MASTER’S THESIS M-735

FÏILWYLER, Niles J. NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS ^ FOR NATO: THE MULTILATERAL PROBLEM OF COMMAND, CONTROL, AND SHARING.

The American University, M. A., 1965 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc.. Ann Arbor. Michigan NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS FOR NATO;

THE MULTILATERAL PROBLEM OP COMMAND. CONTROL. AND SHARING

by

Niles J, Fulwyler

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

MASTER OF ARTS

Signatures / p Committee:

Chairman :

Date : ./ f

Date : AMFRICAN _ .. - :RSITY. LIBRARY !.'EC)g:iy64 WASHINGTON. 0. C. TABLE OP CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

■I. INTRODUCTION . . ■...... 1

■ G e n e r a l ...... 1

Objective ...... 2

Review of American Policy...... 5

II. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM ...... 11

III. TOWARDS NUCLEAR SHARING ...... 19

Introduction ...... ' ...... 19

NATO’s Commitment to a Nuclear Strategy . . 20

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles

to Europe ...... 25

The Norstad Proposals ...... 30

Secretary of State Herter Proposal...... 33

The Kennedy Administration Proposals.... 36

S u m m a r y ...... 39

IV. BASIC SOURCES 0 ’=' THE PROBLEM ...... 40

Introduction ...... 4o

A Resurgent Europe ...... 42

Nuclear Proliferation ...... 45

The Medlum-Range Ballistic Missile Issue . . .4 8

United States Vulnerability...... 51

S u m m a r y ...... 56 ill

CHAPTER PAGE'

V. THE QUESTION OF CONTROL ...... 58

General ...... 58

Components of Nuclear Control ...... 6l

Approaches to Sharing Nuclear Control

in N A T O ...... 63

United States Sharing of Planning ...... 65

The Case for National Nuclear forces . . . 68

Summary ...... 76

VI. THE UNITED STATES CASE FOR THE MULTILATERAL

FORCE ...... 78

General ...... 78

The Nassau Agreement...... 79

Negotiation and Réponse ...... 83

Problem Areas ...... 92

Operational Feasibility...... 93

Military Utility ...... 98

Political Value ...... 100

Political Control...... 104

The Prospects ...... 107 VII. CONCLUSIONS ...... 110

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 121 Is is hardly too much to say that the future not only of NATO but of the Atlantic Community as a whole depends today on the ability of

Western statesmanship to find a politically acceptable and militarily sensible solution to the problem of how to give all the NATO allies a

share in a common responsibility for defense of the West in the nuclear age.

— Sir John Slessor CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General

The development of nuclear weapons policy in the

NATO Alliance reflects continuing tension between the pre­ ference of the United States to retain exclusive control of these weapons and the desire of European governments to participate in this control or to deploy their own nuclear forces. This process of interaction has carried NATO policy away from the American unilateral control system, through a stage of nuclear sharing, and now into the creation of a

"NATO nuclear force". Thus, attention is now being directed towards the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. This continuing controversy over nuclear control is a reflection of the vast changes in the international environment since

1949, most notably the resurgence of the nations of Western

Europe,

The issue at hand is far more than just military strategy. Though the problem is usually discussed in military terms, it is in reality a political problem. The control of nuclear weapons in NATO constitutes a serious problem for political reasons most directly, and for mili­ tary reasons only indirectly. The stakes involved are worthy of the complexity of the problem. They are: the 2 organization of Europe; the domestic stability of major allied governments; and the future of the Atlantic

Alliance.1 For this reason the problem assumes a role of great importance.

NATO is the cornerstone of the world-wide security system which the United States has labored to build since the coming of the Cold War. Since Russia launched her first Sputnik in 1957, this basic Western Alliance has shown symptoms of serious disarray. Frequently, leading members found themselves at odds about the aims and role of the alliance itself and about their part within it.

This debate has tended to converge upon the questions of the control of nuclear weapons. Related to this as well, was the question of allocation of member forces to nuclear and conventional military capabilities.

Objective

This thesis will be concerned primarily with the problem of control and sharing of nuclear armaments within

NATO. As indicated, basically it is a political problem, and one which is still in a state of volatile development.

Because it is a political consideration, the emphasis in this paper will be on the political policies and attitudes of the nation states involved. At the same time, some

^Henry Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," The Reporter. XXVIII (March 28, 1963), p. 22. 3 consideration will be given to the military strategy involved, since the two are so closely entwined.

The most recent development in the nuclear-sharing problem has been the ressurrection of the multilateral force proposal (MLP) by the United States. It is basically the consideration of this development which has inspired this research. Some have considered the MLP plan as a

"novel", bold plan which could at long last solve the entire problem. Others see it only as an unworkable attempt to soothe European doubts and as a means to continue American hegemony. However, it seems to me that the final judgment of this proposal must be based upon the consideration of a vital question: Is progress being made to meet the nuclear control problem in a way which will ensure the continuity of the Alliance?

Herein lies the major task of this research— to examine the aspects of the nuclear-control problem which have produced the American proposal for a multilateral force. In so doing, it should be possible to determine whether significant progress has been made toward further­ ing the concepts of European unity and Atlantic partnership and whether the American proposal will contribute to these concepts. The study envisaged to accomplish this task will encompass: a definition of the basic problem; a summary of the major events along the path to increased nuclear-sharing; a discussion of the basic sources of the 4 problem as we know it today; a discussion of the various problems of control; a discussion of the European position on national nuclear forces; and finally, an examination of the multilateral force proposal. From this, it should be possible to draw conclusions bearing on the basic problem.

Because this is such a contemporary problem, its subject matter is still in a state of volatile flux. Due to this factor, little comprehensive writing on the subject has been done. Moreover, many of the official documents con­ cerning the problem are still classified. Hence, research has been somewhat difficult. It has been necessary in this

Instance to rely mainly upon periodical writings, unclassi­ fied government documents, and interviews with government officials for research materials. However, even with cer­ tain research limitations, it has still been possible for me to get a grasp of the over-all problem and from this make knowledgeable observations concerning the basic problem.

This was the objective of this research— and the measure of its true success will be dependent upon the degree readers are able to do likewise.

I am particularly indebted to the following individuals :

Professor Durward V. Sandifer, Chairman of my Thesis Committee;

Dr, Robert S. Jordan, member of Thesis Committee; Dr. F.

Gunther Eyck; Ambassador Loy W. Henderson; and the Honorable

Philander Claxton, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State.

Each of these individuals gave of their time to assist me in 5 my research. More important, their counsel and suggestions were of immeasurable help.

Review of American Policy

Before getting into a discussion of the problem as it is today, it is almost mandatory to have some background of the history of the nuclear control problem. This is best shown by studying briefly the history of American nuclear control policy towards the NATO area.

The development of nuclear policy within NATO since

1949 has evolved out of the interaction of the general

"status quo" preferences of the. United States and the re­ visionist pressures of a renascent Europe. It is generally within this context that American policy has been formulated.

There appears to be three definable phases of American policy concerning the issue of nuclear weapons control. They are;

(1) American unilateral control; (2 ) Sharing and bilateral control; and (3) A NATO force by assignment of national forces.2

The first phase of this policy^reaches from 19^9 into a period extending through the Korean War. During this time NATO operated in the framework of an American nuclear dominance that could hardly be challenged. The

2 Raymond Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear Force," The Annals. Vol. 351 (January, 1964), p. 37. 6

American monopoly of the weapon capability was ended by the Russians exploding their first atomic device in 1949.

Britain followed with her own capability in 1952, However, it was to be some time before Britain had significant capa­ bility. Thus, within NATO, there was little doubt as to

America's complete domination in nuclear affairs during these early years.

In any event, the Europe of that era was in no posi­ tion to demand a share in United States nuclear strength as a price for cooperation in the alliance. Europe in 1949 found herself greatly enfeebled by the holocaust of World

War II. She was practically stripped of military strength and the economic situation was grave. Europe was too depen­ dent upon the United States for military and economic assistance to contest seriously the American monopoly of nuclear control.

The second phase in America's nuclear policy covered approximately the Eisenhower years in office, from 1953 until i9 6 0 . By the time President Eisenhower came to office in 1953, the United States looked out upon a vastly changed situation in nuclear weapons and international security,

Russia and Britain both had significant nuclear capability.

Without doubt, Russia had a formidable nuclear striking force. Usable tactical nuclear weapons were coming into the American stock piles. The successful testing of hydrogen weapons by both the U.S. and Russia gave a new 7 dimension to terror in the nuclear era.

In an effort to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also in part an indication of renewed hope for arms-control agreement, Washington advanced the "Atoms for

Peace Program," This program was designed to make peaceful nuclear technology available to other nations under inter­ national safeguards against any military application.

At the same time, a "new look" in the defense of the west was advocated. This new look meant direct depen­

dence on nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, for

deterrence of aggression and for defense against actual

attack. However, with regard to the NATO nations, this presented the United States with two distinct problems:

first, the nuclear weapons would have to come from the

United States; and second, the forces using them would have

to know something about them. Giving out this type informa­

tion was not an idea Congress liked, yet some action was

required.

As a result of this, the Atomic Energy Act was amended

on two occasions. The first amendment in 1954 permitted the

transfer to friendly powers data on the tactical use of

atomic weapons, information on training men for atomic war­

fare, and evaluation of the atomic capabilities of potential

enemies. However, careful safeguards were included to pre­

vent release of information concerning the design or fabrication of nuclear components of weapons.3

The second amendment of the Atomic Energy Act occurred in 1958, after Russia had orbited her Sputnik.

As President Eisenhower observed in his message to Congress that year, "it was wasteful in the extreme for friendly allies to consume talent and money in solving problems that their friends have already solved— all because of artificial barriers to s h a r i n g . "4 The new legislation permitted broadened sharing of information and also some sharing of materials, but all subject to stipulation of such a nature that Britain was the only nation that could derive important benefits.5

The last, and current, phase in American policy towards nuclear sharing was initiated in I960. This phase came into being when numerous public and private groups in both Europe and America began urging the endowment of NATO itself with a nuclear deterrent capability as the only real solution to the sharing problem. This concept was formally endorsed by the United States when Secretary of State Herter

3»Nuclear Information for Allies," The New York Times, December 19, 1954,

^President Eisenhower, "Address to Congress," Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, Nr. 970 (January 27, 1958).

5u.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. as Amended. Rouse ReporF”1849, 85th Congress^ 2d ^ e s s i o n ,"%9 9 made his proposal before the Atlantic Council for the creation of a NATO-controlled nuclear force.

This proposal called for commitment to the Alliance by the United States of five ballistic missile submarines armed with eighty Polaris missiles. This proposal was to be conditional upon agreement by the European allies on political control of the weapons

The Kennedy Administration, although initially being rather cool to the idea, found it prudent to give endorse­ ment to the idea of a NATO nuclear force. Consequently, the concept advanced by Secretary Herter was again advanced and elaborated upon. President Kennedy reaffirmed this commitment while speaking to the Canadian Parliament in

Ottawa in 1961.^ Steps to actually create such a force were included in the Nassau Agreements in 1962 by President

Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan. Since that time, nego­ tiations and plans have been going forward to provide NATO with its own nuclear force by the contribution of national nuclear forces. The major obstacle to these negotiations to date is agreement on some system of political control.

Negotiations to this end are still taking place.

^Drew Middleton, "U.S. Offers NATO A Nuclear Arsenal," The New York Times, December 17, i9 6 0 , p. 1, 7 President Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the U.S.," Department of State Bulletin, XLlV, Nr. 1145 (June 5, 1961). 10

Thus, since the time of 1949, there has been great modification in American policy towards nuclear sharing.

It has been a period characterized by a great transforma­ tion in American attitudes towards the entire spectrum of nuclear affairs. CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

This year NATO again finds itself confronted with new challenges, new problems, and new opportunities In an ever-changing international environment. The profound changes which have occurred within the world during the past decade have left their indelible effects on the Atlantic

Alliance. These world environmental changes have resulted in a searching reappraisal of the concept of the Atlantic

Alliance. Nearly everyone is convinced, however, that the idea of an Atlantic partnership is an essential of our time.

Still, many differences exist as to the exact form this partnership should take. Both America and Europe have dis­ covered that there is no easy path to unity in this ever- changing world. Though Europe achieved economic independence some time ago, she is still searching for mastery in her . political and strategic destiny. In the nuclear-missile age of the 1960's, she is finding this a much more difficult task. Yet, to achieve this mastery seems to be her dedi­ cated purpose. Many of the problems confronting the

Atlantic Alliance today stem from this self-appointed task.

On the European side of the Atlantic, the three former great power centers of the nation-state system—

Britain, France, and Germany— are once again principal 12 participants In the world arena. Today, these powers are more stable politically and economically than they have been for years. The British are reappraising their historic attitudes towards the Continent. The French, under de Gaulle, are experiencing a sense of a new revival in the world. The Germans, who profess no political ambitions beyond the Continent, are faced with the dilemma of choosing between their own national reunification and the desire to be firmly aligned with the West. They fully realize that the greater their integration with the Atlantic Community, the less chance they have of reunification in the foreseeable future. The last half-decade has seen all three of these old powers casting about for a creative role in the formu­ lation of Western strategy.

Since the days of the Marshall Plan, the United y States has consistently supported the trend toward West

European integration. It has been the unflinching orienta­ tion of United States foreign policy to encourage a movement towards both an integrated Europe and an Atlantic partner­ ship of equals. As Secretary of State Rusk put it succinctly in December I96I;

In 1947 the American government decided that it would link the recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification. We chose quite consciously not to play a balance of power game with the nations of Europe, but to build a strong partner­ ship in the affairs of the West. At that moment we joined forces with those Europeans who drew from the lessons of the Second World War and indeed from the long history of Europe the con­ clusion that the great European center of Western 13

culture and strength could play Its part on the world scene only if It transcended the national divisions and moved towards unity,1

Until quite recently, American policy makers have seldom worried about the issues that European unity would raise for NATO, Four years ago, the Foreign Policy Research

Institute In its report to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations

Committee took the position that the trend toward West

European Integration would be Inconsistent neither with

United States interests nor NATO objectives provided that :

(a) excluslvlst groupings be avoided; (b) the pursuit of discriminatory economic policies by the European Economic

Community be shunned; and (c) Atlantic-wide Community ties be strengthened commensurately as the movement toward 2 European unity progressed.

Under such conditions, the trend towards unity among

West European states was deemed worthy of continued U.S. support. It was felt that any temptation on West European part to form a "third force" would be held in check by the awareness that her defense would increasingly depend upon the strategic capabilities of the United States. It was generally felt that even if a NATO strategic nuclear

iRusk, "Some Issues of Contemporary History," Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XLVI, Nr. 1177 (January 15, 19b2).

^"United States Foreign Policy: Western Europe," A study prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, October 15, 1959, p. 5. 14 deterrent should be created, It would still be contributed almost exclusively by the U.S.^ Thus, it seemed that the

Europeans were destined to remain dependent upon the United

States for a nuclear deterrent for an indefinitely long period of time. In such a position, the Europeans could hardly create any serious nuclear problems for the United

States.

However, fresh political breezes have blown across

Europe during recent years and Europeans have been stirred to reassess their role in world affairs. This reassessment has produced a crisis of confidence between the United States and several of its European partners in NATO. This crisis is simmering in the background today. In short, the Atlantic

Alliance is going through another of those critical re­ examinations which over the past few years have been recurring at ever shorter intervals. At issue is the near-monopoly which, the United States still holds on nuclear strategy in the NATO area. Actually, these are basic decisions con­ cerning nuclear war or peace. V/ith Western Europe economical­ ly strong and politically more confident, it is only reason­ able that pressure has built up for greater equality— and voice— in nuclear affairs, something approaching the balance being reached in the economic field under the Common Market.

The crux of the problem is this: The insistence on

^Robert Strausz-Hupe, et. al. Building the Atlantic World (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), P. 192. 15 a single nuclear force under U.S. control for the entire alliance has come to appear as a United States effort to dictate not only allied strategy once war has started, but also the decision of when and where to fight a nuclear war.

The tendency to treat members of the Alliance as subsi­ diaries of a large corporation has turned allied cooperation into near-disunity. This disunity could destroy from within what the enemy is determined to destroy from without. This is why the question of nuclear armaments is probably the most serious and far-reaching crisis in NATO’s history.

With NATO strategy depending so heavily upon nuclear weapons, their control has been central to the Alliance from the start, and especially after 1954 when NATO re­ ceived tactical nuclear weapons. The question of control has become a matter for serious debate, however, only in the last few years. The issue has come to the fore as growing Soviet strength made the U.S. itself vulnerable, as Britain and France developed their own nuclear force, and as Europe revived its self confidence and strength.

The factor which greatly complicates this issue is that though the problem is usually couched in military terms, it is in reality a political problem. As Robert Osgood writes :

No contemporary military problem illustrates more poignantly the political ramifications of military policies than the problem of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. . . . The control of nuclear weapons in NATO 16

constitutes a serious problem for political reasons, most directly, and for military reasons only indirectly.4

Robert Bowie points out the same characteristic:

While couched in military terms, the issues are at bottom political and deeply enmeshed with the broader problems of adapting to new conditions the relations between the United States and Europe and within Europe,5

Recently, Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs, also pointed out the political implications and noted the urgency with which the problem should be met.

One hears occasionally the view that we have become too preoccupied with the nuclear issue, that we could better employ our time in con­ sideration of other urgent Alliance problems. No matter how desirable this release from our current agonies would be, it would appear that the Alliance must soon be set on a course of action which promises over a period of time to deal effectively with the nuclear quec'cion— and to do so in such a fashion as to strengthen the political will and cohesion of NATO without in any way degrading the deterrent value or military content of our nuclear power. It is thus the political, rather than military, situation which lends urgency to the problem.°

The lessons of the past seem clear: we must meet

il Robert E. Osgood, Nuclear Control In NATO, Washington Center of Foreign Policy ResearcFT, 1962, p. 1.

^Robert Bowie, "Strategy and Atlantic Alliance," International Affairs. XVII (Summer 1963), p. 720.

.. . Robert Shaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Independence," Address to the Ditchley Foundation, Extracts printed in Document 290, Assembly of Western European Union, October 30, 1963. 17 the nuclear problem, as we have met the European economic . problem, in a way which will further the concepts of

European unity and Atlantic partnership. On the resolution of the nuclear issue, as much as on any other factor, will depend whether these concepts can be translated into reality and will endure.

From the beginning there has been general agreement among the members of NATO that the Organization must have m o d e m weapons in order to effectively confront further

Communist expansion. This is reflected in the Communique of the North Atlantic Council in 1950;

The nations of the Atlantic Council are accordingly resolved, by their united efforts, to build up a system of defense equipped with the most modern weapons and capable of withstanding any external threat directed against any of them.7

It was obvious that "modern weapons" must of neces­ sity, include nuclear weapons. While America retained near-monopoly of the nuclear capability within the world, there was little discussion of control or sharing. However, today Russia is a great nuclear power, technology has pro­ duced even greater weapons of destruction with delivery systems to reach any area of the globe, England and Prance have a nuclear capability, and various weapon systems with nuclear warheads are on site in European locales. No longer

7 North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, London, 18 May 1950, paragraph 6, .18

is the problem a question of having modern weapons for

NATO. In this age where several nations possess the means

to utterly destroy civilization within a few hours, the

real problem is now one of control. Consequently, the

complex problems of command, control, and sharing of nuclear weapons have become the most important concern of the

peoples of the NATO Alliance. CHAPTER III

TOWARDS NUCLEAR SHARING

Introduction

Before getting into a discussion of the actual problem of sharing and control, it is necessary to examine some of the major events which have occurred during the past few years which have had a direct effect upon the problem as we know it today. Obviously, a problem of this magnitude did not originate overnight. Like all problems, if neglected, they tend to grow until they reach a crisis point. This chapter will attempt to trace the significant developments in the growth of the nuclear sharing and control problem within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization— from its beginning with the commitment of NATO to a nuclear strategy through the Kennedy Administration proposals. It is a brief history of European concern and United States response to the ever-growing problem of equality in nuclear affairs.

The problems of nuclear control, and in particular

"nuclear sharing," have been growing steadily more urgent since October 1957 when the Soviet Union orbited the first earth satellite. However, certain manifestations appeared as early as 1954 when NATO was committed to a tactical nuclear strategy. The administration of Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy have both endeavored to come to 20 grips with the vast and complicated problems stemming from the understandable and legitimate interests of a rising and renascent Europe to find its proper place in the world of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles.

The steps along the path to greater sharing to be discussed here are: (1) the commitment of NATO to a nuclear strategy and the placing of IRBM's on allied territory;

(2) General Norstad's multi-national proposals; (3) the proposal of Secretary of State Herter in i960 ; and (4) the

Kennedy Administration proposals.

NATO’s Commitment to a Nuclear Strategy

Though most of the member nations were little aware of it at the onset, NATO has, from the beginninc, • relied on a nuclear strategy. Because the other member nations pos­ sessed no such capability, the earliest plans of NATO left to the United States the mission of strategic bombing, and this Implied the use of the atomic bomb.^ However, the actual incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO planning was not to come until later.

3h the beginning, it was the forces on hand that were the determinant of NATO’s strategy. It was not until the Korean War that the NATO nations took serious stock of

Lt. Col. Bennett L. Jackson, "A Strategy for NATO in the Nuclear Age," U.S. Army War College, 1958 , p. 2. 21 their defenses. This reappraisal offered little encourage­ ment, The United States, Canada, and Britain had redeployed their large war-time armies and only skeletal occupation forces remained in Europe, The armies of the remaining

European countries, except for perhaps France, had been des­ troyed or dispersed during the course of the war and little had been done to reconstitute them. The occupation forces were extremely vulnerable to any Soviet aggression. Their lines of communication and supply were all in close proximity to the Russians and could be cut in the first hours of aggression,

NATO's early defenses left little doubt that its main reliance was on the strategic capability of the United

States, The United States was responsible for strategic bombing— and the Strategic Air Command of the United States had a monopoly on the delivery of atomic weapons. Thus,

NATO received, as .a result of American partnership, a legacy of nuclear strategy. This nuclear aspect, however, was hardly mentioned and not always recognized. This implication of reliance on nuclear weapons was not new. As early as

1946 Winston Churchill told his fellow Europeans: "In these present days we dwell strangely under the precarious shield and, I might even say, protection of the atomic bomb."

2 F. W, Mulley, The Politics of_ Western Defense (London: Thames and Hudson"] 1962), p. 2 3. 22

The concern of Western Europe for her protection became more paramount after the Korean War, The great

Inequity of Soviet-Allied forces in Europe made it obvious that some attempt must be made to counteract the overwhelm­ ing odds of the Russians, Accordingly, the North Atlantic

Council took up the issue of nuclear weapons in its meeting in December 1953. The final Communique of that meeting recognized the importance of nuclear weapons for the defenses of NATO;

It was recognized that special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defense system. The Council noted with satisfaction the intention of the President of the United States of America^ to ask Congress for authority to provide information on nuclear weapons to NATO Commanders for purposes of NATO military planning,3

Early in 1954, President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress requesting a change to the Atomic Energy Act to enable the transfer of nuclear Information to NATO allies. Under the Act as it was finally approved in

August 1954, the President could direct the Defense Depart­ ment to transfer to friendly powers, or to a regional defense organization such as NATO, data on the tactical use of

atomic weapons, information on training men for atomic warfare, and evaluations of the atomic capabilities of

^North Atlantic Council, Final Communique, December 16, 1953, Paragraphs 6 & 7, Department of State Bulletin. XXX, 758 (January 4, 1954). 23 potential enemies. Any information on the design and con­ struction of the weapons, however, was prohibited.^

In 1954, the planned use of tactical atomic weapons was announced. In a speech made in November of that year.

Field Marshall Montgomery made it clear that NATO planning embraced.the use of nuclear weapons. He said:

We could not defend the territories of the NATO nations in Europe without using nuclear weapons, because otherwise wq could not match the strength that could be brought against us. Therefore, we must be ready to use atomic weapons, and we are so ready, and have geared our operations accordingly,5

In December 1954, the North Atlantic Council gave their approval to a policy of tactical atomic defense,^

However, this move did not come without some heated debate.

This debate raised for the first time the question of con­ trol and decision which was to haunt NATO for years to come.

At the onset of the Council meeting there was a

controversy over the question of when or whether NATO would use nuclear weapons and who would make the decision.

The question was raised whether the decision would be made

"Nuclear Information for Allies," New York Times, December 19, 1954. President Elsenhower's message F5 Congress requesting this legislation may be found in the Department of State Bulletin, Nr. 926, June 14, 1965,

5pield Marshal Montgomery, "NATO and the Defense of the Free World," The Pacific Spectator, Vol, IX, Nr, 2 (Spring 1955), p. 169.

^The text of the Final Statement of the North Atlantic Council Meeting may be found in the New York Times, December 19, 1954, p, 2, . 24 by the military commanders or by the member governments.

The Montgomery statement that nuclear weapons would be used had touched off considerable criticism. As It turned out, a good deal of this criticism was directed towards the United

States which, some Europeans feared, might use the atomic bomb and thus precipitate a nuclear war without consulting its allies.7

However, the Council finally accepted the tactical nuclear weapon concept and endorsed its use for NATO’s defenses. What this meant was an open acceptance of a defense concept which NATO's commanders had long urged— reliance on atomic weapons as the bulwark of Western strength. It was a sober awareness that only through nuclear weapons could the

NATO nations possibly hope to adequately confront further

Russian aggression. As Lincoln Gordon wrote:

The decision in 1954 to base NATO planning on the adoption of tactical nuclear weapons did not reflect a new strategic concept. It was rather designed to make up for Insufficiencies in manpower by providing greater firepower,8

Thus, NATO was set on its nuclear course. From this time of critical commitment, there would be no turning back— only deeper involvement.

7 "North Atlantic Council. Meets," New York Times, December 19, 1954, p. 1, Q Lincoln Gordon, "NATO Strategy," Yale Review, XLVIII (March 1959). 25

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles to Europe

The Pall of 1957 ushered in another new era In

NATO's nuclear defenses. When Russia's Sputnik I was hurled into orbit on October 4, 1957, there was little doubt that the state of the missile art in Russia had ad­ vanced to the stage where the Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile (ICBM) would soon become a practical reality. If there were any doubts, they were soon dispelled when

Sputnik II was orbited with a payload said to be nearly

1200 pounds.9

The growth of Soviet missile capability had great significance to the defenses of the West, The launching of the Sputniks revealed the immense strides that Russia had made in missile technology. This disclosure of Russian capability led to a reappraisal in Washington of the value of the European members of the Alliance to the security of the United States itself. It was clear that it would be several years before the United States could match the

Soviet lead in ICBM's with anything more than land based intermediate missiles, and to use these weapons was dependent on the good will of her European allies.

■9 Jackson, o£. cit., 3*

^°Ibid, 26

To counteract possible Soviet advantage in future missile strength, various proposals were aired to place

ICBM's on allied soil. General Norstad stated that he felt tactical nuclear weapons should be placed in Europe to thwart the Russian capability.

The General (Norstad) wants the Europeans as well as U.S, troops in Europe to be armed with tactical nuclear weapons and trained in advance in their use. This and dispersal of ground troops he considers essential,H

The dilemma in which the United States found herself is expressed by Drew Middleton;

The U.S., it is emphasized, has claimed for 12 years pre-eminence in weapons and weapons develop­ ments. Now, that pre-eminence has been shown to be transitory. While it existed, NATO governments were willing to accept American leadership in the field. They are still willing to accept it, but from now on they must be given good reasons for this acceptance and more control over use of such weapons as are based in E u r o p e . 12

It was left to the North Atlantic Council to find a solution to the strategic dilemma precipitated by Russia's technological advances. To register the sense of importance attached to such a solution, the heads of government them­ selves attended the Council meetings in December 1957.

At this meeting Secretary of State Dulles, speaking

for the United States, made a startling proposal to the

^^"General Norstad Reports," New York Times, October 10, 1957, p. 21,

12 Drew Middleton, New York Times, November 19, 1957, p. 3. 27

NATO governments. He said In part:

The U.S. Is prepared, If this Council so wishes, to participate in a NATO atomic stockpile. Within this stockpile system, nuclear warheads would be deployed under U,S, custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned. In the event of hostilities, nuclear warheads would be released to the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander for employment by nuclear-capable NATO forces. If this Council so desires, and in order to strengthen NATO's deterrent power, the U,S, is prepared to make available to other NATO countries IRBM's for deployment in accordance with the plans of SACEUR, Nuclear warheads for these IRBM's have become a part of the NATO atomic stockpile system. Such IRBM deployment would be subject to agreement between SACEUR and the countries concerned and to agreement between each such country and the U,S, with respect to material, training, and other necessary arrangements,13

The American position was that as long as Russia persisted in her program of building up nuclear weapons and missiles, there was danger that the Soviets might attempt to dominate the wopld by sheer power. In the face of such persistence, it would be folly to accept the Soviet view that the Soviet Union should have nuclear weapons and missiles with which to threaten Western Europe while Western

Europe itself should have for its defense only weapons of the preatomic age, "Our purpose was to be strong, but not

to be provocative,

^^secretary Dulles, "Address to North Atlantic Council," Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, Nr, 967 ■ (January 6, 19^ 8 ),

14 Secretary Dulles, "Report to the Nation," Depart­ ment of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, Nr, 968 (January 13, 1958), 28 .

In view of the circumstances confronting it, the

North Atlantic Council made the critical decision to estab­

lish stocks of nuclear weapons and missiles at the disposal

of the Supreme Commander, Europe, thus taking a stage further

the process of "nuclearizing" NATO's defenses which was

decided in principle in. 1954. The Pinal Communique in part

'said:

As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defenses. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that inter­ mediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the.disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defense plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defense. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions i n v o l v e d , 15

Thus, the North Atlantic Council agreed in principle

to placing missiles on allied soil. Part of the bargain

was that these missiles should be under bilateral operation

and SACEUR command in accordance with bilateral agreements

15North Atlantic Council, "Final Communique," Paras, 19, 20, 21, Department of State Bulletin. XXXVIII, Nr, 967 (January 6, 29 negotiated by the United States with her allies. The warheads, however, would remain under custody of American troops and under the exclusive authority of the American

President to release them for use, as prescribed by the

Atomic Energy Act, Only Italy and Turkey received IRBM's on their soil under such bilateral agreements. The IRBM's placed in Britain were under a special "two-key" system outside NATO command, France refused to accept nuclear warheads that were not under her physical control,1^

This further "nuclearization" of NATO increased the tempo of comment concerning eventual control of the weapon systems on European soil. As indicated, France flatly refused to have any weapon on her soil if she did not have physical control over it. Other European officials urged that the U.S, show its confidence in its allies and its solidarity with them by repealing the Act of Congress and permitting the distribution of tactical weapons directly to the European forces of the Alliance, They also urged a full sharing of scientific information and skills.^7

This discussion was a "preview" of similar discussions which were to rack the Alliance from that day forward. It was becoming obvious that some European officials, of the

16 Robert Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO, V/ashington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 19b2, p, 2,

17 New York Times, October 10, 1957, p. 21, 30

Alliance were becoming concerned about who was going to pull the trigger on the IRBM's located at bases on

European soil.^® The Alliance was destined to struggle over the ramifications of this problem for years to come.

The Norstad Proposals

General Norstad, NATO commander, was the first official to really attempt to find a solution to the ever­ growing problem of nuclear-sharing. In March, I960, he reported a "tacit agreement" between the United States,

Britain, and France to integrate a battalion each into a task force that would have atomic weapons,General Norstad explained that the force would consist of 2,500 to 3,000 men and would have both conventional and nuclear arms under a single commander. According to General Norstad:

The formation of an integrated multinational unit with nuclear striking power would constitute a step toward greater NATO control over nuclear weapons, hitherto kept in national hands,20

When the solid-full Polaris missile first began to become available. General Norstad had proposed an extensive form of sharing and control of nuclear weapons. In August,

l8 For a discussion of unrest created by U.S. missile bases in Europe, see "U.S. Missile Bases Disquiet Europe," New York Times, December 10, 1957, p. 2,

^^Henry Griniger, "NATO Plans to Put Troops of 3 Nations Into Atom Brigade," New York Times, March 3, I960, p • 1 •

20 Ibid., p . 4. 31

1959, he had proposed reassuring the Europeans that nuclear weapons would be available for their defense by making NATO itself the "fourth nuclear power." Subsequently, he indi­ cated that he had in mind the multinational operation of mobile, land-based Polarises and other nuclear weapons.

Nothing much became of this proposal until the Fall of i960 when Secretary-General Spaak (NATO) and Chancellor

Adenauer Joined General Norstad in promoting this general plan. With increased support. General Norstad again pushed for acceptance of his plan. By this time, more was known ' about what the plan entailed.

Norstad's project comprised three distinct aspects.

The first was an attempt to modernize allied forces. This meant generally supplanting bombers with medium-range bal­ listic missiles. Thus, the missiles already installed in

Turkey and Italy would be augmented by further medium-range missiles, and perhaps, Polaris-bearing submarines. The second aspect was that NATO should have its. own long-range striking force. This would be accomplished by the Allies, particularly the U.S., earmarking part of their strategic air capability to NATO. However, it was the third aspect which was crucial. It was the recommendation that the United

States make available to NATO an essential minimum stock of nuclear warheads. Their availability would be guaranteed

21 Osgood, 0£. cit.. p. 2 32

"for the duration of NATO In its present form,"^^

General Norstad argued that Europeans were right­ fully asking whether It was reasonable for them to build their defenses around atomic weapons without any assurance that warheads would be available in an emergency. It was possible, he argued, that some future President might with­ draw the warheads from the continent. He pointed out that

Europeans were demanding an equal voice in the control of the weapons needed for their defense,

The warheads, under General Norstad's plan, would be used only as NATO directed. They would be placed in the custody of American officers, responsible only to

NATO's orders and not to any national authorities, including those of the United States, Thus, individual allies could not copy the devices and later build their own weapons.

General Norstad's proposal was generally accepted by the Allies as the best way to solve the problem. The general feeling of the Europeans was expressed by a leading diplomat who said:

We have to move toward something of this kind if NATO is to remain a worthwhile organization. You cannot go on forever with an alliance of unequals—

L. Sulzberger, "A Critical Problem for M r , Kennedy," New York Times, November 21, i960.

^^Ibid.

^^Ibid. 33 some entitled to control nuclear weapons, some not.25

While this proposal might fulfill certain military

requirements, it could also fulfill certain political pur­ poses. One would be to answer the demands of some Western powers that the U.S. share with them the control over nuclear weapons based in Europe. A second would be to

give assurances to Western Europe that it would not be

left without nuclear weapons by some future U.S. decision.

A third purpose hinted at would be to persuade France that she did not need her,own nuclear striking f o r c e . 26

By this time the election of I960 was over and it was only a question of time until a new administration

came to power. Consequently, the Eisenhower Administra­

tion was hesitant to commit itself to any plan until some

indication of future policy could be ascertained from the

new President-elect. Thus, the Norstad plan remained up

in the air. It was hoped that some definite steps could

be taken at the forth-coming North Atlantic Council Meeting

to be held in December.

Secretary of State Herter Proposal

In December, I960, at the North Atlantic Council

^Dana Schmidt, "Diplomats Praise Atomic NATO Plan," New York Times, November 25, I960.

2^«Poiitical Implications of Norstad Plan," New York Times, November 22, I960, p. 1. 34 meeting. Secretary of State Herter responded to the building pressure. On behalf of the United States, he endorsed the

"concept" of a NATO-controlled nuclear force.

Secretary Herter*s plan called for commitment to the

Atlantic Alliance before the end of I963 of five ballistic

missile submarines armed with eighty Polaris missiles.27

However, this offer was conditional upon agreement by the

European Allies on political control of the weapons. Addi­

tionally, the U;S, would expect other members of the alliance

to contribute approximately 100 medium-range ballistic

missiles to NATO defenses. These additional missiles were

to be purchased from the United States.28

According to Secretary Herter, this plan would en­

large the Alliance's military capabilities and reaffirm

the United States' commitment to Europe's defense. It

would stress the significance of multi-national participa­

tion which had been put forward by General Norstad the

previous year.

However, the major condition of the proposal— that

the nations of the alliance would be required to work out

some form of political control for the new weapons system—

seemed to indicate that a true multinational participation

^7px*ew Middleton, "U.S. Offers NATO a Nuclear Arsenal," New York Times. December 17, I960, p. 1.

^^Ibid.. p. 13. 35 was still far from being a reality. Though the major powers seemed to welcome the proposal, their diplomats

"were said to understand that working out the arrangements for political control of the weapons would be a long, complex t a s k . "29 The success of the whole proposal was contingent upon the Allies agreeing on a "multilateral system" of political control, which is a condition in the words of Robert Osgood, "that the Allies are surely unable to meet without the most forceful American assistance."3^

Still, the North Atlantic Council welcomed the propo* sal and instructed their permanent representatives to study the plan. Thus, the multilateral concept became officially recognized by the Council when it issued its final

Communique:

. . . There must be a proper balance in the forces of the Alliance of nuclear and conventional strength to provide the required flexibility. The Ministers • . . expressed their determination to continue their efforts to improve the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance, In this connection, the United States Government suggested the concept of an MRBM multilateral force for consideration by the Alliance. The Council took note of the United States suggestion with great interest and instructed the permanent repre­ sentatives to study the suggestion and related matters in detail.31

^^Ibid.

^^Osgood, on, cit., p. 3.

^^North Atlantic Council, "Final Communique," Paras. 6 & 7, Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, Nr. 1124 (Jan. 9, IW)". 36

The Kennedy Administrâtion Proposals

The first mention of an armament plan for NATO by the Kennedy Administration occurred in May I96I, Secretary of State Rusk, speaking at a conference of the Foreign

Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, pledged to commit Polaris nuclear missile submarines to forces assigned to NATO, The immediate goal was to contribute five Polaris submarines to the naval forces committed to the organiza­ tion, but more would be added as they became available.32

This decision represented acceptance in part by the Kennedy Administration of a nuclear armaments plan for the treaty group advanced previously by the Eisenhower

Administration. However, the Herter plan was contingent upon agreement by the Europeans to buy 100 nuclear missiles from the U.S. This part of the plan was abandoned by the

Kennedy Administration because the Europeans objected that the purchase cost would be too much for them.33 The matter of control was still left very much in doubt and generally dependent upon a European agreement on a "multilateral political control plan."

President Kennedy reaffirmed this commitment while speaking in Ottawa to the Canadian Parliament:

^^Russell Baker, "U.S. Renews Offer of Polaris," New York Times, May 10, 1961, p. 1.

33Ibid. 37

To make clear our own intentions and commitments to the defense of Western Europe, the United States will commit to the NATO command five— and subsequently more— Polaris atomic-missile submarines, which are defensive weapons, subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use, , . ,34

Additionally, the President for the first time committed his Administration to the multilateral concept;

Beyond this we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO's nonnuclear goals have been achieved.35

No further action took place to institute this multilateral plan. The impetus was left with the Europeans,

During a news conference in November, 1961, Secretary Rusk reaffirmed the offer and again left the initiative with the Europeans,

This is a problem of quite literally the utmost complexity . . , because the political and military management of a nuclear force in the hands of 15 or 16 nations, itself, is a political and a military problem of the highest order of difficulty. There are matters which we hope that our European friends will discuss among themselves. We would like to know what they, themselves, think would be suitable arrangements.36

In May 1962, the United States announced that it

•3Ü John F, Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the U.S.," Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, Nr. 1145, June 5, 196TT 35ibid.

^^Secretary Rusk, "News Conference," Department of State Bulletin. XLV, Nr, 1171 (December 4, 1961). 38 had committed five Polaris submarines to NATO. The sub­ marines remained part of the U.S. Navy but, like the U.S.

Army forces In Germany, the ships were assigned and committed to NATO. Control of the warheads still remained with the.

President of the United S t a t e s . 37

The immediate effect of this decision was to estab­ lish NATO as a nuclear deterrent. It had political effects as well. It was hoped that the commitment of such a large nuclear force to NATO would cause deGaulle to give up his own aims of an independent French nuclear force. It was also hoped that the commitment would appease European agita­ tion for a European nuclear deterrent.

Thus, the Kennedy Administration, although initially being rather cool to the idea, found it prudent to give endorsement to the idea of a NATO nuclear force. During its first year in power, it had committed itself to re­ stating American interest in broadening allied participa­ tion in nuclear control. After the Administration thus

cautiously opened the door to nuclear sharing a bit wider, there was a marked intensification of pressure to propose

a variety of plans. This pressure was generated from both

sides of the Atlantic and eventually led to the Nassau

Agreements in December 1962. The Nassau Agreement will be

discussed in detail later in this paper; hence, it is not

37orew Middleton, "U.S. Gives NATO 5 Submarines," New York Times, May 6, 1962, p. 1. 39 considered at this point.

Summary

This, then, has been a brief summary of the pro­ gression towards nuclear sharing and control between NATO and the United States. This has been a period characterized by a growing awareness on the part of both Europeans and

Americans of the growing complexity of nuclear armaments.

For several years Europeans had been growing increasingly restive about the totality of United States control. This resulted in France's efforts to create a nuclear deterrent of her own, and warnings from some German politicians that

West Germany may have to eventually follow the same course.

To combat this trend, the U.S. has had to restructure its thinking on U.S.-NATO nuclear affairs. In so doing, she became aware of an ever-increasing need for some de­ volution of her nuclear monopoly if the Atlantic Alliance was to remain unified. The United States recognized that a revitalized and renascent Europe would no longer settle for less than full partnership in affairs that had as their, possible consequence her very survival. The United States correctly judged that the way to dispel European uneasiness over nuclear matters was to provide them with more informa­ tion about nuclear weapons and with more operating authority over their use. Thus, the trend was established— hardly discernible at first, but etched in hard lines of crucial importance as time went on. Its final culmination is still in doubt, and in the future. CHAPTER IV

BASIC SOURCES OP THE PROBLEM

Introduction

There have been great transformations in the international arena since the end of the Second World

War, This period marked the end of a hot war and the beginning of a Cold War. At the beginning of this period, the United States occupied the pinnacle of world power by virtue of its monopoly in nuclear technology.

In the world of today, however, others share this awe­ some pinnacle. This has been a period marked by the emer­ gence of a great number of new nations, each seeking to achieve its own independence and each seeking to place its own Indelible mark on the world. This has been a period which has seen the power of the world gradually settle into a bipolar configuration, and then later, a period which has seen the gradual devolution of this same power. It was this period which gave birth to NATO, and it has been the influences of this period which have caused significant changes within that organization. One of the most signi­ ficant of these changes was the possession and control of nuclear weapons.

European pressure for mitigating America's monopoly of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO was bound to 41 arise sooner or later. The major reason for this was that the basis of Allied security at the end of the war was

America's monopoly of nuclear striking power, and this monopoly was bound to fade away. Once the American mono­ poly was ended, it was only natural for the NATO states to display their own sovereignty and to seek greater con­ trol over their own destiny. This had disruptive effects on continued American control of nuclear weapons and strategy.

The rising pressure for mitigation of America's nuclear control has placed considerable strain upon allied cohesion. This strain has intensified considerably during the past few years. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the basic sources of this strain. There have been four major developments which have greatly complicated the issue of nuclear control in NATO. They are: (1) the re­ surgence of Western Europe; (2) the proliferation of the nuclear capability; (3). the lack of Medium Range Ballistic

Missiles (MRBM) in Western Europe; and (4) the increased vulnerability of the United States to Soviet attack,^

Each of these developments will be discussed in greater

1 Interview with Mr. Philander P. Claxton, Jr., Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for NATO, U.S. Department of State, 11 May, 1964. Additionally, Robert Bowie used essentially the same factors when he addressed the Western European Union on December 3, 1963. (Western European Union, Assembly, A/WEU (9)CR 9, pp. 40-41). 42 detail.

A Resurgent Europe

The first major source of concern for nuclear control stems from the changing political balance between the United

States and Europe. At the time NATO came into being,

Europe was on the edge of catastrophe. She was stagnant, weak, and fragmented. Despite a mutual interest in defense, the European states were wholly unequal in size, power, or influence. However, the years since 1949 have seen a great resurgence of these states. Economic revival and the

European Community have restored the strength and self- confidence of Europe and nourished the sense of a Common

European destiny.

This European revival has resulted in a growing dissatisfaction with continued dependence on the United

States for defense and strategy. However, the problem is more than just a military one. The trouble does not lie in a European feeling of distrust and doubt towards U.S. intentions. .Most Europeans do not have this feeling.2

They recognize that the United States, making a rational calculation of its own vital interests, cannot possibly permit a Soviet takeover of Western Europe with all its productive potential. The trouble lies elsewhere. Many

2 Robert Bowie, "Address to Western European Union," op. cit., pp. 43-44. 43

Europeans simply feel that the U.S. monopoly is no longer fitting or acceptable on a continuing basis. They are not happy with the position of Europe in the Alliance today.

They want a larger role in the conduct of NATO strategy and in the control over the nuclear forces.3

Robert Bowie, after actually talking to many Europeans, identified the feeling of the resurgent Europe of today:

Their feeling is mainly a political one. Its origin is the changing political balance between the United States and Europe, and even within Europe. No longer is Europe weak and stagnant as it was when NATO started. True, the other NATO members are still small in size, power and influence, compared to the United States. But with their economic revival, and the success of the European community, the European members have regained their strength and self-confidence and have attained a certain sense of a common European destiny. They want a more self-respecting role. They do not like the feeling of being wholly dependent on the United States. The concern about control of the nuclear deterrent largely reflects this broader attitude.4

Though Europeans on the whole seem satisfied that the United States is a responsible keeper of the peace, it is not surprising that many European statesmen, and not de Gaulle alone, should like to have a voice in the making of nuclear decisions.^ Alastalr Buchan recently noted this trend:

^Ibld.

^Robert Bowie, Address to Western European Union, op. cit., pp.' 44-46.

^Robert Strausz-Hupe, et al., Building the Atlantic World (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 199. 44

What Is beyond dispute. In my view, is that the restored pride .and dynamism of Europe makes it likely that these countries will tend to play a critical or even obstructive role in the formula­ tion of allied policy, unless a means can be found which gives them full responsibility of playing a constructive role. Moreover, there can be no reason to assume that this is not a permanent development or is likely to be less marked when certain grand old men of a passing generation have quit the European scene, for the new Europe is not the creation merely of de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan.8

As Europe regained her equilibrium after the great war, it was only inevitable that she would begin to chafe under external dominance. After having suffered horrible years of first-hand experience with war, she demanded a greater voice in the life and death decisions of nuclear strategy. Since NATO was an alliance of sovereign states, it was only natural that the West European members demanded greater equality in the control of the organization's defenses. Europe felt that since she would surely bear the brunt of any nuclear holocaust, she should at least be able to exercise some control over the weapon systems which might involve her in such a holocaust.

This awareness on the part of a revitalized Europe has resulted in increasing pressure being put on the United

States to make changes in her nuclear control policies.

Despite great progress and potential, Europe cannot yet

Alastalr Buchan, "The Evolution of NATO," Adelphi Papers No. 1, distributed by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, November, 1961, p. 9. 45 act as a great power In most fields. Including defense and foreign policy. Even if the European Community continues to develop at the present rate, some years will elapse before it can act as a single entity. In the meantime, the gap between aspirations and capabilities for effective action will continue to cause serious tensions within the Alliance.7

Nuclear Proliferation

The strain upon allied cohesion was intensified by another development, which reflects an allied desire to overcome America's nuclear monopoly and which is stimulated by the rise of Soviet nuclear power and NATO's nuclear de­ pendence. This development was the inexorable spread of nuclear technology, resulting in efforts by France and

Britain to build their own nuclear forces. The consequences of this development are pointed out by Robert Osgood;

These efforts to create two more independently- controlled nuclear forces in the alliance complicate the problem of maintaining mutual confidence in the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons, since, to the extent the efforts succeed, they will increase the number of unilateral national decisions that could be disastrous for all. If the contagion of independent nuclear efforts were to spread, if a number of allies were determined and able to produce their own nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the whole political foundation of military and diplomatic collaboration in the West might be undermined.°

7 Robert Strausz-Hupe, et al., o£. cit., p. 193.

^Robert Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO (Washington: The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1962), p. 6. 46

The specter of national nuclear proliferation has

compelled the United States, since the late 1950's, to

think more seriously about modifying its nuclear policies

for NATO, The policies pursued, especially by General

de Gaulle, have made it obvious that the United States must

act, even if only symbolically, to placate the European

allies and to quiet their misgivings.9 When the French

developed their own nuclear bomb, it seemed to confirm the

growing fears on both sides of the Atlantic that nuclear

proliferation threatened the unity of the alliance. It became evident that the present efforts at "sharing" could

not deal with the problem. Numerous public and private

groups in both Europe and America began urging the endowment

of NATO itself with a nuclear deterrent capability as the only solution,

The threat of wholesale nuclear proliferation raised

fears that West Germany would seek membership in the nuclear

club, if for no other reason than to gain a share in the

control of the decision to use America's nuclear weapons.

It was evident that in time British and especially French

nuclear efforts were bound to rankle a power which feels

itself entitled to equal status and is in a good position

"Strausz-Hupe, et al., o£. cit., p, 196,

^^Raymond Dawson, "What Kind of NATO Nuclear Force," The Annals, Vol. 351 (January 1964), 47 to demand It.

The Kennedy Administration, like its predecessor,

seemed to recognize that the desire for national deterrents

could not be dampened by strategic arguments alone. The .

question was whether the proposals thus far advanced by

the United States would satisfy the Europeans, or whether

they would increasingly resent their continued dependence

upon.the U.S. for the defense of what they regard as their

vital interests. If answered in the latter, then certainly

they would strike out on their own. So far as NATO’s

political future is concerned, this question goes to the

heart of the matter.

Thus, there was a great impetus for the United

States to attempt to find an alternative to the spread of

the nuclear deterrent. As Under Secretary of State Ball

pointed out :

. . . it is only natural that vigorous peoples should wish to play an effective role in their own defense and, if no alternative is provided, the political pressures for the multiplication of national nuclear deterrent systems will make themselves felt. This is, I think, very likely to happen if we simply let nature take its course. In one country after another these pressures may become irresistible. Moreover, the process will feed upon itself, since the decision to build a national deterrent in one country will almost certainly increase pressures for a similar decision in others.11

11 George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Press Release Nr. 224, April 26, 1963. 48

The Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Issue

One of the basic concerns of Europeans today is that of the Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM),^^

Europeans are fully aware that they are living under the gun of Soviet nuclear power. As a result of this, they desire to carry a greater share of the responsibility for their own nuclear defense. As Secretary Rusk has pointed out,

this desire has come to focus, in large part, on medium range ballistic missiles since these are the only effective weapons of strategic range which can usefully be deployed in the European area against similar weapons aimed at Europe.13

Recent statements by American defense authorities indicate that they see no military need for MRBM's being stationed in Europe, since the long-range rockets stationed in America or deployed at sea are able to do the Job just as well.l^ However, this point has raised a big question mark in the minds of many Europeans. Knowing as they do that they are threatened by hundreds of medium-range Soviet missiles stationed only a few hundred miles away, they

Mr. Philander Claxton, in his interview previously noted, stated that he felt that this issue was probably the major impetus for all of Europe's demands for greater voice in nuclear sharing.

^^Secretary Rusk, Address to Virginia State Bar Association, July 12, 1963, State Deoartment Press Release 367. ^^Francois de Rose, "Atlantic Relationships and Nuclear Problems," Foreign Affairs (April I963), p. 484. 49 wonder how the American counterforce blows delivered by rockets several thousand miles away would come in time.

They are also inclined to believe that the longer the range of a rocket, the higher the explosive yield that is required to offset greater inaccuracies in aim. Thus, though any nuclear battle would likely leave Europe crippled for years, they believe there still exists a case for fighting the battle with the smallest size weapons p o s s i b l e . 15

As Francois de Rose points out, there are some

Europeans who think that the Cuban affair in 1962 has to a certain extent vindicated their argument for MRBM's in

Europe ;

Since the installation of some 40 Russian medium- range rockets close to the American territory was considered a threat to the defense posture of the United States, they are tempted to infer that the same would apply to the threat from the Communist bloc to Europe.1°

European desires for MRBM's first made themselves manifest in I960. As Secretary Rusk has pointed out,

there were then, and there are now, broadly three alternative ways of responding: (1) we could refuse to provide MRBM's to allied forces; (2) we could deploy such missiles to nationally manned and owned forces; and (3) we could provide MRBM's to forces jointly organized by us and our allies, but not to nationally manned and owned forces,17

^^Ibid.

l^Ibid.

^Secretary Rusk, o£. cit. 50

Thus, the problem Is to arrive at a solution which will be acceptable to the Europeans. The Europeans are concerned with the fact that over the past seven years the Soviet Union has been deploying hundreds of rockets aimed at Western Europe, and this array is still growing.

To them, such a threat requires that they have some share in formulating defense plans which will counter that threat.

Mr. Gerard Smith, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, recently indicated an awareness of this problem;

Although programmed U.S. forces would be adequate to meet the threat, there is a good case for replac­ ing some of these programmed forces with medium range missiles. On military grounds, two successive NATO Supreme Commanders, Generals Norstad and Lemnltzer, have urged deployment of such missiles to help cover Soviet forces directly threatening Europe. Broader political and psychological considerations are also involved. The Soviet leaders have not hesitated to put their rockets to political use. They have reminded European countries from time to time how easily the USSR could destroy the Acropolis or the orange groves of Italy or, for that matter, all of England or Prance. Nuclear blackmail addressed to Europe lay at the heart of Moscow's pressure on Berlin over the period 1958-62. It is not surprising, therefore, that Europeans living so near this Soviet nuclear power have been anxious to have a larger role In long range strategic deterrence, to complement their existing manning, ownership, and share in control of shorter range missiles.18

Thus, since the late 1950's, there has been evidence of a European desire for the installation of MRBM's with

X 8 Gerard C. Smith, Address to the U.S. Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference, April 22, 1964, State Depart­ ment Press Release Nr. 178. 51 allied forces in Western Europe. This interest has generally taken two forms: first, a desire to see MRBM's deployed in the European area, and second, a desire to achieve for Europe a greater role in the vital decisions about the circumstances under which these weapons are to be fired.19

United. States Vulnerability

For a decade and a half, the United States has provided the nuclear umbrella for NATO. The British

V-bomber force and,the emerging French force de frappe are not significant factors in the strategic deterrent.

NATO.is today, as it has been since its Inception, entirely dependent upon the U.S. for strategic deterrence.

Just as long as the Western powers had a monopoly of the atom bomb, it seemed safe that there would be no outbreak of another world war. However, vast changes have swept over the world during the past few years. These changes have stirred the Europeans to reassess their role in world affairs.

Some of the most important new developments on the far side of the Atlantic must be traced back to the period

1956-57 when two events occurred which have had profound affect upon the history of NATO. The first was the policy

19 Robert G. Neumann, "European and the Nuclear Weapons Issue," Europe-Archiv (Bonn), September 1963. 52 pursued by the United States in the Suez crisis, which demonstrated to the Europeans how abjectly dependent they were upon the U.S. for defense of their interests outside.

Europe. The depth of European concern over this event can be felt by reading the words of Sir Geoffrey Crowther, former editor of The Economist, who asked whether the

American policy meant that "the alliance will be expected to work in matters that the United States deems important, but not in matters that .Britain and Prance deem important, and even perhaps vital to their existence?"20 The second event came in October 1957, when the successful launching of the Sputnik made it clear that the Soviet Union was on the way to acquiring an intercontinental missile capability which might eventually neutralize American intentions to defend European interests inside Europe. Although this

Soviet achievement in space technology produced no revolu­ tionary change in the military balance of power, the implica­ tions and propaganda of it did much to weaken, the confidence of many Europeans in the determination of the United States to defend them against attack, now that American cities were becoming exposed for the first time to the threat of swift missile retaliation. The fear seemed to be that if the

Soviets should come to look uoon the U.S. nuclear commitment

20 Geoffrey Crowther, "Reconstruction of an Alliance," Foreign Affairs (January 1957), pp. 180-181. 53 to Its allies as purely declaratory. Western Europe might become a safe area for conventional aggression.

The progress made by the Russians from 1958 onward in evolving a modern military force placed them on a footing of virtual equality with the U.S. They developed tactical nuclear weapons in great quantities and extremely powerful strategic nuclear weapons. Most Important of all, however, they built the necessary means of delivery which permitted them to threaten every corner of the globe with instantaneous destruction. Besides innumerable aircraft and tactical missiles with nuclear warheads, they produced ballistic missiles which had both a long range and a tremendous carrying capacity. Thus, the U.S. was now in turn under the constant threat of total destruction, and there came into being a certain balance of mutual deter­ rence.^2

This growing Soviet capability, in both weapons and delivery means, created a situation which was quite different from that at the beginning of NATO. Now, the

Soviet Union had the capability to inflict great damage- on the U.S. with ICBM's and on Europe with MRBM’s. As Robert

21 James Dougherty, "European Deterrence and Atlantic Unity," Orbis (Fall 1962), p. 372.

22 General Paul Stehlin, "The Evolution of Western Defense," Foreign Affairs (October 1963), pp. 73-74. 54

Bowie pointed out, this changing strategic balance posed a critical question in the minds of Europeans: would the

United States still be prepared to use its nuclear arsenal to defend Europe in view of its own vulnerability?23

This European fear was not altogether unfounded.

Christian A. Herter gave cogent though unwitting support to this fear. In the course of the hearings on his nomina­ tion for Secretary of State in April 1959# he said:

I cannot conceive of any President involving us in all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves or that actual moves have been made toward devastating o u r s e l v e s . 24

In order to assuage the fears of its European allies, the United States began in 1958 to station medium-range missiles in Britain and on the Continent. The nuclear warheads for these missiles, however, have always remained under American control. Amendments to the Atomic Energy

Act permitted the incorporation of atomic weapons delivery

systems into European NATO forces, but the United States has

always been careful to withhold information on weapons

design. However, the Europeans are quick to point out

that these weapons counterbalance the Soviet threat only

^Robert Bowie, "Address to Western European Union," Official Report, Assembly, Western European Union, A/WteÜ (9) CR 9, December 3» 1963, pp. 43-44. 24 Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as quoted in the New York Times, April 22, 1959, p. 1. 55 if there is absolute assurance that they will be used in case of any Russian attack. In the European viewpoint, there is no such assurance, since these weapons remain under the exclusive control of the President of the U.S.

Europeans feel that the U.S. might attempt to make some distinction between enemy attacks. That is, some attacks might be regarded by the U.S. as not vital to the security of the Continent, and thus not justification for use of nuclear weapons. This explains the reluctance of the

Europeans to accept a nuclear strategy which might result in the complete destruction of their country in a conflict which could be. regarded as limited from the standpoint of the Atlantic Community, but which would be total where they were concerned.

Despite commitments by the U.S. to defend Europe against all attacks, Britain and France commenced their own nuclear programs. One of the reasons cited, by the

British for deciding to manufacture their own nuclear wea­ pons was that there should be an independent deterrent on the European side of the Atlantic. President de Gaulle's basis for France's actions was his insistence that in the nuclear age no nation could depend upon another for its defense.26

25 General Paul Stehlin, o£, cit. , p. 76.

Z^Dougherty, 0£. cit. , pp. 373-374. 56

Thus, as the United States herself moved under the shadow of possible nuclear destruction, it was inevitable that the Europeans would have second thoughts about their own security. To them, there certainly seemed to be cause to wonder whether the United States would risk national suicide to defend Europe, The nuclear umbrella of the

United States did not resolve the problem as the European nations saw it, nor was it the fulfillment of their own ambitions. General Stehlin identifies the problem as the

Europeans see it;

It is their ambition to participate to the full extent of their, capabilities in the common defense, in which there can be no compartments specially reserved for one of the allies. In particular, they must participate in the production and control of the atomic weapons on which, to repeat, may depend their safety and their very survival.27

Summary

In summary, the above four major developments have been the source of much of the controversy over possession and control of nuclear weapons which now threatens the cohesion of the NATO Alliance. First, as a result of a great resurgence into the international mainstream, Europe seeks, a redefinition of her role in defense strategies.

Second, the proliferation of the nuclear capability has made it mandatory for non-nuclear states to either gain

27 General Paul Stehlin, o£. cit., p. 77. 57 that capability or to gain a degree of control over the use of that capability. Third, living in the shadow of

Soviet medium-range missiles has caused Europeans to seek some immediate means to counter that threat. Finally, the rising fears concerning the credibility of the American response in case of an attack upon Europe has caused

Europeans to seek a deterrent of their own. Generally, these factors have precipitated the present situation— a

situation marked by mutual dissatisfaction on the part of the allies and by a lessening of political effectiveness. CHAPTER V

THE QUESTION OP CONTROL

General

There are many uncertainties which beset the

Western Alliance today. Among these uncertainties, the most harrowing is the unanswered question of the control of nuclear weapons. With NATO strategy depending so heavily upon nuclear weapons, their control has been central to the alliance from the start. However, this question of control has become a matter for serious debate only in the last few years.

The question of the control, ownership, and de­ ployment of nuclear weapons is one of the critical problems facing the Alliance today. This problem represents a direct challenge to the solidarity and political coherence of the Western alliance system.

There are a number of reasons why this problem assumes such importance today.^ The most obvious reason is that the great preponderance of Allied military strength lies in the nuclear weapons that a few of its members possess. Consequently, the few who possess nuclear

^Alastair Buchan, NATO in the i960's (Rev. ed.; New York: P. A, Praeger, 19&3TT PP» 73-74. 59 weapons can exert far greater Influence than those who do not possess the nuclear capability. NATO strategy today is overwhelmingly a nuclear strategy and is likely to remain so. However, with the regeneration of economic strength and political self-confidence among the non-nuclear powers in NATO, they are no longer prepared to leave mili­ tary policy formulation just to the nuclear powers. The non-nuclear powers realize that any miscalculation in policy would be catastrophic to them as well as the nuclear powers.

Another reason why the question of the control of nuclear weapons has come to dominate inter-Allied dis­ cussion is that with the rise of the Soviet long-range striking capability, there has been some qualification of

America's guarantee of nuclear retaliation in case of aggression. It is not true that America is less ready now than it was 10 years ago to use nuclear weapons in response to major aggression in Europe, However, there have been many important changes in the international situation since the early days of NATO which require greater precision and caution in determining the circumstances which would justify the use of nuclear weapons. As Alastair Buchan writes : What is true is that the United States has to exercise greater caution and precision about the kinds of circumstances that would justify the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore, feels obliged to make clear that any concept 60

of automatic nuclear retaliation, to a Soviet demarche of any kind is ruled out. This in turn means that the President must exercise the very closest control over American nuclear weapons, whether based in Europe or elsewhere. Thus, the increasing delicacy of the nuclear balance of power makes the United States anxious to tighten its grip on the nuclear strategy of NATO at a time when politically her allies are no longer fully prepared to accept such close control.2

Another reason lies in the great diversification of types of nuclear weapons in the Western arsenals and the steady increase in the numbers of them in Europe. Some of the resulting problems of this proliferation were pointed out in the previous chapter. However, it should be noted here that it is not just a question of control of nuclear strategy which creates friction among the allies, there is also a deep concern over the actual control of the tactical nuclear weapons themselves.

A final reason for the importance of control today deals with the difficult relation of stability and confi­ dence within NATO to stability between NATO and the Soviet

Union. Again, as Buchan points out;

If nuclear weapons were like other weapons, much of the inter-allied tension to which they give rise could be solved, either by encouraging the smaller allies to develop their own or by distributing American weapons outright. But whatever arguments this might settle within NATO, it would create such apprehension on the Soviet side as to weaken the over-all position of the Alliance and increase the dangers of war out of all proportion.3

^Ibid,, p. 74. 3Ibid. 61

The history of NATO reflects a continuing search for ways to put into more effective practice the spirit of partnership. In this search, the obstacle over which statesmen have stumbled most frequently has been connected' with nuclear problems, and specifically, with the sharing of responsibilities for the control and use of nuclear weapons. The urgent importance of settling the nuclear control issue cannot be denied. Without doubt, it is the settlement of this issue which will largely determine the political fortunes of NATO in the years ahead.

Components of Nuclear Control

Semantics has also contributed some confusion to the issue of control. It is necessary to differentiate between control in the English sense of the word and control

in the French sense of the word. In the English sense,

control Implies physical disposition over the ultimate weapons, while in the French sense, control implies inspec­

tion and verification, irrespective of who is in physical

possession of the weapons.^ The endeavor of both Great

Britain and France to become atomic powers stemmed mainly

from a desire for a greater share in the co-determination

of nuclear strategy in the French sense of controls rather

4 Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the Nth Country," Foreign Affairs (April 1961), 62 than control In the English sense of physical disposition.5

Hence, nuclear control, or the sharing of nuclear control, can mean different things, since there are differ­ ent kinds of activities governing and supporting the use of nuclear weapons which are subject to control.° Sharing some of these activities more broadly might advance allied cohesion and security; sharing others might either reduce allied cohesion and security or have no effect at all. One might speak of these, several nuclear activities as the components of control.

The principal components are these: manufacture of weapons; ownership of weapons; custody of warheads; manning and operation of weapons; military command of weapons; planning the strategy for using nuclear weapons; the poli­ tical decision to use or not use nuclear weapons; and the political decisions to govern the use of nuclear weapons in c o m b a t , 7 Allies can share actual participation in these activities, or they can simply share information and con­ sult about them; both kinds of sharing could provide them with some assurance that their vital interests were

^Kurt Birrenbach, "The Reorganization of NATO," Orbis. Vol. VI (Summer 1962), p. 244. 6 Alastair Buchan, "The Reform of NATO," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 4o (January 1962). 7 Robert Osgood, Nuclear Control in NATO. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, I962, p. ÉÏ. 63 safeguarded. In addition, allies can share these activities

Independently or jointly. In public discussion, the.problem of nuclear sharing has related chiefly to the matter of who pulls the trigger and the safety catch— that is, which ally 8 or allies decides whether to use or not use nuclear weapons.

Approaches to Sharing Nuclear Control in NATO

Any discussion of nuclear control within NATO must recognize that no solution will fully satisfy all the desir­ able criteria. As in most foreign policy questions, each course has its advantages and weaknesses. The problem is to compare the merits and defects of the alternatives in order to make the best choice.

What should be the criteria for such a comparison?

It is generally accepted that any solution to the nuclear control problem should fulfill three basic requirements:

(1) It should reinforce Western unity. Whatever is done in the nuclear field should foster the progress and vitality of European integration and Atlantic partnership and should not undermine or weaken these constructive trends. (2) The solution should also assure responsible political control over the weapons and unify the deterrent. It should be designed to take full account of the integral character of the defense of the NATO area. (3) Finally, any solution should take account of the fact that the situation is still evolving and evolving rapidly. The shape of Europe is not yet finally determined. The relation between the emerging Europe and the United States also continues

3Ibid.. p. 22. 64

to develop. What is needed is to lay the basis for a constructive solution which can be worked toward over a period of time.9

Broadly, three approaches have been proposed for sharing nuclear control in NATO:

(1) The United States could share with its allies the planning, targeting, and guidelines for nuclear forces, while retaining the ultimate jdecision on use.

(2) National nuclear forces could be supported, with a view of eventually grouping them and some or all United

States strategic forces under some form of NATO force.

(3) An Integrated multilateral nuclear force could be created, composed either of Atlantic or European membership. 19

The selection of one of these approaches seems to Involve the answering of three vital questions. First, will the allies continue to accept American hegemony in- nuclear weapons and in the form Nation of nuclear strategy?

Secondly, what is the real value of national nuclear weapons programs? Finally, what is the desirability of creating a

European or Atlantic multilateral nuclear deterrent? The remainder of this chapter will deal with the first two of

9 Robert R. Bowie, "Strategy and Atlantic Alliance," The Atlantic Community edited by F. 0. Wilcox & H. P. Haviland, Jr. (New York : P. A. Praeger, 1963), p. 200.

^°Ibid. 65 these questions. The last question, that of a multilateral deterrent, will be considered in the following chapter.

United States Sharing of Planning

Greater sharing of data and cooperation in target­ ing and planning for nuclear defense seem highly desirable.

The United States has recognized that this is essential if the unity of the Alliance is to be maintained. During the past year, significant progress towards this end has been accomplished. At the Ottawa meeting of the North Atlantic

Council in May 1963, certain decisions were taken to accomplish this. These decisions included:

(1) Establishment by SACEUR on his staff of a Deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs. (2) Arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in coordination of operational planning at Omaha. (3) Fuller information to national authorities, both political and military.H

Steps have already been taken to implement these decisions. NATO officers have been introduced into the headquarters of the United States Strategic Air Command.

The Allied role in nuclear planning in the Supreme Head­ quarters has also been expanded. These arrangements represent considerable progress in allied strategic nuclear planning. Countries which hitherto had felt .excluded from

11 North Atlantic Council, Final Communique of Ministerial Meeting held in Ottawa, May 22-24, I963, paragraph 8. 66 the strategic deterrent on which the defense of the West depended, will now have an insight into its detailed working,

However, will a larger share in planning, guide­ lines, and targeting satisfy the other allies? Will it reconcile them to a virtual monopoly on the ultimate deci­ sion of use by the United States? It does not seem feasible that the European Allies will continue to accept American hegemony in nuclear affairs. For one thing, it is widely felt that nuclear weapons give governments possessing them a superior standing both in East-West negotiations in the general field of disarmament, and in the higher planning of strategy within the Alliance. This, coupled with the undoubted civilian benefit stemming from nuclear technology, provides incentive for countries to produce their own nuclear w e a p o n s . ^3

Another important factor to be considered is that the countries of the Alliance which do not possess their own nuclear weapons feel that they are discriminated against.

This is especially true of countries which have the techno­ logical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and who, at the same time, make a substantial contribution

12 Western European Union, Assembly, State of European Security, The NATO Nuclear Force, ftocumenF 290, Ninth Ordinary Session, 30 October 1^65. 13ibid. 67 to the conventional forces of the Alliance; Germany is obviously a case in point,

Finally, since there is no apparent defense against

ICBM’s, the credibility of the United States or any other nuclear deterrent as a means of preventing an attack on a non-nuclear country has been questioned. The Europeans ask: Why should an American President accept the inevitable reprisals against American cities which would surely result if the United States strategic forces were used in reply to an overwhelming attack on European territory? Though the

Europeans do not generally doubt the reliability of the

United States commitment, they fear the Russians m a y .^5

As noted earlier, with their enhanced confidence and revived strength, many European members Inevitably desire a larger part in the planning of NATO strategy and in the control over the forces for its defense. They now feel that a virtual monopoly in United States hands is no longer appropriate or acceptable. Thus., as Robert Bowie writes :

If this analysis is correct, the desire of other allies for a role in nuclear control is not likely to be satisfied solely by measures for sharing knowledge and planning. As has been said, such steps are overdue and should be valuable in solidifying the alliance and mitigating some types of doubts or concern. But they fall short of offering the Europeans a position as real partners, even for the future. They are likely.

^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. 68

in the long run, to feel that they remain wards of the United States, if the real power of decision rests indefinitely with the President of the United States.16

The Case for National Nuclear Forces

The origins of British and French national nuclear forces can be traced generally to a preoccupation with the potentially dire consequences of not possessing a national deterrent. The flow of nuclear technology east­ ward continued because none of NATO’s major powers on the

European side fully trusted its partner to the west to make good its commitment to the defense of the Alliance.

Britain did not entirely trust the United States to assign target priority to installations deemed important to Britain, and hence she constructed her own deterrent. France felt that she could not rely upon British strategy, and so she, too, sought her own national deterrent, 17 One of the reasons cited by the British for deciding to manufacture their own nuclear weapons was that there should be an inde­ pendent deterrent on the European side of the Atlantic.

The British, because of their special wartime relationship with the United States atomic energy program, received

American assistance. The French were not able to reconcile

16 Bowie, 0£. cit., p. 204.

17 Dougherty, o£. cit. , p. 375. 69 themselves to the American view that it was safe for nuclear weapons be given to England, but most dangerous for them to be given to France. The British acquisition of the capability and the assurance thereby gained that

Britain would continue to play a significant role in the formulation of United States policy towards Europe spurred 18 the French to embark upon their own nuclear weapons program.

A growing concern of such proliferation, however, is that the logical climax of such a process would be an insistence by West Germany upon the right to attain nuclear parity with her West European allies. Such a climax seems logical because, of all the countries of Western Europe, the Federal Republic could make out the best case on the basis of both strategic need and technological competence.^9

United States concern with the ability to fight a centrally controlled general war against a single target system has caused her to be extremely hostile to the exist- ? n ence of national nuclear forces within the Alliance,^ As

Secretary McNamara and others have said, national nuclear forces in Europe (1) are expensive; (2) are seriously divi­ sive; and (3) fragment the NATO strategic force.21

^^Ibid., p. 374. ^^Ibid., p. 376.

Z^Henry Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," The Reporter. XXVIII (March 28, 1963), p. 22.

21gecretary McNamara, Address at University of Michigan, Transcript printed in New York Times, June 17, 1963. 70

The requirement for central control is interpreted to mean that strategic nuclear weapons of the alliance must be integrated and responsive to a single chain of command. In line with this, current Department of Defense thinking indicates hostility towards the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Secretary McNamara holds that use of tactical nuclear weapons involves grave risks of escalation and should not be considered as a substitute for conventional defense. The corollary to tactical nuclear weapons is to be able to resist conventional attack with conventional forces. To achieve this, the United States feels that the European contribution to NATO should be in the field of conventional defense.22

Pew Europeans agree with the American judgment about the feasibility of a purely conventional defense of Europe.

Most of them believe that a great gap in conventional power exists and that this gap can only be compensated with nuclear weapons. Their judgment may be mistaken, but the

United States must remember that she has no advantage in experience over the Europeans in the analysis of conventional war. Europeans have a compelling incentive to strive for a strategy that poses the threat of maximum devastation for the Soviets. They prefer, a strategy that seems to magnify

22 Kissinger, 0£. cit., pp. 22-26 . 71 the risks of the aggressor rather than reduce the losses of the defender,

To understand the European general reaction to these propositions, it is Important to compare them to what has been the traditional NATO doctrine. This doctrine was that the conventional ground forces were the "shield"

and the nuclear forces the "sword". It was a part of MATO

strategy that a massive Soviet attack on Central Europe would be met with some form of nuclear retaliation immediate­

ly; conventional forces were to deal only with minor probes by the Communists, That most Europeans accepted this

doctrine is indicated by Kissinger:

Most Europeans have been convinced . . . in large scale by previous U,S, policy makers . , , that deterrence would be enhanced by confronting the Soviets with the strong likelihood that ma,1or aggression against Europe would mean nuclear war.

However, certain elements within the old strategy were replaced with new guidelines during the Kennedy

Administration, This change in emphasis served to heighten

European doubts with respect to the continued validity of the American response. To many, particularly the French,

it reaffirmed the necessity for Western Europe to have its

own national nuclear forces in order to insure their vital

interests.

23lbid., p, 26,

Z^lbid.. p. 23, 72

Robert Osgood presents a useful summary of the reasons usually advanced by Europeans In favor of national forces;

(1) To obtain a more credible and reliable deterrent to military incursions that the United States might not counter with American-controlled nuclear weapons; (2) To gain greater protection against "nuclear blackmail"; (3) To contribute to the West's combined deterrent posture by supplementing America’s nuclear striking force ; (4) To support political and military courses of action, including those outside the NATO area, that the U.S. might not be willing to back at the risk of her own military involvement ; (5) To enhance bargaining power and influence vis-a-vis the U.S. and other allies in matters of foreign policy, military strategy, and disarmament; (6) To enjoy the most impressive military attribute of national autonomy and prestige and avoid dependence upon another nation's control of this fateful weapon; (7) To avoid being left out of an. expanding nuclear club.25

General Norstad expressed a similar summary in more psychological terms when he spoke:

Most Europeans, perhaps all, believe that nuclear weapons in some number and established in some appropriate organization structure, are essential to their defense. There flows from this a wish for a guarantee that weapons on which they must place dependence for the preservation of their freedom will continue to be available. Further, . they wish an influence, some reasonable voice, in making decisions governing the use of nuclear weapons. As sovereign states, they feel that they

25 Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling-Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 259-260* 73 need this to fulfill their ^^tles to.their people as well,as to the Alliance.2<

However, there has been a growing consensus among

Western strategic analysts, not only Americans but

Europeans as well, that National nuclear deterrents do not make a great deal of sense. To the extent that they already exist in Britain and Prance, their reason in being is more political than military.

The efforts to create national deterrents, even with U.S. assistance, cannot but drain the resources— economic and technological— of any European power. Another common fear is that the concentration upon nuclear policy is likely to divert attention away from needed conventional strength. As pointed out earlier, proliferation of nuclear forces tends to create greater incentive for still other countries to seek to acquire the capability. Such prolifera­ tion heightens the danger of accidental occurrences, strategic miscalculations and other events which might precipitate a global conflagration. The further diffusion of nuclear weapons also complicates the problems of arms 2ft control.

Another compelling case against additional national

General Lauris Norstad, "Authority Over Nuclear Weapons," Vital Speeches, XXIX (February 15, 1963), p. 259

27oougherty, 0£. cit., p. 376. 28 Ibid.. p. 377. 74 deterrents rests on purely military calculations: Can a British or a French national deterrent really deter?

The thesis that a small nuclear power, wielding a few instruments of retaliation, could deter a large nuclear power is no longer plausible in this era of sophisticated second-strike capability. Bombers or missiles exposed above the ground are no longer secure. In order to have an effective deterrent, there must be a substantial degree of invulnerability. It must be dispersed or mobile, protected against blast, and made secure against the dis­ ruption of command and control systems. It is not possible for the European deterrents to reach this degree of sophistication in the forseeable future.^9

The political effects of national forces are bound to be divisive within NATO. The French force is mainly a means for political primacy: a symbol to distinguish her from Germany and Italy. It reflects de Gaulle's concept of Europe, based on nation-states, cooperating under French hegemony. In essence, this concept' is contrary to the goals of the European Community. Thus, assistance to the French effort would endorse de Gaulle's concept of Europe and would probably Jeopardize support for real integration within Western Europe. Assistance to Britain has much the same effect. The conservative government's attempt to show

29 ^Ibid. 75 that the British force is the keystone of an independent

British foreign policy reveals a certain ambiguity in their approach to Europe. American assistance to this force appears to offer support to this ambiguous attitude.3^

The American position on national nuclear forces was stated by Under Secretary of State Ball when he pointed out that he felt such a course on the part of the

European allies would start the Alliance down a road beset

With dangers:

First. the development of national nuclear systems, by one nation and then another, could not help but heighten the feelings of mistrust within the Alliance. At the same time, it would increase the tensions between the free world and the Bloc. Second, the multiplication of national deterrents would multiply the chance that . . . at some point . . . nuclear weapons might fall under the control of an irresponsible government. Third, the multiplication of national deterrents' would render progressively more difficult the achievement of an ultimate agreement to control or limit nuclear armament.31

It appears that the real motivation behind the

British and French national nuclear forces is more political than Just military strategy. As James Dougherty writes:

Political rather than strategic factors prompt de Gaulle to exploit the national nuclear deterrent as a lever not only against the Soviet bloc but also against the Anglo-American leadership of the Western alliance— perhaps more the latter than the former. . . . But the Europeans who have supported

30 Bowie, op. cit.. p. 207.

3lQeorge W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," Department of State, Press Release Nr. 224, April 26, 1963. 76

the Idea of national deterrents are by no.means hypnotized by a strategy which culminates in suicide; they are not motivated in formulating government policy by any collective death instinct. On the contrary, they seem convinced that there are vital positive political purposes to be achieved along the path which they have chosen.32

Summary

In considering the problems of control of nuclear weapons, it appears that it is the political problems associated with them which require solution; the technical ones were disposed of long ago. The scientists of this century have perfected the ultimate in weapons of destruc- tlon--the long-range ballistic missile with a thermonuclear warhead— while their political contemporaries have, as yet, developed only the crudest machinery for the political control of the Western Alliance and of the weapons which ensure its security.

After considering the over-all problem in this chapter, it is possible to answer the two questions referred to at the beginning. First, it is quite obvious that the European allies will no longer accept American hegemony in nuclear weapons and in the formulation of nuclear strategy. Continued dependence upon the United

States is the antithesis of their economic and nolitical

32 Dougherty, o£. cit. . p. 380. 77 resurgence. Secondly, the European national nuclear programs seem to have only dubious value. They meet few military requirements and only complicate the political picture. More Important, they greatly Increase the prob­ lems of control. Even in the face of such judgments, one must realize that Europe, like the rest of the world, recognizes that there is a powerful appeal of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national greatness and as an instru­ ment of diplomatic influence. With no other alternative, it is no surprise that certain powers of Western Europe have chosen this course. As Robert Osgood notes:

When security depends so heavily on the power to meet an attack with nuclear weapons, one must expect that those nations who can develop a nuclear force will seek their own, if it is the only alternative to depending entirely upon the . United States force.33

33 Robert E. Osgood, Nuclear Control In NATO, op. cit., p. 8. CHAPTER VI

THE UNITED STATES CASE FOR THE

MULTILATERAL FORCE

General

The development of nuclear weapons policy in the

NATO Alliance has reflected, a continuing tension between the preferences of the United States to retain exclusive control of these weapons and the desire of European govern­ ments to participate in this control or to deploy their own nuclear forces. However, as has been pointed out, it appears that it is no longer feasible or possible for the

United States to continue her monopoly over Western Europe’s nuclear affairs. Likewise, it also appears that the proli­ feration of national nuclear forces is full of dangers, both to the United States and to the European members of

NATO. What then is the alternative?

The United States government considered that the alternatives to concentrating nuclear power under one government or proliferating power among many must lie in some arrangement for the pooling of effort bn a basis of international management and control. In the fall of I960, after full consideration of alternative courses. President

Elsenhower decided that the U.S. should be prepared to

support the concept of a multilateral sea-based MRBM force. 79 Such a concept was presented to NATO in December 1960.^

When the Kennedy Administration came to office, further studies were conducted on the concept. Later, President

Kennedy reaffirmed the U.S. willingness to go forward with a multilateral sea-based MRBM force.

Thus, though some forms of the plan had been mentioned earlier, it was not until the Nassau meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan that anything beyond the "concept" stage was attempted.

The Nassau Agreement

At Nassau, the United States and Britain called for the creation of an international nuclear force to protect the North Atlantic area and immediately invited France to join it as their partner. After three days of negotiations.

President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan announced that they had settled their differences over missiles for

Britain with a plan for the establishment of a "multilateral

NATO nuclear force.

The differences referred to in this instance stemmed mainly from the "Skybolt" issue. Earlier, the British

^Robert Neumann, "European and the Nuclear Weapons Issue," Europa-Archiv (Bonn), Mr, 17 (September 1963).

2 Wallace Carroll, "Leaders Propose MATO Atom Force," New York Times, December 22, 1962, p. 1, 80

Government had given clear indication that it was determined to maintain its own independent nuclear striking force, even in the face of Kennedy Administration opposition to the maintenance of such forces even by its closest allies.3

The immediate cause of the trouble was the decision by the

United States to abandon the development and the production of Skybolt for its own purposes. This- decision had been conveyed to Britain by Secretary McNamara only a short time earlier. Britain had been counting on the Skybolt, developed entirely at American expense, to use with its jet bombers and thus give it an independent striking force until the early 1970's.^ It was during these discussions to settle

Britain's "embarrassing position" that the United States agreed to substitute the Polaris missile for the Skybolt missile, thus paving the way for a NATO nuclear force.

These were the main elements of the agreement and proposals:9

(1) The United States agreed to sell Britain the

Polaris sub marine-borne missile in place of the Skybolt missile. The British will equip the Polaris with their own warheads and will design.and build their own nuclear submarines to carry the missile.

^Ibid., p. 3.

^Ibld.

^'Texts on Kennedy-Macmlllan Talks," New York Times, December 22, 1963, p. 3. 81

(2) Britain agreed that the Polaris missile systems acquired in this way will become part of a NATO nuclear force and will have their targets designated by

NATO. Only if "supreme national interests" were at stake would the British use them for any purpose other than the defense of the Western alliance.

(3) The United States guaranteed to match this

British contribution to the proposed NATO nuclear force with "at least equivalent forces". These U.S.-British forces would be made available for inclusion in a "NATO multilateral nuclear force."

(4) The United States and Britain agreed that they would Immediately contribute to NATO part of their existing nuclear forces.

(5) The United States offered to sell France

Polaris equipment under the same conditions offered

Britain. These French missile systems would also then be put under NATO command.

Upon conclusion of the matter, Americans said that the proposed arrangements would go a long way to meet three of the major objectives of the Kennedy

Administration :

1. Recognition among the allies that the nuclear war is "indivisible"— that is, that the use of even feeble nuclear forces of Britain or Prance would inevitably set off an all-out nuclear war. 2. Prevention of the spread of national nuclear forces and gradual integration of the existing forces into a coordinated effort. 82 3. Recognition that strategic nuclear forces— even.those as powerful as the United States now possesses— are not an infallible deterrent to an aggressor. Powerful conventional forces are needed as well to deal effectively with all forms of political and military aggression,6

Thus, "multilateral NATO nuclear force" became the phrase most closely associated with the Nassau meeting.

The concept of this force was described by a member of the ■

State Department:

It would be a fleet of surface warships, armed with Polaris missiles., owned, controlled and manned Jointly by a number of NATO nations. The force would be under the military command of an allied officer and under the general policy direction of a Board of high officials of the participating nations. The force would be open to any NATO member willing to assume a fair share of the costs and responsibilities. No nation’s share could exceed hO%, The force would be manned by a mix of officers and crews from participating nations. Each ship would be manned by nationals of at least three countries, with no nation providing more than 4o% of the personnel in any ship. Firing of the missiles in wartime would be by decision of an agreed number of participants including the United States.7

However, out of the meeting emerged three important questions: (1). Was NATO on the way towards becoming a formidable force? (2) Had Britain's Skybolt dilemma been resolved? (3) How would the highly individualistic General de Gaulle react to the proposal?

^Carroll, o£. cit., p. 3.

"^Gerard C, Smith, "Problems of Foreign Policy in* Connection with the Nuclear Defense of NATO,’’ Department of State Press Release Nr. 178, April 22, 1964, p. 5. 83 As for NATO, certainly a start had been made toward a Western nuclear "sword" to supplement the "shield" of conventional arms; but whether it was and could be more than a start was still uncertain, especially because of the various national feelings involved. As for Britain's

Skybolt problem, the immediate impasse had been breached.

However, there were still questions whether she could stand the expense involved and whether her demand for nuclear independence could be satisfied. Finally, as for General de Gaulle, it was still questionable whether he would agree to the Polaris offer in view of his Insistence on a fully independent nuclear force. In a way, de Gaulle held the Q key to the entire solution proposed at Nassau,

Involved in all of this was another central issue.

This was the issue of American leadership, which had hitherto always been expressed in most emphatic terms of nuclear independence. For the Europeans, the question remained whether the United States was to retain what is, in effect, a monopoly of Western nuclear power.

Negotiation and Response

The first significant European response to the

Nassau proposals was not long in coming. At his news conference on January 15» 1963, President de Gaulle turned

8 "Pact of Nassau," New York Times, December 24, 1962, p, 9. 84 down the United States proposal for an Integrated Atlantic nuclear force. "Prance has taken note of the Anglo-

American Bahamas agreement. Considering its content, undoubtedly no one will be astonished at the fact that we cannot subscribe to It."9 President de Gaulle pointed out that it would be useless for the French to buy the Polaris missiles because they have neither the nuclear warheads to arm them with nor the submarines in which to put then. He made it quite plain, however, that France would continue its own development of nuclear forces:

Thus, principles and realities have joined in causing France to equip herself with an atomic force which will be her own. . . . France intends to have her own national d e f e n s e . 10

In his discussion of defense matters. President de Gaulle implied that since the United States was far from Europe, France must continue to equip herself with an independent nuclear force, rather than rely on exclusively

American nuclear protection which might be wanting in a purely European showdown. He indicated that the whole picture of nuclear defense changed the moment Russia achieved nuclear status:

. . . above all, deterrence is now a Russian as well as an American achievement, which means that In the event of a general atomic war there would Inevitably be appalling and perhaps mortal destruction in both countries. In these conditions no one in ■ the world, and especially in America, could say if.

9 ^ Keeslng's Contemporary Archives, January 19-26, 1963, p. 19I98I

^°Ibld. 85 where, when, how, and in what measure, American nuclear weapons would be used to defend Europe,H

Lastly, President de Gaulle answered the frequent

United States criticism that France’s nuclear arms would be,Inferior and Impotent:

It Is perfectly true that the quality of nuclear arms with which we shall be able to equip ourselves with will be far from equivalent to the mass of those of the two giants of today. But since when has it been proved that a people must remain deprived of the most effective weapons on the ground that its principal possible adversary and its principal friend have means very superior to its o w n ? i 2

Thus, one question which emerged at the Nassau conference was answered. President de Gaulle and France would have no part of the Nassau proposals. Further,

France remained committed towards achieving her own nuclear deterrent and would have nothing to do with any arrangement which abrogated her authority in the use of those weapons. This general attitude of France has been restated In many Instances since, and continues to be one of her key policies.

Despite President de Gaulle’s rejection of the

United States offer of Polaris missiles for Prance, inten­ sive diplomatic activity continued between the United States and other Interested member-governments of NATO with ,a view of Implementing the Nassau proposals.

^^Ibld.

^^Ibld. 86 Mr, George Ball, Under Secretary of State, explained the Anglo-American proposals to .the NATO Council and to the German government In early January 1963» German

Defense Minister Von Hassel Indicated that the Federal

Government was prepared to contribute to a NATO multi- ' lateral force "In accordance with its capacity.

The proposed multilateral force was discussed by

President Kennedy and Italian Prime Minister Fanfani in

Washington in January 1963. The joint communique stated that Prime Minister Fanfani had "expressed great interest" in the proposals and agreed that they "should receive the most serious consideration of all members of the Alliance."I^

President Kennedy announced later in January that he had appointed Ambassador Livingston Merchant as head of a special team to prepare and negotiate United States proposals for a multilateral NATO nuclear force. Ambassador .

Merchant departed for Europe and a round of discussions with European allies.

A major modification of the proposed force was made by the United States on February 20, 1963. The

State Department declared:

In considering a NATO multilateral nuclear force, we believe a seaborne force ban be either surface or submarine— -or both— . . , . U.S. studies indicate

^^Ibid.. May 4-11, 1963, p. 19389.

^^Ibld.. p. 19390. 87 that it would be advantageous to equip the forces with surface ships at least initially.15

The apparent change In the United States conception of the NATO force gave rise to much comment from the allies, even though the possibility of using surface ships had been referred to earlier at the December meeting of the

NATO Council by Secretary McNamara.

In a statement on February 26, the U.S. Information

Service gave an explanation of Ambassador Merchant's mission and the current American views:

Mr. Merchant Is In Europe to explore what American officials call the degree of willingness and enthusiasm with which NATO Allies are pre­ pared to participate In a truly multilateral NATO nuclear force. His mission Is to determine the feasible arrangements for such a force, which In American eyes can only be effective if European nations— at least two or three of them— are prepared to share In Its creation, its management, Its operation, and its costs.16

As details later developed, the seaborne-force would consist of a surface fleet of 25 ships armed with 200 missiles. The estimated cost of this force was

$500,000,000 over a 10 year period.

From the beginning, the German government indicated a great interest In the plan and a general acceptance of

^^Ibid.

^^Ibld.

^^Sydney Gruson, "British Wary on Sharing Cost of a Nuclear Fleet," New York Times, March 12, I963., p. 1. 88

Its proposals. Lack of voice in nuclear matters had long been a concern of theirs. The MLF plan offered them some degree of control, and certainly a significant voice in nuclear deliberations. Thus, In February I963 the Federal

Republic announced it was prepared to take part In a surface-borne force, adding that it had Informed President de Gaulle of Its rèadlness to agree to a multilateral force, and that the French government had approved of the

West German decision.

The United States views on the MLF proposals were presented to the NATO Permanent Council by Ambassador

Merchant on February 27, 1963. At this time It was reported that

members of NATO have given a generally very satisfactorily reception to the project for forminer a multilateral seaborne force . . . backine: is seen coming from four NATO members— Britain, Federal Republic, Italy, and Belgium— and Is looked for as well from Turkey, Greece, and the Netherlands. . . .19

After the shift to a surface-borne fleet, British 4 public opinion greatly cooled toward the oroposal. In negotiations, the British government emphasized that it was not committed though it had given general acceptance to the political concept behind the project. As was reported from London:

^^Ibld.

^9ibid. 89 No one here Is trying to hide the British military's skepticism over the American- sponsored project. There Is also a large, and apparently, growing, body of political opinion against It.20

Britain's hesitancy stemmed from questions she had con­

cerning the difficulties of operating with mixed crews,

the vulnerability of surface ships, and the type of

communication system to b e ■established to control it.

Also, she had considerable reservation about the eventual 21 costs of the plan.

The European responses noted thus far were the

official government views. In most cases, however, the

responses of the press in each country were far less

favorable to the American proposal. Many members of the

press questioned the feasibility of the plan and America's

motives in attempting to implement It.

The British press showed only modest interest in

Ambassador Merchant's mission and generally concluded that

it had failed to generate any real support on the continent

for a multilateral force.

The independent London Times and liberal Manchester Guardian did, however, concede some political value to the plan in terms of advancing European Integration and preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some liberal and labor elements, while opposed to a British national deterrent, did express

20sydney Gruson, "U.S. Admiral Opens Talks in Britain on Atom Fleet," New York Times,-June 5, 1963, p. 1.

^^Ibld., p. 6. 90 preference for a continued U.S. monopoly as being more conducive to an East-West detente. In their opinion any NATO controlled nuclear force would be a lesser evil than a Franco-German cooperative, effort. The prospect of-a West German voice, however limited, in nuclear matters was a major source of concern to the British p r e s s . 22

■ Surprisingly, the German press was even more negative

In their response to the MLP proposal. At the same time, despite its negative approach, the West German oress recog­ nized that one of the major motivations was the U.S. desire to give the Federal Republic a sense of nuclear participation within the Western Alliance system. Still, this recognition did not prevent them from generally attacking the proposal.

With respect to U.S. motives. It was commonly believed that the conflicting pressures of Congressional Insistence on U.S. nuclear monopoly and Administration desires to head off attempts of potential nuclear powers to emulate de Gaulle had caused the American to react as they did. Nonetheless, the feelingjwas widespread that more could be expected of U.S. leadership than the offer of a solution to a paramount problem which. It was assumed, this leadership did not believe in Itself and which some media felt was absurd and even disingenuous. Perhaps the most sensitive of themes underlying West German press criticism was the fear that the multilateral national force plan was Just another indication that the U.S. had decided on a policy of nuclear "thinning out" or even disengagement In West Europe, Many papers expressed the view that what was Important was not so much the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force but rather of proce­ dures which would insure a West German voice in strategic planning and its implementation, even though the U.S. President would have ultimate res­ ponsibility for nuclear decisions. By contrast, a few voices asserted that the status quo with its

^^Unlted States Information Agency, "Western European Press Cold to U.S. Proposal for a Multilateral NATO Nuclear Force," R-6O-63 (AE), April 5, I963, 91 total reliance on U.S. nuclear might was preferable to the schemes advanced thus f a r . ^3

In view of France's special position, it was not surprising that a majority of French papers were skeptical as to the effectiveness of Ambassador Merchant's negotia­ tions which started In Paris and ended in London. Many

French papers tended to look at the reaction in other

European countries as confirming their opinion as to the difficulty. If not improbability, of converting the United

States proposal into reality.

Skepticism ranged from practical doubts as to the possibilities of an MLF to outright and unqualified rejection,■culminating in extreme statements such as that of General Gallois who termed the MLF project a "farce" consisting of multilateral costs. More representative of majority opinion was the editorial comment of Raymond Aron who wrote in conservative ^ Figaro that Western defense was Indivisible and that most Europeans would prefer a very powerful United States nuclear deterrent to a very minor French one, provided that the principles of equal partnership was adopted by the United States.24

Thus, both public and official response to the

Nassau MLF proposal since Its inception has covered the gauntlet— from modest acceptance to complete rejection.

In between the tv;o extremes are many variants and degrees of acceptability. Negotiations are going, forward in an attempt to reach some agreement upon which firm plans and decisions can be based. These negotiations reoresent a

^^Ibid.

^Ibid, 92 continuing challenge to the perseverance and ingenuity of both American and West European dinlomats.

Problem Areas

The agreement reached at Nassau by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan was naturally a broad concept.

It did not spell out the many details that would have to be decided In the creation of such a multilateral force. In the negotiations since, there have been many doubts expressed as to its worth. Many penetrating questions have been raised and the interest is worldwide. It is being discussed on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This is natural ■ since the

Idea of a multilateral nuclear force has become the keystone of our MATO nuclear policy. To date, the proposal has had a checkered history.

Many instinctively suspect that any such novel plan

Is an unworkable gimmick. Thus, the MLF has been received with considerable skepticism from both sides of the Atlantic.

There have been expressions from some U.S. military officers that the MLF is operationally impractical and militarily

Ineffective; some Congressional leaders have been quite

cool to the plan for fear the exclusive control of warheads by the United States v;ill be endangered; and some academic

analysts consider the MLF militarily superfluous and politically unnecessary or disadvantageous.Nevertheless,

25Robert E, Osgood, The Case for the MLF: A Critical Evaluation, The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 196 4, p. To. (Hereafter referred to as:- Osgood, The Case for MLF). 93 there has developed some knowledgeable support for the proposal, both within the United States and Europe. This

Is so because many Individuals feel that this is the only feasible alternative to the problem of sharing and control.

The discussions and controversies over the MLF proposal have tended to converge upon four vital questions.

These questions are; First, would it be operationally feasible to create it? Second, would it be militarily useful? Third, what, political purpose would it serve? Finally, how would it be controlled?26 in order to gain a clear picture of the MLF, it Is necessary to examine each of these questions.

Operational Feasibility

It Is commonly said, by supporters and critics alike, that the primary purpose of the'MLF is political.

Without doubt, the proposal was motivated out of political necessities. However, it is not likely that a force which has no military purpose can serve any useful political purpose. Therefore, one must subject even a primarily political device to a certain amount of military scrutiny when it assumes a military form. Though generally accepted that the MLF is primarily political, most of the criticisms directed towards it stem from'a doubt in its operational

26 Interview with Mr.■ Philander Claxton, op. cit. Also Osgood, The Case for MLF, op. cit. 94 feasibility.

Those who doubt the operational feasibility of the MLF stress two aspects of the proposal: First, that the force is to be placed on surface ships; and second, that these ships are to be manned with mixed crews of various nationalities.

Most criticism against the surface force has centered on the question of relative survivability. Much of the criticism on this point is argued on the comparative safety of one surface ship as compared to one submarine. A more meaningful comparison, however, would be the survivability of a smaller number of submarines as compared to a force of surface vessels several times larger, since this is the ratio dictated by the cost factor.^8

In 1962, the United States Navy commenced a series of studies to determine what would be the best mode for such a force should it come into being, i.e. a submarine or surface ship force. The results of this study were indicated by Admiral Claude Ricketts, Vice-Chief of Naval

Operations:

Our conclusion was that, for this particular force, It would be preferable that it be a surface ship mode. Immediately after the Nassau Agreement, we again reviewed these studies, refined them and made new ones to determine whether or not our

^"^Osgood, The Case for the MLF, p. 11.

P ft Neumann, on. cit. 95 conclusion was still valid today. These studies verified our previous conclusion, and we again recommended the surface ship mode.29

There were several factors which led the study group to this conclusion. First, the time to get the first ship operating and the over-all time required for creation of the entire force was much less for. the surface ships. It was estimated that by adopting surface ships the time required would be less than 75% of the time required to create the submarine force.

A second factor which entered Into the conclusions was cost. The cost of the surface mode was again less than 75% of the submarine force.

A third factor that favored the surface ships was the relative simplicity in operation of the surface ship as compared to the submarine. The submarine is far more complicated, and safety factors enter heavily in the operation of the submarine. Likewise, the time required to train personnel to operate the submarine Is considerably longer than that required to train men to operate the surface missile warship.

Another factor was the relative simplicity of

^Admiral Claude Ricketts, "The Multilateral Force," a mimeographed copy distributed by the Department of State of an article which appeared in European Review (Summer 1963). 30 Ibid. 96 logistic support of the surface ship. For the submarine, a special pipeline of spare parts is constantly required wherever the ship operates. Likewise, specially designed overhaul and upkeep facilities are required to be manned by personnel highly trained for this purpose. For the conventional-powered surface missile warship, virtually any port that a surface shin can visit would be suitable for entry.

A final factor was that of survivability. Analysis of the probability of survival of surface ships was detailed and extensive. In comparing the relative survivability between the surface ship and the submarine, it is obvious that the submarine has a higher degree of survivability.

However, as Admiral Ricketts points out, this is not the primary question. The primary question is this;

Does the surface ship have a sufficiently high probability of survival that, in actuality, it is an effective weapons system, that retaliation by it is inevitable, and there is no foreseeable way in which an enemy could destroy this capability for inevitable and massive retaliation?

The result of the analysis showed that the answer to these questions is unequivocally "yes",

Now, let us turn to the second aspect of operational

feasibility which is often criticized— the mixed manning by various nationalities. Those who doubt the feasibility

31 Ibid. 97 of this aspect of the MLP stress the difficulties of recruiting, training, and administering an efficient multi­ national military organization in the face of national differences of language, pay, discipline, career structures, skills, food, religion, and social customs. Without doubt, this is indeed a unique problem.

However, Naval experts, both American and Allied, have extensively studied the issue and have come up with the conclusion that they are fully satisfied that the issues involved can be solved. They think that operating with mixed crews of various nationalities would be nowhere near as difficult as some people have said.^^ One reason is that the numbers involved are small. It appears that the MLF would be operated by an elite corps of about seven thousand men, who would be very carefully selected and trained to­

gether for several years. Only a fraction of these men would be assigned the technically demanding military tasks

.connected with firing the missiles.33

As the United States government has pointed out, mixed manning is not new. Mixed manning has been

successfully carried out for prolonged periods in the

32 Honorable Gerard C. Smith, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State, Department of State, Press Release Nr. 178, April 22, 1964.

33 ■ Osgood, The Case for the MLF, pp. 11-12, 98 turnover of U.S. naval vessels to foreign navies. Crews

of a number of European allied nations manned some British

ships in World War II.3^ There are even earlier precedents

as well;

In a letter to the London Times, Alan Villiers pointed out that to the very end of the sailing era large British, American, and Scandinavian square riggers were mixed manned. Mr. Villiers, who served on one such ship, says that use of eleven nationalities was commonplace. ’Nationality did not enter into the matter. Competence did. . . . The square rigger was an exacting ship to sail. Surely what these men did, down the centuries, could be carried on by a few trained men in powered NATO ships.'35

Military Utility

Another often quoted criticism of the MLF has been

directed chiefly against its alleged redundancy as a military force. AsAlastair Buchan points out,

it is fair to say that there is considerable skepticism as to whether SACEUR needs a force of this range at his disposal, and whether he could conceivably employ it without invoking general thermonuclear war throughout the Northern Hemisphere.36

This criticism raises two questions; Is the MLF needed militarily? Would the projected force be militarily

effective? Regarding the first question, if the question

3^Honorable Gerard Smith, op. cit.

35Meumann, o^. clt.

^^Alastair Buchan, NATO in the I96O ’s (Rev. ed.; New York: ^ . A. Praeger, 1963), p.. 91. 99 means is it essential to create such a force for military reasons, then the answer is probably "no".37 if such a force is not created the United States will have no choice but to provide sufficient nuclear weapons to cover whatever targets the NATO area requires. That, however, is not the legitimate question .if it is assumed that there are other reasons why European members wish to participate in this activity. The question is then, as Robert Bowie indicates,

"If such a force is to be created, will it have a legiti­ mate military role?"^^ The answer here is "yes", because the weapons will be part of the total NATO deterrent and the force will play its part in meeting the targets to be covered. Also, it is impossible to know what the world situation will be like ten years hence when this force is in full operation.

Certainly, we are sure of one thing— that there will be advances— that the situation will not be the same then as now. Some of our systems of today may well be obsolescent, or perhaps obsolete . at that time. The lead-time required to bring into being new weapons systems is long, usually years. Certainly,, we have no alternative to our keeping the lead that we now have in nuclear retaliatory strength. Superiority comes not only from numbers and yields of weapons, but also from a diversity of delivery systems.39

37Admiral Claude Ricketts, op. cit.

33Robert Bowie, Address to the Assembly of the Western European Union, Western European Union, A/WEU (9) CR 9,-Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3, 1963.

^^Admiral Claude Ricketts, po. cit. 100

Would the proposed force be militarily effective?

The U.S. Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, after a long study, have concluded that the

MLF would be militarily effective and a useful element 40 of NATO’s strategic deterrent forces. General Norstad, and General Lemnitzer after him, have stated that the MLF could help to meet a military requirement of their command.

As presently planned, the MLF would have Polaris A-3 missiles of great penetration capacity. These missiles would be useable for all the purposes of deterrence and defense of Europe for which the weapons of U.S. Polaris submarines are capable. They would be effective against many missile sites, airfields, and other targets threatening European nations of the NATO Alliance. These missiles would be assigned to NATO and placed under the operational control of SACEUR. They would be targeted by SACEUR and be included in NATO strategic plans.%1

Political Value

The most substantial criticisms of the MLF question is its political value. Opponents charge that the MLF will not prevent France from going ahead with her nuclear program but will only alienate her and impede her recovery

of self-esteem and internal stability. They also charge

that the MLF will split the alliance by creating a power­

ful American-German axis, will obstruct a Franco-German

approachment, will thviart the achievement of 9 closer

4o Honorable Gerard C. Smith, 0£. clt.

^^Ibid. 101

European community including Britain as a member of the

Common Market, and. will nurture the desire while providing the avenue for Germany’s acquisition of nuclear control free of an American veto.^^

The best answer to these criticisms is simply to point out that the alternatives of doing nothing or supporting de.Gaulle’s nuclear designs are much more likely to lead to serious divisions within the alliance and to a

German nuclear force than the MLF. Few people will say that the MLF is the perfect solution to the problem of nuclear control in the alliance. However, it is the only arrangement that anyone has suggested that stands much chance of alleviating the "German problem" in the immediate future.^3

If France’s nuclear effort involved only a conflict between French and American interests without any relation to other allies, then there would be .Tittle reason for an

MLF. However, it is quite clear that the force de frappe affects the vital interests of the entire alliance. The center of this concern impinges upon, the German Federal

Republic. To Europe, as well as the United States, the prospect of Germany acquiring or even seeking an independent

42 . Osgood, The Case for the MLF, p. 20.

43 Ibid. , pp. 20-21. 102 nuclear force presents a much more serious problem than the force de frappe. Because of Germany is history and geographic position, a German nuclear force would create strains within the alliance, and between the alliance and the Soviet Bloc.

However, if France continues in its belief that a great and self-respecting state must have its own nuclear weapons to protect its special interests, how long will a resurgent and vulnerable Germany accept a non-nuclear status? Even if France appeals to Germany to commit its future to a European coalition under the leadership of

France, how long would Germany be content to be dependent upon the French nuclear trigger? As Robert Osgood points out, "the answers are uncertain, but the questions are 4 % disconcerting."

President de Gaulle aims to create a coalition of the Common Market countries built upon the coordination of defense and foreign policies. This coalition is to be under French leadership and no longer entirely dependent upon the United States deterrent. The American government, on the other hand, aims to preserve and perfect a closely integrated military alliance under American leadership, A proclaimed United States goal has always been for a

4 4 ijc Ibid. Ibid. 103 "united Europe", However, it would much prefer to have

Britain included in that membership.

It has been these opposing French and American views on the organization of Europe and on the relationship between Europe and the United States that has led to different conclusions about the merits of the MLF. Clearly, the MLF would obstruct de Gaulle's plan for Europe, On the other hand, neither would it facilitate the creation of a unified and multilateral independent European nuclear force in the foreseeable future. However, some proponents envisage the MLF as an eventual step, towards European unity through its transformation into a multilateral European nuclear force free of an American veto. It is unlikely, though, that such a force will arise until there is a united

European political entity. This does not appear likely for some time. In the meantime, many feel that the ML? presents the best alternative at this time.

In considering the MLF as the best alternative at this time, how does it contribute to the United States political goal of Atlantic partnership and European unity?

1. It should reduce the attraction and apparent rewards of national nuclear programs— thus diminishing the likelihood that such politically divisive programs will spread.

^^Ibid. 104

2, It would narrow the present gap between nuclear and non-nuclear powers in Europe— a gan which cannot fail to imoede the European Community's progress toward unity. 3, It would increase the effectiveness of consultation about use of Alliance nuclear forces. MLF would afford its members the knowledge, sense of responsibility, and participation needed to make nuclear consultation effective. 4, It v;ould be a nuclear defense program in which Europe's role and influence could grow as Europe moved toward unity. The eventual possibility of such a larger Eurooean role is an important element in making the MLF a viable alternative to national nuclear weapons programs,^7

Political Control

Tied in very closely with the political considera­ tions is the U.S. and European concern over control of such a force. • The political value of the MLF will not depend merely upon the establishment of the force, but also on the manner in which the organization is to function and develop. The vital consideration in this instance is the method by which the participants in MLF would authorize the firing of its missiles. This is perhaps the most thorny of all problem areas. This is particularly delicate because it involves the nature of Germany's'nuclear associa­ tion with its allies.

The question here is "how many fingers on the nuclear trigger?" This Involves the question of command; who would push the button? Would the United States agree to allow a

47 Honorable Gerard C. Smith, or. cit. 105 European to launch a nuclear war that the United States would have to finish? Would Europe accept anything li R less? Or as Henry Kissinger asks, "Is every national contingent to receive separate instructions before the missiles can be fired?"^^

This complex problem is still unsolved. However, the general guidelines of control are indicated by Under

Secretary of State Ball;

Political control would be exercised through some form of executive body representing the participating nations. The United States would, of course, be one of the participating nations and would— like other major participants— have an authoritative voice in any decisions concerning the use of the f o r c e , 50

Initially, authorization would require unanimity

of the major participants, thereby giving each a veto.on the use of the MLP's missiles. Any method of authorization

short of unanimity would require contingent states to

collaborate in waging a nuclear war they might oppose,

since the MLF is designed to prevent the withdrawal of

contingent forces. Thus, acceptance of anything less than

unanimity initially is unlikely,

48 "Nuclear Problem," New York Times, February 25, 1963, p. 11.

49 Kissinger, 0£, cit., p, 31.

50 Ball, op, cit,

51osgood, The Case for the MLF, pp, 40-4l. 106

However, after the force comes into operation, it is not entirely hypothetical that a less-than-unanimous vote can be agreed upon. Such a system vrould be based on some weighted voting formula based upon the relative support given by the various participants,^^ As various

American officials have pointed out, should the MLF become a military reality, Europeans can look forward to an agreed revision of the initial voting formula to permit the control group to authorize the use of nuclear weapons by a majority vote free of an American veto. President

Kennedy, referring to the force, said: "And as Europe moves toward unity, its role and responsibility, here as elsewhere, would and must increase accordingly."53 More recently. President Johnson himself reaffirmed this same belief; "Evolution toward European control as Europe marches toward unity is by no means excluded.

Any formal arrangement for reaching the fateful decision to use nuclear weapons 'will continue to be of utmost importance to all governm.ents. Nevertheless, it

52 ■ Claxton, o£. clt.

53 John F. Kennedy, "^aulskirche Address," Department of State Bulletin, XLIX, Nr. 1256 (July 22, 1963), p. 1 ^ . 5 4 Robert Estabrook, "U.S. to Press for A-Fleet at NATO Talks," The Washington Post, May 10, 1964, p • 13. 107 is possible that MLF participants might agree on some formula which would satisfy European needs and at the same time allow special American influence. Many Euronean officials feel that an American veto is necessary, and they would not participate without it. To them, it would be much safer for the United States to control the nuclear trigger than several smaller European powers, either individually or collectively,

As noted earlier, this problem of political control is still evolving. Initially, it seems certain that any control will have to be based upon the principle of un­ animity. However, as the force becomes operational and gains in experience, it seems likely that some other formula for control can be worked out among the particioants. A completely satisfactory arrangement is probably not possible until Europe becomes a single political entity.

Until that tine, the problem of MLF control will have to be something that evolves in step with the political evolution of Europe.

The Prospects

Negotiations for the. creation of the MLF are still

going forward. However, significant progress has been made. Recently, it has been reported that some American

55 Claxton, 0£_. cit. 108 officials view the MLP as the foundation of a revised ■

NATO. They believe that the MLP could become the basis of a European nuclear deterrent. To this end, it was reported that American officials were willing to consider

European requests for insertion of a clause in the NATO treaty that would permit conversion of the MLF for that purpose

In the meantime, actual tests of the mixed crew concept is taking place. Trials are under way with an experimental mixed-manned guided-missile destroyer, the

USS Biddle, with crews from the United States, Britain,

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey. These tests are scheduled to run for s o m e t i m e . 57

However, participation in the experiment does not commit any government to take part in the force, which is envisaged as starting with 20 surface ships. Italy, as an example, supports the MLF concept and is expected to join.

However, it may delay a firm commitment. No decision is expected from Britain until after the election in the Pall of 1964. Officials believe that despite some Labor Party opposition, if it came to power it would still go along with the concept.5®

56 Estabrook, o£. cit.

57 58 Ibid. Ibid. 109 The major difference between the current momentum towards MLP and others which have oreceded it is that the United States now seems determined to go ahead without worrying about the possibility that the MLP will start out as merely a German-Amerioan effort. The final out­ come of this current momentum is still something which no American official can foresee at the moment.

It should be noted, however, that all steps taken thus far have been done by executive decree only, and the legislation which allows only United States custody and control of its nuclear weapons is still in effect.

Though there are still many problems to be worked out concerning the political control of these forces, MLF does represent a significant step towards solving the problem of multilateral command, control, and sharing of

NATO's nuclear weapons. It appears to be the only feasible alternative advanced thus, far which can satisfy the require­ ments of the NATO Alliance and still insure some degree of responsibility in its ownership of nuclear weanons. CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

As history so graphically portrays, there is usually no easy path out of dilemmas. Dilemmas, by their nature, tend to tax the reservoirs of vision. Innovation, and initiative. Rarely are dilemmas solved by Inaction, Rarely are they solved by action alone without thoughtful contem­ plation. So it is that the United States has realized over the past four years that she is facing an ever-growing problem with regard to the control and sharing of nuclear weapons within the NATO Alliance. The statesmen who have grappled with this problem have realized all too well that the search for a course out of a dilemma is a wearisome one.

Yet, search we must. For there is no escaping the complicated, intractable nature of the problem of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. It is a most delicate issue of inter-allied politics, as well as an exacting problem of military strategy. Consequently, the aporoach to its solution must combine all the sensitivity, flexibi­ lity, and pragmatism that can be marshalled. This issue facing the United States, like so many of old, calls for a high order of foresight, innovation, and leadership, for it is probably both too complex and too consequential to work itself out through the normal channels of statecraft. Ill

Today, the governments of the Western Alliance

search for a solution to their nuclear dilemma. To date,

they have not found one. Viewing the world situation as

it is today, I believe it is probably safe to say that

there is no single solution to the problem— the future

solution will probably encompass a combination of several

solutions. The task today appears to be the determination

of that combination.

This research has attempted to survey the entire

nuclear issue within the NATO Alliance. After doing so,

it is still impossible to foresee what form the final

solution will take. However, it has been possible to more

clearly discern some of the factors and implications

involved. Thus, based on this increased understanding

I offer the following observations and conclusions.

American policy concerning nuclear weapons has

clearly dominated the development of MATO strategy since

1949. That policy has had a quality of ambivalence, growing

out of competing operational priorities and interests. The

United States emerged from the Second World War aware of

the interdependency of her security and interests with the

nations of Western Europe. Consequently, the United States

committed itself to the defense of Western Europe through

• the NATO pact. The foundation of this pact was America’s

nuclear might, and it was on this capability that the

defenses of the West were organized. 112

At the same time, the United States has sought to

prevent, or at least to discourage, the spread of nuclear weapons. While employing its own nuclear capability as

a means of protecting herself, and Europe, from further

Soviet aggression, the United States has also shown a

mutual Interest with Russia to preserve and maintain a bipolar configuration of nuclear capability vis-a-vis all

other nations, including allies. To this rule of policy,

the United States has made only limited exceptions.

From the viewpoint of Washington, there were com­

pelling Justifications for this policy. Like any govern­ ment, it preferred to reserve to itself, as long.as possible,

the monopoly of control of the most powerful weapons knovjn

to man, and' the resultant basic choice of war or peace.

The United States expressed the belief that the spread of

nuclear weapons was inherently dangerous, likely to increase

the danger of war by accident or by reckless action on the

part of a single nation. Beyond this, it was also the

American belief that the proliferation of nuclear capabi­

lities would only multiply and complicate the problems of

controllin.g the arms race.

American interests, preferences, and reactions form

only one part of the context of nuclear strategy and weapons

control within NATO. Historic changes have taken place in

Europe and throughout the world since 19^9. This process

of change has generated particular pressure upon the United 113 States to modify its policies, not only with regard to nuclear weapons, but to the Alliance as well. The spread

of nuclear capability to Russia, England, and France put

an end to American monopoly in the field. A momentuous

revolution in military technology resulted in the passing

of American invulnerability. A renascent Europe again

emerged upon the international scene, manifesting her

growing independence and seeking a share in the determina­

tion of her destiny. All of these were developments of

immense proportion which could not help but affect American

policy. These compelling changes necessitated a vast re­

appraisal of American interests, considerations, and actions.

Meeting this challenge of change has been a consuming task

for American and European policy makers. Upon their ability

rests the freedom of the West, and the very survival of

mankind.

One point is quite obvious— any solution must be

essentially a political one. The problem of European

deterrence represents the most complex and delicate poli­

tical challenge yet to arise within the NATO Alliance. The

manner in which it is handled is a matter of crucial import

for the future of the Atlantic Community. The issue brings

into play all the political inter-relationships of the

United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. It is

my opinion that it is doubtful that a satisfactory solution'

can be worked out by any three of them over the strong 114 objection of the fourth. The Atlantic Alliance was founded on the principle that the defense of the Free World, on both sides of the Atlantic, is one and indivisible. This principle is Just as valid today as it was in 1949. Thus, it is my belief that this political reality should deter­ mine the form of the Alliance’s military defenses. Until this political reality is accepted in deed as well as word, it does not seem likely that a completely workable solution to the problem can be found.

There appears to be three choices with respect to

Europe's nuclear future. First, the nuclear weapons needed to cover the direct threat to Europe could continue to be provided by the United States, with the Europeans having a larger consultative role about their use. Secondly, the

United States could accept the British and French national forces and eventually encourage the development of a purely

European deterrent. Finally, the United States and inter­ ested. allies could Jointly own, man, and control medium- range missiles deployed to Europe.

As we have seen, the first course— virtually exclusive United States coverage of the threat— does not seem feasible any longer. Increased consultation does not fully respond to European concerns. Moreover, participation in nuclear matters within Europe Is unequal. Some countries already have national nuclear weapons programs. The non­ nuclear powers in Europe may not be prepared to accept 115 Indefinitely this inequality in participation. European leaders are likely to find nuclear consultation with the

United States ,as inadequate as a substitute for a role of active participation in operation of strategic weanons.

The second course seems beset with its own dangers.

The proliferation of the nuclear capability would Inherently

increase the danger of nuclear incidents. New nationally

owned and manned strategic missile forces could be divisive within the Alliance and unsettling in terms of East-West

relations. More important, individual national forces would tend to fragment the Alliance into "haves" and

"have-nots" even more intensely. The goal of the Alliance

should be to move toward forms of ever— closer integration,

political and military, in the ownership, manning, and

control of nuclear weapons.

The last two Administrations have chosen the third

course of action as the answer to nuclear sharing. Although

it has Imperfections, I believe it offers the most feasible

solution at this time. Still, I believe that its over-all

effectiveness will be Jeopardized until France becomes a

participant. . In my opinion, .ML? offers four ways in which

to meet some— but not all— of the allied concerns which

fall under the heading of wanting more "control". They are;

(1) It would, insure to each of the major members

of the MLP (nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike)

self-respecting participation, on a basis of equality. 116

In a force having not only strategic missiles but also its own high yield warheads.

(2) By placing warheads under Joint control the

MLP would insure that they could not, so long as the MLF

continued in existence, be withdrawn from the European area without the consent of all participants. It would thus involve the United States in an even firmer nuclear

association with the European countries than now exists.

(3) The MLP will meet the continuing European wish to share in actual decisions— not merely to advise the

United" States— about planning and targeting of strategic nuclear forces. In the MLP, decisions will be Joint responsibility Jointly shared on a basis of full equality.

(4) MLF will meet the Allies' needs for wider know­

ledge of nuclear matters. It will provide them with a

sense, of a greater awareness of the problems, costs, and

opportunities which are created by ownership, control, and

manning of strategic weapons systems. It will also provide

them with the benefits and knowledge derived from the manu­

facturing and the development of these systems, which can

further peaceful and industrial development in the member

countries.

Likewise, I believe that MLP has some special

significance to the United States as well.

(1) MLF will provide a way for non-nuclear countries

to participate in their nuclear defense without promoting 117 national nuclear weapons proliferation.

(2) It will allow the United States to support proponents of moderate, democratic government in Germany who want to forestall pressures for a national nuclear weapons program.

(3) It will give confidence to the Alliance members by closely associating them with the United States in the ownership of nuclear weapons.

(4) It will provide the United States with a practical means of countering de Gaulle’s proposals for creating a

French-organized Europe.

What conclusions are we to draw from all this?

Without dramatizing the situation, we must recognize that the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community are going through the most serious crisis they have so far experienced.

By virtue of her position as the Free World leader, the

United States must assume a special role of responsibility for alleviating this crisis. In my opinion, I believe she can best accomplish this by a firm commitment to the following courses of action;

First, there must be continued devolution of America’s nuclear monopoly in strategy, control, and ownership. This is a fact of life we must accept. Nuclear sharing is the best way to resolve the schism in the European soul, alter­ nating between fears that the United States will use its nuclear oower and fears that it will not. Continued amblva- 118 lence of attitudes and actions will only deepen the problem. The United States cannot have it both ways forever. If it wants to exercise global strategic leader­ ship of the Free World it must form a nuclear partnership or else cope with uncontrolled nuclear diffusion on our side as well as the Communist side of the Iron Curtain.

Secondly, the United States must continue to resist the growth of nationally owned and controlled nuclear forces. Such forces only serve to divide the Alliance, and greatly complicate the issue of responsible control.

However, the same reasons that cause the United States to oppose national'deterrent forces should also constrain us from acting independently or without due regard for the interests and sensibilities of our allies. V/e cannot simultaneously preach Atlantic integration and practice unimpaired sovereignty on llfe-and-death matters. Vague and secretive reassurances will not satisfy our Allies, but will only serve to increase their anxiety and resent­ ment. We must somehow reconcile the operational need for unitary nuclear control with allied political participation and partnership.

Thirdly, the United States must continue to strive to provide West Germany with some voice in nuclear matters.

Without some voice in nuclear defense, it will be impossible to forever satisfy Germany with a non-nuclear role. It will be far less disconcerting to the rest of the world if 119 this voice is on a multilateral basis rather thatn on a unilateral one.

Finally, it appears that the course of action which best incorporates all of the above is some form of multi­

lateral force. Such a force. Jointly owned, manned, and controlled, offers the best hope for settlement of NATO's nuclear dilemma. Once such a force becomes a reality, the United States must recognize that the political control

of this force must be free to evolve with the political

structure of Western Europe. Eventually, such evolution will undoubtedly bar any American veto. For the past 15 years American policy has had as its goal a strong, unified,

self-sufficient Europe. This goal is certainly valid today,

and due to American foresight, matched with the determina­

tion of the Europeans themselves, this goal is becoming

a reality. We must be willing to accept the loss of our

veto as the price for this reality.

In conclusion, I would say that significant progress

has been made towards coming to grips with the problem of

nuclear control and sharing within NATO during the past

four years. Probably the greatest reason for this progress

has been the awareness on the United States' part that her

nuclear monopoly was no longer feasible or possible. By

increasing consultation and cooperation among the MATO

members in nuclear affairs, the United States has furthered

and strengthened the concepts of European unity and Atlantic 120 partnership. Much still remains to be done. If the MLF proposal becomes a reality, with maximum participation, it promises to provide the proper foundation upon which the military structure of the Alliance can evolve in step with the political evolution of Europe, It is to Lhis end that the United States must continue to dedicate her efforts.

How and when the Atlantic Community will finally solve her nuclear dilemma is still undetermined. Only the highest order of statecraft can cope with an issue that combines the most intricate features of the political and military realms. The key to the future of the Alliance is a high order of foresight, innovation, and leadership. This key must be forged by the members of the Alliance themselves.

Many say that the Atlantic Alliance is at its most important crossroads— as such, it is approaching one of those critical moments in the march of history.

The problem as we know it today is simple in concep­ tion but Infinitely complex in definition. However, Jean

Monnet stated it succinctly when he said:

The United States must realize that the claims of Europe to share common responsibility and authority for decision on defense, including nuclear weapons, is natural, since any decision involves the very existence of the European peoples. On the other hand, Europeans must understand that the nuclear terror is indivisible and that they too must shoulder an adequate share of the common defense. 1

Ijean Monnet, as quoted by Sir John Slessor, "Control of Nuclear Strategy," The Atlantic Community. Vol. 1 (Winter 1963-64), p. 530. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. BOOKS

Beaton, Leonard and John Maddox. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. London; Chatto and Wlndus, 196TT

Birrenbach, Kurt, The Future of the Atlantic Community. Towards European~Amer'ican Partnership. New York; P. A. Fraeger, 1963.

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Jackson, Bennett L. A Strategy for NATO In the Nuclear Age. Thesis, CarTlsle: uTs. Army War College, 1958.

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Speler, Hans. Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance. Santa Monica; The Rand Cornoratlcn, T^w: "United States Foreign Policy: Western Europe." A Study prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, October 15, 1959.

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______. "Tensions Within the Alliance," foreign Affa. 1 Vol. 42, Mr. 1 (October I963).

Rrodie, B. "What Price Conventional CanabiIj.ties in Europe?" The Reporter, Vol. 2 8 (Nay 23, 196 3 ) ’.

Buchan, Alastalr. "MATO Divided," The New Republic, Vol. 147 (December 29, I962). 124

Buchan, Alastalr. "Partners and Allies," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, Hr. 4 (July 1963). "

. "The Reform of NATO,".Foreign Affafrs, Vol. 40 (January 1962).

"Conference at Nassau," Commonwealth, Vol. 77 (January 11, 1963). "Crazy but Senslble~A Plan for a NATO Multilateral Force," Time. Vo". 82 (October 4, I963).

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Hoag, Malcolm. "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4l, Nr. 2 (January I963).

Hoffman, Stanley. "Discord In Community," International Organization, Vol. XVII, Nr. 3 (Summer 1963).

Kissinger, Henry. "Strains on the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4l, Nr. 2 (January 1963).

"NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," The Reporter, XXVIII TFTarch 28, 1963), 22-37.

"Living with the Multilateral Force of Polaris Armed Surface Ships," The New Republic, Vol. 149 (MVvember 2,. 1963).

McNamara, Robert. "Speech at University of Michigan," Vital Speeches (August 1, 1962). 125 Merchant, Livingston, "Evolving United States Relations with the Atlantic Community," International Organiza- tion. Vol. XVII, Nr. 3 (Summer 1963).

Messmer, Pierre. "French Military Problems," The Atlantic Community. Quarterly, Vol. 1, Nr. 2 (Summer 1962). “

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Montgomery, Field Marshal. "NATO and the Defense of the Free World," The Pacific Spectator, Vol. IX, Nr. 2 (Spring 1955)T"T%51

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______, ...... Dean Rusk. "State of the North Atlantic Alliance," Denartment of State Press 'Release Nr. 367, July 12, 1965'.

______, . George V/, Ball. "The Muclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," Department of State Press Release Mr. 22 4, Anril 26, 1963 .

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, . President Dwight D. Eisenhower. ”Address to Congress." Department of State Bulletin. XXXVIII, Nr. 970 (January*195BT7

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______, . President John F. Kennedy. "Paulskirohe Address," Department of State Bulletin, XLIX, Nr. 1256 (July 22,. 196 3).

, . President John F. Kennedy. "The Common Ai'ms of Canada and the U.S.," Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, Nr. 1145 (June 5, 1961).

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_____ As.sembly. Official Report, A/WEU (9) CR 8, Ninth Ordinary Session, December 3 , 1963.

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E. NEWSPAPERS

The New York Times, January, 1954-Eebruary, 1964.

The Washington Post, January, 195 4rUay, 1964,

F. OTHER SOURCES

Personal Interview, Ray 11, 1963, with Honorable Philander Claxton, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, P. C.