The Israeli-Palestinian War—The Israeli Defense Forces 1/19/2005 Page I

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War—The Israeli Defense Forces 1/19/2005 Page i

CSIS______Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 [email protected]

Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War

Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and Correction

The Actors in the Conflict: The Israeli Defense Forces

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies

With the Assistance of Jason A. Wittemen and Richard G. Young

January 13, 2005

Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution. Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War—Terrorism for Settlements 1/19/2005 Page ii

Introduction

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of the CSIS.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VI. THE ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES ...... 1

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN WAR VERSUS THE FIRST INTIFADA...... 2 THE EVOLUTION OF IDF TACTICS ...... 3 KEY PHASES IN THE FIGHTING ...... 19 THE CHALLENGES THE IDF HAS FACED ...... 21 A WAR OF ASSASSINATIONS...... 23 ISRAELI SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ...... 31 SECURITY METHODS AND TACTICS...... 36 ISRAELI DISSENT IN THE CURRENT WAR VERSUS THE FIRST INTIFADA...... 41 OTHER ISRAELI ACTORS IN THE CONFLICT: HARD-LINE MOVEMENTS AND EXTREMISTS...... 43

VI. The Actors in the Conflict: The Israeli Defense Forces In order to understand how the Israeli-Palestinian war developed as the peace process collapsed, it is necessary to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the actors on each side. In the case of Israel, Israeli politics have played a major role, but the two key actors have been the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israeli Security Forces. Hard-line Israeli groups and extremists have played a role, but the Israelis have been far more unified than the Palestinians.

One key to understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to recognize that there is no military balance in any normal sense of the term. The means of combat are far too asymmetric and much depends on the role of outside actors and political events. Normal measures of the conventional military balance have only limited meaning under such conditions. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kashmir, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and the Western Sahara have all shown that long, bloody guerrilla wars and low-level conflicts can be fought by small, poorly-equipped extremist elements even when they face massively superior conventional armies. Even highly trained and well-equipped Israeli forces never entirely succeeded in enforcing security during the Intifada, just as similarly trained and equipped British forces were never able to halt the violence in Northern Ireland.

Many low-intensity wars have occurred where the “guerrillas” initially seemed to have been defeated. In most cases, however, the military or paramilitary capabilities of guerrilla forces evolved during the conflict, adapting and re-adapting to the military and internal security techniques used to suppress them. The conventional military balance at the beginning of such a conflict proved to be little indication of the balance that existed at its end. “Winning” in the first round of battles only led to years of political and military struggle with constant changes in tactics, weapons, and levels of engagement. The paramilitary and guerrilla organizations that existed at the start of such conflicts also often changed radically in leadership, tactics, and equipment under the pressure of events.

Nevertheless, the course of the Israeli-Palestinian War has been shaped by the fact that the IDF has absolute conventional military supremacy on the land, at sea, and in the air. At present, the only purely military restraints on its use of force are a reluctance to take casualties. All of the other restraints are largely political. As a result, it is how the IDF chooses to employ force, rather than the size of its military forces, which has been the primary issue shaping the

Israeli-Palestinian War. The various Palestinian factions have exploited those restraints and challenged the IDF, despite their comparative deficiencies in weapons and personnel.

Israel’s massive conventional superiority has allowed it to defeat the Palestinians decisively in every major clash involving encounters between armed forces, security forces, and paramilitary forces. It has allowed Israel to largely seal off its borders, reoccupy Palestinian territory, seal off towns and cities, secure lines of communication, and isolate the Palestinian Authority. It has deterred involvement by other Arab countries, and allowed Israel to conduct most military operations with minimum losses and casualties.

At the same time, Israel’s conventional forces have been forced to adapt to patterns of asymmetric warfare that they are not designed to fight. In addition to the problems they encountered in the first Intifada, they have faced a de facto Palestinian state that began the war with large armed security forces. Palestinian resistance has been better organized, and the Palestinians have been able to fight actual battles for the first time.

The end result is that the IDF has faced more serious problems in dealing with the Palestinians even in more conventional forms of combat. The Israeli Defense Forces have had to make major redeployments throughout the Israeli-Palestinian War. Many of the units deployed against the Palestinians have also had to be specially trained and manned, and sometimes reequipped and reorganized to deal with the new types of low intensity conflict that have developed in Palestinian areas. There are few details as to the exact scope and cost of such changes, but they have certainly reduced the IDF’s training activity for conventional warfare and cost it hundreds of millions of dollars. The Israeli-Palestinian War Versus the First Intifada There are significant differences in the fighting in the first Intifada compared to that of the Israeli-Palestinian War that began in September 2000. For one, the Israeli-Palestinian War does not seem to have had as demoralizing an impact on the IDF as the first Intifada. The IDF found during the first Intifada, and the fighting in Lebanon, that conscripts and many officers were not prepared for the strain of dealing with civilian riots, protesters, and the grinding tensions of dealing with hostile populations and guerilla warfare. The current war has not been as difficult in this respect, although problems with excessive violence have occurred and morale and military support for the war has deteriorated over time. Some IDF soldiers have over-

reacted and have been careless in inflicting collateral damage and causing civilian casualties. Discipline and morale problems have emerged in some clashes, and the IDF has found it difficult to determine the circumstances under which units and individuals used lethal force and whether in each instance it was justified.

During the first Intifada, the IDF found that many conscripts did not want to become engaged against Palestinian youths, or become involved in a struggle that they did not see as a major threat to Israel, and/or where many perhaps did not feel Israel’s position was fully justified. It took the IDF several years to work out training, rotation, and leadership systems, and suitable tactics, to deal with the ongoing clashes with Palestinian youths and the problems resulting from such security duty.

These problems led the IDF to carry out significant specialized retraining and to place mature officers—oftentimes experienced reservists—in sensitive positions to ensure that the use of lethal force was kept to a minimum. Similarly, units involved in Lebanon required extensive special training to operate effectively in an environment where it was extremely difficult to distinguish the enemy from hostile civilians. The IDF had to revise its targeting and command and control systems extensively to reduce the risk of ambushes on IDF troops and incidents involving IDF fire on civilians. Israel has employed some of these techniques in the current war against the Palestinians, such as the extensive use of RPVs, and precision strikes against given vehicles or houses.

The Israeli-Palestinian War, however, is much more clearly a “war” than the first Intifada. The Palestinian use of armed force and tactics such as suicide bombings has created a different environment and a different set of Israeli perceptions. While duty is scarcely popular particularly in Gaza and the West Bank, most soldiers perceive it as justified. As a result, the Israeli-Palestinian War has become a struggle where many in the IDF favor escalation and the use of decisive force, rather than one where there has been much sympathy for the Palestinians. The Evolution of IDF Tactics The escalation of the violence committed by both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian War is interactive to the point where neither side can be held wholly to blame, and leads to steady changes in tactics. Each time one side increases the intensity of their attacks, the other side responds in kind, creating an ascending cycle of violence. For the IDF this has meant a shift from

reliance on containment and isolation to the use of invasion, siege, and limited reoccupation in the West Bank and Gaza. The array of forces that the IDF brings to the conflict has expanded over time to include helicopters, aircraft, armor and tanks, artillery, special ground forces, bulldozers, and naval forces.

Though the IDF’s ability to wield these forces in combination has grown more sophisticated over time, the resulting increase in the precision of Israeli firepower has been paralleled by growing difficulties in intelligence collection. Since the collapse of the peace process, Israel has lost much of its HUMINT network in the Palestinian territories, and the polarized and bitter climate of combat makes it harder to recruit new assets. Greater reliance on SIGINT, UAVs, unattended ground sensors, ground-based radars, night-vision equipment, and large-scale arrests have offset this disadvantage to some degree. But in the end there is no substitute for good HUMINT.

On the military side, both the Israelis and the Palestinians altered and diversified their tactics while escalating the level of violence. The Israeli willingness to tolerate collateral damage among Palestinian civilians grew. For instance, early in the war the IDF began to shift from non- lethal crowd control measures such as tear gas and rubber bullets, to lethal methods like live ammunition, tank rounds, and artillery fire.

The IDF has tried to limit the scale of reoccupation, and mix containment and isolation with targeted raids and precision strikes and assassinations in order to limit casualties and help reduce the number of tactical engagements in which IDF troops have had to fight in urban or built-up areas under conditions where their superior equipment and training could be offset by superior Palestinian knowledge of the ground and the short ranges imposed by street fighting. The IDF’s use of decisive force, shock, and tools such as tanks, bulldozers, and clearing of security perimeters has also helped to provide protection and separation from Palestinian threats. These measures to reduce the risk of Israeli casualties have developed over the course of the war as part of a larger evolution in IDF tactics.

The IDF’s tactical diversification and escalation took different forms in Gaza and the West Bank. Gaza is a compact, densely populated, urban area that is almost entirely Palestinian and thus relatively easy for the IDF to isolate and seal-off. However, invading Gaza can lead to dangerous urban battles that minimize the advantages of Israel’s technological superiority. The

West Bank is a much larger area with porous borders, extreme terrain, and a population where Israelis and Palestinians are far more intermingled. It cannot be isolated in its entirety, making it necessary for the IDF to operate within its confines to a greater degree and to isolate it piecemeal.

Though the different characteristics of Gaza and the West Bank necessitated differences in IDF operations, the techniques used in both areas share many similar characteristics. Armor, artillery, separation barriers, strategic road networks, and settlements were all used to isolate Palestinian population centers and territory. Attack helicopters could bypass dangerous urban terrain and provide mobility, precision attacks, and suppressive fire. The use of snipers and guided weapons further enhanced the IDF’s precision-strike capability. Israeli heavy firepower was directed against high-value Palestinian targets, while infantry forces conducted search and seizure incursions that targeted militant leaders, destroyed terrorist infrastructure, and gathered intelligence. The IDF employed bulldozers and armor to destroy buildings and trees that were bases for attack on Israeli positions or to clear fire lanes. Economic and critical infrastructure blockades such as cutting electricity, water, or communication lines, supplemented these military measures, as did an aggressive media campaign.

As is discussed later in Chapter XI, there was a parallel escalation on the Palestinian side from rock throwing, to militants with guns mixing with and hiding among groups of rock- throwers, to car bombs, suicide bombings, and mortar attacks. By June 2001, for example, there had been nine suicide bombings and ten car bomb attacks in Israel. At times when Israeli or Palestinian attacks increased in intensity the other side would, in the majority of cases, respond with further belligerence, thereby stimulating a cycle of violence—escalating to nowhere. This dual perception of unprovoked aggression is exemplified by looking at how many Israelis view their country’s role in the evolution of the conflict.

The following chronology illustrates just how complex and interactive the course of the IDF’s tactical evolution has been. It shows the parallel development of the Palestinian side, and the key political events shaping the conflict. Major IDF actions and changes in tactics are highlighted in italics.1

2000

• September 28: Sharon visits the Temple Mount. • September 29: IDF begins to fire rubber bullets at Palestinian crowds. • September 30: First major armed clashes; 14 Palestinians killed. • October 8: First Israeli settler killed. IDF begins to demolish Palestinian buildings in the territories. • October 12: Two IDF soldiers taken from Palestinian police station and killed. In response, first IDF helicopter attacks on Arafat’s compound and PA security forces. • October 23: IDF’s first attempt to blockade a Palestinian town – Beit Jalla. • October 26: Palestinian Islamic Jihad conducts first suicide bombing on Israeli post in Gaza. • October 31: Israel begins its efforts to fortify vulnerable towns and erect physical barriers separating Israelis from Palestinians. • November 9: First helicopter targeted assassination of a Palestinian leader, a local commander of Fatah Hussein Abayat. 2001 • February 6: Ariel Sharon defeats Ehud Barak in Israeli prime ministerial elections. • February 13: Israeli gunships kill a member of Force 17, Arafat’s personal security force, named Colonel Masoud Ayad who Israel claims was a leader of Hezbollah. • February 14: Eight Israelis killed and 25 injured when a Palestinian drives a bus into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop near Holon, south of Tel-Aviv. • March 7: Ariel Sharon is sworn in as Israel’s new prime minister. • March 18: Palestinians fire mortar shells at an Israeli army base near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, lightly injuring one soldier. The mortar attack marks the first time Palestinian insurgents in Gaza have fired at Israeli targets located within Israel's borders. Three mortar bombs are fired at the Israel Defense Forces base.2 • March 27: A car bomb explodes in the Talpiot industrial/commercial zone in Jerusalem injuring seven people and the Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack. 28 people are injured, two seriously, in a suicide bombing directed against a bus in Jerusalem for which Hamas claims responsibility. • March 28: In response, Israeli helicopter gunships bombard bases and training camps of Yasir Arafat's personal security forces. It is Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's first military response since he took office three weeks ago. One member of the Force and two other Palestinians are killed. • April 5: A booby-trapped public telephone booth explodes, killing Iyyad Hardan, the military leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin. • April 6: Three mortar shells are fired from Palestinian areas in Gaza and land near an Israeli village next to Gaza. • April 10: Israel responds by firing antitank missiles at Palestinian police posts in Gaza. The attack on one target, a Palestinian naval post, kills a lieutenant and wounds 7 police officers; the second strike, on a police headquarters in a refugee camp, wounds 10. In contrast to recent nighttime raids, these are daylight attacks without warning on occupied buildings. • April 11: Israelis in tanks and bulldozers enter a densely populated Gaza refugee camp in Khan Yunis before dawn and destroy buildings suspected of serving as launching pads for mortar attacks. The raid is

followed by a prolonged ground battle as hundreds of armed Palestinians, summoned by mosque loudspeakers to defend the camp against an "Israeli invasion," rush into the streets. Two Palestinians are killed and two dozen wounded; no Israelis are killed. The assault on the refugee camp represents the largest and deepest Israeli ground attack into Palestinian-ruled territory since the current round of violence began in September. • April 17: IDF forces for the first time reoccupy territory in the Gaza Strip ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Agreements, before withdrawing under US pressure. • April 30: On the same day that the Mitchell Commission releases its final report the IDF kills two Hamas militants with a car bomb in Gaza City. • May 2: Israeli Army bulldozers backed by tanks rumble into a Palestinian refugee camp and raze several homes. One teenager is killed and 14 other Palestinians are wounded, United Nations and Palestinian officials said. The demolition in the Rafah refugee camp is the latest example of an increasingly common tactic of the Israeli Army in its battles with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. • May 6: Israeli soldiers enter Palestinian-controlled territory for several hours in what the IDF term an effort to silence shooting at its positions. Israeli tank shells and gunfire kill a Palestinian fighter, Muhammad Abayat, 45, and wound 20 people, including a 5-year-old boy who is in serious condition. • May 13: Israeli helicopter gunships bombard Palestinian security targets across the Gaza Strip, including, and naval boats strike at least eight Palestinian armored personnel carriers with rockets. • May 18: A Palestinian suicide bomber, wearing an explosive vest, detonates himself outside a Shopping Mall in Netanya. Five civilians are killed and over 100 wounded in the attack, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by sending F-16 fighter jets against security buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time since the 1967 war. At least nine Palestinians are killed and 90 wounded in fighter jet attacks on Nablus and Ramallah. • May 27: A car bomb explodes in the morning at the ‘Russian Compound’ neighborhood in Jerusalem. It includes several mortar shells, some of which are propelled hundreds of meters from the site of the explosion. 30 people are injured, most suffering from shock. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility. • June 1: A suicide bomber of Hamas strikes a Tel Aviv nightclub killing 20 and wounding nearly 100. Palestinians fear a major Israeli retaliation. • June 2: Arafat calls for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. • June 3: Arafat orders his security chiefs to prevent all attacks on Israeli targets from Palestinian territory. • June 6: Jewish settlers fight Palestinians near a West Bank crossroads where an Israeli infant was wounded by Arab stone-throwers on June 5. Thousands of settlers gather at a rally in downtown Jerusalem, calling for Arafat’s death and condemning Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s policy of restraint. • June 12: Israel unconditionally accepts DCI Tenet’s plan for ending the Israeli-Palestinian violence. • June 13: Shortly after midnight, Yasir Arafat agreed in principle to the truce proposal, after a long meeting with DCI Tenet but voices two main reservations, one concerning the timetable and the other a proposal for a "buffer zone" separating Israeli and Palestinian territory.3 • July 16: In northern Israel, in the town of Binyamina, a suicide bombing kills two Israelis at a railway station bus stop. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility. • July 31: Israeli helicopters fire on the Hamas office in Nablus, killing eight – two leading Hamas officials in the West Bank, and four other activists, as well as two children. • August 9: 15 people are killed and 88 wounded in a suicide bomb attack on a pizzeria in central Jerusalem. Hamas claims responsibility4. Israel takes hold of and closes the East Jerusalem office of the Palestinian Authority.

In Ramallah, F-16s flatten a Palestinian police station. • August 14: Israeli tanks enter the West Bank city of Jenin, leveling the city’s police station. • August 25: At a Gaza Strip Israeli army post, guerilla soldiers of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine breach security and kill three Israeli soldiers. Seven other soldiers are wounded, and two of the guerilla soldiers are shot dead. • August 26: Israeli F-16s and F-17s destroy security installations in the West Bank and Gaza.5 • August 27: Israeli forces assassinate Mustafa Zibri, the secretary-general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in a suburb of Ramallah. Angry protests from Palestinians follow and Israel launches multiple incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopter gunships take over “dominant positions” in the West Bank town of Beit Jalah in response to Palestinians firing at Gilo. In Gaza, before withdrawing Troops, Israeli tanks demolish eight buildings in area west of Rafah.6. • September 9: In northern Israel, a suicide attack leaves three dead and 36 wounded. Responsibility for the attack is claimed by Hamas7. A second suicide bombing at an intersection in Beit Lid wounds another three people8. • September 12: The IDF pushes into Jenin once again and sends tanks and bulldozers into Jericho9. • October 17: In east Jerusalem, Rehavam Zeevi, a right-wing Israeli tourism minister, is killed and the PLFP claims responsibility10. • October 18-20: In the most extensive military operation in the occupied territories at the time, Israel deploys forces into and around Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and four other Palestinian cities.11 • November 4: In east Jerusalem, an Islamic Jihad gunman shoots at passengers on a bus, killing two schoolgirls and wounding 35 other before being shot dead12. • November 15: In Gaza, Israeli troops, tanks, and bulldozers enter the Khan Younis refugee camp. The Palestine Red Crescent Society reports one dead and 13 wounded. According to the IDF, the structures destroyed were suspected firing bases for mortars aimed at settlements and IDF posts in Gush Katif. 13 • December 1: Two suicide bombers in west Jerusalem kill 10 people and wound around 170. Hamas claims responsibility14. • December 2: Sixteen people die and 40 are wounded in Haifa, when a Hamas militant blows himself up15. • December 3: In Gaza City, the IDF sends in helicopter gunships and jets to hit Palestinian Authority targets near Arafat’s headquarters, including two of his three helicopters. The mission effectively confines Arafat to Ramallah.16 • December 12: In the West Bank near a Jewish settlement, a gunman kills 10 Israelis on a bus.17 • December 13: Israel declares Arafat “irrelevant” and cuts ties with the Palestinian Authority. 2002 • January 3: Israel intercepts a Palestinian freighter, called the Karine-A, loaded with 50 tons of arms, including anti-tank missiles. • January 27: The first Palestinian woman suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, blows herself up on the busy shopping street, Jaffa Road, in West Jerusalem. One Israeli is killed and dozens wounded. The Al-Aqsa Brigades claim responsibility for the attack18. • February 10: From the Gaza Strip, Palestinians fire homemade Qassam-2 rockets into the Negev Desert19. • February 11-13: In response to the rocket attacks, Israel bombs security compounds in Gaza City. Moreover, searching for the manufacturing and launching sites of the rockets, the IDF initiates a military incursion into Gaza20.

• February 15: Palestinian mines blow up an Israeli tank. Three crewmembers are killed in the explosion. This is the first time that one of Israel’s highly sophisticated tanks is destroyed.21 • February 16: In the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron, a suicide bombing at a shopping mall kills two and leaves 27 wounded. The PFLP claims responsibility for the attack22. • February 19: In an ambush on an army checkpoint near Ramallah, Palestinian gunmen kill six Israeli soldiers. Three groups claim responsibility – two groups linked with Fatah and the armed wing of Hamas23. • February 20: Israel initiates an attack on buildings belonging to the Palestinian Authority. Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority compound in Gaza City are attacked. Sixteen Palestinians are killed24. • February 27-March 1: Near the West Bank towns of Nablus and Jenin, Israeli troops invade two Palestinian refugee camps – the Balata and Jenin refugee camps. Twelve Palestinians and one Israeli soldier are killed. As the fighting continues there are more than 20 Palestinians casualties in total25. This is the beginning of an operation where Israeli forces will enter several cities and refugee camps. The aim is to send a message that there is “no safe haven for terror”26. • March 2: In west Jerusalem, in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood, a suicide bomber kills nine Israelis and wounds dozens. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility27. • March 3: Ten Israelis are killed when a sniper assaults an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank. Al Aqsa Brigades claims responsibility28. • March 7-8: Several Palestinians are killed as Israel continues advancing into Palestinian-controlled territory in retaliation for a week that produced 30 Israeli deaths. The IDF enter refugee camps near Tulkarem in search of suspected militants. In the Gaza Strip, Israeli helicopters fire rockets into Jabalaya refugee camp. The operations produce forty Palestinian deaths but it is not clear how many were combatants.29. • March 9: A suicide bomber blows himself up killing 11 Israelis and injuring an estimated 54 at Jerusalem's Cafe Moment, across the street from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's official residence. Hamas claims responsibility for the bombing30. • March 10: The IDF raids Arafat’s compound in Gaza City, completely destroying the leader’s headquarters. • March 14: Israeli tanks begin to withdraw from Ramallah after the U.S. pressured Israel to withdraw31. • March 15: Israel pulls troops out of all Palestinian-controlled West Bank towns, except for Bethlehem32. • March 27: A suicide bomber blows himself up as guests sat down to a Seder in the lobby of a hotel in Netanya, 29 Israelis are killed, and over 100 are injured. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack, and a spokesman from Hamas is quoted by the Israeli press as saying that “the attack was timed to undermine the Beirut meeting of the Arab League33 • March 29: The Israeli Cabinet declares Arafat an enemy and Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield. Israel sends tanks and bulldozers to attack Arafat's Ramallah compound, confining Arafat and dozens of aides to several rooms. In an offensive into areas in the West Bank Israeli tanks enter Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, in addition to a number of Palestinian- controlled villages in the West Bank, by April 4. Hundreds of Palestinians are detained for questioning.34 • March 31: An explosion set off by a suicide bomber in a crowded restaurant in Haifa kills 15 Israelis, and injures more than 30. Izzedine al-Qassam – the armed wing of Hamas – claims responsibility. According to an announcement by Ariel Sharon, Israel is at war and Yasser Arafat is “the enemy of Israel and the entire free world35. Over 100 Israeli tanks enter Qalailiya. Ramallah is declared a closed military zone and journalists are ordered to leave after an estimated 40 peace activists surround Arafat in his headquarters.

In March, a total of 259 Palestinians and 130 Israelis were killed.36 • April 2: In Ramallah, Israeli tanks and helicopters attack Palestinian Preventative Security Services headquarters. Running from Israeli troops, about 30 Palestinian gunmen enter a Franciscan monastery in Bethlehem, breaking into the compound with their weapons. Accompanying the gunmen are about 170 Palestinian police and civilians. • April 3: Israeli tanks enter Nablus – the West Bank’s largest city. Israeli troops also encircle the West Bank refugee camp of Jenin. Once the IDF enters Jenin, the fighting lasts 9 days. • April 9: Israeli forces pull out of Qalailiya and Tulkarem.37 In Jenin, 13 Israeli soldiers are killed upon entering a booby-trapped building. • April 15: Israeli forces arrest Marwan Barghouti, the West Bank leader of Fatah and Tanzim. As a leading official of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, he is arrested for assisting in the orchestration of several suicide bombings and shooting attacks, and for participating in shooting attacks as well38. • April 18: In Jenin, the Israelis pull back to the edge of the city.39 • April 28: Israel’s Cabinet agrees to a U.S. proposal to release Arafat from his confinement. According to the agreement, six men on Israel’s most-wanted list will be transferred from Arafat’s compound to a West Bank prison in Jericho. British and U.S. military officials will supervise the men in detention40. During the month of April, a total of 311 Palestinians and 58 Israelis were killed - mostly during Israel's West Bank offensive41. • May 7: 16 Israelis are killed and at least 57 others are injured in a suicide bombing attack in a crowded hall south of Tel-Aviv, in Rishon Lezion. The armed wing of Hamas claims responsibility for the attack42. • May 10: At the Church of Nativity, the 39-day siege ends in a deal that sends 26 Palestinian gunmen to Gaza and exiles 13 wanted Palestinian militants to a number of European countries. According to the deal, the IDF is expected to withdraw troops once the church is emptied.43 Operation Defensive Shield comes to a close. • May 19: Disguised as a soldier, a suicide bomber blows himself up in a market in Netanya, killing three people and injuring 59. Hamas and the PFLP both claim responsibility44. • June 5: At the Megiddo junction in northern Israel, a man drives a car packed with explosives into a bus, killing seventeen Israelis in addition to the driver, and wounding 38 people. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack45. • June 18: At rush hour, a suicide bomber blows himself up aboard a bus in Jerusalem, killing 19 people and injuring 74. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack46. • June 19: At a bus stop and popular hitchhiking spot, in the French Hill area of Arab east Jerusalem, a suicide bombing attack kills seven – including the bomber - and wounds 37 others. Al Aqsa claims responsibility for the attack47. In Gaza, in Khan Younis and in the Jabaliya refugee camp, Israeli helicopters attack weapons’ manufacturing plants. In another incident, Israeli forces discover and demolish a tunnel on the Israeli-Egyptian border used for smuggling weapons. The tunnel paved a course for travel from an area controlled by Israel to territory of the Palestinian Authority – the IDF has discovered a number of tunnels of this nature by the Israeli- Egyptian border near Rafah. Israeli soldiers came under heavy fire from grenades and machine-guns while carrying out the operation; the unit did not suffer any casualties. 48 • June 24: U.S. President Bush delivers a speech calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state pending reforms in the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, Bush announces that the US will no longer deal with Yasser Arafat or recognize him as the Palestinian’s leader.

• July 19: Israeli army imposes a harsh new form of collective punishment on the Palestinians, rounding up 21 relatives of suspected militants for exile and blowing up their homes. • July 22: An Israeli jet attack on a residential area of Gaza City kills the Hamas military leader, Salah Shehadeh, and 14 other people, including nine children. • July 31: A Hamas bomber attacks Hebrew University in Jerusalem, killing two Israelis and five US nationals. Investigators believe the bomb was left in a bag in the cafeteria. • August 4: A wave of violent attacks leaves at least 15 people dead. In one of the incidents nine people (including three soldiers, two women from the Philippines and an Arab Israeli woman) are killed by a suicide bomber on a bus in northern Israel. In another, a gunman kills a security guard and a Palestinian bystander in Jerusalem before being shot dead himself. • September 26: Israeli helicopter gunships fire rockets at two cars in a crowded street in Gaza City, killing at least two members of Hamas and wounding 25 civilians. The target was Mohammmed Deif, one of Hamas’ main bombmakers. • September 29: Israel pulled its tanks and soldiers out of Yasser Arafat’s compound in Ramallah, under intense American pressure to end the 11-day siege because it was undermining its efforts to build a coalition for war with Iraq. • October 7 – Israeli tanks raid Gaza Strip and ten die when an Israeli helicopter fires on a Palestinian crowd. • October 21: A Hamas militant rams a jeep packed with up to 100 kilogrammes of explosives into a commuter bus as it is waiting at a bus stop east of Hadera, in northern Israel. Fourteen Israelis and the bomber are killed, 47 people are injured. • November 21: A Palestinian suicide bomber from Bethlehem, affiliated with Hamas, detonated himself on a crowded Egged bus No. 20 traveling through the Kiryat Menachem neighborhood in Jerusalem. Eleven people were killed and some 50 were injured. • December 2: One Palestinian was killed, and 21 others were injured, when Israeli forces opened fire at a group of civilians that had been stoning Israeli tanks and other armored vehicles. 2003 • January 5: Two suicide bombers set off their explosives one block apart and within a few seconds. 23 people were killed and an estimated 120 others were injured. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the attacks. In response to the double-suicide attack, Israeli Air Force combat helicopters attacked a weapons producing workshop in Gaza City.

• January 8: IDF troops demolished the house of Ossama Mahmad Ali Ashkar, a Tanzim operative. Ashkar has been involved in multiple terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens. • January 10: In Nablus, IDF troops demolished the house of Darin Muhammad Tufik Abu Ayisha, a Fatah terrorist. He carried out the attack on February 27, 2002 at the Maccabim Junction where two police officers were wounded. • January 16: IDF troops demolished two houses of suspected terrorists. In Beit Fajar, Amdalib Halil Muhammad Saliman’s house was demolished. She carried out the suicide attack in the Jerusalem market on March 19, 2002. In Kabatiya, a member of Hamas, Salah Mukammad Kamil’s house was demolished. • January 26: Israeli troops conduct the largest raid on Gaza since Sharon came to office in 2001. Twelve Palestinians are killed and eight are seriously injured. • January 28: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is reelected by a large margin.

• April 3: Israeli bulldozers destroyed four Palestinian homes in Rafah in an attempt to stop weapon smuggling. Palestinians reported that four men were killed and seven others were wounded. Four Israeli soldiers were wounded when a bomb burst beneath their tank. More than a dozen Palestinian homes were destroyed on the outskirts of Jerusalem. • April 8: An Israeli missile blows up a car in Gaza City, killing Hamas commander Saed Arabeed and six other people, including Hamas operative Ashraf Halaby. A second missile wounded at least 50 bystanders. • April 19: At least five Palestinians were killed and 35 were wounded when Israeli troops pushed into the Rafah refugee camp. Clashes in Nablus left Associated Press Television cameraman Nazeh Arwazeh dead and 17 others wounded. • April 20: In the continuing operation in the Rafah refugee camp, five Palestinians and an Israeli combat photographer were killed and roughly 40 Palestinians were wounded. • April 30: Mahmoud Abbas takes office as the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. • May 1: The “road map” is presented to the Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians immediately accept it. Thirteen Palestinians, including three Hamas militants, were killed and at least 60 others were wounded in a gun battle when Israeli tanks and soldiers entered Gaza in search of Hamas bombmakers. • May 21: In an attempt to deprive militants of cover, Israeli troops demolished 15 houses and uprooted trees in the Gaza town of Beit Hanoun. • June 4: Prime Ministers Abbas and Sharon meet President Bush in Aqaba, Jordan and formally inaugurate the peace plan. • June 10: Israeli helicopter gunships struck the car of Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi in Gaza City, injuring him and killing another person. Two-dozen bystanders were wounded. • June 11: Disguised as an Orthodox Jew, 18-year-old Abdel Madi Shabneh boarded a bus in downtown Jerusalem and detonated explosives strapped to his body while the bus was near Jerusalem’s largest outdoor market. Sixteen people were killed and more than 100 were hurt. In retaliation, Israeli helicopters fired missiles at Hamas members Tito Massoud and Soheil Abu Nahel in a crowded Gaza City neighborhood. The two died, as well as six bystanders. Thirty-five people were wounded.

• June 21: Israeli troops in Hebron shot and killed a senior Hamas leader, Abdullah Qawasmeh. • June 29: In the first major step towards the “road map” Hamas and Islamic Jihad agree to a three- month ceasefire and Fatah agrees to one for six months. Israeli troops withdraw from Beit Hanoun and remove two roadblocks along the main north-south road in Gaza, transferring security responsibility to the Palestinian Authority.49 • July 3: Israeli Border Police capture the leader of the al-Aqsa Brigades in Qalqilyah and kill his assistant when he tries to escape. • August 12: An al-Aqsa suicide bomber kills two and injures ten in a shopping mall near Tel-Aviv. An hour later a Hamas suicide bomber detonates himself among Israeli soldiers at a bus stop outside the Ariel settlement, killing one and critically injuring two.50 • August 14: IDF forces kill Muhammad Sidr, the leader of Islamic Jihad in Hebron, by surrounding and firing on the car workshop where he was staying.51 • August 17: Israeli-PA discussions on expanding the PA’s security responsibilities to include Jericho and Qalqilya fall apart over the issue of controlling entry points into the cities. Plans for further talks in this regard are canceled.

• August 19: A member of Hamas sets off a bomb on a crowded bus in West Jerusalem, killing more than 20 and wounding over 100 people. Islamic Jihad and Hamas accept responsibility for the attack, but claim they would still abide by the cease-fire agreement and that this was a one-time retaliatory action for the IDF’s killing of Sidr on the 14th. Israel suspends any further negotiations on transferring territory to PA control. • August 20: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s security cabinet approves a series of military actions in response to the suicide bombing. The IDF seals off the West Bank and Gaza and sends forces into Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, and the outskirts of Ramallah,, imposing curfews in these areas. • August 21: IDF helicopters fire 5 missiles at the car of Ismail Abu Shanab, a senior Hamas political leader and spokesman, killing him and 2 bodyguards and wounding 19 bystanders. Both Islamic Jihad and Hamas officially declare an end to the cease-fire. • August 24: Israel assassinates two senior members of Hamas, Ahmad Aishtawi and Wahid Hamad, along with their two aids in a helicopter missile strike. • August 26: An Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza City kills a Palestinian bystander and wounds its target, Hamas member Khalid Massud, along with 25 other bystanders. Massud dies of his injuries on September 6. • August 28: An Israeli missile strike in southern Gaza kills wanted Hamas activist Hamdi Kalakh and injures three others. • August 30: A leading Hamas field commander, Abdullah Akel, and his assistant, Farid Mayet were killed in an Israeli helicopter strike. Two male bystanders were also injured in the attack. • September 1: Missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter kill Hamas member Khadir al-Husary and fatally wound a bystander. 25 others, including 3 Hamas militants, were also wounded. • September 6: Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigns, citing his inability to agree on feasible security arrangements with Arafat, insufficient support from the United States, and ongoing Israeli militarism at the expense of diplomatic efforts. In a failed assassination attempt on Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leaders of Hamas, an IDF jet drops a 550lb bomb on a building in Gaza City. Yasin and 14 others—predominantly Hamas members—are slightly injured in the attack • September 7: Arafat nominates Ahmad Qureia, Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council who had played an instrumental role in the Oslo negotiations, to succeed Abbas as the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority. • September 9: A Hamas suicide bomber detonates himself at a bus stop outside an IDF base in Rishon Letzion, Israel. 8 IDF soldiers are killed and 13 wounded in the attack. Later that day, outside a café in Jerusalem, another Hamas suicide bomber self-detonates, Killing 6 Israelis and an Arab bus boy, and wounding over 30. The IDF assassinates the leader of Hamas in Hebron, Ahamd Badr, and kills another Hamas member by firing a shell into Badr’s apartment. A 12-year-old bystander is also killed. • September 10: The IDF attempts to assassinate Hamas spokesman Mahmud Zahar by dropping a half-ton bomb on his home in Gaza City. Zahar’s son, a bodyguard, and a bystander are killed in the attack; Zahar, his wife and daughter, and 24 others are wounded. • September 11: In response to the Hamas suicide bombings two days earlier, Sharon’s security cabinet brand Arafat a total obstacle that Israel will strive to get rid off when and how it deems fit. The IAF flies several low-level sorties over Arafat’s headquarters and IDF soldiers occupy the PA Cultural Ministry building, overlooking it, prompting thousands of Palestinians to surround Arafat’s compound to protect him. • September 12: Over 10,000 Palestinians take part in rallies throughout the occupied territories to show their support for Arafat. 100 Palestinians throw stones at Jews worshiping at the Western Wall after leaving Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa Mosque to protest Israel’s call to expel Arafat. In response, Israeli police raid the mosque and fire tear gas and stun grenades to break up the crowd.

• October 4: A female Islamic Jihad suicide bomber self-detonates inside a restaurant in Haifa. 14 Israeli Jews and 5 Israeli Arabs are killed; around 50 are wounded—one mortally—in the attack. • October 5: IAF aircraft strike an Islamic Jihad training camp deep in Syria in response to the previous day’s suicide bombing, which Israel claims Syria was involved in orchestrating. • October 10: The IDF launches Operation Root Canal in Rafah, with the aim of locating arms smuggling tunnels to Egypt. During the operation, which lasts until late October, 3 tunnels are uncovered and over 120 Palestinian homes are destroyed. • October 13: A group of unofficial Israeli and Palestinian delegates—led by Yossi Beilin, Israel's former minister of justice, and Yasser Abed Rabbo, the PA’s former minister of information and culture— announce that, through two years of secret talks in Switzerland, they have finalized an unofficial peace proposal to serve as an alternative to the Quartet’s Road Map plan called the Geneva Accord. • October 15: An unidentified group of Palestinian militants detonate a roadside bomb alongside a US embassy convoy as it was passing through the Erez area, killing 3 US security officers and wounding one US diplomat. • October 19: Gunmen of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade ambush an IDF patrol outside the Israeli settlement of Ofra in the West Bank, killing three soldiers and wounding 1. • October 20: Israeli warplanes and helicopters conduct five separate strikes against targets in the Gaza Strip over a 15 hour period. At least 10 Palestinians, including two Hamas members, are killed and over 100 bystanders are wounded in the attacks. • October 29: Israel eases restrictions on Palestinian entry into Israel, granting admission to 3,000 businessmen from the West Bank and 1,000 from Gaza. 1,500 laborers from the West Bank are also allowed into the Atarot industrial area. • November 2: Israel increases the number of entry permits given to Palestinian laborers from Gaza to 10,000.52 • November 18: An al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gunman kills two IDF soldiers at an IDF checkpoint outside Jerusalem. • November 30: The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade releases a leaflet denouncing the Geneva Accord and threatening the Palestinians who participated in drafting it. • December 1: 150 Israelis and Palestinians involved in drafting the Geneva Accord formally unveil their unofficial peace initiative at a ceremony in Geneva. In Israel, Sharon denounces the Geneva Accord, calling it “subversive”; and from the occupied territories, Arafat issues a statement calling it a “brave and courageous initiative,” but does not endorse the details of the plan. • December 18: In a speech at the Herzliya Conference on Israeli strength and security, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon warns that, barring rapid Palestinian progress on implementing the road map, he would cut-off negotiations with the PA and unilaterally determine the “security lines” of Israel, which would include parts of the West Bank and all of Jerusalem. The IDF kills senior PFLP members Jibril Awwad and Firas Haneni, and Hamas member Majdi Bahish during a major raid into Nablus. • December 22: Two al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gunmen ambush a group of IDF soldiers, killing two, near Dayr al-Balah. The assailants are killed and five Palestinian bystanders are wounded by the surviving IDF soldiers’ return fire. • December 25: The IDF assassinates Mekled Hamied, a senior military leader of the Islamic Jihad, in a helicopter missile strike on his car in Gaza City. A short while later, a PFLP suicide bomber self-detonates at a bus stop in Tel Aviv. Four IDF soldiers and an Israeli civilian were killed in the attack; 15 Israelis were wounded. The PFLP claims the bombing was in retaliation for the IDF killing of PFLP members Awwad and Haneni on the 18th.

2004 • January 7: Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin proposes that Hamas could accept a “temporary peace” or “long-term truce” with Israel in return for the creation of a Palestinian state according to 1967 borders. • January 14: A female Hamas suicide bomber self-detonates at the Erez crossing, killing 3 IDF soldiers and an Israeli security officer. Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin claims the attack was conducted jointly with the AMB and vows to escalate attacks against Israelis. • January 25: Echoing Yassin’s proposal of January 7th, senior Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi offers a 10- year truce with Israel in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boarders. Rantisi emphasizes that neither an official Hamas recognition of Israel nor an end of the conflict are included in the proposal. • January 29: 10 Israelis are killed and 44 wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber self-detonates on a bus in West Jerusalem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Hamas each separately claim responsibility.53 • February 22: Eight Israelis are killed and 50 wounded when an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade suicide bomber from the town of Husan self-detonates on a bus in Jerusalem. The IDF responds by sending troops into Husan and sealing off nearby Bethlehem. • February 26: Two al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gunmen enter the Erez industrial zone through a sewer pipe and kill two IDF soldiers before they are shot dead. • February 28: An IDF helicopter gunship fires a missile at a car containing three Islamic Jihad members, military commander Mohammed ‘Abdul Fattah Jouda, Amin Hamdan Ibrahim al-Dahdouh, and Ayman Sha’ban al-Dahdouh—killed all inside and wounding 11 civilian bystanders. • February 29: The IDF fatally shoots wanted al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member Muhammad Oweiss during a raid on the Balata refugee camp outside of Nablus. Later that day, the IDF shoots and kills another wanted al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member, Rihad Abu Shallah, at Oweiss’s funeral. • March 3: On a coastal road southwest of Gaza city, Israeli helicopters fire on a car containing three Hamas militants, local military commander Tarad Jamal, Ibrahim Dayri and Ammar Hassan, killing all inside. • March 6: Two Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade militants, a member of Hamas and an Islamic Jihad member use vehicles disguised as IDF jeeps to conduct a joint attack on the Palestinian Security Forces and IDF posts at the Erez crossing. Two Palestinian security force officers are killed and 19 wounded in the attack. • March 14: Two militants from the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza, an Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member and a Hamas member, carry out a double suicide bombing inside the Israeli port of Ashdod, killing 11 Israelis and wounding 20. The attack is the first suicide bombing inside Israel emanating from Gaza. Al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Hamas release a communiqué avowing that joint operations involving various militant Palestinian factions will become commonplace. • March 19: An IDF tank is disabled and four soldiers traveling inside are injured when a roadside bomb planted by Hamas detonates along side it near Mughraqa. In response, the IDF demolishes 5 Palestinian homes in Mughraqa. • March 22: The IDF assassinates Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, by using an IAF helicopter to fire three missiles at him as he leaves a mosque in Gaza City. Seven others— including several of Yassin’s bodyguards—are killed and seventeen people are wounded in the strike. • March 23: Abdel Aziz Rantisi is named the new leader of Hamas in Gaza. Hamas politburo chairman Khalid Mishal, living in exile in Syria, is chosen to serve as the new overall leader of Hamas. • April 2: In the greatest violence at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound since Sharon’s 9/27/00 visit which sparked the current conflict, Palestinians leaving the compound after Friday prayers throw stones at Israeli police guarding the Wailing Wall. In response, Israeli riot police charge the Mosque, firing tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.

• April 14: In a joint Whitehouse press conference with Prime Minister Sharon, US President George W Bush endorses Israel's claim to parts of the West Bank seized in the 1967 Middle East war, asserts that Palestinian refugees cannot expect to return to their homes inside Israel and expresses strong support for Sharon’s plan to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip. • April 17: The IDF assassinates Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, and two of his bodyguards when two missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter destroy the van in which they were traveling. • April 28: A Hamas militant detonates an explosive laden jeep disguised as an Israeli civilian vehicle outside of the Kfar Darom settlement in Gaza. 4 IDF soldiers are wounded in the attack. • May 2: An Islamic Jihad member and an Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade member ambush the vehicle of a Jewish settler outside of the Gush Katif settlement in Gaza, killing her and her four children and wounding two IDF soldiers in the car behind them. The soldiers return fire, killing both gunmen. In retaliation, the IDF raids the nearby Palestinian town of Wadi al-Salqa, bulldozing 15 homes; and assassinates four Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade members, including the group’s senior military commanders in Nablus—Nadir Abu-Layl and Hashim Abu Hamdan. Also, the Likud Party votes to reject Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan.54 • May 11: The IDF conducts a major raid on the Gaza City neighborhood of Zeitoun to search for and destroy weapons workshops. During the operation, a large bomb detonates under an IDF APC, killing 6 soldiers riding inside. Various Palestinian militant groups seize and display body parts of the dead IDF soldiers. • May 12: A rocket-propelled grenade fired by Palestinian guerrillas hits an IDF APC loaded with demolition explosives during a search for cross-border arms smuggling tunnels along an IDF patrolled corridor between Egypt and the Gaza strip. 5 Israeli soldiers are killed in the attack.55 • May 13: In retaliation for the 5/11 and 5/12 attacks on IDF APCs, an IAF helicopter fires missiles at two groups of armed Palestinian militants in Rafah refugee camp, killing 11; and in Zeitoun, the IDF raises dozens of Palestinian homes containing arms and/or arms manufacturing materials.56 • May 17-25: The IDF conducts Operation Rainbow in and around Rafah, with the primary objective of uncovering and dealing with the local terrorist and weapons smuggling infrastructure. It is one of the largest Israeli military operations since the start of the current conflict in September 2000. Israeli, Palestinian and UN officials disagree on precisely how many Palestinians were killed and homes were destroyed; though there is a consensus that over 50 Palestinians (including members of militant groups) died and over 50 buildings were destroyed during the operation.57 • June 6: The Israeli cabinet approves a modified version of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral Gaza Strip disengagement plan. • June 7: PA President Arafat accepts Egypt’s proposal to assist in stabilizing the Gaza strip after any Israeli withdrawal. • June 8: Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announces that all Israeli businesses will be withdrawn from the Erez industrial zone on the border with the Gaza Strip, citing lack of security as the reason for the closure.58 • June 14: Khalil Marshoud, the local leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus, is killed in an Israeli helicopter missile strike. 59 • June 18-19: IAF helicopters fire missiles at three metal workshops (two in Gaza City and one in the Al- Muazi refugee camp) which, according to an Israeli military spokesman, Hamas and other militant groups used to build rockets and other munitions for attacking Israel.60 • June 24-27: The IDF conducts operation “Full Court Press” in the Old City of Nablus. The mission is intended to clear the area of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah militants. In total, the IDF captures or kills 20 of 38 targeted fugitives, including the military leaders of Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (Naef Abu Sharh), Islamic Jihad (Fadi al-Buhti—also known as “Sheikh Ibrahim”), and Hamas (Jafer al-Masri) in the city.61

• June 27: Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades militants remotely detonate 150 kilograms of explosives in a tunnel they dug under an IDF outpost at the Gush Katif junction in the Gaza Strip, killing one IDF soldier and injuring 5. Hamas claims the attack was carried out in revenge for Israel’s assassinations of Hamas leaders Yassin (March 22) and Rantisi (April 17).62 • June 28: Two Israeli civilians are killed and one seriously wounded in a Qassam rocket attack on Sderot. It is the first time that a Qassam rocket attack has led to fatalities. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.63 • June 29: In response to the previous day’s rocket attacks, the IDF begins a major open-ended deployment in the northern Gaza Strip, creating a buffer “security zone” between the Erez border crossing and the outskirts of Gaza city.64 • July 6: An Israeli civilian is killed and his wife injured when Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades gunmen open fire on their car near the West Bank village of Yabad. The group claims the attack was carried out in reprisal for the IDF’s killing of Naef Abu Sharh on June 26th. In Nablus, Yamon Faraj, the military leader of the PFLP in the West Bank, and Amjed Hanani, the deputy PFLP commander in Nablus, as well as several Palestinian civilians are killed in an IDF raid. An IDF Shayetet 13 commando is also killed and 3 are wounded in the fighting.65 • July 8: The IDF officer leading the implementation of Sharon’s Gaza disengagement plan, Colonel Yossi Turjeman, and the commander of IDF forces in southern Gaza, Colonel Pinhas Zuaretz, are wounded when a roadside bomb explodes alongside their vehicle near the Jewish settlement of Morag in southern Gaza. Islamic Jihad takes responsibility for the ambush.66 • July 9: The United Nations’ International Court of Justice issues a non-binding ruling on Israel’s West Bank security fence, claiming that the construction of the barrier is illegal and should be halted. • July 11: A bomb is remotely detonated at a bus stop in Tel Aviv, killing an IDF soldier and wounding 30 Israeli civilians. It is the first attack inside Israel since March 14th. A cell of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades takes responsibility for the attack, claiming it was in response to the ongoing IDF incursion in northern Gaza. • July 11: Israeli officials reject the ruling that the barrier is illegal and say they have no intention of dismantling it.67 • July 13: An undercover Israeli Border Police unit kills Nueman Takhina, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad's military wing in Jenin. Over the last few days, other senior Jenin-area members of the al-Kuds Brigades have been arrested. • July 22: Three Islamic Jihad members are killed when an IAF helicopter fires a missile at their car in the Zeitoun neighborhood of Gaza City. Israeli security sources confirm that the strike's target was Hazam Rahim, who had planned to carry out an attack in Israel in the coming days.68 • July 25: Undercover Israeli Border Police forces kill six Palestinian gunmen in the West Bank city of Tulkarm, including senior Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades commanders Hani Aweida and Mahdi Tambuz.69 • August 11: Two Palestinian bystanders are killed and 18 people are wounded, including six border policemen, when an Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades member remotely detonates a bomb at a checkpoint at the northern entrance to Jerusalem. Zakariya Zubeidi, the organization’s spokesman in Jenin, says the original plan was to dispatch a suicide bomber, but the plan was later changed for an attack on a checkpoint.70 • August 13: The security coordinator of the northern West Bank settlement of Itamar is shot dead by a Palestinian infiltrator. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claims responsibility for the killing.71 • August 31: Two Hamas suicide bombers self-detonate on buses traveling approximately 100 yards apart in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba. At least 16 people are killed and more than 100 are wounded in the nearly simultaneous attacks. Hamas claims the dual attack was retaliation for the assassinations of its leaders, Yassin and Rantisi.72 • September 6: Fifteen Hamas members are killed when IAF aircraft bomb a paramilitary training facility near Jebalya in Gaza.73

• September 22: Two Israeli Border Policemen are killed and 30 Israeli civilians are wounded when a female suicide bomber self-detonates at a hitchhicking post near the French Hill neighborhood of northern Jerusalem. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claims responsibility for the attack.74 • September 23: Palestinian gunmen ambush an IDF outpost near the southern Gaza settlement of Morag, killing three IDF soldiers and critically wounding a fourth. The three Palestinian militants are also killed in the ensuing gun battle. An anonymous caller tells the Associated Press that the attack was carried out by a joint-collaboration of Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committee and Ahmed Abu El-Rish Brigades militants.75 • September 24: An Israeli woman is killed and another is lightly wounded when four mortar shells are fired at the Neveh Dekalim settlement, part of the Gush Katif bloc in the southern Gaza Strip. Hamas claims responsibility for the shelling. It is the second time that a mortar attack on Gaza settlements has been fatal.76 • September 29: A Palestinian rocket lands in an alley way in Sderot killing two young Israeli children. Hamas claims it carried out the attack in response to recent IDF incursions into the northern Gaza Strip.77 • October 1: The IDF launches “Days of Penitence”, a large-scale and prolonged operation aimed at pushing Qassam rocket launching sites out of the range of Sderot.78 • October 7: Three bombings on two Egyptian Red Sea resorts kill 34 people and wound over 122 (about half of them Israelis). In the most serious attack, a bomb-laden truck crashes into the lobby of the Hilton hotel in Taba. The other attacks take place two hours later when two bombs explode in nearby camping areas in Ras al-Satan. Jama'a Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist Group) claims responsibility for the attacks, but Israeli officials believe it was an Al-Qaeda directed operation.79 • October 21: Adnan al-Ghoul, Hamas’ no. 2 man, and his deputy Imad Abbas, are killed in their car as a result of an Israeli airstrike on Gaza City; four bystanders are wounded. Al-Ghoul was responsible for making Qassams and other rockets and for manufacturing the group’s most powerful explosives.80 • October 26: Israel’s Knesset approves Prime Minister Sharon’s Disengagement Plan with a 67-45 majority in the 120-member parliament. The plan consists of evacuating all 21 settlements in Gaza and four settlements in the northern West Bank, as well as withdrawing the IDF troops stationed there to protect them, by the summer of 2005.81 • October 29: Yaser Arafat flies to Paris to seek treatment for an illness that has severely weakened him for the past two weeks. His health demise has been a cause for concern regarding the future of Palestinian politics and the impact it will have in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.82 • November 1: Three Israelis are killed and more than 35 are wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber blows himself up in the crowded Carmel market in Tel Aviv. The PFLP claims responsibility for the attack in a statement which condemns those “talking about ending the resistance,” a reference made to a speculated policy transition due to Arafat’s health deterioration.83 • November 7: Hezbollah flies an unmanned aerial vehicle over the northern Israeli city of Nahariya which ultimately crashes into the sea on its way back to Lebanon. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards provided the drone and the training necessary to prepare and launch the mission, which marks an escalation of Iranian involvement in the conflict.84

As the chronology illustrates, there has been an equally complex pattern of political escalation. For the first year of the war, Israel concentrated on striking Palestinian militant groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. A wave of suicide bombings in early December 2001, however, led Israel to alter this strategy. December 2001 marked the point at which Israel ceased to treat Arafat as a potential partner in peace and began a campaign to hold him and the

Palestinian Authority responsible for continuing terrorist activity and to undermine Arafat’s position both internationally and within the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF’s role in this effort was to isolate Arafat in Ramallah, and eventually within his compound, and to destroy much of the Palestinian Authority’s civil and military infrastructure. Key Phases in the Fighting As the chronologies in this analysis show, it is difficult to divide the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into clean phases. In broad terms, it is more a steady process of interactive escalation than a war of major battles or phases of conflict.

Nevertheless, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has described the following phases of Israeli and Palestinian use of force throughout the early part of the war.85 While such “phases” are somewhat arbitrary, they do provide insights into Israel’s view of the war: Phase 1: Palestinians direct large-scale mob violence mostly against soldiers, using stones, Molotov cocktails and rifle fire from gunmen hiding within the crowd. The Palestinian Authority (PA) helps prepare for future escalation, releasing from jail hundreds of known terrorists. Israel largely looks to the PA to help fight the violence, responding only in areas under Israeli security control and using mainly non-lethal means, including tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets.

• October 12, 2000: Two IDF soldiers lynched by mob at Ramallah police station • October 13, 2000: PA releases hundreds of known terrorists from jail • November 1, 2000: Uniformed Palestinian police kill three IDF soldiers in West Bank • November 20, 2000: School bus bombed in Gaza killing two Israelis, injuring nine

Phase 2: Palestinian terrorist groups, unhindered by the PA, ratchet up the violence by launching ambushes and roadside bombings against Israeli motorists, making travel along West Bank roads perilous. Thirty-three Israelis are killed and dozens are wounded in more than 130 roadside attacks during a six-month period. The IDF prevents numerous terrorist attacks by manning security checkpoints that, while inconvenient for the general population, prevent terrorists from entering Israeli population centers. After more than 3,000 attacks, Israel also begins carrying out temporary, pinpoint military missions in Palestinian-controlled areas to disrupt terrorist plots.

• December 29, 2000: Two Israeli security officers killed, two wounded by roadside bomb • January, 2001: 3,254 total Palestinian attacks • April 28, 2001: Israeli man killed and his wife injured in West Bank ambush

Phase 3: Palestinian terrorist groups, with assistance from the PA, carry out large-scale attacks and make the suicide bombing their weapon of choice. The suicide attacks, which grow increasingly deadlier, kill hundreds of Israelis as Israel works with the U.S. to negotiate a ceasefire.

Only after 14 months, nearly 10,000 attacks and 300 Israelis killed, does the IDF spend its first night in Palestinian areas. Israel also begins utilizing preventive actions against terrorists. These targeted killings are directed at “ticking bombs” about to carry out attacks.

• June 1, 2001: Suicide bomber kills 18 Israelis, mostly teens, outside Dolphinarium disco • July 2001: 6,587 total Palestinian attacks • August 9, 2001: Suicide bombing at Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem kills 15 Israelis, including 6 children, and wounds 130 • November 2001: IDF spends first night in Palestinian areas • January 2002: Israel initiates targeted killings to intercept suicide bombings • January 4, 2002: PA attempts to smuggle 50 tons of offensive arms aboard Karine-A ship • January 28, 2002: First female suicide bomber kills one Israeli, wounds 150

Phase 4: As suicide bombings intensify, large-scale Palestinian arms smuggling efforts and indigenous weapons production are uncovered. Israel, having lost 700 of its citizens in terror attacks, including 125 killed in the month of March alone, carries out extensive military operations including Operation Defensive Shield, which repositions the IDF throughout the West Bank. The IDF arrests terrorists, destroys explosives factories and works to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. Curfews are employed in Palestinian cities to keep civilians off the street and out of harm’s way during military operations and to prevent terrorist cells from linking up to execute attacks.H A S E V

• March 27, 2002: Suicide bombing at Passover Seder in Netanya kills 29 Israelis, wounds 140 • March 2002: 12,293 total Palestinian attacks • End of March 2002: Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield

Phase 5: Palestinian terrorism in the form of bombings and shootings continues, and the Palestinians look for new ways to avoid detection by Israeli security forces, including using children as suicide bombers. Meanwhile, the threat level to Israel grows enormously with attempted “megaattacks” aimed at killing thousands of Israelis. Faced with ongoing Palestinian attacks, Israel expands its preventive actions to include taking out terrorist leaders “with blood on their hands,” who are personally responsible for ordering or coordinating attacks. Israel continues to employ various anti-terror tactics as it works to erect a high-tech fence that will create an easier- to-defend security line between Israel and the West Bank.

• May 23, 2002: Palestinian megaterror attempt to blow up Israel’s Pi Glilot gas depot • June 2002: Israel approves first stage of security fence and begins construction • July 2002: 13, 870 total Palestinian attacks. • October 21, 2002: Car bomb in Tel Aviv kills 14 Israelis, wounds 50 others • January 2003: 16, 310 total Palestinian attacks. • July 2003: First stage of security fence is completedrst stage of • August 2003: Israel begins targeting leaders of terrorist groupsIsrael begins • October 4, 2003: Female suicide bomber kills 19 people, including four children,at Haifa’s Maxim restaurant

Although this analysis of phases is made from a pro-Israeli perspective, it does reflect some important shifts in Israeli public opinion. According to an October 2003 survey by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, 57% of Israelis polled in 2002 thought

that IDF measures employed in the West Bank and Gaza since the start of the conflict were too “soft,” and 34% responded that the policies have been “correct”/“appropriate.” 86 In 2003, although the number of those who deemed IDF polices too soft fell to 29%, the percentage of responders who perceived IDF actions as “correct”/“appropriate” increased from 34% to 58%. Thus, in 2002 and 2003, Israeli public opinion that supported or called for even harsher IDF polices in the West Bank and Gaza remained fairly constant at 91% and 87% of the population.87 Nevertheless, AIPAC’s account should be considered among other accounts as to the veracity of the account of the evolution of Israeli and Palestinian use of force after the outbreak of fighting in September 2000. As the following sections demonstrate, there are several areas where the rectitude of IDF tactics and actions has come under scrutiny from many in the international community. 88 The Challenges the IDF Has Faced Despite the IDF’s growing willingness to wield its superior firepower and military strength more broadly, it has faced significant difficulties during the course of the war. The IDF has had some of its most serious problems with urban warfare. Jenin is a classic example. The IDF was forced to engage in over a week of urban warfare in April 2002, when conducting an incursion into the refugee camp in accordance with the IDF policy of containment. Although Israeli forces claim to have warned residents of Jenin before entering the camp, many remained in the camp and fought rather than evacuated.89 A number of Palestinian fighters from outside Jenin also moved into the area to assist Jenin fighters in carrying out organized resistance to the IDF. This resistance led to many Palestinian casualties, but was also costly to the IDF—which was not properly prepared or trained for urban warfare. In nine days of fighting in Jenin, 22 IDF soldiers were killed, including 13 in one attack.90

As a result, the IDF launched a multimillion-dollar program in June 2002 to upgrade the Army’s national training center and provide Israeli soldiers with an “urban warfare” training facility.91 This expansion built upon existing efforts. According to the upgrade program’s manager, Israeli forces already practiced “abbreviated urban warfare operations at a few bases around the country.”92 An urban battlefield facility opened at the Lachish base in the Negev desert in 2001, and “soldiers practice[d] approaches, surveillance techniques and maneuvers among loosely constructed facades of buildings, homes, and roadways.”93 This facility is

equipped with laser identifying markers in addition to voice and data recording devices. Nevertheless, improved and high-tech training facilities can only give soldiers limited preparation for the difficult decisions that may confront them in combat, such as who their enemies are in a densely crowded environment where it is hard to distinguish militant from civilian.

The IDF has also had to retrain many of its forces for counter-terrorist, security missions to protect the settlements, occupation and reoccupation duties, and low intensity combat against the Palestinian factions. The scale and cost of this effort is unclear, but much will depend on how long the Israeli-Palestinian War continues and how far it escalates. For example, the 2002 upgrade of the Israeli Training Center is a multimillion-dollar project that uses funds drawn directly from US military aid to Israel. The war has likely already cost the IDF several billion US dollars in special training, deployments, operational expenses, and equipment.94

Financial costs are only part of the problem. The IDF has encountered many of the same problems that US forces in Vietnam and British troops have encountered in Ireland. Even the best rules of engagement still force constant judgment calls about what level of force is really warranted and what level of risk to civilians is justified. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are most often inevitable, and even the best sensors, targeting, and clearance procedures cannot avoid serious mistakes.

The fog of war on conventional battlefields is virtually transparent compared to the problems of trying to operate in an environment where there are constant clashes with unarmed youths, ordinary civilian life continues, urban “clutter” is the operational norm, and enemies are mixed in character and hard to identify. It is equally difficult to enforce precise discipline and rules of engagement under conditions where the situation on the ground is so uncertain and complex and troops must constantly decide whether to use extensive or lethal force to protect them or accomplish their missions.

There is a natural tendency to overreact under these conditions, and no army in history has been able to keep its troops from using excessive force, or inflicting unnecessary casualties in such combat. At the same time, Palestinian charges that the IDF has used excessive force— whether considered valid or not—the charges are a vital political and media weapon for the Palestinian cause. The end result is that the fog of war has been accompanied by a “fog of

charges,” some justified, some not, and many caught up in the real-world uncertainties surrounding the true tactical situation. A War of Assassinations “Targeted killings” are another good example of a provocative tactic that in some ways can minimize the casualties and collateral damage caused by broader combat operations, but which can also be counterproductive and produce significant civilian casualties and/or produce negative media attention. The Israeli security forces have killed many Palestinians directly involved in attacks on Israelis, but they have killed others not directly involved as well. Such killings are not new.

Assassinations Before the War

Israel has long fought its side of asymmetric warfare by engaging in the practice of political and anti-terrorism assassinations. Following, is a list of such pre-war assassinations:95

• July 1972: Ghassan Kanafani, a Palestinian novelist and editor, was killed in Beirut when a bomb planted by “Israeli” agents exploded in his car. • October 1972: Wael Zuaiter, a Palestinian scholar and artist, was gunned down by the Israeli Mossad at his apartment entrance in Rome. • April 1973: Israeli commandos land on Beirut beach and drive into city to kill PLO officials Kamal Nasser, Mohammed Najjar, and Kamal Adwan. • May 1973: Mrs. Nada Yashruti, a Palestinian feminist leader and mother of two, was ambushed by three “Israeli” agents with machine-guns at the entrance to her apartment and killed.96 • January 1979: PLO special forces head Abu Hassan, A.K.A. Ali Salameh, who was involved in 1972 Munich Olympics killings of 11 Israelis, killed in car bombing in Beirut. • July 1979: Zuhayr Mohsen, PLO operations wing chief, killed in Cannes, France. • December 1979: Samir Tukan, second secretary in PLO office in Nicosia, Cyprus, and Abu Safawat, another top PLO official, are murdered. • October 1981: Majed Abu Sharar, head of the PLO information office, killed by bomb at Rome Hotel. • June 1982: PLO deputy Kamel Hussein killed by bomb in Rome. • July 1982: Fadel el-Daani, deputy of the PLO representative in France, killed by car bomb. • August 1983: Mamoun Muraish, aide to Abu Jihad, No. 2 in Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, shot to death in car. • June 1986: Khaled Ahmed Nazal, of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, gunned down at Cyprus hotel. • October 1986: Munzer Abu Ghazala, PLO navy commander, killed in Athens.

• February 1988: Three senior PLO officers killed by car bomb in Limassol, Cyprus. • April 1988: Khalil al-Wazir, a.k.a. Abu Jihad, killed in his home in Tunis, Tunisia by Israeli commandos. • December 1988: Israel kidnaps Hizbollah leader Jawad Kaspi from south Lebanon. • August 1989: Israeli commandos kidnap Hizbollah spiritual leader Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid from south Lebanon. • February 1992: Israeli helicopters kill Hizbollah chief Abbas Musawi, firing rockets at his car in south Lebanon. • May 1994: Mustafa Dirani, head of the Believers Resistance Group, kidnapped from home in Lebanon. • October 1995: Dr. Fathi Shakaki, head of Islamic Jihad, shot and killed in Malta by gunman on motorbike. • January 1996: Yehya Ayyash, Hamas’s bomb-maker, known as the “engineer,” killed when a cellular phone packed with fifty grams of explosives detonates near his head. • September 1997: Mossad agents attempted to assassinate Khalid Meshaal, a Hamas political leader, in Amman, Jordan, but failed.

Two other Palestinians have sometimes been added to this list, although they may have been killed by Abu Nidal. These include Said Hamami, a top PLO official who was murdered in London in January, 1978; and Nayim Kader, a PLO representative in Belgium who was killed on a Brussels street in June 1981.

Assassinations Since the Start of the War

Since the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian War, Israel has markedly stepped up such attacks and has adopted a policy of selectively assassinating Palestinians it held responsible for attacking or planning attacks on Israelis. It has made increasing use of IDF Special Forces and attack helicopters in such attacks, however, many killings have been carried out by the intelligence and security services. Following is a list of such assassinations:97

• November 9, 2000: Hussein Abayat, head of Fatah’s armed militias in the southern West Bank, is killed when a missile is fired on his vehicle. • November 22: The IDF ambushes and kills Jamal Abdel Razeq, along with three other Palestinians. Razeq was suspected of involvement in a series of attacks. • November 23: Ibrahim Beni Ouda, a leader of Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, is blown up in a car in Nablus. • December 10: Mahmoud Yusef Moghrabi, a Fatah militant accused by Israel of having planted a bomb, is killed on a bypass road.

• December 11: Anwar Mahmoud Hamran, a member of Islamic Jihad, is shot near an army post in Nablus. • December 12: Fatah militant Yusef Ahmed Abu Suwai is gunned down by IDF soldiers while standing outside his West Bank village home near Bethlehem. • December 13: Hamas militant Abbas Osman Awidi is killed outside his home in Hebron. • December 31: Thabet Thabet, head of Fatah in Tulkarem, is shot to death. • February 13, 2001: Massud Ayyad, a high ranking official of Force 17 and suspected of heading a militant cell of Hizballah, is killed. • February 19: Mahmoud el-Madani of the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, is shot and killed in a refugee camp near Nablus • April 5: Iyyad Hardan, the military leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Jenin is blown up while standing in a public telephone booth, apparently by a booby-trapped telephone. • April 14: Mohammad Yassin Nassar, a Hamas activist, is killed in an explosion in a house in Gaza City • April 28: Imad Daud Karake, a Fatah activist, is shot dead while driving near Bethlehem • April 30: Two Hamas militants, Hamdi Madhoun and Mohamed Abu Khaled, are killed by the explosion of a booby-trapped car in a garage in Gaza City • May 5: Ahmad Khalil Issa Ismail, a member of the PIJ, is gunned down outside his ship in the village of Artas in the West Bank • June 24: Osama Jawabri, a member of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a group that has claimed responsibility for the killings of Jewish settlers during the Israeli-Palestinian War, and who was on Israel’s list of most wanted terrorists, is killed when a booby-trapped public telephone he was often using exploded. • July 17: Helicopter gunships kill four men in Bethlehem, two of who are linked to Hamas. Israeli sources say the men were planning an attack on the athletes in the Maccabiah games. • July 25: Hamas activist Saleh Darwazeh dies when Israeli antitank missiles strike his car on the outskirts of Nablus. • July 30: Israeli rockets destroy a Hamas office in Nablus, killing Jamal Mansour, a leading Hamas figure in the West Bank, and two small children. • August 5: Hamas activist Amer Mansour Habiri dies when Israeli missiles strike his car in the West Bank town of Tulkarem. • August 15: Israeli troops ambush and kill the Palestinian militant Emad Abu Sneineh. • August 27: A shell attack destroys the offices of Abu Ali Mustafa, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and kills Mustafa. • September 1: Colonel Taiseer Khatab, an aide to the chief of Gaza Strip intelligence, dies when a bomb ignites under the seat of his car. Palestinians accuse the Israelis of ordering the assassination, though Israel denies it.

• October 14: Israeli forces shoot and kill Abdel Rahman Hamad, the alleged architect behind the June 1 attack on a Tel Aviv discotheque that left 22 people dead. • October 18: Atef Abayat of the PFLP is killed, along with two other Palestinian gunmen, when the car they were riding in near Bethlehem explodes. • October 22: Hamas bombmaker Hayman Halaweh dies, and three others are wounded, when his booby-trapped car explodes in Nablus. • November 1: Hamas officials Yasser Asideh and Fahami Abu Eisha die in a missile attack outside the West Bank town of Tulkarem. • November 23: An Israeli helicopter fires two missiles at a van in Nablus, killing Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, a top-ranking Hamas official. • December 10: Two children die when Israeli helicopter gunships fire missiles at Islamic Jihad leader Muhammed Sidr in the streets of Hebron. Sidr is wounded, but lives. • January 15, 2002: Raed Mahmoud Karmi, a commander of Fatah Tanzim in Tulkarem, is killed. • January 24: A missile strike kills senior Hamas militant Adali Bakr Hamdan and two of his associates. • January 24: Lebanese warlord Elie Hobeika, a potential witness in a Belgian war crimes trial against Ariel Sharon, is killed outside his home in Beirut. • February 4: Five members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are killed when their car explodes in the Gaza Strip. Palestinians blame the attack on Israel. • March 4: The wife of Hamas activist Hussein Abu Kweik and five children are slain when Israeli tanks fire into a crowded refugee camp in Ramallah. • March 5: Mohand Dirya (Abu Haliwa), a top Fatah Tanzim operations officer, and two members of Force 17 die in a missile strike on their car west of Ramallah. • March 9: Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades activist Samer Awis dies in a missile attack on his car in Ramallah. • April 5: The military leader of Hamas in the West Bank, Kayes Adnan, is killed along with five other Hamas militants. Israel hunted Adnan unsuccessfully for more than a year until the army’s invasion of the West Bank cut off his avenues of escape. • April 22: Israeli missiles destroy the car of Marwan Zalloum, a commander in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, in Hebron, killing Zalloum and his bodyguard. • May 14: Israeli troops shoot and kill Palestinian General Intelligence agent Khalid Abu Khairan in the West Bank town of Haloul. • May 22: An Israeli tank shell kills the chief of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Mohammed Titi, and two other militants hiding in a cemetery in the West Bank. • June 17: Israeli snipers kill Walid Na’aman Aliu Sbeh, a senior member of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.

• June 18: Israeli security forces shoot and kill Yusef Besharat, a member of the Islamic Jihad, who was accused of killing two European observers from an international force stationed in Hebron. • June 24: Rafah-area Hamas commander Yasser Rizik and five other Hamas members die when Israeli Apache helicopters destroy the two taxis they were riding in the Gaza town of Rafah. • June 30: Senior Hamas leader Mohamed Tahir is killed when an Israeli tank strikes the house where he is living in Nablus. • July 4: Jehad al-A’marin, a top leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and a fellow militant are killed in a car bomb apparently triggered by a helicopter hovering overhead. • July 23: An Israeli warplane drops a one-ton bomb on the house of Salah Shehadeh, the head of Hamas’ military wing, a close personal aide to the movement’s spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and the highest-ranking Hamas member ever targeted by Israel. The strike levels the five-story apartment building and kills Shehadeh, his bodyguard, and 13 bystanders, including his wife, daughter, and eight other children. • August 6: An Israeli sniper kills Hussaan Hamdam, a wanted leader within Hamas’ military wing. • August 14: Hamas leader Nasr Jarrar is killed when Israeli forces fire rockets into his house in the West Bank. • August 31: Israeli gunships fire four missiles in an attempt to assassinate wanted Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades militant Jihad Sauafta. Rafat Daraghmeh, identified by some sources as a fellow Brigades member and by others as a Palestinian Authority intelligence official, is killed along with four other bystanders, two of whom are children. Sauafta and six bystanders are wounded. • September 26: In an attempt to hit Hamas operations chief and bomb-maker Mohammed Deif, Israeli missiles kill his bodyguard and a leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and wound 35 bystanders. • October 13: Mohammed Shtewie Abayat, a low-ranking member of the Fatah Tanzim movement, dies when a public telephone explodes in his hands. The intended target appears to have been his brother Nasser, the current Tanzim military commander. • November 4: Israeli forces remotely detonate a car bomb and kill wanted Hamas militant Hamad Sadder and one other man in Nablus. • November 9: Iyad Sawalha, a leader of the Islamic Jihad, is killed when Israeli soldiers burst into a house in Jenin and shoot him dead after an hour-long firefight. • December 4: Israeli helicopters fire several missiles at a room in the Palestinian Authority Preventive Security headquarters compound in Gaza City where Mustafa Sabah, a bomb-maker responsible for destroying three Israeli battle tanks and killing seven soldiers, is employed as a guard. Sabah dies in the assault and five others are wounded. • January 12, 2003: Two Hamas activists take advantage of orchard foliage near Khan Younis to evade an Israeli gunship attack that kills two teenagers and wounds another man instead. • February 16: A mysterious explosion kills six Hamas members in the Gaza Strip.

• February 19: A leader within the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades Tha’er Zakarneh is killed and four other men are wounded when a small bomb allegedly planted by Israel detonates within a stolen car in Jenin. • March 8: The Israeli Army kills Ibrahim Makadmeh, a co-founder of the political wing of Hamas, and three of his bodyguards in a missile strike in Gaza City. • March 25: Israeli troops fire on a car in Bethlehem, killing two Hamas militants, but killing a 10 year- old girl and wounding her family in the process. • April 8: An Israeli missile strike kills two Hamas leaders, Saad Arabid and Ashraf Halaby, and a third activist in Gaza City. Five bystanders die and fifty are wounded. • April 10: Islamic Jihad military leader Mahmoud Zatme is killed in Gaza City when Israeli missiles destroy his car. • May 8: Leading Hamas militant Iyad Al-Beik Hamas is killed in an Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza. • June 10: An Israeli helicopter attack in Gaza leaves chief Hamas political leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi wounded and his bodyguard dead. Four others are also killed and 23 wounded. • June 12: Hamas militant Yasser Taha, his wife, his daughter, and four others are killed, and 29 bystanders are wounded, when Israeli helicopters fire into their car in Gaza City. • June 13: Israeli helicopters kill Hamas militant Fuad Lidawi in Gaza City; the strike kills one bystander and injures nearly two-dozen others. • June 21: Israeli undercover troops kill a senior militant commander of Hamas in the Hebron area, Abdullah Qawasmeh. • June 25: Missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter wound a Hamas militant, kill two bystanders and injure 14 others. • June 27: An Israeli soldier and four Palestinian militants are killed in an Israeli commando operation to assault the house of a Hamas bomb-maker in Mughraqa and capture a cell that had launched bombing and rocket attacks in Gaza. • August 21: An Israeli helicopter missile strike kills prominent Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab, two of his bodyguards and one bystander. At least 15 others were wounded in the attack. • August 24: An Israeli helicopter strike kills four Hamas militants, senior members Ahmad Aishtawi and Wahid Hamad and their two aids, and injures over a dozen bystanders in Gaza City. • August 26: An Israeli helicopter strike in Gaza City kills a Palestinian bystander and wounds its target, Hamas member Khalid Massud, along with 25 other bystanders. Massud dies of his injuries on September 6. • August 28: An Israeli missile strike in southern Gaza kills wanted Hamas activist Hamdi Kalakh and injures three others. • August 30: 4 missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter kill a leading Hamas field commander, Abdullah Akel, and his assistant, Farid Mayet. Two male bystanders were also injured in the attack. • September 1: Missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter kill Hamas member Khadir al-Husary and fatally wound a bystander. 25 others were also wounded—including 3 Hamas militants, one fatally.

• September 9: The IDF assassinates the leader of Hamas in Hebron, Ahamd Badr, and kills another Hamas member by firing a shell into Badr’s apartment. A 12-year-old bystander is also killed. • September 10: The IDF attempts to assassinate Hamas spokesman Mahmud Zahar by dropping a half- ton bomb on his home in Gaza City. Zahar’s son, a bodyguard, and a bystander are killed in the attack; Zahar, his wife and daughter, and 24 others are wounded. • October 20: Israeli helicopters fire missiles into the Nusseirat refugee camp in Gaza, killing 14 Palestinians. The number of militants killed in the strike is still under dispute. Palestinian sources claim two of the dead were members of armed groups; the Israeli military puts the figure higher. • December 25, 2003: A rocket attack in Gaza kills top Islamic Jihad leader Mekled Hamied, two other PIJ members and two bystanders. • February 7, 2004: An Israeli missile scores a direct hit on a car containing senior Islamic Jihad bodyguard Aziz Mahmoud al-Shami and his bodyguard, Khalil Salah al-Bahtini. Al-Shami and a 12- year-old bystander later died from their injuries sustained in the attack. Al-Bahtini and 11 other bystanders were also injured. • February 28: A missile launched from an Israeli helicopter gunship destroys a car containing three Islamic Jihad members: military commander Mohammed ‘Abdul Fattah Jouda, Amin Hamdan Ibrahim al-Dahdouh, and Ayman Sha’ban al-Dahdouh. All three passengers are killed and 11 civilian bystanders are wounded in the attack. • March 3: Israeli helicopters fired two missiles at a car containing three Hamas militants, local military commander Tarad Jamal, Ibrahim Dayri and Ammar Hassan, as it was traveling on a coastal road southwest of Gaza city, killing all inside. • March 22: Three missiles fired from an Israeli helicopter kill Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, as he was leaving a mosque in Gaza City. Seven others—including several of Yassin’s bodyguards—were killed and seventeen people were wounded in the strike. • April 17: Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, his son and a bodyguard, Akran\m Nassar, were assassinated when an Israeli helicopter fired two missiles at the van in which they were traveling. • June 14: Khalil Marshud, the head of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Nablus, was killed in a targeted IAF helicopter gunship strike. • July 13: Members of an undercover Israeli Border Police unit shoot and kill wanted militant Nueman Takhina, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad’s military wing in Jenin, after he crashed his car into a fence while attempting to escape the Israeli troops’ pursuit. • July 22: The IAF targets senior Islamic Jihad member Hazam Rahim in a helicopter missile strike. Rahim and two other Islamic Jihad militants are killed in the attack. • July 25: Undercover units of the Israeli Special Border Police forces kill six Palestinian gunmen in a kill or capture raid on Tulkarm, including two wanted senior Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades commanders in the city, Hani Aweida and Mahidi Tambuz.

• July 29: Amr Abu Suta, commander of the breakaway Abu Reish Brigade faction of Fatah, and an associate, Zaki Abu-Rarka, are killed by missiles fired in a targeted Israeli air strike on their car in Rafah. • September 6: Fifteen Hamas members are killed when IAF aircraft bomb a training facility near Jebalya in Gaza, where members are gathered to prepare bombs and carry out shooting exercises. The field is used by Palestinian civilians as a soccer field during the day, but at night Hamas turns it into a paramilitary training camp.98 • September 13: Three Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades members are killed in an IAF missile strike targeting their car in Jenin. Mahmoud Abu Halifa, considered the second in command of the Al-Aksa Martyrs' Brigades in Jenin, was the main target. The other two militants killed were Yamen Ayub Faisal and Majd Ayub Faisal. • September 19: Khaled Abu Salamiya, a member of Hamas and a key figure in the manufacturing of Kassam rockets, is killed when the IAF fires a missile at his car in Gaza City. Salamiya had escaped injury in the September 6 attack on the soccer field that had been serving as a Hamas training camp. • September 20: Two senior Hamas militants, Rabah Zakut and Nabil al-Saidi, are killed in an IAF missile strike as they were riding in a jeep in Gaza City. The IDF claims the two were going to launch Kassam rockets at Israel. • September 26: A car bomb explodes in Damascus killing a top Hamas leader, Izz El-Deen Al-Sheikh Khalil, who was believed to be in charge of Hamas's military wing outside the West Bank and Gaza.99 • October 5: An IAF helicopter fires a missile at a car near Gaza City killing Bashir Al-Dabash, head of Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Brigade, and his bodyguard Ahmed Al-Ar’er.100 • October 21: Adnan al-Ghoul, Hamas’ no. 2 man, and his deputy Imad Abbas, are killed in their car as a result of an Israeli airstrike on Gaza City; four bystanders are wounded. Al-Ghoul was responsible for making Qassams and other rockets and for manufacturing the group’s most powerful explosives.101

As this chronology illustrates, the rate of Israeli targeted assassinations, and the rank and prominence of the targets they have struck, has grown as the conflict has progressed. The overall deterrent impact of this escalation in Israeli targeted assassinations, however, is uncertain. Palestinian militants view such tactical hits on their operatives and operations as provocations that require revenge. For instance, shortly after the Israeli assassination of Hamas founder and spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin on March 22, 2004, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, the newly appointed leader of Hamas in Gaza, promised vengeance: “Yassin is a man in a nation, and a nation in a man. And the retaliation of this nation will be of the size of this man.”102 And after Rantisi himself was assassinated in an Israeli missile strike less than a month later on April 17, 2004, Ismail Haniya, another senior Hamas political leader, proclaimed: “Israel will regret

this—revenge is coming. This blood will not be wasted…The battle will not weaken our determination or break our will.”103 Palestinian militant groups often attempt to strike in revenge and reprisal against Israeli targets to counter any suggestion that the Israeli attacks are impairing their organizations’ ability to function by chipping away at their leadership. Israel’s targeted assassination strategy however, has been having precisely that effect. For instance, as of mid-June 2004, Hamas and other militant groups have to date not been able to fulfill their promises to avenge the assassinations of Yassin and Rantisi. In a late April 2004 interview with Iran’s state controlled news agency, a leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade admitted that “the Islamic and Arab world . . . expected … Palestinian Fatah and Hamas …combatants to take revenge for the bloodshed of martyr Sheikh Ahmed Yassin immediately. But [they] are unaware of the limitations and [the] amount of pressure imposed against the Palestinian combatants.”104 The unnamed leader went on to cite Israel’s recent successes in killing or capturing key leaders and members—particularly bomb makers—of Palestinian militant groups and the difficulties in replacing them as a primary reason why they have been unable to retaliate. The fact that Hamas did not disclose the name of Rantisi’s successor in Gaza over concern for his physical protection also reflects the difficulties the group has experienced operating under the continuous threat of Israeli “targeted killings.” Thus, although Israel’s assassination policy has not reduced—and may actually reinforce—the motivation or determination of Palestinian militant organizations such as Hamas, it has weakened their ability to carry out terrorist operations. Furthermore, successful retaliatory attacks by Palestinian militants often have the effect of increasing the level of Israeli countermeasures since they further shift Israeli public opinion to the right of the political spectrum and strengthen support for targeted killings and other Israeli military action. The end result is that the cycle continues. Israeli Security and Human Rights Issues There is nothing new about Israeli counterterrorism operations. Israeli defense forces have long had to operate against extremist and terrorist forces, many of which learned to cloak their activities under “respectable” political cover. They have had to operate under conditions where those Palestinians who opposed the peace process have waged a political and media war while the most extreme and violent elements of the Palestinians have used terrorism and force. Israel has always had to respond decisively to such attacks, whether or not there was an active

peace process. Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described the Israeli security operations required to counter this as a “war without quarter” shortly before his assassination; and Israeli counterterrorist activity was swift and violent long before the Israeli-Palestinian war began in the Fall of 2000.

At the same time, Israel increasingly faces both a far more serious threat in terms of scale and weapons. As a result, its defense forces have stepped up their operations, sometimes in ways that involve excessive measures or add to the cycle of violence by rousing greater Palestinian opposition and willingness to use terrorism. Such measures may be effective in a given case, but they can also sometimes breed more violence than they eliminate. The State Department report on human rights practices for 2003 offers some insight into the difficulty of balancing security concerns with the preservation of human rights for Israel and its defense forces:105

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. The IDF included a significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve status and played a role in maintaining security. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviewed the activities of the IDF….

Security forces killed at least 573 Palestinians and 1 foreign national and injured 2,992 Palestinians and other persons during the year, some of whom were innocent bystanders. Israeli security forces targeted and killed at least 44 Palestinians, many of whom were terrorists or suspected terrorists. Israeli forces undertook many of these targeted killings in areas where civilian casualties were likely, killing 47 bystanders in the process, including children. The Israeli Government said that it made every effort to reduce civilian casualties during these operations.

Israeli security forces killed most Palestinians during armed clashes, targeted killings, incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, at checkpoints, or as a result of sometimes excessive or indiscriminate fire toward Palestinian civilian areas. During these incidents, Palestinian protesters frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and in some cases, also fired weapons at IDF soldiers.... Israeli security forces used a variety of means to disperse protesters, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, and live ammunition.

Israeli security units often used excessive force when confronting Palestinian demonstrations, while on patrol, pursuing suspects, and enforcing checkpoints and curfews, which resulted in numerous deaths. In response to Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets, Palestinian civilian areas suffered extensive damage as a result of IDF retaliation, which included shelling, bombing, and raiding.

Israeli soldiers placed Palestinian civilians in danger by ordering them to facilitate military operations, which exposed them to live fire between armed Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. Since the beginning of the Intifada, IDF soldiers have ordered Palestinian civilians to enter buildings to check whether they were booby-trapped; to expel their occupants; to remove suspicious objects from the road; and to walk in front of soldiers to protect them from gunfire.

For example, on May 14 Israeli Border Police officers forced a Palestinian driving a car in Jenin to park the vehicle in front of a private home and then proceeded to use the car, which held three passengers, as a shield during a gun battle with armed Palestinians. One Border Police officer forced Muhammad Aradeh,

19, out of the car and made him to kneel while firing over his head. On March 6, IDF soldiers conducting an incursion into Awarta village near Nablus ordered 'Ula 'Awad to lead them through an apartment building and a neighboring house and knock on doors as they conducted searches. The officers threatened to shoot 'Awad as he conducted the search.

In 2002, the Israeli High Court of Justice granted an injunction against the use of Palestinians as "shields" for Israeli forces. Israel admitted the use of such practices, in violation of existing procedures, and reiterated that IDF forces "are absolutely forbidden to use civilians of any kind as a means of 'living shield' against gunfire or attack by the Palestinian side, or as 'hostages.'" However, this ruling did not prevent IDF soldiers from carrying out the same practices under another name. IDF soldiers are openly permitted to employ the "neighbor procedure," which allows them to seek the assistance of Palestinian civilians in operations so long as that assistance is consensual.

However, in practice, most Palestinians who agreed to assist such operations often did so out of fear of the soldiers even if they were not directly coerced. Palestinians who took part in such operations without being harmed still faced the risk of being branded as collaborators and risked being attacked by other Palestinians.

The IDF destroyed numerous citrus orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems on Palestinian- owned agricultural land in both the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF destroyed these groves or orchards for security reasons, stating that Palestinians had been shooting from those areas. The IDF also cleared and took control of West Bank land, including land held by private Palestinians, in order to facilitate construction of the separation barrier.

Israeli security forces killed most Palestinians during armed clashes, targeted killings, incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, at checkpoints, or as a result of sometimes excessive or indiscriminate fire toward Palestinian civilian areas. During these incidents, Palestinian protesters frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and in some cases, also fired weapons at IDF soldiers…. Israeli security forces used a variety of means to disperse protesters, including tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, and live ammunition.

The IDF did not regularly investigate the actions of security force members who killed and injured Palestinians under suspicious circumstances. Since the start of the Intifada, the IDF has opened only 11 investigations into the improper use of deadly force despite the fact that human rights organizations have raised numerous allegations.

Israeli security forces used excessive force against protesters, in response to threats while on patrols, in pursuing fleeing suspects, and in responding to trespassers in restricted areas, at times resulting in death. Israel also used excessive lethal force against rock-throwers in some instances. For example, on September 15, IDF soldiers shot and killed 10-year-old Ahmad Abu Latifa near the Qalandia checkpoint north of Jerusalem. The boy was among a group of youths who were throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers.

IDF soldiers shot and killed suspects who were avoiding arrest, but in a number of cases who posed no apparent mortal threat to the soldiers at the time of the incidents. For example, on February 10, IDF soldiers in Nablus shot and killed PFLP member Imad Mabrouk when he attempted to escape arrest. On July 3, IDF soldiers in Qalqilya shot and killed al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades militant Ahmad Shawar when he attempted to run away after being ordered to halt.

IDF soldiers fired without warning on unarmed Palestinian trespassers in or near restricted areas, on several occasions killing Palestinians. For example, on March 5, an IDF soldier shot and killed 75-year-old Abdallah Shehadeh al-Ash'hab as he rode a donkey collecting firewood on his property, which was located near the Netzarim settlement in the Gaza Strip.

On November 29, IDF soldiers in Gaza shot and killed Palestinian police officer Sayed Abu Safra when he attempted to prevent a mentally disabled Palestinian from nearing the perimeter fence surrounding the Israeli settlement of Nissanit. The IDF expressed "sorrow and regret" over the incident.

In December, IDF soldiers conducted raids in the Old City of Nablus and detained residents of buildings in a single apartment while using the upper floors for military activities.

During the year, the IDF targeted for killing at least 44 Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorism. In the process, IDF forces killed more bystanders than targeted individuals, including children. IDF forces killed at least 47 bystanders of those targeted and injured a number of others, including bystanders, relatives, or associates. Israel stated that it only targeted individuals believed to be "ticking bombs" on the verge of carrying out terrorist attacks. In practice, however, the IDF targeted some leaders of terrorist organizations generally considered not to be directly engaged in carrying out attacks.

Israeli security personnel used excessive force while operating checkpoints, killing a number of Palestinians…. On July 25, an IDF soldier at a checkpoint outside Bartaqa ash-Sharqiya near Jenin fired on a car waiting for permission to pass. The shots killed 3-year-old Palestinian Mahmoud Jawadat Sharif Kabaha, who was sitting in the car. An investigation into the incident was ongoing at year's end.

Israeli forces put civilian lives in jeopardy by using imprecise, heavy weaponry in operations against terrorist infrastructure conducted in civilian areas. Frequently, and often following Palestinian shooting attacks, IDF retaliation excessively damaged Palestinian towns and cities in the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli forces fired tank shells, heavy machine-gun rounds, and rockets from aircraft at targets in residential and business neighborhoods where Palestinian gunfire was believed by the IDF to have originated.

On September 9, Israeli soldiers targeting gunmen hiding in a building in a residential area of Hebron opened fire on the building with tank shells. The shelling continued for more than 4 hours, and shrapnel killed 11-year-old Palestinian Muhammad Mansour Sayouri, who was hit in the head while standing in the kitchen of another residential building approximately 150 feet south of the structure being targeted.

Israeli security forces killed numerous civilians during military incursions into Palestinian-controlled cities and towns. Such incursions usually were conducted in response to Palestinian suicide bombings, shooting attacks that had killed Israeli civilians, settlers, or soldiers, or to make arrests. Israeli security forces also conducted military incursions on the basis of intelligence information about possible future attacks. Palestinians often responded with gunfire and by booby-trapping civilian homes and apartment buildings with deadly, indiscriminate devices. As part of such actions, the IDF usually raided and often leveled buildings, including homes.

On May 1, the IDF launched an incursion into Gaza City, home to approximately 365,000 Palestinians. The raid in a densely populated neighborhood led to a shootout with Palestinian militants. During the fighting, the IDF killed five innocent Palestinian bystanders, including a 1-year-old boy, a 13-year-old boy, a 14- year-old boy, a 57-year-old man, and a 38-year-old man who attempted to treat the wounded. IDF fire killed Amir Ahmad Muhammad 'Ayad, the 1-year-old baby boy who was inside his home during the incursion. The IDF also killed seven Palestinian gunmen during the clash. The IDF demolished two homes before withdrawing from the city.

Israeli forces used excessive force to enforce curfews in reoccupied Palestinian areas, resulting in deaths. For example, on April 17, IDF soldiers enforcing a curfew in Tulkarm opened fire on and killed a Palestinian civilian found out of his home.

Palestinian security officers and members of Arafat's Fatah faction attacked and killed Israeli citizens, Israeli settlers, foreign nationals, and soldiers. They often fired at Israelis from within or close to the homes of Palestinian civilians or in other locations with knowledge that civilians were present, drawing Israeli return fire and increasing the potential for the noncombatants to be injured. Arafat issued several

"ceasefire" orders and publicly denounced attacks on civilians without lasting effect, but took no action to arrest or try violators or against terrorist groups including those affiliated with the PLO. The PA did not prevent terrorist attacks, enforce a ban on militant groups, or prevent such groups from seeking shelter in civilian areas. Some PA officials made public statements justifying Palestinian attacks on Israelis. Additionally, some Fatah leaders made public statements urging Palestinians to continue all aspects of the Intifada, including violent attacks on Israelis.

Palestinian civilians harassed, attacked, and killed Israelis, especially settlers and soldiers. During the year, Palestinians, acting as individuals or in unorganized or small groups, including some members of PA security services, killed 25 Israeli civilians, 39 Israeli soldiers, and injured hundreds of others in acts of violence and terrorism in the occupied territories (see Section 1.c.). The Palestinian attacks consisted of suicide bombings, shootings, bombings involving improvised, indiscriminate explosive devices, and stone- throwing at Israeli drivers.

The IDF subjected Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to beatings, tire slashings, and gunfire directed against them or their vehicles because they were traveling on, or trying to circumvent, roads on which the IDF blocked passage to Palestinians as it attempted to enforce internal closures between Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank and Gaza

Israeli soldiers on patrol in June attacked 20 Palestinian youths who were trying to cross a dirt road near a military checkpoint north of Jerusalem. The soldiers beat the youths with their rifles and threw several of them in a sewage ditch before leaving the scene.

Israeli security forces often used excessive force against Palestinians and others. The IDF killed or injured Palestinians or others in non life-threatening situations. IDF fire killed or injured innocent bystanders, including journalists and Palestinian civilians, when they fired into crowds at demonstrations (see Sections 1.a. and 2.a.). Palestinian medical groups have estimated that approximately 10 percent of the injuries will result in permanent disabilities, and another 10 percent will require medical rehabilitation (see Section 5).

Israel obstructed the movement of and occasionally fired upon and assaulted medical personnel and ambulances. In the past, Israel alleged that terrorists have used ambulances to transport weapons or to commit terrorist acts. During the year, the PRCS reported that ambulances came under fire 57 times and emergency teams came under fire 79 times. The PRCS also reported that IDF soldiers and Israeli settlers injured 7 PRCS medical staff members and damaged 12 ambulances in these incidents. PRCS reported that its ambulances were delayed or denied access to areas on 584 separate occasions.

On March 11, a PRCS ambulance entered an ongoing firefight in Tel al-Sultan in Gaza to retrieve a Palestinian injured in tank shelling and gunfire. When the crew located an injured Palestinian and moved to take him into the ambulance an IDF tank opened fire in the ambulance's direction. The ambulance driver was hit in the left hand by shrapnel from a tank shell before managing to flee the scene.

Israel demolished entire apartment buildings that had been used as past shooting points by Palestinian gunmen, effectively punishing innocent civilians unconnected with the attacks. For example, on September 5, Israel demolished a seven-story residential building in Nablus after exchanging fire with and killing Muhammad al-Hanbali, 26, a Hamas militant who was hiding inside the building. IDF soldiers removed Hanbali's body from the building and then planted explosives on the first floor of the building and leveled the structure. The demolition left 15 Palestinian families homeless with all of their belongings destroyed.

IDF tactics such as establishing checkpoints and curfews, imposing lengthy closures on occupied areas, clamping down on riots, and retaliating to Palestinian attacks with heavy firepower even in densely civilian areas do have substantial security and military justifications. Their tactical utility must be weighed against the strategic costs they incur by hardening the

hostility of much of the Palestinian population and their support for terrorist groups, provoking international outcry and opposition from incendiary media images, and possibly weakening the Israeli public’s support for aggressive military action. Security Methods and Tactics The Israeli security services face many of the same problems as the Israeli defense forces and many of the same dilemmas as the Palestinian security forces. Although the Israeli security forces are under much tighter central government control, and are less prone to arbitrary human rights abuses than the Palestinian security forces, they often have had to choose between a strict interpretation of the law and its effectiveness. They have also faced the dilemma that the effectiveness of Israeli security must be weighed against the need to create Palestinian support for an eventual ceasefire and return to a peace process.

The results are inevitably unpleasant and controversial. The Israeli security forces have long employed extreme measures in counter-insurgency operations. At the same time, Palestinian factions have shown expertise at manipulating the rhetoric of human rights and democracy, as well as human rights groups and the media, and to exploit weaknesses in the law and legal procedures.

Many Israeli leaders argue that extreme measures are the only way to deal with terrorism and asymmetric warfare. For instance, former Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair has stated publicly that security organizations like the Shin Bet have long used violence during interrogations and have sometimes killed those being interrogated.106 However, the potential long-term inflammatory effect these measures may have on the conflict, outweighs the short- term perceived benefits that they may bring.

The 2003 US State Department report on human rights practices provides further insight into this aspect of Israeli security operations, and gives what seems to be an accurate picture of the trade-offs Israel has continued to make between security operations and human rights:107

Internal security is the responsibility of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), formerly the General Security Service (GSS) and also known as Shin Bet or Shabak, which is under the authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the authority of the Minister of Internal Security. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviewed the activities of … the ISA. Security forces were under effective government control…. Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consisted of the IDF, the Israel Security Agency (the ISA-formerly the General Security Service, or GSS), the Israeli National Police (INP), and the paramilitary border police. Israeli military courts tried Palestinians accused

of committing acts of violence and terror in Israeli-controlled areas…. Members of the Israeli security forces committed serious human rights abuses in the occupied territories and against Palestinian detainees…

The judiciary generally provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial process. However, in practice, Arab citizens often received harsher punishments than Jewish citizens did…. For example, human rights advocates claimed that Arab citizens were more likely to be convicted of murder (which carries a mandatory life sentence for adults) than Jewish citizens. The courts reportedly also were more likely to detain without bail Arab citizens until the conclusion of proceedings….

Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in the occupied territories usually were tried in Israeli military courts. Security offenses are defined broadly and may include charges as varied as rock throwing or membership in outlawed terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS or the PFLP. Military prosecutors brought charges. Serious charges were tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses were tried before one judge. The Israeli military courts rarely acquitted Palestinians of security offenses….

Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of security and ordinary criminal offenses were tried under Israeli law in the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges presided, and the standards of due process and admissibility of evidence were governed by the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers rarely were prosecuted in Israeli courts of crimes against Palestinians, and, in the rare instances in which they were convicted, regularly received lighter punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts

Israeli security personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person suspected of having committed a criminal or security offense. During the year, Israel conducted mass, arbitrary … arrests in the West Bank during military operations, summoning and detaining males between the ages of 15 and 45…. Most of those detained were released several days or weeks thereafter. Israeli Military Order 1507 permits the Israeli army to detain people for 10 days during which detainees were barred from seeing a lawyer or appearing before court. Israel conducted mass detentions under this order's authority. On May 12 and 13, Israeli forces arrested 83 Palestinians in Hebron.

Israel used administrative detention to hold hundreds of Palestinians without trial or charge. At year's end, Israel held 649 Palestinians in administrative detention. Individual administrative detention orders could be issued for up to 6-month periods and could be renewed indefinitely. A number of Palestinians under administrative detention during the previous several years have had their detention orders renewed repeatedly.

Israel provided poor conditions for Palestinians in Israeli prisons…. Facilities were overcrowded, sanitation was poor, and food and clothing at times were insufficient. Israeli security forces and police officers beat and tortured detainees. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and infringements on privacy rights remained problems…. Israel crowded Palestinian prisoners, exceeding capacity of the facilities. Israel was unprepared to accommodate properly the hundreds of Palestinians that were arrested in sweeps that accompanied Israeli operations during the year. In January, Palestinian prisoners in the Ofer prison camp near Ramallah, which held close to 1,000 Palestinian detainees, conducted a protest against poor treatment.

Israel employs physical pressure and degrading treatment as interrogation methods against arrested Palestinians in the occupied territories. The law, based on a 1999 High Court decision, prohibits the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. However, the High Court decision allowed for the security forces to request "special permission" to use "moderate physical pressure" against detainees considered to possess information about an imminent attack. In 2002, the Israeli GSS acknowledged use of physical pressure against 90 Palestinians who had been defined as "ticking bombs."

Israel … placed civilians in danger by occupying Palestinian homes, quartering soldiers there, and conducting military operations from them. Israeli forces sometimes arbitrarily destroyed, damaged, or looted Palestinian property during these operations.

The Israeli Government severely restricted freedom of movement for Palestinians. During the year, Israel prohibited most Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza from entering Israel, and the IDF continued to enforce a massive network of checkpoints and roadblocks across the occupied territories, which impeded the movement of people and goods between Palestinian cities, villages, and towns. Numerous cities were placed under strict curfews that ran for weeks and even months. Israel lifted some checkpoints and eased some movement following the release of the roadmap in May, but in most cases the restrictions were later reinstituted. During the year, the restrictions on movement were the most severe that Israel had imposed since it occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza in 1967.

Israeli security forces often impeded the provision of medical assistance to Palestinian civilians by strict enforcement of internal closures that prevented passage of ambulances, asserting in some cases that emergency vehicles have been used to facilitate terrorist transit and operations…. The Government's implementation of control measures resulted in delayed access to medical treatment for at least one Palestinian who subsequently died….

Since 1993, Israel has required that all West Bank and Gaza residents obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, Israel often denied applicants permits with no explanation and did not allow effective means of appeal. Palestinian officials and members of the clergy with VIP passes, including PA cabinet officials, members of the Palestinian Council were regularly subjected to long delays and searches at Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, despite the fact that they were traveling on special passes issued by the Israeli Government. These practices continued at an increased level from previous years, severely restricting PA officials from conducting administrative functions and implementing reform.

Israel's extensive curfews on Palestinian towns punished entire innocent populations. The curfews affected every aspect of life for Palestinians, damaging livelihood and causing food shortages. The Israeli Government's sustained imposition of internal and external closures and curfews in the West Bank and Gaza during the year severely impacted Palestinian society and economy, contributing to shortages of basic food, water, and the provision of medical care and supplies.

Israel demolished the homes of families and relatives of suspected terrorists as well as buildings suspected terrorists used as hideouts. Israel's demolitions left hundreds of Palestinians not involved in terror attacks homeless. Israel often demolished homes after suspects had already been killed or arrested. Israel maintained that such punishment of innocents would serve as a deterrent against future terrorist attacks.

The IDF destroyed numerous orchards, olive and date groves, and irrigation systems on Palestinian- controlled agricultural land. Israel constructed parts of a large security barrier on land inside the West Bank isolating residents and limiting access to hospitals, schools, social services, and agricultural property.

Israeli authorities abused Palestinians at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical harassment. Each day, tens of thousands of Palestinians traveling between Palestinian towns and villages faced as many as 730 different barriers to movement. At year's end, Israel had established 60 checkpoints, 9 occasionally manned checkpoints, 479 earthen mounds blocking roads, 102 cement roadblocks, 39 road gates, and 41 gates in a separation barrier. As many as several thousand Palestinians encountered some form of abuse from soldiers at checkpoints. Palestinians were subjected to excessive delays in passing through checkpoints. For example, … on April 30, an IDF soldier abused Qassem Awisat, 19, a resident of Qalqilya, when he attempted to pass through the Seida checkpoint in the Tulkarm district. The soldier pulled Awisat aside and etched a Star of David on his arm using shards of broken glass.

Israel conducted de facto detentions at checkpoints by confiscating Palestinian identification cards and car keys. Palestinians were unable to leave the scene until IDF soldiers returned the items. For example, on the

morning of June 3, IDF soldiers confiscated the car keys and identification cards of three Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem driving to Hebron. The soldiers did not return the keys until the afternoon and never returned the identification cards at all…. On November 23, IDF soldiers at the Hawwara checkpoint outside Nablus demanded that two Palestinians stop and clean the checkpoint. When the men refused, the soldiers handcuffed, blindfolded and detained them for several hours.

Israeli forces arbitrarily destroyed or looted Palestinian property and solicited bribes during military operations. A B'tselem investigation revealed that IDF soldiers stationed at the Qalandiya checkpoint outside Jerusalem in October and November solicited bribes from Palestinian truck drivers to facilitate the passage of their vehicles. Authorities stated that beatings and arbitrary destruction of property during searches were punishable violations of military regulations and that compensation was due to victims in such cases. However, the Israeli Government stated that it did not keep consolidated information regarding the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages resulting from IDF actions.

Israeli security forces put large numbers of Palestinian civilian lives in jeopardy by undertaking targeted killings in crowded areas where civilian casualties were likely. For example, on April 9, Israeli forces fired four missiles at a car in a densely populated area of Gaza city in order to kill two suspected terrorists, Sa'ad ad-Din al-Arabeit, 35, and Ashraf al-Halabi, 25. Israeli forces killed five other Palestinians in the effort, including two children, 13-year-old Ahmad Hamsa al-Ashraf, and 16-year-old Samid Hasan Qasem.

Beginning on June 11, Israeli forces conducted 5 targeted killings in Gaza City within 48 hours, killing 23 Palestinians, including 18 bystanders. Israel conducted the fifth such attack on June 12, firing five rockets at a car traveling in central Gaza City. The rockets killed wanted Hamas terrorist Yasser Muhammad Ali Taha, 31, and six bystanders, including an 18-month-old child and a pregnant woman.

War is inherently horrifying and inhumane, and the violence inherent in counterterrorism is often as ugly as terrorism itself. Many of Israel’s actions violate human rights by peacetime standards, and some are almost certainly counterproductive in terms of the Palestinian reaction and the resulting increase in Palestinian violence. The other side of this story, however, is that counter insurgency and counterterrorism must deal with very real threats by groups who deliberately exploit human rights and national legal systems as shields for conducting asymmetric and terrorist attacks, and with groups who falsely claim they are purely political organizations and exploit civil rights as a political weapon.

As the previous analysis has shown, Israel has had to deal with such threats even during the peace process and during periods when cooperation between Israelis and the Palestinian Authority was most effective. For example, on March 21, 1997, a suicide bomber killed three Israelis and wounded 48 in an attack on a Tel Aviv cafe. On July 30, two suicide bombers killed 16 persons and wounded 178 in an attack on a Jerusalem market. On September 4,three suicide bombers killed five persons and wounded 181 in an attack on a Jerusalem pedestrian shopping mall. During 1998, eight Israelis were killed and over 100 were wounded in terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals seeking to halt the Middle East peace process.

In September 1999, there were two bombings by Hamas on the same day that Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached a new agreement to move forward with the Wye Accords.

However, Israel made significant progress in improving the quality of its internal security methods before the Israeli-Palestinian War began. The Israeli Supreme Court voted 9-0 to place important new constraints on Israeli use of force against suspected terrorists in a decision on September 6, 1999.108 The Court concluded that the Shin Bet had misused a variety of torture- like techniques such as violent shaking, sleep deprivation, beatings, and violent disorientation techniques.

Since then, the IDF and Israeli security forces have faced the same dilemma inherent in virtually every intensive internal security effort that must take place in a climate of extremism, terrorism, and social violence. Israel must seek to preserve its immediate security but cannot hope for future stability in Gaza, the West Bank, or Jerusalem, if it ignores the need to preserve Palestinian dignity and create a security climate that promotes economic cooperation and an improvement in Palestinian living conditions.

Chapters VII and VIII provide a series of chronologies of attacks on Israelis by factions aligned with the PA and those factions not aligned with the PA. They describe a pattern of violent, interactive escalation that Israel cannot justifiably ignore, and where there are no real- world humanitarian methods of dealing with the violence on either side. For its part, Israel must carry out hard-line counter-terrorism operations if it is to protect its people. There are no examples of effective alternatives in anything like the conditions that have existed in the Israeli- Palestinian war. It is equally true, however, that such Israeli actions breed hatred and counter- violence. History has shown that the IDF and Israeli security forces can only have mid- and long- term effectiveness if they constantly consider the broader political implications of each of their actions and remember that excesses undermine outside support for Israel, breed Palestinian hostility and violence, undercut Palestinian and Arab support for the peace process, and destroy the viability of Palestinian security operations.109 Israeli and Palestinian security forces must both try to walk a very narrow line in a climate of crisis and uncertainty and under conditions where neither can hope to be fully successful either in their narrow security operations or in creating the conditions for a ceasefire and peace process.

Israeli Dissent in the Current War versus the First Intifada On the other hand, as the duration and intensity of the present conflict has increased, so have the number of IDF personnel opposed to IDF actions. In January 2002 two IDF reserve officers drafted the “Combatants Letter,” pledging ongoing commitment to the security of Israel,

but declaring that they “will not continue to fight [serve] beyond the 1967 borders” because they believe operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are for “the sole purpose of perpetuating our [Israeli] control over the Palestinian people” and have “nothing to do with the security” of Israel.110 By the end of May 2004, 615 IDF personnel of various ranks, units and personal backgrounds had signed the letter. According to Courage to Refuse, a movement that has grown out of the Combatants Letter, over 280 signatories have been court-martialed and jailed due to their repudiations.111

There are two main reasons that account for such dissension. First, some IDF personnel believe tactics employed by the IDF in and at the borders of the West Bank and Gaza are both inhumane and strategically ineffective. In particular, they argue that widespread house-to-house searches for suspected militants, targeted assassinations, and the harassment of civilians at checkpoints, not only can help further corrupt those charged with carrying out such measures, but potentially foster anti-Israel sentiments and/or radicalize the general Palestinian population and, in turn, do not help to enhance Israel’s security. Second, some perceive guarding settlers in Gaza and “illegal” settlements in the West Bank to be immoral. Although such member of the IDF generally are obliged to participate in what they perceive to be conventional military missions such as uncovering smuggler’s tunnels or raiding terrorist weapon workshops, they are against serving as bodyguards to settlers in “occupied” territory that they believe Israel should return to the Palestinian people. Despite such grievances over service in the West Bank and Gaza those opposed, on the whole, assert their loyalty to the state of Israel and willingness to defend and protect its sovereignty with their lives.

On the eve of Rosh Hashanah, in September 2003, 27 Israeli Air Force reservist pilots and instructors declared in a letter that they would no longer support or carry out attacks and/or assassination attempts in Palestinian civilian population centers. The week of October 27th, 2003, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon told a journalist from Yediot Ahronot newspaper that “the road closures, curfews and roadblocks imposed on the Palestinian civilians

were creating explosive levels of ‘hatred and terrorism’ among the populace”; hence, “in our tactical decisions, we [the IDF] are operating contrary to our strategic interests.”112

On December 21, 2003, thirteen reservist members of Sayeret Matkal—the IDF’s elite commando unit that is the equivalent of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force—submitted an open letter to Prime Minister Sharon, refusing to take part in any further IDF activities within the West Bank and Gaza because they believe such operations deprive “basic human rights from millions of Palestinians,” require them to serve as shields “in the crusade of the settlements,” and are “missions of oppression.”113

The Sayeret Matkal letter states that internal IDF dissention is born largely “out of concern for the future of Israel as a democratic, Zionist and Jewish state, and out of fear for its moral character.”114 This perspective is exemplified by the case of Eitan Ronel, who resigned his rank as a Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF reserve in January 2004 to protest IDF conduct in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In his resignation letter to IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.Yaalon, Ronel wrote: “I saw this deterioration, stage after stage: the blind eye that was turned to the abuse of detainees in violation of the army’s orders; the blind eye that was turned to soldiers’ gunfire on unarmed Palestinian civilians; the blind eye that was turned to the settlers’ unlawful behavior towards Palestinian civilians; the oppression of the population; the roadblocks; the curfew; the closure; the blind eye the army turned towards the humiliation and abuse….”115 And as one of the Sayeret Matkal letter signatories, identified only as Zohar, explained in a media interview the week of February 2, 2004, many IDF “refuseniks” presume “the war has led Israelis increasingly to accept the idea of killing the innocent. ‘I could not believe three years ago that we could live in the situation that we live in today. I have seen acceleration downwards in the standards of Israeli society. Things I thought no Israeli soldier could ever do, I have found myself and others doing.’”116

Nevertheless, despite the media attention IDF dissidents receive, they are only several hundred of the approximately 167,000 active and 358,000 reserve IDF personnel (estimates are from 2003), and have been condemned by all major Israeli political parties and editorials in every major Israeli newspaper. Furthermore, according to a public opinion survey published by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in October 2003, the majority of Israeli society does not support refusing IDF service in the West Bank and Gaza. The study reports that 75% of those

polled believed that IDF personnel could not legitimately refuse to serve in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.117 Another study published the week of December 29, 2003 by the Israel Democracy Institute and the Guttman Center produced similar results. It determined that 28% support refusing to serve in the territories, while 78% of respondents do not support the actions of IDF refuseniks.118 The progression of the wider debate over the morality, effectiveness and necessity of various IDF actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that the IDF dissenters raise, however, will largely depend on how the roles of the actors in the conflict continue to evolve. Other Israeli Actors in the Conflict: Hard-Line Movements and Extremists Both Israelis, and Israel’s supporters, need to remember that Israeli extremism and terrorism is a problem as well as Palestinian terrorism. Israeli extremist violence against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs broke out in the fighting in the fall of 2000 and has continued to play a role in the Israeli-Palestinian War. While few Israelis would accept the fact that occupation and discrimination are a form of terrorism, the fact is that they are when pushed to extremes.

The problems caused by continued settlement activity have been discussed in detail in Chapter XIV. Discrimination and hate rhetoric, however, are also serious problems. Israeli extremists use rhetoric that is as violent and extreme as that of the Palestinian extremists. They have charged leaders such as Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres with “treason,” and one of their members murdered Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. Similar charges were made about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the Wye Accords and about Israeli moderates during the 1999 election campaign. Israeli extremists have threatened to kill Palestinians who interfere with their actions and drive them out of their homes or the entire West Bank. A few have beaten or murdered innocent Palestinians.

The most prominent radical Jewish groups that are opposed to any Israeli-Palestinian peace process are Kach and Kahane Chai. Rabbi Meir Kahane founded Kach, and Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives) was founded by Kahane’s son, Binyamin, after his father was assassinated in the United States in 1990. According to Kenneth Katzman, a Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “the two movements seek to expel all Arabs from Israel and expand Israel's boundaries to include the occupied territories and parts of Jordan.”119

Baruch Goldstein, a Kach member, killed twenty-nine Palestinian worshipers and wounded more than 200 in a Hebron mosque on February 25, 1994. Israel declared Kach and Kahane Chai to be terrorist organizations, and arrested eleven Jewish extremists for planning attacks on Palestinians in September 1994. 120 This, however, did little to halt the activities of Israeli extremists whose rhetoric grew progressively more violent as the peace accords were implemented. Their verbal and physical attacks came to include Israel’s leaders, and created a major problem for the peace process.

The extremist threat to Israel’s own leaders took its most vicious form when Yigal Amir, an Israeli with ties to the extreme right-wing group Eyal, assassinated Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, on November 4, 1995. Although he only killed one man, his target was so critical to the peace process that he may have done as much to delay it and create the conditions that led to the Israeli-Palestinian War as all of the Palestinian suicide bombings.

Annual surveys conducted by Dr. Ami Pedahzur of Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center to measure the Israeli public’s level of extremism indicated in 2001 that as many as 25% of Israelis thought the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Kach movement, would be a good leader for Israel if he were still living. Twenty percent of Israelis said that they would vote for Kahane if he were alive and allowed to run for election.121 As the war escalates, extremist ideas like those of Kahane are no longer consigned to the lunatic fringe. There is a small, but growing minority that feels that all Palestinians should be expelled from Israel, that far more violent action should be taken to deter Palestinian violence, and that private acts of violence against the Palestinians are justified.

Some Israeli settlers began demonstrating such extremist behavior and rhetoric at the very beginning of the war. For example on October 7, 2000, Israeli settlers ransacked 8 villages in the Qalquilya area of the West Bank, killing two Palestinians and kidnapping two others. Protests and assaults against Palestinians were sparked after Benjamin Ze’ev Kahane, son of Meir Kahane and leader of Kahane Chai, and his wife Talia were killed in a Palestinian roadside ambush on December 31, 2000. Not only did Kahane’s supporters call for more Arab blood to be spilled, they also denounced Prime Minister Barak as a traitor. For instance, Noam Federman, a close friend of Binyamin and long-time follower of his father’s teachings, declared “there is no turning the other cheek in Judaism. Judaism means revenge…There is no difference

between one Arab or another. Every Arab wants to murder us.” And Baruch Kahane, Binyamin 's brother, called for Israelis to “take your fate in your own hands….This government that negotiates with murderers must be brought down over the dead bodies of my family.”122

The war also leads to racism. On the far right, Israel’s tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi, once referred to the estimated 180,000 Palestinians working and living illegally in Israel as “lice,” and stated that, “They arrived here and are trying to become citizens because they want social security and welfare payments. We should get rid of the ones who are not Israeli citizens the same way you get rid of lice. We have to stop this cancer from spreading within us."123 While Levi was on the margin of Sharon’s center-right coalition, he is scarcely alone.

This drift towards extremism has been increasingly interactive as the war has escalated. Every new Palestinian act of violence tends to push some Israelis closer toward vigilante action or toward possible overreaction. There have been many serious incidents of Israeli violence against Palestinians, and attacks on Israeli Arabs began during the fighting in September-October 2000 that produced significant casualties. Since that time, Israelis have persistently assaulted and sometimes killed Palestinian civilians who played no role in the Israeli-Palestinian War, or have used potential lethal force with little or insufficient justification. The State Department’s Human Rights Report provides a summary of Israeli civilian violence in 2003.124 Israeli civilians, most often settlers, harassed, attacked, and occasionally killed Palestinians in the occupied territories. During the year, settlers attacked and killed at least one Palestinian. Settlers also caused significant economic damage to Palestinians by attacking and damaging greenhouses and agricultural equipment, uprooting olive trees, and damaging other valuable crops. The settlers did not act under government directive in the attacks, and Israeli soldiers sometimes restrained them, but in several cases Israeli soldiers accompanied them or stood by without acting. While there are no reliable statistics, most such acts of violence have taken place largely near settlements, roads, or other areas where Israelis and Palestinians already clash.

So far, existing Jewish extremist groups have not mounted major terrorist attacks and the Israeli-Palestinian War does not seem to have created new Israeli paramilitary groups or underground organizations—largely because the Sharon government has taken a hard-line position towards the conflict and has used the IDF and security services aggressively. What attacks extremists have carried out, like the July 19, 2001 killing of two Palestinian men and a three-month old baby in Hebron claimed by a group calling themselves the “Committee for Road Safety,” have been isolated incidents with no overall pattern.125 At the same time, radical groups like Kach and Kahane Chai pose a lingering threat because any serious violence they commit, especially in connection with the Temple Mount and their desire to control it in its entirety would be extremely inflammatory.

Moreover, Israeli extremists can be a threat to their own government when it pursues the peace process. The arrest on August 10, 2003 of a Jewish settler threatening to kill Prime Minister Ariel Sharon outside his home provides a glimpse of the impending danger Israel faces from these fringe elements whenever progress towards peace involves making concessions to the Palestinians.126 It is also likely that Israeli extremists will become far more active the moment they believe the government is not taking decisive steps against the Palestinians, or when the government is perceived as being too “liberal” and that they will resist any ceasefire or peace moves far more actively than they did before the Israeli-Palestinian War began.

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