of its fighters, who had a vested interest in the triiimph of Soviet Power in south-east
Russia. The First Cavalry Army developed an effective fighting style, based on the extensive use of firepower.
This gave it an edge over the White cavalry, which preferred more traditional but less effective charge eind sabre-based tactics. The commanders of the First Cavalry Army were, for the most part, former Tsarist Non Commissioned Officers or ordinary soldiers yet, as they gained in experience in the
Civil War, they showed great talent. Semen Budennyi, the commander of the First Cavalry Army, displayed exceptional abi1ity.
Soviet writers tend to portray the campaigns of the
Civil War as if the achievements of the Red Army reflected the shrewd leadership of the centre, the political leadership and the high command. Problems that arose are usually put down to overwhelming enemy strength or incompetence at the front line. In the campaigns of the
Civil War that are investigated here, a different conclusion is reached. In the campaigns in which the First Cavalry Army fought, it was often the case that the shape and result of vii the campaign was determined much more by front-line fighters than by the centre. Sometimes the centre exercised a baleful influence upon events. At other times it was irrelevant.
The First Cavalry Army was involved in a steady stream of disputes within the Red Army command during the Civil War as well as much controversy. Some writers have considered that this, in large measure, reflected the conflict-prone behaviour of the command of the First Cavalry Army. It is argued here that these disputes have to be viewed within a wider pattern of conflict in the Red Army and that they can only be understood within this broader context. Vlll
Table Of Contents,
Page
List of Abbreviations ix
List of Illustrations x
Introduction 1
Chapter One: 26
A War Of Manoeuvre: The Military Context.
Chapter Two: 57
Knights of the Commune: The Social Context.
Chapter Three: 87
Building A Cavalry Army: December 1917- November 1919.
Chapter Four: 124
A Question Of Strategy: August-December 1919
Chapter Five: 169
The Road To Maikop: October
1919-April 1920
Chapter Six: 215
Horsemen Of The Apocalypse: April-June 1920.
Chapter Seven: 277
War On Two Fronts: July-August 1920.
Chapter Eight: 312 From Zamoste' To Simferopol': August- November 1920.
Conclusion 350
Bibliography 359 IX
List of Abbreviations used in Footnotes.
(1) Grazhdanskaia voina (1983) for S. Khromov et al., Grazhdanskaia voina i voeimaia interventsiia v SSSR: Entsiklopedia (Moscow, 1983).
(2) Grazhdanskaia voina (1986) for N. Azovstev et al. Grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR (Moscow, 1986) v. 2.
(3) Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine (1967-68) for Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine: Sbomik dokumentov i materialov (Moscow, 1967-68), edited by S. Korolivskii et al., h vols. Kiev.
(4) Iz istorii (1961) for Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR: 1918-1922: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Moscow, 1961). 3 vols.
(5) Iz istorii (1974) for Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny i interventsii 1917-1922 gg. Sbornik statei. (Moscow, 1974).
(6) D.G.K.K.A. for Direktivy Glavnogo Komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917-1920): Sbomik dokumentov (noscow, 1969).
(7) D.K.F.K.A. for Direktivy komandovaniia frontov Krasnoi Armii (1917-1922 gg.): Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1971- 1978), 4 vols.
(8) Trotsky Papers for Meijer, J (ed.). The Trotsky Papers: 1917-1922 (The Hague and London, 1964-71). List Of Illustrations.
Maps.
Opposite Page
South Russia 1
The Cossack lands of south-east Russia 56
The First Cavalry Army in south-east Russia 56
The Turning Point in October 1919 139
The War in the north Caucasus 189
The Long March 221
Poland. 229
Wrangel. 290
Photographs
Commanders of the First Cavalry Army. 86
Konnoarmeitsy 86
A tachanka 86
Military Council of the First Cavalry Army 123
Command of the South Front. 123 Introduction
It is the business of the future historian to confirm, or perhaps even to add something to the glory of our First Cavalry Army. Or perhaps to diminish that glory, or to deny it completely.
Voroshilov, December 1920, quoted in Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 4.
Although the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920 was not just a military contest between armies, events on the battlefield were of crucial importance. If the infant Soviet government had not been able to rise to the task of building an effective * sword and shield' in the shape of the Red Army, it would not have been able to win this contest for the
Tsarist inheritance. In the outcome, the Red Army was able to defeat the White Armies, which constituted the most serious threat to Soviet government. There were limits to what the Red Army was capable of achieving on the battlefield as the failed invasion of Poland in August 1920 showed. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to describe the
Red Army in the Civil War as having represented anything other than a success story.
Why is the First Cavalry Army a worthy subject of historical investigation? The First Cavalry Army was one of eighteen individual front-line 'armies' that made up the Red
Army in the Civil War. That its contribution to the Red
Army's victory in the Civil War was significant is suggested by the fact that the First Cavalry Army is the best-known component of the Red Army of that period. Its deeds have been recalled and celebrated not only in scholarly Soviet military literature, but in works of song, literature, poetry, theatre and art. Ewan Mawdsley rightly described the
First Cavalry Army as 'the most famous formation' of the Red
Army.^ Its commander. Semen Budennyi, became a national hero: by 1951 over 3000 collective farms had been named in his honour.^ In the 1930's, veterans of the First Cavalry
Army came to dominate the Soviet military establishment: in
1935, the Soviet government appointed its first five
'marshals' and three of them, Budennyi, Klim Voroshilov and
Alexander Egorov, had risen to prominence through their role in directing the First Cavalry Army.
While the major events in the story of the First Cavalry
Army are already familiar to most students of the Civil War, there is still a need for further investigation. Existing studies in the West have only dealt with the First Cavalry
Army in passing. Studies that have appeared in the Soviet
Union mostly came out in the era of Soviet history that was dominated by Joseph Stalin and reflected, at least in part, the close association that this cavalry force enjoyed with
Stalin. The closeness of the relationship was symbolised by
Stalin's enlistment as an honourary cavalryman of the 4th
Cavalry Division in December 1919, and by the presentation to him on 21 July 1920 of a specially-inscribed sabre."^
^ E. Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War (Winchester, 1967), p. 220.
The Modern Encyclopaedia of Russian and Soviet History ed. by J. Wieczynski. (United States, 1971), v. 5., p. 221.
^ P. Ivangorodskii (ed.), Kak myi osvobozhdali Rostov (Rostov, 1935), p. 40. The First Cavalry Army was so prominent in the Civil War material of the Stalin era that the casual reader of this literature might be forgiven for coming to the conclusion that the First Cavalry Army had won a number of important campaigns, against the 'Whites' under general Anton Denikin
(October 1919-April 1920) and Baron Peter Wrangel (October
1920-November 1920), and against Poland (May 1920-September
1920), virtually single-handedly. The prominence of the
First Cavalry Army in Stalin era accounts had particularly sinister overtones given that so many other units and formations had been written out of the histories, with their personnel becoming victims of Stalin's purges.
The need for a history of the First Cavalry Army has long been recognised. Mikhail Frunze, the Red Army's leading soldier in the early 1920's remarked that:
Regrettably we still do not have a detailed history of the First Cavalry Army. This is a great pity because there was no other unit which so fully and so clearly reflected in itself and in its actions the whole character of the Civil War as well as the virtues and shortcomings of the entire Red Army.^
By the late 1920's, partial accounts of the First
Cavalry Army had been published inside the Soviet Union.^
With the coming of the Stalin era, a great deal of information about the First Cavalry Army became available. A considerable amount of information became available in journals. The journal Krasnaia konnitsa was devoted entirely
M. Frunze, 'Daesh konia', Pravda, 16 November 1924.
For example, S. Budennyi 'Iz istorii krasnoi konnitsy' in A. Bubnov, et. al. eds. Grazhdanskaia voina 1918-1921, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1928-31). N. Evseev, Flangovyi udar na Voronezh-Kastomaia (Moscow, 1936). to cavalry matters, while other journals, such as Voina i revoliutsiia, carried frequent articles that featured the campaigns of the First Cavalry Army. When Voenno- istoricheskii zhumal' first appeared in 1939, a number of issues were devoted almost exclusively to Stalin and the
First Cavalry Anny.
No general history of the First Cavalry Army appeared until 1938, when a work by Ivan Tiulenev purported to fit the bill." This was a study devoted entirely to the First
Cavalry Army, which dealt with all its major campaigns.
There was much that was valuable in it, but its hagiographical approach was obvious. According to this account, the First Cavalry Army never lost a battle; if things went wrong occasionally, it was because of the orders of the traitor Trotsky and his accomplices.
There were other accoiints in the Stalin era that provided extensive coverage of the deeds of the First
Cavalry Army, some 'popular',' some genuinely impressive in their scholarly argumentation." The obligatory praise of
Stalin, along with a reluctance to be critical of the First
Cavalry Army was nearly always there.^ By the middle of the
^ I. Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia v boiakh za sotsialisticheskuiu rodinu (Moscow, 1938).
' See, for example, 0. Leonidov, Pervaia konnaia (Moscow, 1939).
° In this category belong the works of A. Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919 (Moscow 1931), L'vov-Varshava (Moscow 1929), and L. Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia krasnaia armiia na Pol'skom fronte v 1920 godu (Moscow, 1932).
Kliuev, Op. cit. was remarkable for the fact that it managed to avoid any overt praise of Stalin. 1930's, the First Cavalry Army, 'a child of Stalin's military genius', had passed into legend.
In 1958, there appeared the first volume of what would end up as a three-volume memoir composed by Budenny.-*^^ The first volume was to be translated into English in 1972. All three volumes have been used extensively by writers in the
West as a major source for the campaigns of the Civil War.
Budennyi wrote after the death of Stalin and even allowed himself the luxury of an occasional criticism of the recently-deceased dictator.
Budennyi had his reputation to protect and his memoir, while full of interesting information, had the purpose of putting himself and his cavalrymen in the best possible light. The tenor of the work and of much of the hagiographical writing of the Stalin era was encapsulated in the flourish with which he concluded the first volume:
Inspired by the Communist Party in the sacred struggle against exploiters and their hirelings and united by their singleness of purpose and common goal, the Army's commanders, commissars, and men worked wonders of courage and daring in their struggle against the enemy. Day and night in bitter cold and scorching heat, often hungry, badly clothed, poorly armed but always strong in their enthusiasm and revolutionary consciousness, the men of the Cavalry Army achieved victory after victory. •'^•'^
At the same time Budennyi, like so many writers of the
Stalin era, was free in his criticism of neighbouring units which he claimed had let the First Cavalry Army down at crucial moments by failing to operate as they should have
^^ S. Budennyi, Proidennyi put' 3 vols. (Moscow, 1956-73); Eng. trans, of vol. 1, The Path of Valour (Moscow, 1972).
^^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 445. done. The vitriol of this account and others of the Stalin era made them more interesting than their bland, modern-day
Soviet counterparts, in which criticism of units and individuals of the Red Army is invariably muted. Yet the word of writers with a vested interest in the reputation of the First Cavalry Army cannot be taken on trust when assessing the contribution of the First Cavalry Army or that of its neighbours to the Red Army's campaigns.
Even in the period of de-Stalinisation, the First
Cavalry Army still occupied a comfortable niche at the very top of the Soviet military pantheon. The fact that Stalin was now hardly ever mentioned in literature about the Civil
War, except for purposes of criticism, meant that an important chunk of the legend of the First Cavalry Army had disappeared. Other cracks in the legend began to appear. It was pointed out that the reputation of the cavalrymen was greatly inflated in the literatiure of the Stalin era and that there were glaring inaccuracies in the latter. For example, the First Cavalry Army was credited with having captured the towns of Kursk and Kharkov in December 1919; but while the First Cavalry Army operated in the vicinity of these towns, it certainly did not occupy them. 11
In the revisionist era of Khrushchev, there were calls for a new history of the First Cavalry Army.^^ None appeared: all that happened was that other units and
^^ A. Aleksashenko, 'Sovietskaia istoriografiia razgroma Denikinshchiny', Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 1, January 1966, p. 86 pointed this out.
^^ P. Zelenskii, 'Slavnaia stranitsa istorii Sovietskoi konnitsy' , Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 11, November 1964, p. 44. personalities were rehabilitated and the reader was left with the false impression that the Red Army was peopled by countless heroes, each having made an outstanding contribution. As Albert Seaton has remarked, Trotsky's stricture that 'according to Red Army history there were only heroes in its ranks, that every soldier burned with a desire to fight and that the enemy was always superior in numbers' is still pertinent to much Soviet literature to the present day.^^
In the West, the material available about the First
Cavalry Army is unsatisfactory too. Some emigre accounts have appeared, which have had as one of their aims the demolition of the aura that surrounded the First Cavalry
Army; but these suffer from the same lack of objectivity as the Stalinist sources. In recent years, some highly-
informative accounts by Western writers dealing with the
Civil War and the role of the Red Army in it have
^^ A. Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander (New York, 1976), p. 81.
1 "S For example, V. Rapoport and I. Rapoport, High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-1938 (Durham, 1985). 8 appeared^"; but there has been no detailed study of the
First Cavalry Army.
So, despite its prominence in existing accounts of the
Red Army in the Civil War, there remains a need for an accurate history of the First Cavalry Army. The First
Cavalry Army has passed into legend; but the legend requires critical analysis. The question that needs to be asked, and which this thesis poses, is: what was the contribution of the First Cavalry Army to the campaigns of the Red Army in the Civil War? Put a slightly different way: to what extent were the legendary deeds of the First Cavalry Army a figment of the Stalinist imagination?
The conclusion reached is that there is a great deal of substance to the legend of the First Cavalry Army. Its contribution to the Red Army campaigns against Denikin,
Poland and Wrangel was truly outstanding. The fortunes of the Red Army as a whole depended upon the performance of the
First Cavalry Army in each of these campaigns. That is not to propose that Stalinist histories of the First Cavalry
Army are being endorsed. They are not. In the first place, it was certainly not the case that the First Cavalry Army
^^ Notably, Mawdsley, Op. cit.', Seaton, Op. cit.', F. Benvenuti, The Bolsheviks and the Red Army, 1918-22 (Cambridge, 1988); T. H. Rigby, Lenin^s Government: Sovnarkom, 1917-1922. (Cambridge, 1979); R. G. Suny The Baku Commune: 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972); D Raleigh Revolution on the Volga: 1917 in Saratov. (Ithaca, 1986); G. Legget The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (Oxford, 1981); V. M. Fie The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion: the Origin of Their Armed Conflict: March-May 1918 (New Delhi, 1978); N. Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London, 1972); Zamoyski, The Battle for the Marchlands (Boulder, 1981); and J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History (London, 1962). knew only victory, as so much Stalinist literature claimed.
Yet it turns out that there was more truth in the accounts of the Stalin era than might have been expected.
Outstanding contributions were made by other Red Army units. Among the Red infantrymen, the Latvian Rifle Division boasted an enviable record in defence of the Soviet government in the Civil War. In the Red cavalry, there were several outstanding units, notably the 3rd Cavalry Corps led by Gaia Gai, Valerii Primakov's 8th Cavalry Divison, the 2nd
Cavalry Corps led by Boris Dumenko and the Second Cavalry
Army led by Philip Mironov. The aim here is not to sell short the contribution of other units. It is merely to demonstrate the outstanding contribution of the First
Cavalry Army by showing its importance and achievement in the campaigns against Denikin, Poland and Wrangel.
Is it possible to make this claim about the contribution of the First Cavalry Army, given the limitations imposed by the sources? It is possible to make the claim, thanks to the availability now of a reasonable number of non-Stalinist sources. From the Soviet Union there is now available the valuable Soviet document collections put out in the post-
Stalin era as well as the scholarly accounts from the 1920's and the era of de-Stalinisation. The most valuable source has proven to be the Direktivy series with its primary material, which includes orders, reports and teleprinter conversations that issued from central and front commands during the Civil War.^' On the basis of these documents,
^' Direktivy Glavnogo komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii (1917- 1920). Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1969) and Direktivy komandovaniia frontov Krasnoi Armii (1917-1922 gg.): Sbomik dokumentov. 4 vols. (Moscow, 1971-78). Other useful 10
supplemented with information from other sources, it is possible to reconstruct the campaigns of the Civil War with
greater accuracy than before, and to identify the
contribution made by the cavalry.
Of the accounts that came out in the 1920*s, the best were probably the works of Nikolai Kakurin.-'^^ The three volume compilation edited by Bubnov et al.^^ is also valuable. The same can be claimed for some of the books and,
just as importantly, journal articles, that appeared in the
Khrushchev era as well as the 1983 Encyclopaedia and 1986 two-volume history of the Civil War, both of which contain a plenitude of information."^^
At the same time, there is the body of work left by
Trotsky, which includes both documents and commentaries.^-*^
collections include Grazhdanskaia voina na Ukraine: Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, edited by S. Korolivskii et al. (Kiev, 1967-68), and Iz istorii grazhdanskoi voiny v SSSR: 1918-1922: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1960-61). One of the better monographs of the post-Stalin era was K. Agureev, Razgrom belogvardeiskikh voisk Denikina: (Oktiabr' 1919-mart 1920 goda) (Moscow, 1961).
^° N. Kakurin, Kak srazhalas' revoliutsiia, 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925-26); Strategicheskii ocherk grazhdanskoi voiny (Moscow and Leningrad, 1926); N. Kakurin and V. Melikov, Voina s belopoliakami 1920 g. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925).
A. S. Bubnov et al., Grazhdanskaia voina, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1928-31).
" S. Khromov et al., Grazhdanskaia voina i voennaia interventsiia v SSSR: Entsiklopedia (Moscow, 1983); N. Azovtsev et al., Grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR. 2 vols. (Moscow, 1980-86). The most valuable output among the journals came from Voenno-istoricheskii Zhumal during the Khrushchev era and the years that followed. 21 L. Trotsky, Kak vooruzhalas' revoliutsiia: Na voennoi rabote, 3 vols, (in 5), (Moscow, 1923-25); Eng. ed. How the Revolution Armed: Military Writings and Speeches, 5 vols. (London, 1979-81); and Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and his Influence, 2 vols. (London, 1969). 11
There are also the accounts produced by those who fought against the First Cavalry Army and who had no interest in squabbles within the Soviet Union over how the history of the Civil War should be written. The best accounts were those written by Denikin and Josef Pilsudski, the Polish leader; but other works are also of value. -^ Another indispensible corrective to the hagiography of so much
Soviet writing is the fictional work by the remarkable writer and former cavalryman, Isaac Babel.^^
The only way to avoid the traps set by the hagiographers of the Stalin era is to return where possible to the primary sources and to make use of non-Stalinist accounts, including
White and Polish accoxints. These non-Stalinist sources make possible a balanced assessment of the contribution of the
First Cavalry Army. While the relative plenitude of information about the First Cavalry Army that was put out in the literature of the Stalin era is employed in this study for the purpose of helping to answer secondary questions, the burden of the thesis itself is carried by non-Stalinist sources.
The simple fact that an account was not published in the
Stalin era does not mean that it is guaranteed to be free of bias. Modern Soviet writers have their own biases. Among them are a determination to portray the Red Army in a heroic light, to build up the role played by Lenin and to dismantle
^^ A. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi smuty, 5 vols. (Paris, 1921- 26) and The White Army (London 1930). J. Pilsudski, Year 1920 (New York, 1972). A valuable account by a White journalist is G. Rakovskii, V stane belykh (Constantinople, 1920).
23 I. Babel, Collected Stories (Harmondsworth, 1974). 12 the particular hagiography of the Stalin era. Nor is it the case that books published in the West are free of bias. Many find it difficult to write objectively about the army of a government and ideology that they find unattractive.
There are distortions in all writing about war, Soviet or Western, brought about partly by the fact that it is often written by soldiers who have their reputations to protect and who desire as much as possible to impose an order on events that does no justice to the chaos and complexity of the events themselves. Certain conventions of battle narrative are so ingrained that it is diffficult for any writer about war to break free of them.^^ All that can be done is for the student of war to be aware of the likely pitfalls.
The thesis that the First Cavalry Army made an outstanding contribution to the campaigns of the Red Army in the Civil War is unexceptional: this has been assumed if not proven by a great many writers about the Civil War. A more novel feature of this thesis is that it is a study of a front-line Red army which conveys to the reader a sense of just how important to the success of the Red Army was the initiative and resourcefulness, the improvisations and the insubordination of its front-line personnel.
The thesis provides a corrective to the overwhelming bent of Soviet literature, which tends to see the Red Army's successes in terms of astute direction from the centre, its failures in terms of poor implementation of the plan at the
2^ See J. keegan, The Face Of Battle (Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 57-73. 13 front line. A major part of the problem for Soviet writers
is that Lenin is still above criticism and Lenin's supervisory role in the Red Army at the centre is always
emphasised in Soviet literature. As one recent Soviet publication has put it:
Lenin led the Soviet government and the Council of Defence. His instructions defined the principal dir ections in the build up of the Red Army and laid the foundations for all the most important operations. The correct strategic leadership on the part of the Central Committee of the Party was the most important condition of victory of the Red Army.^^
As a result of this approach, the central military planners
are often spared the critical analysis that should be their
due.
Western studies have unintentionally consolidated this
centrist view. In an article written more than twenty years
ago, John Erickson noted that while:
the "Red Army"-the central institution-is well enough known...the individual armies, the regional formations and the forces on the periphery conspicuously lack their complement of serious investigations....-^^
It is true that this state of affairs is changing. The Civil
War in general, including events at the periphery, has been studied with increasing thoroughness. In more recent times, there have appeared a good general account of the Civil War by Mawdsley, an examination of central Soviet government by
Rigby, a study of the Red Army by Benvenuti, Raleigh's work on Tsaritsyn and Saratov, Siiny's study of Baku, Fic's work
^^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 16.
'^^ J. Erickson, 'The Origins of the Red Army' in Revolutionary Russia: A Symposium Edited by R. Pipes. (New York, 1969). p. 227. 14 on the Czechoslovak Corps and Legget's account of the
Cheka.27
Even so, it is still true to say that a great deal more needs to be uncovered about the Red Army at the periphery.
There still needs to be studies of individual units and formations of the Red Army.2° With existing studies biased towards the personalities and institutions of the centre, there is an obvious danger that the centre's role will be exaggerated, simply because not enough is known about the
Red Army away from Moscow.
The claim that the First Cavalry Army was a creature of the front is developed in the answers to the two most important secondary questions that emerge from the answer to the main question. The first question is: if the First
Cavalry Army was a highly-successful military force, what explains its success?
Put another way, how did the First Cavalry Army solve the problems that needed to be solved if it was to become an effective military organisation? Erickson considered that there were four basic problems confronted by the Red Army at the outset of the Civil War, 'manpower, administration, command and combat capability (training, morale and
27 The work of Suny on Baku, of Raleigh on Tsaritsyn and Saratov, and of Fie on the Czechoslovak Legion has added greatly to our understanding of the Civil War and points to the importance of studies of areas and events away from the centre. A recent publication that is likely to add to oinr knowledge of the peasants in the Civil War is 0. Figes Peasant Russia, Civil War (Oxford, 1989), but this work did not become available before the completion of my thesis.
9ft A study by Ezergailis and Germanis of the Latvian Riflemen is likely to be of great value in this context but sadly this work did not become available before the completion of my thesis. 15 experience)'. This is a useful check-list for isolating the ingredients in the success of the First Cavalry Army. In the case of the First Cavalry Army, these problems were not solved with an equal degree of success. What is remarkable is the extent to which the solutions depended upon front line initiative.
The First Cavalry Army did not follow precepts that were laid down by the Red Army's central planners. The First
Cavalry Army evolved at the front in the virtual absence of assistcince or even of expressions of support from the centre. It grew in strength not through conscripts assembled by the central recruiting agencies but through local volunteers and front mobilisations carried out in and aroxmd the Cossack lands of south Russia.
This was a remarkably plebeian cavalry. It was led not by former Tsarist officers, who were the cornerstone of the higher echelons of the Red Army's command, but by former
Tsarist Non Commissioned Officers and ordinary soldiers. Its morale owed much to the fact that it drew its strength from a nucleus of volunteers with a vested interest in the defeat of the Cossack-led counterrevolution. Its armament and tactics, based around the extensive use of firepower, were the result of improvisation at the front line and were fashioned independently of, sometimes despite, the Red
Army's often inappropriate regulations.
Soviet writers emphasise the role of the centre, of
Lenin, of the Communist Party and of the High Command in the
Civil War. An examination of the campaigns that involved the 2'^ j^^^;^ pp^ -^^^^-^ 16
First Cavalry Army strongly suggests that the assertion of
Soviet writers that the centre was responsible for the victory of the Red Army does not stand up to scrutiny.
The impression that the reader can gain from Soviet literature is that the Red Army for the most part worked in the manner of a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy, with shrewd plans being formulated at the centre which were then dutifully carried out at the front. When things went wrong, as they did in Poland, it was, according to these writers, chiefly because of massive enemy strength or else the insubordination of certain front-line individuals, in this case Stalin and Budenny. As will become apparent in the case of Poland, it was mismanagement on the part of the centre that was responsible for the debacle there. In other campaigns of the Civil War, it becomes clear that the Red
Army triumphed often in spite of the plans of the centre and thanks in good measure to the initiative and resourcefulness of the front-line commanders and troops.
Another secondary question concerns the turmoil and conflict within the Red Army command that was such an important part of the story of the First Cavalry Army in the
Civil War. Why did this happen? An answer that is implied in much Western literature is that the conflict-prone behaviour of the cavalry command and its ally, Stalin, generated many of the problems. To quote Erickson:
that scheming triumvirate of war and politics-Stalin, Voroshilov and Budenny-were to cast a giant shadow across the military and political destiny of Russia. It is this bitter and ugly partisanship which must be considered in connection with the dramatic and critical strifes of the 17
summer of 1919 and Denikin's drive on Moscow.^^
A different approach is taken here. The disputes involving the First Cavalry Army are analysed in the light of a pattern of conflict within the Red Army in the Civil
War noted by Timothy Colton. Colton examined a number of disputes that beset the Red Army and characterised them as sectoral conflict between central and front commands over the issues of strategy, resources and appointments.^•'^ This type of sectoral conflict was rife in the Red Army. In the story of the First Cavalry Army, the basic actors in disputes were personnel at the levels of centre, front and army. It is in this context that the involvement of the command of the First Cavalry Army in a steady stream of disputes within the command of the Red Army must be understood.
As well as providing answers to these questions, it is intended in this study to shed light on a number of Red Army campaigns in the Civil War, involving the First Cavalry
Army, that have not been adequately studied in Western literature or that have not been properly understood. Some of these campaigns have given rise to quite well-known controversies, including the question of the authorship of the successful Red Army strategy in south Russia in autumn
1919; and the events that led to the Red Army's bxmgling performance in the Battle of Warsaw in August 1920.
^^ J. Erickson, The Soviet High Command (London, 1962), p. 67.
31 T. Colton 'Military Councils and Military Politics in the Russian Civil War' Canadian Slavonic Papers, no. 1, v. 18, 1976, p. 41. 18
The modem approach of Soviet writers is unsatisfactory, because it tends to give the false impression to the reader that the Red Army was of uniformly good quality; and that its victory over the Whites was a cooperative effort on a grand scale. These accounts usually have had little of interest to offer about the continual turmoil that beset the
Red Army command or the reasons for the fact that the five- million strong Red Army struggled for long periods to defeat smaller but evidently better-quality White Armies and failed to accomplish its invasion of Poland.
The reality was that the Red Army was tremendously dependent upon the contribution of its hcindful of high- quality units. Students of armies since World War Two have noted that in any group of soldiers only a minority, perhaps
20X or 25X, are likely to be effective fighters.^2 An analogy can be drawn here with the Red Army, where only a minority of its units and formations could fight and these carried along with them the remainder. As this thesis will show, the First Cavalry Army pulled a lot more than its own weight in the Red Army's campaigns against Denikin, the
Poles and Wrangel.
Some other matters require comment at the outset. It should be pointed out that this is a study of the legend of the First Cavalry Army as well as of the First Cavalry Army itself. This legend involves not just the cavalry, but characters who were closely involved with it, including
Stalin and the front commander, Egorov. That is not to say
32 J. Keegan, 'The Historian and Battle', International Security, v. 3, 1978-79, p. 146. 19 that Stalin or Egorov's Civil War careers are being subjected to a comprehensive study here, only their actions as they were related to the operations of the First Cavalry
Army.
There is a problem of chronology that should be noted.
The First Cavalry Army did not begin its official existence until 17 November 1919; but this date is not particularly significant. The First Cavalry Army, initially at least, was merely the renamed Cavalry Corps of Budenny, set up as early as 28 June 1919. Further, the history of the First Cavalry
Army cannot be understood unless there is some explanation of its evolution. This means that any serious study has to begin at the outset of the Civil War, October 1917.
The system of transliteration employed here is that of the Library of Congress in a slightly simplified form in that ligatures are not used. Names that are reasonably well known have been left in their usual if inaccurate form, for example, Trotsky. In quotations from works published in
English, different spellings of these names have been left as they are; but this should not produce any confusion. At the same time, place names are mostly transliterated in the manner preferred by the Russians, even though they would be spelt differently by Poles, Ukrainians or the other peoples of the borderlands.
The bulk of this thesis deals with the period after 14
February 1918; but those dates listed from the earlier period follow the Julian calendar in keeping with the practice of the central Russian government. The Bolsheviks changed their name to the Communist Party early in 1918. For 20
convenience, this organisation is referred to as much as
possible simply as the 'Party'. The Bolshevik-dominated
Soviet government was confronted by many enemies in the
course of the Civil War and the term 'White' is used only to
describe the most conservative elements of the
counterrevolution, notably the ex-Tsarist officers and
Cossacks who formed the basis of the most important anti-
Bolshevik armies in Siberia and south Russia. The official
name of the largest White Army, that commanded by Denikin in
south Russia, was 'The Armed Forces of South Russia'; but
here this force is referred to simply as Denikin's White
Army.
This is not an account that has as its aim detailed
description of battles, though some military terminology has
been employed. The Red Army employed conventional
designations such as front, army and division, though often
this meant little in terms of actual strength. As is the
case generally in modem-day literature, these designations
are not placed within inverted commas. A problem arises in
that the term 'front' has a more general meaning, for
example, as opposed to 'centre'. Here, 'front' in that
general sense is replaced by the term 'front line' so as to
ensure that there is no confusion. Individual armies are
given their full written names, for example, the Tenth Army, while divisions are given a number, for example, the 4th
Cavalry Division.
The First Cavalry Army goes under a variety of names in the literature. The abbreviations Konarmiia in Soviet
literature and Konarmiya in Western literature have proved 21 quite popular. It was decided to employ First Cavalry Army, its formal name, here for the sake of consistency. On occasions, it is referred to simply as Budennyi's cavalry.
This phrasing is particularly useful for the second half of
1919, when Budenny's cavalry had not yet received its formal upgrading to a cavalry army. At the same time, the Soviet shorthand of konnoarmeitsy, literally, the personnel of the cavalry army, has been employed, for there is not a convenient equivalent in English. 'Konnoarmeitsy' has an advantage over 'cavalrymen' in that it is non-sexist; and a good many women served in the First Cavalry Army.
The term 'cavalrymen' might be inappropriate in any case, given that the First Cavalry Army hardly conformed to the model of a traditional cavalry force. Some definitions of cavalry include only those who fought exclusively on horseback. Those like the konnoarmeitsy, who fought sometimes mounted and at other times dismounted, are usually described as dragoons or perhaps mounted infantry. By the time of World War One, 'pure' cavalry that was trained only in mounted action had virtually ceased to exist because modem firepower greatly limited its field of action. In this thesis, the term 'cavalry' is used in a generic way to cover all fighters who used the horse as their means of transportation. This loose definition of cavalry seems to have been employed by most military commentators in the first quarter of the twentieth century.
The thesis argues that the First Cavalry Army made a substantial contribution to the Red Army's victory in three of the most important campaigns of the Civil War, against 22
Denikin, Poland and Wrangel. At the same time it is argued that the success of the First Cavalry Army reflected most of all front-line initiative and resourcefulness; that the conflicts in which its command became embroiled must be seen in a broader perspective than simply as resulting from the personalities involved; that the shape and success of the
Red Army campaigns involving the First Cavalry Army depended as much and sometimes more on the front line as on the centre.
The first two chapters explore the military and social contexts respectively. The third deals with the evolution of the First Cavalry Army, while subsequent chapters deal in order with the campaigns against Denikin, Polcind and
Wrange1.
In Chapter One it is argued that the First Cavalry Army has to be viewed as a creatvire of a peculiar military environment. The Civil War witnessed a cavalry revival in large measure because the level of infantry and artillery firepower that had brought about the demise of the moxmted arm in World War One was absent. Yet the Red Army's central planners were slow to respond to the challenge of building a
Red cavalry, and when they did respond, they achieved little.
In Chapter Two it is argued that the social origins of the konnoarmeitsy were of the greatest significance for the
First Cavalry Army. The konnoarmeitsy are best described not as Cossack freebooters, as is often claimed, but as representatives of the rural poor of south-east Russia. As the White cavalry was largely drawn from the ranks of the 23 relatively-privileged Cossacks, as well as from ex-Tsarist officers, this meant that the mounted contest in the Civil
War represented something of a class war. The commitment displayed by the konnoarmeitsy on the battlefield reflected their social origins, their dislike of the status quo in the
Cossack lands of south-east Russia.
In Chapter Three the evolution of the First Cavalry Army is exeunined. It is demonstrated that the First Cavalry Army was a front-line improvisation. It is argued that Budenny's cavalry evolved a distinctive and effective fighting style in the course of the first two years of the Civil War. The key element in the tactics of Budennyi's cavalry was the extensive use of firepower and this contrasted with the more traditional, charge and sabre-based tactics of the White cavalry. The mounted warfare of the Civil War should not be thought of in terms of two walls of colliding cavalry, in the manner suggested by works of art and fiction. Budennyi's cavalry owed most of its success to its capacity to utilise the firepower of the revolver, rifle, machine guns and horse artillery as well as the support of infantry and even of armoured trains and cars.
Chapter Fovir is concerned with a celebrated controversy in the military history of the Civil War that debated the authorship of the strategy that led to the crucial Red Army breakthrough against Denikin in autumn 1919. In the literature of the Stalin era, it was claimed that vital ingredients in the Red Army's adoption of the successful strategy were due to Budennyi's cavalry and to Stalin. It is shown that there is considerable truth in both these claims. 24
although the account of these events provided here differs
in important respects from the Stalinist one. At the same
time, it is argued that Budennyi's cavalry made a major
contribution to the successful counterattack against
Denikin, despite the fact that divisions within the Red
command and the ill-conceived plans of the centre hampered
Red Army operations throughout.
Chapter Five is concerned with the battlefield
experience of Budennyi's cavalry between October 1919 and
April 1920, the final months of the war against Denikin. It
is argued that the First Cavalry Army achieved its victory
over the White cavalry in the second half of 1919 not, as
some White sources have argued, because of superior numbers,
but because it fought better and in particular it made good
use of firepower. In January 1920, the First Cavalry Army
suffered one of it worst defeats. It was claimed in the
literature of the Stalin era that this was brought about by
the incompetence and ill-feeling towards the konnoarmeitsy
of the Front commander, Ivan Shorin. This version of these
events is substantially correct. The campaign only started to proceed successfully for the Red Army once Shorin had
been removed and the First Cavalry Army was given a new mission.
In Chapter Six it is argued that, in so far as the Red
Army's campaign against the Poles was a success, the
component of the Red Army that was most responsible for it was the First Cavalry Army. The changes to the First Cavalry
Army that took place immediately before and during its thousand-kilometre march to the Polish Front in April and 25
May 1920 help to explain the initial success of Budenny's
cavalry against the Poles. It is argued that the process of
the march itself, the build up in the numbers of
konnoarmeitsy before the march and the political education
measures that were taken during the march were vital factors
in underpinning the success of the First Cavalry Army in the
initial stages of the war against the Poles. The initial
breakthrough against the Poles is examined and it is argued
that it was not the planning of the Red Army's strategists
that was chiefly responsible for it, but rather the
initiative and resourcefulness of the konnoarmeitsy.
Chapter Seven deals with the failure of the Red Army to
win the Battle of Warsaw in mid-August 1920. A number of
writers considered that this episode represented a black
mark in the history of the First Cavalry Army because of its
failure to assist its neighbouring armies to the north at a
crucial moment. It is argued here that mismanagement by the
centre rather than the insubordination of those who
controlled the First Cavalry Army was chiefly responsible
for the debacle at Warsaw.
Chapter Eight examines the final stages of the war
against the Poles and the last major campaign of the Civil
War, fought against the Whites under Wrangel based in the
Crimea. It is argued that the First Cavalry Army was the key
element in both these campaigns and in both cases it was necessary to battle not just the enemy but the ill-conceived
instructions of the Red Army's central planners. 26
The Conclusion presents some general findings as well as a brief account of what happened to the konnoarmeitsy after the Civil War. 27
Chapter One: A War of Manoeuvre:
The Military Context.
The Civil War is a war of manoeuvre in which the chief means of mobility is the horse
Trotsky, Proletarians, To Horsel, September, 1919, How the Revolution Armed, v. 2., p. 212.
Before the First Cavalry Army can be properly understood, the military context that gave rise to it must be examined. The First Cavalry Army was a creature of a peculiar military environment that favoured the operations of cavalry in general and large bodies of cavalry in particular. It was this environment that made possible the success in the Russian Civil War of the mounted arm that had fared so badly on the contemporary and adjacent battlefields of World War One.
The Red and White cavalries were the inheritors of developments in the Tsarist cavalry in the half cent\iry before World War One. There needs to be some description of these developments to provide the necessary background information for the examination of Red cavalry organisation, armament and tactics during the Civil War, and in order to explain its success.
The largest standard body of cavalry, according to the conventional pattern of European military organisation at the time of World War One, was the division, which rarely boasted a strength of more than 4,000 sabres. Sometimes two or three divisions might be grouped together to form a
1 W. Balck, Tactics, 2 vols. (Westport, 1912), v. 2, p. 13. 28
cavalry corps; but this happened only rarely. The
designation of cavalry army was unknown in the army of the
Tsar or indeed of any other European power at the time of
World War One and that is why Soviet writers have sometimes
described the First Cavalry Army as having constituted 'a
new phenomenon of the military art'.2
In the Civil \iar, grand titles were often attached to
what were, by the standards of established European armies,
xinderstrength units and formations. It is true that, when it
was formally established in November 1919, the strength of
the First Cavalry Army was only some 7,000 sabres,
equivalent at most to a Tsarist cavalry corps.3 By the time
it marched to the Polish front in May 1920, the First
Cavalry Army had grown to about 16,000 sabres and included
four separate divisions.^ Thus, by this time, the First
Cavalry Army was not badly named: by any modem standard
this was an unusually large body of sabres.
The decline of cavalry in Europe began before World War
One. Cavalry was considered em auxiliary arm to the more
numerous and versatile infantry even at the beginning of the
nineteenth century.^ Cavalry was not suited to defensive
tasks and required favourable terrain in order for it to
operate with any great effect. For reasons of cost, it was
impossible to maintain large numbers of cavalry in peace
For example, P. Rotmistrov, Istoriia voennogo isskustva (Moscow, 1963), V. 1, p. 422.
3 D.K.F.K.A., V. 4, p. 108.
^ Ibid., V. 4, p. 172.
^ Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 273. 29 time. Because a prerequisite of cavalry was a trained rider and a trained horse, cavalry could not be improvised in the course of the campaign." Cavalry units and formations therefore tended to be kept smaller than their infantry counterparts. A Tsarist cavalry division was only about a quarter the size of a Tsarist infantry division.'
If the cavalry was viewed as an auxiliary arm it was, in the first half of the nineteenth century at least, universally recognised as an indispensible part of war. With good reason. Napoleon considered that the cavalry was
'useful before, during and after the battle'. Before the battle, the cavalry provided the scouts who were the major source of information about the enemy, as well as skirmishers, whose task it was to conceal and protect the main body of the army from the scouts of the enemy. In the battle itself, the cavalry had a number of tasks; most notably, it was reqfuired to form a compact mass to charge enemy formations. After the battle, it was the cavalry alone that could exploit a success, employing its mobility to mount a pursuit.
But the indications were already there, even at the time of the Napoleonic Wars, that mounted troops would experience great difficulty in being effective thereafter. The problem for the cavalry was that horse and rider were becoming ever more vulnerable to bullet and shell. Warfare of the
" Balck, Op. cit., p. 4.
7 V. Littauer, Russian Hussar (London, 1965), p.287.
^ Quoted in D. Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London, 1976), p. 28. 30
industrial age involved the mass production of ever quicker-
firing, longer-range and more accurate guns, along with the appearance of trenches and mass-produced barbed wire which greatly limited the chief asset of the cavalry, its mobility. These developments were particularly devastating
for the cavalry's shock tactics, the dense-formation charges which, since the time of Frederick the Great in the middle
of the eighteenth century, had been regarded both as the apogee of the cavalryman's art and as potentially the decisive moment in the battle.
Even in 1815 there were clear indications as to the
limitations of shock when the cavalry was confronted with concentrated firepower. As John Keegan put it in his analysis of Napoleon's last battle, 'if Waterloo had a
leitmotif it is that of cavalry charging square and being repulsed'.^ By the second half of the nineteenth century,
such was the firepower of the new weapons that it was
increasingly unlikely that the cavalryman would reach his opponent, no matter how bravely he charged. Large bodies of charging horsemen presented an especially inviting target for a defence armed with modem rifles, machine guns and artillery.
The difficulties confronting the cavalry by the middle of the nineteenth century were such that they did not pass unnoticed by military commentators. There was a growing body of evidence that pointed not only to the impotence of shock tactics, but to the limited killing power of the
^ John Keegan, The Face of Battle (Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 155. 31 cavalryman's cold steel of sabre and lance, weapons which in any case could only be used if the cavalryman succeeded in closing with his opponent. In his analysis of the casualty figures of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, George Denison pointed out that of the 65,160 Germans killed or wounded, only 218 were killed or wounded by the sabre or clubbed musket. Even more remarkably, of these only six were actually killed. The damning conclusion reached by Denison was that the 40,000 strong French cavalry had with their sabres caused a mere six deaths in six months of fighting.^^
All of this should be kept in mind when reading the latter- day accounts of cavalrymen, who tend to remember and glorify in their minds the work done by lance and sabre while neglecting to tell of the fact that these weapons were ineffective most of the time.
It was true that, in the secondary tasks of scouting, skirmishing or pursuing an already-broken opponent, the cavalry could still do valuable work even in the warfare of the twentieth century. On the battlefield itself, the developments in firepower, trenches and mass-produced barbed wire were condemning the mounted soldier to choosing between slaughter and inactivity.
Despite these developments, there was never any suggestion that the cavalry should be pensioned off. For the armies of Europe, there was simply no alternative means of mobility on the battlefield. This was why the debate about the future of cavalry and proposed changes to its
^^ G. Denison, A History of Cavalry From the Earliest Times (Westport, 1913), p. 426. 32 organisation, armament and tactics was so intense in the half century before World War One.-'^-'^ As a result of this debate, European cavalry underwent major changes. There were many who would argue that it did not change nearly enough.
The debate was itself a symptom of the decline of the
European mounted arm. At the same time, it seemed to hold out some hope for the soldier on horseback, if only he was willing to accept the need for change. Certainly, there was no shortage of remedies proposed for the ills of the cavalry in this period. A number of cavalry reformers were inspired by the experience of the American Civil War of 1861-1865, the first major conflict of the industrial age. Mounted troops were prominent in the American conflict, though shock tactics were rarely employed. Instead, the American cavalrymen used their horses principally for the purpose of rapid transportation to the battlefield. They then fought dismounted in the manner of infantry. It was argued that this type of cavalry could serve as a powerful means of mobile firepower in Europe.12 The cavalrymen would need to become expert in the use of firearms. It was argued that even on the occasions when mounted action was required, the revolver would prove a more valuable ally to the man in the saddle than would the sword or lance.13
The Russian cavalry was the first in Europe to be reorganised in the light of the lessons of the American
H For an account of the debate see B. Bond, 'Doctrine and Training in the British Cavalry' in M. Howard (ed.). The Theory and Practice of War (Indiana 1975), pp. 97-99.
12 Ibid., p. 98.
13 Denison, Op. cit., pp. 422-26. 33
Civil War. In the 1870's and 1880's, training in dismounted action was emphasised while the bulk of the cavalry was transformed into dragoons, moimted all rounders who in theory would have the ability to fight equally well on horseback or on foot as the situation demanded.!^ The
Russians came to be regarded as modem-style cavalrymen, because of their training in the use of firearms. William
Balck, a German officer who compiled a comprehensive survey of the Eiu~opean military scene on the eve of World War One, noted that 'a special fondness for the use of the fire arm is not unjustly ascribed to the Russian cavalry'. Balck acknowledged that the regulations emphasised the primacy of mounted action, but at the same time,
the thorough infantry training that the Russian cavalryman receives as regards dismounted drill and even bayonet fencing, the rifle and bayonet of the Dragoons, and the frequent mention of hand- to-hand combat when fighting on foot, force the cultivation of dismounted action more into the f oregroxind. ^^
Another reform was the adoption of the Cossack 'lava' as the method for conducting the mounted attack for the entire
Tsarist cavalry. The Cossack was widely regarded as an antiquated type of warrior in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet just before World War One, the non-
Cossack cavalry was being taught to use the Cossack method of attack in 'lava' formation. It was a type of loose- formation charge designed to put the enemy off balance, with the attackers lapping around the edges of an enemy
1^ Albert Seaton, The Horsemen of the Steppes (London, 1985) p. 205.
1^ Balck, Op. cit., p. 113. 34 formation. The Tsarist military establishment considered that an attack in 'lava' formation was likely to be less costly than the dense-formation charges demanded by shock tactics. The 'lava' had a chaotic appearance, but a definite purpose. As Balck described the result of the charge.
Yelling and firing, the Cossacks swarm in dispersed formation all around an enemy in order to induce him to disperse likewise, thus enabling them in hand-to-hand combat, to bring into play their superiority in riding and in handling their weapons.1°
At the time of World War One, the Russian cavalrymsm was armed with the modem three-line five-roxind bolt-action rifle that was shorter and lighter than its infantry eq[uivalent. This was carried along with the sword and sometimes the lance. Some of the Don Cossacks were lancers.
Officers carried a sword and a revolver. When the soldier was mounted, the rifle was worn slving across his back and for dismounted action, the non-Cossack cavalryman had a bayonet which was carried on the outside of the scabbard for the sword. When it ceime time for dismounted action, two out of every three cavalrymen dismounted, while the third led away the horses.l' At the same time, the machine gun was becoming an ever more important means of firepower in war.
Before 1914 machine gun troops using the reliable Maxim gun had made their appearance in the Tsarist cavalry. During
World War One, the number of machine guns attached to the cavalry doubled to four guns per regiment.
1'^ Iljifj;^ p; 1387
17 Littauer, Op. cit., p. 112. 35
To characterise the Russian cavalry in 1914 as having grasped the nettle of the cavalry's need to modernise by embracing firepower and dismounted action would be misleading. In Russia, as was the case elsewhere in Europe, changes to the traditional organisation, armament and tactics of the cavalry were resisted by the cavalrymen. The best account of the Russian cavalry in this period was written by Vladimir Littaeur, an officer in the Tsarist hussars who would recall that he and his fellow cavalry officers simply ignored the new teaching. To their way of thinking, it would prove of no value anyway for, as Littauer later recalled, 'we believed that we would charge bravely enough when the time came and that nothing else would matter very much'.18 According to Littauer, 'the spirit of the
Russian cavalry still remained that of charging with drawn swords'.19
Despite evidence of its inadequacy, the emotional attachment to the traditional cavalry fighting style was still strong. For the cavalryman, what was really at stake was his status. The cavalryman saw himself as part of an elite, distinguished from the common soldier because he used his horse and sabre in battle. To become a dragoon, with the capacity to fight on foot when required, was distasteful enough: the idea of being engaged almost exclusively in dismounted action was totally repugnant.20
1® Ibid7, j>. 17^
1^ Ibid. p. 107.
20 Bond, Op. cit., p. 112. 36
The conservative prejudice of the cavalrymen in these matters almost certainly reflected a conservative world-view that was not siurprising given that even in 1914 a majority of cavalry officers were titled when elsewhere in the
Tsarist Army the proportion was considerably lower.2^
Trotsky noted this conservative ethos in the cavalry when he wrote that 'An ultra-reactionary spirit always prevailed in the cavalry. The old cavalry regiments were the last to come over to the side of the October Revolution'.22
Before 1914, the contest between reformers and traditionalists over cavalry matters produced no clear winner. As a conseqfuence, the Tsarist cavalry of World War
One was a hybrid of tradition and reform. The ability to fight dismounted was part of its repertoire; but the regulations stipulated that it was to be undertaken only when mounted action was impossible. A largely symbolic victory for the traditionalists in the Russian cavalry came after the disappointing performance of the Russian Army, including its cavalry, in the war with Japan in 1904-1905, with the reinstatement of the lance for some cavalrymen. The lance did not justify its recall. So awkward was this weapon that in World War One those Russian cavalrymen who were so armed frequently discarded it voluntarily on the battlefield.23
21 A. Wiiidman The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt, (March-April 1917) (Princeton, 1980), pp. 22-25; Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 21.
22 Trotsky, How the Revolution Aimed, v. 2, p. 412.
23 Littauer, Op. cit., p. 116. 37
In 1914, the Tsarist cavalry was the largest in Europe.
Its organisation followed a basic continental pattern. For the most part, this pattern was followed in the Civil War by both the Red and the White cavalries. The strength of the cavalry was usually measured in the number of regiments. A regiment comprised about 1,000 men. In peace time, the
Russian cavalry stood at some 127 regiments. Of these, 60 formed the numbered divisions, while the bulk of the remainder formed separate regiments, brigades and Cossack units. The fifteen numbered divisions were organised into two brigades, each of two regiments. A regiment contained six squadrons, while each squadron contained on average six platoons of 36 men. The recommended strength of the Russiem cavalry division was 3,600 sabres. Each division was to have twelve guns assigned to two horse batteries, as well as mounted sappers and a mounted machine gun detachment attached to each regiment. The total number in the division drawing rations was set at 4,389 while the number of horses was 5,103.24
The war-time strength of the Tsarist cavalry was 270 regiments. The increase was made possible by the mobilisation of the Cossacks, who made up two thirds of the war-time strength of the Tsarist cavalry. In World War One, the experience of Cossack and non-Cossack cavalry was much the same. The cavalrymen generally had to come to terms with the fact that they were an anachronism in this type of war.
Cavalry proved an anachronism in World War One; but that was not because mounted troops were no longer required on
2^ Ibid., pp. 288-90i 38 the battlefield. In the first quarter of the twentieth century, there was was no viable alternative means of mobility in war to the horse in the forward areas. The military possibilities of the internal combustion engine could not yet be properly exploited. In the absence of an alternative, the generals of World War One hoped in vain that their cavalry might exploit the breakthrough that was to be made in the enemy lines by the infantry and artillery2^. In World War One, it was the presence of dense lines of infantry and artillery, with their unprecedented firepower and trench and barbed-wire protection, that prevented the cavalry from operating effectively and condemned the belligerents to years of static trench warfare and military stalemate.
The accomplishments of the Russian cavalry in World War
One were meagre. Trotsky wrote that the cavalry had been reduced to an arm 'of third-rate importance'.2" Observers closer to the action than Trotsky came to the same conclusion. The Russian cavalryman, Littauer, later recalled how in World War One the cavalry was 'reduced to scouting, to the occasional pursuit of the defeated enemy and to dismounted combat'. It might have been that the Russian cavalry would have fought better had it adopted in more whole-hearted fashion changes to the organisation, armament and tactics of the arm that had been recommended by various
2^ J Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire (London, 1980), p. 164.
2^ Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed., v. 2, p. 212.
27 Littauer, Op. cit., p. 107. 39
cavalry reformers in the period before World War One. On the
other hand, it is difficult to see how mounted troops,
however armed and trained, could have performed anything
other than a secondary role in the conditions of World War
One. In the Civil War in Russia, by contrast, the cavalrymen
found a much more congenial environment.
While it was not the case that the Civil War was fought
mainly on horseback, this conflict was, more than any other
conflict in Europe since the Napoleonic Wars, a cavalryman's
war. A comparison with the trend of cavalry representation
in earlier European wars makes this point.
In 1809, the ratio of cavalry to infantry in the French
Army was 1:4.8. In 1866, in the German theatre of war, it
was 1:8.6 in the Austrian Army and 1:7.7 in the Prussian
Army. In 1870, it was 1:6 in the French Army and 1:8 in the
German Army.2° In the half century before World War One, the
size of European armies increased dramatically, with cavalry
failing to keep pace with the rising numbers of infantry.
This process gathered pace during World War One. The Russian
cavalry was the largest in Europe but, after mobilisation in
1914, its seemingly impressive strength of 270,000 sabres was soon dwarfed by the infantry. The peace-time strength of the Russian Army was 1.4 million: this soon rose to 4 million after the outbreak of war in 1914. The cavalry was unable to compete not only with infantry firepower but with
infantry numbers.
It was a different story in the Civil War. Here the proportion of cavalry was greatest in the armies of the
2S Balck, Op. cit., p.96. 40
counterrevolution. Cavalry representation was at its peak among the Whites in south Russia, led by general Anton
Denikin. This force achieved its maximum strength in late
summer, 1919. According to Red Army figures at the time, the
front-line strength of Denikin's army in June 1919 was
110,000, including some 58,000 cavalry.2^ This was a ratio
of approximately 1:1. By September 1919, the balance had
changed slightly so that in a force of about 94,000, cavalry
contributed 40,000.
Cavalry numbers were impressive too in admiral Alexander
Kolchak's White Army in Siberia. The Red Army estimate of
Kolchak's strength in June 1919 was 127,000 troops,
including 33,000 cavalry.30 This was a ratio of slightly better than 1:4. Cavalry representation was lower, but by no means inconsequential in the Red Army. In mid-October 1920,
at the height of the Soviet-Polish War, the front-line
strength of the Red Army on all fronts was about 400,000
men. Of these, cavalry contributed about 72,000.-^^ The ratio
of cavalry to infantry was therefore about 1:5.5.
Significantly, this was an improvement upon the situation at the end of 1918, when the ratio of cavalry to infantry in the Red Army was a little better than 1:9.32
At times in the fighting in south Russia cavalry actually outnumbered infantry in both the White and the Red
Armies. It is interesting to note that while the Red Army
29 D.K.F.k.A., V. 4, p. 481
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., V. 4, p. 219.
32 Ibid., V. 4, p. 51. 41 overall never had enough cavalry, it might be argued that the Whites in south Russia had too much relative to their infantry numbers with the imbalance causing a number of difficulties, including an inability to hold groxmd.
It was not simply a (juestion of numbers. Cavalry played a crucial role in Civil War operations. Trotsky, the Red
Army's Commissar for War, was not exaggerating when he reported to Lenin in June 1919, at the height of the fighting in south Russia, that 'cavalry is essential at all costs...All that needs to be realised is that the question of defeat or victory turns on this'.33 Even in 1920, the Red
Army's campaigns against the Poles and the Whites in the
Crimea were hampered by squabbles over where to send much- neeeded but scarce cavalry resources.
There is no real mystery about this cavalry revival. The prominence of cavalry in the Civil War reflected the need for and availability of cavalrymen, a suitable topography for mounted warfare and, above all, the absence of infantry and artillery firepower on the scale that had brought about the demise of cavalry in World War One.
While the Civil War was to resemble World War One in terms of the enormous lengths of the battle fronts and the firepower of the weapons employed, neither the Red nor the
White Armies succeeded in assembling the resources required to form the solid walls of infantry and artillery that had characterised the 1914-1918 conflict. With the coming to power of the Soviet government in October 1917, the vast reserves of the Russian Army simply melted away: the Civil
33 Trotsky Papers, v. 1, pp. 530-31 42
War armies had to be built up from scratch. They grew in size, but were always pathetically understrength in comparison to the vast distances of Russia across which the fighting took place.
At the height of the Civil War in mid-1919, the Red
Army, by far the single largest force engaged, was able to muster a mere 250 men and two artillery pieces per kilometre for its major offensive in south Russia. This hardly compares with a typical World War One ratio of 4,000-5,000 men and 150 artillery pieces per kilometre.3^ By the end of
1920, the Red Army had accumulated some 2,300 pieces of artillery, equivalent to that which was placed on a single
15 kilometre stretch of the German front at Verdun.3^ Not only was the Civil War infantry and artillery lacking in numbers: it regularly showed all the signs of poor training and chronic supply problems.
Alternative means of mobility to the horse were lacking.
There were armoured cars which on occasions proved of great value. But passable roads and fuel were in short supply. The armovired train was a very useful means of mobile firepower, but its range was naturally restricted to the railroad. The
Russian Army in World War One had no tanks. These would make only scattered and largely unproductive appearances in the
White Armies in 1919, thanks to supplies from Britain and
France. Air power was in its infancy. This was just as well for the cavalry of the Civil War. An enemy in the air was a deadly adversary for a large target such as a mass of men
3^ Iz istorii (£97^^); p; 210.
35 Ibid., p. 208. 43 and horses. When fighting Polish aircraft in 1920, the Red cavalry found that virtually its only defence was to hide in the woods.
As a consequence of the limited resources available, the front lines of the Civil War came to resemble thinly-held cordons with concentrations at particular points where an offensive was being mounted. At the strategic level, the ubiquitous exposed flanks that dotted these front lines were to provide inviting targets for mounted troops with the requisite mobility and strike power.
The huge spaces of Russia and particularly the vast, relatively open southern steppes, cut only by a few large, but fordable, rivers, favoured cavalry operations. The southern steppes had long proved something of a cavalryman's paradise. In centuries past, they had served as the invasion route to the west for mounted hordes of Hims and Mongols from Asia. For several centuries thereafter, they were a sort of no-man's land between several great powers, and during this long interregnum, they became the home of the
Cossacks, whole communities of mounted warriors.36
All of this is not to suggest that life in the forward areas was free of risk for the cavalryman in the Civil War in Russia. Fighting on horseback remained a hazardous occupation. There was no magical cure for the cavalryman's vulnerability to bullet and shell. When badly used against prepared enemy defences, the cavalrymen of the Civil War could still be slaughtered in large n\unbers. It was simply that there was opportunity for the cavalry in the Civil War
3° Seaton, Horsemen of the Steppes, p. 1. 44
in a way that there was not in World War One. Great rewards awaited the cavalry that could make the most of the conditions.
The favourable objective conditions that obtained made possible a cavalry revival in the Civil War. A subjective
element was required to ensure that one would take place.
The suitability of this environment for mounted warfare proved difficult to foresee at the outset of the Civil War.
There was initial scepticism in both the Red and White
camps, resulting from the poor achievement of mounted troops
in World War One.37 Vfhat ensured that mounted troops would receive their chance in the Civil War was the over representation of ex-Tsarist cavalrymen in the armies of the
covinterrevolution. Ex-Tsarist cavalry officers, famous for their political conservativism, and Cossacks, were to
constitute two of the best-represented groups in the White
Armies.38
The story of the cavalry in the Russian Civil War is closely linked to the story of the Cossacks. The Cossacks were an essential ingredient in the counterrevolution in south Russia. They provided the principal bases for the
White Army that emerged there and more than half its troops.
The Cossacks were the descendents of the escaped serfs and freebooters who came to the southern steppes at the end of
37 The scepticism in the Red camp is discussed below. For evidence of initial scepticism in relation to the cavalry even among the Whites see N. Kelchevskii, Dumenko i Budennyi (Constantinople, 1920), pp. 5-6.
3ft For a discussion of the representation of ex-Tsarist officers and Cossacks in the White Army of south Russia, see P. Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-20: The Defeat of the Whites (Berkeley, 1977). pp. 18-22. 45 the Mongol period. The Tsars, recognising their military value and location near the borders, transformed the
Cossacks into long-service cavalry for the Tsarist Army.39
The Cossacks came to form a separate legal estate, defined by their military service. By 1914, there were thirteen separate Cossack Hosts, voiska, in the Russian Empire.
The lands of the Don, Kuban and Terek Cossack Hosts dominated the south-east comer of Em-opean Russia. The Don
Cossack region sprawled over 165,000 square kilometres of the southern steppe in the area surrounding the lower half of the Don river and its tributaries. To the south of the
Don was the Kuban region of some 94,000 square kilometres, an area bisected by the westerly course of the Kuban River to the Black Sea. To the east of the Kuban was the Terek region, centred on the Terek river which flows in an easterly direction to the Caspian Sea.
The total Cossack population at the beginning of 1917 was just 4.5 million.^0 xhe Don and Kuban Hosts were by far the largest, with populations of about 1.5 and 1.3 million respectively. In terms of population, the strength of the
Cossacks was extremely limited but, as a warrior caste, the
Cossacks represented a formidable force.
The Cossacks had been rewarded by the Tsars for their military service with certain privileges of land ownership and self government. As relatively well-off farming communities, the Cossack Hosts were viewed both by
39 S. Starikov and: R. Medvedev, Philip Mironov and the Russian Civil War (New York, 1978), p. 4.
^0 Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855-191'^, (London 1967). p.21. 46 themselves and by others as having little in common with
ordinary Russian peasants. Overall the Cossack held larger
land allotments than the average Russian peasant. The
Cossack did not pay the soul tax and, like the nobility, he was allowed to distil vodka. Geographically, the Cossack was
isolated from the rest of Russia, and in the Tsarist Army there were separate Cossack units with Cossack commanders.
This sense of being different was reinforced among the
Cossacks by their distinctive customs and close-knit family
life. Each stanitsa, meaning a large Cossack village, had at
its head its own elected ataman and he, in turn, was
responsible directly to the Host ataman.
From the Cossack point of view, his privileged position was justified, given the level of military service that was
imposed upon him and not upon the non-Cossack peasant. Given that the Bolsheviks advocated a class war of the underprivileged against the privileged and that the Cossacks were a relatively privileged group, conflict between
Cossacks and the Bolshevik-dominated Soviet government was always likely after the latter came to power in October
1917.
The Cossacks were the last social group to desert the
Tsar in February 1917: the hopes of anti-Soviet leaders such as general Komilov in August 1917 were pinned on the
Cossacks. Lenin at that time summarised a widely-held view about the Cossacks among socialists when he wrote that they were characterised by 'many medieval traits in their way of 47
life, their economy and their customs' and that this was the
'socio-economic basis for a Russian Vendee.'41
This remark of Lenin's was particularly prescient, for that was exactly what the Cossack lands would become in the
Civil War, the Vendee of the Russian revolution. In the months that followed the October Revolution, the Cossack
lands became the centre of opposition to the Soviet government. Anti-Bolshevik refugees from the north began to arrive there. The ex-Tsarist officers who came to the
Cossack lands of south Russia in this time formed the nucleus of what would become the best anti-Bolshevik
fighting force, the Volunteer Army.
Like the covinterrevolution generally, it would take time before the Cossacks emerged as a serious military threat to the Soviet government. The initial attempt made by the conservative Don Cossack ataman, general Viktor Kaledin, to challenge the Soviet government ended in dismal failure with the overthrow of Kaledin's government in February 1918 and the setting up of the Don and Kuban Soviet Republics in
March 1918. Yet slowly a more concerted resistance to Soviet
Power took hold in the Cossack lands. It was greatly aided by the German invasion of the Ukraine which, by May 1916, had sealed the Cossacks' left flank from Bolshevik attack.
At that time, the Don Cossacks found themselves with a new leader, the able general Peter Krasnov, a committed enemy of the Bolsheviks who, by mid 1918, was in command of a force
^1 V. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii 4th ed. Moscow, v. 26, p. 15. 48 about 50,000 strong, about half of which was mounted. 2 The
Cossack counterrevolution was under way.
The Cossacks made their reputation as frontier fighters in the Caucasus region, and in helping to repulse Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. In the war against the French, the Cossacks had excelled as scouts, skirmishers and raiders.^3 -fhe performance of the Cossacks in subsequent conflicts was less impressive, so that their reputation declined accordingly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Observers wondered whether the settled life of the modem Cossack farmer had dulled the fighting edge that had
come with the earlier nomadic existence on the steppe.
In the half century before World War One, the Cossacks were best known as a mobile police force for suppressing popular demonstrations within Russia. In World War One, the battlefield record of the Cossacks was, as many had
anticipated, unimpressive. By contrast, in the Civil War the
Cossacks were to be roused to one final military effort: the
stakes became very high indeed-the survival of Cossackdom
itself. They were aided in that they found the going much
easier against the under-strength, ill-equipped, \insteady
Red infantry and artillery that confronted them in the first months of the Civil War.^^ The success of the White cavalry
in turn encouraged the development of its Red counterpart.
^2 Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919, p. 50.
^3 Seaton, Horsemen of the Steppes, p. 127.
"*"* Ibid.
^5 Kel'chevskii, Op. cit., p. 7. 49
In the conditions of World War One, the moral effect that the advancing horseman was supposed to produce upon infantry failed to materialise. It was a different story in the Civil War. Alexander Egorov, a Red Army commander in the south-east in early 1919, wrote later about the importance of what he described as the 'psychological' factor here. By moving its forces quickly, the Cossack cavalry was able to give the impression that there was more of it than there was. Many of the Red infantrymen, despite or because of the fact that they were veterans of World War One, had little experience in dealing with cavalry in conditions of a war of movement and were prone to panic. "
The Cossack was equally at home fighting as an individual scout or as part of a large mounted force. In a report prepared for his political masters in January 1919, the Red Army's Commander-in-Chief, loachim Vatsetis, noted that the 'mobility of their cavalry masses' was a crucial ingredient in the success of the Whites up to that time.
It is not clear how large were the 'cavalry masses' of the
Whites to which Vatsetis referred. Probably at this stage the largest vmits would have been no more than 3,000 or
4,000 sabres, the equivalent of a Tsarist division. Yet it was a significant development.
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 had clearly revealed the tendency in modern war towards extensive front lines. It was argued, even at that time, that this development would enable cavalry to employ its mobility in raids.
'^^ A. Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919, p. 75.
^7 D.G.K.K.A., p. 343. 50 reconnaissance and turning movements on the enemy's flanks.^^ At the time of World War One, it was widely assumed that cavalry operations in the wider theatre of war could only be performed by small, extremely mobile bodies of mounted troops that would make as difficult a target as possible for enemy infantry and artillery. In the Civil War, the White cavalry had shown that this constraint did not apply. Added size made the cavalry masses of the Civil War more capable of independent operation without seriously impairing their mobility or providing undue problems of command. Their battlefield record was to be testimony to their effectiveness.
As Budennyi later described the Cossack cavalry that he encountered at Tsaritsyn in the second half of 1918, it was always quick to regroup so as to attack the weakest place in the Red line. If an attack at one point failed, the Cossacks left a small, covering detachment and attacked in a different direction. According to Budennyi, it was obvious then that the Red Army had to have its own cavalry masses, capable of matching the mobility and strikepower of the Whites.^9
The operations of the Don Cossack cavalry in summer and autumn 1916 established the characteristic features of mounted warfare in the Civil War, with its emphasis upon size and independent operation. In Denikin's White Army in south Russia, this development was taken to its logical
For a sample of this type of argument from a Tsarist cavalryman, see W. Balck, Op. cit., p. 95.
^9 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 106. 51 conclusion in summer 1919, with the appearance of two corps- size bodies of cavalry, one led by a Don Cossack, Konstantin
Mamontov, the other by a Kuban Cossack, Andrei Shkuro.
Mamontov's force was about 9,000 strong at its peak and
Shkuro's corps was not greatly inferior.^^ T^e cavalry of
Mamontov and Shkuro provided the model for the First Cavalry
Array.
Not all the mounted troops of the Civil War were part of these large bodies of cavalry. In the Civil War, there was a great flowering of cavalry of all descriptions. There was what Soviet literature describes as \init, voiskovaia, cavalry, of perhaps a couple of hundred sabres or less that provided close support for the infantry and artillery. This
cavalry was involved in reconnaissance, outpost duties, skirmishing, covering the retreat and assisting the infantry
in battle.
More important were the larger bodies of cavalry capable of independent operation, the strategic, strategicheskaia, cavalry masses which had a much wider commission and which represented the most interesting military phenomenon of the
Civil War. This cavalry was not tied to an infantry unit, but instead operated in the wider theatre of war, probing for the flanks and rear of the enemy, conducting raids, cooperating with infantry divisions, or armies, to bring coordinated blows against an enemy's front and rear.^1
The size of the components of this strategic cavalry in the Civil War varied. The 16,000 sabres of the First Cavalry
50 Grazhdanskaia voina (;i983), p. 341.
51 Ibid., p. 241. 52
Army, when it marched against the Poles in May 1920, made it by far the largest. For much of the war against Denikin in south Russia, the First Cavalry Array was considerably smaller, with between 7,000 and 10,000 sabres. This was about the same size as the White cavalry corps led by
Mamontov and Shkuro in 1919 and by Pavlov in spring 1920. In the Red Army, the 3rd Cavalry Corps under Gaia Gai, the 8th
Cavalry Divison, under Valerii Primakov and the 2nd Cavalry
Army, first under Oka Gorodovikov and later under Philip
Mironov, each had a strength of some 3,000-4,000 sabres: each made a significant contribution to the campaigns of the
Red Array. The White corps, under Barbovich in the Crimea in
1920, was about 5,000 sabres in strength.
The First Cavalry Army was to be the symbol and the proof of the emergence of the Red cavalry in the Civil War.
It should not be thought that this was a triumph of the Red
Army's central planners. The efforts of the latter produced little or no results in the crucial first eighteen months of the Civil War.
Modem Soviet writers have made no attempt to hide the fact that the early efforts to build a Red cavalry met with little success.52 They explain this failure in terms of the scepticism towards the cavalry of the former Tsarist officers recruited as 'military specialists' and of Trotsky, the War Commissar.
It would seem to have been the case that ex-Tsarist cavalry officers, who might have put forward a case for cavalry, were conspicuous by their absence in the Red Army.
52 See, for example, Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 241. 53
A few joined, most notably Boris Shaposhnikov, a former
Tsarist colonel, and the Don Cossack, Philip Mironov, but these were very much the exceptions. A measure of this is that, whereas in the Red infantry there were many ex- officers among the field commanders, Mironov was the only former officer who was prominent in the Red cavalry in the field. Budennyi, Valerii Primakov, Boris Dumenko and Gaia
Gai, the four most important cavalry commauiders, were of humble origins with Budennyi, Dumenko and Gai having served as Non Commissioned Officers in the Tsarist Army.53
Joseph Pilsudskii, the Polish Commander-in-Chief and in
World War One the commander of a Polish legionary brigade that served with the armies of Austria-Hungary, was expressing a view that was typical of many infantry and artillery officers when he wrote that,
It is a matter of common knowledge that even before 1914 the value of cavalry had been rated increasingly low. It was assigned auxiliary duties, such as reconnaissance and the protection of wings. Never was it given independent or decisive tasks. With the development of firing power during the vast struggles in E\u"ope the mission of the cavalry practically ceased to exist. The horses were turned over to the artillery and the troopers were turned into infantrymen.
Trotsky has been vilified in Soviet literature as a matter of routine and so the claim that he was partly, or chiefly responsible for the retarded development of the Red cavalry cannot be accepted at face value. After the Civil
War, Trotsky was to style himself as the guiding light behind the development of the Red cavalry, the man who
53 See biographies in Grazhdanskaia voina (1983).
54 J. Pilsudski, The Year 1920, p. 175. 54 penned the celebrated recruiting slogan, 'Proletarians to
Horse'.55 Trotsky appears to have come alive to the importance of cavalry only in summer and autumn 1919, when the Red Army's lurgent need for mounted troops was clear.
'Proletarians to Horse', did not appear iintil September
1919. It missed the point if Trotsky expected urban workers to take to the saddle: the First Cavalry Army was essentially an army of peasants and Cossacks.
No evidence has been produced by Soviet writers that
Lenin, whose supervisory role over the affairs of the Red
Army in the Civil War is emphasised in Soviet literature, took an early interest in the cavalry. This neglect of the mounted arm on the part of those who are so often portrayed in the literature as having been clairvoyant in such matters has proved embarrassing to Soviet writers. Trotsky and his
'criminal' neglect for a long time provided a convenient scapegoat, absolving others in the Soviet political and military leadership from the sin of lack of vision. In the crucial first eighteen months of the Civil War, it would appear that the cavalry was virtually friendless amongst those with authority in the Red Army.
The fail\u~e to foresee the importance of cavalry has to be viewed within context. A crucial factor was that there was no ready availability of the human raw material needed for a Red cavalry. Among the Cossacks and cavalry officers generally, there was minority support for the Soviet government. No less depressing, from the Red Army's point of
55 Trotsky Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and his Influence 2 vols. (London, 1969), pp. 55-56; How The Revolution Armed, V. 2, pp. 412-14. 55
view, was the fact that for much of the Civil War the Soviet
writ did not run on the southern steppe, the major horse-
producing area of the Russian Empire. To these difficulties,
about which they could do little, the Red Army's planners
added a few of their own by failing to undertake any
concerted or far-sighted program to build up the Red cavalry
at the outset of the Civil War.
The work of producing a Red cavalry went particularly
slowly in 1918. loachim Vatsetis, the East Front commander,
experimented with mounted infantry; but this was not the
stuff of an effective mounted force. At the end of 1918, the
East Front, which had received top priority from the centre,
still did not have a single cavalry division. In August
1918, the Higher Military Soviet, the body responsible at
that time for the central direction of the Red Army's
affairs, came up with plans aimed at forming larger cavalry
bodies. The Moscow, Orel and Turkestan Military Districts
were supposed to produce a cavalry division each; but only
the Moscow division was ever formed. Its contribution to the
Red Army was not particularly significant.5"
The situation was no better as regards horses. In
September 1918, eight regional committees were set up to
find horses for the Red Army. In December 1918, this work was taken over by a central commission. Soviet writers do not conceal the fact that the results of these equine mobilisations were disappointing.57 At the end of 1918, the
Whites held a monopoly over mobility because of the
5'^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 241.
57 Ibid. Map 1 Don. Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan voiskos Legend The Red p«Hn«n c«v«ify © WelachmenI ii ofqatjjiecj .^. _ „ CoTib*) foufe of i«gJmen(
Co<"b*l fou'e o( divmon
I Comb«l route of corpi
iCornb#l fou'e of Fifil C«v«lry A Campaigns of the Cavalry Reglmenf-jubsequenlly Firsi Cavalry Army from June 1918 !o March 1920 56 superiority of their cavalry. Even in September 1919, Trotsky could write, with no hint of exaggeration, that the shortage of cavalry was the Red Army's 'single greatest failing'.58 Red Army leaders were able to comfort themselves with the illusion that on paper the Red cavalry always seemed a much grander force than it in fact was. The Tables of Organisation for a cavalry division that finally appeared in August 1918 were singularly misleading. The fashion in the Red Army at the time was to plan for larger units than the Tsarist equivalents. In terms of cavalry divisions, this meant that according to the Tables of Organisation of 3 August 1918, each cavalry division was to have three separate brigades, each of two regiments and a total strength of 7,653 men and 8,469 horses. An order of 26 December 1918 made the cavalry division even larger, 8,346 men and 9,226 horses. There were implausible plans for teams of veterinarians and motor cyclists to be part of the divisions. It was unrealistic. As a Soviet writer acknowledged, 'in practice the fighting and numerical composition of the cavalry division was lower than that 59 required by the Tables of Organisation.'^^ Slowly but surely, a competitive Red cavalry emerged; but it owed little to the efforts of the Red Army's central planners. Sergei Kamenev, the Red Army Commander-in-Chief for the second half of the Civil War, remarked later that 58 Trotsky, How The Revolution Armed, v. 2., p. 412. 5^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 240. 57 'the enemy's trump, by the will of fate, passed to us'. There was a lot more to this achievement than fate. Kamenev's latter-day remark quoted above was really an admission of how little involved in this process was the centre. As will become clear, what was required was the commitment to the cavalry cause that was to be developed at the front. ^^ S. Kamenev, Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine i voennom stroitel'stve (Moscow, 1963), p. 140. 58 Chapter Two: The Knights of the Commune: The Social Context. 'We are the Knights of the Commune 'We are the Cavalry of Labour' From the poem, Vpered, by Sergei Minin. If the White cavalry was a product not just of a particular military context but of a social context, then the same was true of its Red counterpart. Unlike the Red Array as a whole, the First Cavalry Array was not an array of conscripts from all parts of Russia. It was a force that arose in a specific area, in or near the Cossack lands of south Russia. It contained a solid nucleus of volunteers. According to the cavalryman Ivan Kosogov, 'the primary method of recruitment was voluntarism'.-'- This is a picture that requires filling out, and precisely how the First Cavalry Army was assembled will become clear in the account that follows. The social origins of the konnoarmeitsy are of the greatest importance to an understanding of the battlefield achievements of Budennyi's cavalry. In Western literatiure, the konnoarmeitsy have most frequently been depicted as Cossacks and/or declasse freebooters, motivated by a 'lust for loot' , with little or no connection to the political agenda of the revolution under whose banners they fought. As Norman Davies, in his description of the entry of the First Cavalry Army into Poland, put it: ^ Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 168. 2 Fiddick, ' The "Miracle of the Vistula": Soviet Policy versus Red Array Strategy', Journal of Modem History, no. 4, vol. 45, 1973, p. 639. 59 The troopers of the Konarmyia had little in common with Bolshevik politics except that they were fighting on the same side. Most were former Cossacks, partisans and bandits won over in the course of the Red Army's victories.^ This kind of description is a caricatxire and a misleading one. There is little reason for thinking that the First Cavalry Army was a predominantly Cossack force: this was more truly the case with the Whites. There was nothing accidental about the service of Budennyi and his fellow konnoarmeitsy in the Red Army. The konnoarmeitsy had as much of a vested interest in the defeat of the counterrevolution in south Russia as had Lenin and his Soviet government. The majority of the konnoarmeitsy had quite definite revolutionary goals: the redistribution of land and political power in south Russia, the destruction of the hegemony of the Cossack atamany there. The First Cavalry Array grew out of the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi, Konnyi korpus Budennogo, which was established as part of the Red Tenth Army based at Tsaritsyn in south-east Russia officially on 26 June 1919.^ The Cavalry Corps was in turn the result of the merger of two formerly-independent cavalry divisions, the 4th and the 6th. The 4th Cavalry Division grew up at Tsaritsyn and its raw material was provided by dissidents from the Don Cossack lands. The 6th Cavalry Division began its career farther to the south, in the fighting in the Kuban and Stavropol regions, before moving to Tsaritsyn early in 1919. ^ Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, p. 117. ^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 279. 60 Conscripts supplied by the centre were not a significant factor in the development of the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. They grew through the incorporation of smaller units of cavalry that had also been formed locally and by front mobilisations5 whereby recruits were gathered from the areas found in the path of the advancing Red Army, in this case south-east Russia. This method of recruitment was systematized by the cavalrymen in January 1920 with the setting up of the First Cavalry Army's Formations Board in Rostov, in the heart of the Don Cossack territory. Who were the konnoarmeitsy? According to Andrei Shkiuro, the White cavalry leader, Budennyi's cavalry 'was formed mostly from Don, Kuban and Terek Cossacks, expelled from their stanitsy because of their Bolshevik sympathies, as well as the inogorodnie of these regions'." Ivan Tiulenev, a coraraander in the First Cavalry Array and later its most prolific historian, made the same point when he wrote that the 'basic nucleus of the First Cavalry Army was formed from the inogorodnie peasants and the Cossack poor of the Don and Kuban regions and frora Stavropol'. These two writers were in general agreeraent that the konnoarmeitsy were basically a mixture of dissident Cossacks and inogorodnie. The inogorodnie were the most recently ^ For a description of how the Red Army at the front carried out its own mobilisations see N. Movchin 'Komplektovanie krasnoi armii v 1918-1920 gg.' in Bubnov et al, Op. cit., v. 2, p. 86. A. Shkuro, Zapiski belogo partisana (Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 238. ' I. Tiulenev, Sovietskaia kavaleriia v boiakh za rodinu, (Moscow, 1957), p. 22. 61 arrived of the mosaic of groups that made up the population of south-east Russia in 1917. In the half century before World War One, increasing numbers of non-Cossacks arrived in the Cossack lands. The influx of new arrivals was such that, by 1917, Cossacks formed a minority of the population in their own lands. In the two largest of the Cossack Hosts, those of the Don and the Kuban in south-east Russia, Cossacks formed only about 43% of the population.8 A large part of the non-Cossack population was made up of migrants from land-hungry central Russia, who came to the reputedly rich and free Cossack lands after the 1861 Emancipation. The newcomers were known as inogorodnie, the literal meaning of which is "people frora another town'. By that tirae entry into the Cossack estate was alraost impossible. In the Don region, the inogorodnie made up only about one half of the non-Cossack population and about one quarter of the population overall. The remainder of the non Cossacks comprised a special category known as korrenye, made up of the descendents of those who were brought to the Cossack lands as serfs by the richer Cossacks in centuries past emd who had received their freedom as a result of the Emancipation. In the Kuban, the inogorodnie made up more than half the population. Some of the non-Cossack population lived in the scattered towns and mining settlements, although the urban ® Ibid. ^ K. Khmelevskii, Krakh Krasnovshchiny i Nemetskoi Interventsii na Donu. (aprel' 1918 - mart 1919 goda) (Rostov, 1965), p. 20. 62 population of the Don region only made up 7% of the total. In the countryside, the populations of Cossacks and non- Cossacks were about even in numbers in the Don and Kuban; but the Cossacks owned 80% of the land.-'-^ It was the presence of the inogorodnie that was a very important factor in pushing the bulk of the Cossacks into the camp of the counterrevolution. Before the Civil War, the Cossacks tolerated the inogorodnie, because the latter were a source of rent, taxes and seasonal labour. But a redistribution of land and power in south Russia had to favour the inogorodnie at the expense of the Cossacks. It was just this type of threat that seemed to be embodied in Soviet Power, in whose name the Bolsheviks took power in Petrograd in October 1917. Just as the Cossacks were drawn to the cause of counterrevolution, so the inogorodnie would come to represent a vital source of raw material for the Red Array in south Russia. During summer 1918, Stalin noted from his vantage point at Tsaritsyn that the Red Army in the south was in need of all manner of supplies and equipment; but not manpower, for this was to be had in ample quantity from among the local inogorodnie.^^ The motivation of these inogorodnie is not difficult to discover. The most important issue for the rural inhabitants of Russia in 1917 was land ownership.-'^^ For the inogorodnie, this meant taking land frora the Cossacks. While the south TO Grazhdanskaia voina (1963), pp. 199, 310. 11 Iz istorii (1960-61), v. 1, p. 496. G. Gill, Peasants and Government in the Russian Revolution (London, 1979), p. 159. 63 east was a wealthy comer of rural Russia,!^ many among the inogorodnie had found in their new homes the very poverty and servitude that they had sought to leave behind in their places of origin. It was not commitment to the central Soviet government, but their opposition to the Cossacks that would eventually lead a great many of the inogorodnie to service in the Red Army. The relative wealth of most Cossacks was matched by the relative poverty of most inogorodnie. According to the census taken in the Don region in 1917, 61.3% of the inogorodnie had no agricultural implements, 56.4% were without working livestock while 49.6% produced no grain crops. About half were not farmers at all; they subsisted through seasonal work on the larger estates. Of those who rented sufficient land from the Cossacks to farm, only a few were successful. This underclass of inogorodnie lived in settlements on the outskirts of the stanitsy. They paid taxes to the Cossacks but had little say in local politics, at least not xintil Kaledin was forced to make some major but short-lived concessions in January 1918. Some legislation designed to ameliorate the position of the inogorodnie appeared during the time of the Tsars; but it failed to solve their problems.•'-5 At most, the peasants 1^ There were well-off inogorodnie as well as poor. According to Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 170, the fertile land in the south meant that 'the average peasant, who had his own plot or leased land from Cossacks, quite often enjoyed prosperity comparable to that of a kulak in the central regions of Russia.' Some of the inogorodnie were on the side of the Cossack counterrevolution in the Civil War. Khmelevskii, Op. cit., p. 22. 1^ Ibid., p. 21. 15 Seaton, Horsemen of the Steppes, p. 219. 64 might sit on various advisory committees to the Host ataman. According to Budennyi, the best-known representative of the inogorodnie: Among the privileged Cossacks the inogorodnie had few or no rights and had to pay any taxes which the Cossack ataman might dream up: his mud-hut, window, chimney, cow, sheep and hen were all liable to taxation.1" It was not just the peaseints within the Cossack lands but those around their edges who also resented Cossack privileges and coveted Cossack land. The 6th Cavalry Division of the First Cavalry Army drew mostly upon peasants of the Stavropol plateau, situated between the lands of the Don, Kuban and Terek Hosts. Like the Cossack lands, Stavropol was a rich area but the wealth was unevenly shared. 23% of the population had no land in 1917 while a further 17% had what a Soviet writer described as insufficient land.l There was potential for peasant militancy in the Stavropol region and when it came it was directed not only against the local estate owners, but against the neighbouring Kuban Cossacks as well. What a volatile political mix was brewing in the Cossack lands was to become apparent in the elections to the Constituent Assembly in November 1917. In the Don region, 45% voted for the Cossack list, meaning in all probability that it had gained the support of the overwhelming majority of Cossacks and a sprinkling of non Cossacks. The Socialist Revolutionaries, the peasant party of land redistribution. 1° Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 9. 17 V. Sukhorukov, XI Armiia v boiakh na Severnom Kavkaze i Nizhnei Volge v 1918-1920 gg (Moscow, 1961), p. 10. 65 came second with 34%. This was the vote of the land-hungry, rural, non-Cossack population. 15% voted for the Bolsheviks, with the latter topping the polls in major towns like Rostov and doing well in mining and railway settlements as well as in some military units.1^ The non-Cossack population was voting for radical social change.1^ Throughout the Civil War, the Bolsheviks sought to exploit class war in rural Russia, pitting 'poor' and 'middle' peasants against the richer 'kulaks'. Their success was limited, in part because rural Russia displayed considerable solidarity. The peculiar social situation of south-east Russia meant that here at least conditions were ripe for a class war of rich against poor, which usually, although not always, translated as Cossack versus non- Cossack. As was the case elsewhere in Russia, the Socialist Revolutionaries were not a serious competitor for political power in south-east Russia once the Civil War got under way; the contest became one that pitted the bulk of the Cossacks against an opposition that was led by what might best be described as supporters of 'Soviet Power' who were slowly drawn into the Bolshevik camp. The Bolsheviks justified their seizure of power from the enfeebled Provisional Government in October 1917 as a defence of Soviet Power from counterrevolution. The Soviets 1" Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 18. Starikov and Medvedev, Op. cit., pp. 39-40. The SR's at the national level had become an integral part of the unpopular Provisional Government but this seemingly did not discredit local SR figures at the village level who still had support because they were in touch with peasant concerns. G. Gill, Op. cit., pp. 128-29. 66 were the elected councils that reappeared during the February Revolution that overthrew the Tsar. They were particularly important in representing urban worker and peasant soldier opinion. The soviet movement was one that, with increasing impatience, looked forward to fundamental social change in Russia: an end to the war, workers' control of industry and peasant OAWiership of the land. It was in large measure on the basis of these popular aspirations that the Bolsheviks rose in strength. With their promises of 'Peace, Land and Bread' and 'All Power to the Soviets' they gained majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets by September 1917. Growing support for the Bolsheviks was reflected in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, where they took 24% of the vote to come second overall to the Socialist Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks topped the poll in Petrograd and Moscow and took 41% of the army vote, the same as the Socialist Revolutionaries.'^^ In the winter of 1917-1918, Soviet Power came to south east Russia through a number of different sources. There was an active Bolshevik organisation in towns such as Rostov and the raining districts. Perhaps the most important contribution was made on the battlefield by a 7,000-strong invasion force under the command of Vladimir Antonov- Ovseenko, sent frora the north to fight the anti-Bolshevik Don Cossacks. It was the efforts of this force that led directly to the setting-up of the Don and Kuban Soviet Republics in March 1918. ^" Mawdsley, Op. cit., pp. 5-6. 67 A third source of support for Soviet Power were ex- Tsarist soldiers, many of whom had 'voted with their feet' by deserting, with many returning to their homes in a railitant mood. In the great Russian tradition of soldier-led peasant revolt, the returning peasant soldiers were the catalyst for much of the unrest in and around the Cossack lands in the winter of 1917-1918. Emboldened by news of Kaledin's military difficulties in this period, caused mainly by the invasion force dispatched by the Soviet government and the unwillingness of many Cossack units to fight, the peasant soldiers began to challenge the power of the atamany. In some areas, self-styled Soviets began to make their appearance. As one returned soldier later put it: Among the poor, particularly the inogorodnie, dissatisfaction was growing. This dissatisfaction was set alight by the soldiers passing through the stanitsa. They talked about ...how everywhere the peasant poor were threatening the landowners and taking the land from them. 1 Many peasant soldiers of the Tsar were radicalised by their experiences in 1917. The soldiers had flexed their political muscles in the February Revolution. As a result, soldiers' committees emerged in the army as a check on the power of the officers."^^ The ret\u-ning soldiers, slotting into the role of village militants, became an important element in the cauldron of revolutionary politics in south east Russia. Budennyi's experience was typical of that of many of the konnoarmeitsy. His grandfather migrated to the Don Cossack ^1 0. Gorodovikov, Vospominaniia (Moscow, 1957), p. 44. 22 Wildman, Op. cit., pp. 378-79. 68 lands from the over-crowded Voronezh area after the Eraancipation Act of 1661. Both he and Budennyi's father worked as seasonal labo\u~ers on the larger farms in the area. Budennyi received no formal education and was drafted in 1903. Because he had been apprenticed as a blacksmith's hammerer, Budennyi served in a dragoon regiment in Manchuria diu-ing the 1904-1905 war with Japan. Army life appealed to Budennyi; at this point he took the unusual step of staying on in the army as an extended-service Non Commissioned Officer. In 1907, he received training in St. Petersburg and became his regiment's riding instructor. In World War One, Budennyi displayed martial qualities in the service of the Tsar of a type that he would later exhibit in the Red Army, namely, bravery, initiative and a predilection for insubordination. By the end of the war, he was rewarded for his efforts with a full order of St. George, having narrowly escaped execution after striking an officer in 1914.^"^ Budennyi was radicalised during the soldiers' revolt of 1917. He served as a representative on soldiers' committees, at regimental and divisional levels. Returning to his home near Platovskaia stanitsa in the southern Don region, which he reached in December 1917, Budennyi soon fell in with other retiu~ned soldiers and discontents from the inogorodnie population, who were plotting to overthrow the ataman there. In February 1918, the Platovskaia insurgents achieved their goal; Budennyi was elected head of the Land Department of the Platovskaia Soviet. As was the case elsewhere in the Cossack lands, the establishment of a soviet did not signify 23 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 9-26. 69 a complete victory for the insurgents: many Cossacks became part of the soviet without any enthusiasm, or with the aim of exerting a moderating influence there. Once armed Cossack resistance got under way, in spring 1918, they quickly joined the counterrevolution.2^ It would not be long before Budennyi was required to resume his career as a soldier, for Soviet Power in the Cossack lands proved short lived. The Don and Kuban Soviet Republics that were established in March 1918 were basically urban worker and peasant supported. They came under attack in spring 1918, from the twin blows of the German Army, moving east from the Ukraine and from a resurgent Cossack counterrevolution. These infant Soviet republics had virtually no regular troops with which to defend themselves. In so far as the counterrevolution met armed resistance, it came mostly from spontaneously-arising detachments, otriady, formed on a village-by-village basis by the local supporters of Soviet Power. Budennyi became a part of a 2,000-strong detachment that emerged in Platovskaia.''^ The experience of Joseph Apanasenko, who was later to become commander of the First Cavalry Army's 6th Cavalry Division, was sirailar to Budennyi's, in that he was a retxirned soldier who became a villagerailitant in the winter of 1917-1918. Apanasenko was a peasant from the Stavropol area. He helped set up a soviet in the village of Mitrofonovskoe in February 1918. Unlike Budennyi, Apanasenko was recruited into the Bolshevik party at this time. Soon 2^ --^^--^^ ---^— 25 Khmelevskii, Op. cit., 96. 70 after, this outpost of Soviet Power came under attack from raiding bands of Kuban Cossacks. Apanasenko found himself at the head of a detachment of twenty riders, which conducted a series of revenge raids against the Cossacks. The detachment soon grew for, according to Apanasenko's latter-day account, 'each village gave up to sixty to one hundred fighters'.2° Later, Apanasenko linked up with other detachments that were at war with the counterrevolution in the Kuban and Stavropol regions, this force by summer 1918 becoming part of the large but chaotically-organised South-East Revolutionary Army there. Soviet writers described the detachments such as the ones that Budennyi and Apanasenko fought in as 'partisan', because they operated in irregular fashion and, for the most part, outside of any centralised control. Their aim was to defend the local area against the incursions of counterrevolutionary Cossacks, whose numbers were growing in April and May 1918. Cooperation between separate detachments was minimal. The loyalty of the fighters was to an elected detachment commander.27 Not surprisingly, the Soviet partisans of south Russia proved no match for their Cossack opponents. The beaten detachments in the Don region treked north, eventually to find sanctuary in Bolshevik strongholds, such as Voronezh or Tsaritsyn. A similar fate awaited the partisans of the Kuban and Stavropol once the Civil War there took on a more organised form.2° Somewhat I. Apanasenko, 'Pervaia konnaia', Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 8., August 1939, p. 37. 27 Khmelevskii, Op. cit., pp. 97-98. 28 Sukhorukov, Op. cit., pp. 40-47. 71 paradoxically, the defeat of the partisans was to provide the regular Red Army in south Russia with a vital source of manpower. For the majority of the peasants in Russia, the revolution was won when, by the end of 1917, they had taken all the landowner, church and state land that was not in their possession previously. It is true that the Soviet government's Land Decree had sanctioned the peasant land seizures and given that the Whites were associated with the return of the old landowners, the Bolsheviks must have been seen by many peasants as the lesser of two evils. Yet, in the Civil War, the peasants had little reason to be enthusiastic supporters of either side for, while the Soviet government had sanctioned the land expropriations, it began requisitioning grain from the peasants to feed the towns and army xinder the policy that came to be known as 'war communism'. .^2 9 The situation was different for the peasant inogorodnie of the Cossack lands, or at least for those with little or no land. For them, the revolution was far frora over at the end of 1917 for as yet little had been achieved. There was a glimpse of hope as soviet insurgents took power early in 1918; but then came the Cossack counterrevolution. For the inogorodnie, the revolution could not be won until the Cossack counterrevolution was defeated. The First Cavalry Array was to derive great benefit from the fact that the peasants from the Cossack lands of south-east Russia fought 2^ Mawdsley, Op. cit., pp. 75, 210. 72 with a commitment rarely seen among peasant conscripts elsewhere in the Red Array: they had a cause. If the inogorodnie were one important source of manpower for the First Cavalry Army, renegade Cossacks, chiefly from the Don and Kuban Hosts, were another. There were splits in the ranks of the Cossacks from the first. When, in the winter of 1917-18, Kaledin tried to rouse the Don Cossacks for his anti-Bolshevik crusade, he was met with indifference, even outright hostility, particularly from the returning Cossack soldiers, the frontoviki. They had proven in 1917 that they were not immune to the revolutionary agitation that swept the array. Many Cossack regiments returned home under the sway of soldiers' coraraittees rather than their officers. These Cossacks bore no grudge against a Soviet govemraent that had ended an unpopular war and seeraed to present no threat to the ordinary Cossack who could now resume his peaceful life as a farmer. They believed that on autonomy for the Cossack lands was likely."-^ In January 1918, a Cossack Revolutionary Military Committee was set up by representatives of the frontoviki at Karaenskaia with the aira of directly challenging Kaledin's authority. The coraplaint made by an anti-Soviet Cossack leader in Novocherkassk, the Don Cossack capital, is eloqpient testimony to the phenomenon of the renegade Cossack: It is impossible to close our eyes to reality. The reality is this; almost all the peasant population of the Don region is on the side of the Red Guard... A significant part of the Cossacks are also fighting in the Red Guard, meaning that the insiu~rectionary Cossacks 30 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander., p. 23. 73 are outnumbered by their opponent."^! The Cossack mood began to change in the co\u~se of spring 1918. By April and May 1918, Soviet power in the Cossack lands of south Russia was under siege frora arraed Cossack bands. There began what one writer later described as the Don 'awakening'-^2^ ^s the frontoviki left their regiments and returned to their homes, they came under the influence once more of the stanitsa elders, who were much more likely to view the situation in terras of a life-and-death struggle between Bolshevism and Cossackdom. The Cossack elders could argue plausibly that Soviet power must inevitably favour those worst off, that is, the inogorodnie, at the expense of the Cossacks as a whole. It may well have been that the behaviour of the Soviet invasion force in the Cossack lands and the sometimes wild anti-Cossack pronouncements of local Soviet officials did much to alienate potential Cossack support.^"^ By May 1918, Krasnov's headquarters claimed that they were receiving support frora 77 of the 127 stanitsy of the Don region. The Cossack opponents of Soviet Power received a timely boost that same month from the eastward movement of the German Army through the Ukraine, which tied up the troops of the Red Army, still in the process of formation and secured the Cossacks' left flank from attack.3^ 31 Quoted in Khmelevskii, Op. cit., p.59. 32 V. Dobrynin, Bor'ba s bol'shevism na iuge Rossii: Uchastie v bor'be Donskogo kazachestva: Fevral' 1917-Mart 1920 (Ocherk) (Prague, 1921), p. 49. 33 Starikov and Medvedev, Op. cit., p. 61. 3^ Khmelevskii, Op. cit., pp. 56-60. 74 In spring 1918, support among the Cossacks for the counterrevolution was becoming overwhelming. Even a modem- day Soviet writer acknowledged that 'the counterrevolution succeeded in tviming to its side significant layers of middle Cossacks and in a nximber of cases even part of the Cossack poor'.35 There were Cossacks who fought willingly on the side of Soviet power in this period. Soviet writers usually describe the pro-Soviet Cossacks as being from among the poor, with a small sprinkling of 'middle' Cossacks. There is considerable truth in this. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that class and class tension were an important part of the life of the Cossack Hosts. One study concluded that the Don Cossacks could be characterised as roughly 20-25% rich, 40-50% middle and 30-40% poor.3^ Whatever the accxu~acy of these figures, there was a stratura of Cossack poor in the supposedly egalitarian Cossack Hosts. According to the census carried out in the Don region in 1917, some 25.4% of the Cossacks were without agricultural implements, 18.6% were without working cattle while 16.1% produced no grain crops.'^' For the poorest Cossacks, there was little difference in their way of life from that of the bulk of the inogorodnie, whatever their status as Cossacks. Oka Gorodovikov, commander of the 4th Cavalry Division of the First Cavalry Army, was someone who knew the duties 35 Ibid., p. 56. 3° Starikov and Medvedev, Op. cit., pp. 7-8. 37 Ibid., p. 8. 75 but not the privileges of Cossack life. Gorodovikov was actually a Kalmyk, but the Kalmyks had been part of the Don Cossack Host since 1882. There were many prosperous Kalmyks; but Gorodovikov was not one of them. At the age of nine, he was hired out by his impoverished family to a wealthy herder for the price of a pair of animal skins. Only military service interrupted his life of pastoral drudgery. Even so, to provide himself with the necessary horse and equipment, Gorodovikov was forced to mortgage his land allotment or pai for six years. Gorodovikov was wounded during World War One and ended up guarding a factory in the rear. Revolutionary sentiments among the workers there soon attracted Gorodovikov who did not need much convincing about the injustices of the system.3° There was reason for discontent even for those above the poorest 20% of Cossacks. A degree of economic hardship is suggested by the fact that, in 1917, about half the Cossacks in the Don region rented out some of their allotted lands. There was widespread resentment at the economic burden of military service. Among middle Cossacks, demands for land redistribution were heard in the winter of 1917-1918 with the resentment directed against the richest Cossack stratum. The resentment was greatest in the poorest areas, such as the northern Don region.^ It is not only Soviet writers who point to the importance of class antagonisms within the Cossack Hosts. One Western writer, in a comprehensive study of the 38 Gorodovikov, Op. cit., pp. 23-43. 3^ Khmelevskii, Op. cit., p. 19. 76 Cossacks, traced the emergence within the Don Cossack Host of a group of individuals and families who were able to 'gain repeated election to lucrative and powerful offices'. This group, known originally as starshina or 'elders' and later as chinovniki or 'officials' 'developed a firm sense of class interest, and from an early date there was serious conflict between them and ordinary Cossacks'. According to this writer, the notion of equality among the Cossacks was a myth.'^O The claim of Soviet writers that the Cossack elite and most of theraiddle Cossacks supported the coxmterrevolution, while araong the Cossack poor, especially among the retiu-ned soldiers, there was support for Soviet power, is plausible. Like the inogorodnie, many pro-Soviet Cossacks began their Civil War careers in small detachments belonging to a particular stanitsa. For example, Gorodovikov fought alongside Budenny in the detachment formed in Platovskaia. For the emerging Red cavalry, the renegade Cossacks represented a welcome if somewhat unexpected boost. If the First Cavalry Army was to be made up of inogorodnie and Cossacks, which element predorainated? It has soraetimes been assumed that the First Cavalry Army was basically a Cossack force. Many Western readers would be familiar with Isaac Babel's literary masterpiece, Red Cavalry, from which the impression can easily be gained that the icoiMoarmeitsy were nearly all Cossacks. Yet Babel, a Jew from Odessa, might not have been able to tell the difference between the inogorodnie and Cossacks from south-east Russia. ^° Mc j^g^ 1 y PP^ ^^:^;^ p^ g ^ 77 For the most part, the peasants and Cossacks spoke the same distinctive, mainly Russian but partly Ukrainian dialect, wore the same Tsarist Array greatcoat or Cossack uniform, as well as headgear of all descriptions from the Cossack lands. No doubt they also shared anti-semitic prejudices. It was difficult for the keenest observer to distinguish the mainly non-Cossack Red from the mainly Cossack White cavalrymen. The similarities in appearance were such that one of the stories that would be retold with greatest frequency after the Civil War was about how individual cavalrymen and groups sturabled xinknowingly into theraidst o f the eneray, often in broad daylight. This was so despite the fact that the Red cavalrymen sometimes wore identifying Red ribbons. The Red cavalrymen docked their horses' tails and wore their rifles over the left shoulder while the White cavalrymen did the opposite, if they carried rifles at all. Nevertheless, the notion of the First Cavalry Army as being a Cossack array is not correct. According to the only statistics available in Soviet literature, the composition of the First Cavalry Array was as follows; 62% peasant, 21% worker, 14% Cossack and 4% intelligentsia.^2 j^ jg irapossible to verify these figures; but there would seem little reason to doubt them. In December 1920, Trotsky gave figures for the Red Army as a whole, suggesting that the composition of the Red Army at the end of the Civil War was 67% peasant, 12% worker, and 20% others. Presumably both sets of figures came from the same registration analysis m Budennyij^ , Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 95. ^2 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 3. 78 that took place near the end of 1920. The statistics about the konnoarmeitsy appeared in the literature produced by writers who served in the First Cavalry Army which would suggest that their authenticity, or at least their general thrust, is being vouched for. Nor does the idea of an ino^orod!nie-dorainated Red cavalry seem improbable. It was the inogorodnie, not the Cossacks, who had most to gain from social change in south-east Russia. Like the Cossacks, the inogorodnie of south-east Russia were usually capable riders. The proportion of workers in the First Cavalry Army seems high, given that the urban worker was an unlikely horseman. But it would seem that workers were usually engaged in activities in the rear. Therefore the proportion of peasants and Cossacks in the front line was likely to have been considerably higher than these figures suggest.^3 It might be objected that there would be an anti-Cossack bias in Soviet literature and that the figures quoted above may have been falsifications of the Stalin era designed to minimise the contribution of the Cossacks to the Red cavalry. The Cossacks, as an estate, ceased to exist after the Civil War but Cossack imits reappeared in World War Two, some fighting in the Red Army and others in alliance with the Wehrmacht. It should be remembered that in the mid-1930's there was a concerted campaign in Soviet literatiu~e to rehabilitate the glories of the Russian past, including the Cossacks. Towards the end of the 1930's, the Red cavalry came to be "^3 Kosogov, Op. cit, p. 167. 79 desc^ribed as Cossack: even Budennyi was himself in some official publications numbered among the ranks of the Cossack estate that he so despised.^^ A bemused Budennyi found himself reminding Red Array soldiers about the true coraposition of the First Cavalry Array. In one such address, he alluded to the fact that some Soviet writers had mistakenly assumed that the First Cavalry Army was predominantly Cossack. Budennyi asserted that while Cossacks made up a significant proportion of the konnoarmeitsy, they did not form the majority. Rather: The majority were peasants from the Don and Kuban regions (inogorodnie) and Stavropol while in the 11th Cavalry Division they wereraostly fror a the central provinces. Quite incorrect are the assertions of some writers that the First Cavalry Army was basically a Cossack army, albeit Red Cossack.^5 Rather than declasse freebooters, the original konnoarmeitsy are probably best described as representatives of the rural poor of south Russia who saw the Civil War as an opportunity to achieve a redistribution of wealth and power in the Cossack lands. For Cossacks and peasants alike, support for Soviet power signified their opposition to the political, social and econoraic domination of the better-off Cossacks in south Russia. Viewed in this light, the contest between the Red and White cavalry, with the latter's preponderance of Cossacks and ex-Tsarist officers, was something of a class war. Seaton, Horsemen of the Steppe, pp. 233-34. Budennyi, Krasnaia konnitsa, no. 2., February, 1935, p. 4. 80 This makes more understandable the commitment displayed by the konnoarmeitsy on the battlefield. During the first two years of the Civil War, the konnoarmeitsy of the 4th and the 6th Cavalry Divisions, like the Red Army as a whole in south Russia, became better acquainted with defeat than with victory. Nevertheless, this Red cavalry did not disintegrate under pressxure, or ride off with their booty after a victory, as their White counterpart was prone to do. The classic case of this in the White cavalry was the disintegration of the 4th Don Corps, led by Mamontov in September and October 1919. The Cossacks simply rode home with their booty: a force of 9,000 became a force of 2,000 in a matter of weeks.46 The First Cavalry Army displayed as much, if not more, war-like spirit than any component of the Red Army. This was particularly true at the time when the going was at its toughest, in summer and autumn 1919. This is not to suggest, as Soviet writers sometimes do, that the peasant and Cossack konnoarmeitsy comprised committed Bolsheviks, or loyal supporters of the central Soviet government. The parochialism of the village-based detachments was legendary, the aims of the rural supporters of Soviet Power in south Russia strictly local. Service in the Red Array came to be a means of achieving goals that could not be achieved any other way. Very few of the konnoarmeitsy joined the Bolshevik Party in the first two years of the Civil War. In October 1919, when a Party conference was held, only thirty Party members ^^ Denikin, Tie White Army, p. 283. 81 from among the konnoarmeitsy could be fo\ind to attend.47 This was in a total force of about 7,600. Budennyi has described how mmours that the central Soviet government intended to take the land back from the peasants caused great disquiet araong the rank and file in the course of 1919, which rather suggests that many did not have a great deal of faith in the Red Army's political masters. As Budennyi was to describe his cavalrymen in a letter to Stalin written in October 1919: the vast majority of our cavalrymen are peasants. They are fine, brave fighters but are more interested in the land than in politics.^° These peasants and Cossacks would have preferred to defend their own patch of earth once a more equitable distribution of the land had been achieved; but the growing strength of the Cossack counterrevolution meant that this option was not available. Any return to their homes was dependent upon the victory of the Red Army. As a White journalist put it: These Cossacks and inogorodnie went to the north as far back as 1917 when the Don, Terek and Kuban Hosts liberated themselves from the yoke of Soviet Power. Behind them they left their homes and farms, pillaged by their bitter coiintryraen who were opponents of the Bolsheviks. Their craving for their horaeland forced them to strive to take back the Don, Terek and Kuban, the path to which was barred so that a return was only possible with gun in hand.^^ ^7 s. Oriovsicii 'Zametki o politrabote v Konarraii' in Pervaia konnaia v izobrazhenii ee boitsov i komandirov (Moscow, 1935), p. 164. ^8 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 283. ^^ G. Rakovskii V stane belykh, (Constantinople, 1921), p. 20. 82 Budennyi would later make the observation that many of the konnoarmeitsy had fathers, mothers, wives and children living under Whiteguard occupation. The atrocities committed by the Whites filled their hearts with anger and hatred. They strove to avenge themselves for these outrages to their families and were willing to fight in any conditions.50 Budennyi was in a position to know about this sort of bitterness. By the middle of 1919, he had lost his father and a brother in the fighting. Throughout the Civil War, it was to be a feature of the performance of the White Cossacks that they fought less well when they were away from their own steppe lands. For the konnoarmeitsy, on the other hand, it was, as Rakovskii pointed out in the above quotation, a case of having to defeat the armies of the counterrevolution in order to retvirn home. At the same time, the experience of fighting in the partisan detachments was itself a crucial formative influence for many konnoarmeitsy. One of Trotsky's pet criticisms of the Red Army in the south was its tendency 51 towards partisan methods, partisanstvo.^^ By this, Trotsky meant the heritage of parochialism and disunity of the separate village-based detachments that had hampered their military effectiveness, especially in 1918. Yet there was a positive side to partisanstvo that should not be overlooked and this was the bonds that developed in the partisan detachments. The latter were locality-based or else formed 5'^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 181. 51 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 162. 83 on the basis of a particular Tsarist xinit. The shared backgrounds, the war-time dangers and sacrifices and daily face-to-face contact cultivated those bonds within small groups of the type that military sociologists consider to be the sine qua non of military cohesion.52 Some soldiers fight well and others fight badly. The term 'morale' is often used as an excuse for cutting short further investigation of the problem, or a shorthand way of asserting that the troops displayed great courage, discipline and enthusiasm, or the lack of these qualities in the case of low morale. Those who have investigated why soldiers fight have come CO up with a considerable body of information on theraatter. "- ^ Since World War Two, emphasis has been placed upon the small, 'primary group' which binds soldiers together in combat. According to one research team that investigated the Wehrmacht in World War Two: It appears that a soldier's ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration. When the individual's iraraediate group, and its support ing formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group was minimized.5^ 52 Keegan, The Historian and Battle, p. 146. 53 See, for example, S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York, 1947); M. Janowitz and R. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York, 1965); A. George, 'Primary Groups, Organisation and Military Performance' in The Study of Leadership (West Point, 1972). E. Shils and M. Janowitz, 'Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II', Public Opinion (^arterly no. 12(2), 1948, p. 261. 84 Primary group solidarity is strengthened by factors such as the members of the group having a shared religion, region, ethnic group or social class. Potentially influential are factors such as the group member's commitment to the cause, system or ideology for which he is fighting. Volunteers are easier for the command to motivate than conscripts. In the case of both volunteers and conscripts, it is necessary for the coraraand to be able to control and direct the fighting qualities of the troops, given that primary groups are ready-made centres of resistance within an army should the more influential members of the group become disillusioned with the command. Communist Party cells within units constitutes one means of influencing the behaviour of small groups in the army.55 John Keegan has argued that, while primary group loyalty is important in explaining how the burdens of battle are borne, other factors are relevant as well. He emphasises that the chance of enrichment through loot or ransom, coercion, the fear of punishment, drink and drugs have been and are of vital importance in human behavio\u~ in wars.5" The less information that is available about ordinary soldiers, the more difficult it is to be certain about which factors were the most important. In the case of the Russian Civil War, the group loyalty that developed among the konnoarmeitsy from the days of the partisan detachments was 55 George, Op. cit., p. 19. 56 Keegan, The Historian and Battle, p. 146. 85 likely to have been a crucial factor in consolidating these fighters into an effective military force. The opposition of the konnoarmeitsy to the status quo in the Cossack lands meant that they had great potential for becoming a successful military force. This is not to claim that loot, drink and coercion were unimportant but simply to point to a factor facilitating the cohesion of the konnoarmeitsy that might normally be overlooked. Who the konnoarmeitsy were had other implications for the battlefield performance of the Red cavalry. While the White cavalry came to be populated by experienced Tsarist cavalrymen, the s€ime was not true of the konnoarmeitsy. According to Ivan Kosogov, the long-time chief-of-staff of the 4th Cavalry Division: the mass of the Red horsemen, konniki, was not made up of cavalrymen, kavaleristi. A significant majority of them had served in the old army as infantry while some had no experience at all before service in the Red Array.5' Budennyi was to make the same point about service in the Tsarist infantry being the most likely military school for the Red cavalrymen, if indeed they had any experience at all.58 While the White cavalry had the service of many ex- Tsarist officers, the credentials of the Red cavalry commanders were much less impressive. Budennyi was one of the best credentialled. He was thirty-five years old at the beginning of 1919, a former Non Commissioned Officer with 15 57 Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 168. 58 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 65, 121. 66 years experience in the Tsarist cavalry. But few among the Red cavalry commanders could match his level of experience.5 9 This becomes apparent from a study of the biographies of the three field commanders who were to be next most senior to Budenny in the First Cavalry Array. Twenty-eight years old at the beginning of 1919, Apanasenko was a former Non Commissioned Officer; but he had served in the Tsarist infantry, not the cavalry. Gorodovikov, who was forty years old, while he was a Cossack cavalryman, had received only a single promotion and was barely and poorly acquainted with the Russian language. He would later recall his embarrassment at having to admit to one of his superiors in the Red Army that he could not use a map to report his unit's position.°0 Timoshenko was twenty-three years old at the beginning of 1919, and his only previous experience amounted to his service in World War One as a machine gunner in a Tsarist cavalry regiment."1 Yet these three rose up to become divisional commanders. Below them were commanders who had even less experience to call upon. For example, the regimental coraraander, Vasilii Kniga, a peasant, and the divisional chief-of-staff, Ivan Kosogov, a school-teacher, had no previous military experience at all. 5" S. Budennyi, 'Prazdnik RKKA i krasnoi konnitsy', Krasnaia konnitsa, no. 2, February, 1935 p. 5, asserts that 'a peculiarity of the First Cavalry Army was the absence from its leadership of the old specialists, a class that was alien to us'. This was not quite true for a handful of ex- Tsarist officers did serve in the First Cavalry Army including the chiefs-of-staff, L. Kliuev and N Shelokov. Gorodovikov Op.cit., p. 65. "1 Zhemantis, Op. cit., p. 48. > 7^ ^^m SEMEN BUDENNYI Di V-isi()II COnimandGr L'. I. (.;Mr.xln\-ikov (1920) t i- "* ^v 1 *>-'v' «-*>^ Di\ision commander 1. Pu Apanasenko U92U) Division commander S. K. Timoshenko (If)2( 87 It was hardly svirprising that the Red cavalry was much slower than its White counterpart to develop into an effective military force. Yet on the basis of what must have seemed singularly unpromising raw material, a spectacularly successful Red cavalry emerged. In the first, difficult eighteen months of the Civil War, it was not the cavalry expertise of the konnoarmeitsy that enabled them to endure the trials of that period, because they had little of that and it would take time to develop an effective fighting style. Their essential attribute was a high degree of commitment which reflected their social origins. 88 Chapter Three: Building a Cavalry Army December 1917-Noveraber 1919. The First Cavalry Array carae into existence without the support of, and even in spite of, the centre. Voroshilov, Stalin i krasnaia armiia, p. 33. I-master of the sort of little cart we call a tachanka and a driver to boot. A tachanka! Upon that word had been erected a triangle epitomising our ways: massacre, tachanka, blood. Babel, Collected Stories, p. 73. Although the First Cavalry Array was only formally established in mid-November 1919, it already existed before that date. When it was first set up, the First Cavalry Army amounted to the renaming of the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi that had been in existence since June 1919. The Cavalry Corps was itself a product of the merger of the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, each of which could trace its origins back to the earliest days of the Civil War in south Russia. The First Cavalry Array cannot be understood without first examining its evolution during the opening eighteen months of the Civil War. The story of the evolution of the First Cavalry Array represents a study in rainiatinre of the evolution of the Red Array as a whole, from one-time scattered partisan detachments, to a regular and effective fighting force. While the First Cavalry Army was formally established on 17 November 1919, by an order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the RVSR, which was the body responsible at that time for the central direction of the 69 Red Army's affairs, it was not a creation of the Red Army's central planners. The process of building the First Cavalry Army depended on the initiative and efforts of front-line personnel of the Red Army, in particular, of the /coiMoarmeitsy themselves. At the same time, much of the hard work in terms of solving the problems of recruitment, organisation, command, armament and tactics, was done in the eighteen months before the formal establishment of the First Cavalry Army. The basic features of the Red Army's structure were established in the course of 1918. The regular Red Array, in the sense of a conventionally-organised military force, emerged in the wake of the Soviet government's belated recognition of its vulnerability, brought about by the almost unopposed march of the armies of the Central powers through the Ukraine in spring 1918. This made it clear that the insurgent forces that had secured the victory of the October Revolution of 1917 and contributed so well to the spread of Soviet Power to the Russian periphery in winter 1917-1916 were unlikely to prove a sufficient 'sword and shield' for the infant Soviet state, once its enemies became better organised. Despite opposition from sorae Bolsheviks opposed to a regular army, as being the embodiment of the type of reactionary institution that socialists had hoped to eliminate, by March 1916 it had been decided that such an array was necessary, with Trotsky playing a leading role in establishing therailitary policy of the Soviet govemraent.1 1 Mawdsley, Op.cit., p. 59. 90 In April 1918, the decisions of March began to be translated into practice: former Tsarist officers were recruited in considerable numbers, 40,000 by the end of 1918 as 'military specialists' to command the new army. Conscription was introduced and the drive to build a mass army began. Conventional discipline, including the death penalty, was introduced. A high conraiand gradually evolved, aimed at directing the Red Array frora above, with the post of Commander-in-Chief being brought into existence in September 1918. All the while, plans were being prepared and action taken for the transformation of the irregular insurgent detachments that had served the cause of Soviet Power in the months immediately following the October revolution into fronts, armies, and divisions.2 While the Red Army took on a conventional appearance, there were some significant revolutionary innovations. In order to guard against treason, agents of the Soviet government, commissars, supervised the work of the former Tsarist officers. At the levels of front and army, a system of collegial command was established, whereby the commander was only one member of a railitary council, subordinate to the central military council, the RVSR. From time to time, particularly in moments of crisis. Party members were mobilised to stiffen the army with their coramitraent. This was all very important in providing the freimework within which the Red Army came into existence. Yet the decisions of the central planners do not tell the whole 2 Benvenuti, Op. cit., pp. 42-51. 3 Colton, Op.cit., pp. 36-37. 91 story of the Red Army's evolution. A substantial part of the Red Army was built at the front, and not necessarily in accordance with the plans or instructions of the centre. In any event, this was certainly true of the evolution of the First Cavalry Army. The centre failed when it came to creating cavalry units. The First Cavalry Army did not follow any pattern or plan set down by the centre. Its evolution depended upon front-line initiative. There were in it very few Communist Party members and even fewer former Tsarist officers. Its armament and tactics were products of front-line improvisation which had little, if anything, to do with official regulations. While the paper divisions of the Red Army's central planners failed to materialise, the picture proved much more promising at the periphery. In the second half of 1918, the regional headquarters of the Red Army in south Russia were beginning to assemble mounted troops in reasonable numbers. This was especially true of Tsaritsyn, which stands just beyond the north-western corner of the Don Cossack region. It was here that resources were most plentiful and the need for cavalry most urgent. The emerging Red cavalry fattened itself with peasant insurgents and Cossack renegades, who were fleeing the Don Cossack region and the Ukraine, as well as a sprinkling of ex-Tsarist cavalrymen arriving with the invading Soviet forces from the north. This was the raw material from which the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, the core of the First Cavalry Array, was drawn. According to writers of the Stalin era, Tsaritsyn was the birthplace of the Red cavalry. This was a reasonable 92 claim. In 1918, there was more Red cavalry at Tsaritsyn than anywhere else. At the end of 1918, the Red Tenth Army, based at Tsaritsyn and the largest of the South Front's five armies, included some 8,840 sabres in a total army strength of about 50,000. Altogether, the five armies of the South Front boasted a little over 100,000 troops, with some 14,150 of these being cavalry. By contrast, the five armies of the East Front at the end of 1918 had only about 10,000 sabres, in a total force of about 85,000 troops. Overall, cavalry made up about 25,000 of the 226,000 fighters in the Red Army in December 1918.4 More than a quarter of the Red Army's sabres were in the Tenth Array. It was the fighting around Tsaritsyn that would bring together not only the futvire nucleus of the First Cavalry Array, but also a number of individuals who would later be prominent in its command: Stalin, Voroshilov, Egorov, Efrim Shchadenko, Sergei Minin, Alexander Parkhoraenko and Leonid Kliuev, to name only the most important. Tsaritsyn had great significance as a sanctuary for refugees fleeing the enemies of the Soviet government in the Ukraine and the Cossack lands of south Russia. Tsaritsyn also had considerable strategic significance as a stronghold of the Soviet government in south-east Russia. It was at Tsaritsyn, in May 1918, that the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District was set up \mder the command of an ex-Tsarist general, Snesarev, with the aim of coordinating the activities of the Red Army in the south.5 From the Ukraine, ^ D.K.F.K.A., V. 4, pp. 51-2. 5 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p.529. 93 in June 1918, came the remnants of battered detachments that went under the names of the Third and Fifth Ukrainian Armies led by Voroshilov and Shchadenko. The latter were not welcomed at first by the Bolshevik mayor of Tsaritsyn, Sergei Minin, who feared that anarchist elements among the Ukrainians would disrupt Tsaritsyn's defences." This fear proved unfounded. The defence of Tsaritsyn from the Don Cossacks in the second half of 1918 came to depend in large measure upon the Ukrainians. A dominant figure in the Red Army headquarters at Tsaritsyn, in the second half of 1918, was Stalin, the Soviet government's Commissar for Nationalities and a top- ranking member of the Politburo. He was sent to the south by Lenin, with a brief to expedite grain shipments to the north. Stalin arrived in the first week of May 1918. He soon began demanding military powers as well, which he received the following month. Stalin gained a reputation at Tsaritsyn as an opponent of the central government's military policies in this period.8 He was at the centre of a protracted debate over command appointments, strategy and resources. At the same time, he presided over the dismissal of most of the ex- Tsarist officers at Tsaritsyn, including Snesarev. Stalin promoted the career of Voroshilov, a veteran Bolshevik who was the embodiment of the self-taught Red coraraander. He had no railitary experience before the Civil War at all, apart from gvm-running from Finland in 1907. It was Voroshilov who 7 L. Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn (Moscow, 1925), p. 31. 8 Benvenuti, loc. cit. 94 became commander of the Tenth Array, based at Tsaritsyn, in the first week in October 1916. Voroshilov was assailed by his critics as being a railitary incompetent. At Tsaritsyn, he earned the respect of his enemies for his ability to put up a 'stubborn resistance'.^ The centre thought enough of this emerging 'Tsaritsyn Gang', as Trotsky would later stigmatise the group that was gathering around Stalin, to appoint Stalin, Voroshilov and Minin as three of the members of the military council of the new South Front that was established in September 1916, with Voroshilov as the deputy commander. The 'Tsaritsyn Gang' soon fell out with the South Front commander, Pavel Sytin, over the latter's plan to relocate the headquarters of the South Front from Tsaritsyn to Kozlov and to concentrate the Red Army's efforts farther to the west. Stalin, Voroshilov and Minin fought hard against the Sytin strategy and the episode culminated in Stalin being recalled to Moscow, in October 1918, to explain his actions. It was an early sign of just how zealous an advocate of front-line interests Stalin could be.l^ While Stalin and Voroshilov were unimpressed with the ex-Tsarist officers, or at least with those that they encountered at Tsaritsyn, they had no objection to the general thrust of the policy of building a conventional army. Orders calling for greater centralisation and for the transformation of the various detachraents and military sections into regiments and divisions that had been issued 9 R. Medvedev, All Stalin's Men (Oxford, 1983), p. 6. 1° Colton, Op.cit., pp. 41-50. 95 by Snesarev were now put out under the signatures of Voroshilov and Stalin.H It was within this organisational structure that the 4th Cavalry Division was to grow up. Mounted fighters from the Don Cossack region began to collect at Tsaritsyn in summer 1916. Among the most important were fighters belonging to a column of refugees from the Sal' steppe area, which included the detachraent frora Platovskaia. The Sal' steppe partisans were driven from their homes by the resiur-gent Don Cossack counterrevolution. While retreating northwards towards the sanctuary of Tsaritsyn, they had agreed to coordinate their activities and, in the first week in June 1918, to accept a formal Red Army designation as the 3rd Peasant Socialist Regiment.12 It was renamed as the 1st Don Infantry Division. The letter's mounted element became the Socialist Cavalry Regiment in July 1918, with a strength of about 700 sabres. 13 The commander was Boris Dumenko, a Don Cossack and ex-Tsarist NCO from Veseloe. Budennyi emerged as one of Dumenko's squadron commanders. Dumenko's command expanded steadily, as smaller units culled frora various partisan detachments were added to it. By August 1918, it had grown to 1,800 sabres. On 24 September 1918, the regiment was upgraded to the status of a brigade.1^ This expansion was aided by the relative abundance of cavalry resources at Tsaritsyn; and by the fact 11 Compare D.K.F.K.A., v. 1, pp. 264-87, and pp. 293-96. 12 Khmelevskii, Op.cit., p. 112. 13 Tiulenev, Sovetskaia kavaleriia, p. 50. 1"* Ibid. 96 that the combining of smaller units into larger ones was part of a wider process that was taking place in the Red Army at this time. There was pressure from the cavalrymen, who argued the need for larger cavalry units, for it was they who had to confront the cavalry masses of the Don Cossacks. The cause of the cavalrymen was not harmed by the fact that Tenth Army commander Voroshilov got to know Dumenko's cavalry at first hand, having accompanied it on a mission in July 1918 to rescue an encircled detachment.15 It was Voroshilov who signed the order that, on 28 November 1918, established the Composite Cavalry Division under Dumenko's command. Budennyi became Dumenko's chief-of-staff. Stalin received more of the credit for the build up of the Red cavalry than he deserved. His hagiographers claimed that he founded the Red cavalry at Tsaritsyn during his time there in the summer and autumn of 1918. There is little evidence to support that claim. In his voluminous correspondence with the centre in this period, which is full of all manner of complaints and proposals, cavalry raatters were barelyraentioned a t all.l" While Stalin raay have raade a mental note of the importance of mounted troops in the fighting in the south, he did not become a champion of the cavalry cause at this stage. A significant exchange took place when Stalin made the acquaintance of Budennyi at a soldiers' meeting in July 1916. According to Budennyi's account, Stalin used Snesarev 15 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 85. 1" For a sample of this correspondence see the documents that appear in D.K.F.K.A., v. 1, pp. 304-36. 97 to conduct an impromptu examination of the cavalryman's knowledge of his trade. The test was passed, according to Budenny, with flying colo\irs.l7 A year later, when it came time to set up the First Cavalry Army, Stalin proved a most valuable ally to Budennyi. In the second half of 1916, all sorts of problems confronted the Red cavalrymen at Tsaritsyn. Their greatest problem at the outset was that they lacked the training and the cavalry expertise of their Cossack opponents. Experienced Tsarist cavalrymen constituted a minority in the emerging Red cavalry: war-time service in the Tsarist infantry was the more common background among the inogorodnie.^° This meant that a great deal depended upon the small nucleus of trained cavalrymen, especially the ex- Non Commissioned Officers like Dumenko and Budennyi, who occupied coraraand positions. The evolution of this Red cavalry array did not always proceed smoothly. The greatest disaster came soon after the establishment of the Composite Cavalry Division in January 1919, when one of the units that was welded on to Dumenko's brigade mutinied. This was the mounted element of what had been the Steel Division, commanded by Draitrii Zhloba. The Steel Division hailed frora the north Caucasus. It had arrived at Tsaritsyn in mid-October 1918, in time to help put an end to a siege of the city by Don Cossacks. Zhloba received a different reward for his efforts to the one that he expected. He was arrested for having left the north 17 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 83. 18 Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 168. 98 Caucasus without permission. His troops were shared out among various units of the Tenth Army. The cavalry went to Dumenko; but this resulted in an unstable combination. At the first opportunity, Zhloba's men deserted and rode off towards Astrakhan where, they believed, their erstwhile commander was being held.l^ It was a powerful reminder that, even late in 1918, the loyalty of Red Army troops was often more directed towards the unit coraraander than to any formal command structure. This setback notwithstanding, the establishment of the Composite Cavalry Division was still a step in the right direction. Much more successfully integrated into Dumenko's command was the 1st Crimean Regiment of approximately 750 sabres comraanded by Timoshenko. In Timoshenko's regiment, there were five scjuadrons. The first comprised the remnants of Timoshenko's Tsarist regiment, 1st Mariupol Hussars, which had joined up with the initial Soviet invasion force sent against the Don Cossacks in December 1917. A second squadron was recruited frora Tsaritsyn Red Guards. The third and fourth squadrons mostly comprised Cossacks, one from the Don and the other frora Astrakhan. The fifth and most exotic of the squadrons was made up of 'internationalists', mainly Serb, Croat and Hxingarian soldiers who were on Russian soil in 1917. Sorae had served in the Serbian Army. Others had fought with the Austro-Hungarian Army and then became Russian prisoners of war. 1^ Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p. 34. 2^ D. Serdich 'Pervaia vstrecha s BudeBudennyimi ' in Pervaia konnaia v izobrazhenii ee boitsov i komandirov, pp. 85-86. 99 The internationalists were far outnumbered by the Russians and Ukrainians in the Red cavalry but their impact should not be underestimated. A good many were ardent believers in the cause of expanding Soviet Power on an international scale. This group produced some of the most celebrated fighters of the First Cavalry Army. The best known was Oleko Dundich, the pseudonym of Milutin Cholich, a Serb who had fought with the Serbian Army until 1916 when he was captured by the Austrians. He then escaped to Odessa and trained as a Non Commissioned Officer for the Russian Army's Romanian Front. In the course of 1917, Dundich became a Red Guard in Petrograd and a member of the Bolshevik Party. By September 1916, he was commander of 3rd International Brigade at Tsaritsyn. Later, as part of First Cavalry Army, he served as a regimental commander, having carried out a number of missions that required particular daring. He was killed outside of Rovno in July 1920.21 By the end of 1918, the Red cavalrymen were working within a reasonably regular military organisation. Their actions were coordinated with other units of the Red Army. The Composite Cavalry Division possessed a recognisably regular structure, with two brigades each of four regiments, which in turn consisted of five squadrons.'''' This was increased to three brigades of six regiments, which meant that it was possible to manoeuvre with two regiments, while the third was held in reserve. This in 21 See the biography by A. Dunaevskii, Oleko Dundich (Moscow, 1960). 22 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 108. 100 itself represented something of a victory over the often unwieldy organisation that was characteristic of earlier months. When the Socialist Cavalry Regiment was first set up, it boasted thirteen squadrons at a tirae when Red Array tables of organisation recommended five or six.23 it would seem likely that this excessive number reflected the number of formerly independent detachments incorporated within it. The detachment commanders seem not to have wanted to give up any of their authority and so command positions had to be found for them. With the establishment of the Composite Cavalry Division, this situation came to an end. In January and February 1919, the cavalrymen of the Tenth Array were subjected to their greatest battlefield test. For the Tenth Army, the new year began inauspiciously. Tsaritsyn was under heavy pressure once more from the Don Cossacks. Alexander Egorov, who took over from Voroshilov as the commander of the Tenth Army, told his superiors in mid- January 1919 that the Tsaritsyn front was on the verge of collapse. Tsaritsyn's defences were under pressure frora different directions. Duraenko's command was once more split into two brigades, with the larger to becorae known as the Special Cavalry Division.2^ Duraenko was ill at this time. It was Budennyi who led the Special Cavalry Division on what would prove the most successful mission of the Tenth Army's cavalrymen up to that tirae, a month-long raid to the north 23 I. Kosogov, 'Taktika krypnykh konnykh mass v epokhu grazhdanskoi voiny' in A.S. Bubnov et al. Grazhdanskaia voina (Moscow, 1926), v, 1, p. 165. 2^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 115. 101 of Tsaritsyn for the pxirpose of reestablishing comraunication links with the Kamyshin sector.25 The Red cavalrymen not only achieved that goal, but on the return journey, they raided the Cossack rear, providing the latter with some of their own medicine. This operation was to be celebrated in Soviet literature as the 'northern raid'. Dumenko remained at divisional headquarters. Through him went instructions to the brigade and information back to the headquarters of the Tenth Army. In the field it was Budennyi, along with the brigade commander Maslakov, who made the decisions.2" This was a major success and it brought the Tenth Army's cavalry to the attention of the high command. It was Trotsky who signed the congratulatory order.27 The strength of Budennyi's cavalry increased dxiring these battles, through the incorporation of smaller units of Red cavalry that were encountered en route, including two regiments of the Don-Stavropol Cavalry Brigade commanded by Bulatkin and the 1st Ilovlaia Regiment commanded by Ivan Kolesov. This expansion appears to have been carried out on the basis of informal agreements reached among the 9ft cavalrymen, which were subsequently approved by Egorov.^" As Tiulenev later noted, 'the division did not becorae smaller 25 Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p.33 2" S. Naida '0 komandire Svodnogo konnogo korpusa B M Duraenko' Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal', no. 9, September 1965, p. 119. 27 Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p. 37. 28 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 123. 102 during the raid, but grew to 3000 sabres. The division greatly strengthened and gained confidence in itself'.2^ For the Tenth Army, the military situation took a decided turn for the better in spring 1919. Krasnov's Cossacks were reeling under the blows not only of the Tenth Army, but the Eighth and Ninth Red Armies farther to the west. At the same time, the Cossacks were demoralised. They were made much more vulnerable by the withdrawal of their German allies frora the Ukraine. Not only was the siege of Tsaritsyn broken, but the armies of the South Front now rolled southwards as the Don Cossacks fell back. The Tenth Array drove a distance of 350 kiloraetres into the Don Cossack region, with the Special Cavalry Division forraing the advance guard.3^ in the literature of the Stalin era, the 'northern raid' of Budennyi's cavalry received much of the credit for this turnaround. The reality was more complicated, although it could not be denied that Budennyi hadraade a significant contribution. On 14 March 1919, the Special Cavalry Divison became the 4th Cavalry Division. On 24 March 1919, Budennyi formally took over from the still ailing Duraenko as commander. According to Budennyi, his division continued to grow in this period, as recruits were found in the stanitsy and settlements in the path of the Red Army advance. For a while, things were so good that Budennyi could afford to be 2" Tiulenev, Sovetskaia kavaleriia, p. 64. 3^ Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p. 39. 31 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 46. Budenny, Proidennyi put', V. 1, pp. 133-34. 103 highly selective about who he took, tiuming away many would- be volunteers.32 The situation was not nearly so happy for the Eleventh Army farther to the south. Late in 1918, the Eleventh Array finally succurabed to the wounds that had been inflicted upon it by Denikin's Volunteer Array and by its Kuban Cossack allies. It was the Red Array's greatest disaster in the history of the Civil War. Soviet forces with a total strength at one point of 150,000 men had ceased to exist. Only about 10% of this force managed to escape, to link up with the Red Array farther to the north.33 The remnants of the Eleventh Army would be incorporated in the Tenth Array. One of those remnants, the Stavropol Cavalry Division formed the basis of the 6th Cavalry Division of the First Cavalry Army. The Stavropol Cavalry Division boasted an interesting history among the detachments of the Kuban and Stavropol regions. One of its commanders, Apanasenko, was to recall how, in the early days, it had been necessary to resort to self supply and improvisation. According to Apanasenko, 'transport, horses, food and equipment we took from the kulaks'. The foot soldiers travelled in peasant carts, to ensure more rapid movement. Weapons were in short supply and, according to Apanasenko, only 40%-50% had rifles. The numerous statues of Alexander the Third in the Stavropol 32 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 143. 33 Mawdsley, Op.cit., p. 162 104 region were put to good use, their metal being melted down so as to be raade into bullets.3^ The component parts of the Red Army in the north Caucasus operated in chaotic, uncoordinated fashion for much of 1918. In February 1918, a South-East Revolutionary Army came into existence in the area between Rostov and Tikhoretskaia for the pxu-pose of fighting the Volunteer Array. It was formed from forraer Tsarist soldiers who had been fighting the Turks in the Trans-Caucasus as well as from local peasant ins\irgents, such as Apanasenko. In April 1918, this force evolved into the army of the Kuban Soviet Republic, which as the counterrevolution got into full swing in spring 1918, broke down into various component parts, including the celebrated Taman Army, as well as various detachments and columns.35 From the latter there was created in August 1918 the 8,000-strong 1st Stavropol Infantry Division and the 12,000 strong 2nd Stavropol Infantry Division. Attached to them was a 3500-strong cavalry brigade which came into existence under the coraraand of S. V. Negovor.3" In Septeraber 1918, the Eleventh Array was established to embrace these elements. Negovor's brigade became the Stavropol Cavalry Division. The Stavropol Cavalry Division fought with mixed success under Negovor's command so he was replaced in February 1919 by Apanasenko. Apanasenko was, in 3^ Apanasenko, Op. cit., p. 37. 35 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), pp. 297-98. 3" V. Sukhorukov XI Armiia v boiakh na Severnom Kavkaze i Nizhnei Volge (1918-1920 gg.) Moscow 1961, pp. 78-79. 105 the opinion of one Soviet writer 'distinguished by his high political consciousness, bravery and boldness in nvimerous battles and always served as an example to the fighters'. According to Budennyi, Apanasenko was the embodiment of a partisan type of fighter who fovind it difficult 'to shake off the habits from those days of unlimited authority'. The Eleventh Array had been forced out of the north Caucasus and was operating alongside the Tenth Army against the Volunteers and the Don Cossacks in the vicinity of the Manych river. The Stavropol Cavalry Division, now only about 1,100 sabres strong38, had not been demoralised by the retreat, as its succeessful raid across the Manych to capture Remontnaia in the second week in February 1919 proved.^^ On 13 March 1919, the Stavropol Cavalry Division formally became part of the Tenth Army, the Eleventh Army having been disbanded and was renamed as the 6th Cavalry Divison. The paths of the 4th and the 6th Cavalry Divisions crossed, in May 1919, when they were operating along the same section of the front near the Manych river. Tenth Array coraraander Egorov was using both divisions as a raobile reserve, transferring them back and forth soraetimes up to 100 kiloraetres along the front to check the advances of an enemy that had regrouped and was once more a formidable opponent. Denikin's Volunteer Army now became the mainstay 37 Sukhorukov, Op.cit., p. 193. Budenny, The Path of Valour, p. 291. 38 Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p. 46. 3^ Sukhorukov, Op. cit., pp. 192-96. 106 of the counterrevolution and Denikin succeeded in welding the Volunteers and the Cossacks into a powerful force. Cavalry made up about half this force, setting new challenges for the Red cavalry. Budennyi and Apanasenko were in agreement as to the desirability of the merger of their commands, though they disagreed as to who should become overall commander. As the commander of the larger force, Budennyi won out in this contest. According to Budennyi's account, Egorov, the Tenth Army commander, gave his blessing to this arrangement.^^ Formal recognition did not come until the following month. The order that established the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi was signed on 28 June 1919 by Leonid Kliuev, Egorov's successor as the Tenth Army commander. According to an inventory of the forces of the Red Army's South Front, which was drawn up in mid-July 1919, the 4th Cavalry Division coraprised 4,358 sabres, 114 machine guns and 9 artillery pieces, while the 6th Cavalry Division was made up of 1,344 cavalrymen, 43 machine guns and 5 artillery pieces as well as 539 infantrymen, would-be cavalrymen for whom there were no horses.^2 with about 5,700 sabres this was, even by the standards of its Cossack opponent, a large mounted force. A further 300 sabres were added in October 1919 when the small 11th Cavalry Division, which formally belonged to the Eighth Army, was added to Budennyi's command. The enemy corps led by Mamontov, which had about 9,000 fighters at full strength, and that of ^^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 167-68. ^1 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 279. ^2 D.K.F.K.A., V. 2, p. 289. 107 Shkuro were, for the moment, still larger. But the Red cavalry was narrowing the gap. In keeping with its evolution up to that point, the setting up of the First Cavalry Army represented a front line improvisation. It was not the result of plans produced in the centre. It was Budennyi who made the proposal to expand the Cavalry Corps into a 'cavalry army'. He did this in the last week in October 1919, taking advantage of the prestige of his cavalry, following an important victory over the White cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro at Voronezh and the fact that the headquarters of the South Front had undergone some important personnel changes. From early October 1919, the two Tsaritsyn veterans, Alexander Egorov and Joseph Stalin were, respectively, commander and military council member. Budeimyi's proposal was modest. He made no immediate reso\n~ce claims, arguing that the Cavalry Corps could be expanded gradually.^3 Egorov and Stalin were keen to see an immediate expansion and at a meeting of 11 November 1919 formulated a proposal for a cavalry army that would comprise two cavalry corps. Budennyi was told that this expansion was to take place through the incorporation into his coraraand of the strong 8th Cavalry Division coramanded by Valerii Primakov.^^ The RVSR did not agree to this proposal. On 17 November 1919, it simply renamed the Cavalry Corps as the First ^3 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 279-81. Pervaia konnaia v izobrazhenii ee boitsov i komandirov, p. 3. Budennyi, Proidennyi put, v. 1, p. 288. 108 Cavalry Array.^5 This was a disappointment to Egorov and Stalin and to Budennyi, who had been informed of the South Front's proposal. Trotsky would write later that he had opposed the establishment of a cavalry army for purely military reasons, including doubts as to the wisdom of locking up so many resources in a single unit and about Budennyi's ability to command such a unit. This may have been the case, but it is interesting to note that, in July 1919, Trotsky commented favourably upon a plan for the establishment of a mounted force of '30,000- 40,000 riders' for possible use against India while in October, 1919 he had been fulsome in his praise of Budennyi.^° Trotsky had already fallen out with Stalin in the course of the Civil War. It was most likely the fact that this proposal had come to the RVSR with Stalin's imprimatur that explained the lack of support from Trotsky. At the same tirae it must be remembered that by then the views of Trotsky were not all that important in the RVSR. The real power lay with the Coraraander-in-Chief, Sergei Kamenev and with his allies, Sergei Gusev and Ivan Smilga. In November 1919, Kamenev was engaged in a bitter dispute over strategy and resources with the headquarters of the South Front. This may have coloured his judgement about the cavalry army proposal.^' "i^ fbid. ^^ For Trotsky's latter-day summary of the attitude that he took to the cavalry-army proposal, see Trotsky, Stalin., V.2, p. 55. For the plan to build a 30,000-40,000 strong cavalry force, see Trotsky Papers, v. 1, p. 625. ^7 This dispute is discussed in Chapter Four. 109 The upshot of all this was that the First Cavalry Army would have to wait before it was able to build up its strength. Years later, the writers of the Stalin era were still fuming about the lack of support frora the centre. Voroshilov wrote that the First Cavalry Array had come into existence 'not only without the support of but even in spite of the centre'.^" This was a fair comment. Increasing size complicated the task of leadership. Budennyi was fortunate that there had gathered around hira by the time that the Cavalry Corps had come into existence a core of competent staff workers. Stepan Zotov was a Don Cosack, highly regarded by Budennyi and others, who concerned himself with drafting orders, report writing and assisting staff at the divisional and regimental levels. The chief-of-staff of the Cavalry Corps was Pogrebov, who appears to have been the only former Tsarist officer attached to Budennyi's command in this period. Pogrebov was an alcoholic and, according to Budennyi, was sent to the cavalry to be 'straightened out'.^ Nonetheless Pogrebov proved a valuable acquisition. From August 1919, Pogrebov's deputy was the able Ivan Tiulenev, a former Tsarist dragoon and one of the first batch of graduates from the Red Army's newly-established Staff Academy m Moscow.'^" Budennyi was the dominant figure in the command of the First Cavalry Army. The clearest evidence of this would come in November 1919, when Budennyi demoted his erstwhile rival, ^8 Voroshilov, Op. cit., p. 33. ^^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 168. 50 I Tiulenev, Cherez tri voiny (Moscow, 1960), pp. 71-75. 110 Apanasenko, to regimental commander. It might have been expected that this would have caused a revolt in Apanasenko's power base, the 6th Cavalry Division. Indeed the 6th Cavalry Division performed poorly in the days that followed under the command of Timosheniko. Thereafter things retvimed to norraal. No crisis eventuated.51 It was a sign of Budennyi's authority and the fact that a normal military hierarchy was now prevailing among the former partisans. As a Red cavalry coraraander, Budennyi was to gain a reputation as a difficult subordinate. He was quick to challenge orders that he did not like. His bitter protests to the command of the Tenth Army about the decision to surrender Tsaritsyn early in July 1919 earned him a rebuke from Kliuev.52 More often than not, Budennyi's independence of mind worked to the advantage of the Red Army. This was a war of rapid movement and unexpected turns of events, in which orders from above quickly became outdated and where technical difficulties often made the process of reporting and receiving new instructions rather drawn out. Budennyi has been described as having been without any commitment to the Soviet government. Western writers are fond of endorsing a description of Budennyi attributed to Trotsky, who apparently described Budennyi as a kind of maverick Cossack ataman: 'wherever he leads his gang there 51 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 293. N. Evseev, Flangovyi udar na Voronezh-Kastomaia, (Moscow 1936). p. 76. 52 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 209. Ill they will go: today for the Reds and tomorrow for the Whites.'53 This impression is misleading. One measure of a Red Army commander's readiness to work within the rules established for him was his relationship with the commissars, whose task it was to supervise the coraraander. Sometimes this relationship could be strained in the extreme. Dumenko despised the commissars attached to his command. Budennyi seems to have had no problems. He even took time out to praise his commissars. After one battle, in June 1919, Budennyi reported to the headquarters of the Tenth Array that the commissar of the 4th Cavalry Division, comrade Musinov, had displayed 'selfless bravery' in capturing an enemy machine-gun, setting an example for the other fighters.5^ Budennyi was not in complete control of the men he led, able to exercise hourly control over his subordinates in the field. The Civil War battlefield was much too chaotic and dispersed for that. Budexmyi issued daily orders and positioned himself with one or other of his divisions. He was more than ready to take a hand in the fighting. Coraraand in battle had to be decentralised. A great deal of responsibility rested on the shoulders of lower-level commanders, who were expected to display a maximum of initiative. This was the essence of what was known as 'first-shot tactics' whereby a unit had to ride to the 53 The quote is from Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 245. For its endorsement see, for example, A. Zamoyski, Op. cit., p. 59. 5^ V. Sidorov, 'Kommunisty 1-oi konnoi armii' Voenno- istoricheskii zhurnal, no 2, February, 1939, p. 68. 112 assistance of a neighbour as soon as the 'first shot' was heard, without waiting for orders from above.55 Many of the commanders in the Cavalry Corps were originally elected during the time of the partisan detachments, which must have helped to boost their prestige. There is probably considerable truth in Budennyi's eulogistic description of Ivan Kniga, a Stavropol peasant and a coraraander in the Sixth Cavalry Division. According to Budenny: The 1st Brigade was considered one of the (6th) division's best. It was manned by volvinteers, the poorest Stavropol peasants who held their coraraander in deep respect. Kniga himself was of peasant stock and the men saw in him one of their own kind who had made good and called him by his name and patronymic instead of using merely his rank. Although no dashing swordsman, he could inspire the men with simple words and lead them forward in a lightning charge.5" The White cavalry took the cream of the officers of the Tsarist cavalry who chose to take part in the Civil War. One of the most striking features concerning the Red cavalry was that, unlike the situation that existed elsewhere in the Red Army, there were very few former Tsarist officers. According to Kosogov, the Red cavalry commanders were 'sergeant majors, Non Commissioned Officers and ordinary cavalrymen' from the Tsarist cavalry.57 Although lacking the Tsarist credentials of their White counterparts, the emerging Red cavalry coraanders were enthusiastic and their stock of experience was improving alLthe time. 55 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 197. 56 Ibid., V. 1, p. 327. 57 Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 168. 113 At the head of the 4th Cavalry Division, there was an unlikely but effective pairing. The illiterate Gorodovikov, upon taking over the command of the 4th Cavalry Division in June 1919, was fortunate to have as his chief-of-staff Kosogov, formerly a schoolteacher who, at first, knew little about the cavalry. Kosogov had his work cut out for him. As he recalled later, the staff of the 4th Cavalry Division at first consisted of himself and two scribes. With Kosogov attending to the paperwork, Gorodovikov was able to do what he did best, which was to lead from the front. Gorodovikov was one of a great many Red cavalry commanders who were able to compensate for what they lacked in terms of expert knowledge with their ability to provide an example. It is difficult to know to what extent the behaviour of the konnoarmeitsy was controlled by discipline imposed from above. The Red Army came to be renowned for employing a regime of ruthless discipline. There is considerable evidence of this being applied in the Red infantry. For example, 150 men of the Eighth Army were executed after this force's flight in December 1918.58 Budennyi was fond of threatening new recruits with the death penalty, should they turn tail in battle. On the other hand, Kosogov wrote that conventional discipline was rarely applied because the rank and file would not stand for 'anything that smacked of the old discipline'.5^ This is plausible, given that so many of the konoarmeitsy were veterans of the soldiers' revolt in 58 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 163. 5" Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 168. 114 the Tsarist Army; they were \inlikely to welcome any return to the stringent regime that applied before 1917. There were other factors that influenced morale too. That they were cavalrymen, the traditional elite of an army and that by theraiddle of 1919 they were clearly capable of matching their White counterparts must have added to the fighting spirit of the konnoarmeitsy. Medals and even material rewards came the way of the more distinguished soldiers. New underwear was one of the most sought-after rewards for valour."*^ In summer 1919, the crisis point in the war in south Russia was fast approaching. Denikin's Volunteer Army had been making good progress, breathing life into the Don Cossack counterrevolution as it did so. In July 1919, the Red Army surrendered a nximber of iraportant regional centres, including Tsaritsyn and Kharkov. The Volunteer Array was moving north, through the Ukraine, heading towards Kursk and Orel, with its final objective being Moscow. The two large cavalry corps of Mamontov and Shkuro were breaking through weak points in the Red Army's flimsy front line, threatening the rear. During August and Septeraber 1919, Maraontov raided as far north as Tarabov province and briefly occupied the headquarters of the Red Array's South Front at Kozlov, forcing Trotsky to flee for his life. The Maraontov raid was a major contributing factor to the collapse of the Red Array's attempted counteroffensive in August 1919. Shkuro '^" Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2., p. 35, 115 meanwhile was creating havoc of his own. By late September 1919, he established himself in the Voronezh area.^l While Budennyi's cavalry had proven itself a vital component of the Tenth Army during spring and summer 1919, its impact on the Civil War as a whole was not yet particularly significant. The Tenth Army was only one of five armies that formed the Red Army's South Front. In the first half of 1919, the South Front had to take a back seat to the East Front that faced admiral Kolchak's White Army in the Urals. The latter seemed particularly threatening at the beginning of 1919; but by mid-1919 the tide had clearly turned in the war in the east and Kolchak was in retreat."2 The Soviet government then found itself engaged in a life and death struggle with Denikin. Denikin would come closer than any of the other Whites to reaching Moscow, the seat of Soviet government. As the war against Denikin became ever more important for the Red Army, so too did Budennyi's cavalry. In the last three months of 1919, Budennyi's cavalry bested its White coxinterpart in just about every encounter. This was the clearest possible evidence that the Red cavalry had come of age and conclusively broke the spell exercised hitherto over the Red Army by the White cavalry. As Trotsky put it, Budennyi's cavalry 'passed its cavalry examination' in autumn 1919, when it inflicted a series of notable defeats upon the cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro, beginning at Voronezh in mid-October 1919. It also proved itself 61 Grazhdanskaia voina (1963), p. 18. 62 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 149. 116 capable of more than holding its own in contests with the White infantry. This was a remarkable achievement for the Red cavalry, given its apparent limitations in comparison with the White cavalry at the outset of the Civil War. How is this turnabout in the fortxines of the Red cavalry to be explained? Some of the factors that were helping to bring about an improved performance on the part of Budennyi's cavalry have already been examined. By mid-1919, it could nearly match the larger bodies of White cavalry in terms of size. The konnoarmeitsy performed in the manner of highly-motivated fighters, as might have been expected of a volxinteer force with a vested political and socio-economic interest in the defeat of the Cossack-led counterrevolution. At the same time, commanders and rank-and-file konnoarmeitsy were gaining in experience all the time and becoming more expert in their responsibilities. There is another factor of great importance that has to do with the style of fighting of Budennyi's cavalry, its armament and tactics. These are matters that deserve examination here. Cavalry battles in the Civil War did not take place in the style presented in romantic works of fiction and art, with two walls of cavalry colliding together; or, if the enemy was dismounted, a compact mass of horseraen charging into its ranks.63 in the Civil War, clashes of two solid walls of cavalry coming together were rare indeed. One 63 See, for example, the painting: 'Boi za znamia. Ataka.' by N. Saraokish which is included in the series of paintings between pages 240 and 241 in Grazhdanskaia voina (1983). 117 cavalryraan later noted that he could recall only a single occasion when this happened and it resulted frora freak conditions. A retreating column of White cavalry came to a deep ravine. There being no other exit it turned and charged the Red cavalry that was in pursuit.6^ Given that the armament of both Red and White cavalries in the Civil War consisted in variations upon the armament of their Tsarist predecessor, it might be thought that the two cavalries embraced the same fighting style. There were similarities. Both sides charged in lava formation. But there was also a very iraportant difference. The Red cavalry relied upon firepower. The White cavalry, by contrast, appears to have inherited the conservative bias against firepower that had proved so resilient in the Tsarist cavalry. The irapressionraade by the White cavalry on the Red cavalrymen was that of a highly conservative fighting force. According to Kosogov, 'the cult of cavalry "shock", the blow with "cold steel", and an aversion to firepower were the characteristic features of the Don, Kuban and Volunteer cavalries'."^ Again according to Kosogov, the Red cavalry relied upon firepower, the fiery shield of the heavy machine guns and the artillery from the front and a mounted blow from behind them or frora the flank represented the typical tactics of the Red cavalry applied at the South Front'.66 The opening 6^ S. Krivoshein, Skvoz' buri (vospominaniia) (Moscow, 1959), p. 119. 65 Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 162. 66 Ibid., p.174. 118 barrage of machine-gun and artillery fire soraetiraes proved sufficient in itself to obtain a victory as 'often it reraained for the cavalry merely to finish off an enemy already broken by fire'.67 This opening barrage of machine gun and artillery fire became the trademark of an attack by Budennyi's cavalry. Pavel Arshinov, who fought in the array of Nestor Makhno, the Ukrainian anarchist, noted much the same difference between the two cavalries when he wrote that the Red cavalry was 'a cavalry in narae only' because, 'it was never able to carry on hand-to-hand combat and engaged in combat only when the enemy was already disorganised by the fire of canons and machine guns'. Denikin's cavalry, on the other hand, 'merited the highest praise' because it 'always accepted corabats with sabres drawn and charged on the enemy without waiting for him to be disorganised by canon fire'.68 The observer quoted above admired the more conservative fighting style of the Whites but not too much should be made of this. While the differences noted between the two cavalries were real enough, the assessment about their relative merits informs us only about the prejudices of the author and does not provide an accurate picture of battlefield results. In nearly every encounter between October 1919 and April 1920, Budennyi's cavalry had the better of its confrontations with the White cavalry. 67 Ibid. 68 p. Arshinov, History of the Makhnovist Movement: 1918- 1921 (Detroit-Chicago, 1974), pp. 136-39. 119 The prejudice against firepower araong the Whites seems to have been prevalent even among the Cossacks, despite their skills in shooting from the saddle. This was explained by the integration of the Cossacks into the Tsarist line cavalry in the half century before World War One and the tendency for them to ape the style and attitudes of line officers. Mamontov, it seems, even put out an order instructing his men that they were to resort to dismounted action only in 'exceptional circumstances'.6^ It would be too simplistic to view the divergent perspectives on firepower in the Red and White cavalries in terras of an aristocratic cavalry with conservative prejudices versus a proletarian cavalry that did not have thera. The Red cavalrymen fought the way that they did out of necessity. It was not only Tsarist officers who had the emotional attachment to outdated methods of warfare. A cavalryman did not need a title or foppish dress style to become imraersed in the cavalry mystique. Budennyi, a product of humble origins if ever there was one, obviously preferred the image of the traditional warrior on horseback. In his latter-day account, he could be quite derisive of his fellow konnoarmeitsy, so many of whora were unlearned in the proper manipulation of the sabre. He was especially pleased when he could describe a battle that 'consisted mainly of fierce swordplay.' ^ What ensured the predominence of firepower in the Red cavalry was the fact that so many of the konnoarmeitsy had 6^ Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 162. 70 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 272. 120 backgrounds in the Tsarist infantry rather than the cavalry. Their fighting style proved effective enough on the battlefield and Budennyi had the good sense to encourage these developments, his own preferences notwithstanding. Firepower was the natxn-al ally of the konnoarmeitsy for, as Budennyi put it, 'many of ovir cavalrymen had previously served in the infantry and handled small arms better than the Cossacks whose strength lay in swordsmanship'.71 The sword was carried by the konnoarmeitsy, though not by all of them. It was not the principal weapon. The preferred weapon of the konnoarmeitsy was the Nagcint revolver, easy to fire from the saddle, a deadly weapon at close range. The revolver could be fired even when conducting a mounted attack. At the very least, its bullets, however wildly aimed, were more likely to frighten the enemy than an inexpertly-wielded sabre or lance. Nagant revolvers were in short supply and revolvers and pistols of all descriptions could be found among the konnoarmeitsy. Many despaired of ever getting hold of a revolver. They took to cutting down their rifles to a more manageable size.'2 it was commonplace for the rifle or revolver to be fired from "TO the saddle, even when on the move. The preference of the konnoarmeitsy for the revolver was in accord with the ideas of cavalry reformers of the period leading up to World War One, who had advocated the revolver as the logical replacement for the sword. 71^ jjj^^^^ p; 6^; 72 Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 166 73 Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia krasnaia armiia, p. 13. 121 The most important improvisation of the Civil War in Russia was the tachanka, a reinforced peasant cart with a machine gun mounted on it. In this way, the heavy machine gvin, best known as a defensive weapon, could be used in attack. It was employed, along with the horse artillery, to prepare the way for a mounted or dismounted attack and to cover the retreat. It was brilliantly successful. A measure of the value of the tachanka was its proliferation among the front-line units of Budennyi's cavalry. Red Army regulations recomraended that each cavalry regiraent have four Maxira raachine guns, but in Budennyi's cavalry, sixteen to twenty was the standard n\iraber.7^ The machine gun was the most important weapon for the duration of the Civil War, just as artillery had dominated during World War One. The tachanka was a most valuable asset for Budennyi's cavalry. There was to be some dispute after the Civil War about who first used the tachanka, with many writers crediting Nestor Makhno, the Ukrainian peasant leader. It should be remembered that the placing of a machine gun on a transport was not in itself a novel idea for this took place in World War One. The inventor of the tachanka is unknown. It was Budennyi's practice to reinforce reconnaissance parties and to provide them with extra machine guns, so that their eneray covinterparts raight be overwhelraed, in this way depriving the eneray of inforraation from reconnaissance. This tactic drew favourable comment from one White observer.75 7^ Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 166. 75 Kel'chevskii, Op. cit., p. 10. 122 Another White coimnander was to recall how, in February 1919, he had been attacked by armoured cars at the head of a column of cavalry and that this had caused his bewildered troops to panic. Budennyi had arranged for armoured cars to be dragged through snow, by teams of horses so as to save fuel. The movement had been made at night, during a blizzard, so as to achieve maximum surprise. 6 This was evidence that the Red cavalry was capable of fashioning effective tactics revolving around the use of firepower in order to achieve results on the battlefield. The Red cavalry's extensive use of firepower was probably the single most important factor in narrowing the gap that originally existed between the two cavalries in battlefield capability. The real significance of firepower for the Red cavalry was that it opened up mounted warfare to amateurs, by making much less iraportant the skills of the individual Cossack cavalryraan or Tsarist cavalry officer. Fire weapons are a great leveller. Anybody who could ride and fire a rifle or revolver orraachine gun could, with a minimum of training and experience, become a cavalryman. The deadly effect of edged weapons was as nothing when compared to that of theraachine gun s and artillery that were used so extensively by Budennyi. The White cavalry may well have had superior riders and swordsmen but this advantage, by the second half of 1919, was fast becoming an irrelevance. The konnoarmeitsy developed their own distinctive fighting style. They did not copy it from the Whites who preferred a more traditional approach in the first two years 76 A. Goiubintsev, Russkaia vandeia (Munich 1959), p. 88. 123 of the Civil War. Nor did the Red cavalrymen fight in accord with Red Array regulations. These were taken from their out- of-date Tsarist predecessors. In the second half of 1920, the Whites would pay Budennyi's cavalry the compliment by imitating its style. Wrangel's cavalry in the Crimea at that time made such good use of firepower that one Red commentator described it as 'armoured cavalry'.77 In the last seven months of the war against Denikin, between October 1919 and April 1920, it was apparent that the White cavalry, when unsupported by infantry, could not cope with Budennyi. The cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro, later of Pavlov were brushed aside. The progress of the First Cavalry Array came to a halt only when it came up against well-defended positions with a high proportion of infantry and artillery among the defenders. Storming such points usually proved difficult and costly for Budennyi, as was only to be expected for a predominantly-mounted force. Success in these conditions came once Budennyi received close support from neighbouring Red infantry units. This is not to suggest that the Red cavalry followed in any precise way the model provided by the American cavalry in the Civil War of 1861-1865. The latter used its horse purely as a means of transportation and fought in the manner of infantry. The Red cavalry occasionally fought dismounted; but the mounted attack was more in evidence. What characterised the Red cavalry was that that the firepower of the horse artillery and the machine guns was employed to prepare the way for the attack. Revolver or sawn-off rifles 77 s. Gusev, Uroki grazhdanskoi voiny (Moscow, 1921), p. 22. MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FIRST CAVALRY ARMY: K. VOROSHILOV, S. BUDENNYI AND E. SHCHADENKO. JOSEPH STALIN' IN 1918 ALEXANDER EGOROV IN 1918 124 were used in the mounted attack itself. Like the American cavalry, or the tank armies of World War Two, the strength of the Red cavalry was that it was a combination of mobility and firepower. The creation of the First Cavalry Army was to be feted after the Civil War as having represented one of the Red Army's most iraportant achievements. The emergence of a large and capable Red cavalry was an achievement, given the gulf that separated the Red and White cavalries at the outset of the Civil War. Of course, it must be remembered that the achievement was short-lived and specific to the conditions of the Civil War. Budennyi's tactics were a successful adaptation to a passing railitary situation, after the development of machine guns and before major adveincements in the military use of the internal combustion engine. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that in its way the First Cavalry Army anticipated the tactics of tank enthusiasts such as B. H. Liddell Hart in Britain who argued the importance of the right combination of firepower and mobility. 125 Chapter Four: A Question Of Strategy August 1919-December 1919 The struggle with the Whiteguard army of Denikin and its defeat represented the most brilliant pages in the history of the Civil War in the Soviet Union... but in the past, descriptions of these events have been strongly influenced by the Cult of Personality of Stalin. S. Shishkin, VIZ, no. 2, February 1963, p. 31. In August 1919, there began what the Soviet historian, Nikolai Kakurin, characterised as the 'struggle for the initiative in the south'.1 The fate of the war in South Russia hung in the balance during October and November 1919. This was the crucial period in military terms in the Civil War. Given the dramatic nature of these events at the time, it is not really surprising that they gave rise to considerable controversy in the latter-day literature. One area of controversy concerned the question of who or what set of circumstances was chiefly responsible for the crucial change in Red Army strategy against Denikin in this period. Another area of controversy has been defining the contribution made by Budennyi's cavalry to the defeat of Denikin. Soviet writers of the Khrushchev era noted that in literature of the Stalin era, the contribution of the cavalry was exaggerated and that of other units downplayed.2 Kakurin, Kak srazhalas' revoliutsiia, v. 2, p. 283. Aleksashenko, Op. cit., p. 86.For an account of the controversy about strategy, see Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, pp. 55-59. 126 The argument of this chapter is that Budennyi's cavalry did indeed make a very significant contribution to the Red Army's success against Denikin in the last three months of 1919. At the same time, it is argued that the version of how the crucial change in Red Army strategy carae about that was put out in the Stalin era contains more truth than is usually acknowledged by modem Soviet or Western writers. Before proceeding, there needs to be a brief account of the process of Red Army decision making, as its workings are central to this and to subsecpient chapters. Presiding over the affairs of the Red Army was the Soviet political leadership, headed by Lenin. Commentators have noted that while the Bolsheviks, through their network of commissars, did as much as was thought necessary to ensure party control over the army's loyalty, in general the political leadership preferred to leave the actual conduct of carapaigns to the experts, the Red Array chain of coraraand, which in the main was staffed by ex-Tsarist officers.3 At the same time, it should not be forgotten that on occasions the political leadership made important interventions when forced to adjudicate in major disputes that could not be resolved by the military personnel themselves. A peculiarity of the Red Army was that the Commander-in- Chief, as well as front and array coramanders, were members of collegial decision-making bodies known as military councils. These military councils included the commander, a number of Party representatives and sometimes other personnel, such as the deputy commander. The commander was usually the chairman 3jj,^fj;ip_ 58; 127 of this council and he was formally empowered to draft orders, move troops and alter coraraand personnel. His order, to be valid, required the signatiu-e of another member of the military council. The rationale for this arrangement was that the party representative would guard against treachery on the part of the commander, who was often an ex-Tsarist officer and therefore potentially disloyal to the Soviet government.^ The highest military council was the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the RVSR. Throughout the Civil War, the RVSR was chaired by Trotsky, who was also the Soviet government's Commissar for War. The RVSR wdiS formally responsible for the direction of the Red Army's fronts and institutions. From September 1918, the top command post in the Red Army was that of Comraander-in-Chief. In the course of the Civil War, this post was occupied by two ex-Tsarist colonels, Vatsetis and his replacement, Kamenev. The Commander-in-Chief had the assistance of an executive known as the Field Staff. As was the case with the commanders at lower levels, the authority of the Commander-in-Chief was restricted in so far as he was but one member of the RVSR and his orders required the signature of another member of that body. It was assumed by some Western writers that these military councils were rife with conflict between the commander and the Party representative charged with the latter's supervision. As Colton has pointed out, this was rarely the case. Close alliances usually developed within ^ Colton, Op. cit., p. 37. 126 the various railitary councils at front and array levels, because both coraraander and Party representative were jointly responsible for the performance of the organisation to which they were attached. The disputes that broke out usually pitted separate military coxincils, representing different sectors, against one another: The key division was not between army and party or between military command and party organs, but between mixed groups of commanders and party workers marked off from one another by location and task-related boundaries.5 The way the Red Array was supposed to work was as an ideal Weberian hierarchy, with orders passed from top to bottom. Some Soviet writers seem to think that it actually worked this way. The formal Red Army hierarachy might be illustrated as follows: political leadership centre military leadership (Commander-in- Chief, RVSR, Field Staff) front military council front line arrayrailitary counci l But in practice, Red Array decison raaking rarely operated according to such a simple formula. Instead, Red Army decision making was shaped by the interplay of these fo\n~ levels, and the conflicts and alliances that emerged between them. Before he became Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev served as commander of the East Front facing the White Army of admiral Kolchak. In May 1919, a major dispute broke out between East 5 Ibid., p. 56. 129 Front coraraander Karaenev and the then Coraraander-in-Chief, Vatsetis, about strategy. In the course of the dispute, two of the party raembers of the military council of the East Front, Ivan Smilga and Sergei Gusev, enlisted the suppport of Lenin for Kamenev's cause. When the Central Committee finally met, on 3 July 1919, to discuss the matter, only Trotsky supported his protege, Vatsetis. Vatsetis lost not only the dispute but his post as well. Kamenev was appointed Commraander-in-Chief. Thereafter, veterans of the East Front came to dominate the central decison-making bodies of the Red Army. Of the six members of the reorganised RVSR three, Kamenev, Gusev and Smilga, were East Front veterans.6 Lebedev, appointed head of the Field Staff, had formerly served as Kamenev's chief-of-staff at the East Front. Ivan Shorin, an army commander with the East Front, was brought in to command the Special Group that was to be the centrepiece of Karaenev's strategy in the war against Denikin. Joining Shorin on the military council of the Special Group were Gusev and Smilga. Lebedev and Shorin were, like Kamenev, formerly Tsarist officers. This group represented a powerful combination of professional expertise in the ex-officers, Kamenev, Lebedev and Shorin, and political influence in the party workers, Gusev and Smilga. Just as importantly, they enjoyed the confidence of Lenin, whose self-appointed supervisory role over the affairs of the Red Army became more pivotal with the partial eclipse of Trotsky, on the outer after the sacking of Vatsetis. However, Karaenev and his allies ran 6 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 54. 130 into trouble when they saddled themselves with an unworkable strategy in the war against Denikin in south Russia. The war in South Russia reached crisis point by June 1919, following a disastrous summer for the Red Army. By the last week in June 1919, Denikin's forces had reached Kharkov, the centre of the railroad network in the western Ukraine and, for Denikin, the gateway to central Russia. In the first week in July 1919, the Whites captured Tsaritsyn, the strong point of the Red Army's eastern flank on the Volga river. By mid-July 1919, the front line in south Russia stretched more than 1400 kilometres in length, bordered in the west by the still uncertain frontier with newly-independent Poland and in the east by the Volga's southward course to the Caspian Sea. Denikin was now sufficiently confident to issue his 'Moscow Directive' on 3 July 1919, which set as his goal the capture of the Soviet capital.7 This goal was no longer a distant prospect. Denikin's attack was three pronged. The prong that was farthest to the west was the Volunteer Army of general Mai- Maevskii which, having occupied Kharkov, had the task of advancing directly on Moscow along the railroad that passed through Kursk and Orel. The central prong was the Don Army, under general Sidorin, which was to advance north beyond the Don territory, towards Voronezh and Riazan, before turning to the west. The eastern prong was the Caucasus Army under baron Wrangel, which was pushing north beyond Tsaritsyn. Facing Denikin, in summer 1919, was the Red Army's South 7 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 172. 131 Front, which comprised, from west to east, the Fourteenth, Thirteenth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies. By early autumn 1919, there were clear signs that the Red Anny's South Front was on the brink of a major catastrophe. In the Eighth Array, in Septeraber 1919, the Chief-of-staff went over to the Whites. Many units were running away. The commander of the Ninth Array also went over to the Whites.8 In the Thirteenth Army, the command had to be replaced, units completely reorganised and then stiffened by an urgent infusion of Coraraunists.^ In the Foin-teenth Army, what modern Soviet literatiure describes as the subversive work of the anarchists was in full swing. The Fourteenth Army's Political Department had to hold 44 meetings and discussions to combat this anarchism during October 1919.1° Kamenev's strategy for combatting Denikin was contained in his order of 23 July 1919. The basic idea was for the main blow to be struck across the Don steppe by the Ninth and Tenth Armies, formed into a 'Special Group' under the coraraand of Shorin. An auxiliary blow was to be struck frora the area south of Moscow by the Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armies. Karaenev had sound reasons for trying this line of attack. The Don steppe represented the shortest route to the White bases of Rostov and Novocherkassk; and it was the South Front that could most easily be reinforced at the 8j5^^.,p^17b; ^ Agureev, Op. cit., pp. 65-66. 10 Ibid., p. 89. 132 expense of the now victorious East Front in Siberia. The alternative route for a southward advance, farther to the west in the Donbass, had been tried repeatedly in spring and svimmer 1919, without much success. Kamenev's raistake was that he would persevere with the attack across the Don steppe long after it had become clear that it was a less promising route than that of the Donbass. By mid-summer 1919, the Red Array in south Russia enjoyed a considerable numerical superiority over its opponent, a point that modem Soviet writers acknowledge. By the second half of July 1919, the South Front comprised 157,600 infantry and 25,800 cavalry. Denikin's strength was put at 104,500 infantry and 50,900 cavalry. In terras of actual front-line strength, it was only 60,500 infantry and 44,000 cavalry. By mid-August 1919, Shorin's Special Group enjoyed a two-to-one numerical advantage over the enemy facing it, 69,000 infantry and 14,900 cavalry against the 25,400 infantry and 21,500 cavalry of the eneray. The superiority in the east was achieved in large measure by reinforcements from the East Front, the 28th Infantry Division and two brigades plus Kamenev's reserve, the 56th Infantry Division. Yet the Special Group's offensive, when it got under way in August 1919, could make little headway across the steppe. The fighting spirit of the Don Cossack fluctuated in the course of the war, but he was always a force to be reckoned with when defending his own home. Denikin counterattacked in the centre of the front. In mid-August 1919, Mamontov's raiding party commenced its month-long rampage in the rear 11 Iz istorii (^^gQ^y; ^; 2, pp. 154, 159. 133 of the South Front, at one point occupying the headquarters at Kozlov. Mamontov's raid both disrupted the 'August Offensive' of the Special Group and demoralised its rear. As Kamenev was to put it, Mamontov's raid 'caused us the utmost pain'.12 Denikin continued to make ground in the Ukraine and, on 20 September 1919, the Volunteer Army reached Kursk, heading north along the railroad that leads through Orel to Tula and Moscow. The capture of K\u"sk was an iraportant gain for Denikin, because this was the junction that connected the four raajor railroad lines of south Russia with Moscow. Denikin was able to achieve his twin objectives of parrying the Red Array's attempted blow in the east, while continuing to advance in the centre and west. In mid-October 1919, when the Red Army finally launched a successful counterattack, the breakthrough came not on the Don steppe, as Kamenev's strategy had envisaged, but in the area south of Moscow, at Orel and Voronezh. The main follow- up blow was then delivered frora the centre of the Red Army's front-line facing Denikin, along a north-south axis across the Donbass. As Denikin was to describe it later. Two powerful 'shock groups' of Reds were concentrated, one to the west of Orel (Fourteenth Army) and the other facing Voronezh (Budenny)...The plan of the Red Army consisted in striking a double blow (at Orel and Voronezh) at the Volunteer Army nearing Orel.13 The success of the Red Army's blows at Orel and Voronezh decided the fate of Denikin's march on Moscow. It enabled 12 Kamenev, Op. cit., p. 51. 13 Denikin, The White Army, p. 324. 134 the Red Array, in Deceraber 1919, to make a rapid 400- kilometre advance through the Donbass to the Sea of Azov. This was a blow from which the Whites would never recover. There was to be general agreeraent in both Soviet and Western literature that the change in strategy was crucial to the outcorae of the war in south Russia. But there was considerable controversy about how it had corae about. Who was responsible for the felicitous change in the Red Army's point of attack? Some writers accepted Trotsky's claims to have been the author of the successful strategy. Others preferred a version according to which Kamenev rewrote his own strategy in the last week in Septeraber 1920.1 In the literature of the Stalin era, it was put out that Stalin was the man responsible for the change in strategy. The case for Stalin having been the author of the successful strategy was built around a letter that Stalin wrote to Lenin, in mid-November 1919, falsely claimed by Stalin's hagiographers to have been written in mid-October 1919. The discovery of the fraud discredited the entire Stalinist account of these events. Yet Stalin played an important role in the strategy controversy as will become apparent in the account that follows. In a recent Soviet account, no names were mentioned but the 'Soviet coraraand' and 'the High Coraraand of the Red Array' were credited with having made the decision to change the strategy. The reader is meant to receive the mistaken 1^ For the version that favo\u~s Trotsky see, for example, I. Deutscher, Stalin - A Political Biography, (London, 1967), p. 46. For the version that favours Kamenev see Kakurin, Kak srazhalas' revoliutsiia, p. 213. Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 60. 135 irapression that the process was planned and controlled from above.15 The accoxont of these events that comes nearest to the truth has been provided by Mawdsely. He saw the change in strategy as an improvisation that developed in piecemeal fashion in response to successive crises, not as something that was masterminded by a particular individual. This was certainly true; but Mawdsley telescoped events when he wrote that the decision to alter the strategic plan was made at the Politburo meeting of 15 October 1919, thereby overriding Karaenev. Kamenev had already been forced to make a change in strategy, albeit one that he saw as a temporary measure, about a week before the Politburo meeting. He did so as a result of Budennyi's decision, early in October 1919, to take his Cavalry Corps to Voronezh in defiance of the orders of his superiors. The logical alternative to Kamenev's failed strategy was the resumption of something like the strategy advocated in June 1919 by Vatsetis. This called for the main blow to be struck along a north-south axis across the Donbass.17 Vatsetis's plans were vague and preliminary: little had been accomplished before his removal from the post of Commander- in-Chief in the first week in July 1919. To credit Vatsetis with the original idea for what eventually proved the successful strategy is not to achieve very much. It was clearly not the disgraced Vatsetis who was responsible for 15 Grazhdanskaia voina (1966), v. 2, p. 170. 16 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 203. 17 D.G.K.K.A., p. 433. 136 the adoption of his strategy in October 1919. Vatsetis's plan formed the basis of proposed changes to Kamenev's strategy that were to be advocated by Trotsky during September 1919. Budeimyi's cavalry was one of the few Red units to retain its corabat capacity throughout this period. It did what it could to cover the infantry in its northward retreat. Budennyi's cavalry contributed mightily to an important, if isolated, success for the Red Army's August offensive, with a raid in the second half of August 1919 that took it to the outskirts of Tsaritsyn, pushing back the Caucasus Army of the Whites led by Baron Wrangel.18 This greatly assisted the progress of the Tenth Army. But the success was short-lived. The Tenth Army was forced back by Wrangel's counterattack and, despite Budennyi's protests, the Cavalry Corps was shortly afterwards withdrawn to the rear to parry an expected eastward thrust by Mamontov. Budennyi's exploits did not go unnoticed. From this point his cavalry would occupy a much more prominent place in the plans of the Red Army's strategists.1 It was Trotsky who, in the first week in September 1919, first proposed the transfer of Budennyi's cavalry from the eastern flank of the South Front to Voronezh. Trotsky was a perceptive and persistent critic of Kamenev's strategy from the first and the vehemence of his attacks reflected lingering bitterness over the events that led to Kamenev's 18 Kliuev, Bor'ba za Tsaritsyn, p. 45. Grazhdanskaia voina (1966), V. 2, p. 160. 1" For example, see Trotsky's plan for the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi in D.G.K.K.A., p. 462. 137 appointment as Commander-in-Chief. Budennyi's cavalry came to Trotsky's attention dviring the abortive August offensive, when it led the Red Army advance towards Tsaritsyn. On 5 September 1919, in a telegram that was co-signed by two merabers of the railitary council of the South Front, Trotsky put forward his proposed regrouping of the Red Array facing Denikin. Trotsky was particularly disturbed by the raid of Mamontov's cavalry in the rear of the South Front and the failure of all efforts to liquidate it. Trotsky feared that Mamontov would appear in the Kursk-Voronezh sector and he argued that it was necessary toraove reserves to the west. In particular, he considered that the Ninth Army had to turn to the west while Budennyi had to be transferred to 'right-centre', that is, the Kursk-Voronezh area.20 Karaenev responded the next day by describing the proposals as amounting to 'a fundamental change in strategy', which had to be rejected.21 Lenin came to the aid of Karaenev, informing Trotsky of his 'astonishment at the 99 proposed changes to the already decided, basic plan'."''' The venom of Lenin's rebuff was to keep Trotsky quiet for a couple of weeks. Budennyi's cavalry remained where it was. Lenin was a loyal supporter of Coiranander-in-Chief, Kamenev, at this tirae. This was hardly surprising, given that Kamenev was essentially Lenin's choice as Commander-in-Chief d\u~ing 21 Ibid., pp. 464-65. 22 Ibid., p. 466. 138 the crisis that afflicted the high command during the summer. Throughout September 1919, Denikin continued to advance. Towards the end of that month, Trotsky penned a perceptive critique of Kamenev's strategy, in which he cited political, economic and geographical reasons for changing the axis of the attack against Denikin.23 Trotsky pointed out that, in attempting to cross the Don steppe, the Red Array was not only forced to contend with the Cossack's determination to defend his home but was consolidating the alliance between Denikin and the Cossacks. Better results could be expected if the axis of the advance was altered to the resource-rich Donbass region, with its scattered towns and mining settlements, and we11-developed rail and road networks. The urban population of the Donbass was more likely to sympathise with the Soviet government, while an advance through this region would also serve to drive a wedge between the Volunteer Army to the west and Cossack forces on the steppe. Cogent though this argument was, it could not persuade Kamenev to abandon his strategy. The evidence for the suggestion that Kamenev changed strategy in the last week in September 1919 is supposedly contained in the report prepared by the Commander-in-Chief for the plenary session of the Central Committee, which met on 26 September 1919. In fact, though, this report did not advocate a change in strategy. 23 No more precise date is given. Trotsky, How The Revolution Armed., v. 2, pp. 429-33. 139 It is true that Kamenev outlined an alternative strategy, which involved the transfer of troops from Shorin's Special Group to the area south of Moscow, where Denikin was becoming ever more threatening. Kamenev went so far as to suggest that neither strategy held any guarantee of success. He stopped a long way short of endorsing the alternative strategy. He argued that there were major problems with it, not the least being that it would mean that the Red Army would be in a purely defensive mode, along an extensive front, without the necessary concentration to launch a counterattack. Kamenev also suggested that political concessions on the part of the Soviet government might be employed to buy some Cossack support. His conclusion was quite unambiguous, for he insisted that 'the most advisable decision is to retain the existing plan of action.' Nor was there any evidence of a change in strategy in the follow-up action taken by the Central Committee. It was decided that the threat to Moscow was such that its approaches would have to be reinforced. The reinforcements were not to come from Shorin's forces, but from the dormant West Front facing Poland.25 The Special Group retained its priority and, on 30 September 1919, it was upgraded in status to become a separate South East Front. On 1 October 1919, Kamenev reminded Shorin forcefully that 'the centre of gravity of the entire operation against Denikin rests on you'. As late as 3 October 1919 Lenin, in his speech to the workers of Petrograd, was still assuring his public that the 2^ -^^^^-^^y^ p_ ---^ 25 Ibid., pp. 478-79. 140 existing strategy was working and that there would be no change.26 In the week that followed, a dramatic change took place. By 7 October 1919, Kamenev was devoting most of his attention to the South Front and to discussions with its new commander, Alexander Egorov, about how to check Denikin in the Orel area. Shorin was informed that his sector no longer had priority and that he must go on the defensive. On 13 October 1919, Kamenev reminded Shorin that Therefore, I repeat italics mine ray instruction that in the area between the Don and the Volga you must have as your aim only the preservation of the existing position and the pinning down of those vinits of the enemy which are found there so that they cannot be transferred to other areas.2' If, on 13 October 1919, Kamenev was repeating to Shorin an earlier instruction for him to go on to the defensive then it must be assumed that the decision had been made some days before. What had caused Karaenev to change his position in the first week in October 1919? The answer lies in the failure of an attempt by Kamenev to revitalise the advance across the Don steppe with the aid of Budeimyi's cavalry. At the end of September 1919, Kamenev's strategy was plainly living on borrowed time, given that the threat to Moscow was growing daily. To vindicate his stubborn coramitraent to his strategy, a breakthrough on the Don steppe was required urgently. Kamenev's major initiative, in the 26 Ibid., p. 510. For an account of Lenin's support of the Kamenev strategy at the outset of October 1919, see S. Shishkin, '0 planakh bor'by s armiei Denikina', Voenno- istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 5, May 1971, p. 22. 27 D.G.K.K.A., p. 514, 141 days that followed the 26 September meeting of the Central Committee, centred aroimd a new plan of operations for Budeimyi's cavalry. The plan was for Budennyi to move to the south east, from where it was positioned in the Kazanskaia area, on the northern bank of the Don river and, in so doing, clear a path for the sluggish Ninth Army to cross the Don. The aim was to breathe life into the advance of the Special Group. Kamenev's plan came to nothing when Budenny failed to follow the new orders. Kamenev's chain-of-command was staffed for the most part by ex-Tsarist officers, but this did not mean that it fimctioned in copybook fashion. Subordinates did not always impleraent the orders that were handed down to them. Informal relationships also played their part. It was not Kamenev but his Chief-of-Staff, Lebedev, who first canvassed, on 28 September 1919, a change in raission for Budennyi with the South Front coraraander, Peter Egor'ev.28 Lebedev knew that there was a difficulty, in that the previous day Budennyi had received instructions frora Shorin to move in the opposite direction, to the north west, although he remarked that the latest reports suggested that Budennyi was dragging his feet in implementing the order. Lebedev wanted to know Egor'ev's opinion for Egor'ev was, in purely formal terras, Shorin's iraraediate superior. It was an arrangement that had not worked though, for Shorin had always acted with great independence and had connections with Kamenev's clique that Egor'ev lacked. In a rambling reply that Lebedev found difficult to follow, Egor'ev 28 KK.F'.K.A. , v.2, pp. 341-42. 142 appeared not to offer any objections of substance to the proposed change to Budeimyi's mission. At the same time, Egor'ev explained that he had doubts as to his ability to countermand an order given by the 'stubborn' Shorin. Egor'ev recommended that Lebedev, who knew Shorin personally, should be the one to negotiate with the Special Group commander.2^ This Lebedev did; but because of his conversation with Egor'ev the wording of his order to Shorin was vague. It stated only that it would be 'extremely desirable' for the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi to change coin-se to the south east and appeared to impose a condition that this should happen only if there was no danger of Budennyi becoming confused by on the new orders. ^ It would seem that Shorin simply ignored this piece of correspondence from Lebedev, for no order was sent to Budennyi on 28 or 29 September 1919. As a result, Karaenev himself had to dispatch an order to Shorin on 30 September 1919. By this tirae the situation had deteriorated for the Red Array because Denikin's Don Array had launched an unexpected attack, driving back the right flank of the Ninth Array. Kamenev now emphasised that it was 'absolutely necessary...(for) one more short, energetic blow of the Cavalry Corps to the south-east so that the Ninth Army can immediately be brought up to the Don'.31 The blow to the south east by the Cavalry Corps was not to take place. When Shorin that same day finally issued an order to Budennyi, in 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., pp. 478-79. 31 Ibid. 143 the spirit desired by Kamenev, the cavalryman refused to obey it. The relationship between Shorin and Budennyi was strained alraost from the first. As might be expected of the commander of a large, mobile force, Budennyi desired as much operational autonoray as possible. Earlier, on 8 Septeraber 1919 Budennyi had put forward his own ideas about how the Cavalry Corps should be eraployed. He wanted to make a new raid in the Tsaritsyn direction. This was unacceptable to Shorin who, acting on instructions from Kamenev, had ordered Budennyi to patrol the gap between the Eighth and the Ninth Armies, where it was feared that Mamontov might reappear. Budennyi coraplained bitterly to Shorin that the mission T9 allotted to him was 'pointless'.^'' A similar difference of opinion had arisen between the two, in connection with Shorin's 27 September 1919 order for the Cavalry Corps to move to the north west for the purpose of safeguarding the Special Group's left flank from Maraontov. Budennyi dragged his feet because he had no precise information as to the whereabouts of Mamontov and he was not much interested in guard duty.^3^3 On 30 September 1919, information was passed to Budenny frora neighbouring infantry units about a new raid by Mamontov's cavalrymen.3^ With Mamontov located, Budennyi was galvanised into action and the Cavalry Corps was made ready 32 F. Zhemantis, 'Polkovodcheskoe iskusstvo S. M. Budennogo', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal', no. 2, February, 1939, p. 54. 33 Evseev, Op. cit., p. 20. 3^* Budennyi, Proidennyi put', pp. 250-51. 144 for the chase. It was at this point that the new instructions from Shorin arrived, ordering Budennyi to abandon the pursuit of Mamontov and to turn to the south east, in accordance with the latest plan of Karaenev. Budennyi immediately got in touch with Shorin and the matter was debated. Whether Budeimyi's insubordination was as flagrant as he subsequently claimed or whether Shorin was eventually persuaded to sanction the cavalryman's intention, is unclear from the available evidence. The upshot was that, at the outset of October 1919, Budennyi was heading to the north west on the trail of the White cavalry. It was his intention to continue in that direction. In modern Soviet literature, there is no mention of Budenny's insubordination. The movement of the Cavalry Corps to the north west in pursuit of the White cavalry is described as if it was all in accordance with instructions issued from the centre. As one writer has put it, with the usual vagueness about how this situation had arisen. In order to put an end to the excesses and arbitrariness of the Mamontovites, it was decided to throw the Cavalry Corps under the coraraand of S. M. Budennyi against thera. This is unfortunate, not only because it distorts what actually happened, but because it leaves a large gap in the story of how Kamenev's strategy was changed. Budeimyi's actions had important consequences. They meant that Kamenev's last card in his desperate attempt to fashion a quick breakthrough across the Don steppe, would not be played. In the days that followed, Kamenev came to the 35 Agureev, Op. cit., p. 66. 145 conclusion that he would have to shelve his strategy for the tirae being, while measures were taken to defend the area south of Moscow. It would appear that Shorin did not wish to acknowledge to his superiors that Budennyi was no longer under his control. On 1 October 1919, when Shorin attempted to explain to Kamenev why it was that Budennyi was still moving to the north west, there was no mention of the cavalryman's insubordination. The irritated tone of Karaenev's reply reflected both his exasperation at the delays and the iraportance he attached to theraission allotte d to Budennyi. Kamenev complained to Shorin that: The centre of gravity of the entire front against Denikin rests on you. The decision to move the Ninth Array to the Don is unchanged. So too, the decision concerning theraovement o f the Cavalry Corps of Budennyi.36 Kamenev's instructions were unequivocal. Nevertheless, Shorin attempted a compromise solution. Obviously doubting his ability to rein in Budennyi, on 2 October 1919 Shorin encouraged the cavalryman to continue the pursuit of Mamontov, but not to proceed beyond the demarcation line separating the Eighth and Ninth Armies. This pleased no one, least of all Kamenev, who had now come to the conclusion that to issue fresh instructions to Budennyi would only lead to further insubordination. It is likely that Karaenev also feared that forcing the Cavalry Corps to turn back might have the effect of transforming Budennyi into a renegade, an outcome that had to be avoided at any cost. Resigning ^^ D.G.K.K.A., p. 510. 146 himself to what had happened, on 2 October 1919 Karaenev inforraed Shorin that he (Karaenev) was "very sad that you have implemented your orders in this way. Now there is nothing to be done except to sanction your decision'.^ At this point, Shorin must have reported to Kamenev the extent of Budeimyi's insubordination, for in his correspondence of 3 October 1919 Karaenev made mention of Budennyi having 'disobeyed' the 'clear instructions' of Shorin. Kamenev decided that Budennyi was to continue to pursue Mamontov, even though this would take the Cavalry Corps into the 'deep rear of the South Front'.38 Kamenev decided to salvage what he could from this debacle: if Budennyi could not be used to breathe life into the advance across the Don steppe, then it was best that he be allowed to deal with another of the Red Army's pressing problems, Mamontov. On 7 October 1919, Budennyi was to be formally transferred from Shorin's command to the South Front and his mission was confirmed as the pursuit and destruction of the White cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro.^3^9 In the first week in October 1919, the South Front experienced iraportant personnel changes. The able Egorov replaced the incompetent Egor'ev as commander. He was joined on the railitary coimcil of the South Front by Stalin, who had several tiraes already in the Civil War been employed as a troubleshooter by Lenin. On 7 October 1919, at the same time as Budennyi was transferred from Shorin to Egorov's 37 Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919, p. 152 38 D.G.K.K.A., p. 511. 39 D.K.F.K.A., V. 2, pp. 347-48. 147 South Front, Egorov discussed with Kamenev the employment of Kamenev's reserve, which had been formed from the reinforcements from the West Front, with the outcome being that a shock group was formed to the west of Orel as part of the Fourteenth Army. The Red Army regrouping that would prove so devastating to Denikin in the weeks to follow was now in place.^0 it was Budeimyi's insubordination that had brought it about. The reinforcement provided by Budeimyi's cavalry and Kamenev's reserve was to prove decisive in the South Front's war against Denikin. Up to that time, Denikin's forces, outnumbered by the Red Array but fighting with great spirit and skill, had made steady and sometimes spectacular progress. Now at Orel, Denikin's principal strike force, the Volunteer Army, was confronted by an enemy that was three times its size, with the Red Army holding an advantage of approximately 60,000 to 20,000 troops.^1 Not only that but Egorov's newly-formed 'shock group' contained some units of real quality, a Latvian Division and the 8th Cavalry Division. At the same time, the right flank of the Volimteer Army was about to come under pressure from a large mobile force, in the shape of Budeimyi's cavalry. What the South Front now had was an influx of new blood, which would prove decisive. Neither the various components of the shock group nor the Cavalry Corps had been demoralised by the continuous ^Oj^ istorii (1986), V. 2, p. 165. D.G.K.F.K.A., pp. 481- 82. ^1 Grazhdanskaia voina (1963), p. 416. Denikin, The White Army, p. 332. 148 defeats that had been suffered by the armies of the South Front in summer and early autumn 1919. Shorin's command, now renamed as the South-East Front, formally lost its priority at the meeting of the Politburo on 15 October 1919. It was decided temporarily to transfer the South-East Front to the defensive with the task: a) not to allow Denikin to unite with the Don Cossacks; b) to free part of the force for the defence of Tula and Moscow.^2 Yet, as an indignant Kamenev was to respond some days later, 'the situation already compelled us long before the directive was issued to go over in actual fact to the defensive (in a strategic sense) on the South-East Front'.^3 What Kamenev did not report was that Budeimyi's insubordination had left him with no choice. It is ironic, in view of the controversy that would later erupt about the authorship of the crucial regrouping that brought about the change in fortunes in the war in south Russia, that neither Kamenev nor Egorov had any inkling at first that the new configuration of the Red Array south of Moscow would lead in a matter of weeks to Denikin's precipitate retreat. Egorov acknowledged this point in his latter-day account, emphasising that the blows at Orel and Voronezh were conceived as quite separate operations, with the limited aim of checking Denikin's advance on Moscow. Karaenev clearly regarded the regrouping as a teraporary correction, not a wholesale abandonment of his earlier ^2 -^-^^^^^^y^ p^ ^46^ ^3 Trotsky Papers, v. 1, p. 715. ^^ Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919, p.152. 149 strategy. He was waiting his chance to reactivate his original strategy. The regrouping had long been advocated by Trotsky but his arguments, whatever their merit, had not brought it about. The regrouping emerged in piecemeal fashion, triggered by Budeimyi's refusal to act in accordance with the instructions of Shorin. To Kamenev's great surprise, Budeimyi's short-term correction proved decisive in its own right. Egorov's latter-day assessment was that what Budenny had done was much needed in the circumsteinces, although such acts of insubordination could not really be recommended to aspiring Red Army commanders.^5 j^ analysing Budeimyi's action, it would be impossible to make the case that the cavalryraan was in possession of sufficient information to take into account the strategic situation of the entire front. His vision was limited by his location. Budennyi has to be credited with a flair for selecting a task which was clearly of great significance and to which his cavalry was well suited. As things turned out, it was just the action that was required to raise the Red Army from its torpor. Budennyi did well out of this episode. He was extremely pleased at the appointments of Egorov and Stalin, whom he knew from Tsaritsyn. Greetings and congratulations were exchanged between the headquarters of the South Front and the Cavalry Corps. More importantly, Budennyi received the mission he wanted; and Egorov was to be as generous as he could be with his resource allocation, immediately confirming an earlier decision raade by Kamenev to allow ^5 ibid7, J). 180. 150 Budennyi to take control of some of the cavalry of the Eighth Array as well as an infantry battalion. Nor was Budennyi pvmished for his insubordination even when, by 3 October 1919, Karaenev had learnt from Shorin the substance of it. Kamenev's conclusion was that the problems had arisen because of 'repeated changes of orders'. 6 This was an assessment which had the advantage of absolving Karaenev from the duty of rebuking the cavalryman. The Volunteers captured Orel on 13 October 1919. Thereafter their northward advance ground to a halt. Egorov had hoped to use the shock group to attack the base of the wedge of Denikin's northward thrust. Due to the urgent need to stem the White tide, it was sent in quickly in a frontal assault against the White forces at Orel.^7 This was messy and the battles were bloody; but the new combination of quantity and quality in the Red Army did its job. The White advance along the railroad, from Orel to Tula, faltered. The coimterblows of Egorov's shock group would cause the Volunteers to abandon Orel on 20 October 1919, though fierce fighting would continue in the Kromy area for more than a week. No less dramatic were events on the Volvmteers' right flank, where Budennyi occupied Voronezh on 24 October 1919, evicting in the process Denikin's other main strike force, the cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro. Budennyi foimd himself perched above the vulnerable junction of Denikin's Volimteer and Don Armies. The Volimteer Array was now under extreme ^6 D.G-K.K.A., p. 511. ^7 Egorov, Razgrom Denikina 1919, pp. 174-76. 151 pressure on two sides. It would soon become clear that its principal task was no longer the captin-e of Moscow, but to prevent its own encirclement. In the literature of the Khrushchev era, it was argued that the importance accorded in earlier Soviet literature to the blow delivered to Denikin's forces by Budeimyi's cavalry at Voronezh-Kastomaia had been exaggerated, because this was auxiliary to the main blow which was struck at Orel. As one recent Soviet account has put it, 'the Voronezh- Kastomaia operation facilitated the defeat of the Volunteer Army in the Orel-Kursk operation of 1919.^8 This suggests that it was in the fighting at Orel and Kursk that the Volimteer Army received its mortal woimds. In reality, the two blows were complementary: each was indispensible to the success of the Red Army counterattack. It is true that the forces involved at Orel were larger. But the blow delivered at Voronezh-Kastornoe was arguably even more important, for both strategic and psychological reasons. In one blow, Denikin lost his majorraobile strik e force and foimd the right flank of his Volunteer Army exposed to Budenny. Now the Volunteers would come under attack frora two directions. It was Budennyi who made the Whites fear for their rear and who caused what was at first an orderly retreat to become a precipitate rout. Perhaps the clearest description of what happened was provided by Rakovskii, a White journalist, who described how Budeimyi's rapid movement 46 For example, Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 115, 152 southwards, in November and December 1919, caused first one White army and then the other to retreat. Meanwhile, Budennyi using the tiredness and lowered spirits of the enemy, acted systematically and methodically, bringing blow after blow directly on Kharkov from Kupiansk in the gap between the right flank of the Volunteer Army and the left of the Don Array, threatening all the while the rear of the Volunteer Array and forcing it to retreat. At the same tirae, the Don Array, even though it was not directly threatened by Budennyi, had to retreat because 'the coraraand of the Don Army had to reckon with the possibility that one fine day Budeimyi's cavalry might turn to the east and into its rear'. In describing the turmoil within the Red Army command, about the strategy to be employed against Denikin, writers in the West have usually concluded the story in mid-October 1919, once the blows to be delivered at Orel and Voronezh had been prepared. The conflict that was to take place, in November and December 1919, has been downplayed and described, if at all, as a mere squabble over resources between the South and South-East Fronts.5° This was not the case, for the debate over strategy was rekindled in November and December 1919. The easing of the threat to Moscow, in the second half of October 1919, meant that the advance across the Don steppe by Shorin's South-East Front could resume. Karaenev switched the South-East Front to the defensive, following Budeimyi's insubordination, only with great reluctance. Even ^9 Rakovskii, Op. cit., pp. 26-27. 50 See, for example, Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander., p. 60. 153 on 14 October 1919, when he received a report of some recent progress made by Shorin towards Tsaritsyn, Kamenev urged that the operation continue for a few days. Obviously Kamenev was still hoping against hope that Shorin could make the breakthrough. It has to be remembered that the Politburo decision of 15 October 1919 had described the switching of the South-East Front to the defensive as a 'temporary' measure. In November 1919, Kamenev and his allies attempted to revive the strategy that had been suspended the previous month. Precisely why this group was so committed to the failed strategy is impossible to know. Trotsky later suggested that Karaenev 'in consonance with Napoleon's maxira, had apparently hoped, by persisting in his error, to derive from it all possible advantages, and in the end to secure victory'.51 They were to be thwarted in their efforts by the coraraand of the South Front, which demanded a new strategy of striking directly to the south through the Donbass, just as Trotsky and Vatsetis had done. Unlike Trotsky and Vatsetis, Egorov and Stalin were in a position to challenge Kamenev and to do so effectively. As early as 20 October 1919, Kamenev discussed with Shorin the possibility of renewing the South-East Front's advance. In Kamenev's opinion, the situation improved to the point where there existed 'a very suitable moment for tearing the initiative from the hands of the opponent in the south east as well'. In an enthusiastic reply, Shorin 51 Trotsky, Stalin., v. 2, p. 117. 154 pointed out that this would require priority for his sector over the South Front in the allocation of resources.52 The matter was viewed rather differently in the headquarters of the South Front, where it was considered that the successes in the area south of Moscow should be developed into a full-scale advance across the Donbass to the Sea of Azov. Egorov and Stalin's plans were becoming more ambitious. On 20 October 1919, orders were issued calling for coordinated blows against the flanks of the Volunteer Army with the shock group at Orel and Budeimyi's cavalry to converge in the Kursk direction, thereby cutting the Volunteers' line of retreat.53 These plans assumed a heavy work load for Budeimyi's cavalry. It was partly for this reason that Budeimyi's proposal, made after the occupation of Voronezh by the Cavalry Corps, on 24 October 1919, for his command to be expanded into a 'cavalry army' was looked upon more than favourably. By the first week in Noveraber 1919, Gusev and Smilga, both members of the military council of the South-East Front and close allies of Kamenev, were putting the case to the political leadership for the resumption of the advance across the Don steppe. On 3 November 1919, they insisted to the Central Committee that 'the South-East Front remains the main and decisive theatre.'^^ On 5 and 12 Noveraber 1919, Stalin put the case for the South Front in two telegrams to 52 -----j^-j- - ^^g^ 53 D.K.F.K.A., v. 2, pp. 360-61. 5^ N. Kuz'min, 'Rukovodstvo V. I. Lenina vooruzhenoi zashchitoi Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva (1918-1920 gg.)', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal', no. 5, May, 1969, p. 8. 155 the Central Committee. At the same time, Stalin wrote a personal letter to Lenin, which was to become famous when his hagiographers subsequently antedated it to October 1919 so as to demonstrate that it was Stalin who had been responsible for the initial Red Army regrouping. By the first week in November 1919, the debate was acriraonious. Stalin coraplained that Kamenev and the Field Staff were guilty of unjustified personal attacks on the competence of Egorov.55 Stalin was more than capable of hurling abuse of his own, at one point labelling Gusev as the 'strategic cockerel' who was 'the chief instigator against the South Front'.56 Stalin is often caricatm~ed as a poker-faced intriguer; but his correspondence here was forthright and agitated. Stalin put the case for the South Front most eloquently in his letter to Lenin. He repeated the political, geographic and economic arguments for a change in strategy, put forward earlier by Trotsky. He pointed to the fact that what he described as the 'basic' forces of the South Front, the Eighth Army and the Cavalry Corps, were perched directly above the Donbass and were ready to move directly south to Rostov. According to Stalin, the only reason that his opponents were hanging on to the old strategy was 'factionalism, the most stupid and the most dangerous for the Republic'.57 55 Trotsky Papers, v. 1, p. 246. 56 Voroshilov, Op. cit., p. 33. 57 Ibid. 156 The Politburo finally adjudicated on the dispute at its meeting of 14 Noveraber 1919. In Western literature, this raeeting is usually described as having represented a defeat for Stalin and indeed Stalin was rebuked for his habit of 'putting business deraands in the form of ultimata.58 Nevertheless, on the substantial issue, that of strategy, there was a clear victory for the South Front. It was decided that Kamenev should be presented with a political-economic directive about the necessity of taking Kursk and of advancing towards Kharkov and the Donbass, and about an allocation of reinforcements to the South and South-East Fronts which corresponds to this directive.59 The objectives that were given priority by the Politburo, that is, Kursk, Kharkov and the Donbass, were those advocated by the South Front. In the ensuing weeks the South Front was to receive the lion's share of the available reinforcements.6^ Shortly afterwards, on 17 Noveraber 1919, the decision was taken by the RVSR to rename the Cavalry Corps as the First Cavalry Army; but not to add the 8th Cavalry Division to it. The First Cavalry Army was to comprise the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, as well as the tiny 11th Cavalry Division which formerly belonged to the Eighth Army and had already been placed under Budeimyi's command during the fighting at Voronezh. As was customary in the Red Army, a fully-fledged army had to have a military council at its 56 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, p. 179. 59 D.G.K.K.A., p. 466. 60 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, p. 179. 157 head. Joining Budennyi on the military council of the First Cavalry Army were Voroshilov and Shchadenko. The rejection of the South Front's proposal to expand Budenny's coiranand by adding to it the 8th Cavalry Division in part reflected scepticism about an experimental cavalry army, but also it pointed to divisions within the Red Army coraraand at this time. Neither Trotsky's nor Kamenev's factions had much tirae for the personnel of the South Front. It must have seemed that the Politburo decision of 14 Noveraber 1919 had settled the debate about strategy and had prepared the way for greater cooperation within the Red Army command. Yet remarkably, the debate and the turmoil continued. The Comraander-in-Chief did not attend the Politburo meeting; and the task was given to Lenin to explain the decision to him. Kamenev must have succeeded in persuading Lenin to accept a rather broad construction on what the Politburo directive actually meant, for his orders of 17 and 23 November 1919 were at variance with it. Kamenev set as the principal objective of the forces facing Denikin the capture of Pavlovsk, which was clearly to the east of the Donbass. Responsibility for striking the chief blow was to rest with the Eighth and Ninth Armies, that is the left flank of the South Front and the right flank of the South- East Front.61 No objection to any of this appears to have been forthcoming frora the headquarters of the South Front, perhaps because Egorov and Stalin had already obtained the resource allocation they required. In any case, the 61^ D7G.K. K.A., p ^ 468. 158 remaining forces of the South Front were free to push forward in the preferred Donbass direction. Even so, as modem Soviet writers have acknowledged, grave difficulties were involved in the coordination of a main blow by the flanks of two separate fronts.62 This was especially the case, given that the personnel in the two front headquarters were not on speaking terms with each other. While Kamenev was now counting upon the Eighth and Ninth Armies operating in the Pavlovsk direction, Egorov and Stalin were counting upon the First Cavalry Army to cut Denikin's front in two with its rapid southward thrust. Egorov had actually taken resources, in the shape of an infantry division, away from the Eighth Army, to give to Budennyi. Grigorii Sokol'nikov, the Eighth Army commander, complained bitterly that his coraraand was lacking in resources, given the important tasks that Kamenev had entrusted to it. Egorov responded by informing Sokol'nikov that the decision would have to stand because of the vital role that Budeimyi's cavalry had to play. Sokol'nikov was reminded that if the neighbouring armies can succeed in paralysing the eneray forces acting against them, then comrade Budeimyi's manoeuvre can lead directly to a splitting off of the Don Army from the Volunteer Army whose main force is still operating to the west of the Poposnaia-Tagonrog meridian. Budeimyi's cavalry was vital to the Red Army's rapid southward advance in December 1919. This is not to deny that substantial contributions were made by the other armies. The 62 Grazhdanskaia voina (1966), v.2, p. 165. 63 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 364. 159 Eighth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Ninth and Tenth Armies could each point to important successes. Nevertheless, in the accounts provided by observers who had no interest in the conflicts within the Red command, a clear consensus emerged that the greatest damage to the Whites was done by Budeimyi's cavalry. Kakurin, the most respected Soviet military historian of the 1920's, described Budeimyi's cavalry as the wedge that pierced Denikin's armies in the centre and caused them to fall back.6^ In his latter-day account, Denikin also described Budeimyi's cavalry as a 'wedge' that triggered his retreat. As Denikin put it: Budeimyi's 'shock' Red group had driven a deep wedge between the Don and Volunteer Armies. The latter, hard-pressed by an enemy of treble its own strength was for the past two months retreating from Orel to Kharkov (four hundred and fifty kilometres) and beyond, all the while parrying heavy blows, manoeuvring and counter attacking, losing fifty per cent of its man-power in the process.65 Neither Soviet nor Western writers have noted the fact that the achievements of Budeimyi's cavalry received scant recognition from the centre at the time. The First Cavalry Army came under particularly close scrutiny from Kamenev, who was not satisfied with the tempo of the advance. On 8 December 1919, Kamenev complained to Egorov that, having failed 'to deliver a quick and decisive blow the concentration of so powerful a cavalry group loses all sense'.66 6^ Kakurin, Kak srazhalas' revoliutsiia. v. 2., p. 363. 65 Denikin, The White Army, p. 332. 66 D.G.K.K.A., p. 490. 160 Egorov and Stalin quickly came to the aid of their beleagured protege, the next day itemising for Kamenev the most recent successes of the First Cavalry Army. Kamenev's criticisms were unfair, for it was not difficult to find the reason for the relatively slow progress of the cavalrymen since the capture of Kastomaia in mid-November 1919. Denikin was counting on a breakthrough of his own in the 'Voronezh-Kharkov area' and for this purpose had massed his remaining cavalry in the vicinity of Novyi Oskol'. As Denikin was to recall later, his intention was for his reassembled cavalry, now under the command of Ulagai, to defeat Budennyi, thereby to open up the flanks of the Red Eighth and Thirteenth Armies.67 Ulagai was unable to defeat Budennyi at Novyi Oskol'; but he certainly slowed the Red cavalry's progress. It was not until the second week in December 1919, that Budennyi succeeded in clearing this hurdle, in the process opening up the southward route through the Donbass. According to Budennyi, Stalin warned the cavalrymen, early in December 1919, that there were those in the centre who had no wish to see the First Cavalry Army succeed.68 The tempo of the Red Army's advance quickened, as Denikin's forces began to crumble. There were two Red Army strategies in competition at this time. By the second week in Deceraber 1919, the advance guard of the South Front was in the vicinity of Kharkov. On 12 Deceraber 1919, Egorov and Stalin issued new instructions. The key element was to be a 67 Dienikin, The White Army, p. 329. 68 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 336. 161 lightning advance by the First Cavalry Army, to cut off Denikin's escape route to the north Caucasus. Egorov stressed that 'the whole success of the operation depends upon the speed and decisiveness of the Konarmiia'.69 On the other hand, Kamenev rarely mentioned the First Cavalry Army, except to chide Budennyi for excessive tardiness. As he saw the war against Denikin, the Eighth and the Ninth Armies were to decide the issue. On 18 December 1919, Kamenev insisted to Shorin that now, 'the right flank of the Ninth Army and the left flank of the Eighth Army are delivering the main blow. This direction has the greatest significance for the entire operation against Denikin'. 70 Fortunately for the Red Army, Denikin by this stage was in no state to take advantage of divisions within its coraraand. Despite having had to cover more ground than its neighbouring armies, the First Cavalry Army was outstripping them in the race to the Sea of Azov. The momentum of the advance did not slacken. Budennyi crossed the last major natural barrier, the Northern Donets river, on 23 December 1919. Four days later, he occupied Bakhmut, in the heart of the Donbass. By the end of the first week in January 1920, the First Cavalry Army had reached Taganrog, formerly the site of Denikin's headquarters, and Rostov, the Whites' main base in the Don Cossack lands. Denikin was unable to reestablish a stable defensive line untilraid-January 1920 , by which time the main body of his forces had retreated 69 --j^-p^j^j^^ :^^ 2, p. 384. 70 D.G.K.K.A., p. 524. 162 beyond the lower Don river, while those trapped farther to the west had taken refuge in the Crimea.71 It was not \mtil 2 January 1920, that Kamenev finally felt obliged to acknowledge 'the important successes of the Konarmiia and the Thirteenth Army in the Donbass.'72 At just about the same time as the First Cavalry Army entered Rostov, the advance guard of the Eighth Army, a newly-formed Cavalry Corps imder the command of a revitalised Dumenko, occupied the Don Cossack capital of Novocherkassk, to the north of Rostov. Although the Red Army did not succeed in encircling and destroying the main bulk of Denikin's forces because the latter fell back much too quickly for this to occur, in the space of seven weeks Denikin had been forced to surrender all the territory that he had gained in the course of 1919. It is true that Denikin's forces in the north Caucasus would hold out until April 1920 and those in the Crimea imtil Noveraber 1920; but never again were the Whites to represent a serious threat to central Russia. While the tempo of the advance had not been quick enough to lead to the encirclement of Denikin's basic force, it had been sufficient to split the latter in two, setting up the crowning victories that were to be achieved in the north Caucasus and the Crimea in 1920. Egorov and Stalin had gambled on the konnoarmeitsy. The gamble clearly paid off when the First Cavalry Army led the Red Army into Rostov, in early January 1920. The cavalry commanders viewed the achievement as a vindication of all 1 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2., pp. 211-13. 72 D.G.K.K.A., p. 493. 163 their efforts. Budennyi and Voroshilov immediately dispatched a congratulatory telegram to Lenin, outlining their successes. A copy of the telegram, dated 11 January 1920, was sent to Egorov and Stalin. There was no copy for Kamenev. The commands of the First Cavalry Army and the South Front exchanged their own congratulatory correspondence as we11.73 The collapse of Denikin's White Army was not brought about solely by the efforts of the Red Army. Denikin had all sorts of problems, many of them political. One historian of the White movement considered that Denikin failed chiefly because he could not build the political institutions that were needed for success.7^ He could not win the confidence of the peasants, who viewed the Whites, with good reason, as supporters of the former landowners. While the Red Army extracted resources at a great rate from the peasantry, the White Array was just as exploitative and may even have been more demanding. Under the circumstances, it is generally believed that the Whites were more corrupt andraore pron e to looting than were the Reds. 5 Denikin had the problem of an unstable rear: some of his troops had to be employed fighting Makhno in the Ukraine and dealing with unrest in the Kuban. For all that, Denikin made enormous strides during 1919, because he had an effective array. It was made more effective 73 Kak myi osvobodili Rostov, pp. 32-33. 7^ P. Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, 1919-1920: The Defeat of the Whites (Berkely, 1977), pp. 18-22. 75 Ibid., p. 23. 164 by the Red Army's strategic mistakes. Viewed in this light, it is clear that the change in Red Army strategy and the lightning advance through the Donbass, in December 1919, were crucial events in the history of the Civil War. Though many contributions were made to the successful coxmterattack against Denikin, there were none that could claim a greater part in the triumph than the konnoarmeitsy and their allies in the headquarters of the South Front. Once the initial threat to Moscow had passed, if Kamenev had been allowed simply to reactivate his original strategy, the Red Army would once again have become bogged down, while trying to cross the Don steppe. This in turn would have enabled Denikin to regroup and counterattack. Even in December 1919, with Denikin's forces in full retreat in the Donbass, Shorin's Ninth and Tenth Armies were still experiencing difficulties in crossing the Don steppe. On 18 December 1919, Kamenev was still castigating Shorin over a succession of setbacks and delays. Shorin did not succeed in recapturing Tsaritsyn imtil 3 January 1920, just four days before Budennyi entered Rostov, a good 300 kilometres farther to the south west and the target that Kamenev had set for Shorin way back in July 1919. In general, the conflict examined here supports the model of conflict within the Red Army in the Civil War that was described by Colton. Splits occurred not between politicians and the soldiers, but between mixed groups of politicians and soldiers who represented different sectors, that is centre, front and army commands, brought into 76 D.G-K.K.A., pp. 525-28. 165 conflict at a time of acute crisis in the campaign by a dispute about strategy and resources. While it might be thought that in such disputes the centre, with its broader perspective would have the stronger argument, this was not the case. The crucial change in strategy that represented the turning point in the war against Denikin was not, as Soviet literature suggests, due to the Red Army's central planners. It came about in spite of Kamenev's pleuis; and its final shape represented the points of view and decisions of the front line, not the centre. The change was not masterminded by any particular individual, but came about as a result of bitter debate and turmoil within the command, chiefly through the decisions of front-line coramanders whose actions were sometimes in direct defiance of the central planners. The outcome of the conflict was a victory for the front line over the centre and for good sense over a failed idea. Egorov is a much-raaligned figure in the history of the Red Army in the Civil War. Many have doubted his military ability and others have seen him as a pliant puppet under the control of Stalin. Kamenev opposed Egorov's promotion to South Front commander, writing to Trotsky that 'because of his personal characteristics he will hardly be able to cope with such a difficult task as the management of two 77 armies'.'' It is difficult to understand why Kamenev arrived at that judgement. Egorov had performed creditably as commander of the Tenth Army. He had shown that he had a logical 77 KG.k.k.A., p. 464. 166 military mind: it was Egorov who, in August 1918, had proposed the centralisation of the Red Array's coraraand and 7fl the setting up of the position of Commander-in-Chief. As South-Front commander, Egorov controlled his troops well and he clearly foresaw the role that would be played by Budeimyi's cavalry. It raay have been that Kamenev opposed Egorov's promotion because it was first proposed by Trotsky, who at that stage was Kamenev's most trenchant critic. Any fair-minded assessment of the last three months of 1919 must call into question not the ability of Egorov but of Karaenev and Shorin. Karaenev was having troubleraaking the transition from successful East-Front commander to Commander-in-Chief. He had been trained in the Tsarist General Staff but in World War One his rank had only been that of a Tsarist colonel. It seems that he was easy to get along with, especially for those who belonged to his circle. There is no doubt that at times he proved a shrewd military analyst. On other occasions, he seeraed overwhelmed by his new-found responsibilities. His stubborn comraitraent to a failed strategy and an undervaluation of the role of Budeimyi's cavalry could have been disastrous had it not been for the opposition he encountered in the shape of Egorov, Stalin and Budennyi. This group of Red Army personnel, based around Stalin and the First Cavalry Army, are usually portrayed in Western literature and, increasingly, in modern Soviet literature, as troublemakers. Erickson noted that the First Cavalry Army 78Ibid., pp. 51-53. 167 had an iinrivalled 'battlefield record' in the Civil War, but that this was tarnished by its insubordinate, even sinister command, 'that scheming triumvirate of war and politics- Stalin, Voroshilov and Budenny'.79 it is true that this group had a keen understanding of their sectional interests and were only too willing to fight with superiors or colleagues within the coraraand over issues of strategy, resources and the like. On occasions they could be plain insubordinate. But this has to be understood in its context. It was not a case of Stalin, Voroshilov and Budennyi, with their conflict-prone behaviour generating discord in a Red Army where none existed before. Because of the presence at the front of Party workers, unrestrained by military discipline, and because there was so much to fight about in a war of moveraent, waged with scarce resources, severe conflict was a fact of life in the Red Army in the Civil War. Karaenev and his allies defied Vatsetis in spring and summer 1919 and eventually brought about his removal in a debate about strategy in the east. Gusev and Smilga in the debate about strategy in the south, in November 1919, were just as asssertive in fighting for the interests of their sector as Stalin was in advocating the interests of his. Nor was it the case that this type of conflict inevitably exerted a negative influence upon the Red Army's campaigns. In the strategy debate examined above, the insubordination of Budennyi and the persistent opposition of Egorov and Stalin to Kamenev's strategy exercised an enormous and, for the Red Army, a positive influence upon the campaign. 79 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 67. 168 The close relationship that developed between Stalin and the cavalrymen during this campaign should not be taken as evidence that the First Cavalry Army was, as one writer has put it, 'virtually Stalin's private army'.80 Stalin and Egorov were instruraental in the First Cavalry Army coming into existence; and they looked upon it in theraonths that followed as their special project. In the war against Denikin in 1919-20 and six months later in the campaign against Poland in 1920, Stalin and Egorov led the front military councils that controlled the First Cavalry Army; and they maintained a special relationship with the konnoarmeitsy. This was hardly surprising, given that the First Cavalry Array in each case represented the chief strike force of the fronts in question. They were generous to Budennyi in terras of resource allocations and they protected him from attacks that originated elsewhere in the Red Army chain of command. On a number of occasions, Budennyi would look to high-level assistance from Stalin during times of conflict with his superiors. It could certainly be said that Budennyi enjoyed the patronage of Stalin. But Stalin did not exert control over the First Cavalry Army for his own private purposes, whatever they might have been. Budennyi was an independent-rainded commander, with a thirst for operational autonomy. He had a predilection for ignoring orders that he did not like and it did not matter to him from whom the orders came. For example, Budennyi diregarded the order from Egorov and Stalin to laimch an This is Zamoyski's phrase but the inference is widespread in Western literature. Zamoyski, Op. cit., p. 59. 169 immediate attack on Voronezh on 18 October 1919, preferring instead to take up defensive positions. Years later Budennyi was still commenting upon the stupidity of this order and pondering whether it did not reflect the fact that 'Trotsky's placemen' still had some influence in the headquarters of the South Front at that time.81 81 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 270-71. 170 Chapter Five: The Road To Maikop October 1919-April 1920 As we have seen, Budeimyi's cavalry was a vital ingredient in the Red Army's successful coxmteroftensive against Denikin in the last three raonths of 1919. But so far, not all of the contribution of the First Cavalry Array to the war against Denikin has been described or accounted for. The actual battlefield experience during those three raonths is worthy of more detailed consideration. Moreover, the war against Denikin did not end with the Red Army's capture of Rostov in January 1920. The role of the First Cavalry Army in the fighting in the north Caucasus that led to the final defeat of Denikin in April 1920 requires assessment. It would be misleading to suggest that the First Cavalry Array knew only victory in the final sixraonths o f the war against Denikin. In between the triumphs of the last quarter of 1919 and the period after mid-February 1920, Budennyi's cavalry was subjected to its greatest battlefield defeat in the second half of January 1920. There were some things that the First Cavalry Army did well and others not so well and the defeats as well as the victories need to be examined. Trotsky's triumphant exclamation that 'Budennyi has defeated Mamontov and Shkuro!'1 made on 25 October 1919, betrayed his amazement as much as his relief emd pleasure at the turn of events, when the previous day Budennyi had 1 Trotsky, How the Revolution Armed, v. 2, p. 437. 171 driven the White cavalry from Voronezh. If Budeimyi's cavalry had done nothing else in the Civil War other than make this contribution to the turnaround in the fortimes of the Red Army, when the Civil War had reached its crisis point in auturan 1919, it would still have justifiably been counted araong the star performers in the Red Army. These were not massive battles. Piles of corpses were not the order of the day. Nor were there any collisions of walls of charging cavalry. Mounted charges took place; but these were seldom decisive in their own right. Instead, Budeimyi's cavalry wore down its opponents in almost daily encounters that lasted over a period of four weeks. Defensive operations, dismounted attacks and support from neighbouring infantry units were more typical of the fighting than attacks on horseback. What modem Soviet literature describes as the 'Voronezh-Kastorn«oe operation' got under way on 14 October 1919, with an initial skirmish between Budennyi's cavalry and the White cavalry of Mamontov and Shkuro on the outskirts of Voronezh. It ended on 16 November 1919, when units of White infantry and cavalry abandoned Kastom^Spi. Like all major battles, the fighting at Voronezh-Kastome*a gave rise to a number of myths. A Soviet myth was that Budennyi completely crushed the White cavalry at Voronezh-Kastornoe. This was an exaggeration, for the White cavalry continued to put up resistance in the months that followed. Denikin was able to raise a 10,000-strong mounted force to oppose Budennyi in the second half of November 1919. The White cavalry was not 172 yet dead. Another myth was that Budeimyi's triumph at Voronezh-Kastornoe reflected overwhelming Red numerical superiority. According to Shkuro, Budennyi enjoyed a three- to-one advantage, 15,000 to 5,000 sabres.2 This is also misleading. It is true that Budennyi found the White cavalry in a weakened state. The Whites were seemingly disadvantaged too in that first Mamontov and then Shkuro found it necessary to retire to the rear in the course of the fighting at Voronezh-Kastornoe. At the same time, it is worth noting that the White cavalry actually put up stiffer resistance in the first two weeks of November 1919 when Maraontov and Shkuro were not there. This was because the White cavalry at that tirae received a boost frora the infantry and artillery in Kastornaia. Mamontov's corps had once had a strength of 8,000-9,000 men but by mid-October 1919 this was down to 2,000 men, according to Denikin.3 This haerahorraging was brought about not by battle casualties, but by desertion, as the Don Cossacks rode off to the rear, with their booty from the raid. While Mamontov's corps was disintegrating, that of Shkuro's remained basically intact. Shkuro put the strength of his corps at 5,000 fighters, which is almost certainly an underestimate, given that the White cavalryman was attempting to deraonstrate a massive Red numerical superiority. The actual strength of Budennyi's cavalry was 2 Shkuro, Op.cit., p. 236. 3 Denikin, The White Army., p. 283. 173 more like 7,000 sabres.^ If this is compared to the combined strength of Mamontov and Shkmro's corps, it becomes clear that the Red and White cavalries were evenly matched in mid- October 1919, at least in terms of sabres. But this was not just a contest of cavalry. According to one recently-published Soviet account, while cavalry numbers were about even, the Red Army enjoyed a ten-to-one numerical advantage in terms of infantry in the Voronezh area. There are no details as to how this figure was reached, but it would seem that it counted the entire Red Eighth Army of about 18,000 fighters when in fact only the 12th Infantry Division of less than 1200 fighters directly supported Budennyi at Voronezh.5 This was unlikely to have afforded Budennyi any significant numerical advantage, given that the White cavalry had the support of at least some infantry, although perhaps not the 2,000-strong force that was later claimed in Soviet literature. At Kastornoe, Budennyi had the support of the 42nd Infantry Division, which was about 4,000 fighters strong. This was unlikely to have tilted the numbers in favour of the Reds, because Denikin reinforced KastornOfia with infantry which Soviet sources estiraated at 5,000 strong.7 Modern Soviet writers put Budenny's strength in mid- October 1919 at 7600 sabres. Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 114. A contemporary estimate of his strength, including dismoimted fighters, was some 7,000 fighters at the begining of November 1919. D.K.F.K.A., v. 4., p. 108. 5 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2., p. 170. D.K.F.K.A., V.4, p. 109. 6 Evseev, Op. cit., p. 33. Shkuro, Op. cit. pp. 240-41, for evidence that there was sorae White infantry at Voronezh. 7 D.K.F.K.A., p. 108. Evseev, Op. cit., p. 82. 174 This figure may overestimate the numbers of White infantry; but again it would seem unlikely that there was any massive numerical advantage for the Red Army. At the same time, the Whites enjoyed the advantage of a strong defensive position, making good use of the firepower of their armoured trains. It was Budennyi who needed the advantage of numerical superiority, because it was he who had to carry the burden of the attack. The Voronezh-Kastornoe operation comprised four phases. In the first phase, it was Budennyi who made the crucial decision, at the outset of the fighting for Voronezh, not to attack the White positions, even though he had been ordered to do so by the command of the South Front.8 This was the clearest-possible sign that Budennyi had every confidence in his firepower to wreck a White attack. His confidence was justified because, in the early morning of 19 October 1919, the attack of Shkuro's cavalry, supported by armoured trains and some infantry, quickly petered out under the fire of Budeimyi's machine gunners. Budennyi was then able to send his mounted reserve into action, cutting off Shkuro's advance guard. At the end of the day, the Whites were back at their starting point and the initiative lay with Budennyi.10 He had won the first roimd. The second phase consisted in Budeimyi's attempts to cross the Voronezh river and to occupy Voronezh. For four days, Budennyi probed for a weak point. When the ^ D.k.F'.k.A., V. 2, p. 359. 9 Evseev, Op.cit., p. 50. 10 Ibid., pp. 37-39 175 breakthrough came, it was not through a mounted attack, but thanks largely to the efforts of the 6th Cavalry Divison, fighting dismounted and supported by the 12th Infantry Divison and the bulk of the artillery of the Cavalry Corps. Voronezh fell on 24 October 1919. As the Reds fought their way in, the Whites retreated to the west. An able commander, Budennyi was more often right than wrong. Yet in this case he miscalculated for it would seem that he had intended the actions of the 6th Cavalry and 12th Infantry Divisions as a diversion, to assist the 4th Cavalry Division to launch the main attack frora the north. It was with the 4th Cavalry Division that Budenny had positioned himself and his staff. As it turned out, the 4th Cavalry Division became bogged down and it was the 6th Cavalry Division, the planned feint, that made the initial breakthrough.11 In the course of the third phase, Budennyi crossed the next raajor water obstacle, the Don river. The Whites had established new defences on the western bank. This time, it was Budeimyi's 4th Cavalry Division that made the breakthrough. One observer recalled how the 4th Cavalry Division, with as much machine gun and artillery support as possible, was concentrated on a narrow section of the front, while the 6th Cavalry Division made diversionary attacks at other points along the river. The 4th Cavalry Division fought its way across: the crossing was completed by 1 Noveraber 1919.12 11 Ibid., pp. 46-47. Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 276-77. 12 Evseev, Op.cit., pp. 56-59. 176 The Whites now fell back on Kastomaia, which represented a more substantial barrier for Budeimyi's cavalry. This fourth phase of the Voronezh-Kastomaia operation was to prove the most difficult. In part this was because Kastomaia's defences comprised mainly infantry: 5000 infantrymen supported by about 4000 sabres according to Soviet figures.13 According to Budennyi, the main difficulties of his cavalry arose from the armoured trains that patrolled the perimeter of the railroad jimction at Kastornoe and rained down a deadly fire upon the attackers.1^ Once it became clear that Budennyi was having difficulty in traversing the 50 kilometres between the Don river and Kastornaia, the White cavalry took heart and foimd several opportunities to launch coxmterattacks. This is revealing: the White cavalry was becoming effective when it operated in close concert with infantry and artillery support. Budennyi was for a time deprived of infantry support: the 12th Infantry Division was under pressure from the south east to hold on to Voronezh and the expected assistance of the 42nd Infantry Division, which belonged to the Thirteenth Army to the north, had not yet materialised. Consequently, there was a virtual stalemate at Kastornaia until the 42nd Infantry Division's arrival on the scene on 14 November 1919. This caused the White defence to spread still more thinly and, as a result, it was more 13 Ibid., p. 82. 1^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 304. 177 susceptible to Budeimyi's manoeuvring. On 15 November 1919, Budennyi entered KastomffiiSi from the south, with the Whites evacuating in a westerly direction.15 While a substantial part of the White force made good its escape to the west from Kastomaoe, it was now demoralised. It soon became clear that it was in no shape to resist further advances by Budennyi. The latter-day judgement of Egorov was that the victory at Voronezh-Kastornoe owed a great deal to the cooperation of Red cavalry and infantry.16 There was a great deal of truth in this. The lesson Budennyi learnt from his difficulties at Kastomtfitt was that he needed permanent infantry support. In early December 1919, he demanded this and received it from Egorov. Thereafter, two infantry divisions, transported on carts, were the constant companions of the konnoarmeitsy. They assisted in the storming of White strongholds, acting as a pivot that could paralyse the enemy from the front, while the cavalry probed for openings in the flank or rear.-'-17 Casualty figures for the konnoarmeitsy at Voronezh- Kastornoe reflected the fighting style of Budennyi's cavalry. By avoiding suicidal charges, losses were kept to a miniraum. In repelling the White attack, on 19 October 1919 and thereby seizing the initiative, Budennyi suffered 146 casualties, including 44 dead. Another 150 casualties were 15 Evseev, Op.cit., pp. 88-93. 16 Egorov, Razgrom Denikina., p. 200. 17 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 363. 178 suffered in the storming of Kastornoe, between 14 and 16 November 1919.18 Considering that over 7,000 sabres were \mder his command, the losses for Budennyi in each of these encounters, the most significant of the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation, were not crippling. By 1 November 1919, half way through the Voronezh-Kastornoe operation, the strength of the Cavalry Corps was down to 6,900, from a peak of 7,600 at its start inraid-October 1919.19 -j^g losses were easily raade up. Voronezh-Kastornoe was certainly no Pyrrhic victory for Budennyi. In examining the rapid advance of Budeimyi's cavalry to the Sea of Azov, in the seven weeks that followed the capture of Kastornoe on 15 November 1919, it is not difficult to illustrate the importance of firepower to the First Cavalry Army. Budennyi has described how, on 30 November 1919, the Whites finally abandoned Novyi Oskol after a keenly-contested struggle: Making use of natural barriers the Whiteguards repelled our attacks for several hours. It was only towards evening when they came under intense artillery fire and the 4th Division's flank attacks that the enemy wavered.2^ The capture of Svatovo, on 16 December 1919, demonstrated how Budennyi received essential assistance from the firepower of neighbouring \mits, in this case the 18 Evseev, Op.cit., pp. 40-41, 93, 19 This, in any event is the conclusion to be drawn from the estimates of Budennyi's strength in Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 114. D.K.F.K.A., v. 4., p. 108. 20 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 324. 179 armoured trains that accompanied the konnoarmeitsy in the drive across the Donbass. According to Budennyi: When the Whites plastered the 4th Division with withering fire from their armoin-ed trains, our units dismoxmted and dropped flat on the ground. Meanwhile Shapovalov and his gunners drove into the station and began shelling the enemy armoured trains point blank. The (4th) division profited immediately from this and after a decisive forward thrust took the station.21 It was not just the skilful use of firepower and the close support of infantry and artillery, but the opportunity to manoeuvre that facilitated the success of the advance in the month before the capture of Rostov. Budeimyi's style, which he learnt frora the Whites, was to probe for a weak point in the eneray's defences. If he met resistance at one point, he was not deterred, but usually left a screen while 99 the rest of the force regrouped elsewhere.'''' The battle that took place north of Bakhmut, in the last week in December 1919, illustrated how the First Cavalry Army was able to manoeuvre. Budennyi used the 12th and 9th Infantry Divisions as decoys, to act as a magnet for the White forces in the Bakhmut area. The aim here was to allow the 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions to operate against the flanks and rear. Budennyi held the 4th Cavalry Division in reserve. The fighting on Christmas Day 1919 ended in stalemate. On 26 December 1919, Budennyi activated the 4th Cavalry 21 j^^j^; p;35^^; 22 For an assessraent of Budeimyi's skill in manoeuvring his forces from a neutral observer, see E. Farman, Jr., 'The Polish-Bolshevik Cavalry Campaigns of 1920', The Cavalry Journal, v.XXX, July, 1921, no. 124, p.231. 180 Division. Now Gorodovikov led his division into the rear of the Whites, operating against the 9th Infantry and 11th Cavalry Divisions. This drove a wedge between the White forces, causing thera to retreat.23 It is instructive to compare the breakthrough made by Budennyi with that of Mamontov two months earlier. Mamontov had raided the rear of the Red Array's South Front. The effect was not as great as itraight hav e been, because he chose easy targets for plunder, ahead of the railitary objectives set by Denikin. As a result, the northward movement of the infantry and the cavalry was in the end imcoordinated, despite initial promise. The Red Army had to divert forces; but the front could live with a few thousand pillaging Cossacks in the rear. It was a differentraatter wit h Budennyi in the rear of the Whites. In its southward advance, in Deceraber 1919, the First Cavalry Army avoided the large towns that it raight have occupied, such as Belgorod, Kharkov and Kuipansk, preferring instead to seek out and destroy enemy forces, especially the White cavalry. While Mamontov's Cossacks, at the moment of greatest military importance, had behaved like representatives of a social class in an advanced state of decay, Budeimyi's cavalry operated seemingly with its eyes firmly fixed upon the real prize, the crushing of the enemy's army. In Deceraber 1919, the problems of cold, hunger and care of the wounded as well as isolation from front coraraand proved raore intractable for the First Cavalry Army than the 23 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983)., p. 195. 181 resistance of the White cavalry. On 23 Deceraber 1919, Budennyi iteraised for South Front coraraander Egorov the main problems facing the cavalrymen: communications wi-th front headquarters were irregular, partly because of a shortage of signalmen; there was no sugar; most seriously, they had almost run out of cartridges; and they had outrun their maps. The cavalrymen complained that warm uniforms had been promised, but that as yet 'only telegrams and no uniforms' had arrived. As for forage, the First Cavalry Army came across barren country with the onset of winter. Budennyi remarked that most likely he would be leading a force of infantry before any assistance arrived frora the supply bases in the rear. Not the least of Budennyi's problems was the lack of mobile medical teams, with the result that care of the wounded was in an appalling state.24 These sorts of difficulty led to a great deal of bickering between array coramands about scarce resources. Budennyi coraplained to Egorov that the neighbouring Eighth and Thirteenth Armies did not do enough to tend to their own wounded, further overburdening the already inadequate medical services belonging to the First Cavalry Army. Not only that, but Budennyi accused the infantry coraraanders of body snatching, drafting konnoarmeitsy that had been sent away to hospitals in the rear once they had recovered. This type of squabble was to turn into bitter conflict, when resources of great value became available after the capture of Rostov. Control of Rostov was a matter of dispute between the commands of the First Cavalry and Eighth Armies. 2^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 358-63. 182 The cavalrymen arrived there first and imraediately appointed a town commandant, Alexander Parkhoraenko. He was another Tsaritsyn veteran and a close associate of Voroshilov who, with a revolutionary coraraittee, ran the town's affairs. Of the three raembers of this coraraittee, one was a cavalryman. The other two would not have been appointed \mless they had been on good terms with the command of the First Cavalry Army. One of the first duties of this coraraittee was toraake a n inventory of what was available in Rostov.25 Budennyi and Voroshilov fobbed off atterapts by the Eighth Army commander Sokol'nikov to claim a share in the occupation of Rostov.26 This rivalry between the two coraraands was to have disastrous consequences in the early operations against Denikin in the north Caucasus in the second half of January 1920. While food and forage were in short supply towards the end of 1919, the konnoarmeitsy were receiving larger and larger doses of political propaganda to sustain them in their endeavours. In December 1919, the First Cavalry Array's 97 own political departraent, or politdel, was established.'^' Eventually, each division would have its own political departraent. At squadron level and above, there were coramissars whose task originally was to supervise the commemder but who, increasingly, concerned theraselves with political education, the uncovering of morale problems and 25 s. Khnychev, 'Pervyi Revkom' in Kak myi osvobozhdali Rostov (Rostov, 1935), p. 106. 26 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 386-87. 27 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia. p. 8. 183 the build up of Party membership among the konnoarmeitsy. Voroshilov is usually described as having been the dominant figure in the political apparatus, which no doubt was true. Budennyi had always got on well with Voroshilov, whom he respected; and the latter's appointment to the military council of the First Cavalry Army created few, if any, problems. Stalin and Voroshilov got their way in having Budenny's alcoholic chief-of-staff and his long-time commissar replaced with their nominations for these posts but that was the end of any friction. Voroshilov acted as Budennyi's deputy commander and close advisor. With his standing in the Party, Voroshilov had connections with the political leadership that Budennyi lacked. As an experienced political organiser, one of Voroshilov's functions was to be the organization of the political education of the army: through the array newspaper, speeches, raeetings and the encouragement of recruitment to the Coramxmist Party. One of the principal weapons at the disposal of the political departraent was the array newspaper, Krasnyi kavalerist, which was set up with the aid of a printing press captured by the konnoarmeitsy when the Whites abandoned Voronezh in the last week in October 1919. This work was encouraged by Budennyi, who recognised its use to improve the fighting spirit of his konnoarmeitsy. Budennyi, the successful warrior of humble peasant origins and Voroshilov, the ex-metalworker and experienced Party man, were the ideal combination for coraraand positions in the 'workers and peasants' Red Army. 184 Party recruitment among the konnoarmeitsy began to gather pace with the arrival of Voroshilov and the establishment of the political departraent. In general, the number of party members was lower than in other armies in 1919. It would be some time before this situation changed. In October 1919, the five armies of the South Front had boasted 6,801 Party members and 8,024 sympathisers. In Budeimyi's Cavalry Corps in November 1919 there were only perhaps one hundred Party members. Many regiments had insufficient members or interest even to form regimental Party eel Is.28 The process of building up party membership was greatly aided by the work of energetic commissars, such as Bakhturov from the 3rd brigade of the 4th Cavalry division. By mid- March 1920, there would be 78 Party cells, 1605 members and 750 candidates, at a time when the army boasted a strength of over 9,000 sabres.29 This was part of a wider process of recruitment that was taking part in the Red Army at this tirae, with the nvunber of Party members increasing draraatically. In Fourteenth Army alone, some 11,153 new merabers were signed up during a 'Party week' that was held in Noveraber 1919.30 28 Agureev, Op. cit., p.87. V. Sidorov, 'Kommunisty 1-oi konnoi armii' Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 2., 1939. p. 62. 29 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia., p. 10. At this time the army boasted a strength of over 9000 fighters. 30 Agureev, Op. cit., p. 88. This in an array with with a total strength of about 27,000 fighters. D.K.F.K.A., v. 4., p. 108. 165 Political work in the army would reach fever pitch in April and May 1920, when the First Cavalry Array was journeying to the Polish front. At the outset of the campaign in the north Caucasus, this political work had not really had time to make an irapression. In mid-January 1920, the most pressing problem for the First Cavalry Army was strictly military, brought about by the fact that the conditions it now faced were very different to those in which it had made the successful advance of Deceraber 1919. Denikin was badlyraauled by the Red Array counterattack in the last two- and- a- half months of 1919; he would never again pose a threat to Moscow. Yet these White defeats did not signify the complete victory of the Red Array. Even when the Whites surrendered Rostov in the second week in January 1920, all was not yet lost for Denikin, because he could now establish a new defensive line along the Don and Manych rivers, while regrouping his forces in the north Caucasus. The fighting in the north Caucasus, in the first three months of 1920, has generated little interest in Western literature, but its obscurity is xmdeserved. This was by no means a walkover for the Red Army. Denikin would write later that it was this period that provided his best opportunity to covmterattack. The Red Army was now overextended after its rapid southward advance, just as the Whites had been three raonths earlier. A setback suffered by the Red Army on the lower Don river in the second half of January 1920 gave rise to renewed optimism in the White camp and a great deal of turmoil within the Red command. 186 At the outset of the fighting in the north Caucasus in January 1920, the dividing line between the two sides was the Don and Manych rivers, with Denikin's forces lined up along the southern bank of this waterway. In the area opposite Rostov, nearest the mouth of the Don river were the remneuits of Denikin's Volimteer Array, now known as the Volunteer Corps. To the east of the Volunteers, was the Don Array. Farther to the east again, was the relatively weak Kuban Array. The Don and Manych rivers provided the kind of defensive barrier that the Whites had been looking for. A particularly substantial barrier was the deep and wide lower Don river. Facing Denikin along the northern bank of the Don river was the Red Array. From west to east, this comprised First Cavalry, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies while, much further to the east, was the Eleventh Array at Astrakhan. The Red Array's initial problems stemmed from an overconfidence on the part of the Red Array's high command in Moscow. The rapidity of the advance to Rostov apears to have led to a certain complacency, a perception that only mopping-up operations reraained in the war against Denikin. On 8 January 1920, Commander-in-Chief Karaenev wrote Trotsky that the final defeat of Denikin was expected 'by the onset of spring'. According to Kamenev's estimates, Denikin's strength in the north Caucasus stood at 65,000 effectives compared to an already available Red Array strength of 105,000.31 This estimate of relative strengths was not supported by Denikin in his latter-day account, when he wrote that the White strength along the Don river stood at 31 D.G.K.K.A., pp. 724-25. 187 about 54,000, while that of the Red Army on the opposite bank was '50-55,000, that is, as much as we had.'32 Modem Soviet writers share Denikin's view that the two sides were evenly matched in mid-January 1920. According to their calculations, the Red Army's South-East Front, excluding the distant Eleventh Army, boasted only 29,100 infantrymen, 19,300 cavalry, 447 artillery pieces and 2,029 machine g\ms. The front-line strength of Denikin is estimated at having been 29,400 infantrymen, 27,400 cavalry, 451 artillery pieces and 1,185raachine guns.3 3 Denikin would point out that this represented an excellent opportunity to counterattack because, while his army had been retreating for more than two months, its front line was much reduced in length, therefore more defensible. Another advantage was that Denikin's forces were now domiciled in Cossack territory, where greater support and reinforcement could be expected from the local population. The Red Army, on the other hand, was exhausted. According to Denikin: The infantry of the opponent was demoralised and completely worn out, and only the cavalry of Budennyi and Dumenko retained their fighting capacity and continued to be active.3^ It is not difficult to find evidence that, because of the speed of the advance to Rostov, the Red Army was experiencing serious difficulties by January 1920. One problem was that the rear headquarters and supply bases had 32Denikin,Op.^^j;; y, 4^ p. 204? 33 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p.197. 3^ Denikin, Op. cit., v. 4, pp. 203-05. 188 been left far behind. In mid-January 1920, the headquarters of Shorin's South-East Front, which was to take charge of operations in the north Caucasus, was still in Saratov, 620 kilometres from the front line.35 The arraies in the field were greatly reduced in strength. Sokol'nikov, coraraander of the Eighth Array, described the situation blxmtly to Karaenev early in January 1920, You probably know that because of the difficulties of the campaign, a gigantic epidemic of typhus and losses in battle, units of the Eighth Array and neighbouring armies are down to minimum numbers. As well, the veteran fighters have been replaced by local villagers, conscripts and prisoners-of-war. There are no reinforcements. My 13th Division, being in front reserve, arrived in Novocherkassk with a mere 400 fighters.36 In Sokol'nikov's opinion, Denikin's forces were rapidly regaining their former strength, having 'retained their cadre and artillery'. This was Denikin's latter-day assessment as well. He wrote that the Volunteers remained a strong force, while the Don Cossacks were showing renewed zest, now that their lands had been invaded once more.^' A further difficulty for the Red Army was that the shocking state of rail transport meant that reinforcements from the Ukraine never arrived. The 9th, 3rd, 4th, Latvian and Estonian Divisions were earmarked for the Caucasus Front, but ultimately were used against the Whites in the Crimea.-^" 35 Agureeev, Op. cit., p. 176. 36 Quoted in V. Maistrakh, Manych Egorlykskaia Novorossiisk. (Moscow, 1928), p. 20. 37 Denikin, The White Army, pp. 337-39. 38 Maistrakh, Op. cit., p. 32. 189 The break up of the Whites into two groups made necessary a major reorganisation of the Red Army facing Denikin. Kamenev had decided that Egorov's South Front should be renamed the South-West Front, with responsiblity for finishing off the Whites who had taken refuge in the Crimea and to prepare for the expected war against the Poles in the Ukraine. Shorin's South-East Front, to be renamed as the Caucasus Front on 17 January 1920, was to take charge of the crucial war against Denikin's forces in the north Caucasus. To bolster Shorin's strength for the fight against the larger of the two White forces, it was necessary to transfer the First Cavalry and Eighth Arraies from the South- West to the South-East Front. This was done on 9 January 1920. Shorin and Budennyi parted on imfriendly terms early in October 1919. In transferring the Cavalry Corps to Voronezh at that time, Budennyi had disregarded the orders of South- East Front commander, Shorin. While serving as part of the South Front, Budeimyi's relationship with Egorov and Stalin had been friendly and productive, despite occasional differences over resource allocations. Egorov and Stalin had a vested interest in the success of the First Cavalry Army: it was their special project and it was an essential eleraent in their plans for the war against Denikin. Egorov and Stalin had protected the cavalryraen frora the unwelcome attention of Kamenev. Egorov had provided the cavalrymen with considerable operational autonomy, with the orders seldom doing more than setting general goals, leaving the details to Budennyi. Egorov had lavished resources on the 190 cavalrymen when he could, taking infantry away from the Eighth and Thirteenth Armies in December 1919 to meet Budeimyi's request for riflemen. This close relationship proved of great benefit to the Red Array's war against Denikin. Relations between the cavalryraen and Shorin were to be very different. Araajor disput e broke out in the second half of January 1920, as the Red Army's initial attack failed to make headway. This dispute would lead to Shorin's removal. It would be claimed later, in the literature of the Stalin era, that the problems arose because of Shorin's incorapetence and the grudge that he bore against the cavalrymen. This analysis was substantially correct. As early as 9 January 1920, Shorin, still in Saratov, had put out orders for the armies of the South-East Front to begin a general advance. The order was plainly unrealistic, given that on that date Rostov itself had still not been completely pacified. Shorin should have allowed his exhausted armies at least sorae tirae to rest and regroup. Instead, Shorin was anxious to carry out the insistent demands of the centre, to finish off Denikin as quickly as possible. His strategy reflected a requirement of utmost speed, rather than a careful analysis of the situation. The raajor burden of the attack fell upon the First Cavalry Army, which was to cross the Don river and defeat Denikin's Volunteers in the direction of Kushchevskaia. The neighbouring Eighth Army was to support this blow by defeating the westernmost part of Denikin's Don Army and 39 See, for example, Sidorov, Pervaia konnaia, p. 37. 191 then joining in the march to Kushchevskaia. Farther to the east, the Ninth and Tenth Arraies were expected to make groimd in the direction of Velikokniazheskaia on the Manych river.^40" A great deal depended on the ability of the First Cavalry Army to accomplish its raission; and it had been given a task to which it was not well suited. Between Rostov and Kushchevskaia lay not only the Don river, but the hilly area known as the Bataisk heights. Denikin was able to reinforce his Volvmteers with cavalry and infantry frora the Don Array. Events at Kastornaia, in the first half of Noveraber 1919, provided clear evidence of the difficulties experienced by Budennyi's cavalry when confronted with well- defended White positions. Like any predorainantly mounted force, Budeimyi's cavalry was extremely vulnerable to the concentrated firepower of the eneray, if the opportunity for manoeuvre was absent. This was the situation in the fight for Bataisk in the second half of January 1920. There was only one reliable crossing of the flooded lower Don river and that was the railroad bridge leading directly to Bataisk. If the cavalryraen atterapted to bypass Bataisk and ran into difficulties, it would have been a simple matter for Denikin to cut off the escape route. No less daunting for the cavalryraan was the terrain itself which, in front of Bataisk, had been turned into a bog by a spate of warm weather and the pounding of artillery shells. ^^ D.K.F.K.A., V. 2., pp. 466-69, 192 This meant that Budennyi would have great difficulty in using his horse artillery and machine guns. There was the added problem of dealing with the counterattacks of the White cavalry. The attacks made by the First Cavalry Army, on 17 and 18 January 1920, ended in failure. On 19 January 1920, some success was achieved when, with the aid of the Eighth Army, Ol'ginskaia, on the southern bank of the Don river, was captured. The following day it had to be surrendered again and the cavalrymen retreated back across the Don.^1 The failxire of the First Cavalry Army and the neighbouring Eighth Army to capture Bataisk, was the topic of a teleprinter exchange when, on 19 January 1920, Shorin contacted the headquarters of the Eighth Army. In charge for the Eighth Army was the deputy coraraander, Molkachanov, in place of the ailing Sokol'nikov. According to Molkachanov, the Eighth Army had done all it could to aid the First Cavalry Array; but the cavalryraen had retreated, and 'not entirely in an orderly fashion'. Shorin gave his analysis of the setbacks. There had been a delay of twelve days since the fall of Rostov. Even so, the First Cavalry Array had not succeeded in putting itself in order, soraething that Shorin found 'astonishing'. Shorin considered that the eneray was not so strong, but that the Red Army had acted indecisively. Molkachanov then took his opportunity to request the return of the 12th Infantry Division, which in recent months had been operationally subordinate to Budennyi. ^1 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, pp. 116-18. 193 Shorin accepted uncritically the contents of Molkachanov's report. He was very quick to agree to the return of the infantrymen to the Eighth Army. Molkachanov was not reserved, either, in offering his opinion as to why the Caucasus Front was seemingly lacking in resources. It was, he opined, because of over confidence on the part of the centre, taken in by the 'exaggerations by the cavalry units of their successes'.^2 Shorinraay not have been aware of the bad feeling that existed between the coraraands of the First Cavalry and Eighth Arraies over the issues of the disputed infantry division emd the spoils of Rostov. The ease with which Shorin accepted Molkachanov's version of events would suggest that Molkachanov had merely confirmed Shorin's we11-developed suspicions about the konnoarmeitsy. Stories concerning the behaviour of the konnoarmeitsy in Rostov must have reached Shorin. He asked Molkachanov if there was not 'soraething strange' in regard to the poor battlefield perforraance of the First Cavalry Array. Molkachanov replied that he preferred not to answer, for fear of becoraing 'overly emotional'. His suspicions confirraed, Shorin then took Budennyi to task in an exchange on 21 January 1920, following a request frora the cavalryraen for their mission to be changed. According to Budeimyi's accoimt, Shorin now accused the konnoarmeitsy of having 'drowned their glory in the wine-cellars of Rostov'.^3 ^2 D.K.F.K.A., V. 2, pp. 473-75. ^3 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 390. 194 Rxiraours about the riotous behaviour of the konnoarmeitsy in Rostov were apparently widespread in the Red Army at this time. In Soviet literature generally, very little has been written about misbehaviour or driinkenness on the part of the troops of the Red Army. Alcohol should not have been available at all, given that prohibition was still in force. Yet Budennyi has described how, in November 1919, his long time chief-of-staff finally lost his post because of his 'weakness for the bottle'.'^'^ Given the hardships of the campaign, it would have been remarkable indeed if the behaviour of konnoarmeitsy, was as exemplary as latter-day Soviet literature tries to make out. That the konnoarmeitsy could fall short of the Red Array ideal of committed, self-disciplined and altruistic servants of the revolution was adraitted even by the konnoarmeitsy theraselves. As one contributor to Krasnyi kavalerist reported, in Deceraber 1919, it had been necessary to hold a series ofraeetings in his \mit with the aim of, 'purging the many evil tendencies left to us as an inheritance from the bourgeois system'.5 Another cavalryraan wrote later that alcohol had been the 'secret weapon' of the Whites in their efforts to demoralise the konnoarmeitsy but that the vigilance of the coraraand and political workers had seen to the problem. This suggests that drxmkenness was an issue at the time.^6 Further, the command of the First Cavalry Array ^^ Jbid., p^ 336. '^5 s. Ustinov et al. (eds.), 0 geroisme boitsov Pervoi Konnoi Armii (Rostov, 1939), p. 67. ^6 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. ll. 195 may have turned a blind eye to events in Rostov, as a form of reward for the konnoarmeitsy, who received very little else in terms of reward of this kind for their efforts. It should be pointed out that in March 1920, Shorin's replacement as Caucasus Front commander, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, prepared a report for the centre, in which he rejected the allegations against the konnoarmeitsy. Tukhachevskii noted that the 11th Cavalry Division had supposedly sacked Novocherkassk, when in fact it had not even entered the stanitsa. Tukhachevskii also pointed out, that given a lack of supply frora the rear, the requireraents of the cavalryraen could only be met through 'self-supply' and that 'this must mean a heavy burden for the local population'.^' In the case of the behaviour of the konnoarmeitsy in Rostov, the facts of the matter cannot be established on the basis of available evidence, which is contradictory. It is difficult to understand what Shorin hoped to achieve by making these accusations against Budennyi. All he succeeded in doing was to add to the bitterness of the recriminations within the Red Army command that followed the initial setbacks suffered in the attempt to cross the Don river in mid-January 1920. On 22 January 1920, Kamenev provided his analysis of the situation for Trotsky. Kamenev raade no raention of the alleged raisbehaviour of the konnoarmeitsy. Instead, he explained the setback in terms of the difficulties in crossing the melting ice that covered the Don river; and the ^7 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 32. 196 fact that Denikin had dug in at Bataisk, where the best of the White forces was defending grimly. Kamenev also referred to what he described as 'a characteristic peculiarity of the southern fronts' and that was the poor quality of the Red Array's troops there.^8 in blaming the 'southern' troops, remerabering that Kamenev had formerly been the commander of the successful East Front, Karaenev was simply shifting the responsiblity away from where it belonged and that was with Shorin and his unworkable strategy. Kamenev discarded his previous optimism about a relatively straightforwardraarch by the Red Array through the north Caucasus. In the sarae report, he inforraed Trotsky that, in the first instance, 40,000 reinforcements had to be sent to the Caucasus Front, with a further 60,000 to follow.'^9 A.S events would prove, the solution to the Red Array's difficulties there was much simpler. Shorin had to be removed and his strategy abandoned. On 22 January 1920, Budennyi put out an order for all the First Cavalry Army's xmits to withdraw beyond the Don river, to cease operations imtil further notice.50 Budennyi had decided to go over the head of Shorin: on 23 January 1920, he and Voroshilov vented their anger in a telegram addressed to Trotsky as head of the RVSR, with a copy to Stalin. In the telegram, Budennyi and Voroshilov presented their side of the story. There were reasons for the initial delays, especially the need to regroup after the rapid pace ^8 D.G^K.K.A., V- 725. ^9 Ibid., p. 727. 50 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 392. 197 of the advance to Rostov. Bad weather and a difficult terrain hampered operations throughout. The Whites were well and truly dug in at Bataisk; and the marshy ground meant that a 'bridgehead to deploy andraanoeuvre our cavalry' was lacking. They suggested that operations at Bataisk be left to the Eighth Array and that the First Cavalry Army be transferred eastwards, to Konstantinovka, where a relatively easy passage across the Don river might be expected. The First Cavalry Array could then raid in a south-westerly direction into the flank and the rear of the Whites defending Bataisk. If this regrouping was approved, they promised to 'destroy everything in our path. We stake ovir lives on the success of these operations'. At the sarae time, they warned that the continuation of the 'attempts to seize Bataisk from Rostov and Nakichevan will lead to the complete destruction of the best cavalry of the Republic'.51 On 24 January 1920, Shorin finally visited the First Cavalry Army. Another exchange of insults ensued, prorapting yet another telegrara frora Budennyi and Voroshilov, this time to Lenin as well as to Trotsky and Stalin, calling for the removal of Shorin. 2 Although none of this correspondence was addressed to Karaenev, the Comraander-in-Chief could hardly have reraained ignorant of its contents. Earlier, on 22 January 1920, Kamenev warned Shorin that it was quite obvious that the First Cavalry and Eighth Armies were experiencing major difficulties on the southern bank of the 51 Sidorov, Op. cit., p. 40. Zhemantis, Op. cit., p. 54. 52 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 394-95. 196 Don river and that simply repeating the same wasteful manoeuvre held no promise of success. Kamenev's recommendation was that the burden of the Red Army's attack should be shifted eastwards, to the Ninth and Tenth Armies, where progress had been more rapid frora the outset.53 On 24 January 1920, Karaenev issued raore specific instructions. Theseraay have been influenced by the contents of the telegram sent by the cavalryraen to Trotsky and Stalin the day before. Karaenev directed that the First Cavalry Array, less one cavalry division, be transferred eastwards to Konstantinovka, where it was to join forces with Duraenko's Cavalry Corps, which was fighting alongside the Ninth and Tenth Armies. This super cavalry group was then to strike out in a south-westerly direction, into Denikin's flank and rear.5^ This was the direction that was suggested by the cavalryraen the day before. That same day, 25 January 1920, Kamenev found it necessary to send another order to Shorin, deraanding that the 'frontal assaults' required of the First Cavalry and Eighth Armies be cancelled.55 Karaenev was losing patience with his protege. Shorin changed the raission of the First Cavalry Array; but this did not end the row with the cavalryraen nor was there any immediate battlefield success as a result. The First Cavalry Array was ordered to move eastwards to join Dumenko.56 The gist of Kamenev's order was 53 --^-j^-^j^- p^ ;^28. 5^ Ibid., 55 Ibid., p. 729. 56 D.K.F.K.A., pp. 477-78. 199 that Dumenko be made subordinate to Budennyi, which did not happen. Instead Shorin subordinated Dumenko to Budennyi, but only while both cavalries were operating in the Efremov area which, according to Budennyi, was a very small patch of earth indeed.5' Nor were the two cavalries sent in the same direction: Budeimyi's goal was Kushchevskaia, while that of Dumenko was Tikhoretskaia.58 There was, in any event, considerable rivalry between Dumenko and his erstwhile subordinate, Budennyi, which ensured that there would be a rainiraura of cooperation. Duraenko had success, on 26 and 27 January 1920, when he occupied the Efremov area. On 26 January 1920, he retreated back across the Manych river, with the result that both the Ninth and Tenth Armies went on to the defensive. On 28 February 1920, Budennyi was ready to attack. He established a bridgehead at Efremov. Lacking support, he was forced the following day to retreat across the Manych. By now, the White defenders were well and truly alive to the Red strategy: when, on 1 Februrary 1920, Budennyi and Duraenko finally acted in concert, they found the resistance too 59 stiff and achieved nothing.-^ Budennyi now coraplained to Shorin that the attack had once again been badly planned: the Eighth and Ninth Armies had been relatively inactive in recent days, allowing Denikin to regroup his forces in front of the First Cavalry Array. This was Karaenev's assessment too for, on 3 February 57 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 396. 58 Agureev, Op. cit., p. 180. 59 Ibid., pp. 181-82. 200 1920, he proclaimed the need for a new plan on accoimt of the fact that the cavalryraen 'were not supported in good time by the infantry of Eighth and Ninth Armies'.60 These setbacks fuelled further turmoil within the Red Army command and led finally to the removal of Shorin. There are doubts as to whether Shorin was entitled to issue orders at all in the last week in January 1920 for, according to a recent Soviet publication, he had been replaced as coraraander of the Caucasus Front by his deputy, Afanas'ev, on 24 January 1920.61 This corroborates the boast Stalinraade t o Budenny, on 3 February 1920, that 'eight days earlier, upon receiving your coded telegrara, I (Stalin) secured Shorin's dismissal.'62 it is not clear which forum Stalin used to achieve this goal or whether Lenin was brought in to the dispute. There would seem little reason for doubting that Stalin played a role in obtaining Shorin's removal. Yet Shorin was apparently unaware of, or simply ignored, his disraissal notice until the first week in February 1920, when the new Caucasus Front commander, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, arrived to take over.63 From the point of view of the cavalryraen, in the last week in January 1920, Shorin was still in charge in the headquarters of the Caucasus Front; and the war was still going badly. On 2 February 1920, the cavalryraen dispatched a 60 -^^^^^^^j_^ ^^ 2, p. 730. 61 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 245. 62 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 403. 63 Shorin was signing orders as late as 2 Februrary 1920, See D.K.F.K.A., v. 2, p. 479. 201 telegrara to Trotsky and Kamenev, claiming that, since 12 January 1920, they had suffered the loss of more than 3,000 sabres and horses.6^ if the First Cavalry Army really had lost 3,000 sabres in this period, then this was a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. At the beginning of the campaign, the strength of the First Cavalry Army was about 9,000 sabres; it may have been that a third of its strength was wasted in the unsuccessful attempts to take Bataisk. The day before, on 1 February 1920, Budennyi had penned an eraotional, hand-written letter to Lenin, asking for his assistance. It was addressed to Lenin as 'the great leader of all poor peasants and workers' and was written in the style of a peasant who wished the Tsar to know about the injustices that were being perpetrated by the local gentry. In his latter-day account, Budennyi was to note that Lenin received his letter, that by this stage he had lost faith in the Red Array's chain of command and was pinning his hopes upon Lenin's intervention.65 These hopes were misplaced. The letter appears merely to have given Lenin further cause for alarm about what, on 17 February 1920, he described as 'the complete deraoralisation of Budennyi'. It was once raore Stalin who was to prove hiraself the most valuable ally of First Cavalry Army. 6''* S. Zotov, '1-ia Konnaia pod Bataiskom i na r. Manych' Voina i Revoliutsiia, no. 3, March 1935, p. 36. 65 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', pp. 398-99. 66 D.G.K.K.A., p. 731. 202 Even raodem Soviet writers, who are loathe toraake any criticism of individual commanders of the Red Army, have made some complaints about Shorin's handling of the armies of the Caucasus Front in this period. As one writer has put it, Shorin was guilty of 'the incorrect use of the basic force of the Front, First Cavalry Army'.67 Shorin was seemingly determined to put the reputation of the First Cavalry Army to the test, long after it had become apparent that it was experiencing grave difficulties in attacking well-defended eneray positions by frontal assault across a t>oggy terrain which raade difficult the employment of its chief assets, mobility and firepower. Shorin appears to have used the report he received from Molkachanov, without investigating its contents. He was unable to establish any productive dialogue with the coraraand of the First Cavalry Army; and he could not understand their problems. It is difficult to build a credible defence of Shorin, although at least one attempt has been made."° By 24 January 1920, even Karaenev was finally convinced of the incorapetence of his protege and had tried to take control of the Caucasus Front himself, instructing Shorin to countermand his most recent orders. Shorin's record in the Tsarist Array revealed no hint of distinguished ability.69 The platform for his rapid promotion in the Red Army appears to have been the strong bonds that emerged between the East- Front veterans, 67 Agureev, Op. cit., p. 331. 68 V. Rapoport and Y. Alexeev, High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-36. (Durham, 1938)., p. 39. 69 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 63. 203 led by Kamenev during the war, against Kolchak in the Urals and Siberia. Karaenev was gulty of bad judgement. Shorin's record in the second half of 1919, as coraraander of the special group and then of the South-East Front was undistinguished. His coramands did not justify the hopes placed in him by Kamenev. Yet with characteristic stubborness Kamenev had stuck by Shorin, only to be met with disappointment once again in the Red Army's difficulties at Bataisk. With Shorin out of the way and his strategy discarded, the military situation gradually began to improve for the Red Array in the war against Denikin in the north Caucasus. On 4 February 1920, Tukhachevskii formally took over as Caucasus Front commander. Only 27 years of age and an ex- Tsarist captain, TuJchachevskii was an able and aggressive commander who would figure prominently in the story of the Red Army in 1920. Tukhachevskiiraoved his headquarters from Saratov to Millerovo, which was nearer the front, although by no means at the front. The military council of the Caucasus Front was now expanded to include Grigorii Ordzhonikidze, a long-time Bolshevik and acquaintance of Stalin who had worked closely with Stalin during the South Front counterattack of the previous year. On 4 February 1920, Stalin was in touch with Ordzhonikidze and relayed to him the contents of Budennyi and Voroshilov's complaints against Shorin. Stalin wanted not only the removal of Shorin, but also that of Eighth Army coraraander Sokol'nikov as well. He pointed to the need for Dumenko to be subordinated to 204 Budennyi, if the two cavalries were to be successful1. Ordzhonikidze either chose not to, or was not in a position to, satisfy Stalin's demands in these matters; but the following day he co-signed with Txikhachevskii a telegram which expressed shock at the attitude displayed earlier 'towards the heroic Red cavalry by your neighbouring arraies and by sorae individuals'.70 They proraised to visit the front and expressed confidence that 'forraer friendly relations will be resumed'. The telegram was obviously designed to win back Budeimyi's confidence in the coraraand of the Red Army and it achieved its purpose. Stalin is often portrayed in the literature as having been a trouble maker during the Civil War. Whatever truth there is in that characterisation, it certainly was not the case here. Stalin was invited by the cavalrymen to intervene in what was by then a mature dispute. Stalin did not cause the dispute, nor did he welcome it. He was anxious to end it as quickly as possible. He politely turned down a request from the cavalrymen for him to visit the front. He even managed to talk his way out of an instruction from Lenin to undertake the same journey, pleading heavy work commitraents, even ill health.71 His suggestion to Ordzhonikidze, that Sokol'nikov should be reraoved from the command of the Eighth Army, was not an attempt to enlarge the dispute, but rather to tidy up a loose end, given the bad feeling that existed between the coraraands of the First Cavalry and Eighth Armies. Such a move proved unnecessary: the new Red Army strategy 70 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, p. 405. 71 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 64. 205 adopted after Shorin's reraoval placed these armies on opposite flanks of the front, more than 200 kiloraetres apart. In his directives of 9 and 12 February 1920, the new Caucasus-Front commander, Tukhachevskii, outlined the new Red-Array strategy against Denikin.72 its main thrust was to shift the point of attack from the lower Don to the eastern flank, that is, in the direction of Tikhoretskaia. The raajor regrouping that had to take place was the transfer of the First Cavalry Array to the section of the front occupied by the Tenth Army. The First Cavalry Array was to be held in reserve while the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Arraies forced passages across the Don and Manych rivers. After the infantry had cleared a path for it, the First Cavalry Array was to pour through the gap at the junction of Denikin's Don and Kuban Arraies. The object of the operation was to occupy Tikhoretskaia. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Array, based in Astrakhan, was to continue its advance across the Stavropol plateau, herding the Whites in the area west, in order to place them under the blows of the main body of the Red Army.73 There was nothing original about Tukhachevski's strategy. This was the change in the point of attack that had been advocated first by the cavalryraen, then by Karaenev. The notion of using the cavalry to exploit a gap made in enemy defences by the infantry and artillery was hardly novel. It had represented a cornerstone of the thinking of the strategists at the 72 --j^^p-j^^j^^ pp^ 481-63. 73 Grazhdanskaia voina (1963), p. 586. 206 outset of World War One, although the opportunity to put the idea into practice seldom arose in that conflict. In the more fluid conditions of the Civil War, it would prove an eminently soimd plan. At the same time, there was a significant risk attached to this strategy. By strengthening his eastern flank, Tukhachevskii ran the risk of being outflanked on his weaker western flank. This was particularly true, given that Denikin was concentrating his attention on a renewed attack on Rostov, leading to a breakout to the north. Denikin had not been able to expand the size of his forces in this period. Even so, Tukhachevskii could not rely upon a telling numerical superiority. Modern Soviet writers put Denikin's strength at this tirae at 21,700 infantry and 25,200 cavalry, as against a Red Army strength of 31,500 infantry and 18,800 cavalry.7^ In order to concentrate the bulk of his force in the Tikhoretskaia direction, it was necessary for the Eighth Army to spread out and cover a much larger section of the front along the lower Don river. The positive side was that Tukhachevskii was achieving a clear numerical superiority in the east and had positioned there his chief striking force, Budenny's cavalry. Having taken into account the Red Army regrouping, Denikin was still in a position to take countermeasures and to conduct his own regrouping. As he described the change in Red Army strategy. The Soviet command, having lost faith in the 7^Izistorii(1986),v. 2, p. 211. 207 possibility of overturning our front from the north east, changed its plan of operation, bringing the chief blow along the line of least resistance, from Velikokniazheskaia to Tikhoretskaia with the forces of the Tenth and First Cavalry Armies.75 Denikin planned to defeat what he described as 'the main forces of the opponent' by raassing the very strong and steadfast group of general Pavlov (10-12 thousand) which was given the task together with the 1st Corps ofraoving alon g the Manych and striking at the flank and rear of the cavalry of Budennyi.76 At first the battlefield results of this new configuration of the Red Array facing Denikin were raixed. Budennyi could not raeet the deadline appointed for his arrival in the area occupied by Tenth Army. A much raore encouraging development was the fact that the Tenth Army achieved an iraportant success, on 16 February 1920. when it crossed the Manych river and occupied the railroad junction of Torgovaia.77 This was important, because the confuence of the Manych and Don rivers formed a salty, boggy marsh land nearly 10 kilometres wide, that would have proved very difficult for the cavalrymen to fight their way across. As it turned out, the Tenth Array met with little difficulty, making use of the fact that part of the Manych river was frozen. The Tenth Army was aided by the fact that Denikin was able to bring up cavalry to reinforce the Torgovaia area, but little in the way of infantry or artillery. Denikin sent 75 Denikin, Op. cit., v. 4, p. 188. 76 Ibid., V. 4., p. 190. 77 Agureev, Op. cit., p. 188, 208 Pavlov's cavalry to meet this threat. Pavlov succeeded in driving back the Red cavalry units comraanded by Zhloba, across the Manych river. As a result, the 28th Infantry Division came to be surrounded in an open field and was almost entirely destroyed. The Tenth Army was able to hold on to Torgovaia until the First Cavalry Army arrived there on 19 February 1920. Denikin relied upon Pavlov's cavalry. This force suffered a severe blow, during the period 18-19 February 1920, as it moved to the Torgovaia area toraeet Budenny. Travelling across the virtually uninhabited steppe along the southern bank of the Manych river, it encountered a severe snow storm. On 19 February 1920, Pavlov desperately tried to take Torgovaia away from the First Cavalry and Tenth Armies but failed. His cavalry was condemned to spend another night on the steppe. According to information obtained by the Red Array at the time, about 2,000 of the White cavalry force literally froze to death.78 According to a White account, the true figure was more like 5,000 sabres, half the total force.79 Denikin was having greater success farther to the west where he crossed the lower Don river. On 20 February 1920, the Whites drove the Red Eighth Army out of Rostov. Both Karaenev and Lenin were much alarmed by the setback at Rostov and chastised Tukhachevskii. Tukhachevskii did not share their alarm because, as he reported to Kamenev on 19 February 1920, developments were much more promising farther 78 Maistrakh, Op. cit., p. 78. 79 Rakovskii, Op. cit., p. 96. 209 to the east where the Tenth and First Cavalry Armies were raaking good progress. Tukhachevskii irapressed Karaenev with his cavalier declaration that if, at the lower end of the Don river, there had been only sorae villages instead of the town of Rostov, nobody would be concerned by Denikin's apparent success there.80 Tukhachevskii was counting upon the decisive battles taking place farther to the east; and his confidence would prove justified. In a series of battles in the area between Torgovaia and Tikhoretskaia, the blows of the First Cavalry and Tenth Armies shattered Denikin's forces there and led to a general White retreat. On 22 February 1920, Denikin's Kuban Array was dislodged frora Belaia Glina. In so doing, Budennyi had taken control over what was, even in a Russian winter, a food-rich area. The First Cavalry and Tenth Armies then turned north west, towards Sredne-Egorlykskaia. Along the way they came across Pavlov's cavalry and other White units. The result was what Soviet writers described as the largest 'battle of encounter' that took place in the Civil War with, according to their accounts anyway, 25,000 cavalryraen involved.81 As a result, the Whites fell back on Egorlykskaia to where Denikin sent reinforceraents. After the initial attacks failed, the First Cavalry and Tenth Arraies drove the Whites from Egorlykskaia on 1 March 1920. This was the last serious fighting of the campaign. Denikin's forces 80 j^-j^-pj^^j- ^^ 2, p. 490. 81 Grazhdanskaia voina. (1986), v. 2, p. 206. It is doubtful that the nurabers of cavalry could have been that high. The First Cavalry Array was only about 10,000 sabres strong while the weakened White cavalry under Pavlov, even if reinforced, was unlikely to have been any larger. 210 now fell back on their only escape routes, the Black Sea ports. Earlier, Denikin was forced to abandon his hold on Rostov and the projected attack to the north because of these developments. As Denikin later described the situation. The moveraent to the north could not be developed because the enemy. First Cavalry Army of Budennyi and parts of Tenth Array, were already operating in our deep rear in the direction of Tikhoretskaia. The Volimteer Corps was ordered to abandon Rostov and R9 to retreat across the Don. *^ In modem Soviet literature, there is a tendency to portray each move of First Cavalry Army during these operations as having been orchestrated by Tukhachevskii. This is a misleading picture, which does no justice to the complexity and chaos of this period. Budennyi had long been in the habit of adjusting his moveraents to a changing military situation and was not afraid to disregard what he regarded as inappropriate orders issued from the headquarters of the Caucasus Front. In the last ten days of February 1920, Budennyi inflicted two major defeats upon the eneray, at Belaia Glina and Sredne-Egorlykskaia. In neither case was the appearance of Budennyi there in accordance with the orders of Tukhachevskii. The movement of the First Cavalry Army to Belaia Glina directly contradicted the orders of Tukhachevskii, who on 22 February 1920 had set for it the goal of Egorlykskaia.83. Budennyi was either unaware of this order or, more likely, 82 Denikin, The White Army., p. 344. 83 D.K.F.K.A. ^^ 3., p. 491. 211 unimpressed by it. He chose to head for Belaia Glina, some 70 kilometres to the south of Egorlykskaia, where Denikin's Kuban Army had concentrated and was imperilling the left flank of his cavalry. The manoeuvre was a great success. On 25 February 1920, Tukhachevskii triumphantly anounced that Belaia Glina had been occupied by the First Cavalry and Tenth Armies, and that a large part of Denikin's Kuban array had been destroyed. On 26 February 1920, Kamenev coraplained to Tukhachevskii that: one thing displeases me and that is that when you send Budennyi to Egorlykskaia he goes to Belaia Glina and when you send hira to the west, well to the north of Tikhoretskaia, he goes directly to Tikhoretskaia; in a word, he is not obeying your directives which significantly increases the risk.8^ In fact, there was almost certainly much greater risk in sticking to out-of-date orders issued from Tukhachevskii's headquarters, where inforraation about the rapidly-changing military situation at the front line was scanty and often innaccurate. In the course of the conversation frora which the above quote was taken, on the basis of what Tukhachevskii had reported to him, Karaenev forraed the opinion that Budennyi was heading south west towards Tikhoretskaia, when in fact he was travelling north west, towards Sredne-Egorlykskaia. If Kamenev and Tukhachevskii were experiencing such difficulty obtaining information about the moveraents of their own troops, accurate inforraation about the eneray no doubt eluded them as well. 8^ Ibid., p. 494. 212 The movement of Budeimyi's cavalrymen from Belaia Glina to the north west, towards Sredne-Egorlykskaia, brought about what proved to be the decisive clash in the north Caucasus. Denikin had thrown all his available reserves into what he thought was Budeimyi's rear in the Sredne- Egorlykskaia area. From its own reconnaissance work and the information obtained from prisoners, the conrajand of the First Cavalry Array became aware of these developments and decided to march to Sredne-Egorlykskaia to deal with this threat directly, rather than to allow Denikin to threaten its rear. In modern Soviet literature, this sharp turn back to the north west is described as having been in accordance with the orders of Tukhachevskii. 5 This is true enough in that, on the evening of 25 February 1920, Tukhachevskii put out an order setting Sredne-Egorlykskaia as the goal of the cavalryraen: he too had realised the danger there. What is ignored is that the First Cavalry Array was moving in the direction of Sredne-Eegorlykskaia the day before, on 24 February 1920. In his latter-day account, Budennyi has described in some detail a meeting of the command of the First Cavalry Army, held on 23 February 1920, in which the issue was debated. It was decided to ignore theraost recent order from Tukhachevskii, the directive of 22 February 1920, which set Tikhoretskaia as the First Cavalry Army's objective, so as to make the march on Sredne-Egorlykskaia. This version of the timing of the First Cavalry Army's turn to Sredne-Egorlykskaia is corroborated by a ranch earlier 85 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, p. 206. 213 account put out by Maistrakh, a commander in the 20th Infantry Division. 6 The culminating battle took place at Egorlykskaia, which was occupied by the First Cavalry and Tenth Armies on 1 March 1920. The failure of the Whites here represented the final nail in Denikin's coffin. Subsequently, Denikin attempted to establish new defensive lines, along the Kuban river; but these proved flimsy. During March 1920, Denikin's forces were in retreat. By the end of the first week in April 1920, there reraained only raopping-up operations for the Red Army. The First Cavalry Army contributed to these operations and eventually ended up at Maikop, in the heart of the north Caucasus. Part of Denikin's force succeeded in escaping from Novorossiiisk to the Crimea; the remainder was captured. The most obvious tactical lessons of these battles for the cavalryraen concerned the advantages of constant infantry support. It is true that at Bataisk the cavalrymen were in trouble even before Shorin took away the infantry divisions that had been their constant companions since mid-October 1919. Conditions at Bataisk were singularly unfavourable and the operation ill conceived. There was no space in which to raanoeuvre, while the boggy terrain severely restricted the operations of the horse artillery andraachine guns. Having been moved to the Tikhoretskaia direction and finding a very different railitary environment there, the konnoarmeitsy found that they had sufficient firepower to deal with a predominantly moimted opponent, such as Pavlov's 86 Maistrakh, Op. cit., p. 107. 214 cavalry. When at Belaia Glina, Sredne-Egorlykskaia and Egorlykskaia, Denikin was able to reinforce his cavalry with infantry units, this created problems for Budennyi. The tried and tested formula, a barrage of machine gun and artillery fire to prepare the way for araounted attack , did not produce the desired results. At Egorlykskaia, the White defenders retained their nerve and, according to one observer, it was only the assistance of the 20th Infantry Division that ensured victory.87 in his account, Budennyi acknowledged that the infantrymen played an important role.88 The 20th Infantry Division carae frora the East Front and could trace its origins back to the war against the Czechs in raid-1918. It had quickly proved itself theraost battle - efficient part of the Tenth Array in the fighting to retake Tsaritsyn in Deceraber 1919. What was reraarkable about the cooperation of the infantry and the cavalry was that the Tenth Array coraraander, whose narae was Pavlov, just like the White cavalry coraraander, did not object to the subordination of his best troops to Budennyi. Whether this reflected raore an appreciation on the part of Pavlov as to the advantage for the campaign as a whole to be gained from this cooperation or a generous spirit is difficult to know. One feature of the Red cavalry's performance throughout the Civil War was that its reconnaissance and outpost work was not always of a high standard.8 9 In the clash at 87 jjf,;^^^,^ ^ pp^ 130-38. 88 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 1, pp. 429-30. 89 Kosogov Op. cit., p. 172, frankly adraits that reconnaissance work in the Red cavalry was 'weak'. 215 Torgovaia, on 19 February 1920, Budeimyi's cavalry was taken by surprise and his own headquarters was quickly under attack. In the 'battle of encounter', near Sredne- Egorlykskaia, on 25 February 1920, the clash was unexpected for both sides and only the rapid deployment of the Red cavalry and infantry enabled them to take the initiative. In the last week in February 1920, both Budenny and Tenth Army commander, Pavlov, complained bitterly to Tukhachevskii that the Eighth and Ninth Armies to the west were not doing enough to pin down enemy forces on their sector, that the whole burden of the war was falling upon their troops. No doubt there was some truth in this special pleading; but by this stage it did not really matter. Denikin's White Array in the north Caucasus was on the verge of total collapse. Many contributions had beenraade t o the Red Army's victory in the north Caucasus: but it would be difficult to deny that the turning point in the campaign came with the victories of the First Cavalry and Tenth Armies in the last ten days of February 1920. For the First Cavalry Army, there was little opportunity to celebrate the victory. The konnoarmeitsy were already earmarked to be transferred to the Polish front in the Ukraine. 216 Chapter Six: Horsemen Of The Apocalypse April-July 1920 If the term "apocalyptic" fits any event in recent world history, it fits the Russian Civil War. Ewan Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, p. xi Evaluating the actions of the First Cavalry Army it should never be forgotten that the most brilliant pages of the campaign of the South-West Front in the Ukraine were written in the blood of its fighters. Kakurin and Melikov, Voina s belopoliakami, p. 472. Hordes of paupers roll toward your ancient cities, 0 Poland, and above them thunders the serfs' chant of union. Woe unto you. Res publica; woe unto you. Prince Radziwill and unto you, Prince Sapieha, risen for the space of an hour! Babel, Collected Works, p. 40. The Red Army's invasion of Poland in August 1920 was an adventure that should never have been undertaken by a Soviet government that had not yet consolidated itself within Russia. Yet, for a time, the war against the Poles went very well for the Red Army. By the middle of July 1920, the Polish invasion of the Ukraine had been routed and the Poles were willing to accept peace at alraost any price. The coraponent of the Red Army that was most responsible for having brought about this state of affairs was the First Cavalry Army. 217 In Western literature, the Soviet-Polish War of 1920 has been dealt with in more detail thanraost othe r aspects of the Civil War. Davies' book is a very good general account while Zeimoyski has concentrated upon the military side of the war and produced an entertaining and informative account of the raajor battles, including those which involved the First Cavalry Army. It is not my intention to cover the ground already covered by Davies and Zamoyski, except, where necessary, to take issue with them. My concern is purely with an evaluation of the role played by the First Cavalry Army. A raajor confrontation between the Soviet and Polish governments had been brewing for more than twelve raonths before the Poles launched a full-scale invasion of the Ukraine in the last week in April 1920. Minor skirraishes between the Red and Polish Armies had been taking place in the borderlands of the Ukraine and Belorussia since early 1919.1 Whatever the reasons for its origins, full-scale fighting got under way on 25 April 1920, when the Polish Comraander-in-Chief, Joseph Pilsudskii, sent a 70,000 strong invasion force into the Ukraine in a two-pronged attack directed at Kiev and Odessa.'' Frora Pilsudskii's point of view, much of the borderlands belonged to Poland, whose territory had been seized by the Tsars. The immediate aim of the invasion of the Ukraine was 1 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 251. 2 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 256 puts the strength of the invading Polish South-East Front at 69,100 men. Both Davies and Zamoyski are evasive about Polish nurabers but according to Davies, Op. cit., p. 106. the Polish forces were 'raore than adequate in face of their objectives'. 218 to drive the Red Army frora the Ukraine and to establish a Polish-backed Ukrainian govemraent in Kiev. The latter was to be the lynchpin of a federation of states in the borderlands, whose existence would weaken Russian power and help to ensure the security of Poland's eastern frontier. It was at the same time a preemptive strike, aimed at forestalling the expected Red Army occupation of the borderlands. Ultimately, the invasion would prove a disaster for Pilsudski not only in military but in political terms because this action ensured that not only Soviet but world opinion viewed the Poles as the aggressors. The decision was taken in mid-March 1920 to send the First Cavalry Array to reinforce the Red Array's South-West Front facing Poland.3 The requireraent of the First Cavalry Array there becarae more urgent with the Polish invasion of the Ukraine on 25 April 1920. What would turn the war around in favour of the Red Army was the arrival in the western Ukraine, in the last week in May 1920, of the First Cavalry Array. In one of the raore reraarkable odysseys of the Civil War, arauch-enlarged Firs t Cavalry Arrayraarched fror a Maikop, near the Caucasus Mountains, to Uraan' in the Ukraine, a distance of more than 1000 kilometres, in a little over seven weeks, and then went straight into action against the Poles.4 By the end of the second week in June 1920, the Poles in the Ukraine were in full retreat, thanks largely to the efforts of Budeimyi's cavalry. 3 D.G.k.k.A., pp. 674-75. ^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 69, 219 The First Cavalry Array's battlefield performance against the Poles can only be understood in the light of developments in the interval between the end of the war against Denikin and the start of the Polish War. It was during this march that the First Cavalry Army was substantially rebuilt. Budennyi had achieved a significant victory, even before his cavalry arrived in the Ukraine. In this case, it was a victory not over the Poles, but over the Red Army's central planners. It had been decided by the Soviet political and military leadership that the First Cavalry Army was to travel from the north Caucasus to the western Ukraine as soon as possible; but a question reraained as to how this transfer was to take place. Lebedev, head of the Field Staff, and Karaenev's right- hand man, was strongly in favour of transferring the cavalrymen by train, so as to achieve the greatest possible speed. Budennyi had no faith in the rail network: his belief was that the horses would perish long before they reached the Ukraine, due to a lack of forage. Budennyi pointed out that it would be a massive task to arrange for the transportation of his army, estimating that it would require more than one hundred trains each of fifty carriages.5 The alternative, argued for by Budennyi, was the traditional raethod, for the First Cavalry Array to march to the Ukraine, feeding and housing themselves where necessary at the expense of the local population. Budennyi was able to enlist the support of Tukhachevskii, while he was still the 5 D.G7k^k7A., V' 311 220 commander of the Caucasus Front, and Egorov, commander of the South-West Front, to whora the cavalrymen were being sent. Front-line opinion clearly doubted the capacity of the railroad to cope with the task.6 The issue becarae a long-running dispute and was the raain itera on the agenda when Budennyi and Voroshilov arrived in Moscow, on 30 March 1920, to discuss with Kamenev operations against Poland. The cavalrymen called upon Stalin's help and lobbied for the support of Lenin.7 The cavalryraen got their way: the First Cavalry Array continued the raarch to the Ukraine. The issue was to be revived, after the Poles struck in the last week in April 1920, this tirae with not only Karaenev, but Egorov anxious for at least one of the cavalry divisions to be sent on ahead by rail to stem the Polish tide. Budennyi was firraly opposed to any attempt to break up his force. As he pointed out, the First Cavalry Array was a powerful force because it was a mass cavalry unit. To employ it piecemeal against the Poles was to endanger its fighting capacity.8 During the raarch, the divisions raoved separately, but along the sarae road. The cavalryraen covered between thirty and thirty-five kiloraetres a day and a rest was taken every fourth day. On three occasions, there were longer breaks of up to three days.9 The First Cavalry Array arrived at Uraan', 6 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2., pp. 93-97 7 Ibid., V. 2., pp. 21-22. 8 Ibid., V. 2., pp. 40-42. 9 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2., p. 69. 221 the starting point for the Polish campaign, in the last week in May 1920. The front-line situation changed little in the weeks since the evacuation of Kiev. This gave the lie to the arguraent that it was iraperative for the cavalrymen to be railed to the front as quickly as possible. Budeimyi's determination to march to the Ukraine was to be vindicated when the almost immediate success of the First Cavalry Army deraonstrated that theraarch ha d sharpened its performance.10 The long march of the First Cavalry Array was later described by Karaenev as imexarapled inraodern railitary history . It was indeed a reraarkable feat. Before it reached the Ukraine, the First Cavalry Array underwent significant changes, including massive growth. At the same tirae, it was the subject of a vigorous carapaign of political education, that was designed to lift its fighting performance. The numerical growth was truly spectacular. When it was set up, in Noveraber 1919, the strength of the First Cavalry Array stood at 594 infantry, 6,346 sabres, 26 artillery pieces and 222 raachine guns.11 By raid-January 1920, this had grown to 913 infantry, 9,370 sabres, 19 artillery pieces and 238 machine guns.12 By the time it reached Poland, the First Cavalry Array was, according to the official statistics, a force of 1,600 infantry, 16,500 cavalry, 78 artillery pieces, 464 machine guns, 7 armoured 10 Kamenev, Op. cit., p. 155. 11 D.K.F.K.A..^^ n,, p. 108. 12 Ibid., V. 4., p. 121. 222 trains, 3 armoured cars and nearly 30,000 horses.13 Not only had the substantial losses incurred during the fighting in the north Caucasus been made up, but the size of the army had nearly doubled. The increases in the nuraber ofraachine guns, artillery pieces, arraoured trains and cars in part reflected the improving capacity of the centre to supply the Red Army in the field. According to Budennyi,rauch mor e important were the spoils of the successful war against the Whites.1^ Some of the new recruits were conscripts, or Party volunteers mobilised by the centre. But the most iraportant sources for the new recruits were other Red cavalry units, freshly- incorporated into Budeimyi's cavalry, as well as the raobilisations carried out by the First Cavalry Army's Formations Board, which had been established in Rostov in January 1920 under the leadership of the energetic Efrira Shchadenko.15 Recruitraent would appear to have been the principal duty of Shchadenko, in his role as araeraber o f the railitary council of the First Cavalry Array; and his work certainly bore fruit. An entirely new division, the 14th Cavalry Division, was set up under the coraraand of Alexander Parkhoraenko, the erstwhile comraandant of Rostov. With a strength ofraore than 3,000 sabres in April 1920, the 14th Cavalry Division was forraed on the basis of existing units, as well as recruits frora the local population of south Russia. According to Budennyi, this 13Ibid., V. 4., p. 153 1^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 12. 15 Ibid., V. 1, p. 401. 223 meant workers from the Donbass and Rostov regions along with local inogorodnie and Cossacks. This growth in part took place at the expense of Duraenko's 2nd Cavalry Corps, which had fought as part of the Tenth Army during the campaign against Denikin. Duraenko's colourful Red Array career carae to an end in April 1920, when he was executed by Red Array firing squad for his alleged role in the murder of a commissar attached to his command. The accusation against Duraenko is described in raodem Soviet literature as having been false.16 The 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions that had made up the 2nd Cavalry Corps were now welded on to Budeimyi's command. This was substantial reinforceraent, as 2nd Cavalry Division boasted 2,092 sabres and 9th Cavalry Division 1,100.17 Duraenko's cavalry was used to strengthen the existing 4th, 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions of the First Cavalry Army, as well as to assist in the establishment of 14th Cavalry Division. Duraenko's cavalry grew in the course of the fighting in south Russia and so it would seem likely that Budenny's new recruits represented basically the same mix of inogordnie and Cossacks that existed in the other divisions. Araong the new recruits, two other categories should be singled out for special raention. The Forraations Board was based in Rostov and seems to have recruited heavily in the neighbouring Donbass region, with its sprinkling of towns and mining settlements, an industrial area that had long been transformed into a battlefield. This helps to explain 16 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 201. 17 D.K.F.K.A. V. 4., p. 146. 224 how it was that 22X of the konnoarmeitsy by -the end of the Civil War could be registered as 'workers' as distinct from peasants or Cossacks.18 By and large, they were not front line cavalrymen, but populated the support units in the rear, as well as the political apparatus. These workers were raore likely than the other groups to be raerabers of the Comraunist Party, enthusiastic supporters of the central Soviet government. The other special category among the new recruits was very different to the workers from the Donbass. At least some of the new recruits, though it is not clear how many, formerly served with Denikin's armies. This culling of the prison caraps for Cossacks who could beraade t o serve in the Red Array suggests that it was still difficult for the training centres to produce Red cavalryraen quickly. Some of these units would desert, once the war against the Poles got under way: some even fought alongside the Poles, a fact that confirmed the dangers associated with a policy of using ertwhile enemies, albeit for what was now a war against the Pole and not against fellow Russians.19 The policy of boosting the strength of the First Cavalry Army must be counted as having been a success. The strikepower of Budeimyi's cavalry was increased and, as Budenny was to note later, the number of desertions was far 90 from exceeding manageable levels.-^^ While it is true that 18 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia., p. 3. 19 Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 80. 20 According to Budennyi, there were only two cases of whole units going across to the eneray and these involved forraer White cavalrymen. See Budeimyi's commentary in A. Artishevskii, Ostrog-Dubno-Brody. Boi 18 pekhotnoi divizii c 225 increasing size hampered the mobility of Budeimyi's cavalry, there is little doubt that this strengthening was to prove necessary, given the conditions obtaining in the war against the Poles. The First Cavalry Army was not a raiding party, whose aira was to spread terror and retire at the first sign of concerted resistance. Budenny never had the luxury of that sort of approach. Because of the weakness of the neighbouring Twelfth and Fourteenth Arraies, the burden of the Red Array's attack in the Ukraine fell on the konnoarmeitsy. Strength was needed to take on and defeat the Poles, who had forces rauch larger than those put into the field by the Whites. While there was always a shortage of willing workers, it should be eraphasised that not all the koimoarraeitsy were men. Women served, mainly as part ofraedical teara s or in the support services; but some served at the front. No figures were ever produced in Soviet literature about just how many women were serving with Budennyi's cavalry. Voroshilov's wife, Tatiana, was one of those political workers responsible for the conducting of the campaign for literacy amongst the rank and file. One of the more celebrated of the array's machine gunners was Pavlina Kuznetsova.21 This situation did not come about as a result of the comraitraent of the Bolsheviks to woraen's liberation. Araong the Cossacks, it had long been coraraonplace for those women who wished to take part in military operations to serve in konnoi armiei Budennogo (1 Iulia-6 Avgusta 1920 g.) (Moscow- Leningrad, 1928), p. 13, footnote 1. 21 S. Orlovskii, 'Zhenshina v Konarraii' in Pervaia konnaia v izobrazhenii, pp. 191-96. 226 the front line. The women serving in the ranks of the First Cavalry Army were only following an exaraple set by the conservative Cossack Hosts. This new recruitment was changing the face of the First Cavalry Array. The veterans of the partisan detachments, their numbers already thinned in the course of the Civil War, now found themselves fighting alongside a sudden influx of new recruits. While there are no statistics as to the proportion of veterans and newcomers, it would seem that enough of the old guard remained to form the foundation stone of the array. The First Cavalry Array did not fight like an array that had lost its identity amid a sea of unwilling conscripts. It would be naive to accept the assurances of Soviet writers that the konnoarmeitsy were all, or even mostly, enthusiastic supporters of the central Soviet government and that this was what inspired them in the war against the Poles. It is not only the loyalty of those who had until recently been fighting in Denikin's White Army that requires explanation at this point. It might well be asked why the ex-partisans, who had been fighting for land redistribution in the Cossack lands of south-east Russia and who had been the backbone of Budenny's cavalry during the war against Denikin, would trouble theraselves with raaking a difficult trek to a new front, facing the Poles, for a war that did not directly concern their interests. There must have been a real possibility that Budeimyi's cavalry would disintegrate once the lands of south-east Russia had been retaken. One reason why this did not happen 227 is that the konnoarmeitsy were subject to Red Army discipline. Yet, as was suggested earlier, the threat of disciplinary measures may not have been as powerful an incentive as might be thought. Nor did the First Cavalry Array fight in the manner that might have been expected of unwilling conscripts. Budeimyi's description of what actually happened, at the end of the war against Denikin's armies, in spring 1920 provides some clues as to the attitudes of the rank and file at this point. According to Budennyi, a nuraber of konnoarmeitsy deserted to their horaes, only to return later once they found that their villages had been destroyed, fields abandoned, their farailies dead or gone.22 The would- be deserters were cfuickly accepted back into the fold, apparently without penalty. An experienced cavalrjonan was too rare a commodity to run the risk of alienating hira through disciplinary measures. Given the situation in the villages of the Don, Kuban and Stavropol regions, service with the First Cavalry Army in Poland must have seeraed reasonably attractive. While the konnoarmeitsy had been hungry often enough, there were relatively prosperous tiraes as well. While faraine was in prospect in the south east, service in the array promised regular meals. In one of Babel's stories he has a letter- writer describe how, having reached Voronezh in autumn 1919, 'They gave us two pounds of bread a day, half a pound of meat and the right quantity of sugar so that we drank tea 22 Budennyi, Pervaia konnaia na Donu (Rostov 1969), p. 97. 228 with sugar when we got up and the same in the evening and forgot about hunger'.23 It is not difficult to accept that a hard core of committed Soviet enthusiasts had grown up among the konnoarmeitsy. A corporate identity was built up during the two years of fighting. The prestige of the Soviet govemraent was at its highest following the defeat of Denikin. The govemraent had said that the Whites would be defeated by the Red Army and they were. There was no reason to think that a war against the Poles would be any less victorious. All of this would have helped to produce the loyal core of fighters which could carry along with it the raore apathetic mass. There were desertions; but this onlyraeant th e loss of the type of soldier that the First Cavalry Army could do without. The loyalty of the coraraanders was vitally important. The coraraanders were more likely to be Communist Party merabers. On 15 March 1920, there were 38 commander-Communists in the 4th Cavalry Division and by 1 May 1920 there were 112 or 40^ of the entire staff. In the 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions it was more like 50%.2^ They were likely also to have been motivated by the sarae things that motivate officers in any army: the prestige, pride in a job well done and the material rewards, such as they were. In one of Babel's stories, a letter writer told how his brother, Simon Kurdiukov, became regimental coraraander. This was insisted upon by the rank and file who 23 Babel, Op. cit., p. 44. 2^ Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 17 229 were impressed by his bravery. As a result, he received two horses, decent clothes, a wagon to hiraself for his gear and the Order of the Red Banner.25 For these coramanders, it raay well have been that they viewed a war against the Poles as simply part of their vocation; war, after all, is the business of soldiers. While there had been major personnel changes, there was continuity as well. Just before the march into Poland, when the ailing Gorodovikov, coraraander of the 4th Cavalry Division, had to be replaced, it was by Pavel Litunov, a forraer Don partisan who had become a Bolshevik in 1917. Upon Litunov's promotion, his place was taken as coraraander of the 4th Cavalry Division's first brigade by K. Goncharov, another partisan veteran and ex-Tsarist Non Comraissioned Officer. One of the regiraental coraraanders in this brigade was P. Strepukhov, a fighter with nineteen wounds, who had repeatedly refused proraotion, due to his desire to reraain part of a unit that he had fought with since the outset of the Civil War. The 2nd brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division was commanded by Tiulenev, the graduate of the Red Army's newly- established General Staff Academy, who had earlier performed well as head of the reconnaissance section in the Cavalry Corps, then in the First Cavalry Army. At his own request, he was moved frora the relative safety of the staff to take a front-line position. The third brigade of the 4th Cavalry Division was coramanded by V Korobkov, a battle-hardened Don Cossack, another who had fought alongside Budennyi since the 25 Babel, Op. cit., p. 44. *^IH JOVICT ORIVtt 50VICT c*>yAHY OSLivcs -4 lOv >^itT Tooors rouccD IKTO I WTtBHMCM T foi-isw co SOVIET-POLISH WAR, 1920 231 a small base of party loyalists on which to build even in late 1919; but eventually it had to come. The second factor is that theraarch t o Poland provided the opportunity for political work among the troops that had not existed when they were engaged in full-time fighting against Denikin. Despite the constant irritation of having to skirraish with a nuraber of arraed bands during the march through the Ukraine, the largest of which was controlled by Makhno, this was a relatively peaceful time for the konnoarmeitsy and an ideal opportunity for the conducting of political work. The third factor was almost certainly a perception of the desirablility of doing as much as possible to insure the loyalty of the konnoarmeitsy in what was now a foreign war. It is true that the Cossacks and the Poles were traditional foes; but that was a long tirae ago, and in any case Cossacks onlyraade u p arainority o f the First Cavalry Array. According to Tiulenev, the 'political apparatus, the comraissars and the party organisation' provided the 'ceraent' that prevented the First Cavalry Array from breaking down into its constituent parts.28 This was undoubtedly an exaggeration, for there were other forces that were helping to hold the First Cavalry Array together; but no doubt the political workers played their part. From at most one hundred or so konnoarmeitsy who were Party members in October 1919, the figure had grown to some 800raerabers an d 500 candidate raembers in March 1920. The growth in Party merabership was to be evenraore spectacula r 28 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 3. 232 in the following eight weeks, which included the march to the Ukraine. By raid-May 1920, the number of Party raerabers was 2,153 with over 1,000 candidateraerabers. Whethe r this figure included front-line troops, or the support services as well, is not clear. According to one writer, the proportion of Partyraerabers in the First Cavalry Army was 20%29^ in jyjje 1920 which would mean that the 3,000 members and candidate members were part of the front-line composition of the First Cavalry Array, at that tirae 16,000- sabres strong. If the support services are added to the front-line fighters, then the First Cavalry Array represented a 30,000 strong force. If the 3,000 Party raerabers and candidates in fact belonged to this larger group then the proportion of Party members in the First Cavalry Army was only 10%, and this seems a more realistic figure. This was still slightly higher than the figure for the 'active' Red Army as a whole in mid-1920, which had about 120,000 Party members and candidateraerabers in a force of 1.8 million. The proportion of party faithful overall, therefore was only about 7%.30 It is not clear howraany Party workers were dispatched to the First Cavalry Array by the centre in this period to help with the work of building up the Party organisation in the First Cavalry Array. In October 1919, Budennyi had asked for 300 political workers to be sent. At that tirae, his command was only 7,000 sabres strong. Certainly there was an influx of Party workers during the long march to the 29 kliuev. Op. cit., p. 13. 30 D.K.F.K.A., V. 4, pp., 165, 258. 233 Ukraine. One of those who joined Budeimyi's cavalry was Isaac Babel, who helped to put out Krasnyi kavalerist. The rise in the number of Party members in the First Cavalry Army in the course of the preparations for the war against the Poles was an important development. No doubt some of these conversions to Communism were of the most superficial kind. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that there were few privileges attached to Party membership; and the stories that the Poles took no prisoners among the Communists must have discouraged many of the uncommitted. Party membership had to be earned: it was not a right granted to all cavalrymen. The ideal Communist, first and foremost, was expected to display valour on the battlefield, setting the example for others. In this way, he built his prestige among rank-and-file cavalryraen, developing feelings both of respect and friendship towards hira. He was expected to explain the policies of the Soviet government and the virtues of the war in small-group meetings with 'non-Party' cavalrymen. He had to assist in the build up of Party cells in every unit. He was expected to attend Party meetings and perforra Party tasks, such as free labour for the civilian population. Finally, he had to monitor the behaviour and mood of the cavalrymen, report failings to his superiors and work to correct thera. It is doubtful that many Party members ever approached this ideal. But the ideal must have been inspiration to many and the effort that was made was likely to improve morale. 234 One often-repeated instruction to Coraraunists put the duties of the latter in the following terms, Reraeraber, corarade Coraraunist, that if in your unit there are cases of breaches of discipline, then you are guilty because you troubled yourself so little with the political education of the soldiers. If the Coraraunist cell works weakly then you are guilty because you were silent and said nothing in order that itraight be strengthened. Reraeraber that party-political work cannot stop even for a single day. What discussions did you have today with the soldiers about the Coraraunist Party? If in your unit there are cases of ill-treatraent of the civilian population, then what measures have you taken for the eradication of this evil? Have you explained to the soldiers today that the Red Army advances not to conquer Poland but to help the workers and peasants of Poland get rid of the landlords and the bourgeoisie? These guidelines were rerainiscent of the rules of the Mongol arraies of the thirteenth century whichraade eac h member of a unit responsible with their life for the conduct of the whole unit. There was an element too of the old tradition of collective responsibility within the Russian village. The carapaign of political education did not offer just reproaches and exhortations to the rank-and-file konnoarmeitsy. A raajor literacy carapaign got under way. Reading schools and libraries were set up. By Deceraber 1920, there were some 116 reading schools operating in the First Cavalry Array. This was a war not just against the Poles, but against cultural backwardness as well. As the konnoarmeitsy rode to Poland, boards containing the letters of the alphabet were strapped to their backs, so that those behind could brush up on their reading skills without leaving the saddle. Libraries travelled araong the supply columns; there 31 Ustinov, Op. cit., p. 73. 235 were 60 libraries in March 1920 and 120 in June 1920. The number of books in the mobile libraries grew. Soviet writers describe them according to different categories. In March 1920, the libraries held 91 fictional works, 48 political books and 77 agitational pamphlets. By July 1920, there were 655 fictional books, 231 political books and 367 agitational pamphlets.32 Of great iraportance was the array newspaper, Krasnyi kavalerist. This started off as araodest operatio n but had grown quickly. During the Polish carapaign in 1920, about two-and-a-half million copies of Krasnyi kavalerist, 300,000 copies a month,^"^ saw the light of day and not just in Russian but in Ukrainian and Polish as well.3^ It contained instructions, exhortations, positive news from the battlefield and political education. This was the newspaper that Babel's narrator wrote for. It seems that half the contributions to the newspaper carae from the konnoarmeitsy themselves. Their imagination and writing skills were not put to any great test: there were regular columns in Krasnyi kavalerist entitled 'What you should write about'.35 The variety of educational contributions was now reasonably irapressive. There was even a series of articles dealing with theories about the canals that were purported to have been discovered on the plemet 32 Ibid., T>. 117• 33 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 22. 3^ Ibid., p.22. 35 Ivangorodskii, Op. cit., p. 146. 236 Mars."^" A regular feature in the newspaper was 'illiterates comer', a coluran designed to help the literate to assist the illiterate to learn to read. The rank and file contributed letters which were subject to the usual censorship. Between 1 and 15 August 1920, 194 letters were received from rank-and-file fighters, 36 from the political workers, 28 from the comraissars, 15 frora coramanders, 10 from cultural workers, and 97 from official ^7 correspondents."^' The iconnoarmeitsy also received central, local and array newspapers, though often after considerable delay. Meetings were emother coraponent of the political work undertaken in the First Cavalry Array at this time. In the second half of March 1920, there were 83 meetings; in the second half of April 1920, there were 96; and in the first half of May 1920 there were 182. According to Budenny, these meetings concerned themselves with 'the external and internal policies of the Soviet government, shortcomings among the cavalrymen and theraeasures that were to be taken for their eradication'.38 For raany, theraeetings raust hav e been an unwelcorae chore; but efforts wereraade t o entertain the konnoarmeitsy. Entertainment usually consisted of singing sessions accompanied by harraonica; but concerts and theatre perforraances also became a part of the cultural diet of the konnoarmeitsy. Sometimes performances were given by 36 Ustinov, Op. cit., pp. 115-16. 37 Sidorov, Op. cit., p. 90. 38 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 19, 237 professional troupes, brought from the rear or found araong the local population. More common were amateur theatre perforraances and the singalongs of the konnoarmeitsy theraselves. These were accompanied by araateiu~ orchestras•39 Budennyi obviously considered that this type of activity iraproved morale, for after the Civil War, having been appointed inspector of cavalry, he made it mandatory for each Red cavalry unit to have its own orchestra. In January 1920, there had been a conference of the grandly-named 'cultural-enlightenement workers' in the array with representatives of 30 units attending. It was decided to expand the work of the cultural-enlightenement committees at all levels and to have the cavalrymen join clubs to carry on the work. By June 1920, there were 23 cultural- enlightenment coraraittees in the 4th Cavalry Division. The coraraittees had various sections: choral, literary, musical, theatrical and others. The nuraber of clubs expanded rapidly. There were only 5 clubs in March 1920; by June 1920, every squadron had its own club. It is soraetiraes assumed that party interference in army affairs deraoralised the soldiers and created divisions and jealousies. This raay have been the case, though it is unlikely that such probleras would ever be reported in Soviet literature. Yet we know frora studies of other Coimnunist arraies that it is possible for political work of this kind. 39 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 33. ^0 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 238 suppleraented by a network of Party workers, to make an enormous contribution to improving combat effectiveness.'^l The effect of the literature and meetings in shaping the attitudes of the konnoarmeitsy towards political questions should not be underestimated. For the konnoarmeitsy, this was their first taste of sophisticated politics; andraany n o doubt were irapressed by the ideas of socialist activists. The literacy carapaigns, the concerts, even the meetings, were likely to have helped to convince many araong the rank and file that the coraraand and the Soviet government for which it fought was interested in their welfare. For those who had iraproved their reading ability, the reading raaterial raade available pointed in one political direction. The propaganda of the array's political departraent portrayed the Soviet government as the defender of the toiling masses, their enemies as defenders of privilege and tools of foreign interventionists. While the Red Army was successful, dissenting voices were unlikely to have been heard. For the political workers, life could be hazardous. A constant problem seems to have been the high mortality rate of the political workers in battle. According to Tiulenev there were to be battles in which 20%-25X of the political workers were casualties. So it was necessary to put on courses to train replaceraents. Before 15 March 1920, there was only one party school with 12 participants. A raonth later there were 3 schools with 113 participants.^2 ^1 See, for example, W. Henderson, Why the Vietcong Fought (Westport, 1979), pp. 119-21. ^2 Tiulenev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 16. 239 This is not to suggest a rosy picture of a good Communist army, which operated as its hagiographers would have liked it to have done. One aim of political work in the Red Army was to impress upon the konnoarmeitsy the need to gain support from the local population. The potential for obtaining support from the population was certainly there. The battlefields in the coming war against the Poles were the steppe and forest area of Volhynia and eastern Galicia. These were mainly rural areas, in which the Polish population constituted a small minority, although the Poles had often been the occupying landowners in these parts. The Poles were better represented in some of the towns and forraed a majority of the population in L'vov. In other towns, the Poles were outnumbered by Jews; and the enmity between Pole and Jew was especially strong. At meetings and in Krasnyi kavalerist, the konnoarmeitsy were told that they were to behave as liberators and not as foreign conquerors. This was a war against the Polish landowners and bourgeoisie, in which the civilian population was to be looked upon as an ally. In the villages and towns through which the First Cavalry Array passed, they would hold raeetings and distribute literature. Revolutionary coraraittees were set up and soraetiraes political workers frora the First Cavalry Array stayed behind after the array hadraoved o n to assist in the business of establishing Soviet power. Nor did the cavalryraen raerely talk; work days were organised. For exaraple, it was reported proudly in Krasnyi kavalerist that on 12 July 1920 a work party of 35, including 12 Coraraunists 240 and 23 non-Party people, unloaded 13 wagons of firewood at Zhitorair station for the local population.^3 Despite these efforts, the konnoarmeitsy viere often raet with scepticisra by the war-weary population. Even sorae of the contributors to Krasnyi kavalerist regularly mentioned the initial scepticisra of the villagers towards the Red Array, although they invariably went on to describe how strong links were then built between the array and the people. This was alraost certainly to exaggerate. Supply arrangeraents for the array on the march were never adequate. To a large extent, the cavalrymen had to pillage food, forage and shelter in the areas through which they passed. In one of his stories Babel has the political commissar explaining to the 'bewildered villagers and plundered Jews' that they were free now and that 'You are in power. Everything here is yours.' The irony was that once the army had moved through, there was very little left for the local population to take possession of. Babel's portraits of the Polish campaign provide a stark contrast with the official version of the relations between soldiers and civilians. Babel's storyteller recalled how he had passed his initiation test into the regiment. He slaughtered the only goose in a hut where he was billeted and then ordered the widow whose goose it was to cook it for him, brandishing his sword as he did so. It was in this way ^3 Ustinov, Op. cit., p. 90. ^^ Babel, Op. cit., p. 106. 241 that he gained the necessary respect from his fellow cavalrymen. In another story. Babel described how during the fighting at Leszniow, Volhynian peasants had been drafted and sent to the front. The peasants were 'willing enough' and even the battle-hardened konnoarmeitsy were impressed by their 'muzhik ferocity'. One problem was that this peasant militia could not be supplied with arras: there was only one rifle among three and no cartridges. Not only that, but they were hardly raade to feel welcorae in the ranks of the First Cavalry Array. The brigade coraraander, Maslakov, 'suffused with his drunken blood and the putrescence of his greasy huraour' had led his raen in a raock charge at the would-be peasant infantry, just to let them know who was the real master of the battlefield.^6 The konnoarmeitsy were told of the iraportance of raaking a good irapression on the population of the areas through which the array passed, as befitted an army of liberation. There is little reason to think that much was achieved in this regard. Babel has described the burden that the array iraposed upon the population, the shooting of prisoners and the like. Given the circumstances, it would have been surprising had it been otherwise. The peasants and Cossacks frora south Russia were not raodel soldiers for an array of liberation. Their life in peacetirae had been hard enough. As one student of rural society in Russia has described it, violence was endemic, with the most common manifestations ^5 ibid^, ppT 65_57; ^6 Ibid., pp. 113-15. 242 being 'sudden, angry, massive, drunken brawls or even beastly wife beating'.^7 Mikhail Sholokhov's novel, Tikhii Don, describes in vivid detail the everyday violence of the Cossack lands. The years of revolution and war and the hardships of this particular campaign, served to brutalise thera further. These were hardened fighters existing in conditions of chronic scarcity and constant fighting. Babel's stories point clearly to the incongruity of words and deeds in the political message carried to the local population by the First Cavalry Array.^8 This is not to claira that the Poles fared any better in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population. The Polish Array was popular in Poland; but there is little evidence of it gaining widespread support in the borderlands. Elbert Farraan Jr., an Araerican cavalry major who served as a railitary attache to the Poles, observed that. The attitude of the peasantry, except the Poles,raay in general be characterised by saying that they were tired of war and were imfriendly to whichever array was in occupation. The Jews were at first very imfriendly to the Poles, and raany of the younger ones were Bolsheviks. After the experience of a few weeks of Bolshevik occunation they bec€unerauch raore araicabl e to the Poles.^9 Neither side showed itself capable of galvanising widespread support among a population exhausted by years of ^7 M. Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System (London, 1985), pp. 54-56. ^8 For a sample of the words rather than the deeds, see Ustinov, Op. cit., pp. 82-63. ^9 Farman Jr, Op. cit., p. 224. 243 revolution and war. This was to be,rauch more than "the war against the Whites had been, purely a contest between two arraies. For the First Cavalry Array, the hoped-for social revolution in the areas through which it passed did not eventuate. This was to be a disappointraent; but it by no means doomed the konnoarmeitsy to failure, given that the Polish Army was no more popular in the borderlands than they were. The war would have to be won on the battlefield. Perhaps theraost strikin g fact about the Soviet-Polish War was the reraarkable incongruity of a military contest between two small and hastily-improvised armies that had such enormous conteraporary political significance. The Soviet govemraent saw the contest as a life-and-death struggle, in which the Poles were merely the frontmen of the Allies and the forces of international capital. For the anti-Soviet Poles, it becarae a question of whether Poland would continue to exist as an independent state. For Britain and France, it was a question of whether the Versailles Treaty, the lynchpin of which, according to Winston Churchill, was Poland, was to survive. There wereraany bot h inside and outside Soviet Russia who viewed the contest as a raonuraental episode in world history which was to deterraine 50 whether coramunism was going to spread westwards.^ The war ended in anti-cliraax, because the arraies involved were so weak that neither could achieve a decisive victory over the other, let alone bring about the destruction of coraraunisra or capitalism. The war concluded merely in the establishment of a frontier between Soviet 50 Zaraoyski, Op. cit., p. 1. Davies, Op. cit., pp. ix-xiv. 244 Russia and Poland. Yet for a tirae it had seemed that anything was possible. By mid-July 1920, Poland was on its knees and Britain and France were threatening to intervene. The First Cavalry Army embodied all the contradictions of this war. The world revolution was to be triggered by the efforts of a mounted army that seemed, at least to those who had no first-hand experience of its fighting prowess, to be a relic of centuries past. The communist millenium was to be achieved on horseback by fighters who were barely literate and whose politics were still being shaped in the crucible of the Civil War. The Soviet-Polish War raight be divided into three phases. In the first phase, which lasted frora the last week in April 1920, to the first week in July 1920, the Red Army's South-West Front was first driven back by the Polish invasion of the Ukraine but then, with the First Cavalry Army leading the way, successfully counterattacked and restored the position to what it was before the invasion. In the second phase, which lasted from the first week in July 1920, to the second week in August 1920, the Red Array drove the Poles back all along the front, particularly in Belorussia, and approached Warsaw, the Polish capital. The third phase was the Battle of Warsaw and its afterraath, which lasted frora the second week in August 1920 to the end of the war, in October 1920. This phase represented a defeat for the Red Array. It is the first and second phases of the war that are exarained in the remainder of this chapter. The campaign against the Poles represented a much more difficult proposition for the Red Array inrailitary terras . 245 than the struggle against the Whites. For a start, the Poles had a much larger array. By the end of the war, Poland could count upon an array with a strength of about 700,000, which was equivalent to the norainal front-line strength of the Red Array at that time.51 The largest of the White Armies, Denikin's, never boasted more than 150,000 fighters. The Polish Array could count upon a core of experienced veterans of World War One. Like the Whites, the Polish Array was to receive help frora abroad. During spring 1920, France alone dispatched sorae 1,494 artillery pieces, 2,800 raachine guns, 327,500 rifles, 42,000 revolvers and 350 planes. This was substantial reinforceraent. It can be corapared to the armaraents of the Red Array at the beginning of June 1920, which stood at a raere 720 artillery pieces, 3,200 raachine guns and 68 planes.52 At the start of the war, the Poles suffered frora a lack of cavalry, a situation that took sorae raonths to reraedy. This was offset by the fact that Polish infantry deraonstrated an aptitude for holding ground that the Red cavalry had not raet in the White Arraies. In strategic terras, the war represented a real challenge to planners on both sides, because of the length of the front and the fact that the fighting took place in two theatres. For the Red Array, this meant having a West Front in Belorussia and a South-West Front in the Ukraine. The reason for this was that separating the two fronts were the riverlands of Polesie, otherwise known as the Pripiat' marshes. 51Grazhdanskaia voina (1963) p. 550. 52 D.K.F.K.A., v. 4., p. 427. 246 Throughout 1919, the Poles had been creeping eastwards, with little opposition from the Red Army's feeble West Front in Belorussia. As early as 9 January 1920, Kamenev had ordered Egorov, coraraander of the South-West Front, which had responsibility not only for the war against the reranants of the Whites in the Criraea, but for the defence of the Ukraine as well, to be prepared for a Polish strike against Kiev. Despite this awareness of the danger from the west, the Polish invasion in the last week in April 1920 came at an awkward time for the Red Array. When the Poles struck, the South-West Front coraraander, Egorov, was having to deploy the bulk of his forces against the reranants of the Whites in the Criraea, while only the weak Twelfth and Fourteenth Arraies faced the west. The Twelfth and Fourteenth Arraies between thera could rauster only 15,600 troops.53 On 6 May 1920, the Twelfth Array abandoned Kiev. Soon after, the Poles established a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dneipr river. For the Red Array, it was an inauspicious opening to the Polish war: the situation was to get worse before it got better. Karaenev's answer to the Polish attack in the Ukraine was to draw sorae of the pressure off by launching an attack by the Red Array's West Front in Belorussia. The Red Army's most promising coraraander, Tukhachevskii, was sent to take charge of the West Front and the attack got under way on 14 May 1920. This raove proved a dismal failure. By 14 June 1920, the attack had come to nothing, with Tukhachevskii forced 53 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2., p.261 247 back to his starting point.5^ The situation would improve only in the first week in June 1920, when the First Cavalry Array succeeded in breaking through in the Ukraine. Red Array strategy against the Poles was not soraething that was raasterrainded in Moscow and then dutifully irapleraented by the front-line units. As in the case of the war against Denikin, the front line was the chief influence in determining the shape of Red Army operations against the Poles. This was clearly visible in the First Cavalry Army's initial breakthrough in the Ukraine. There was no great strategy debate that preceded the South-West Front's counterattack in the Ukraine. That was because of the way in which the Polish attack developed, which presented the Red Array with an obvious opportunity to use Budennyi to drive a wedge between two Polish forces. The invasion was undertaken by the Polish South-East Front coraprising, frora north to south, the Third, Second and Sixth Arraies which, in conteraporary Red Array parlance, araounted to the 'Kiev' and 'Odessa' Groups of Poles. The junction between the two Groups was the most obvious point for a Red Army counterattack. It was for this reason that Karaenev had been little perturbed by the initial Polish attack. He had suggested to Egorov, on 29 April 1920, that the Poles' success had reflected their nuraerical superiority. Their rapid advance towards Kiev raeant that the Polish forces there would 'hang in the air', unsupported by their slower-raoving neighbours 5^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 339. 248 to the south.55 Both the Kiev and the Odessa Groups of Poles were left vulnerable to flank blows as a result of the invasion of the Ukraine. Egorov decided that his first priority was the destruction of the Kiev Group of Poles and he produced a plan of the coraing Red Array counterattack on 23 May 1920.56 The Twelfth Army was to attack the Kiev group of Poles from the north, while the First Cavalry Array, 'forraing the chief shock group of the front', was to find a way through the Polish lines and then to encircle and destroy the Kiev Group of Poles frora the south. In so doing, the First Cavalry Array was to have the assistance of the small Yakir, later named Fastov, Group, which comprised the 44th and 45th Infantry Divisions. The Fourteenth Array, farther to the south, was to secure the success of theraain operatio n by continuing to pin down the Odessa Group of Poles. The strategy was too obvious to be described as brilliant: it was the kind of plan that might have been expected of a corapetent soldier, such as was Egorov. Subsequently, Stalin was to be credited with this plan. He was unlikely to have had anything to do with it, given that he only returned to Egorov's headquarters on 28 May 1920.57 Elsewhere, this strategy was credited to Trotsky, again with no justification.58 it would be just as raistaken to overestiraate the contribution raade by the Red Array's 55 jj-^-^-^-^- p^ gi^g^ 56 D.K.F.K.A., v. 3, pp. 158-59. 57 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 67. 58 Davies, Op. cit., p. 122. 249 planners. The plan was ignored by Budennyi, theraan charged with the chief responsibility for its implementation, in one of its most iraportant details. The issue was the depth of the First Cavalry Array's incursion. Egorov and Karaenev came to the conclusion, early in the first week in June 1920, that the First Cavalry Array should raake a shallower envelopment of the Kiev Group of Poles than the one envisaged in Egorov's plan of 23 May 1920, raoving only as far west as Fastov, before turning north, rather than raaking a deep incursion towards Zhitomir or Berdichev.59 Stalin explained the change in strategy in a telegram to Lenin on 4 June 1920: The earlier plan of the Coraraander-in-Chief and the Front coraraander concerning the deep envelopraent of the enemy in the Berdichev-Zhitorair region clearly could not be irapleraented because of a lack of forces. Therefore the old plan has been replaced in agreeraent with the Comraander-in-Chief by a new one which has as its goal a less deep andraore realisti c envelopraent in the Fastov area. If after a week we have taken Fastov then the operation can be considered a suecess.60 The change in plans was not acceptable to Budennyi. In his latter-day account, Budennyi recalled a conversation with Egorov, on 3 June 1920, in which the issue of a shallower envelopraent in the Fastov direction was discussed. According to Budennyi, Egorov had been persuaded to accept Budeimyi's arguraent, that the deep raid originally proposed was necessary in order to afford as rauch 'operative space' as possible to his cavalry.61 It is difficult to square this 59 jj-^^j^-j^j-^ p^ ^^2;^ 60 Ibid. p.693 61 Budennyi, Proidennyi put' v. 2, p.99 250 account with Stalin's confidence in his telegrara to Lenin that the strategy had indeed been changed. When the First Cavalry Army broke through, on 5 June 1920, it bypassed Fastov and headed straight for the deep Polish rear. Both Berdichev and Zhitomir were occupied, albeit briefly, on 7 June 1920. Whether Budennyi had misunderstood Egorov or whether, as seems more likely, he simply chose to go his own way, there can be little doubt that the breakthrough of the First Cavalry Army had the reraarkable effect that it did because it struck blows so deep in the Polish rear. A Polish comraentator would later remark that the Polish coraraand tried to find Budennyi in the area just behind the front lines. Instead, Budennyi was well to the west. The Polish staff in Zhitomir fled just in time, leaving behind trainloads of shells, cartridges and horses. More than 7,000 Red Array prisoners were set free.6-^ The Poles in Kiev soon ceune to the realisation that they were almost cut off. This was what prompted their evacuation of the city on 12 June 1920. As Pilsudski would later acknowledge, the morale of the troops at the front, who were now situated in Budeimyi's rear, sank, while panic afflicted the Polish rear even in far-off places such as Warsaw. 3 it is impossible to credit the Red Array's strategists for the breakthrough, because in the end their plans were not carried out. It was Budeimyi's The Polish opinion is that expressed in Bematskii, 'Srazhenie s Konarraiei na rr. Sluch' i Ubort', Bellona, 1927 and quoted in Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 32. Iz istorii (1986), p. 273. 63 Pilsudski, Op. cit., p. 81, 251 initiative that gave the breakthrough its shape and its subsequent irapact. The Polish lines were penetrated, with arainiraura of fighting. The initial skirraishes of the Red cavalryraen with the Poles that began on 28 May 1920, had revealed the Polish positions. During 4 June 1920, the Poles lost touch with Budennyi who had raade use of the rain and fog to withdraw his forces, then to regroup under the cover of a large forest near Saragorodok. The Poles intended to go on to the attack against Budennyi. Part of the Polish 13th Infantry Division coraraenced an advance, whichraeant that the Polish defensive line was spread even raore thinly. By theraorning o f 5 June 1920, Budennyi concentrated three of his divisions at Saragorodok, with the 6th Cavalry Division in reserve, about a day's raarch behind. A hole was punched in the Polish line.^ The Poles responded with a series of unsuccessful cavalry sorties against Budennyi; but the Polish cavalry at this tirae was no match for its Red counterpart. On that day, 5 June 1920, the First Cavalry Army slipped into the Polish rear. Although it had takenraore than a week to happen, there was really nothing particularly surprising about Budennyi having been able to break through. The Polish forces were spread thinly; and it was alraost inevitable that Budennyi would eventually bring superior forces to bear against a weak point. Pilsudski wrote later that he was unperturbed by 6^ Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, pp. 40-44. Pilsudskii, Op. cit. p. 53 252 these events, which he expected and had, in an atmosphere of relative calm, activated his counterraeasures: the use of cavalry as well as infantry to cut Budennyi off from all sides and then to destroy hira. Pilsudski only becarae alarraed when all his efforts, in the reraainder of June 1920, to destroy Budennyi carae to nothing. This was what raade Budeimyi's breakthrough so iraportant in military terras."^ As Pilsudskii was to acknowledge later, he had little respect for the cavalry initially, having witnessed its abysraal perforraance in World War One. He assumed that the success of Budennyi against the Whites merely proved the weakness of the latter. Along with other Polish generals, Pilsudski was soon required to make a radical reassessment. In his latter-day account, Pilsudski described the impact made by Budeimyi's raid. He recalled the panic and 'paralysing fear' because: Budienny's cavalry became a legendary invincible force in the eyes of our troops which lacked the necc- essary preparation to deal with it; and the further one went from the front the more powerful and irresistable the effect of this unreasoning fear.6' Karaenev would note later how the Poles had by this stage promoted Budennyi to a general and described his army as 'cavalry', not, as they had formerly done, as a 'band'.°° However, the breakthrough did not achieve all that it might have done. Egorov's plan called for the destruction of 65 Ibid7, p. 82^ 66 Ibid., p.75 67 Ibid., p. 83. 68 Kamenev, Op. cit., p.158, 253 the Kiev Group of Poles. This was not to take place. The Polish Third Array at Kiev was badly shaken and forced to retreat; but it was able to raake good its escape to the north west along the Korosten' railroad. Some Polish writers considered that Budennyi failed to press home his advantage.69 Upon closer inspection, it turns out that if an error was raade, then it occurred higher up the Red Army chain of command. The blame for this missed opportunity lay with an error of judgement committed by the usually-reliable Egorov. It was made worse by the intervention of Kamenev, for this gave rise to a last-minute change in plans that brought about an outcome that was much less favourable than the Red Array hoped for. On 9 June 1920, Budennyi was in radio contact with the headquarters of the South-West Front, reporting the position of the First Cavalry Array as the Kornin area. He intended to strike in a north-easterly direction towards Fastov, with the aim of completing the encirclement, together with the Twelfth Array of the Kiev Group of Poles. This was in keeping with Egorov's original strategy. On 10 June 1920, Egorov replied with an order for the First Cavalry Army to abandon that plan, on the grounds that they were no longer needed 'to the east', that is, at Kiev. Instead, Egorov wanted the First Cavalry Army to turn to the south west and to take 70 possession once more of Zhitomir, as well as of Kazatin.'" 69 See the opinions quoted in Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia., p. 38. 70 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3., p. 178 254 Egorov's reasoning was to become apparent in the course of his conversation with a dumbfounded Karaenev on 11 June 1920. Egorov described the Poles at Kiev as 'retreating in disarray', pursued by the Twelfth Array and the Fastov Group. Egorov evidently considered that as much as possible had already been achieved at Kiev. He wanted the cavalrymen at Zhitorair and Kazatin as 'the starting point for the second stage of the operation', in which the attention of Budennyi was to be switched to the south west and the Odessa Group of 71 Poles.'-^ Egorov miscalculated in thinking that the Third Army had already left Kiev and that only stragglers remained. The Poles abandoned Kiev only on 12 June 1920. As Karaenev pointed out, Egorov was proceeding to the second phase of the operation before having corapleted the first. The hesitation of the Poles at Kievraight hav e proved fatal to thera had Budennyi continued in the direction of Kiev on 10 June 1920. After his conversation with Kamenev, Egorov came to doubt the wisdom of his latest instructions to Budennyi. He now changed his orders to the cavalryraen and issued new instructions which reached Budennyi on the same day as the Poles abandoned Kiev.72 Worse, the orders frora Egorov were indecisive, in that he instructed Budennyi to divide his force and to cover two different directions: two divisions were to be sent to Zhitomir and Kazatin and the other two were to cut the Kiev-Korosten' railroad with the aim of assisting the Twelfth Army and the Fastov group in the destruction of the Kiev Group of Poles. Complicating the 71Ibid.,V. 3, pp. 178-84 72 Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia. , p. 41 255 matter was that, by this tirae Budennyi, like Egorov, had corae to see the Odessa Group of Poles as the logical target for his cavalryraen. He then queried the latest order frora Egorov, further adding to the delay. 73 Finally on 14 June 1920, Budennyi sent the 4th and 14th Cavalry Divisions, under the overall coraraand of Voroshilov, to Korosten'. The Poles fought desperately to make good their escape along the Korosten' railroad and Voroshilov's two divisions, along with the Twelfth Array and the Fastov Group, could not hold them. The Polish Third Army would live to fight another day. As it turned out, Egorov would undoubtedly have been better served had he persisted in his error and allowed Budenny to head to the south west into the rear of the Odessa Group of Poles. In the event, neither the Kiev nor the Odessa Groups of Poles was destroyed. To obtain complete victory, the Red Array would have to pursue the Poles and occupy Poland itself, a task that would ultiraately prove beyond the Red Array. Not too rauch should beraade o f the failure to coraplete the encircleraent. Such a failing was a coraraon occurrence in the Civil War. The lack of forces, the vast spaces and the difficulty of coordinating units with the equipment then availableraade the corapletion of an encirclement a difficult task indeed. In this case, the task was made even more difficult by the miscalculations and indecisiveness of the Red Array coraraand. The breakthrough of the First Cavalry Array 73 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 184. Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 41. 7^ Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, pp. 49-52. 256 was still a treraendous success. In the weeks that followed, the Poles were to be brought to their knees by the Red Array advance; but they were not to be conquered. With the Poles in retreat, the First Cavalry Array was now airaed at Rovno, the junction at which the railroads that led west to Lublin and L'vov raet. It was Pilsudski's headquarters at the start of the invasion of the Ukraine. The only sealed road in the area joined Kiev with Rovno. The Rovno 'corridor' represented an area of relatively open upland, between the riverlands to the north and the heavily- forested area to the south. By heading towards Rovno, it was intended that Budennyi would drive a wedge into the Polish forces in the Ukraine with the more northerly group being pressed towards the Pripiat' marshes, while the Poles to the south would have to fall back towards the Romanian frontier. In the second half of June 1920, the South-West Front made steady progress. Korosten' fell to the Twelfth Army on 19 June 1920. The Poles were intent on blocking Budennyi by building up the garrison at Novograd-Volynsk, but this only succeeded in slowing Budennyi's progress. On 27 June 1920, Novograd-Volynsk was occupied by the First Cavalry Army. On 4 July 1920, the First Cavalry Army entered Rovno. The town was recaptured by the Poles on 10 July 1920, but the following day was once more in Budeimyi's hands. The invasion of the Ukraine had turned into a disaster for the Poles. It was now Poland itself that was facing invasion. The breakthrough was not just a question of finding a weak point in the Polish lines. Budeimyi's cavalry had to learn how to deal with a new enemy, one that was very 257 different to the Whites. On 26 May 1920, Egorov provided Budennyi with what inforraation he had about how the Poles were likely to fight. According to Egorov, the Poles pushed forward in sraall groups, atterapting to lure Red Array units forward, and then responding with a decisive counterattack. Egorov believed that the Polish cavalry was weak and raostly resorted to fighting dismounted. He predicted that the Polish cavalry would attempt to manoeuvre in such a way as to force the Red cavalrymen into the path of the Polish infantry.75 He also warned that the Poles had dug trenches all over the western Ukraine. This was all very well, but it did not provide any solutions to the principal problem that would beset the cavalrymen and that was how to overcome the strong Polish infantry, which made use of trenches and barbed wire, as well as much more concentrated firepower than the Red cavalrymen had been used to when fighting the Whites. Budennyi experienced so little success in the first week of operations against the Poles that there had to be a review of tactics by the Red cavalrymen. On 2 June 1920, coraraanders of the First Cavalry Array were called to a specialraeeting t o discuss the question of how to pierce the Polish defences. It was obvious that mounted attacks would have to be used sparingly against such an opponent and that there would need to be an even greater reliance upon firepower. The range of weapons available to the konnoarmeitsy was limited in a number of important areas. There were no 75 D.k^F.k7A., V. 3, p. 160. 258 howitzers to fire shells at a high trajectory against the Polish trenches; and the horse artillery of the First Cavalry Army was inadequate in these conditions.76 Dismounted actions were hampered because the Red Army had very few light machine guns. While captured equipnent would raake up for shortfalls in these key areas, for theraost part it was necessary to fashion tactics that corapensated for the deficiencies. It was decided that, should the enemy be chiefly infantry, occupying defensive positions, dismounted units raust atterapt to paralyse the opponent frora the front, while raounted units were thrown against the flank or rear. Mounted attack was to be atterapted only if the eneray was caught by surprise. Counterattacks by the eneray were to be raet by disraoimted units. They would feint to retreat, bringing the eneray if possible under the blows of a mounted reserve, which should have concealed itself in a forest or gully. It was decided that the machine gun tachanky and horse artillery would have to make greater use of their mobility in order to establish cross-fire zones.77 The difficulties of the situation that confronted the konnoarmeitsy at Novograd-Volynsk were typical of what they would face throughout the remainder of the Polish campaign. The Poles had mustered a considerable force at Novograd- Volynsk, providing the town with a garrison of about 21,000 infantrymen, 3,000 cavalry, 360 machine guns and 60 artillery pieces. The First Cavalry Army, with the support 76 Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 177. 77 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2., p. 98. 259 of the 45th Infantry Division, numbered about 3,000 infantry, 16,500 cavalry, 670 machine guns and 100 artillery pieces.78 The Poles had strengthened their defences with trenches and barbed wire. There was also the useful natural barrier of the Sluch' river.79 The numbers favoured the Poles, because it was Budennyi who had to carry the burden of the attack. A frontal assault in such conditions would have been suicidal. Instead, Budennyi manoeuvred his forces, searching for a weak point. His standard tactic was to employ one division in a diversionary attack in one direction while the remaining three divisions regrouped in another direction. If this failed, Budennyi would try again in another direction. Sirailar tactics obtained at the divisional level, where the divisional coraraander used one brigade to pin down the eneray frora the front, while the reraaining two brigades probed for RO weak points in the flank and rear."" Zaraoyski has written that Budennyi did not understand the importance of manoeuvre and was rather a commander who knew only the direct approach, that is, the charge from the front.81 This was not the view of one contemporary and neutral observer. Elbert Farman Jr. witnessed the attack on Novograd-Volynsk and described how Budennyi succeeded through a combination of stealth and manoeuvre: While Budenny created the impression that his whole 78 Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 395. 79 Farman Jr., Op.Cit. p. 238. 80 Kosogov, Op. cit., p. 177. 81 Zaraoyski, Op. Cit., p. 102. 260 force was near Novgrad Volynsk a part of his force crossed the Slutch to the south, and was quickly followed by the reraainder whereupon the Poles withdrew to the Gorin.82 The same observer was impressed by Budeimyi's methods and considered that Budenny was 'a model to be followed': Budennyi invariably tried encirclingraovements in order to reach the rear of his opponent without fighting. If he ran into opposition, he did not persist but tried elsewhere. A second or third failure did not discourage him. With great determination he kept on trying. Having four divisions at his disposal, he could feel the line at different points with part of his force while the reraainder was in reserve, ready to exploit a success. These tactics were very effective for The Poles, having repulsed him at many points, would congratulate themselves on their success when Budenny, having found the unguarded point, would pass through and suddenly appear in the rear. Confusion and retreat resulted for the Poles usually almost without battle. In this method of handling cavalry, Budenny may be regarded alraost as araodel t o be followed. When it had raade its initial breakthrough in the Ukraine, the First Cavalry Array acted as a compact mass. Having broken through, it became necessary to spread out in order to stretch the enemy's defences and to locate the points of least resistance. Each division was given a particular task, with considerable latitude allowed to the divisional commanders. Budennyi positioned hiraself with the staff of any division that had a particularly difficult task, or that was under heavy enemy pressure. In the case of operations at Rovno, Budennyi was with the 11th Cavalry Division, which occupied the central position in the attack. 82 Farman Jr., Op. cit., p. 238. 83 Ibid. p. 231. 261 Although the konnoarmeitsy had set tactical guidelines for theraselves at the outset of the carapaign, each battle was a tactical iraprovisation. As Kosogov later described it, In these conditions it was irapossible to operate on the basis of a worked-out plan. The plan carae into being in the battle itself when the divisional chief along with his chief-of-staff rode forward, personally conducted reconnaissance and received the reports of the forward units. Improvisation was a necessity: the plan of attack was formulated on the spot. According to Kosogov: As the brigades approached, a plan of battle was formulated and the instructions given to the brigade coraraander either directly or by field notes and they, having readied their coramands, transferred to the attack. Because a situation characterised by chance and often unexpected encounters promised raany suprises, one of the brigades was usually kept in reserve by the divisional coraraander. As usual, Budennyi's cavalry operated with great independence frora the the front coraraand. For the Polish campaign, Budeimyi's staff coraprised two parts: a basic staff, which was to be established at Elisavetgrad; and a field staff, which was to raove with the array. Kliuev, the ex-Tsarist colonel who had previously comraanded the Tenth Array, was put in charge of the basic staff, while Zotov continued to run the field staff. South-West Front coraraander Egorov ordered that both the basic and the field staffs should have their own links with the South-West Front's field staff in Kreraenchug, so as to ensure that there were daily reports.85 8^ Kosogov, Op.cit., p. 177. 85 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', pp. 75-76. 262 Egorov's basic staff was way to the rear in Kharkov. He hoped that this arrangement would allow the management of his arraies to proceed sraoothly. This would prove to be wishful thinking on Egorov's part. Once in the Polish rear Budenny had to depend upon a temperaraental radio or else on raessages passed by pony express. There were constant problems and delays. The konnoarmeitsy were on their own for much of the time. The operations of Budeimyi's cavalry, in this period, should not be described as a 'raid'. That would imply a fast-moving force travelling light in the enemy's rear. The First Cavalry Army was nothing like the elusive Maraontov and his raiding party in August and Septeraber 1919. Instead, it was a lumbering giant with a rear following behind, just like any infantry array. Each regiraent had up to 400 transports trailing behind. The First Cavalry Array might have achieved even more, had it been a leaner force. Yet it was still able to move quickly enough to surprise the Poles; and added sizeraeant adde d strikepower. In his advance towards Rovno, Budennyi was assisted by the fact that the two main parts of the Polish Second Army were uncoordinated in their operations. This was because neither was particularly confident about taking on the First Cavalry Array. Having failed to hold Budennyi at the Goryn' river, the Polish coraraand realised that it could not raaintain itself in Rovno. On 4 July 1920, the Poles abandoned the town to the Red cavalrymen. During this battle, about 700 Poles were killed, while a further 1,000 were taken prisoner. This was a big tally for a Civil War 263 engageraent. It was evidence that Budeimyi's cavalry could not only frighten an eneray: it could kill hira as well. Abandoned in Rovno were 1,500 horses, artillery pieces, machine guns, a radio station and an armoured train. The capture of Rovno was araajor triump h for the Red Army. From this point, victories came in quick succession. In July 1920, the Poles were threatened, not just by the forces of the South-West Front, but by Tukhachevskii's West Front as well. Tukhachevskii was unable to make any significant progress in his offensive in May 1920. Budeimyi's breakthrough dramatically changed the situation. Part of the Polish force facing Tukhachevskii in Belorussia wasraoved t o the Ukraine, in an atterapt to slow the progress 87 of the First Cavalry Array.° As the strength of the Poles in Belorussia diminished, that of the Red Army's West front grew, as reinforcements arrived. Two new armies, the Third and Fourth Arraies, were created, along with a powerful 3rd Cavalry Corps. It was forraed frora the merger of the 10th and 15th cavalry divisions and was put under the coraraand of Gaia Gai. This meant that, at the beginning of July 1920, the West Front boasted about 92,000 fighters, facing sorae 72,000 Poles. Although Gai's cavalry araounted to only 3,000 sabres it proved to be of great value, operating on the far right of the front, continually turning the flank of the Poles, and threatening thera with encircleraent.88 86Grazhdanskaia voina (1983), p. 503. 87 Zaraoyski, Op. cit., p. 78. 88 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2., p. 280. 264 On 26 June 1920, Karaenev ordered Tukhachevskii to quicken preparations for a new offensive, so that the West and South-West Fronts raight go forward together. Tukhachevskii's offensive got under way on 7 July 1920. It was raade possible, as a recent Soviet publication has put it, because: the successful counteroffensive of the Soviet forces in the Ukraine created favourable conditions for the transfer to a general offensive of the West and South- West Fronts.89 What is described in Soviet literature as the 'July Offensive of the West Front' was a great success, taking its arraies raore than six hundred kiloraetres in the space of a raere seven weeks. It came to an end only at the gates of Warsaw, the Polish capital. Tukhachevskii relied on his overall numerical advantage and on the mobility of Gai's cavalry on the right flank as well as the general demoralisation of the Poles following the reverses suffered by their armies in the Ukraine. He concentrated his forces at selected points along the Polish lines, not bothering with holding back a reserve. He was confident that the thinly-held Polish line would crurable and that there would be no effective counterattack. It was a garable that paid off: the Poles fell back in a precipitate retreat. By 11 July 1920, Minsk, the capital of Belorussia, was in the hands of the Red Array. By 1 August 1920, Tukhachevskii reached Brest-Litovsk on the Bug river. Budeimyi's win in the Ukraine and the advance by the West Front that it triggered off, brought about what proved 89 Ibid.7 V'. 2, p. 282 265 to be the greatest success of the Red Array's war against the Poles. That was the favourable peace terras suggested in a note from the British government under the signature of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. The British persuaded the Poles to accept a border, running north to south along the Bug river, that left ethnic Poland intact, but which recognised the borderlands to the east as being Soviet. The Curzon note was an admission by the eneraies of the Soviet govemraent that the Red Array had the Poles at its raercy. If the Soviet govemraent had called a halt at this point, the Soviet-Polish War would have been recorded as a monumental victory for the Red Army. Tragically, from the Red Army's point of view, it was decided to test the Red Army beyond the natural frontiers of Soviet Russia. The Red Army was not yet up to the task. Despite the Red Array's failure in the Battle of Warsaw, in raid-August 1920, the efforts of the First Cavalry Array were not entirely in vain. The plans of the Poles and the Ukrainian nationalists, to set up an independent Ukrainian state, carae to nothing; and there would be no atterapt to revive this idea. Budeimyi's success in the Ukraine was araple confirraation that the Soviet govemraent's western neighbours lacked the strength to challenge the forraer's control over this area. The achieveraent of the First Cavalry Array in the second half of July and the first half of August 1920 was not as spectacular as that of the previous six weeks. Budeimyi's cavalry becarae embroiled in costly fighting on the road to 266 L'vov, in the triangle formed by the towns of Dubno, Ostrog and Brody. Its progress was slow and by the end of the first week in August 1920, Budennyi had been forced on to the defensive. Moreover, given that the Red Army's invasion of Poland was to collapse at the gates of Warsaw in mid-August 1920, the fight for L'vov represented something of a waste of effort and lives. Yet this is obvious only in retrospect and it has to be realised that the First Cavalry Army's efforts in the southern theatre of Red Army operations in the second half of July and first half of August 1920 raade an enormous contribution to the spectacular gainsraade by the Red Array in the northern theatre in this period. In the second half of July 1920, the progress of the First Cavalry Array, while not as spectacular as it had been in the previous month, by no means ground to a halt: its achievement was substantial. By mid-July 1920, the First Cavalry Array was consolidated to the west of Rovno, which raeant that it had advanced nearly 300 kiloraetres since the initial breakthrough. This had taken about seven weeks. Four weeks later, in mid-August 1920, the First Cavalry Army was at the gates of L'vov, which is about 200 kilometres south west of Rovno. In this period, the First Cavalry Array continued to pin down significant Polish forces, thus facilitating the westward advance of Tukhachevskii's West Front. After the fall of Rovno, the Poles fell back to the next defensive barrier, which was forraed by the rivers Styr' and Ikva. Budennyi acted quickly; on 14 July 1920, the 11th and 14th divisions crossed the Ikva and occupied Dubno. By 21 267 July 1920, Budennyi had established bridgeheads on the western banks of the Ikva and the Styr' rivers, having cleared the Poles out of an area that stretched frora Rozhishe in the north to Verba in the south. The centre of the fight was raoving out of the Ukraine, towards eastern Galicia. On 23 July 1920, the First Cavalry Array received from Egorov the mission of capturing L'vov. For the next two weeks, Budennyi was engaged in heavy fighting in and aroimd the town of Brody, en route to L'vov. In July 1920, Tukhachevskii's West Front outstripped the First Cavalry Array and its neighbouring armies of the South- West Front. It would be wrong to describe the continuing war in the south, as has one Western writer, as an 'irrelevance' in July 1920, in comparison with 'the raain trial of strength', which was taking place in the line of advance of the West Front.90 This is to succumb to a misunderstanding of Polish strategy in July 1920, and toraisplace th e real centre of gravity of the Polish war at this tirae. Pilsudski's strategy, during July 1920, was to give priority to the defeat of Budennyi, even though it was Tukhachevskii's West Front that was airaed directly at Warsaw. Farraan Jr. noted this fact, though he found it puzzling, describing how: While the fate of the whole operation hung upon the operations in the north the Poles at the end of July were preparing for their counter-offensive against Budenny in the south.91 90 Davies, Op.cit. p. 202. 91 Farraan, Op. cit., p. 226. 268 Pilsudski, in his latter-day account, was quite explicit about his strategy when he wrote that, in mid-July 1920: (1) The northern front was to confine itself to gaining tirae. (2) Throughout the country, there was to be an intense preparation of reserves. These reserves I would direct towards the Bug, in order not to involve them in the rearguard battles in the northern front; (3) I would finish with Budieimy and withdraw from the south as large a force as possible for the counter attack which it was my intention to launch frora the neighbourhood of Brzesc.92 For Pilsudski, everything depended on his being able to 'finish with Budieimy'. His reasoning was that the one truly dangerous eleraent in the Red Array's invasion force was the First Cavalry Array. His aira was to bring superior forces to bear against Budennyi in the south, defeat the Red cavalry, then turn all his forces against Tukhachevskii's West Front. During July and up to the end of the first week in August 1920, the fighting in the south was not a secondary theatre. The Polish troops in the south were Pilsudski's best, the ones that had been selected for the invasion of the Ukraine. The troops facing Tiikhachevskii in Belorussia were placed there chiefly for defensive purposes. Pilsudskii later corapared the quality of troops on the two fronts, when discussing their raorale: Whereas I saw that this (raorale) was rapidly weakening in the north, in the south I observed a kind of raoral stiffening... In the south they continued to show considerable powers ofraanoeuvre an d returned continually to the fight. These battles, even when they were not victorious, daily diminished the forces of our principal enemy, Budienny, and it was difficult for him to obtain reinforcements.93 92 Pilsudski, Op. cit., p. 230. 93 Ibid., p. 146. 269 Arguably the best Polish unit was the 4,000-strong 18th Infantry Division which, in July 1920, waged a keenly- contested duel with the First Cavalry Army. While the First Cavalry Army continued toraake ground , it was not to achieve its objective of occupying L'vov. This was a great victory for the Poles: Budennyi had been slowed at last. In raid- August 1920, when the 18th Infantry Division was transferred from the front facing Budennyi northwards, in order to assist in the Battle of Warsaw, it cut through Tukhachevskii's left flank with disconcerting ease. The konnoarmeitsy failed repeatedly to meet the timetable set for thera by Egorov. The original date set for the capture of L'vov was 31 July 1920. At that tirae the konnoarmeitsy were still erabroiled in fighting in the Brody area, the toughest and raost costly for thera in the entire Polish carapaign. According to Budennyi, the Poles had a strength of about 10,000 fighters. By this tirae, the First Cavalry Array was only about the same strength.9^ A new factor was becoming increasingly iraportant and that was the sheer exhaustion of the First Cavalry Array. On 26 July 1920, the First Cavalry Array was able to occupy Brody. It was a hollow victory. Although surrounded, the Poles succeeded in raaking good their escape, under the cover of night and of a nearby forest. A Polish participant 9^ Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 230. This estiraaate of Polish strength is supported by Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., p. 228. According to their analysis, the strength of the 18th Infantry Divison was 4,000 fighters while that of the reraaining two brigades of the 2nd Army was about 3,000 each, giving a total of 10,000 Polish troops who were chiefly concerned with holding up and defeating Budennyi in the last week of July 1920. 270 and latter-day historian has left a graphic description of the events: The furious sound of the enemy's artillery, the crackle ofraachine guns, unceasing shouts of 'hurrah' frora around the town, the groans of the wounded on the streets were rerainiscent of theraost hard-fought battles of the World War. Although the storming of well-defended positions had never been their strong suit, the konnoarmeitsy were still fighting with considerable deterraination. According to the sarae observer: The eneray advanced with incredible ferocity, dis mounted rather than mounted, on each of the approaches to the town but particularly frora the south towards the railroad station and from the north east. The attacks were beaten back by the furious fire of our raachine guns. New lines of dismounted attackers approached our positions. The attack lasted about half an hour; the eneray was thrown back suffering big losses.95 By this tirae, both sides were exhausted: it was a question of which side would have to call a halt first. There was evidence of disintegration in units of the Polish Second and Sixth Arraies facing Budennyi. In the end, it was Budennyi who had to call a temporary halt to proceedings. The escape of the 18th Infantry Division from Brody was a blow for the konnoarmeitsy. This part of east Galicia had been a raajor battlefield of World War One. It was littered with trenches and barbed wire, left over from that conflict. The Polish infantry raade good use of them. Budennyi was to recall how, for the first time, he came across the strange 95 A. Artishevskii, Ostrog-Dubno-Brody (Moscow 1928), pp. 232-34 96 Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., p. 249. 271 sight of concrete pill boxes. According to Budennyi, the Poles even used chemical weapons. Gas masks had to be called up from the rear. This was a total war for both sides. In the First Cavalry Army, the nurses were armed and took the places of fallen front-line cavalrymen.97 In June 1920, casualties were kept to a minimum because the First Cavalry Army was able to outraanoeuvre an d terrify the enemy. Among the trenches, rivers and fortified towns of eastern Galicia, the going was particularly tough for the Red cavalry. It was not designed to be used as a battering ram. To wear down an opponent in a war of attrition was a task for infantry, not cavalry. The problem for the Red Army's South-West Front was that it lacked the infantry needed to enable Budennyi to withdraw, to be given a raission to which it was better suited. Much raore frightening than gas, or even the occasional tank thrown at thera by the Poles, was the superiority of the latter in air power. Fire frora the air was a deadly adversary for large groups of cavalry. The konnoarmeitsy had no defence, except to look for cover in the forests. They had no anti-aircraft guns. While units were set aside for combat with eneray planes, they had to rely upon machine gun and rifle fire, which was ineffective. One of Babel's stories was about the impotence of the cavalryraen in these circumstances, when he described the failure of two cavalrymen to shoot down with machine guns a sqaudron of planes led by the American airman. Major Font Le Roy. 97 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 43. 272 According to Babel, the Americans fought with considerable skill: They dropped to a height of three hundred metres and with their machine guns shot up first Andie and then Trunov. None of the shots fired by ourraen di d the Araericans any harra, and they flew off to one side without spotting the squadron hidden in the forest. So, after waiting half an hour we were able to ride out and fetch the corpses.98 The Poles kept up the pressure. Theyraoved raainly a t night, which wore out Budeimyi's horses as the horse is an animal which finds it difficult to sleep during the day. The Poles worked overtime to build their own cavalry. The fruits of this labour were now sent against Budennyi, all ten regiments. This meant that the Poles now had arauch better- balanced force. Losses among the konnoarmeitsy were mounting. In the last week in July 1920, the 11th Cavalry Division lost all its brigade coraraanders and half its regiraental commanders and comraissars. On 2 August 1920, Budennyi inforraed Egorov that, in recent struggles, losses amounted to 50X of the command staff and 4,000 rank-and-file soldiers. The loss of experienced fighters in battle impaired the fighting capacity of the Red cavalry.99 Budennyi may have exaggerated somewhat, given that he was at the time making a case to Egorov for his cavalrymen to be given a rest. Some of these casualties were likely to have been infantrymen attached to the First Cavalry Array. Even so, the losses araong the cavalry raust have been considerable. 98 Babel, Op. cit., p. 132. 99 L. Kliuev Op.Cit., p.109. Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., p. 249. 273 According to the Polish writer quoted above, Budennyi persisted with mounted attacks for too long, when dismounted attacks would have produced better results.100 if this was the case, then it most likely reflected the frustration of the konnoarmeitsy. Polish resistance, infantry and artillery, was not as easily broken down as the Whites had been by machine gun and artillery fire. Thisraeant that it was difficult to know when it was safe to attack the deraoralised eneray on horseback. The over-anxious /coimoarmeitsy paid dearly for their irapatience. Another of Babel's stories conveys the flavour of this period. The story takes the forra of a letter written by a divisional coraraander to a forraer cavalryraan: Our Comraunist Party, corarade Khlebnikov, is an iron band of fighting raen that give their blood in the first rank and when blood flows frora iron it is no joke, corarades, but araatter o f win or die. It is the same thing with the coraraon cause whose dawn I shall not live to see, as the fighting is heavy and I have to change coraraanders once a fortnight. I have now been fighting for thirty days in the rearguard, covering the invincible First Cavalry Array, and I am under the active fire of the enemy's aircraft and artillery. Tardy has been killed, Lukhmannikov has been killed, Lykoshenko has been killed, Gulevoy has been killed, Trunov has been killed, and the white stallion is no longer beneath me.11 The First Cavalry Army found that the rear was unable to reinforce the front. During the entire campaign, the First Cavalry Army received only 90 fresh coraraanders and 1,633 rank-and-file cavalryraen. The First Cavalry Array began the carapaign with 16,000 sabres, but by its end was down to 100 Artishevskii, Op.cit., p. 175. 101 Babel, Op. cit., p.141. 274 10,000.102 The reinforceraent was not sufficient toraake up for the losses, especially if the First Cavalry Array was to be used as a battering rara against an eneray that had dug itself in. Egorov did what he could to help Budennyi. On 2 August 1920, he took the 8th Cavalry Division frora the 14th Array and subordinated it to Budennyi. This was too little, too late: the konnoarmeitsy had fought theraselves to a standstill. The final straw came when, on 5 August 1920, the Polish 18th Infantry Division succeeded in reoccupying Brody. The next day, Budennyi inforraed Karaenev direct that the First Cavalry Array had gone on to the defensive. Karaenev agreed to this: he had little option. On 8 August 1920, Egorov put out an order that assigned Budennyi to front reserve.103 The attack on L'vov would not be resuraed until 13 August 1920. It was not to be rauch of a rest for the First Cavalry Array. While its positions were supposed to be taken by infantry of the Twelfth Array, for theraost part these units did not exist or were ineffectual. Budennyi has been criticised for fighting what proved to be a tirae-consuming and costly battle at Brody.10^ The only alternative was to press on deeper into the Polish rear, occupying space but without bringing the enemy to battle. This would have been suicidal because, given the weakness of its neighbouring Twelfth and Fourteenth Armies, such a move would have left the First Cavalry Army completely isolated. 102 j^Jj^^g^^ ^^ -r^^^ pp^ J, ^jQ_4i ^ 103 D.K.F.K.A. V. 3, p. 242 10^ Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., p. 251, 275 with no raeans of escape. Budeimyi'sraoveraents wer e often bold, but seldora reckless. His success had corae partly from his ability to hurl his cavalry into the flank and the rear of an enemy. But just as iraportant an ingredient in his successes was his ability to know when it was necessary to turn his attention on those eneray forces that threatened his own rear and flanks. Having taken Dubno, in the third week in July 1920, Budennyi was confronted with the bulk of the Polish 2nd Array to the north east and the 18th Infantry Division to the south. He knew it would be pointless to proceed unless these powerful eneray groups were destroyed. As the neighbouring infantry was manifestly not capable of doing the job, it had to be the mission of the First Cavalry Array. Araajor probler a for the South-West Front, in the second half of July 1920, was that so much depended on the First Cavalry Array. Yet, the raonths of continuous fighting and raarching was wearing this force out. A force such as the First Cavalry Array should have been used purely as a shock weapon, for a specific raission, such as the initial breakthrough to Rovno, then rested, while the infantry consolidated the breach and prepared the way for a further breakthrough. This option was not available to Egorov, because his Twelfth and Fourteenth Armies lacked the size and corabat effectiveness necessary to tie down their Polish opponents. The Twelfth and Fourteenth Arraiesraade ground only because the First Cavalry Array acted like araagnet, drawin g to it the bulk of the Polish forces facing the South-West Front, 276 making the passage of the Twelfth and Fourteenth Amies easier.-^"'-105^ Budennyi's difficulties in late July and early August 1920, should have represented an ominous warning to the Soviet government that all was not well with the invasion of Poland. The First Cavalry Array represented the best of the Red Array and the tempo of its advance had been slowed from a gallop to a crawl. The Soviet govemraent should have viewed this as proof that it was best to accept the frontier offered in the Curzon note. By this time, Lenin and the leading Bolsheviks, as well as the high coraraand, were convinced that Poland was on the verge of collapse. They were taken in by the spectacular advance of Tukhachevskii's West Front during July 1920. What they did not realise was that Tukhachevskii was able to achieve the success that he did only because Budennyi was pinning down the best of the Polish Array in the south. With Budenny no longer performing that task, it was surely time to call a halt. Sadly for the Red Army, the invasion continued. Even the usually cautious Stalin was enthusiastic about the invasion by this time: on 4 August 1920 he reassured Lenin that Budennyi was experiencing raerely a 'teraporary hitch'.106 in reality, the fighting at Brody constituted a sea change in the war. The tide was turning in favour of the Poles. With Budennyi finally forced on to the defensive at the end of the first week in August 1920, Pilsudski was able to 105 Tiulenev, Op. cit., p. 171. 106 D.K.F.K.A., p. 244. 277 withdraw sorae of his forces frora the south to build up for his last-ditch conterattack in the Lublin area. Within three weeks the Red Army's invasion of Poland would end in disaster. 278 Chapter Seven: War On Two Fronts July-August 1920 Up till August 1920, the campaigns of the Red Army in the Civil War were success stories, terapered by the occasional defeat along the way. This pattern was broken when, in August 1920, the Red Array's invasion of Poland carae to a disastrous end in the Battle of Warsaw, where the Red Army suffered its most humiliating defeat of the Civil War. There has always been a suggestion, in both Western and much Soviet literature, that the First Cavalry Array let the side down in the later stages of the war against the Poles. In theraonth that followed the capture of Rovno, in raid-July 1920, the First Cavalry Array becarae bogged down in what was seeraingly a secondary theatre of war, the area between Brody and L'vov.1 At first glance, the First Cavalry Array's contribution, or lack of it, to the Battle of Warsaw, in mid-August 1920, would appear as an even blacker mark on the reputation of the konnoarmeitsy. The First Cavalry Array failed to answer in tirae the call of the neighbouring West Front for assistance at Warsaw.2 Should the reputation of 1 Davies, Op. cit., p. 202. 2 This episode gave rise to a large body of Soviet literature in the 1920's and 1930's. See. For a raodern Soviet account, see N. Kuz'rain, 'Ob odnoi nevypolneimoi direktive Glavkoraa', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9, Septeraber 1962. The episode has received considerable attention in Western literature as well. See Fiddick Op. 279 the First Cavalry Army have been tarnished by its role in the Red Army's defeat at Warsaw in August 1920 and, if so, to what extent? In previous chapters, the argument has been that Budenny's cavalry raade a substantial contribution to a series of Red Array victories against Denikin's White Array and the Polish invaders. This chapter cunounts to a defence of the First Cavalry Array and, in particular, of those who commanded it, during the latter stages of the war against the Poles. The Red Array's invasion of Poland ended in defeat when it lost the Battle of Warsaw inraid-August 1920 . On 8 August 1920, the Poles, engaged in a desperate retreat for the previous two raonths, launched a last-ditch counterattack frora the area that carae to be known as the 'Lublin Gap', to the south of Warsaw. To the great surprise of alraost everybody, including Pilsudski, the Polish leader responsible for the counterattack, success for the Poles carae almost imraediately.3 Within two weeks, the Red Array's West Front was in precipitate retreat. The Treaty of Riga, that forraally ended the war in March 1921, gave no clear victory to either side; but the terras were rauch raore favourable to the Poles than those which they had been willing to accept in mid-July 1920. It is not difficult to find reasons for the Red Army's failure to win the war against its smaller neighbour, cit.; Erickson, The Soviet High Command, pp. 96-102; Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, pp. 70-77. 3 Pilsudski, Op. cit., pp. 176-77. 280 Poland. Byraid-August 1920, the Poles were fighting on their horae territory, while the Red Array was a long way frora its bases. The Poles had a large array which, unlike the Whites, could raore than raatch the size of its Red opponent. The Poles fought well. Their strategy was bold, just at the moraent when it needed to be. The impleraentation, by the standards of the Civil War, was good. Towards the end of the carapaign, the Red Army was having to fight in eneray country. It had still to deal with other enemies as well, most notably with the Whites in the Crimea. The Soviet political leadership believed that a workers' revolution was likely in Poland and that assistance to the Red Array could be expected frora that quarter. This was a raistake. At the sarae time, it has to be pointed out that the Red Army mistakes in the campaign itself were a significant factor in its defeat. After the fighting was over, attention was focused on how it could have happened that the Poles, operating out of the Lublin Gap, could so easily have penetrated the Red lines and threatened the southern flank and rear of the West Front. This had beenraade possibl e in part because Tukhachevskii's strategy was to outflank Warsaw frora the north. Tukhachevskiiraistakenly believed that this was where the Poles had concentrated their forces, despite the fact that he was warned in good time by Karaenev, the Coramander-in-Chief, that this was not the case.^ In atterapting to outflank the Poles in the north, Tukhachevskii was himself outflanked in the south. The result was a defeat for the Red Array. ^ D.G.k.k.A. pp. 650-5iT 281 In literature about the Red Army's defeat in the Battle of Warsaw, the First Cavalry Army was to have a celebrated role, for what it did not do rather than what it achieved. Tukhachevskii clairaed later that his difficulties at Warsaw would not have arisen had the First Cavalry Arrayraoved fror a where it was positioned at L'vov into the Lublin Gap, as it had been ordered to do by Kamenev on 11 August 1920.5 In the 1920's, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, trenchant criticisms were raade of the First Cavalry Army's role in the Red Army's defeat at Warsaw. Sorae writers blaraed Budennyi.6 Attention soon shifted to the headquarters of the South-West Front, in particular to Stalin. It was Stalin and South-West Front coraraander Egorov who had objected veheraently to Karaenev's order of 11 August 1920, airaed at raoving the First Cavalry Array north to join Tukhachevskii's West Front. Trotsky clairaed that Stalin had succurabed to a 'vainglorious desire' to occupy L'vov at the sarae time as Tukhachevskii entered Warsaw.' Later, it would be considered that Stalin's real motivation was his plan to use the First Cavalry Array against Wrangel in the Criraea.8 Put in these terras, it would seera that the coraraand of the First Cavalry Array was guilty of a breathtaking act of selfish insubordination. The urgent needs of the war against 5MTukhachevskii, 'The March Beyond the Vistula' in Pilsudski, Op. cit., pp. 252-54. 6 Fiddick Op. cit., p.628. Sadly, a new work, T. Fiddick, Russia's Retreat from Poland, 1920 (Manchester 1990), did not becorae available before the corapletion of this thesis. 7 Trotsky, Op. cit., v. 2, p.90 8 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander., p. 72. 282 the Poles were ignored, so that the First Cavalry Army could be used for the secondary campaigns being waged by the South-West Front, at L'vov and in the Criraea. The reality was very different. The selfishness and insubordination of the coraraand of the First Cavalry Array has to be viewed in context. Once this is done, it becomes clear that it was raisraanageraent by the centre that was chiefly responsible for the Red Array's remarkably inept performance in the Battle of Warsaw. There was no question that the Red Array needed separate West and South-West Fronts at the outset of the war against Poland. The width of the entire front wasraore than seven hundred kilometres and it included seven separate arraies as well as other independent units. The physical barrier of the raarshy Pripiat' region divided the four northern Red arraies frora the three southern ones facing the Poles. Karaenev telegraphed Egorov on 18 March 1920 that: In these conditions, the overall raanageraent coordinating our actions cannot rest with one of the fronts butraust b e found in the hands of the Commander- in-Chief. '9 This was logical enough; but Kamenev was to fail in his self-appointed task. Frora the start of the war against the Poles, the South- West Front was labouring under a special difficulty. This was the fact that the remnants of the Whites in the Criraea, now under the command of Wrangel, had not been destroyed and were about to use the Red Army's preoccupation with the Poles to launch an offensive of their own, investing the 9 D7G.K. k.A., p. 675 283 area beyond the Criraean isthmuses known as the Tauride. By late May 1920, Egorov understandably wanted reinforceraents and perraission to launch an iraraediate attack against Wrangel. Karaenev would not grant that perraission, citing the decision of the Central Coraraittee, that priority had to be given to the war against Poland, that offensive actions against Wrangel therefore could not take place.10 On 26 May 1920, at the height of this dispute, Stalin was sent by the Central Coraraittee to rejoin the railitary council of the South-West Front. Having arrived in Kharkov, Stalin soon came to view the situation in the same way as Egorov. He deraanded reinforceraents and perraission to deal iraraediately with the ever-growing threat frora Wrangel. It was refused by Lenin and Karaenev.H The South-West Front was conderaned to fight on two fronts throughout the suraraer of 1920. As late as 10 July 1920, Stalin was warning in Pravda that it was 'ridiculous to talk of a "raarch on Warsaw"'until Wrangel had been defeated.12 It was sound advice and it was ignored. It was an early sign that the conflict about strategy and resources that had pitted Kamenev and his allies against Egorov and Stalin during the campaign against Denikin in the last three months of 1919, was about to be revived, only in a new location. While there was a great deal of discord about the threat posed by Wrangel, there was initial consensus in the Red Army concerning strategy against Poland. Tukhachevskii's ^^ D.G.K.K.A., p. 683. Kuz'min, Op. cit., p. 12. 11 Trotsky Papers, v. 2., p. 199. 12 Stalin, Pravda, 10 July 1920. 284 West Front was aimed in the direction of Warsaw through Belorussia. Having failed to make any progress in May and June 1920, the moraentum of its advance iraproved markedly in July 1920. Byraid-August 1920, the West Front hadraoved raore than six hundred kilometres in just six weeks.13 The South- West Front was aimed at Rovno, in the western Ukraine where, according to Kamenev's original strategy, formulated in March 1920, its armies were then to turn to the north west in the direction of Brest-Litovsk.1^ There the West and the South-West Fronts would link up, facing Warsaw directly frora the west. This was a good strategy and was acceptable to both Tukhachevskii and Egorov. But by raid-July 1920, the railitary situation had changed dramatically and this strategy was to be modified. An initial, and ultimately significant, modification to the strategy took place in the first week in July 1920. On 1 July 1920, Kamenev proposed to Egorov that the First Cavalry Army, which was approaching Rovno, should raake a sharp turn to the north west. In this way, the First Cavalry Array could head directly towards Brest-Litovsk, even before occupying Rovno. Such a change was clearly preraature. As Egorov pointed out to Kamenev, it would mean that the cavalrymen would have to battle the bogs of the Pripiat' as well as the Poles. Egorov had already committed the First Cavalry Army to the battle for Rovno. Substantial Polish forces, the 'Odessa Group of Poles' were ensconced at Rovno and farther to the south at Starokonstantinov. 13 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 252. 1^ D.G.K.K.A., p. 675. 285 Egorov's counter proposal was that Budeimyi's cavalryraen be required to take Rovno frora the south and only then to raove on Brest-Litovsk, in a broad sweep through Dubno towards Lukov.l5 Karaenev offered no objection. This modification to the original strategy was put into effect. Although conceived as a modification, not a change in strategy, this divergence in the direction of the West and South-West Fronts was soon to becoraeraore firml y established as a result of the circumstances that obtained in raid-July 1920. By that time, the speed of the Red Army's advance had become so alarraing to the British and French governraents, that they began to step up pressure on the Poles to raake peace with the Bolsheviks. The frontier that was suggested, was basically the line of the Bug river. This line was put to the Soviet govemraent in a note that arrived in Moscow on 12 July 1920, bearing the signature of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. The Soviet government rejected the Curzon note. It did not shut the door on future negotiations, insisting that there be direct talks between the Soviet and Polish governments. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, found the reply of the Soviet government to be reasonable and negotiations would continue in the weeks that followed.16 Faced with the threat of foreign intervention, it was tirae for Soviet leaders to think seriously about their war airas. Even so, the terras were not accepted; the invasion of 15 jjj^^;- pp^ 702-03^ 16 Fiddick, Op. cit., pp. 631-32. 286 Poland was to continue. In retrospect, it is obvious that the Soviet government should have ended the war on the basis of the terms offered in the Curzon note. The border proposed by Curzon allowed the Polish govemraent to retain control of ethnic Poland; but all the territory to the east was to becorae the province of the Soviet govemraent. This would have been a more than satisfactory conclusion to the war. But at the sarae tirae, the Bolsheviks had aims that far exceeded a favourable western border. According to their thinking, the working class of the world knew no borders. If the westward surge of the Red Army could push over the reactionary govemraent of Polemd, thereby opening up contact with Gerraany, where rested so raany of the Bolshevik hopes for world revolution, so much the better. Military as well as political raiscalculations were involved here. The question was whether an invasion of Poland involved too raany risks, given that the Soviet govemraent was not yet fully consolidated within Russia. The Whites under Wrangel in the Criraea were still alive and well. There was the problera of whether Britain and France 1 7 would intervene.-^' The raain problem was not so much that Lenin foolishly relied upon a pie-in-the-sky uprising by the Polish workers. Lenin overestiraated the extent of support for Soviet Power in Poland; but he had other reasons for thinking that victory was at hand. Lenin allowed hiraself to be misled by his generals, who were confident that they had raore than 17 Davies, Op. cit., pp. 220-25. 287 enough troops to defeat the Poles, that the victory could be accomplished quickly. On 21 July 1920, Commander-in-Chief Kamenev provided the opinion that Warsaw would fall even if a mere three of the seven Red armies entering Poland were sent against it.18 By that tirae, the Red Array's central planners had already set a date for the capture of Warsaw, 12 August 1920.19 Ivan Srailga, a member of the military council of the Red Army's West Front that was approaching Warsaw, clairaed that the Red Array enjoyed a numerical superiority of three to two there.20 Sadly for the Red Array's invasion of Poland, the soldiers as well as the politicians got it wrong. No such nuraerical superiority existed by the tirae that the Red Array arrived at Warsaw; the degree of Polish enfeebleraent had been exaggerated. On 15 July 1920, Kamenev provided his first and best analysis of the situation, in the light of the Curzon note. Kamenev described how the Red Army would reach the frontier designated in the note 'within a week or two', 'with the cavalry of Budennyi nearest to the line'.''-^ Further, Karaenev considered that the Red Array was sufficiently supplied for a further 'tworaonths o f intense fighting'. In that tirae, both Poland and Wrangel would be beaten, provided that the threats of neighbouring powers to intervene did not raaterialise. At the sarae tirae, Karaenev struck a note of 18 fjjj^;^ p^ 515 19 B. Shaposhnikov, Na Visle: k istorii kampanii 1920 goda (Moscow, 1924). p.23 20 Budennyi, Op. cit., v. 2, p. 300, note 3B. 21 D.G.K.K.A., p. 611. 288 caution. He pointed out that the intervention of hostile Romania would be enough to wreck the tirae table of victory in tworaonths. Karaene v also advised the politicians that the situation would reraain 'very difficult' even if the Curzon line was crossed and the Poles defeated, for the Red Array would be in a vulnerable position. It would be defending a long front with an exhausted array, like Denikin's White Array before its defeat in autumn 1919. In the days that followed, Karaenev was to be tremsforraed frora an advocate of caution to a believer in a quick and easy victory over Poland. This carae about when Karaenev visited Tukhachevskii's new headquarters at Minsk on 21 July 99 1920. The relocation of Tukhachevskii's headquarters to Minsk syrabolised the progress that the West Front made in the previous three weeks. The enthusiasra of the front coraraander proved contagious for Karaenev. On 23 July 1920, Kamenev reported to Trotsky about his visit to Minsk, describing 'the feeling of great enthusiasra in the units, which ensures the possibility of raoving further without lessening the speed'.23 in the sarae telegrara, Karaenev announced that 'the possiblity has not been excluded of finishing the business in three weeks'. There can be little doubt as to what the business to be finished was for, on 19 July 1920, Karaenev's Field Staff had set 12 August 1920 as the date for the capture of Warsaw.2^ 22 ^_^ ^^^-^^ p_ ^^- 23 Ibid., p. 644. 2^ Ibid., p. 643. 289 It was in this context that what might appear as the puzzling decision wasraade o n 23 July 1920 to send the First Cavalry Array towards L'vov. On 22 July 1920, Egorov reported to Kamenev that Polish resistance in Galicia remained stubborn and was centred on the fortress town of L'vov. A particularly alarraing developraent, frora Egorov's point of view, was that 'the situation with Romania remains exceptionally tense'.25 if the Roraanians were to burst across the Dneistr river, as they were threatening to do, then the already over-coramitted South-West Front would be in a truly precarious situation. Egorov wanted the konnoarmeitsy to be sent towards L'vov, where they could also be used, if necessary, against the Romanians. Both Karaenev and Tukhachevskii had already come to the sarae conclusion as Egorov. On 19 July 1920, Tukhachevskii recoraraended to Karaenev that the cavalryraen be sent in a 'south-western direction'. Karaenev was able to assure hira that this was precisely the direction in which Oft Budennyi would be raoving."^^ Karaenev's order of 23 July 1920, which sent the First Cavalry Army to L'vov, has often been criticised as the starting point for the breakdown in the coordination of the West and the South-West Fronts in the invasion of Poland. While it represented a change to the original Red Army strategy, which envisaged a linking up of the two fronts at Brest-Litovsk, there were sound military reasons for it. Not 25 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3, pp. 225-26. 26 A. Egorov, L'vov-Varshava: 1920 god, vzaimodeistvie frontov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1929), pp. 41-42. 290 only Karaenev, but the front commanders, Egorov and Tukhachevskii, each agreed for the need to change the strategy. The First Cavalry Army was already headed in the L'vov direction: there was no doubt that there was plenty of work for it to do there. L'vov was on the Soviet side of the frontier outlined in the Curzon note: sending the First Cavalry Array, which was closest to the Curzon line, to the south west raeant that more time would elapse before the necessity of crossing the Curzon line would arise. At L'vov, the First Cavalry Army would continue to act as a magnet, drawing Polish forces away from the defence of Warsaw.27 However, there was a raajor flaw in the thinking of Karaenev and Tukhachevskii. They considered not only that Budennyi was needed at L'vov, which was true; but that Budennyi was not needed by the West Front, because the latter had more than enough strength to defeat its Polish opponent. This was an absurdly optimistic view. The Poles were retreating before the West Front but, for the most part, in reasonably good order. Tukhachevskii had driven back but not destroyed the Poles, who were preparing a last- ditch counterattack south of Warsaw. The youthful Tukhachevskii was being carried away by his success. Karaenev should have been a voice of reason. Instead his pronoimceraents rivalled Tukhachevskii's in their unfounded optimism. A measure of Kamenev's optiraisra at this point was his assessraent that one of Tukhachevskii's four armies could be spared to guard the gap that separated the West and the 27 Shaposhnikov, Op. cit., p. 112. o CJ en f>-- CL_) <- CM t5 ^_ (U on t T3 291 South-West Fronts. Karaenev reported to Trotsky, on 21 July 1920, that: the West Front with the forces of the remaining three arraies will cope with the task of decisively defeating Poland, as long as it does not receive substantial support apart frora the intervention of Roraania and Latvia.28 The First Cavalry Array was heading towards L'vov; no thought was given to how its absence frora the Battle of Warsaw might be off-set by other measures. A little later, Lenin would make the obvious point to Karaenev that 'if Budennyi is going to the south then it is necessary to strengthen the north'.29 Karaenev at this tirae did nothing, because he did not believe that any corapensatory raeasures were necessary. Tukhachevskii's West Front was to charge into Poland, lacking the necessary strength to accomplish its task. Kamenev was only to realise his mistake at the beginning of the second week in August 1920, when the Battle of Warsaw had already been joined. At the end of July 1920, Soviet military and political leadership were once more confronted by a deteriorating situation on Wrangel's front. Wrangel's forces were establishing themselves on the northern shore of the Sea of Azov and threatening the Donbass region. The South-West Front's Thirteenth Array was unable to hold Wrangel's latest incursion, while the newly-forraed Second Cavalry Army, with a mere 4,000 sabres, could not provide the Red Array there with the horsepower it required.30 Kamenev came to the 28 D,G^k^k7L, p. 615. 29 Ibid. 30 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 268. 292 reasonable conclusion that the First Cavalry Army should be sent against Wrangel. On 31 July 1920, Karaenev told Egorov that a blow had to be delivered against Wrangel from the 'right bank of the Dneipr', where the Red Army should be strengthened by 'three cavalry divisions of the First Cavalry Array and one infantry division'.31 The suggestion that the cavalrymen be transferred to the Criraean front was first raade by Karaenev. This reflected the core of his thinking at this tirae, that the war with Poland would soon be over. Egorov and Stalin now considered that Budennyi was earraarked for the Criraea, once the battle for L'vov was won. This was not surprising given that the recoramendation had corae frora Karaenev hiraself. Farther to the north, events were developing quickly. Sorae writers have suggested that, at the beginning of August 1920, Tukhachevskii bolted from Kamenev's control and crossed the Curzon line on his own initiative, in effect preerapting the talks between the Soviet and Polish governraents that were taking place at Baronovichi on 1 and 2 August 1920.32 Yet it would seera raore likely that Tukhachevskii was acting in accordance with instructions frora the Coraraander-in-Chief. On 30 July 1920, Karaenev ordered both Tukhachevskii and Egorov to absolutely destroy the Polish Array and in so doing the coraraands of the fronts raust realise that no peace negotiations whatsoever prior to their confirraation by the government of the RSFSR can be allowed to weaken 31 D.G.K.K.A., p. 706. 32 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 94. Fiddick, Op. cit., pp. 636-37. 293 the conduct of military operations.33 For Egorov and Stalin, in the headquarters of the South- West Front, the position at the end of July 1920 was clear enough. Their forces were to push on into Galicia, with Budennyi airaed directly at L'vov. At the same time, a new offensive against Wrangel was to be prepared. As soon as Budenny had cleared his coraraitraents at L'vov, he was to be transferred to the Criraea. Problems were to arise when, a week later, Karaenev was to change his raind on each of these points. At the height of the Battle of Warsaw, he attempted to revert to his original strategy. Hisraisraanageraent o f this change in strategy was to generate an enorraous amount of chaos and discord. Before this happened, another factor that would further add to the confusion was introduced. On 2 August 1920, the Politburo discussed the threat posed by Wrangel and decided that a new front with a military council that would include Stalin and either Egorov or Mikhail Frunze as front coraraander should be set up to deal with Wrangel.3^ This new front was later known as the South Front. At the same time, both the Politburo and Kamenev were in agreement that the West and the South-West Fronts facing Poland should merge under the command of Tukhachevskii. On the surface, this was an eminently sensible idea. A separate front facing Wrangel should have been created much earlier: this would have spared Egorov and Stalin the agony 33 £j.G.k^k.L, p. 645^ 3^ Trotsky Papers, v. 2, p. 241. 294 of having to wage two quite separate wars. However this proved too complex and difficult a reorganisation to be undertaken just as the decisive battles were about to be fought. Questions of resource allocations between the new South Front and the enlarged West Front had not been decided. Nor was there any decision about how the reorganisation affected Red Army strategy and the role of the First Cavalry Army. On 3 August 1920, Karaenev put out an order uniting the West and the South-West Fronts and instructing Tukhachevskii to establish coramimications with the Twelfth and the First Cavalry Arraies, which were to becorae part of the West Front. The order was plainly preraature, for there had been no preparation for the reorganisation. As Stalin pointed out to Lenin on 3 August 1920, the reallocation of 'headquarters, coraraandraachinery an d resources' had not been discussed.^^^^ Conflict between the headcjuarters of the West and the South-West Fronts was quick in coraing. There had already been a raajor conflict. On 31 July 1920, Karaenev had ordered Tukhachevskii to send one of his infantry divisions to Egorov, to help in the war against Wrangel. Two days later, he raade it two infantry divisions. On 3 August 1920, Egorov asked Tukhachevskii directly for the infantry that Karaenev had said could be taken frora the West Front for the Criraea. Tukhachevskii refused outright.-^° On 7 August 1920, Tukhachevskii telegraphed Karaenev that he was not prepared to take over theraanageraent of the First 35 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 69. 36 Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., pp. 297, 427. 295 Cavalry and Twelfth Armies unless four conditions were met. Included araong them were the demands that the headquarters of the South-West Front must reraain responsible for their supply; and for ensuring coraraunications with his headquarters.37 jjot surpringly, Egorov and Stalin objected fiercely to the position taken by Tukhachevskii. They clairaed that it would lead to the destruction of their headquarters, which was needed for conducting the war against Wrangel.38 it was the kind of dispute that the Red Array could not afford at this crucial stage of Red Array operations. The plan to include the First Cavalry Array in Tukhachevskii's West Front did not mean that itsraission ha d been changed, or that it was once more part of the plans for the Battle of Warsaw. There were no orders for Budennyi to break off operations at L'vov. Tukhachevskii anticipated that it might be 'ten to fourteen days'^^ before his conditions for accepting the armies of the South-West Front were met. He obviously was not counting upon using the First Cavalry Army in the fight for Warsaw, which was supposed to fall some tirae around 12 August 1920. Stalin informed Lenin, on 3 August 1920, that 'those armies transferred from the South- West to the West Front would be maintained where they are at present by arrangements made by the headquarters of the West Front'.^0 37 j^-j^-p-j^-- ^^ 3^^ pp^ 75_77^ 38 Iz istorii (1960-61), v. 3., p. 346. 39 D.K.F.K.A., v. 3, p. 76. 40 Iz istorii (1960-61), v. 3, p. 336. 296 In other words, the armies of the South-West Front were to continue to carry out their previous missions under the new raanageraent of the West Front. The First Cavalry Array would continue to fight at L'vov on the southern flank of the Polish front, beforeraoving of f to the Crimea. Kamenev, too, at this stage expected that the war against Poland would continue to be fought in two stages. Kamenev would have preferred that, rather than transfer the three southern armies to Tukhachevskii, they should have been incorporated in a new coraraand led by Frunze to embrace the southern armies of the Polish front.^1 This was not to happen, for Frunze did not become available until Septeraber 1920. When did Karaenev decide that the First Cavalry Array was, after all, to take part in the Battle of Warsaw? The decision was not made in the first week in August 1920. On 4 August 1920, Budennyi sent word to Kamenev that he had on his own initiative gone over to the defensive, that his cavalry was in need of a rest. Kamenev responded by placing the First Cavalry Army in reserve. On 8 August 1920, he telegraphed Tukhachevskii that the First Cavalry Army would have to be sent ' in a more favourable direction which is to be decided'.^2 Karaenev gave no hint as to what this new direction raight be, the Roraanian border, the Criraea or Warsaw. If a decision had beenraade by that stage to use the First Cavalry Array in the Battle of Warsaw, then Karaenev would not have been so vague. ^1 D^G7k^k.A., p. 648, ^2 Ibid., p. 649. 297 It was only on the raorning of 11 August 1920 that Karaenev finally raade up his raind that a change in strategy was required. At that tirae, he informed Tukhachevskii of his views: Till now the First Cavalry Array has had as its task the destruction of the eneray at L'vov. Given this task it was natural that Budennyi and the Twelfth Array inclined to the south.^3 Kamenev then went on to suggest to Tukhachevskii a change in direction for the First Cavalry Army. Kamenev had at last realised the danger that was facing the Red Array. On 7 August 1920, Karaenev noted that Tukhachevskii's Sixteenth Array, which a week earlier had occupied Brest-Litovsk, was having difficulty in advancing further west towards Warsaw. This suggested to Karaenev that the Poles had greater strength than he had previously thought. On 8 August 1920, Kamenev warned Tukhachevskii that the Poles had retreated in good order behind the Bug river, directly to the west of Warsaw. Kamenev was rightly alarraed that Tukhachevskii was sending three of his arraies to the north of Warsaw across the Vistula river, leaving only the Sixteenth Array and the weak, so-called Mozyr Group facing Warsaw directly frora the west.^^ Tukhachevskii was atterapting a repeat of the outflankingraanoeuvre tha t had worked so well for hira in the north Caucasus against Denikin's arraies sixraonths before. With good reason, Kamenev feared that in atterapting to outflank the Poles from the north, Tukhachevskii hiraself ^3 J-^-p-^-J^^ ^^ J-^ P^ r^g^ ^^ D.G.K.K.A., pp. 648-649., 650. 298 might be stmck a blow in the flank and the rear from the south by Polish forces that were concentrating behind the Bug river. Tukhachevskii has been eulogised in raodern Soviet literature as one of the raost able of the Red Array coramanders that emerged during the Civil War. Whatever the merit of this assessment, there can be no doubt that Tukhachevskii raade some raajor blunders. None was more important than his misreading of the Polish defences at Warsaw. As late as 10 August 1920, Tukhachevskii was still insisting to Kamenev that the bulk of the Polish defence was concentrated against his three arraies on the Vistula river, well to the north of the Bug river.^5 ^g the Polish counterattack that began on 16 August 1920 would show, Tukhachevskii was wrong while Kamenev was right. Yet if Kamenev's analysis of Polish strategy at this point was good, his solution to the problem was to be badly mismanaged. Kamenev was unable to convince the ever-stubborn Tukhachevskii to regroup his armies, so as to strike directly across the Bug river at Warsaw. Karaenev now decided that Tukhachevskii would need the direct assistance of the arraies of the South-West Front at Warsaw. In other words, the Twelfth and First Cavalry Arraies would have to be raoved to the north to cover the gap left by Tukhachevskii to the west and south of Warsaw. This was a raajor change in strategy and it was to be carried out when the Battle of Warsaw had already been ^5 Ibid., p. 651^ 299 joined. Ideally, this move should have been made at least a week before. The First Cavalry Armv v,-^ ^. J nxuiy iifjjj been m reserve since 4 August 1920, following its failure to take L'vov. The warning order concerning the linking up of the West and South-West Fronts would have been the best means of inforraing his subordinates about any new appreciation of the situation. There was nothing wrong with the idea of bringing the First Cavalry Army north into the rear of the Poles at Lublin. This was the type of mission that it invariably perforraed well. Karaenev had realised what the true situation was at Warsaw very late in the day, so that a last-minute reorganisation was required. Yet if this change in strategy was to be carried out successfully, it would need to be expertly done. But Karaenev was to find that unwarranted optimism about the speedy fall of Warsaw that he had engendered in the Red Army and the ill will between the headquarters of the West and South-West Fronts that he had caused to fester, would combine to ensure that there was no cooperation frora the headquarters of the South-West Front. Failure would follow. The orders of Karaenev, dispatched to the headquarters of the South-West Front on 11 August 1920, provided a clear illustration of the inadequacies of Kamenev and his staff in the business of running a carapaign. The first order sent by Karaenev set dates for the transfer of the Twelfth and First Cavalry Arraies to Tukhachevskii's West Front, 13 and 15 August 1920 respectively, and seeraed to order their iraraediateraoveraent in the direction of Lublin. Up to that 300 point, the order seeraed straightforward enough; but it ended with an 'urgent' request to Egorov for 'your opinion upon the aforesaid'.^6 Anyone receiving this piece of correspondence might have wondered whether it was an order, or merely a proposal to be debated. Later that day, Kamenev sent another order which said nothing about the First Cavalry Array, but urged the speediest irapleraentation by the Twelfth Army of its 'new task'.^ At the sarae tirae, it described the Poles as being in full retreat. It was by noraeans clea r whether this new order suppleraented the first or overrode it. If the Poles were in full retreat, itraay hav e been that the Twelfth Array was all that was required to the north, that the First Cavalry Array could remain where it was. There was no response to this correspondence from the headquarters of the South Front, until 13 August 1920. When finally they responded, Egorov and Stalin blamed the delay on a problem with the deciphering. They now claimed that a change in the mission of either the Twelfth or the First Cavalry Armies was 'impossible', because they were locked into the fight for L'vov.^8 Sorae writers consider it possible that Egorov and Stalin faked the delay in the deciphering, so as toraaintain thei r control over the First Cavalry Array. For exaraple, Erickson pondered whether the delay occurred 'by accident or ^6 JIJY^^^ p; jQg[ ^7 Ibid., pp. 709-10. ^8 D.K.F.K.A. V. 3., p. 253, 301 design'.^9 The previous day, 12 August 1920, Egorov had taken Budennyi out of reserve and sent him once more in the direction of L'vov.50 Trotsky opined that Stalin's vanity had caused him to desire a triumph by taking L'vov at the sarae time Tukhachevskii entered Warsaw. Elsewhere it has been suggested, muchraore plausibly, that by erabroiling the First Cavalry Array once more in the battle for L'vov, Egorov and Stalin would shrewdly retain control over Budennyi for future use against Wrangel in the Crimea.51 Was the alleged delay in deciphering a strategem on Stalin's part? Albert Seaton doubted that such a problera could occur with the Hughes-Baudot teleprinter systera, wherebyraessages are relayed directly frora point to point.5^^ Egorov clairaed that the problera occurred at a relay station in the headquarters of the West Front and that similar problems in fact occurred with other orders."^^ Certainly Soviet writers, even those writing after the death of Stalin, have accepted the story of the delay, which suggests that they consider such a happening at the very least to have been possible.5^ My guess is that there was a problem with the deciphering. It was Stalin's usual style, upon receipt of an order he did not like, to protest vigorously •^9 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 97. 50 Budennyi, Proidennyi put' , v. 2, pp. 293-94. 51 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 72. 52 Ibid., p. 71. 53 Egorov, L'vov-Varshava, pp. 110-12. 5^ N. Kuz'rain, 'Ob odnoi nevypolnenoi direktive Glavkoraa' Voenno-istoricheskii zhumal, no. 9, Septeraber, 1962, p. 60. 302 or to appeal to Lenin. The first piece of correspondence frora Karaenev on 11 August 1920 had asked for an urgent opinion frora the headquarters of the South-West Front. It was not like Stalin to waste an opportunity like that. Moreover, the response of the South-West Front, when it was raade on 13 August 1920, was a hasty and emotional reply, not the result of concerted scheming in theraore tha n two days that had elapsed since the orders were given. Egorov and Stalin told Karaenev that a change in orders was 'irapossible' because the Twelfth and First Cavalry Arraies were already locked into battle. Yet the previous day, 12 August 1920, they had sent a note to Karaenev which pondered the future use of the First Cavalry Array. The coraraand of the South-West Front considered that it would be best if the First Cavalry Array was sent to Proskurov, where it could act as a reserve in case of intervention by Roraania, while the 6th Cavalry Division should be sent iraraediately to the Crimea.55 Thus it was disingenuous on the part of Egorov and Stalin to claira on 13 August 1920 that the First Cavalry Army could not be disengaged frora the battle for L'vov when they theraselves, the day before, had proposed just such a disengageraent, albeit with the First Cavalry Army heading in the direction of the Crimea rather than Lublin. If Stalin hadraasterrainded this episode with the luxury ofraore tha n two days in which to plan, he would surely have avoided such a slip up. 55 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3., pp. 251-52. 303 Having received the response from Egorov and Stalin on 13 August 1920, Kamenev now sent an order which stated, in part, that from midday on 14 August 1920, both the Twelfth and the First Cavalry Armies were to be transferred to the West Front, with the South-West Front taking responsibility for coraraunications between Tukhachevskii and these two arraies.5° Stalin refused to attach his signature to such an order. Only after further pressure frora the centre did Egorov sign the order, along with a secondraeraber o f the South-West Front's railitary council, Reingold Berzin. Shortly afterwards, Stalin was recalled to Moscow to explain his actions.57 There is really noraystery as to why Egorov and Stalin structured their priorities so that the support of Tukhachevskii's West Front took second place. Egorov and Stalin had their hands full, while from the information that was available to them, Warsaw was about to fall any day, with or without the assistance of Budennyi. The First Cavalry Array was sent to L'vov not to salve Stalin's vanity nor, as another writer has suggested, 'to satisfy the cavalryraan's desire for loot',58 but because L'vov was the last Polish stronghold in the south. Victory there would have untied the South-West Front's hands for operations against a possible attack by the Roraanians and the continuing threat posed by Wrangel in the Criraea. 56 D.G.if.iir.7., pp. 711-12. 57 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 73. 58 Fiddick, Op. cit., p. 639. 304 To deal with Wrangel, and possibly the Roraanians as well, the South-West Front needed troops, in particular, cavalry. Two weeks before, Tukhachevskii had been required by Karaenev to send two infantry divisions to the Criraea. Tukhachevskii refused. Karaenev had allowed the West-Front coraraander to get away with this act of insubordination. Understandably enough, Egorov and Stalin could see no reason why they should not return Tukhachevskii's favour. At no stage, in his correspondence with the South-West Front, did Karaenev refer to the fact that Budennyi was needed at Warsaw. Egorov and Stalin had no way of knowing that the situation had deteriorated there. From the point of view of the South-West Front, Kamenev and Tukhachevskii wanted the First Cavalry Array at Lublin as a precaution, while the South-West Front had urgent military tasks for Budennyi to perform elsewhere. At the same tirae, Stalin received a significant telegram on 11 August 1920 thatraust hav e steeled his resolve in this raatter. The telegrara was frora Lenin and it was badly tiraed. In it, the Soviet leader inforraed Stalin that reports frora England suggested that the Poles had been advised to accept Soviet peace terms. According to Lenin, 'Our victory is great and will be even greater if we defeat Wrangel'. Lenin concluded by advising Stalin that what was needed was 'an immediate blow to take all of the Crimea at whatever cost'.59 Little wonder that Stalin felt he had every reason to stand in the way of the transfer of Budennyi to the Battle of Warsaw. Going on the basis of the information 59 ^^^^^^^^ j_ ^ ^^ 3^ p^ 251. 305 provided by Lenin, Budennyi was obviously no longer required at Warsaw, when at the sarae time the cavalry was needed urgently in the Criraea, a front that was at last receiving priority frora the Soviet political leadership. This telegrara frora Lenin to Stalin has led one writer to the conclusion that there was a split between the Soviet politicians and soldiers over military priorities and that Lenin was deliberately sabotaging the Red Array at Warsaw by encouraging Stalin to send the First Cavalry Array to the south.60 There is very little in the way of supportive evidence for this claira, apart frora the telegrara itself. A more easily-supported explanation of Lenin's telegrara is that Lenin had come to the raistaken conclusion that the Poles were beaten and, on that basis, was urging a speedy reduction of the last White bastion in the Crimea. Lenin did what he did not because he did not desire a victory over the Poles, but because he considered that it had already been achieved. There was not so much a split in the views of the Soviet soldiers and politicians as a breakdown in comraunication. Karaenev had evidently neglected to inforra Lenin of his latest appreciation of the situation and how he now envisaged a role for the First Cavalry Army in the Battle of Warsaw. It is true that there were those in the Soviet political leadership who, in early August 1920, were in favour of an immediate peace with Poland given the threat represented at that time by Wrangel. Both Lenin and Stalin were opposed to such a peace, because they considered that this would 60Fiddick, Op.cit.,pp. 640-41. 306 deprive the Red Army of a victory that had already been won. On 2 August 1920, Lenin warned Stalin that there was a growingraoveraent insid e the Central Committee in favour of an iraraediate peace with Poland. Stalin replied bitterly that 'Soviet diploraacy soraetiraes very successfully wrecks the achieveraents of the Red Array'.1 Nor was Lenin one of the faint hearts inside the Central Coraraittee. On 7 August 1920, Lenin assured Stalin that 'no decisions changing the established political line had been taken' and that the South-West Front's successes against Wrangel would darapen the unrest in the Central Coraraittee.62 As late as 13 August 1920, Lenin was still in a bellicoseraood, furaing to Trotsky that talk of peace with Poland while the Poles were advancing was ridiculous and that Karaenev 'had no right to be nervous'.63 The recall of Stalin on 15 August 1920 did not bring this episode to an end. There were tworaore events that were to cause a great deal of controversy both at the tirae and in latter-day literature. The first has beenraisunderstood by writers in the West. On 13 August 1920, Egorov and Berzin inforraed Budennyi that he was to becorae part of the West Front. Egorov raade no mention of a change in direction to Lublin. As a result, the First Cavalry Array continued to fight at L'vov. It has been assuraed that this was a case of insubordination on the part of Egorov, who was once raore frustrating Kamenev's plan to move the First Cavalry Army 61 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 69. 62 D.G.K.K.A., pp. 707-08. 63 Ibid., p. 654. 307 away from L'vov to Lublin.6^ in fact, Egorov had fraraed the order not only according to the letter of Kamenev's latest order to him but in the spirit in which Kamenev had intended. What has been overlooked is that Karaenev had changed his raind yet again. On 13 August 1920, Karaenev was no longer deraanding that the First Cavalry Array break off its operations at L'vov. On that day, Kamenev ordered that the 8th Cavalry Division be sent to the Criraea, presumably as a replacement for the previously-promised First Cavalry Array. Budennyi was to take responsibility for the section of the front forraerly occupied by this division. The 8th Cavalry Division was at that tirae positioned to the south of the First Cavalry Array.65 Thus Karaenev was now ordering the First Cavalry Array toraove south, not north into the Lublin gap. Kamenev seems to have once more lapsed into an unwarranted optiraisra regarding the situation at Warsaw and no longer saw the urgency of Budennyi going to Lublin. One of the things that Karaenev was clearly not providing at this point was decisive leadership. It was only on the evening of 15 August 1920, that Kamenev and Tukhachevskii reassessed the situation and decided that Budennyi was needed at Lublin. But the confusion did not end there and the result was that the First Cavalry Army almost joined the list of the Red Array's casualties in the Battle of Warsaw. On 15 August 1920, the First Cavalry Army became part of the West Front and on that 6^ Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 73. 65 D.G.K.K.A., p. 711. 308 day Tukhachevskii decided that the cavalrymen would definitely be used to strengthen his left flank in the Battle of Warsaw. An order to this effect was dispatched to the cavalryraen and was received by thera the next day.66 Budennyi and Voroshilov were dumbfounded by this order, which was the first they had heard of a relocation northwards. By this time, the First Cavalry Array was in the process of crossing the water barrier of the Western Bug river, where they had been held up for sorae days. The spires of L'vov were in sight.67 This was the first that Budennyi and Voroshilov heard of any change in mission. To thera, it seeraed that Tukhachevskii was deterrained to snatch defeat frora the jaws of victory. The order frora Tukhachevskii had arrived with only one signature, because that of another raeraber of the West Front's railitary council had been lost along the way, and was therefore invalid. Budennyi and Voroshilov referred the order back to Tukhachevskii for confirraation, as they were entitled to do. Tukhachevskii then repeated the order on 17 and 19 August 1920. The cavalryraen replied with fierce protests. Voroshilov sent a special report to the RVSR on 20 August 1920, but he could get no satisfaction there. Trotsky insisted that the First Cavalry Array begin its relocation northwards. That sarae day the First Cavalry Army abandoned the siege of L'vov and headed north.68 66 ---^^^^_^^ ^ :^_ 3^ pp_ Q^_Q2, 67 Kakurin and Melikov, Op. cit., p. 255. 68 D.G.K.K.A., pp. 656-62. Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, pp. 335-39. 309 If the First Cavalry Array was going to influence events at Warsaw, it should have been near Lublin on or near 16 August 1920. That would have caused the Poles to fear for their safety and given courage to what would prove to be the faint-hearted left flank of Tukhachevskii's West Front. It was about 220 kiloraetres frora the outskirts of L'vov to the area north of Lublin, where Pilsudski was concentrating his counterattack. During the raarch to the Ukraine, the First Cavalry Array averaged forty kiloraetres a day but soraetiraes did seventy. If galvanised into action, the First Cavalry Array could have been at Lublin in three or four days. Pilsudski's troops at Lublin beganraoving north west on 16 August 1920. As late as 18 August 1920 the presence of the First Cavalry Array in his rear raight have made Pilsudski turn around before rauch damage had been done to the Red Sixteenth Army. If the First Cavalry Army had moved even as late as 13 August 1920, it might well have been able to affect the situation at Warsaw. At the same tirae, theraoveraent o f the First Cavalry Array away frora L'vov would have given the Polish forces there a free hand to operate in Budennyi's rear. Even so, there is no doubt that a sweep into the rear of the Polish forces that had regrouped at Lublin was just the type of operation that the First Cavalry Army had performed so well in the past. The result could not have been any worse for the Red Array than the coraplete defeat in the Battle of Warsaw that eventually took place. So coraplete was the success of the Polish counterattack, in the third week in August 1920 that. 310 by 20 August 1920, there was nothing that the First Cavalry Array could do at Lublin or at Warsaw. The greatest mistake made by the Soviet political and military leadership in summer 1920 was the carapaign to take Warsaw. Having made that flawed decision, it was vital that the resources of the Red Array be used in the raost efficient and effective way. Arguably the raost iraportant resource of the Red Array was the First Cavalry Array. The mission of the First Cavalry Array should have been specified at the earliest possible tirae and those responsible for its direct coraraand inforraed as to why Warsaw had to take precedence over the Criraea. Ultiraate responsibility for the debacle raust rest with the centre. Karaenev's raanageraent of this carapaign was faulty. He changed his strategy no less than five tiraes between 22 July and 15 August 1920. He was indulgent with Tukhachevskii and unsympathetic to Egorov and Stalin. He conducted a last-minute change of operations in the raost amateurish way. As a Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev represented the worst of two types. He neither demanded nor did he receive unswerving discipline. At the sarae tirae, Karaenev made it impossible for his subordinates to make informed decisions. They were never provided with the necessary information about the enemy'sraoveraents, Kamenev's thinking, or even the operations of other Red Army units. Chaos and confusion were the order of the day in the first two weeks in August 1920. Things might have gone very differently had Kamenev explained in good time to the coraraand of the South-West Front and to Budennyi and Voroshilov why it was that the 311 First Cavalry Array was needed at Warsaw. This he never did. The result was a significant contribution to the Red Array's disaster at Warsaw. It is soraetiraes suggested, or implied, that Budennyi and Voroshilov acted in collusion with Stalin to obstruct Tukhachevskii, by refusing to break off the seige of L'vov. As one writer has put it, 'Budenny and Voroshilov played out their obstructionist roles perfectly'.69 There is no reason to think that the cavalrymen were acting on instructions from Stalin. They had not been reticent in challenging disagreeable orders in the past and the instruction from Tukhachevskii fitted into the category of a disagreeable order. L'vov, for which they had expended so much, seeraed on the brink of capture. At the last moment, the cavalrymen were being ordered to leave their prize and to head north to Lublin for reasons that were not explained. There was justificiation for Budennyi and Voroshilov suspecting that not only incompetence but treachery was at work. For Red Array participants in the Battle of Warsaw, this debacle would naturally leave a bitter taste. It was an opportunity lost: the Red Array had not given the Battle of Warsaw its best shot. As Karaenev would note later: 'our chief ace on the Ukrainian front' had becorae tied down in a 'secondary task'.70 There is no way of knowing if the First Cavalry Army could have turned the tide. Given their successful record, there was always a chance of thera doing 69 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, p. 98. 70 Karaenev, Op. cit., p. 168. 312 just that. On the other hand, the konnoarraeitsy had displayed clear signs of exhaustion and a loss of fighting capacity in the first half of August 1920. But at the very least, the Red Array would not have suffered the humiliation of having to beat a retreat with indecent haste. Stalin and Egorov were clearly embarrassed by what happened. Stalin blamed Smilga, in the headqaurters of the West Front, for having done raore than most to foster the spirit of misplaced optimism about the Red Array's prospects.'71^ In general he was silent on the matter. Budennyi was upset that he did not get a chance at Warsaw. In his latter-day account, he held Egorov and Stalin responsible.72 Egorov did not reply to his critics until 1929. When he did, it was with a very interesting and incisive accoimt that deraolished raany of the arguraents put forward by his critics. Egorov could not bring hiraself to tell the whole truth, which was that mismanagement by the centre had led him and Stalin to take a wrong course of action. By 1929, Stalin was above criticisra, so Egorov could not possibly suggest that Stalin had misread the situation or even that he had been misled. 71 Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander, p. 75, 72 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 2, p. 248-50. 313 Chapter Eight: From Zamoste' to Siraferopol' August 1920-November 1920 Therailitary operations of the Civil War that carae after the Battle of Warsaw, in raid-August 1920, represented an anticliraax. The Soviet-Polish War continued for another two raonths, before ending undraraatically and inconclusively with an arraistice on 12 October 1920. The Red Array was then free to turn its attention to the last bastion of counterrevolution inside Russia, Baron Wrangel's White forces in south Russia. This was to be an uneven contest. By late October 1920, the Red Array had araassed a telling nuraerical superiority over its White opponent. By raid-November 1920, Wrangel's battered troops were forced to flee for their lives from Criraean ports. With this action, seriousrailitary operation s in the Civil War were brought to a close. A crucial role in these final battles of the Civil War was played by the First Cavalry Array. The Soviet-Polish War did not end inraid-August 1920 , with the victory of the Poles in the Battle of Warsaw. A negotiated end to the war only becarae certain in the third week in Septeraber 1920.1 j^ ^j^g second half of August and the first half of Septeraber 1920, the fighting continued, Pilsudskii's Polish Array atterapted to press horae the advantage won by its success in the Battle of Warsaw and began to push eastwards. The leaders of the Red Array planned 1 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 260. 314 a counterattack. In Soviet literature, not a great deal was to be heard about the counterattack. That is not surprising for it ended in a fiasco that brought no credit to its planners. In his latter-day account, Tukhachevskii considered that the whole episode was not worthraore than a single sentence. As he described it: The Cavalry Army, which had ended up in the direction of Lublin, was instructed by the High Command to carry out a deep raid on Zamoste' but it was too late.2 For the konnoarmeitsy, the episode was not to be forgotten. Only with great difficulty were they able to extricate themselves from a Polish encirclement designed to destroy the First Cavalry Army. The encircleraent wasraade possibl e by the breakdown of the proposed counterattack. The First Cavalry Array was handed a virtual suicide raission by the Red Array coraraand. In the third week in August 1920, the konnoarraeitsy were ordered to advance deep into the Polish rear, at the sarae tirae as the Red Array elsewhere was in full retreat to the east. Not surprisingly, sorae writers have found these events puzzling. Norraan Davies wrote that: Nothing in this operationraakes sense...His (Tukhachevskii's) second repetition of the order on 20 August 1920 sent the Konarmyia to certain encirclement in an area which the other Soviet armies had completely abandonded. The operation was as incomprehensible to the people involved as itraust be to the historian. 2 Tukhachevskii, Op. cit., p. 74. 3 Davies, Op. cit., p. 217. 315 Davies went on to suggest that the order was the result of 'the quarrel within the Soviet coraraand' that had plagued Red Array operations during the Battle of Warsaw. The strategic thinking that condemned the First Cavalry Army to a desperate fight for its life deep behind the Polish lines was incompetent, but not sinister. This was not Coraraander-in-Chief Karaenev and Tukhachevski's revenge on Budennyi for the trouble they believed he had caused them during the Battle of Warsaw. It was the result of a poorly- conceived plan by two men desperate to resuscitate the failed invasion of Poland. They came to the conclusion that the only coraponent of the Red Array capable of effecting a turnaround in the war was the First Cavalry Array. But in reality, the process of defeat and disintegration elsewhere in the Red Array had gone too far, so that the efforts of the First Cavalry Array were wasted. Neither Karaenev nor Tukhachevskii viewed the defeat at Warsaw as the final word in the war against Poland. They were soon engaged in planning a counterattack. In the last week in August 1920, this counterattack could not be launched by Tukhachevskii's four northern arraies, because they were in disarray as the result of the Polish counterattack, which began on 16 August 1920. The Red Fourth Array, along with the 3rd Cavalry Corps, had been forced to take refuge in East Prussia, suffering the ignominy of internment by the Germans. The Third, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Armies, along with the Mozyr Group farthest to the south, were reeling back eastwards, desperate to escape from 316 the encirclement planned by Pilsudskii.^ According to the coraraander of the Red Sixteenth Array: The only units which preserved coraparative order or fighting value were: about a brigade of the 8th and 17th Infantry Divisions and the two brigades of the 27th Infantry Division, (this, out of the fifteen brigades included in the Sixteenth Array.)5 In these circumstances, if the Red Army was to counterattack, it would have to do so in the south. This meant employing the First Cavalry and Twelfth Arraies. The First Cavalry Array would have to constitute the main strike force. An isolated raid by the First Cavalry Army could not achieve anything on its own. The aira of anyraoveraent t o the west of Budeimyi's cavalry would be to draw asraany Polish units to it as possible, so that the way would be cleared for Tukhachevskii's northern group of arraies to put theraselves in order and to resurae the offensive in the direction of Warsaw. Budeimyi's cavalryraen would turn the Polish flank from the south. The success of the plan hinged not only on the First Cavalry Army, but on Tukhachevskii's northern group of arraies. After the Civil War, Tukhachevskii clairaed that the idea of sending Budennyi to Zaraoste' was Karaenev's and not his. Budennyi was charitable enough to accept Tukhachevski's disclaimer.6 Thisraay have been the case. On 23 August 1920, Kamenev inforraed Tukhachevskii that the Polish advance was ^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, p. 212. 5 M. Sergeev, Ot Dvini do Visli (Moscow, 1922), p. 118, 6 Budennyi, Op. cit. v. 2., p. 347 317 playing into the Red Array's hands, leaving the Poles wide open to a counterattack. As Kamenev described the situation, 'the risk increases for the opponent with each step forward'. Kamenev's recomraendation was that the Red Array's Mozyr Group, which forraed the left flank of Tukhachevskii's northern group of armies, be ordered to stiffen its resistance, to stop the Polish advance so that a new blow might be prepared. Tukhachevskii responded the next day with instructions not only to the Mozyr Group, but to Budenny as well. The First Cavalry Array was ordered to concentrate in the Sokal' area, then to head to the north east, towards Lublin. The town of Krasnostav was set as the first objective, to be taken after four days.°. A few days later, Tukhachevskii was describing this as the Krasnostav-Zaraoste' direction. Budennyi's cavalry never reached Krasnostav. The advance was halted on 31 August 1920, with the konnoarmeitsy just short of Zamoste'. With the forces that had not been pinned down by the First Cavalry Army's neighbours, the Polish coraraander in this area, Sikorski, raarshalled his troops against Budennyi. The Poles asserabled a force in this area that coraprised more than 14,000 infantry and 4,800 cavalry.10 The First Cavalry Army, by this time, was only slightly raore than 10,000 sabres strong.H Fifty kiloraetres 7 jjj^j;^ p, 664. 8 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3. , p. 92. 9 Ibid. p. 96. 10 Ibid. V. 4, p. 522. 11 Kliuev, Pervaia konnaia, p. 140. 318 to the east, was the 2,000-strong Twelfth Array; but as it was defending rather than attacking, it was not drawing to it substantial Polish forces. The First Cavalry Array was corapletely alone in the Polish rear. In Zamoste' itself, was a Polish garrison that had been reinforced by the 10th Infantry Division. To the north and west, were units of the Third Army. To the south was a group of Polish forces comraanded by general Stanislaw Haller. Haller attacked Budeimyi's rear. At the sarae tirae, he had taken charge of the Guchka river crossings, of which Budennyi would need to regain control, if he was to escape eastwards to rejoin the Red front. Budennyi was now caught 1 9 in a narrow corridor, ten to fifteen kiloraetres wide.-^'' The First Cavalry Array did its job. Karaenev noted that Budeimyi's raoveraent caused the Poles to raove three divisions 1 o frora the northern to the southern sector.^-^ However, the northern arraies did not fulfill their part of the bargain. The atterapts to build a counterattack were raeagre and produced no results. As Karaenev characterised the situation to Tukhachevskii on 7 Septeraber 1920, 'the advance of Budennyi is the only plus'.l^ In that sarae conversation, Karaenev was critical of Tukhachevskii and scathing about the northern arraies of the West Front. The latter, supposed to be putting theraselves in order, in reality were retreating, putting up only token resistance. Tukhachevskii wanted to know if he was to 12Budennyi,Op.cit., v. 2, pp. 357-360. 13 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3, p. 101. l"* Ibid. 319 receive reinforceraent in the shape of the Fourteenth Army frora Egorov's South-West Front. Karaenev's bitter reply was that he was thinking of giving Budennyi and the Twelfth Array back to Egorov, because he feared that the 'psychology' of the northern arraiesraight affect theraood o f the Red Array's raore war-like forces in the south.15 By 1 Septeraber 1920, Budennyi sensed that he was being drawn into a trap set by the Poles. He decided to break out to the east in the Grubeshov direction, in order to link up with the Red Twelfth Array. The Red cavalrymen were being pressed hard in every direction. One participant later provided a dramatic description of the events of 1 September 1920. By midday, the Poles were tightening the ring, putting special pressure on the 11th Cavalry Division and on the Special Brigade frora the Koraarov and Grabovets directions. The 14th Cavalry Division was under pressure frora the direction of Gostinnoe and, like the 11th Cavalry Division was falling back. Farthest to the west was the 6th Cavalry Division, which was holding its ground near Zamoste'. Budennyi used his 4th Cavalry Division as a mobile reserve. He sent two of its brigades to the aid of the 11th Cavalry Division. Together, they drove back Galler's group to the south. Following up this success, the two brigades of the 4th Cavalry Division fell upon the Poles to the east, thus regaining the bridges across the Guchva river. Two regiraents of Polish cavalry were brushed aside in the process. The 15 Ibid, 320 iconnoarroeitsy had found a way out and Budeimyi's array escaped eastwards to safety.16 Polish writers were to be critical of Sikorskii for acting with excessive caution against Budennyi and for failing to secure the Guchva crossings.17 Soviet writers would claira that the Poles acted indecisively, because they had still not overcorae their fear of the Red cavalryraen.18 The upshot of it all was that the First Cavalry Army was able to make good its escape from what Soviet literature would later describe as the 'Zamoste' ring'. So ended the last Red Army attack of the Polish war. Time was running out for both Karaenev and Tukhachevskii in their futile efforts to turn the war against Poland once raore to the Red Array's advantage. Tukhachevskii still hoped that the First Cavalry Array raight be able to perforra raore rairaculous deeds. He tried to cover its redeployraent with the Twelfth Array. This was only partially successful. By mid-Septeraber 1920, it was clear that the Polish war was drawing to an inconclusive end. As the Red Army fell back, the Poles crept forward, coraing to occupy the sarae positions which they had held before their unsuccessful invasion of the Ukraine began in the last week in April 1920; and a little bitraore besides. Soviet political leadership at this tirae had as its priority not the renewal of the offensive against Poland, but a speedy reduction of Wrangel and an end to the fighting. 16 Tiulenev, Sovetskaia kavaleriia, pp. 207-210. 17 Davies, Op. cit., p. 226 18 Ibid., p.211. 321 Reinforcraents were being brought back frora the Polish front to face Wrangel. On 26 Septeraber 1920, the First Cavalry Array was transferred to Kamenev's reserve. Soon after it was set as its mission the quickest possible transfer to the war against Wrangel in south Russia.19 Sanity had returned at last. The plans developed by Kamenev and Tukhachevskii, to revitalise the war against the Poles, were unrealistic. While it was true that the First Cavalry Array still retained rauch of its capacity for corabat, the sarae could not be clairaed for other coraponents of the Red Array, especially for the three northern arraies of Tukhachevskii's West Front. Soviet political leadership had now corae to the sensible conclusion that the war with Poland had dragged on for too long, that the Red Array's full resources would have to be turned towards the Criraea and Wrangel's White Army there. On 19 August 1920, the Central Coraraittee decided that the front against Wrangel had to take priority over the Polish carapaign.20 Even so, Karaenev and Tukhachevskii continued to cherish the illusion that the war against the Poles could still be won, throughout the second half of August and the first half of September 1920. If there was a positive side to the abortive Zamoste' : aid, it was that it would have helped put to rest any thoughts that the Poles might have had of a second invasion of the Ukraine. The Poles now knew the limits of their success at Warsaw. The Red Array had been checked, but was by 19 D.G.K.K.A., pp. 758-59. 20 Ibid., p. 620. 322 noraeans crushed . The First Cavalry Array was still alive and well. At the sarae tirae, to the north in Belorussia, the Red Array's northern group was starting to put up a stiffer defence despite the continuing absence of any offensive ardour. By the third week in Septeraber 1920, both sides were ready to end the fighting. The border agreed to by the Poles, in the Peace of Riga in 1921, was more favourable to the Soviet government than that which obtained before the initial Polish invasion of the Ukraine in April 1920. The bulk of the Ukraine would remain under the control of the Soviet government. For this, the Soviet government owed a debt of gratitude to the First Cavalry Army. With the defeat of Denikin's White Array in the north Caucasus in early April 1920, the last reraaining bastion of counterrevolution inside Russia was the Crimean peninsula. It was here that Baron Peter Wrangel took over command of Denikin's White Army. In April 1920, therailitary outloo k for the Whites appeared bleak. Wrangel had taken coraraand only on the provision that his fellow White generals sign an acknowledgement that Wrangel's task was not to win the war, but to lead the Whites to safety. Despite this gloomy beginning, Wrangel's forces were to enjoy considerable success in suraraer 1920, because the raain body of the Red Array was erabroiled in full-scale war with the Poles. Wrangel'sraost notable success carae in June 1920, when his forces advanced beyond the safety of their Criraean stronghold, into the rich agricultural land of the Tauride, In the west, the Whites advanced to the line of the Dneipr 323 river as far north as Aleksandrovsk. To the east, Wrangel occupied Mariupol', on the Sea of Azov, and his forces could nowraenace th e Donbass to the north. WrangeI's array was sraall, about 35,000 strong, but it was a quality force. The Markov, Komilov and Drozdov divisions were veteran units that had played a big part in the successes of Denikin's White Array in 1919. Ex-Tsarist officers forraed their nucleus. Alraost half of Wrangel's force was cavalry. It wasraade u p of Don and Kuban Cossacks, who had escaped the Red Array's occupation of their homeland, as well as non-Cossack veterans of the Tsarist cavalry. The White cavalry had learnt from its defeats at the hands of its Red counterpart. Aversion to firepower no longer existed. White cavalry now worked closely with armoured cars, machine gun units and even air power. One Soviet observer dubbed Wrangel's mounted troops 'armoured 91 cavalry'.^^ In suraraer 1920, Wrangel's array was opposed only by the Red Thirteenth Array. Disaster struck the latter late in June 1920, when its 1st Cavalry Corps, led by Zhloba, was annihilated while atterapting to move against Wrangel's forces in the eastern part of the Tauride. Frora that tirae, a lack of cavalry in south Russia was to bedevil the plans of the Red Array's South-West Front. They responded by creating the Second Cavalry Army, which began its existence on 28 June 1920.22 21 Gusev, Op. cit., p. 22. 22 D.K.F.K.A., p. 203. 324 The Second Cavalry Army was not to grow beyond about 4,000 sabres. Its original commander was Gorodovikov, the veteran divisional commander of the First Cavalry Array who hadraissed th e Polish campaign through illness. He was to be replaced, on 6 September 1920, by Philip Mironov, the controversial Don Cossack who had narrowly escaped execution at the hands of Budennyi, in September 1919, following Mironov's outlawing by the Soviet government. In the course of late summer and auturan 1920, the Red Array steadily built up its forces facing Wrangel. By mid- October 1920, the strength of the Red Army was more like 100,000 and that of the Whites 35,000.23 This growing nuraerical superiority had not, by mid-October 1920, produced an improveraent in the military situation for the Red Army. All the Red Army could do was defend grimly hard-won gains, such as the Kakhovka bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dneipr river. The only positive development was that Wrangel's atterapts to expand his base had failed. On 8 August 1920, Wrangel landed a 4,500-strong force on the shores of the Kuban. It failed to rouse the war-weary Cossacks to another carapaign. In the first week in October 1920, Wrangelraade a last desperate atterapt to encourage the Poles to continue the war against Soviet Russia, by crossing the Dneipr river and advancing into the western Ukraine. The advance petered out: within a week Wrangel's array was forced back to its starting point.2^ 23 I. Korotkov, Razgrom Vrangelia (Moscow, 1955), p. 287. 2^ Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, pp. 299-300. 325 This last development caused great anxiety in the Red Army. As Kamenev described the situation to Lenin, on 13 October 1920: The initiative is wholly in the hands of Wrangel. Now we are only defending25 At the sarae time, Trotsky reinforced this gloomy raessage for Lenin, suggesting that the war against Wrangel could easily last all winter.26 Lenin told his generals that there 97 could be no winter carapaign. The Soviet government was now haunted by the spectre of peasant revolt, already manifest in the Ukraine and in the Tambov region of central Russia. Kamenev saw the problem in terms of the Red Army's need for further reinforceraent. It was a question too of quality, not just quantity. Karaenev gave his opinion that, 'the chief hope lies in the transfer of units of the 30th division and the speeding up of theraoveraent o f the Cavalry Array'."^^ It was certainly an indictraent of the units of the Red Army already engaged against Wrangel, with their existing numerical superiority, that Kamenev saw no prospect of victory until the First Cavalry Army arrived. This had always been the problera for the Red Array: its paper strength was irapressive but it lacked units of real quality. This was particularly true in the case of cavalry, so necessary for success in a war ofraoveraent. Karaenev was desperate by this 25 iJ^G. iCif. A., p. 772. 26 Mawdsley, Op. cit. p. 264. 27 Grazhdanskaia voina (1986), v. 2, p. 304. 28 D.G.K.K.A., p. 772 326 time. He saw the First Cavalry Army as a panacea for the problems of the South Front. The First Cavalry Army was the big hope to speed up the much-delayed final victory over the Whites. It was to be the centrepiece in the strategy devised by the South Front's coraraander, Mikhail Frunze. During October 1920, Lenin sent two telegraras to Budennyi, urging hira to speed up the tempo 29 of his raarch.^^ The First Cavalry Array was raaking si ow progress. This reflected difficulties it experienced in extricating itself frora the front line against the Poles. It also reflected difficulties of a different sort. The First Cavalry Array rode out of Poland, battered and bruised. The fighting had taken its toll. When it first went into action against the Poles, the First Cavalry Array boasted a fighting strength ofraore than 16,000 sabres. By September 1920, it was down to about 10,000 fighters. The fighting took its heaviest toll among the best and bravest of the cavalrymen. The command staff was depleted. As usual, the Red Army's rear had great difficulty in supplying the front. Eloquent testimony to this type of difficulty was the fact that Budennyi decided to write to his erstwhile ally frora the Caucasus front, Ordzhonikidze, to see if he could arrange the shipment of warm uniforras frora the north Caucasus.30 Clearly, Budennyi had lost faith in the raore conventionalraethods o f organising supply. The konnoarmeitsy were soon to receive more disheartening news from the rear, as they began their seven-hundred 29 Ibid., pp. 767, 780. 30 Budennyi, Op. cit., v. 2, p. 272, 327 kilometre raarch to the war against Wrangel. Letters from horae, as well as the reports of iconnoarroeitsy returning frora the hospitals in the rear, told of widespread faraine in the Don, Kuban and Stavropol areas. Another destabilising element was the presence of bands of peasant rebels in the Ukraine, which raade efforts to encourage the konnoarmeitsy to desert. All of this forraed the background to a major crisis which took place in the First Cavalry Army in the first week in October 1920.31 It had been Red Army policy, since early in the Civil War, to keep units as active as possible. It had been noted that desertion and other breaches of military discipline were much raore coraraon araong units not directly engaged in the fighting. This general rule was to find added proof in the 'disorders' in the 6th Cavalry Division that took place as the konnoarmeitsy raade their way frora the Polish to the south Russian battlefield in late Septeraber and early October 1920. Budeimyi's probleras began with a series of pogroms comraitted by konnoarmeitsy of the 6th Cavalry Division against the civilian population of uimaraed villages in the western Ukraine, which had a large Jewish population. The 31st, 32nd and 33rd regiraents had gone on a rarapage. The details have never been published. It was not just a question of pogroras. The disorders began with the konnoarmeitsy of one unit refusing to go into corabat, coraplaining that their horses were tired and that the raen were dressed in rags. On 28 Septeraber 1920, the 31 Ibid. 328 coraraissar of the 6th Cavalry Division was murdered. Budennyi would write later that he had been deeply shocked by these events, because they had taken place in veteran units, and not araong raw recruits. He responded quickly enough. The three regiraents were formally disbanded, their banners and decorations forfeited. The cavalryraen were regrouped into raarch batallions and a process of purging 'hooligans, bandits and suspicious elements' was coraraenced.3^ For seventeen days, the First Cavalry Array's revolutionary tribunal debated the fate of the coramanders involved. Death penalties were eventually brought down. These were comrauted, on the grounds that the coraraanders involved were all volunteers with exeraplary records. Two brigade commanders and a number of lower-level coraraanders were sent to the headquarters of the South Front for reassignment. The divisional commander, Apemasenko, was once raore demoted. Frora Budeimyi's point of view, the action taken had served his purpose. There was an end to the disorders. The disgraced konnoarmeitsy were to be provided with an opportunity to redeem theraselves in the war against Wrangel. Budennyi could hardly afford to lose the services of the 6th Cavalry Division which, with nearly 4,000 sabres, had been the First Cavalry Array's largest. These events slowed down the First Cavalry Array in its raarch back to south Russia; but they did not spell the end of the First Cavalry Army as a potent military force. Even the 6th Cavalry Division, which for much of October 1920 lingered four days behind the 32 ibid., V. 3, pp. 38-41. 329 other three divisions, was able to put itself in order sufficiently to perform with credit in the war against Wrange1. There was sorae sraall corapensation for Budennyi during the march to south Russia. The First Cavalry Army was now directly subordinated to Commander-in-Chief, Kamenev, who raade the supply requirements of the cavalrymen a priority. Six regiraents, 3,000 fighters, had been found to reinforce Budennyi. By the time the First Cavalry Array reached the Dneipr river, in late October 1920, its strength was once raore around the 16,000-sabreraark. A t last warra uniforras and adequate supplies of cartridges began to arrive. The replenishing of the human and raaterial stocks of the army served to buoy the raood of the cavalrymen. By the middle of the last week in October 1920, Budeimyi's cavalry was ready to play its part in the final assault against the last of the White Armies. Soviet writers are fond of quoting Lenin's glowing assessment of the three-week carapaign, beginning on 28 October 1920, that finally drove the Whites from their last foothold in south Russia. According to the Soviet leader, 'the complete, decisive and remarkably quick victory over Wrangel represents one of the raost brilliant pages in the history of the Red Army'.3^ Lenin was so desperate to conclude the war against the Whites that any victory over Wrangel would have appeared 'brilliant' to hira. In reality, the carapaign against Wrangel was no raodel of railitary 33 ------^ — j--^ 34 Korotkov, Op. cit., p. 279. 330 efficiency. The Red Array attack did not proceed sraoothly: only at great cost was victory achieved. Wrangel was beaten, thanks largely to the efforts of the First Cavalry and, later, of the Sixth Array; but the price was higher than it needed to be. Soviet writers have tended to play down the failings of the campaign. This is because the man responsible for directing the Red Army's South Front against Wrangel was Mikhail Frunze, the quintessential Red Array hero. Later to become the Soviet government's Commissar for War, Frunze had no formal military training. He had been a Bolshevik since 1904. In 1917, he had agitated amongst the soldier malcontents of the Tsarist Array. In the Civil War, he had proved hiraself in coraraand positions, rising to commander of first the East and then the Turkestan Fronts. In September 1920, he was given the honour of leading the final assault on the Whites. There can be little doubt that Frunze was an able commander. There can be equally little doubt that Soviet writers have been too generous in their assessment of Frunze's conduct of the war against Wrangel. The Red Army's strategists were gladdened by Wrangel's decision to leave his forces in the Tauride, rather than pull them back behind the Criraean isthrauses as soon as it becarae apparent that the Red Array was ready for a decisive attack. The Criraea, with its narrow isthmuses joining it to the main body of Russia, could easily be turned into a fortress that could only be stormed with the greatest difficulty. While Wrangel remained in the Tauride, he was rauchraore vulnerabl e to a Red Array attack. 331 Wrangel's thinking in not reraoving his forces iraraediately frora the north Tauride has been the source of considerable speculation. It raay have been, as Wrangel hiraself later claimed, that he did not want to give the irapresssion to his foreign backers that all was lost, nor did he wish to create panic among his own people. To retreat into the Crimea was to admit powerlessness. By remaining in the Tauride, he raade the situation appear better than it was.35 Wrangel was keen too to coraplete the harvest in the rich Tauride area before withdrawing to the Crimea.36 It may also have been that Wrangel was still hoping that the Red Array would falter at the last hurdle. Peasant revolts were flaring up in the Red Array's rear in the Ukraine. The Red Array was of uneven quality and its raost battle-hardened units were fresh frora a defeat at the hands of the Poles. A strong showing by his forces in the Tauride would help to shatter the Red Army's morale. Whatever Wrangel thought, the Red Army was presented with the opportunity to deal with Wrangel's forces before they escaped to the Criraea. The shape of the front line reserabled a serai circle, with its base forraed by the Black Sea, the Criraean isthrauses and the Sea of Azov. In the west, Wrangel's 1st and 2nd Array Corps, under the overall coraraand of general Kutepov, were positioned along the banks of the Dneipr river. Here bridgeheads on the eastern bank had already been established by the Red Army, including the area around Kakhovka, where the main blow against Wrangel was 35 p. Wrangel, Always with Honour (Ann Arbor, 1963), p. 294. 36 Mawdsley, Op. cit., p. 269. 332 being prepared. The eastern side of the serai circle, was defended by the 2nd Array, under the command of general Kazanovich, in the Melitopol' area. Wrangel had a useful raobile reserve, in the shape of a Cavalry Corps, under the coraraand of Barbovich, which was positioned in the Nizhnie Seregozy area.37 The essence of Frunze's strategy was contained in his directive of 19 October 1920.38 The aira was to encircle and to destroy Wrangel's forces in the Tauride. At Kakhovka, Frunze had positioned the Sixth Array, which was about to be reinforced by the First Cavalry Array. Farther to the north was the Second Cavalry Array, which was operating in the Nikopol' area. To the north east was the Fourth Array and to its left was the Thirteenth Array. For good raeasure, the eastern side of the serai circle was reinforced by a newly- forraed 3rd Cavalry Corps and a 2,000 strong Insurgent Army coramanded by Makhno, now in alliance with the Red Array against Wrangel. The Red Array could press Wrangel frora three sides; but that would serve only to force Wrangel to fall back to the south, to the relative safety of the Crimean peninsula. The key to Frunze's plan involved the dispatch of Budennyi from Kakhovka into Wrangel's rear, with the aira of blocking the Whites' paths of retreat. Once the bulk of Wrangel's forces had been destroyed in the Tauride, the Red Array could then turn its attention to an assault on the Crimea. 37 Korotkov Op. cit., pp. 193-95, 38 D.K.F.K.A., v. 3., pp. 471-72, 333 A debate about strategy preceded the campaign. Frunze's plan was not well received by the cavalrymen. They took advantage of the fact that the regroupings called for in Fmnze's directive of 19 October 1920 were described as 'preliminary', to propose major modifications to Frunze's strategy.39 vfhat raost disturbed Budennyi was the fact that Frunze envisaged the war against Wrangel as having two phases. The first phase was the defeat of Wrangel's forces in the northern Tauride. The second phase was to be the invasion of the Crimean peninsula itself. Budennyi believed that the operation should be undertaken as a single whole. In his report on 19 October 1920, Budennyi proposed that the Sixth Army, supported by two cavalry divisions, fight its way into the Crimea, even before Wrangel's forces in the Tauride were defeated. On 26 October 1920, Budennyi and Voroshilov met with Frunze in Kharkov to discuss the coraing campaign. It seeems that the cavalryraen went even further and suggested that they be allowed to invade the Criraea through the Chongar isthmus, for the purpose of destroying the rear of the Whites, before Wrangel succeeded in organising his defences there.^0 Budennyi had anticipated what would prove a major difficulty for Frunze's strategy. By concentrating its efforts purely against Wrangel's forces in the Tauride, Frunze was allowing Wrangel the luxury of not having to fear for his rear in the Crimean peninsula. Budeimyi's strategy was aimed at avoiding that possibility, by reducing 39 jj-^-j^^^---^ pp_ 777_7Q^ ^0 Bubnov, Op. cit., v. 3., p. 94. 334 Wrangel's hold on the Tauride and the Crimea siraultaneously. Kakurin, the independent-rainded Soviet military historian of the 1920's, later vrrote favourably of Budeimyi's plan, noting that a raid into the Criraea itself was likely to have met with succeess given, as Wrangel himself acknowledged, the chaos that obtained at that tirae in the deep rear of the Whites.^1 Karaenev and Frunze rejected the proposals frora Budennyi. Frunze issued a new general directive, on 26 October 1920, but this was brought about by new inforraation about where Wrangel's forces were concentrated. It was realised that Wrangel was strongest at Nizhnie Seregozy, not at Melitopol' as previously thought.^2 Frunze raodified his plans so that the Second Cavalry Array striking frora the north, the Sixth Array frora the west and the First Cavalry Array frora the south would corabine to crush Wrangel's forces in and around Nizhnie Seregozy. In other words, there was to be an encircleraent within the more general encirclement of Wrangel's forces that would occur when the First Cavalry and the Sixth Arraies raoving frora the west and the Thirteenth Array raoving frora the east took control of the Criraean isthrauses. The strategy was becoraing coraplicated. It would prove beyond the capabilities of the Red Array to impleraent. The Red Array's attack began on 28 October 1920, with the Sixth Army raaking its way to the Perekop isthraus, the western passage into the Criraea. Here the Sixth Array's "^1^ Ibid. ^2 Korotkov, Op. cit., pp. 195, 196. ^3 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3, pp. 483-84. 335 advance ground to a halt; but the effect of its action was to block off this route of escape to Wrangel's forces. Now they would have to raake their escape through the routes to the east, Chongar and the Arabatskaia peninsula. The key to these escape routes was control of the area around Salkovo, Genichesk and the salt marshes of the Sivach. On 28 October 1920, Budennyi was ordered by Frunze to take control of this area, with the aira of ensuring that the Whites did not escape.^^ Theraoveraent o f the First Cavalry Array into the rear of the Whites brought about a dramatic change in the railitary situation in the north Tauride. In two days, Budennyi had moved nearly 100 kiloraetres to the east and had taken possession of the railroad that connects the Criraea with the north Tauride through Salkovo. With Budennyi threatening his rear, Wrangel now came to the conclusion that he must retreat before the Red Army's encirclement of his forces was coraplete. The order to retreat was given on 30 October 1920. Wrangel had to take control of the Salkovo area and not allow Budennyi to establish himself there. As Wrangel later described these events. Large masses of Red cavalry had turned the right wing of the 2nd Army Corps and were advancing rapidly towards the east. The 1st Red Cavalry Array had thrown all its forces behind our troops and was striving to cut off their retreat into the Criraea. In the raeanwhile. General Koutepov wasraarking time. I sent him a wireless order toraarch o n Salkovo at all speed, and do his utraost to check the enemy troops which had penetrated our lines at Sivache.^5 ^^ ibid., v. 3, p. 488. ^5 Wrangel, Op. cit., p. 308. 336 For three days, beginning on 30 October 1920, the First Cavalry Army was engaged in fierce fighting as Wrangel's troops stampeded southwards, striving desperately to regain the sanctuary of their Crimean base. In the area of Agaiman, Budeimyi's 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions fought with the enemy's best forces, 1st Army Corps and Barbovich's cavalry, in all some 12,300 infantry and 7,800 cavalry, on 30 and 31 October 1920.^6 The Red cavalry was forced to surrender Agaiman temporarily. A measure of the ferocity of the fighting was that the coraraander, Morozov, and the commissar, Bakhturov of the 11th Cavalry Division were killed in action. Then it was the turn of the 4th and 14th Cavalry Divisions, 65 kiloraetres to the south east in the Salkovo area, to feel the brunt of the onslaught by Wrangel's troops. By the evening of 2 Noveraber 1920, the Tauride was in the hands of the Red Array, thanks chiefly to the efforts of the First Cavalry Array. The Red Army had taken nearly 20,000 prisoners, more than half of Wrangel's troops. Wrangel described what occurred as a raajor defeat for his array, writing in his latter-day account that. The decisive battle in Northern Taurida was over. The eneray had becoraeraaster o f all the territory we had taken frora thera during the suraraer. An enorraous amount of booty had fallen into their hands... Our troops had suffered heavy losses, many had been killed, wounded or frozen. A large nuraber of prisoners and stragglers were in the hands of the eneray:^ ^6 These are the figures for these forces at the outset of the Red Array offensive supplied in the modern Soviet literature Grazhdanskaia voina, (1986), v. 2, p. 306. It may be that Soviet writers have overestimated Wrangel's strength. As ever, it is difficult to be certain about figures given for the numbers involved in Civil War battles. "^7 Wrangel, Op.cit., p. 309. 337 Yet, this was not as much of a victory as the Red Army's strategists had planned. Their aim was to destroy Wrangel's forces totally in the Tauride, so that only miniraal resistance would be encountered along the excellent defensive barriers of the Crimean isthmuses. Enough of Wrangel's best troops had broken through the cordon forraed by the First Cavalry Array to ensure that the Red Army would have to fight its way into the Crimea. The storming of the Crimean isthrauses, in the second week in Noveraber 1920, resulted in a bloodbath. Frunze put the nuraber of casualties at 10,000, araassive toll by Civil War standards.^8 ^^^^y (jj^j Red Array operations in the Tauride not yield the results that they were supposed to? It raight seem that the escape of the Whitesraust hav e been the fault of the First Cavalry Army, who had been given the task of blocking the southward moveraent of Wrangel's troops. A Western writer has reraarked that, if Budeimyi's reputation in the Civil War had depended solely upon the war against Wrangel, it is unlikely that he would have been rated very highly.^9 Latter-day Soviet coraraentators would find two groimds on which to criticise Budeimyi's handling of his troops. The first was that he divided his array into two groups, once he had reached Wrangel's rear. The second was that his reconnaissance work had been inadequate in that the ferocity ^8 Mawdsley, Op.cit., p. 270. ^9 w. Jacobs, Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz 1885-1925 (The Hague, 1969), p. 224. 338 of the southward surge of the Whites on 30 October 1920 had not been expected. Budeimyi's decision to divide his forces proved a mistake, although his thinking was logical. Wrangel's troops were retreating in two groups, 1st Array Corps and Barbovich's cavalry to the west, and 2nd Array Corps to the east. Budennyi had been given the task of blocking the paths of both the eastern and the western groups of Whites, It raade sense for Budennyi to deal with each group separately, before they had the chance to join forces. At the same tirae, Budennyi could not turn all his forces against one eneray group because this would provide the freedora of manoeuvre to the other enemy group either to escape or to strike the First Cavalry Army in the rear. Less understandable was Budennyi's decision to divide his forces equally, with two divisions in each direction, when Wrangel's western group was clearly the more dangerous opponent. Budennyi positioned his own headquarters at Otrada, which could only have raeant that he was giving priority to the Salkovo direction and the eastern group of Whites.51 The reason for this is not hard to find. Budennyi had been fed incorrect inforraation, that the Whites at Nizhnie Seregozy had already been sraashed by the Second Cavalry Array. The man feeding Budennyi the incorrect inforraation was Frunze, who had all too readily accepted the 50Grazhdanskaiavoina (1986), v. 2, p.308. Korotkov, Op. cit., pp. 219-20. 51 Ibid. 339 contents of a report from Mironov, which exaggerated a recent local success of the Second Cavalry Array. Late on 28 October 1920, Frunze telegraphed Budennyi that 'the best of the corps of Wrangel's array was sraashed by the Second Cavalry Array on 27 October 1920'.52 Frunze's order to Budennyi was for him to proceed to Salkovo. In this way, Wrangel's western group, which had not been sraashed by the Second Cavalry Array, did not receive the attention they deserved frora the First Cavalry Array. The fault was Fnmze's, not Budeimyi's. At the sarae tirae it was certainly the case that the separate divisions of the First Cavalry Array could still have cooperated more closely and responded more quickly once Wrangel's forces had coraraenced their retreat. Budennyi was having difficulty in obtaining information from his divisional headquarters. On the night of 30 October 1920, Budennyi complained to his divisional coraraanders that he had 'not received a single report frora any of the divisions about their concentration.'53 As ever, it was also the case that reconnaissance work by the Red cavalryraen was not of the highest standard. Budennyi would claira later that here the guilty party was the Red Array's air arra, which had failed to provide useful inforraaton about the eneray's moveraents. No doubt there was sorae truth in this, but Budennyi was atterapting to shift the blarae frora his own scouts. 52 jj-^^p,j^j-^ — ^QQ^ 53 Korotkov, Op.cit. p. 208, 340 A raore fundaraental question needs to be asked, concerning how it was that the First Cavalry Army came to be set upon by superior forces of the eneray on 30 October 1920. The First Cavalry Army was not expected to defeat Wrangel single handedly. According to Fnmze's plan, the Whites were to be attacked on all sides. Did the other armies perform the tasks set for thera? The cavalryraen would argue later that they had been let down by neighbouring armies and it would seem that there was considerable justification for this contention. Frunze had to urge the First Cavalry Array's neighbours to show raore energy. To the east, the Fourth Array had not succeeded in deploying itself properly before the attack. As a consequence its best units did not even participate in the fighting in the Tauride, The Thirteenth Array raoved exceedingly cautiously, fearing for its right flank, which in reality was covered by the Fourth Array. On 30 October 1920, Frunze urged the coraraander of the Thirteenth Array to show raore energy, to throw his cavalry forward into Wrangel's rear 'for upon this depends the fate of the task entrusted to the array'. At the same time, he ordered the Fourth Array to activate itself, to advance 'day and night', not to restrict itself to the tiraetable worked out earlier.~^~1 • 5^5 On 2 Noveraber 1920, Karaenev coraplained about the inactivity of the Thirteenth Array, and about the raisjudgeraents of its coraraander Uborevich: ^^ D.k7F.k.A., y. 3, p. 492. 55 Ibid. 341 in the very decisiveraoraents o f the campaign and in the most iraportant areas there fought only a single Latvian division and the First Cavalry Array, without any help from the reraaining arraies of the front. As a result of these battles it is clear that the First Cavalry Array has suffered a setback.56 If the Fourth and the Thirteenth Arraies were not doing enough to defeat Wrangel's eastern group at Melitopol', the situation was even worse to the west where the Second Cavalry Army had allowed the main body of Wrangel's forces at Nizhnie Seregozy to escape to the south. By 30 October 1920, Frunze realised that Mironov, the coraraander of the Second Cavalry Array, had raisread the situation. Frunze now chastised Mironov for 'the absence of the necessary energy and decisiveness in the actions of your cavalry'. He criticised Mironov for wasting a whole day fending off the counterattacks of a mere two regiments, 'which clearly had the task of covering the retreat of the main body of the 57 enemy'.^ Frunze was at fault. He had been too ready to accept Mironov's earlier report about the 'smashing of the best corps of the enemy'. Frunze's tendency to make preraature judgeraents was in evidence on 29 October 1920, when he telegraphed Lenin that. The paths of retreat towards Perekop have been cut and for the opponent there remains only the road to Salkovo. I consider that the fate of the battle to the north of the isthmuses has already been decided in our favour.58 56 D. G.K. ji[^_^; ^ p"; 73^; 57 Korotkov, Op.cit., pp. 215-16. 58 D.K.F.K.A., v. 3, p. 489. 342 At that tirae, the battle for the Tauride was only just beginning. Mironov, the commander of the Second Cavalry Array, was to be executed by the Red Array in 1921 and his reputation was only rehabilitated in the 1960's. The writers of the Stalin era, especially Budenny, took every opportunity to vilify Mironov. Yet while the attacks upon Mironovraade a t that tirae must be treated with the utmost caution, it would seem that there did exist solid grounds for criticising the lack of progress made by the Second Cavalry Array in the light of Frunze's assessraent quoted above. The Second Cavalry Army's inactivity had allowed Wrangel's forces in the Nizhnie Seregozy area to break away to the south, where only the 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions of the First Cavalry Array were positioned. So it was that the bulk of Wrangel's western group, some 20,000 strong and of the highest quality, was able to overrun the 6th and 11th Cavalry Divisions, which at most could boast 8,000 sabres. Meanwhile, farther to the south east, Budeimyi's 4th and 14th Cavalry Divisions, also about 8,000 sabres strong, were fighting a lone hand against Wrangel's eastern group, which coraprised sorae 18,000 troops in all.^5^9 When looked at in this light, a fairly clear picture eraerges of how it was that the First Cavalry Array came to be fighting a numerically superior eneray at a tirae when the Red Array enjoyed an overall nuraerical superiority of nearly four to one. The question arises as to why this had not been anticipated before the campaign got under way. It should 59 Korotkov, Op.cit., p. 271. 343 have been obvious that, at some stage, Wrangel's troops would have to break out to the south. Part of the problem was that Frunze did not pay sufficient attention to the possible consequences of Wrangel's retreat because, as a recent Soviet publication has acknowledged, he expected that Wrangel would stand and fight it out in the northern Tauride. Given Wrangel's numerical weakness, this was a strange assessment on Frunze's part, one that was not justified by events. Perhaps because of his feeling that Wrangel would stand and fight in the northern Tauride, Frunze had passed up the opportunity to reinforce the First Cavalry Army. Frunze could have reinforced the First Cavalry Array by adding to it the Second Cavalry Array, before the carapaign got under way. Such a merger of the cavalry armies was part of the alternative strategy proposed by Budennyi on 19 October 1920. It must be noted that Budennyi had never been one to raiss an opportunity to expand his coraraand; but there were sound reasons for allowing hira to do so here. Budennyi argued that the 4,000-strong Second Cavalry Array was really too weak to operate independently from the north, that there was a risk that it would be rendered ineffective in the coraing carapaign. Mironov hiraself had sensed the desirability of raaking a joint attack with the First Cavalry Army into Wrangel's rear. If the Second Cavalry Army had been placed at the disposal of Budennyi, or at least allowed to operate alongside it, this would certainly have improved if not saved the situation for Budeimyi's cavalryraen when the White retreat began on 30 344 October 1920. With an extra 4,000 sabres in the Nizhnie Seregozy region, the fight would at least have been more even. In Soviet literature, Frunze was to be absolved from blame for the failure to reinforce Budennyi. It would be claimed that Frunze wanted to give the Second Cavalry Array to Budenny but was thwarted by Kamenev.60 This was not the case. Karaenev and Frunze discussed theraatter on 19 October 1920. Karaenev expressed doubts 'as to the capacity of one raan to handle seven divisions of cavalry'. Frunze's reply was that 'the transfer of Mironov to Budennyi is iraperraissable and we will avoid this under any circurastances'. 61 When Mironov raade his proposal for the Second Cavalry Array to raove south, so that it could coordinate its actions better with the First Cavalry Army, Frunze rejected the idea outright, claiming that such a regrouping would necessarily give rise to the question of subordinating all the cavalry to Budennyi.62 This was obviously an outcome that Frunze was seeking to avoid at all costs. It is not at all clear why it was that Frunze was so opposed to the unification of the two cavalry armies. It raay have been that Frunze had taken a set against Budennyi. The cavalryraan's reputation as a troublemaker raay well have preceded hira to Frunze's headquarters in Kharkov. It had not taken long for Budennyi to rock the boat by proposing his 60 ibid., p. 293^ 61 D.K.F.K.A., V. 3, p. 476. 62 Ibid., V. 3, p. 477. 345 alternative strategy. Whatever his reasoning, Frunze's failure to reinforce Budennyi was araajor error . By the end of the first week in Noveraber 1920, the Red Array was lined up to the north of the Criraean isthrauses ready to attack. On the night of 7 Noveraber 1920, the Revolution's third anniversary, the infantryraen of the Red Sixth Array found a way across the shallow Sivashraarsh an d into the rear of Wrangel's defences at Perekop. At the same tirae, the Fourth Army fought for control of the Chongar isthmus farther to the east. After extremely bloody fighting, the Red infantrymen forced a passage into the Crimea by 11 November 1920. If the konnoarmeitsy were to receive sorae corapensation for their unsupported toil in the Tauride, it was that they had not been required to force the isthrauses, Instead they were able to gallop through the gap created by the Red infantrjnnen. With the gates opened, on 11 Noveraber 1920, the First and Second Cavalry Arraies were sent into action. By 15 Noveraber 1920, the First Cavalry Army was in possession of Simferopol' and Sevastopol'. In these final days, Wrangel concentrated solely on evacuating from the Black Sea ports as much of his force as he could. He was very successful: 146,000 people were evacuated. Their escape did notrauch matte r from the point of view of the outcome of the Civil War. The remnants of the White movement were on their way to internment in Constantinople. The Soviet government had taken a monumental step forward in its gradual mastering of the bulk of the territory that had formerly constituted the Russian Empire. 346 The First Cavalry Army was called upon to perform a heavy workload in the final Red Array carapaigns of the Civil War. It was the centrepiece of the last Red Array counterattack against the Poles; and of the carapaign against Wrangel in south Russia. Neither campaign was a raodel of railitary efficiency, though the blarae lay with the Red Army's planners, much more than it did with the First Cavalry Army. The First Cavalry Army was also required to do raore than its fair share of fighting, siraply because of the relatively low combat capacity of its Red Army neighbours. Nothing illustrated this better than the fact that the carapaign against Wrangel could not get under way until the First Cavalry Army had corapleted its 700-kiloraetre journey frora the Polish front, even though the Red Array already enjoyed a substantial nuraerical superiority over its White opponent. In the war against the Whites in south Russia, it was the First Cavalry Array that ended Wrangel's occupation of the north Tauride and set up the final victory. Its contribution to these final battles of the Civil War was plainly outstanding. The defeat of Wrangelraeant that the Civil War had, for all intents and purposes, been won: the Whites were vanquished. Yet the fighting was not over. It was not until 1922 that the Japanese left eastern Siberia. The Civil War continued in the Ukraine as well. In Deceraber 1920, Frunze ordered Makhno's forces to becorae part of the regular Red Army. When they refused, war broke out between these recent allies against Wrangel. During winter 1920, the First Cavalry Army, or part of it, was sent against Makhno. This 347 was not a particularly successful campaign for the First Cavalry Army. It is tme that Makhno was beaten, thanks in part to the efforts of the First Cavalry Army; but this was a drawn-out stmggle against a numerically-weak opponent. At the outset of December 1920, the First Cavalry Army was still a raassive force with about 17,000 sabres and an equal number of support workers, in all more than 34,000 raouths to feed. There was an equivalent number of horses. Each day, the First Cavalry Array required 17 tonnes of bread, 21 tonnes of oats and 25 tonnes of hay. In the suraraer campaign against the Poles, food and forage could be requisitioned from the local population. With winter setting in, the First Cavalry Army's food reserves at Elisavetgrad were all but exhausted. These probleras were eased slightly by the decision, taken in Deceraber 1920, to release frora the Red Array all those below the age of eighteen and above the age of thirty. According to Budennyi, this meant that the First Cavalry Array would have to let go about 10,000 individuals, a process that was likely to irapair its fighting capacity. By this stage, just about everybody was anxious to pick up the pieces of their peace-time lives and to re-establish themselves before the spring sowing. The news of the demobilisation caused disquiet among those who would have to remain in the array. 3 Sorae of the discontent was eased when it was decided that there would be iraraediate corapensation for horses that the peasants and Cossacks had lost in the fighting. 63 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', v. 3, p. 175. 348 Makhno was not finally defeated until April 1921, even though he had no raore than about 4,000 fighters at full strength. Makhno's forces were able to blend into a Ukrainian countryside that was seething with revolt. Other anti-Bolshevik bands operated alongside Makhno. The First Cavalry Army was a regular force designed for regular war against arraies that had reasonably well-defined front lines and rear bases to protect. Makhno's forcesraoved quickly , refused to give battle except on terras that suited thera and led the konnoarmeitsy on a merry dance through the Ukraine. One of Makhno's greatest successes occurred when Parkhoraenko, the 14th Cavalry Division coraraander, sturabled upon a Makhnovist arabush and was captured and executed."^ Budennyi and Voroshilov were both delegates to the Tenth Party Congress in Moscow, whichraeant that, in Deceraber 1920 and January 1921, the First Cavalry Array was led by Kliuev, the ex-Tsarist colonel. He was undoubtedly a corapetent coraraander in regular warfare, but was ill suited to the partisan struggle that the contest with Makhno entailed. Yet the causes of the First Cavalry Array's difficulties with Makhno wentrauch deeper than siraply failures of coraraand. Norraal ly, the konnoarmeitsy responded quickly to a new challenge, developing fresh tactics to suit the situation. Here they responded slowly. The sledgehammer of the Red cavalry was unable to do any damage to the feather that was Makhno's force. A new approach was needed, but the konnoarmeitsy did not have their heart in this fight. It is not hard to find the reasons why. 6^ ibid!7, v. 3, p. 198. 349 The konnoarmeitsy had been told that the war against Wrangel was their last campaign. They were tired of war. Word was received frora their families about the growing faraine and about the depradations of the grain- requisitioning detachments in the Don, Kuban and Stavropol areas. The Soviet govemraent was supposed to look after the families of the konnoarmeitsy; but this was not happening. Budennyi set up a comraission to investigate the complaints; they were all found to be true. Desertion became a problem. Budennyi was dumbfounded when Maslakov, the brigade commander who, like Budennyi, had his origins among the peasant poor of the Sal' steppe, turned renegade, deciding it was time to fight for 'true Soviet Power'.65 The problems of the First Cavalry Army were the probleras of the entire Red Array, theraost angr y expression of which was being felt at Kronshtadt. Itraay hav e been that in the First Cavalry Array, the cases of rautiny, such as that of Maslakov, were isolated but even so, the danger was there for all to see. This was the environment in which Lenin introduced the Soviet government's New Economic Policy, which was designed to win back the confidence of the peasantry. The Soviet government had to do soraething, when even its best troops were on the verge of breaking. During spring 1921, the /connoarmeitsy tried to use Makhno's tactics, organising into sraall raobile groups and relying upon inforraation frora the local population. By this stage, there was little or no support for the Red Array in the villages, so these tactics were not effective. According 65 Ibid., V. 3, p.207. 350 to Budenny, by March 1920, Makhno was down to only about 650 fighters divided into two groups. Makhno was now less of a priority and the bulk of the First Cavalry Array was given labour army tasks, including spring sowing. Only a hand- picked force continued the pursuit of Makhno. By March 1920, Budennyi had corae to the conclusion that his array would disintegrate if it it did not return to its native Don, Kuban and Stavropol regions. Budennyi even discussed theraatter wit h Lenin by direct line. Lenin warned Budennyi that these regions were in revolt and he hoped that the First Cavalry Array would not join the insurgents. Budennyi had to assure Lenin that there was no possibility of that occurring. On 20 April 1921, the Politburo took the decison that the transfer should beraade an d that the First Cavalry Array should be reduced in strength to two divisions. On 4 May 1921, the RVSR reforraed the North Caucasus Military District. Thisrailitary distric t was originally set up on 31 March 1920 under the coraraand of G. D. Bazilevich but was abolished on 4 August 1920. Upon reforraation, its staff was taken frora the First Cavalry Array, with Voroshilov as coraraander and Budennyi as his deputy.66 The First Cavalry Array reached its home regions by May 1921. Formations from the First Cavalry Army continued to see active service. Tiulenev coraraanded forraations drawn frora the First Cavalry Army until late 1921. Zhukov was part of the Independent Cavalry Brigade that served under Uborevich in the fight against the peasant rebellion known as the 'Antonovshchina' 66 ibid., V. 3, pp7 215-16. 351 in Tambov province in August 1921. The First Cavalry .Army was forraally disbanded in October 1923. The fight against Makhno did not constitute one of the First Cavalry Army'sraost glorious carapaigns. Yet this does not detract a great deal from the reputation of the First Cavalry Array, given that Makhno never constituted a serious threat to the existence of the Soviet govemraent. In any event, Makhno was in detention in Roraania by the end of April 1920, so the carapaign could not be described as having represented a failure. Conclusion The principal burden of this thesis has been to show that the First Cavalry Army made an outstanding contribution to the Red Array's achievements in the Civil War of 1918- 1920. This was done by reexamining the Red Array carapaigns in which the First Cavalry Array took part, the carapaigns against Denikin, Poland and Wrangel. These carapaigns represented sorae of the raost important fighting of the Civil War. Denikin led the most powerful of the White Arraies while the Poles constituted the most formidable opponent with which the Red Array had to deal in the Civil War. The victory over Wrangel had to be accoraplished quickly, because the Soviet government was under intense pressure from widespread peasant unrest by late 1920. The First Cavalry Army was the centrepiece of these Red Army campaigns. Iraportant contributions were made by other units; but in each of these campaigns. Red Army operations 352 at crucial times turned upon the performance of the First Cavalry Array. When it became bogged down, so did the Red Army. When it succeeded in breaking through, the Red Array prospered. In the case of the war against Denikin, it was the First Cavalry Array's sweeping aside of the White cavalry of Maraontov and Shkuro, in October and November 1920, and its rapid southward surge to the Sea of Azov in Deceraber 1920, that caused Denikin's forces to split into two and led on to their defeat. In January and early February 1920, when the First Cavalry Array was unable to capture Bataisk, the Red Army found itself in major difficulties in the face of a resurgent Denikin. It was only with the switch of the First Cavalry Array to the east, where it joined the Tenth Array in raid-February 1920, that the offensive raomentum of the Red Army was regained and victory was achieved. In the war against Poland, the Red Army suffered defeat in both the Ukrainian and Belorussian theatres before the arrival on the scene, in late May 1920, of the First Cavalry Army. Budennyi scored the first major success of the Polish campaign early in June 1920. Its westward thrust, in the month that followed, gave rise to a general Red Army advance that by mid-July 1920 had the Poles on their knees. In the second half of July 1920 the First Cavalry Army was less successful but it still was able to pin down substantial Polish forces, facilitating the advance of the Red Army's West Front. The Red Army's attempt to capture Warsaw, in August 1920, ended in disaster but the blame lay chiefly 353 withraisraanageraent o n the part of the centre, not with "the insubordination of the First Cavalry Array. A raeasure of how vital the First Cavalry Array was to the prospects of the Red Army was that, in October 1920, operations against Wrangel had to wait for its arrival frora the Polish Front, despite the overwhelraing nuraerical superiority of the Red Array. The First Cavalry Army, in November 1920, made a raajor contribution to breaking the back of Wrangel's White Army, setting up the crowning victory later that month. Against Makhno, in the first half of 1921, the First Cavalry Army fought with raixed success. This did not constitute a major railitary carapaign for the Red Array in the Civil War. At the sarae tirae, it has to be pointed out that the First Cavalry Array knew defeat as well as victory in the Civil War. It was not the unconquerable force sometimes portrayed by the hagiographers of the Stalin era. There were sorae tasks that it performed well and others that it performed badly. That the First Cavalry Array could be tamed was deraonstrated conclusively in the setbacks at Bataisk in January 1920 and in the fighting around Brody in and L'vov in July and August 1920. Sorae of its achieveraents such as the clearing of the Tauride in the first week in Noveraber 1920 were won at considerable cost. The First Cavalry Array was an extreraely valuable fighting force in the conditions obtaining in the Civil War but, as was inevitably the case with a predorainantly raounted force, there were clear liraits to what it could achieve on the battlefield. But, overall, the 354 contribution of the First Cavalry Army to the victory of the Red Army in the Civil War was remarkable. The thesis was also a study of an iraportant coraponent of the front-line Red Army. It was concerned to show that the First Cavalry Army was a product of front-line improvisation, that the initiative, resourcefulness and even the insubordination of the konnoarmeitsy constituted a vital ingredient in the Red Array's success. The nucleus of the First Cavalry Array grew up at the front line and fattened itself not upon conscripts recruited by the central recruiting agencies, but on the basis of volunteers, and through a process of mobilisations carried out in the areas in which the First Cavalry Army fought. The social origins of the konnoarmeitsy represented a factor of tremendous iraportance in generating the fighting spirit displayed by the First Cavalry Array, This was not an army of declasse freebooters, but the revolution in arms in south east Russia. This was a class war of the rural poor, mostly peasants but some dissident Cossacks, against established Cossack leadership. The coraraanders of the First Cavalry Array were not the ex-Tsarist officers that were such a feature of the Red Army coraraand in the Civil War. Sorae had experience in the Tsarist cavalry as Non Coraraissioned Officers, others were unversed in cavalry matters before the Civil War. Yet they rose to the occasion, in the sarae way that the French revolutionary arraies had been able to find a number of corporals who carried a marshal's baton in their knapsack. Most remarkably of all, Budennyi proved himself the outstanding cavalryman 355 of the Civil War. There was none who could match the record of achieveraent of his coraraands. In terras of organisation, arraament and tactics, the First Cavalry Array developed its own distinctive fighting style. The First Cavalry Array imitated the 'cavalry masses' of the Whites but then improved upon this raodel by raaking extensive use of firepower as well as the raobility and stealth that are the characteristics of any successful raounted force. The tachanka and the sawn-off rifle were not standard Red Array issue, nor was the opening barrage of artillery and machine gun fire learnt from any regulations put out by the centre. What was important was the creativity of the konnoarmeitsy. Soviet writers emphasise the contribution of the centre to the carapaigns of the Red Army. In this thesis, it has been shown that in the case of the campaigns involving the First Cavalry Army, it often happened that the plans of the centre were ill-conceived or irrelevant. The campaign against the Poles was very badly misraanaged by the centre. The shape and outcome of the Red Array carapaigns that involved the First Cavalry Array owed raore to the front line than to the centre. Usually it was not a case of the front line spoiling the plans of the centre with poor irapleraentation, but of the front line raaking the necessary adjustraents to correct the inadequacies of the central plan. The campaigns of the First Cavalry Army generated considerable turraoil within the Red Array coraraand. This should not be taken as evidence that the coraraand of the First Cavalry Array was responsible for this conflict. 356 Colton's analysis of conflict within the Red Array pointed to the iraportance of sectoral conflict within the Red Array coraraand over the issues of strategy, resources and appointraents. It is in this light that the conflicts involving the First Cavalry Array must be viewed. Soraetiraes the position on an issue taken by the coraraand of the First Cavalry Array was the wrong one but, raore often than not, its contribution worked to the advantage of the Red Array. The First Cavalry Array represents a reraarkable story. At the outset of the Civil War, cavalry was the area in which the Red Array was weakest and in which the Whites were strongest. By the end of 1919, the tables had turned and cavalry was the trump card of the Red Army. This represented a watershed in the Civil War, the clearest-possible sign that it was the Red Army that would triumph in this contest for the Tsarist inheritance. The First Cavalry Army represented the best of the Red Army. Its achievement tells us a great deal about why the Red Army won the Civil War, With the forraal disbanding of the First Cavalry Army, Budennyi became assistant coraraander of the North Caucasus Military District in May 1921. The following year he becarae the Coraraander-in-Chief's assistant on cavalry. In 1923, he became a raeraber of the RVSR and Inspector of Red Array cavalry. He became even more prorainent in the Stalin era, as one of the original five Red Array soldiers who gained the post of 'raarshal' in 1935. Budennyi helped to ensure that, even in 1938, there were still 30 cavalry divisions in the Red Array. He is criticised in raodern Soviet and Western literature for having preferred horses to raechanised war. In 357 1937, Budennyi served on the jury at the courtraarshal that sentenced Tukhachevskii, another of the original five raarshals, to death. In 1939, Budennyi becarae Deputy Commissar of Defence. In 1941, he became coraraander of the ill-fated South-West Front, which was virtually wiped out by the Germans at Kiev, in September 1941. Budennyi had wanted to retreat, but had been ordered to stand his ground by Stalin. Budennyi escaped from Kiev, but this was to represent a rather inglorious end to what had been a distinguished Red Army coramand in the field. After the war, he served in various military capacities, including Inspector of Cavalry once more and as a Vice Minister of Agriculture for Horse Raising. His efforts in the field of horse breeding led to his name being attached to a breed of horse. Between 1934 and his death in 1973, he was either a full or candidate member of the Central Coraraittee. He remains a nationalrailitary her o in the Soviet Union for his efforts in the Civil War, Voroshilov's career after the Civil War had an even higher profile than Budeimyi's, Voroshilov was head of the North Caucasus Military District between 1921 and 1924 and a member of the RVSR in 1924 and 1925. From 1925 until 1934, he was People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs and from 1934 to 1940 he was People's Coraraissar for Defence. Voroshilov was one of the original five 'raarshals' of the Soviet Union. He was a Politburoraeraber fror a 1934 to 1960. Like Budennyi, his record in field commands in World War Two was undistinguished and he was blamed for the poor showing of the Red Army in the war against Finland in 1939-1940, 358 Voroshilov's political career plumraeted in 1957, when he was part of the 'Anti-Party Group' that atterapted to oust Khrushchev. Although he retained his membership of the Central Committee until 1961 and got it back in 1966, Voroshilov was never again the political force that he had been. Yet Voroshilov was still widely popular as a Civil War hero. He received a state burial in Red Square following his death in 1969. Timoshenko graduated from the Higher Red Array military course in 1922. His career was to profit greatly from Stalin's military purge of 1937. In 1938, Timoshenko became head of the Kiev Military District. Subsequently he took charge of the war against Finland, following early reverses for the Red Array. In 1940, Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as Coraraissar of Defence. After the initial Red Array defeats at the hands of the Gerraans in 1941, Tiraoshenko found himself moved from one military coraraand to another without any great achieveraent to his credit. Following World War Two, Tiraoshenko held coraraand posts in the Urals and Belorussia. He was buried with full railitary honours in the Kreralin Wall following his death in 1970. Egorov was one of the few coraraanders closely associated with the First Cavalry Array who was to perish during the purges. Between 1921 and 1922, he served as coraraander of the Kiev and Petrograd Military districts. Between 1924 and 1927, he was in China as an attache to the Peking govemraent. In 1927, he returned frora China to becorae coraraander of the Belorussian Military District. Between then and 1931 he wrote his raajor works. Between 1931 and 1937, he 359 was chief of the Red Army General Staff and was one of the original five raarshals appointed in 1935. He was particularly interested in the potential of tactical aviation in war and in weapon developraent. In 1937, he became a First Deputy Coraraissar of Defence, but was purged shortly afterwards. Unlike the other konnoarmeitsy in senior coraraand positions at that time, Egorov was an ex-Tsarist officer, had served abroad and was araoderniser in the Red Array. Any part of that resume may have doomed him. He was executed on 23 February 1939. Egorov was rehabilitated in the Khrushchev era. Apanasenko became a division coraraander in World War Two and a four-star general in 1941. He commanded in the Far East but was transferred to the West in 1943 as Deputy Coraraander of an Army Group (Voronezh Front), where he died of wounds. Tiulenev subsequently became a brigade commander and a four-star general in 1940. He becarae an Array Group coraraander (TransCaucasus Front) in 1942 and died in 1978. A number of other famous Red soldiers began their careers in the First Cavalry Army. Theraost faraou s Soviet soldier of World War Two, Georgii Zhukov, was one. Another was A. A. Grechko, the nuraber one Soviet soldier of the Brezhnev era. Other well-known Soviet soldiers, including A. V. Khrulev, K. S. Moskalenko, P. S. Rybalko, D. D. Leliushenko, K. A. Meretskov and la. N. Fedorenko were forraer koimoarraeitsy. As was pointed out in the introduction, the accounts of the Civil War put out inside the Soviet Union during the Stalin era exalted the role of the First Cavalry Array. 360 Meanwhile, raany of those who had crossed swords with the First Cavalry Array in the Civil War, including Tukhachevskii and Shorin, perished in the purges, although not always as a result of settling old scores. What made the hagiography of the Stalin-era accounts of the Civil War at least a little bit credible was the fact that there was considerable substance to the legend of the First Cavalry Array. 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