Flemish Technology Assessment in Historical and Socio-Political

Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Research Policy

jo urnal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/respol

Broadening, deepening, and governing innovation: Flemish

technology assessment in historical and socio-political perspective

a,∗ a,b a a

Michiel van Oudheusden , Nathan Charlier , Benedikt Rosskamp , Pierre Delvenne

Spiral—Department of Political Science, University of Liège, Quartier Agora—Place des Orateurs 3, Bât. B-31, Bte 29, 4000 Liège, Belgium

Centre de Recherche Droit Information, Droit et Société, University of Namur, 5000 Namur, Belgium

a r a

t i b s

c t

l e i n f o r a c t

Article history: This article examines the socio-political dynamics in the evolution and development of Flemish technol-

Received 10 September 2014

ogy assessment (TA). Broadly deﬁned, TA encompasses activities and programs that expand and deepen

Received in revised form 21 June 2015

the knowledge base of contemporary knowledge-based economies (KBEs), typically by including new

Accepted 21 June 2015

actors (e.g. trade unions), ideas (e.g. science in society), and rationales (e.g. participatory techniques)

Available online 12 August 2015

in science, technology, and innovation (STI) processes. Starting from the regionalization of STI policy in

Belgium and the convergence of Flemish STI around global KBE principles, the article exempliﬁes how

Keywords:

since the 1980s successive Flemish TA waves (early-warning, bottom-up, and interactive TA) have co-

Flanders

evolved with successive generations of Flemish innovation policy. Building on these ﬁndings, it argues

Knowledge-based economy

that Flemish TA has counteracted and accommodated dominant STI paradigms. By providing a historical

Innovation policy

Political governance and socio-political perspective on TA and innovation policy, the article draws critical attention to the

Technology assessment institutional settings and societal contexts in which TA is embedded, and questions TA’s strategic utility

within contemporary KBEs. This perspective sheds light on the Flemish government’s recent decision to

close its parliamentary TA institute and the institutional expansion of TA elsewhere in Europe.

1. Introduction most competitive economies by 2020 . To this end, the Pact out-

lines a number of domains in which progress is to be made and

In Flanders, Belgium, government ofﬁcials, business and indus- through which “researchers, companies, and the authorities must

try leaders, academics, and journalists frequently unveil to one work very closely together” within a framework of “open innova-

another their views on how to spur innovation for economic tion.” Accordingly, new, collaborative approaches are to be devised,

growth and ensure quality of life. Hence, in a 2006 government- including ones that sustain the “knowledge commons” on which

sanctioned report entitled Innovative Flanders: Innovation Policies innovation depends .

for the 21st Century, we read that Flanders must ensure “innovation- To a considerable degree, the visions above advance a

led growth,” as the welfare and wellbeing of the Flemish people strategic-economic rationale to innovation, as they sustain the

depend on high-technological innovation in the wake of “globaliza- understanding that innovation is a must to the creation of well-

tion.” In their contribution to the report, the then Flemish Minister paying jobs, securing social welfare, and strengthening capacities

of Innovation and members of her ministry call for more collabora- for international competition and global growth. This outlook is

tion and learning among government, industries, and universities, not new. Innovation has long been identiﬁed in the social sci-

if Flanders is to remain a “leading innovation region” (CCIP, 2008, ences as a major source of economic and social development (e.g.

p. 13; pp. 17–18). Schumpeter, 1939; Kondratiev, 1978). It also resonates with views

More formally, in 2009 Flemish social partners and captains of voiced elsewhere in the industrialized world. To give an exam-

industry signed the Pact 2020, indicating a joint resolve to turn Flan- ple, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ders into one of the ﬁve top regions in Europe and one of the world’s (OECD, 2010) describes innovation as the chief engine of productiv-

ity that holds the prospect of supporting economic growth on the

∗

Corresponding author. Tel.: +0032 498367984.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M. van Oudheusden), The term “social partners” encompasses employers’ organizations and trade

[email protected] (N. Charlier), [email protected] (B. Rosskamp), unions, who regularly convene to negotiate and reconcile their interests.

[email protected] (P. Delvenne). See http://www.vlaandereninactie.be/over/over-via.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.06.010

1878 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886

cheap, particularly in a time of slow economic development, global ﬁrst Flemish government was installed, policy actors instigated

warming, and rising prices for natural resources. TA programs in an attempt to alleviate the social, economic, and

In short, innovation and innovation management feature promi- legal consequences of new technologies like biotechnology. These

nently on the public agenda in Flanders, as they do elsewhere, programs emerged in response to pressure from the trade unions,

and often within a prevalent market-oriented, knowledge-based among others, who demanded that R&D agents take into concern

economy (KBE) narrative. Following Wullweber (2008), this narra- workers’ safety and wellbeing. In more recent years, interactive

tive simultaneously underlines the cooperative pooling of strategic TA forms have developed involving civil society organizations and

resources and the competitive production of new knowledge as lay publics, with the aim of formulating social and environmen-

a means of garnering wealth and new employment in industrial- tal needs as a starting point for R&D. Hence, the enlargement of

ized countries. However, the prevalent language of innovation-led innovation terms and rationales in Flemish STI policies can partly

growth is also extended in ways that suggest a more comprehensive be traced back to TA interventions in Flemish workspaces, gover-

reading of innovation beyond purely economic and commercial ning bodies (e.g. Flemish parliament), and industrial R&D processes.

interests. Flemish innovation industries, policymakers, and aca- These spaces in turn provided a fertile basis for the further devel-

demics increasingly acknowledge the importance of integrating opment of TA and its institutional uptake, as Flemish TA evolved

ecological and social concerns into research and development with, and ongoingly drew inspiration from, TA processes elsewhere,

(R&D) and business processes if technological innovation is to suc- including constructive TA (Schot and Rip, 1997), parliamentary TA

ceed. In fact, the aim of broadening innovation to include “its (Decker and Ladikas, 2004; Ganzevles and Van Est, 2012), and par-

non-technological aspects” is now explicitly on the agenda of ticipatory TA (Joss and Bellucci, 2002). Flemish TA can hence be

industry players and the Flemish government as a whole (Vervliet, seen as an instructive “test case” for how various kinds of TA min-

2006, p. 19). Correspondingly, contemporary science policy dis- gled with innovation policies and practices within the conﬁnes of

course is laden with notions such as horizontal governance, open a high-technology, innovation-driven KBE.

innovation, and social innovation, which stress not only strategic To put the above considerations in due empirical and historical

cooperation between multiple actors, including stakeholders and perspective, we retrace the emergence and evolution of Flem-

publics, but also the co-evolution of technology and society (Felin ish TA in connection to Flemish and European innovation policy

and Zenger, 2013). As stated in the Flemish government’s 2006 (part 2). Our description draws on documentary analysis and on

action program Flanders in Action (VIA), Flanders has “great need accounts provided to us by policy analysts and spokesmen, indus-

for a competitive economy, not only to face and tackle the chal- try research leaders, and academics well-knowledgeable of Flemish

lenges confronting us today and tomorrow, but also to be able and European innovation policy and TA. These interviewees were

to accomplish our goal of creating an open, caring, concerned, identiﬁed through their association with TA or selected based on

and sustainable social environment. . . there can be neither room an initial analysis of newspaper coverage, innovation reports, policy

nor patience for poverty, social inequality, or exclusion.” Thus, memos, and agency documents, as well as legislation and records

social and ecological concerns have entered the policy lexicon, of parliamentary hearings dating back to the eighties . The his-

as has the question of how to incorporate such concerns into torical overview presented in part 2 is followed by a section on

innovation strategies. Innovation then, is not only about ensur- the so-called Three Generations model of innovation from the

ing international competitiveness through knowledge networking innovation systems literature (part 3). Contemporary policy dis-

and management, but also about meeting the needs of citizens, and course (both Flemish and European) and TA language invoke this

organizing interaction among a larger variety of technological and evolutionary model of technical change in pursuit of a more inter-

social actors than has thus far been the case. As these actors include active and collaborative innovation process that involves actors

Flemish and European “stakeholders” and citizens, who operate from “all policy domains,” including governments, industries, uni-

within the framework of an open and inclusive European econ- versities and schools, as well as “societal stakeholders” and wider

omy, the VIA program aligns with a broader set of initiatives, such publics (Larosse, 2004, p. 6; Kuhlmann, 2001a). Thus, through the

as the 2000 Lisbon Agenda and the more recently established EU Generations model, TA and mainstream innovation discourse are

Research and Innovation program, Horizon 2020 . potentially aligned. This alignment opens onto new, potentially

Taking these extensions of mainstream STI discourses as its powerful, STI articulations that may or may not evoke shared sense

entry point, this article examines how Flemish STI is affected by, making among implicated actors. It therefore begs the question as

and potentially transformed through, technology assessments (TAs). to which role TA can, and should, play in present-day processes of

Broadly deﬁned, TA encompasses activities and programs that “innovation governance” (Felt et al., 2007) (part 4).

extend and deepen the knowledge base of contemporary KBEs, We stress upfront that this study does not fully map the policy

typically by including new actors (e.g. trade unions), ideas (e.g. sci- debate on innovation in Flanders or Europe. Rather, the emphasis

ence in society), and rationales (e.g. participatory techniques) in STI is on TA actors and processes, and particularly on the broad-

processes. Research on TA suggests that the role of TA in national, ening of innovation terms and actions through Flemish TA. The

transnational, and international innovation processes can be sub- relatively small interview sample reﬂects this focus, as only a hand-

stantial (Joss and Bellucci, 2002; Delvenne, 2011; Rodmeyer et al., ful of people has profound expertise of Flemish TA. We hence

2005; Ganzevles et al., 2014). Even if particular TA activities do not caution against overstating the role TA in Flanders has played in

directly impact on innovation policy, TA can catalyze democratic

debate on technology, raise public awareness about sociotechnical

issues, or simply bring together actors and their issues in origi-

All interviews were held in Dutch and transcribed in that language based on

nal ways (Ely et al., 2014; Hennen, 1999; Bütschi and Nentwich,

repeated listening to the audio-recordings and interview notes we had taken. The

2002, p. 245). As we show in this article, from the 1980s onwards

interview approach was semi-structured, as we started from a number of key

Flemish TA initiatives challenged technology-centric, market-led

themes, such as the history of Flemish innovation, which are found in the abovemen-

innovation policies for failing to consider the wider social, eco- tioned documentary sources. From a concern with securing credible interpretations

logical, and ethical ramiﬁcations of technology. Shortly after the and deepening the scope of the data, various respondents were interviewed up to

four times. Of the ten interviewees who responded to an initial draft of this paper

(which the ﬁrst author circulated in April 2012), all afﬁrmed the accuracy of our

interpretations, although four added valuable comments, which led us to further

See the Flemish government’s VIA website for countless references to these nuance or accentuate particular points. A list of interviewees is provided in Appendix

European initiatives. A. One respondent’s name is not disclosed as she insisted on remaining anonymous.

M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1879

broadening traditional, usually linear, views of innovation, even if problems between the country’s Dutch and French speaking com-

our ﬁndings suggest that it has in important instances facilitated munities. As a consequence of these reforms, the Belgian innovation

Flanders’ transition to a KBE that seeks to be sustainable, inclu- system came to be decentralized, based on a horizontal division of

sive, and democratic. The gradual institutional and public uptake policy domains between the regions of Flanders (in the north), Wal-

of TA in Flanders bears witness to this interpretation, even if var- lonia (in the south), and the Brussels Capital region (in the center).

ious context factors are always at play. We thus concur with Joss Each entity now pursues, develops, and implements its own inno-

and Bellucci (2002, p. 9) that the actual performance of TA should vation policy, more or less independent from the federal state and

always be understood as the interplay between the wider institu- from one another.

tional and social settings in which TA is embedded and which no Although Flanders is presently the economically richer region,

single actor can control. In other words, these settings co-evolve, it lagged behind Wallonia until the middle of the twentieth cen-

as a change in the innovation system can inﬂuence the (expected) tury. It became more prosperous than Wallonia after the Second

output of a TA activity, for instance. World War, following the decline of Wallonia’s coal and iron indus-

By emphasizing the speciﬁc manners in which Flemish political tries. When the ﬁrst ever Flemish Executive (the initial name for

culture, innovation system thinking, and TA dynamically co-evolve, the Flemish government) came to power in the early 1980s, it

this article seeks to accomplish two key aims: (1) To provide made attempts to boost Flemish economic self-awareness and posi-

a deeper historical and contextual understanding as to how TA tion Flanders as an industrial, entrepreneurial, high-tech region

emerged and developed with Flemish innovation policy and R&D (Oosterlynck, 2006, p. 98). Since then, large-scale investments in

practice; (2) To open new inroads towards analyzing and debating biotechnology, new materials, broadband technology, microelec-

the socio-political dynamics in the evolution of TA in knowledge- tronics and nanotechnology have been made with measurable

driven economies. economic gains, and government agencies and institutes erected

Upon attending to these objectives, the article reconsiders to support “innovative technological R&D” (CCIP, 2008, p. 27).

the relationship between TA, science and technology policymak- A determining ﬁgure in transforming Flanders into a new, invig-

ing, and innovation governance. Although TA is often presented orated economy after the economic crisis of the seventies was

as a management or governance tool in the TA literature (Van the then chair of the Flemish government, Gaston Geens. Geens

Oudheusden, 2014a), TA processes enact, as well as counteract, launched “DIRV,” which stands for Derde Industriële Revolutie

dominant STI policies, and typically do so at the intersection of Vlaanderen, literally Third Industrial Revolution Flanders . This

sociotechnical spheres, policies, and temporalities. How TA pos- action program was ofﬁcially launched in 1982. Geens repeatedly

itions itself or is positioned in relation to these dominant policy spoke of DIRV as an offensive policy to create new products, pro-

paradigms is particularly relevant to consider in view of the Flemish duction methods, and markets for industries of the future (Vlaamse

government’s 2012 decision to close its parliamentary TA agency, Raad, 1983). He also stressed that it was the government’s task

the Institute for Science and Technology. Whereas this decision to stimulate innovation in new technologies, while entrepreneurs

appears largely out of sync with the institutional expansion of TA and industries designed concrete projects in tandem with research

in other parts of Europe (e.g. in Wallonia and through the EU-wide institutes, universities, and private companies. Oosterlynck (2006,

PACITA project, on which more below), it coincides with the reor- p. 98), in his political-economic study of regionalism in Flanders,

ganization of the iconic Danish Board of Technology. Rendering sums up these key threads of DIRV as follows:

explicit the interplay between TA and STI policies and institutions is .

. . the DIRV-action stressed the central role of the entrepreneur

hence important to understand longer-term STI dynamics, possibil-

as the carrier of innovative potential. There was a strong focus

ities, and constraints both in and beyond Belgium, even when these

on high technology industries and the role of the state was rede-

possibilities are not immediately picked up or await enactment. It

ﬁned as supplying the conditions for innovation to take place.

can also render explicit how the integration of social rationales into

innovation elicits tensions and struggles among actors and pro- The effects of DIRV on innovation policy and practice are tan-

grams, as prevalent policy concepts like open innovation or the gible, as the program lent support to various basic and applied

presently fashionable notion of “responsible innovation” do not technologies, including the highly promising and already emanat-

readily translate into innovation practice (Von Schomberg, 2012). ing ﬁelds of biotechnology, new materials, and microelectronics.

The article thus paves the way for reﬂection on the evolving viabil- Less perceptibly, but equally important, DIRV delivered a deci-

ity and utility of TA within contemporary KBEs, as TA and STI engage sive break with Flemish economic pessimism. As again Oosterlynck

in an “innovation policy dance” (Kuhlmann et al., 2010, pp. 7–8); (2006, p. 101) writes, although DIRV was an institutional policy

that is, the two spheres interchange prevailing perspectives and effort, it was “primarily a campaign to raise awareness and promote

approaches by “dancing” together . The Flemish TA experiences the new technologies and innovation.” In that respect it was highly suc-

article describes can thus serve STI policymakers, TA communities, cessful as well . Furthermore, DIRV was a conspicuous campaign,

and innovation scholars as resources to ponder the role, place, and

orientation of regional, national, and transnational TA in the years

ahead, as talk of broadening, deepening, and governing innovation

Following Larosse (2001), the First Industrial Revolution refers to the changes

gains policy traction.

that took place in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc. in the 18th century, and in

which the region of Wallonia played a lead role on the European continent. The Sec-

2. “Innovative Flanders”: From third industrial revolution ond Industrial Revolution began around 1957, when the European Community was

to third generation innovation policy established. Thanks to its central geographical location, its highly educated, multi-

lingual, and relatively cheap workforce, Flanders drew in multinational investments

intended to supply the entire Community. However, the subsequent economic crisis

Since the 1970s, constitutional reforms have gradually trans-

threatened Flemish welfare, inciting a Third Industrial Revolution.

formed Belgium from a uniﬁed state into a federal one with 7

To lend support to this assertion, Oosterlynck cites Paul Zeeuwts, a past chair

communities, regions, and language areas. The reforms were of the government-funding agency IWT. Zeeuwts argues that “[n]obody, not even

the staunchest critics of the DIRV action, dispute that it succeeded in breaking the

enacted as a way of ﬁnding constitutional solutions for the

economic pessimism of the Flemish population and business world and that it led

to a renewed dynamism and courage (our translation).” René De Feyter, then head

of the Flemish employers’ organization and an important ally of Geens, argues that

Alternatively, one could use the metaphor of “dancing partners,” as does Rip DIRV succeeded in inciting pride among Flemings, demonstrating that they could

(1992) to imply that innovation theory, policy, and practice dynamically interact. make things happen (Durnez and Vandeborne, 2008).

1880 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886

which served the Flemish government to present “a clear image automatically implies economic growth [Oosterlynck, 2010]. Other

of itself to the general public, with an offensive policy of its own, respondents argue that STV contributed to providing a more com-

distinct from both Walloon policy and national policy” (Goorden, plex understanding of the relationship between innovation and

2004, p. 8). labor in which the role of the government is redeﬁned [Berloznik,

Various authors and interviewees hence identify DIRV as a “key- 2011; Holemans, 2012; Larosse, 2011].

stone” not just in instigating contemporary innovation policy in While it is hard to assess the precise contribution of STV to

Flanders, but also acknowledge its role in the construction of Flan- innovation policy, its erection in 1984 appears to have had some

ders as an innovation region, even if their appreciations of the inﬂuence on the discourses of innovation at the time. This is not

program vary. For the purpose of this article it is important to just because it was a consensually-managed advisory organization

note that actions like DIRV induced a range of political-economic that had to take into account different political visions, but as one

reforms that emphasized entrepreneurship and restricted Keynes- respondent who worked at STV points out, a leading politician like

like state intervention in the economy. While these restructurings De Batselier literally integrated chunks of text from STV outlets

emerged in response to various international and domestic trends in his parliamentary speeches [Goorden, 2012]. Consequently, the

and challenges (e.g. the linguistic conﬂict in Belgium), they were agency succeeded in introducing the notion of TA in the policy arena

also the result of ideological crafting and the search for new pol- (Berckmans, 2007, p. 84).

icy paradigms (Witte et al., 1997, p. 321). It is partly against this Other respondents acknowledge the inﬂuence of STV in shaping

background that ensuing programs, actions, and contestations in policy: “The introduction of technology assessments in organiza-

the Flemish innovation context should be understood, including tional processes was in large part thanks to STV, and was rooted

the emergence of technology assessment and the broadening of in the criticism that DIRV lacked consideration of social dimen-

the notion of innovation that TA engenders. sions in innovation” [Berloznik, 2011; Maes, 2012]. Thus, through

STV “innovation” was broadened to encompass other concerns than

2.1. Resistance to DIRV and scope for change purely economic ones, such as the unions’ concerns for wellbeing

in the workplace, quality of work, and labor organization, and in

As a program of large-scale reform, DIRV did not go uncon- a later stage also ethical and ecological aspects of technological

tested. Strong opposition to DIRV came primarily from the political innovation .

left, including the socialist trade union ABVV (representing tradi-

tional industries, among others), as well as one of its most vocal

2.2. Further expanding the scope: Towards a third generation

critics in the Flemish parliament, the socialist Norbert De Batse-

innovation policy

lier, who after Geens went on to become the Minister of Economy.

These actors criticized DIRV not just for its “liberal” emphasis on

After the regional elections of 1988, Flemish innovation policy

entrepreneurship and small government, but also for its neglect

ofﬁcially fell in hands of the Socialist Party, much to the dismay of

of “social dimensions” [Goorden, 2012] . From the trade union’s 11

Geens (Hellinck, 2010, p. 170) . Since then, innovation thinking

point of view, the DIRV action was too much about rationalizing

has shifted to a Third Generation Policy, on which more shortly.

work and cutting jobs; a point they argued with the active support

Although certain respondents relate these policy changes to shifts

of labor sociologists from various universities, who were critical of

in the political landscape (i.e. the political actions that were taken to

the government’s labor policies. The unions contended that DIRV

counter, or at least balance, DIRV reforms), structural factors are to

lacked a broad debate about how to organize industry, the role

be considered as well. According to Larosse (2001), the DIRV action,

of the state, and participation of the labor movement [Berckmans,

in promoting innovation as a distinct policy objective, instilled into

2012] . Similarly, the ABVV saw DIRV as too opportunistic, as the

the minds of Flemish policymakers an awareness of the KBE, as

program emerged from the minds of an elite cadre of politicians,

knowledge generation and the economy were now seen as inextri-

technocrats, and venture capitalists rather than through the more

cably intertwined. Thus, the challenge for all policymakers both on

customary process of collective bargaining, which brings together

the left and the right became one of reorganizing Flemish society

trade unions, employers’ organizations, and the government.

in order to make better use of knowledge across borders and dis-

Given these expressed concerns and needs, various interviewees

ciplines, which in turn stimulated entrepreneurs, researchers, and

suggest a causal link between the above criticisms and Geens’s

industries to pool resources. Importantly, this change also induced

establishment in 1984 of Stichting Technologie Vlaanderen (STV),

certain expansions in the sense that new actors, actions, and issues

which ofﬁcially translates into Flemish Foundation for Technology

were brought to the policy table to make innovation policy more

Assessment [Berloznik, 2011; Goorden, 2012; Berckmans, 2012].

“coherent” (Van Humbeeck et al., 2004).

Similarly, in his biography of De Batselier, Hellinck (2010, p. 128)

Without going into full detail, we attempt to capture the main

states that STV was erected because the DIRV action failed to take

tenets of the so-called Third Generation Innovation Policy (TGIP),

into account “the impacts of new technology on society.”

as TGIP is an important “theoretical building block” from the inno-

As a government-ﬁnanced agency led by the social partners

vation systems literature, which innovation actors in Flanders and

and embedded in the Social Economic Council of Flanders (SERV),

the EU draw on to direct innovation [Larosse, 2011; Berloznik, 2013;

STV’s aim was to analyze the social dimensions of new technolo-

Evers, 2013; Goorden, 2012] (Zeeuwts, 2004). TGIP also aligns with

gies and advise the government on science and technology issues

the theory of regional innovation systems that accompanied the

(SERV-STV, 1994; Goorden, 1990). One interviewee describes STV

emergence of regionally identiﬁable clusters of industrial activity,

as a compromise between more “liberal” and “socialist” views of

and which casts the region as the most appropriate scale at which to

innovation policy, adding that although STV’s mission was ambigu-

sustain innovation-based learning economies (Asheim and Isaksen,

ous from the start, the organization managed to “socially assist,”

and thus “soften,” the transition of the Flemish economy to post-

Fordism by questioning the assumption that technological growth

Although STV initially developed a TA program, the agency later dropped TA

from its “already considerably wide-ranging” agenda, choosing instead to focus

on socio-economic matters (Berckmans, 2009). In June 2000, a parliamentary TA

In this article, square brackets indicate that the quotes are taken from interviews. institution called viWTA was erected, on which more later.

9 11

A point of view the ABVV shared with its sister organization, the Christian- Although there was no Minister of Innovation or portfolio at the time, De Bat-

Democrat trade union ACV. selier took the lead in this policy area.

M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1881

Table 1

Overview of the ﬁrst, second, and third generation of innovation policy.

FGIP SGIP TGIP

Time period 80 s 90 s ?

View of innovation Linear, from research to market Nonsequential feedback loops Complex, nonlinear, interactive,

process nontechnical as well as technical

Main actors Scientists and government As in FGIP plus “nontechnical” actors, Actors from all policy domains and all

e.g. ‘social partners’; government as relevant stakeholders; includes social

innovation mentor/enabler scientists and lay publics

Types of relations Vertical, hierarchical Networked (“horizontal”) Integrated, cooperative

among agents

Key concepts and Picking winners, technology Systems, clusters, networks, bottom up Interaction, learning, knowledge-based

metaphors pusha economy

Main emphasis Science and technology Innovation systems and networks Knowledge, collaboration, and process

It should be noted that these two FGIP concepts were not prominent in the eighties, but arose in later years.

1997). This explains TGIP’s popularity in Flanders, where policy- interactively, as a systemic activity in which policy instruments are

makers and innovation actors look to establish Flanders as a leading not only directed towards individual organizations (e.g. through

innovation-led economy in the world and develop its cultural iden- R&D subsidies) or bilateral relations (e.g. knowledge transfer), but

tity (Delvenne, 2011, p. 224). As both TGIP and regional innovation also to the innovation system as a whole (e.g. managing interfaces

systems theory are indebted to the evolutionary theory of techni- and organizing learning platforms). From this perspective, it is nec-

cal change, they sustain the now prevalent reading of innovation essary to identify the relevant stakeholders and involve them in

as a creative process that beneﬁts from collaborative interaction the innovation process early on. Last, in a TGIP framework, it is

between innovation agents (Cooke et al., 2000). important to provide good public information on important waves

Following Lengrand et al. (2002), this emphasis on interac- of innovation and ensure greater public involvement in decision

tive learning and joint knowledge building emerges in response making.

to First and Second GIP. In Flanders, FGIP, is usually associated Table 1 summarizes the main tenets of each generation of inno-

with the DIRV action and reﬂects the “linear model of innova- vation policy.

tion”; i.e. the idea that new processes and products are developed To offer an indication of how TGIP concepts infuse contemporary

through scientiﬁc discovery in a laboratory and subsequently policy discourse, let us brieﬂy consider the Pact 2020 (mentioned

break through and are diffused on market. With FGIP, often char- earlier), which is a much referred to “future plan” for Flanders, and

acterized as a science-driven and “technology-push” approach which ﬁts in the overarching framework of Flanders in Action (VIA).

(Berckmans, 2009), Flemish innovation policy selectively rewarded To begin with, the Pact aspires to providing a “social platform”;

those research groups who placed their research activities explic- hence its signatories include not only the Flemish government, but

itly in the domains government pushed for. With the aim of “picking also the social partners and civil society organizations, including

winners,” Flemish government encouraged world-class research in environmental organizations. Second, the Pact projects a “long-

generic technology ﬁelds such as microelectronics. As a result, uni- term growth path” for Flanders by 2020, with the aims of achieving

versities and public research institutions with an interuniversity greater prosperity and welfare and a competitive and sustainable

structure became inﬂuential players in innovation. The institu- economy. These aims constitute one “coherent” policy. Thus, we

tional context in which they operated emphasized the central role read that by 2020 “a proportionate participation in employment

of research actors in the innovation system with the focus on a will be assured,” “the demands of Work and Family are better

science-driven philosophy. attuned to one another,” and CO2 emissions lowered in line with

SGIP, which came to the fore in the mid-nineties, offers a more EU targets. As these objectives indicate, the scope of innovation is

integrated take on innovation, as it acknowledges the complex expanded to include not just economic goals (growth in a narrow

interplay between science, technology, and nontechnical groups sense), but sustainable development as the integration of economic,

of actors, such as social and economic sectors. In Flanders, this social, and ecological goals. Moreover, the expansion of economic

approach was reﬂected in government support of a bottom-up goals to other type of policy goals is taken not in terms of con-

growth of innovation clusters as horizontal collaborations between straints on growth following a zero-sum logic, but as part of a

all innovation actors (companies, universities, technological insti- coherent social mission with a long-term development perspective

tutions, public administrations), with attention for spontaneous for Flanders (Van Humbeeck et al., 2004).

feedback loops between innovation phases. Following this thread The Pact’s signiﬁcance is that it broadens the notion of inno-

of thought, the Flemish government sought to stimulate endoge- vation in ways that are conducive to TA principles and programs;

nous growth in Flanders by anchoring technological innovation in notably through the shift from linear models of innovation to inter-

geographic regions and existing activities (Goorden et al., 2008, p. active ones, the broadening of actors and issues in innovation, and

170). talk of collaborative learning and innovation governance. These

More recently, Flemish policymakers generally appeal to TGIP; principles are consistent with the EU’s governance approach, as

ofﬁcially at least, as certain aspects of FGIP and SGIP are still found articulated in the European Commission’s 2001 White Paper on

in Flemish policy documents and practices . TGIP’s importance European Governance, which, like Flemish innovation policy, draws

is that it places innovation on the agenda of every policy domain, inspiration from the innovation systems literature (e.g. CEC, 2001).

for instance in the areas of education, healthcare, and sustain- They also open to more inclusive and participatory ways of orga-

able development. Consequently, innovation is to be developed nizing innovation, in line with the EU’s Science in Society Action Plan

(e.g. CEC, 2002, p. 6) .

As Lengrand et al. (2002) note, “[t]here are dangers in announcing the immi-

nence of a ‘third generation’ policy, when progress still needs to be made to make the Hence, we ﬁnd in the Flemish Minister of Innovation’s 2010 Policy Memoran-

second generation a reality!” Clearly, First and Second Generations ways of thinking dum on Innovation an explicit reference to the EU Science in Society Action Plan

about innovation co-exist with Third Generation language and concepts. and an endorsement of public participation in science and technology: “In order to

1882 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886

We turn to an example of public participation in STI below, emphasis added). In the second, written two years later by an

where we situate a Flemish participatory TA on nanotechnologies. advisor to minister De Batselier, the author similarly urges TA

For now, let us return to the DIRV campaign to situate the emer- researchers to consider the “social, economic, legal, and ecological

gence of successive Flemish TA waves in relation to EU-wide STI aspects” of biotechnology. However, she adds that these aspects

policy. are “not boundary conditions, but essential elements for modulat-

ing and orienting” the biotechnology program as a whole (Vervliet,

1990, cited in Holemans, 1994; emphasis added). Thus, whereas in

3. Three TA waves

the action program TA is cast as a corrective mechanism in order

to develop a “favourable social climate” for technology develop-

Not long after the end of the DIRV action and the erection of STV,

ment (Geens, 1987, p. 177), the second document proposes a more

the ﬁrst TA initiatives were launched as academic research pro-

integrated method, which directs attention to the aforementioned

grams. As these programs were charged with examining the social

social and other aspects in technology development through dia-

impacts of new technologies such as biotechnology and microelec-

logue between multiple disciplines.

tronics, the need for TA research was framed within the dominant

A similar emphasis on creating a more integrated technology

science-driven and technology-push approach; i.e. in terms of pre-

approach is found in other Flemish technology programs at the

dicting the social impacts of science and technology in order to

time (e.g. energy technology, environmental technology, and new

adequately steer and orient governmental research and technology 17

materials) . To sustain such an approach, TA research units in each

programs. One could say that TA was assigned the task of giving

program were set up. Each of these units was charged with study-

public governance a helping hand in “picking winners.” As such,

ing the social effects of the technologies at hand. The units would

the initiatives represented an instrumental type of TA in which

stimulate dialogue among technology developers, social partners,

the social scientiﬁc and policy analytic approaches of experts dom-

and the government, and also seek to broaden the scope of debate

inate (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). Following Goorden (2004, p.

by opening the possible negative effects of technology innovation

11), we label this kind of TA early-warning TA because of its invest-

to debate, for instance in the areas of environment, health, safety,

ment in technological prediction, control of (negative) impacts, and

14 and law.

scientiﬁc expertise .

Today, both the early-warning and bottom-up approaches are

As indicated earlier, from the nineties onwards there was a

considered outdated. Goorden and Deblonde (2011) contend that

growing responsiveness to the idea that Flemish innovation pol-

top-down academic experiences involving early warning mecha-

icy needed a shift in focus, departing from a technology-push

nisms for negative impacts of new technologies have not led to a

approach to striving for a policy that stresses the importance of

reorientation of research programs or technology trajectories. In

technology diffusion. Policymakers therefore called for a kind of

order to create a more interactive type of TA in which civil society

bottom-up TA, which they described as an approach “that may

and citizens participate, TA was lodged in an institution advising

not slow down or have a negative inﬂuence on creativity and

15 the Flemish parliament in the year 2000, the Flemish Institute for

the innovation process .” To this end TA activities had to be

Science and Technology Assessment, viWTA (later renamed IST).

organized in close interaction with R&D practices in govern-

The institute sought to stimulate social debate on sociotechnical

mental technological programs on biotechnology, new materials

developments and inform MPs of the social and ethical implica-

and energy, and environmental technology. The expectation was

tions of science and technology. Importantly, with the erection of

that if TA were practiced in direct consultation with science and

viWTA, TA was removed from the R&D enterprise. Thus, contrary

technology producers, research would lead to socially useful appli-

to several STV programs and initiatives like the action program on

cations. A parallel can be drawn here with constructive TA (CTA),

biotechnologies mentioned above, TA was not fully ingrained in the

which emerged a few years earlier in the Netherlands. Like CTA,

innovation process but took place in a different location and time.

bottom-up TA sought to broaden the design, development, and

In this respect, developing timely participatory TA frameworks

implementation of ongoing technology developments by initiat-

and procedures to effectively deal with the emergence of new and

ing dialogue among innovation actors about (R&D) design practices

emerging technologies remained a big challenge for Flemish inno-

(Schot and Rip, 1997). However, as the quote above indicates, Flem-

vation policy. In a survey published by viwTA, a group of R&D

ish policymakers took explicit care to channel (if not contain) the

directors from companies, universities, and public administrations

potential impact of this type of TA on the innovation process.

voiced some expectations and concerns. They stated that public

The shift from early-warning TA to bottom-up TA can be

governance should play the role of mentor by creating and gov-

illustrated by comparing two Flemish policy documents on biotech-

16 erning new ways of collaboration among all relevant social actors.

nology, which outline the role of TA in this technology domain . In

Second, they underlined the need for a collective vision and the for-

the ﬁrst document, entitled Action Program for Biotechnology, and

mulation of social demands in relation to the policy goal of spending

written by the Prime Minister, Geens, we read that the success-

3% of Flanders’ Gross Regional Product on R&D by 2010. Third, given

ful implementation of new biotechnology R&D depends on “social,

the lack of broad public support for technological innovation in

economic, legal, and ecological boundary conditions,” as these con-

Flanders, science and technology should have a more prominent

ditions set a context for biotechnology development (Geens, 1988;

place on the public agenda.

In response to these policy calls for a more integrated and

inclusive innovation policy, the Flemish government endorsed a

permanently turn Flanders into a successful knowledge society, it is essential that large participatory TA project on nanotechnologies in 2006, enti-

societal needs and concerns are integrated through ongoing democratic debate with

tled Nanotechnologies for Tomorrow’s Society (NanoSoc). NanoSoc

a more involved and more informed public, and with better opportunities for mak-

sought to develop new forms of collaboration in which all social

ing collective choices as regards science and technology issues (our translation)”

actors stimulate technology innovation and R&D receives broad

(Vlaams Parlement, 2010, p. 36).

Other designations that underline the instrumental and control character of TA

could also apply, such as expert TA or classical TA. For an instructive overview of

these and other kinds of TA, see Decker and Ladikas (2004, p. 14), Van Est and Brom

(2012), and Ely et al. (2014). As mentioned earlier, the idea of integrating TA into technology policy was a

Technology Note of the Flemish government (1994). central concern of the then Flemish Minister of Economy. This is indicated by his

We are grateful to Dirk Holemans for directing us to these documents and resolve to “(. . .) weave technology assessment into all the facets of technology policy

pointing out the distinctions between them. (our translation)” (Vlaamse Raad, 1991, p. 4).

M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1883

classiﬁcation stresses the mediating potential of TA. In reality, inter-

vention does not amount to simply implementing schemes or

theories. Nor are the generations and TA waves distinct histor-

ical stages that follow one another in an inevitable sequence;

Early-warning TA

rather, various elements combine, depending on local context. For

instance, early-warning TA served both a technology-push strategy

FGIP SGIP and enabled social partners to articulate previously unconsidered

social needs. Or, to give another example, whereas with bottom-up

TA the aim was to integrate TA into technology programs, today TA

Bottom-up TA

is no longer an integral component of Flemish technology policy.

Inter-

We conclude this section by reiterating the different roles TA

active

practices have played in Flanders to this day. While in general

terms, TA mediated between economic and technological ratio-

nales on the one hand, and social and environmental concerns, on

the other, TA was implanted in several Flemish technology action

programs in the 1980s–1990s. In subsequent years, TA took on the

TGIP form of a policy tool liked to parliament, as well as a more experi-

mental, interactive form tied to the abovementioned contemporary

international TA frameworks.

Fig. 1. TA waves in relation to generations of innovation policy.

4. Discussion: Quo Vadis TA?

public support (Goorden et al., 2008, pp. 171–172). The project

What do we learn from the Flemish TA experiences and how

approach was novel to Flanders, as social scientists working in

do these relate to STI developments more broadly? In this section,

TA took the lead throughout the project’s duration rather than

we provide three answers to these questions by outlining deﬁning

engineers or technologists. Second, the project sought to provide

features of Flemish TA and STI, which we infer from our historical

nanotechnologists in Flanders with incentives to reﬂect on social

and sociological overview. Our responses emerge in the context of

and ethical issues in relation to nanotechnology development so

recent, cross-regional and cross-national STI and TA developments,

such considerations are brought to bear on their work. To this end,

notably the EU policy shift towards responsible innovation gover-

successive participation rounds were initiated involving nanotech-

nance and the potential expansion of TA activities in Wallonia and

nologists, stakeholders, and citizens. These rounds were initiated

elsewhere in Europe.

before and during actual nanotechnology R&D stages in research

A ﬁrst important observation is that Flemish TA emerged and

centers in order to allow timely adjustment of strategic research

matured in a strategic, knowledge-centered STI environment; i.e.

agendas. NanoSoc thus pulled out researchers from their labs in

an environment that forges new alliances between the scientiﬁc

an effort to initiate broad-range, interactive TA. The project drew

establishment, policymakers, and societal actors for the sake of

inspiration from contemporary TA forms designed to “open up” and

science-driven economic development. As Delvenne (2011, p. 335;

“broaden out” the social appraisal of technology (Stirling, 2008;

Delvenne et al., 2011) notes in his study of European parliamen-

Ely et al., 2014). These forms included real-time TA (Guston and

tary TA institutes, the institutionalization of TA may well depend

Sarewitz, 2002), constructive TA (Schot and Rip, 1997), interactive

upon the emergence of strategic science as a new mode of knowl-

TA (Grin et al., 1997), and the TA-related approach of upstream

edge production. Following Rip (2000), strategic science heralds a

public engagement (Macnaghten et al., 2005). In line with these

shift in scientiﬁc knowledge production from relatively isolated,

frameworks, NanoSoc sought to instigate an ongoing, delibera-

“basic,” academic research, to research that is economically and

tive role-principles dialogue on technoscientiﬁc responsibility that

socially relevant and that can only be understood within a con-

implicates wider society and scientists on the work ﬂoor, ulti-

text of application. As we have seen, TA potentially transforms this

mately with the aim of developing an interactive methodology

context by bringing more diverse epistemic cultures and “knowl-

for socially responsible technology development (Goorden and

edges” into STI processes. Knowledge here no longer only refers

Deblonde, 2011). Hence, it took the role of TA in Flemish innovation

18 to intellectual property, technological applications, and scientiﬁc

a step further than we have seen thus far .

beliefs, but also, and increasingly so, to new kinds of expertise (e.g.

Having outlined the range of Flemish TA approaches, let us

sociological, lay, indigenous), to new forms and manifestations of

consider how the three TA waves described above (early-warning,

relevance (e.g. social and ecological concerns, mutual learning, and

bottom-up, and interactive) link to the three generations of innova-

the acquisition of skills), and the democratization of sociotechnical

tion policy presented earlier. Fig. 1 positions each wave in relation

culture at large (Knorr-Cetina, 1999: 8; Bijker, 1995). TA can thus

to one or more generations.

contribute to broadening, deepening, and governing knowledge in

In the ﬁgure above, TA is presented as the interplay between

contemporary KBEs, which is precisely what STI policymakers and

innovation programs (FGIP, SGIP, TGIP) and technologies. The term

various innovation enactors claim innovation is, or should be, about

technology here comprises “a range of devices, instruments, cal- 19

(Stilgoe et al., 2013; Ely et al., 2014; Rodriguez et al., 2013) .

culations and inscriptions,” which articulate and make operable

(Miller and O’Leary, 2007). Seen through this sociopolitical lens of

enactment and fabrication, early-warning TA mediates the tran-

Consider in this light the various citations of Flemish STI policy documents pro-

sition from FGIP to SGIP, whereas bottom-up TA and interactive

vided in this article’s introduction. Consider also the many EU policy discourses

TA mediate the transition from FGIP and SGIP to TGIP, albeit by

on integrating science in society for the sake of good innovation governance. For

emphasizing different aspects. It is important to note that this instance, in a 2013 Expert Group Report to the EU’s Directorate General for Research

and Innovation, we read that ““The [Responsible Research and Innovation] approach

has to be a key part of the research and innovation process and should be established

as a collective, inclusive and system-wide approach” (downloaded on 14 October

For more on NanoSoc and the TA approaches that informed it, see Goorden et al. 2013 from http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document library/pdf 06/

(2008) and Van Oudheusden (2014b). options-forstrengthening en.pdf).

1884 M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886

The development of TA in other KBE contexts (e.g. the removed from the R&D process. Thus, while TA gained a foothold

Netherlands, Denmark, Germany) lends weight to the above within formal Flemish policy circles, it became less ingrained in

hypothesis, as does the emergence of signiﬁcant EU-wide Science scientiﬁc and technological research activities across the region.

in Society projects like Parliaments and Civil Society in Technol- Second, as Horst (2014) argues in relation to the restructuring of

ogy Assessment (PACITA; 2011-20145) and previous initiatives the DBT by the Danish government in 2011, when TA is embedded

like EUROPTA . While it is too early to establish PACITA’s policy within formal policymaking bodies and processes, it risks being

impacts, it is important to note that PACITA is designed to facilitate domesticated or “tamed.” This is because ideas, roles, and values

“coordination and networking activities, dissemination and use of that were once considered new subsequently become the norm.

knowledge” in support of research activities and policies across When these new norms are socially established, innovation typi-

Europe. In fact, PACITA is construed as a “Mobilisation and Mutual cally takes on other challenges, forms, and orientations. Established

Learning Action Plan [that] will distribute capacity and enhance organizations may then ﬁnd it hard to change, adapt, and reposition

the institutional foundation for knowledge-based policy-making themselves to meet new needs in complex and changing environ-

on issues involving science, technology and innovation (. . .) .” ments, and may even become obsolete (Gubrium and Holstein,

The potential inﬂuence of PACITA is felt in Wallonia, which 2001). As Horst notes, in Denmark democratic debate about science

contrary to Flanders has not institutionalized TA, but which now and technology lost momentum after the DBT’s institutionalization

explicitly gears its STI policy towards the KBE and strategic sci- in 1986. In the years that followed, Danes came to take debate of

ence (e.g. Plan Marshall, 2022). At present, TA advocates and this kind for granted. In fact, many Danes appeared ignorant of the

policymakers debate the opportunity of establishing a Walloon TA DBT’s existence.

institute linked to the Walloon parliament. They do so with the Whether or not similar assertions can be made about the clos-

explicit aim of rendering TA serviceable to Walloon STI policy- ing of the Flemish IST is an open question. As with any institutional

making, in line with PACITA’s aims of activating multiple kinds of reform, the reasons for the IST’s closure are manifold and com-

knowledge and engaging multiple societal actors in STI decision plex; they pertain to the institute’s ambiguous public identity and

making (Van Oudheusden, 2013). its relation to parliament and governmental agencies, the multiple

Based on these examples, it would appear that TA not only missions inscribed in its statutes, and to how the IST was managed

relies on, but thrives in, the context of knowledge-driven innova- on a day-to-day basis, among others . Rather than develop these

tion. However, if TA is to exert a lasting inﬂuence in the KBE, TA reasons in detail, we draw attention to a third important feature of

actors must render clear to policymakers and innovation actors TA’s Flemish TA as a whole, which complements the interpretation that

credentials as a decisive knowledge player. Recent developments, established institutes like IST fail to reposition themselves in light

such as the closing of the Flemish parliamentary TA institute, IST, of new challenges. Various Flemish politicians, industry actors, and

and the restructuring of the DBT by the Flemish and Danish govern- scientists argue that Flemish TA is not a neutral governance tool,

ment, suggest that these credentials cannot be taken for granted. but politically partisan, as TA emanated on the left side of the polit-

We return to this point shortly. ical spectrum; speciﬁcally among the green and socialist parties.

Second, and in relation to our ﬁrst observation, Flemish TA taps The establishment of STV in response to the DIRV campaign ren-

into a political culture that emphasizes the importance of social ders explicit how Flemish TA has politics, to paraphrase Langdon

concertation. In countries like Belgium (but also Switzerland, the Winner (1980). Politics here is deﬁned as achieving and exercising

Netherlands, and some would argue the EU at large), collective positions of inﬂuence within, and through, organized party politics.

bargaining between trade unions, employers’ organizations, and Given Flanders’ multiparty political system, these politics provide

governments is an important political and social tradition that an often overlooked explanation as to why the IST was disman-

allows TA practices to gain a ﬁrm foothold in multi-layered, conso- tled, as since 2009 Flemings have increasingly voted for right-wing,

ciational democracies (Lijphart, 1977). The erection of the Flemish conservative parties that are at best indifferent to TA and at worst

TA institute STV in response to the DIRV campaign illustrates this vehemently opposed to it. As noted elsewhere (Van Oudheusden,

point, as trade unions demanded their say in STI policymaking. 2014a), TA’s political afﬁliations are often denied or downplayed

Seen in this way, TA can arbitrate between scientiﬁc, political, across TA communities. TA is typically framed as an analytic activ-

and social worlds. When TA is integrated into R&D settings (e.g. ity aimed at providing decision makers with an objective analysis

Flemish technology action programs) and/or embedded in formal of a technology (Van Eijndhoven, 1997) and/or as an interactive and

policymaking bodies, it can open onto new negotiation practices communicative tool that aims to enrich the basis for STI decision

and establish a more integrative decision-making culture. TA can making (Decker and Ladikas, 2004). While some policymakers may

hence contribute to “strengthening more responsive relations in ﬁnd these broad designations (i.e. geared towards all political fac-

the governance of innovation” (Ely et al., 2014); by promoting vari- tions and to the beneﬁt of all innovation actors) of TA compelling,

ous kinds of communication among concerned actors (government, they risk trivializing and undermining the very policy changes TA

social partners, academia, citizens), by developing democratically advocates seek to instigate when TA is associated with speciﬁc polit-

legitimate meeting spaces for these actors and their concerns, or ical parties or politicians .

simply by reopening debate on sociotechnical issues (Bütschi and These considerations call into question the widely shared

Nentwich, 2002, p. 240). assumption among TA proponents and some policymakers that

However, the institutionalization of TA entails risks, as well TA and responsible innovation go hand in hand (Von Schomberg,

as opportunities. As noted earlier, when the IST (formerly viwTA) 2012). Whereas TA is correctly ascribed great potential as a

was installed in the Flemish parliament in 2000, TA was physically tool for strategic intelligence (Kuhlmann, 2001b) and democratic

20 22

This EUROPTA research project was initiated by the Danish Board of Technology These assertions are based on interviews the ﬁrst author had with former IST

within the European Participatory TA network EPTA; see www.eptanetwork.org. staff, politicians, and implicated others; as is the understanding that “TA has politics”

Other, related, initiatives include those implemented by the European Parliament’s below.

Science and Technology Options Assessment unit, STOA; see www.europarl.europa. Here, an instructive comparison could be drawn with the American Ofﬁce of

eu/stoa. Technology Assessment (OTA), which US Congress abolished in 1995. A former OTA

Downloaded on 8 August 2014 from http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/98487 staff member, LaPorte (2013), argues that OTA was not always perceived of as neutral

en.html. and independent; rather, it was associated with (certain) Democrats.

M. van Oudheusden et al. / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1877–1886 1885

innovation governance (Bijker, 2013), the developments in Flan- knowledge player in the KBE. Failure to do so risks undermining

ders (and Denmark) point to potentially signiﬁcant pitfalls inherent TA’s relevance, to use a strategic science term. In turn, policymakers

in institutionalizing TA and in aligning technological, economic, and innovation scholars can draw on the Flemish TA case to ques-

and social rationales in the ﬁrst place. Connecting and coordinating tion and perhaps reﬁne contemporary notions of innovation, as

TA experiments through cross-national, networked programs like “innovation governance” gains ever more public acclaim and policy

PACITA is a possible means of attending to such pitfalls (Ely et al., momentum.

2014). Yet, to further maximize collective learning among these

networks, and to more fully grasp the mechanisms of innovation Acknowledgements

governance at large, the uncertainties and paradoxes in TA prac-

tices should be debated head-on and addressed by TA communities,

This paper has greatly beneﬁted from comments provided by

policymakers, and innovation scholars.

two anonymous reviewers, and from suggestions made by Maja

Horst, Erik Fisher, and members of his research project “Socio-

Technical Integration Research.” The material this article contains is

5. Conclusion

partly based upon work supported by the Fonds de la Recherche Sci-

entiﬁque (FNRS) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) under

This article describes how Flemish technology assessment (TA)

grant no. 0849101.

initiatives have unfolded with Flemish science, technology, and

innovation (STI) policies from the 1980s to the present day. Build-

Appendix A. List of interviewees

ing on a historical review of Flemish STI and TA processes, it links

various TA strands (early-warning, bottom-up, and interactive TA)

Interviewee names are followed by the interviewee’s present

to different generations of innovation thinking in Europe. The arti-

and past afﬁliations (where relevant).

cle suggests that Flemish TA contested and complemented Flemish

Paul Berckmans, Flanders Social and Economic Council (SERV),

innovation policies; typically by bringing new actors (e.g. trade

Stichting Technologie Vlaanderen (STV); Robby Berloznick, Flem-

unions) and issues (e.g. ecological concerns) to the policy innova-

ish Institute for Technological Research (VITO), Institute for Science

tion table and by stimulating more interactive kinds of STI decision

and Technology (IST; formerly viwTA); Donaat Cosaert, Green Party

making.

(Flemish Parliament), IST; Marian Deblonde, VITO, IST, Nanotech-

In the process, tensions and struggles emerged between TA aspi-

nologies for Tomorrow’s Society (NanoSoc); Johan Evers, Flemish

rations and STI policies. Arguably, these tensions were most potent

Department of Foreign Affairs, IST, NanoSoc; Lieve Goorden,

in the early eighties, when TA emerged as a counterforce to the

NanoSoc, STV; Dirk Holemans, Green Party (Flemish Parliament);

dominant technology- and economy-driven DIRV campaign of the

Erik Laes, VITO; Jan Larosse, Government Agency for Innovation

Flemish government. Yet, even after the institutionalization of TA

in Science and Technology (IWT), European Commission Seconded

in the Flemish parliament in 2000 and the now general acknowl-

national expert; Herman Maes, Interuniversity Microelectronics

edgment of the importance of cooperation and social responsibility

Center (IMEC); Stijn Oosterlynck, University of Antwerp; Undis-

in STI, TA remains a fragile knowledge-based economy (KBE)-

closed interviewee, Flemish Ministry of Innovation.

instrument, highly dependent on economic and social forces and

dynamics. These forces also include politics, as Flemish TA is his-

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