NAME 'Ali 'Abd al-'Al'.iz 'Ali PHONETICS ah-Lee ahbd-al-ah-ZEFZ ah-LEE KEY ALIAS 'Ammar al-Baluchi AFHLIATION AI-Qa'ida NA TIONALITY Baluchi bom and raised in Kuwait

Pakistan-based al-Qa'ida operative 'Ammar al-Baluchi is 8 member of an e:tlended family of exU'Cmisu; that has spawllCd such notorious lerrorisls as his delaillCd uncle and 11 Sepiember ma5!ennind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) and cousin and incarcerated World Trade Center bomber Rarnzi Yousef. 'Ammar served as a key lieutenant for KSM during ihe operation on 11 September and subscqucmly assisted his uncle on various plots against Lhc and United Kingdom.

'Ammar, who is 29 years old, spent most of his ICCn)'C.iU1l in Iran before movi ng to the (UAE) to work as a compulcr programmer in Dul;Kti in 1998. Even before thi s move, he was gradually being influenced by his extremisl relatives to bcx:ome involved in ; his chief mentor was Ramzi Yousef, who laught him in ihe early 1990s in Iran aboul ihe importance of war ag~inSl the West. 'Ammar volunleerc'ei facilitator to hijackers transiling the UAE on their way from to ihe United States.

After ihe collapse ofihe Talib.an in in late 2001. 'Amm~r ani.ted KSM in organizing ihe movement of al -Qa'ida operatives and their families to safehouscs in Pakistan, KSM also direcled him at ihc forefront of planning for a variety of terrorist plotS against ihe West. including:

• In late 2001 in Afghanistan, KS M directed 'Ammar 10 be the eommunical;ons intermediary betwccn al-Qa'ida and "shoe bombers" and Saajid Badal, In early 2002 in Pakistan, 'Ammar helped KSM prepare OPCI'llIj,1:S for travel to ihe United Slatc,s, ostensibly to carry out au"l'ks,

• During 2002-2003 'Ammar also worked with KSM lO prepare and others for travel to the United Stales 10 conduct terroriSl operalions, 'Ammar also sent Khan in lale 2002 lO Thailand to deliver 550,000 10 finance plotting hy Jemaab Islamiya leader Hambali againsl US and Israeli targetS in Souiheast Asia.

• From late 2002, 'Ammar began plouing 10 carry 0Il1 simultaneous altaeks in again>t the US Consulale, Western residences, and Westerners .11 ihe local airport. Arter KSM's detention, 'Ammar assumed responsibility for the plot 10 carry OUI hijacking attacks from Heaihrow Airpon bul decided 10 delay !hat plot until after the bombings in Karachi occurred. He W3$ within days of completing preparations for the Karachi plOl when he was captured,

• In 2002, ·Ammar directed Aaria Siddiqui-a US-educatcd neuroscientisl and al-Qa'ida facilitalor---to (favel to lhe United States to prepare paperwork 10 ease Majid Khan's deploymenl to Ihc United State-$, 'Ammar married Siddiqui shortly berore his detention. NAME Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani PHONETICS geh-LAH-nee KE Y ALlAS(ES) Haylhamal-Kini Aml.lA TlON(S) AI-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Tanzanian

An aJ-Qa'ida documem forger and lravel faeililalor, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani_known in al-Qa'ida circles as HaYlham al-Kini- rose in stalure after II September 2001 10 become one of a1-Qa'ida's lOp forge~. Allhough Ghailani was not directly inwlved in operalional planning. he worted for lhc now-dccea.>ed Hamza Rabi'a­ lhcn al-Qa'ida's chief of external opernlions--and forged or altered passp<>ns for many al-Qa'ida mcmbcrs. Most of his woO: involved subSlituLing pilolOS in and modifying visa slIImps,

• Ghailani lived al various houses in North and South WaziriSlan in 2003 and 2004, which in conjunction with his forgery work, allowed him to meel many high- and low-level BI-Qs'ida operatives.

Ghailani, born around 1974 in Zm1.ibar, Tanzania, is one of the FBl"s MOSI Wanted lerrorislS and has been indicted for his mle in lhe Easl Africa Embassy bombings on 7 August 1998. Ghailani. who knew many oflhe Africans involved in the attacks. originally mel one of the operali"e~. Fahid Muhaml"l\:ld Ali Msalcm. through a mutual friend: hc laler befriended Ihe resl nflhe group afler he began uaseling between Dar es Salaam, TanlaJlia, and Mombasa, Kenya. l1an~po " ing and selling various items and doing odd jobs, M.>alcm asked Ghailani al various limes 10 help lhc group purchase: a truck. gas cylinders, and TNT that would later be uscd In construct a car bomb, requeslS Ghailani fulfilled.

• Ghailani and several other oper:lIivcs moved 10 Afghanistan--which Ghailani had wanted 10 du fur sewral ycars-ihC! day befnre the Embassy bombings.

• After arriving in Afghanistan, Ghailani allended regular training alone nfal-Qa'ida's camps and served as a rank-and-file soldier, Gtlailani C\-cntuaJly beeame a cook for Usama Bin Ladin before joining a group of fellow Africans in 2001 who ran al-Qa';da's document forgery office in . Afghanistan.

• Ghailani fled 10 Karachi. Pakistan, ofler lhc fall nf the Taliban, bul high-profile arre5lS in Karachi in April 2003 convioced him 10 move 10 Soulh Wa;.jristan. NAl\1E Hambali PHONETICS HAM-bali KEY ALIAS{ES) Ridunn bin Isomuddin (troe name). Encep Nurjaman At'HLIATION(S) Jcmaah Islami)'a and al--Qa'ida NA TIONALln' Bom in Indonesia. ethnically Sundanc.se

Indonesian-hom Rlduan bin Isomuddin-/)csl known among extremists as Hambali- was an operational mastennind in the Southeast Asia-based Islamic extremist group Jcmaah Islamiya (11) and also served as the main interface betwccn 11 and al--Qa'ida from 2000 until his capture in 2003. Hambali helped plan the first Bali bombings in 2002 that killed more than 200 persons and faciliUlted al-Qa'ida financing for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing the following year. In latc 2002. he also dif'C(:teU hissubonlinates LiUie and Zubair 10 case the British High Commission in Phnom Penh. CWIlbodia. Hambali was pn:viously involved in the auemptcd assa.~sinalion of the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia in August 2000 and the bombings on Chrislmas Eve that year of some 30 churches across the archipelago. Hambali had longstanding ties to ai­ Qa'ida external operations chief Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). Befoll: returning to Southeast Asia in ~cembcr 20(11, Hambali discussed operations with senior al--Qa'ida leaders regarding post- II SeplCmber auacks against US interests.

Hambali in 1999 established a eell of young 11 operatives in Karachi. Pakistan-dubbcd al-Ghuraha---whieh provided its members with advanced doctrinal and operational training. including at al-Qa';da tmining camps in Afghanistan. Hambali tapped his younger brother. Rusman "Gun Gun" Gunawan. as deputy Ghumba cell leader.

Hambali wa.~ born on 4 April 1964 in Cianjur, West Java, and is the elde~t male of II children. His great­ grandfather founded a local Islamic schoo!. which Hamhali auended during his early adolescence. Hambali was a devout Muslim youth who, at age 20, left Indonesia for Malaysia, ostensibly to seck work. While tOOre. he met 11 eofoundcrs Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakat Bashir- fcllow Indonesians who had fled the Suharto regime for Malaysia--and through them was exposed ({I radical Islamic teachings, Hambali tried unsuccessfully to get a scholarship to an Islamic school in Malaysia, before traveling in tile mid-1980s to Afghanistan, where he fought alongside many of al-Qa 'ida's future leaders. During his throe-year stint in Afghanistan, he forged strong ties to Usama Bin Lad;n and KSM. Alier returning to Malaysia in the early 1990s. Hambali and JI spirituallcadcr Bashir funher developed their relatiunship and became close friends. NAME Mustafa Ahmad aJ-HawS3wi PHONETICS moo-STAH-fah ahl-hah-SOW-ce KEY ALlAS(ES) Hashim 'Abd ai-Rahman. Zahir, Ayyub, Muhammad Adnan AFFILIA TlON(S) AI-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Saudi

MuswJa Ahmad al-Hawsawi was one of two key tinan.:.:ial facilitators entrusted by ] I September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) 10 manage the funding for the hijackings. As a trusted, respected fin~ncial facilitator known to the leadership, al- Hawsawi separllLCly mel with Usama Bin Ladifl, hi.~ deputy Ayman al­ Zawahiri, and al-Qa'ida spokesman Sulayman Bu Ghayth !iOOn after the attacks on II September and had contact with many of al Qa'ida's moSt senior managers.

Various n:pnrl$ suggest that al -HawS3wi had direct ties to !OIly~ral of the hijackers and to other operali "es, including Ra.m;i Bin a1_Shibh--who delivered some tnQney from al_Hawsawi 10 !he hijackers. In addition, al-HawS3wi and Bin al-Shihh !OIlrved as a communications link ~tween KSM and the hijackers. He shared a United Arab Eminnes (UAE}-bascd financial account with one hijacker-an account that funded the hijaeken;' activities in the month hefore the attacks on I J September. Four hijackers rewllled money directly to ai­ HawS3wi in !he week before thc attacks, which a1-Hawsawi then redeemed in the UAE. AI·Hawsawi also wired thousands of dollars to Bio al·Shibh in the summer of 2001, per KSM's instruttions. KSM also maintained his own financial links 10 al-HawS3wi. In 2001, KSM held a supplemental cn:dit card linked to an al-Hawsawi ll<,.-eount based in the UAE.

• AI-Hawsaw; worked in the al Qa'ida media center in Afghanistan from 2000-while it "'a~ under Ihe direction of KSM-until he departed for the UAE in early 2001.

After the attacks on II September, al-Hawsawi ned the UAE and trIIveled to Afghanistan and 10 Pakistan, where he hid until hi s caplun: in 2003. KSM reponcdJy had been providing a safchouse and other logi,tic support to guarantee al -Hawsawi's security lifter he arrived in Paki~lan.

• Hawsawi facilitated othcropcrali"cs' travel, including Muhammad aJ-Qahtani, who was denied entry into the United States in the summer of2001.

• Hawsawi's close relationship with KSM and the lauer's active participation in providing for his security following J I September suggests Hawsawi was key to KSM's opcrationalteam. NA.ME Lillic PHONETICS LlL-lec

KEY ALJAS(E'S) Mohammed Nazir Bin up (true name), Ba~hir Bin Lcp AFFlLlA TlON(S) Jemaah Islamiya and al-Qa'ida NA TIONALJTY Malaysian

Malaysian-born Mohammed Nazir Bin Lcp (a_k.a. Bashir Bin Lap}---beUer known as Lillie-was one of Hambali's kcy licutenants and had considerable operational c~pe ri encc, Lillie focililllied !he Lransfcr of al­ Qa'idol funds u~d for Ihe Jakarta Mamou Hotel bombing in 200) and knew of !he Jemaah Islamiya·s (JI) targcts and plans to launch altacks elsewhere in SOUlocasl Asia. Hc was involved in 2002 in the JJ plOI against !he British High Commission in Phnom Penh. Cambodia. and in mid-2002 cased targcts in Bangkok and Pallaya. Thailand. at HambaWs direction. Lillic was particularly interested in the ideas of manyroom and was Slated to be a suicide operalive for an al-Qa'ida "second wavc·' auack targeting Los Angeles. Lillie also had links 10 now-dcccascd JI bombmaker Dr. Azahari bin Husin and in 2002 rea:i,'ed bomhmaking tuwrials from Azahari. Lillie spenl lime in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2000, where Iw: trained at aJ·Qa'ida·s al-Faroq eamp in weaponry and explosives. Lillie auended Polytechnic University Malaysia in the mid-J990s. where he earned a dcgree in IItChilccturc. NAME Majid Khan PIlONETlCS MAH-jid KAHN KEY ALIAS(ES) Yusif Afl<"LLIATION(S) AI-Qa'ida. NATIONALITY Pakistani

Befon: his 2(x)3 capturc, Pakislani national Majid Khan was an al·Qa 'ida operativc with direct connections to thc United States, III 1996, Khan moved to the United SUIllS with his family and setlled in . . butllCvcr obtained US citizenship. After gr"duating from high s.:hool in 1999, Khan became involved in a local Islamic organization and, in early 2002, returned to Pakistan, In PakiSlan, Khan's uncle and cousin, who were al-Qa'ida operatives, introduccd Khan to senior a1-Qa'ida. operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). who sclC(;ted Khan as an operative for a possible attack inside the United Slates. KSM selectcd Khan because orhis C};cellcnt English and extcnsive knowledge of the United St.atcs.

• During his stay in the United State!;. Khan worked al his family"s gas statiOn and was, therefore. able to assist KSM with his research inlO the feasibility of a plan to blow up gas stations in the Uniled States. In support of this plot. Khan auended a lt3ining course at which he learned how 10 construct explosive timing devices.

• KSM further tasked Khan 10 conduct research {)n poisoning US water reservoi'1i and ~Oflsidercd Khan for an operation to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf. In addition. Khan passed a test that KSM orchestrated which showed that Khan was commiucd to being a suicide operative.

• In the fall of 2002 Khan also dclivc.w money to Zubair. an operative who worked directly for Jenlilah IsJamiya (11) leader and al-Qa'ida.·s South Asin representative Hambali. The money was to support terrorist allacks against Western targets.

Khan and detained al-Qa'ida operative and facilitator 'Ammar al -Baluchi discussed with U7.air Para<:ha's father. Saifullah. a plan to use the New York office of Saifullah's Karnchi-bascd textile importle~pon business to smuggle uplosives into the United States for use with various al-Qa'ida allacks. Khan also had links to al-Qa'ida. operatives and facilitators. most Jl()\ably. Aafia Siddiquc. a US-cducated neuroscientist and al-Qa'ida facilitator. who assisted Majid with documents to hide his U"lII'clto Pakistan from US authorities to reemer the United States.

In carty 2003. Khan Lapped U7..air Paracha. a US pennancnt resident a1icn he met in Pakistan through 'Ammar. to impersonate Khan in the Uniled Stales to makc il appear as if Khan had never left the Uni!ed Stales and oblain immigration documents that .....ould enable Khan LO illegally reenter. was convicted and re<.:emly sentenced to 30 years imprisonment in the United States for material support to terrorism.

Khan recommended to KSM thatiyman Faris. a naturalized US citizen, be lasked for an al-Qa'ida operation. In 2003. Faris was convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisooment in the Uni!ed StateS on two counts pertaining to material support to 1errorism. In 2002. Faris rescan:l>ed. at KSM's rcquest. suspension bridges in New York and looked into obtaining the tools thaI would he necesr.ary to CUI bridge suspension cables. NAME 'Abd aI_Rahim al-Nashiri PHONETICS AHtxI al-Rah-HEEM ah-NASH-cr-REE KEY ALIAS{ES) Abd ai-Rahim Hussein Muhammad Abdu (Irue name), Mullah Bilal, Bila!. Abu Bilal al_Malki, Khalid al-Safani, Amm Ahmad ("Uocle Ahmad") AFFILIATION{S) AI-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Saudi National of Yemeni descent

'Abd aI-Rahim al-Nashiri was al-Qa'ida's operations chief in Lhe Arabian Peninsula until his capture in 2002, Tfilined in explosives, Nashiri honed his expertise: in suicide attaCks anYemen, and lie was lhc maswnnind and local manager of Lhc bombing in

Bom in Ml:CCa on 5 January 1965, Nashiri ended his fonnal education after intermediate school and eventually followed in the footsteps of his uocles and cousins to become an extremist He panicipated in Ibn al-Khattab's Checllen am.! Tajik insurgencies and became a truiner at al-Qa'ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan in 1992. After retuming from Tajikistan. Nashiri. accompanied by al-Qa'ida operative Khallad bin ·Attash. first met Usama Bin Ladin in 1994. In 1997. Nashiri fought with the Taliban in Kabul and Jalalabad. 1be following year. Nashiri and his cousin, Jihad Muhammad Abu Ali, were implicated in a Bin Ladin-spon50red operation to smuggle Sagger missiles into Saudi Arabia fo r useagainSI an unspecified US military target Nashiri was tile leader of the plot and a major player in the Saudi ~ell at that time,

Nashiri was tasked by Bin Ladin in a private meeting in Afghanistan in 1998 to attack a US or Wcstern oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. This original objective was subsequently modified by Bin Ladin in 1999 II) target a US military ship in the Pon of Aden. Nashiri's operotillCS' first attcmpt .... as unsuccessful when their OOatladco with explosives sank in January 2CXXl-Lhcy ..... ere probably Larg('\ing the USS The Sullivans. On Bin Ladin's instructions to try again, his suicide operatives successfully altacked the USS Cole in October: Nashiri wa~ in Afghanistan at the time of the atlack.

At the time of his arrest. Nashiri was arranging funding for a plot 10 crash a small airplane into tile bridge of a Westcrn navy vessel in Pon Rashid, UAE. an operation lie had hoped 10 CJ:ccute in November or December 2002. He also was orcbe5trating additional auach. one targeting a US housing compound in Riyadh. Saudi Ambia. which he had planned for mid-2003, Nashiri abandoned a plot that he was involved in earlier in 2002 to ;lllaC k warships in the Strait of Hormuz. but his operntives--an orders from Bin Ladin- in AH·boo FAH-rnj ahl·LEE-bec

KEY ALIAS(ES) Mu~lUfa a1-·Uza)·t; (probable true name). MahrLll'. 'Abd al·Hilfiz. Abu Humada. Taw/iq AFFILIATION Al-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Lib)l

Veteran paramilitary commander and facilitator in the Paldsum-Afghanistan theater Abu Falllj look on more direcl operational responsibilities following the am:st in 2003 of former al-Qa'ida e~temal operations chief and II September mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM). He was the organization's general manager subordinate only to Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri heginning in mid·2003. while being heavily involved in financing operatives and their families.

Abu Faraj was a communications conduit for a1-Qa'ida managers to Bin Ladin from Augu~t 2003 unlil his eapture in 2005. He was the recipient of couriercd messages and public statements from Bin Ladin and passed messages tn Bin Ladin from bolh senior lieutenants and rank·and·file members. Some of his w<.lr!; almost certainly required penlOnal meetings with Bin Ladin 01" Zawahiri. a privilege reserved since 2002 for select members of the group.

Abu Faraj had frequent C()ntacl with IIOw..(jeee:lsed senior operntiOfluJ planner Hamza Rabi'a. and other senior managers involved with al·Qa'ida's extcIlUlI operations and paramiJitary effolU. Abu Faraj searched for operatives on Rabi·a·s behalf. including those who could \nIvellO the United States f<.lr attach. and he also asked now--deccased aJ-Qa·ida in Iraq leader Aoo Mus'ab al·Zarqawi to target US interests outside of Iraq .

• Abu Faraj was suspected ofinvolvcmcnt in plots to assassinate Pakistani President Musharraf,

• Abu Faraj sef\·ed as a \rai"",r in the early 1990s and later helped to administer a1-Qa· ida's \nIining ~arnps in Afghanistan. NAME Zayn al -'Abidin PHONETIC AH·Boo Zoo-BA Y -duh KEY ALIASES Hani. Tariq AFFlLlATIONS AI-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Palestinian, raised in Saudi Arahia

Zayn al·'Abidin Abu Zubaydah was a leading e~lremisl facilitator woo opcnued in the Afghanistan-Pakisla!l region from the mid·J990s. Bin Ladin I'l:':eruited him to he one of al -Qa'ida's senior travel facilitalon; following Abu Zubaydah's success in 1996 al s.ccuring IiIIfc passage of aJ-Qa'ida members returning from Sudan 10 Afghanistan. In November 2001, Abu Zubaydah helped smuggle now-dcccascd al-Qa'idll in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al·Zarqawi and some 70 Arab I1ghtcrs out of Kandahar, Afghanistan, into Iran.

• At the Lime of his capture, Abu Zubaydah was trying 10 urganize a terrorist anad: in and he had enlisted the help ofZarqawi in finding a smuggling route into I5racl for moving persons and materials.

• Althougb not believed to be directly linked to the attacks on II September 2001, the 550,000 that Abu Zubaydah received from Saudi donors and passed 10 al·Qa'ida's seniur leadership for his Israel plot may have been used for the attacks. Moreover, three of the hijac\;;cn; re<:civcd hasie training at al-Qa'ida's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which was pan orthe "Khaldan group" of camps and guesthoui;Cs that he oversaw between 19')5 and 2O(X}.

Ahu Zuhaydah's early ""ork as an extremist raeil itator in the mid·l990s focused on recruiting Arabs in Pakistan and arranging their tra\'c1 for various training ClImps in Afghanistan and the frontlines of Bosnia and . Between 1994 and early 2000, he often smJJggled both perrons and chemicals-such as cyanide and nlumes for use by al-Qa'ida in making wcapons-from Pakistan into Afgbanistan. He learned document forgery and trained in explosives at the KhaJdan camp, where he advanced to become instM.lclOJ and then adminislrali\'e director. In his role as a senior mujahidin facilitator and Khaldan camp dircct.or, he assisled Western-based trained extremiSL~, induding Americans.

• Abu Zubaydah established a document forgery network in Pakistan that supported al-Qa'ida and other eXlremisl groupS. In the late. 1990s, he procured funds from donors in Kuwait. Saudi Ar.thia. and the United Arab Emirates, which he doled out to various oontacl.'l in Pakistan·based extremist netwoJi(.s for their terroriSt activities.

• Abu Zubaydah also assisted US Millennium Plot operative Ahmad Ressam 10 entcT Afgbanistan to altcnd a training camp in the late 1990s and to travel to C.anada via the United Stale:! at the end of 1998, He facilitated the travel and tr.... ning of the Jordanian cell that wa~ involved in Jordan's Millennium P]QL NAME RalTl7.i Bin aJ-Shibh PHONETICS RahnH.ee bihn-uhl-SHEEB KEY ALIASES Abu Ubaydah, 'Umar Muhammad 'Abdallah Ba' Amar AFFILIATION AJ-Qa'ida NATIONALIIT Yemeni

Ramzi Bin al_Shibh, a kcy facilitator for the attacks on II September 2001. wa. 3 lead opcmtive-until his capture in 2002~in the post-II September plot concei,·ed of by II September mrustermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) 10 hijack and crash them into Heathrow Airpo!1 in the United Kingdom.

Bin aJ-Shihh was born in 1972 in southern Yemen. He no!~"d that he was religious from the agcof 12 and fought briefly in Yemell·s civil war in 1994. After two attempts \0 immigrate 10 the United StaleS failed.. Bin al-Shibh travclcd 10 Gennany. where he applied for political asylum under an assumed name and a. a Sudanese citizen. Denied his requcst for asylum in January 1996. he left Ge""any and Tt'lumcd to Yemen. wheno he applied for a visa in his true name. In December 1997. he n:lurned to . where he bccarnc a student. In . he met hijackers Muhammad Alta. Marwan al-Shehhi, and .

Bin al-Shibh, Atta. al -Shehhi, and Jarrah traveled 10 Afghanistan in 1999. In Afghanistan, the four men mel Usama Bin Ladin. pledged their loyalty to him. and readily accepted Bin Ladin's proposa1 to martyr themselves in an operatiun against the United Slates. Bin al-Shibh was slated to be one of the II September hijaekcr pil()!S. He and Atta travelcd to Karachi. where they met with KSM.

• After returning to Gcrmany in early 2000. Bin al-Shibh obtained a new pa.'sport hut was unable to obtain a US visa. despite four auemplS. Bin al-Shibh said that in laIC 2000 be tried 10 convince a US citil~n in San Diego via c-maillO IIl3IT)' him to gain entry into the United Stal<..-s, but Atta convinced him to abandoo the idea.

During thc cight months before the atlacks. Bin a1-Shibh was lhe primary communications intenncdiary iletween the hijackers in the United StateS and al-Qa·ida·s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He relayed orders from al-Qa'ida senior operatives to Atta via e-mail orphonc.1l!ld he mel with AUlI in Germany in January 2001 and in in July 2001 for in..tJepth briefings from Atta on the progress of the plot. He alw made travel plans to the United States for Wille of the 11 September terrorists and facilitated the transfer of moncy to the II September terrorists, including eonvicl~d tcrrorist Zacharias Moussaoui. After learning from Atta in late August 2001 of the date of the hijacking allxk", Bin al Shibh passed the infannation 10 KSM.

• A ,,·cd before the II September al1~ks, Bin al-Shibh left Gefffi3ny and arrived in Afghanistan three or four days after the lIt\:lch. In late 2oo!. he fled Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban and began working with KSM in Karaehi on follow-(m plots against the We~1, particularly the Heathrow plOl He w~ tagked by KSM to recruit operatives in Saudi Anlbia for an allack on Heathrow Airpon, and. as of his capture. Bin al-Shibh had identified four operatives for the operation. NAME Zubair PHONETICS 1.oo-BEAR KEY ALIAS(ES) MoM Fank bin Amin (true name), Zaid AFFlLlATION (S) 1cmaall Islamiya and sl-Qa'ida NATIONALITY Malaysian

AI-Qa'ida and 1cmaallislamiya (11) member Molld Farik Bin Amin-bcs\ known as Zul:lair-scrved directly under Jl operational planner Hambali, As ooe of Hamhali's trusLCd associateS, Zubair assisted in Hambali's operations, which included casing targets for 11 planned altacb, until his captun: in 2003, Hamhali in November 2001 tapped Zubair to be a suicide operative for an al-Qa'ida lluIICk targeting Los Angel~s, Zubair played a role in transferring funds used to finance Icrronsl attacks in Southeast Asia from a1-Qa'i

WaJid Bin 'Attash, best known a.' Khallad, was a key al-Qa'ida operative from 1998 until his eaptun: in 2003. Khallad. who is 27, is the scion of a prominent terrorist family: his father, Muhammad, was close to Usama Bin Ladin. and several of Khallad's brothers went to Afghanistan to train and fight in the 1990s; two of these brotheTll were killed- including one during US airstrikes in Afghanistan in late 200I - and another. Ha~!\aIl, has been dcmined at Guanmnamo Bay since 2004.

Khal1ad arrived in Afghanismn in about 1995 and trained at a number of camps. In 1996, after Bin Ladin's n:turn to Afghanistan from SUdan. Khallad alternated Dclween serving as a bodygUArd for the al-Qa'ida leader and participating in combat against the Northern Alliance: he lost his rigtll leg during a baulefield ~ccident in I 997. In 1998, Bin Ladin began u,ing Klmllad operationally. first as the al-Qa'id:! leader's intermediary tu BI·Qa·ida Arabian Peninsula netwolt chief 'Abd al-Rilhim al-Nashiri: together during 1998 and 1999, Khallad and Nashiri worked together on the maritime plot that culminated in the bombing of Lhc. USS COle in October 2000. In early 1999. Bin Ladin reportedly selected him to become a hijacker in the operation on II September 2001. but he was arrested in Yemen in April of that year while attempting to obtain a US visa because local authorities SllSptttOO he was a different extremis\. Although his brief imprisonmem bloclr;.ed his travcl to the United States. Khallad othcrwi!iC assisted in the operation. including helping Bin Ladin select additional hijaekers and tra"eling to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok during Decl:mber 1m-J anuary 2000 to meet with hijacir;.crs Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al·Mihdhar and to rake IWO nights on II US-flagged airliner to as!iCS$ in­ flight SCCUrily procedures .

• [n late 1999. Bin Ladin aslr;.ed him to help select about two-dozen experienced and reliablc operativcs for special training at the Mcs Ainalr;. camp in Afghanistan: Khallad supervised the lraining at the camp: many of these operatives ....ent on to participale in pl'()mine nl operations: OIlC bec.tme a suicide bomber in Ihe Cole operolion: two were latcr II Seplember hijacke",: another was II cell leader who was killed during Lhc. suicide bombings in Riyadh io May 2003; and yet another gained ren()wn for hi.~ involve,""nl in!lu: bomhing of the Limburg in October 2002 and for hili plot to ass.assinale tbe US Ambassador \0 Yemen.

After the attacks on II September, Khallad helped prepare al-Qa'ida's defenses around Tara Bora. then ned Afghanistan after the collapse of the Taliban in lale 2001. In early January 2002. Khallad arrived in Karachi, where he served as II communications link between al-Qa'ida's senior leadership and the oClworlr;. in Saudi Ambia-particularly after the detention of al·Nashiri in late 20m_nd assisted in the movement of operatives from South and Southeast Asia to the Arabian Peninsula. He also aided eITon.., by Khalid Shaykh MuhamtTllld (KSM) to recruil Saudi hijackers for the al-Qa'ida plot to hijack airliners 10 3t!.lCk Heathrow AiipOn .

• In the months before his arre:Il. Khallad and KSM's nephew 'Ammar al -Baluchi wen: organizing a plot to carry out simultaneous attac!r;.s in Karachi against the US Consulatc. Westcm travelers .11 the airport. and WesteTllC'TS residing in the Karachi area. The plot was close to execution when he was detained. NAME Khalid Sha~kh Muhammad PHONETICS HAH-lid SHA KE moo-HAH-mud KEY A LlAS Mukh!:lr AFFlLlA TION AI-Qu'ida NA TIONALITY Baluehi born and raised in Kuwait

Khalid Sha~kh Muhamm.ad (KSM) is one of his lOry'S moSt infamous terrorists, and his capture in 2003 deprived al-Qa'ida of one of its most capable senior operntives, He devoted most of his adult life to terrorist ploning, spccifieall~ against !he United States, and was !he driving foree behind the attacks on II September 2001 as well as several subsequenl plots against US and Western !:lrgclS worldwide.

Aner graduating from North Carolina A&T State Universily in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering, KSM ((a>'elcd 10 Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet fighting there. KSMjoined Youscf in the Philippines in 199410 plan !he "Bojinka" plot-the simultaneous bombings of a dOZC11 US-flagged commercial airliners ovcr the Pacific. After !he plot was disrupted and Youscf w~ caught in carl~ 1995. KS M was indicted for his role in the plot and went into hiding. By 1':199, he convinced Usama Bin Ladin to provide him with opcrntivcs and funding for a new airliner plot, which culminated in the attacks (In II September IW(l yean; later.

• KSM headed al-Qa'itla's Media Commiucc from 2000 and he helped build elose operational ties Ix:twccn al-Qa'ida and tile Jemaah [slamiya Oil terrorist group that was plotting against US and Israeli targels in Southeast Asia.

By late 2001, with the coUapsc of the Taliban regime aJ'ld the dispersal of al ·Qa'ida's!eadership, the pre.tige associated with engineering the attaCks on II September propelled KS M into the role of external operations chief ror al-Qa'ida .

• In addition to plots targeting Britain, KSM launched severn! plots targeting the US Homeland, including a plot in late 2001 to have 11 suicide opcrntivcs hijack a plane over the Pacific and crash it into a skyscraper on the US W C.~L Coast; a plan in early 2002 to send aI·Qa'ida operatives to conduct attacks in the U,S.; and a plot in early 2003 to employ a network ofPaldstanis----including Majid Khan-to smuggle explosiVe!; into New York and to target gas stations, railroad tracks, and a bridge in New York. NAME Goolcd Hassan Doumd PHONETICS Goo-LED HAH· SllJ1 Door-AHD KEY ALlAS(ES) Guleed H:lSS.lIn Ahmad, HanOO AFFlLlATlON(S) al-Qa'ida, al-Ittihad aJ-Islami NATIONALITY Soma li

Gouled Hassan Dourad was the head of a Mogadishu·boased facilitation network of al-Iuihad al-Islami (AlAI) member.> that supported aJ·Qa'ida memhers in Somalia, Gooled was a memher of a small, selective group of AlAI member.> who worked for !he East African aI-Qa"ida eeilled by Abu T alha al-Sudani-Gouled's responsibilities included locating r.afehouses, assisting in the tran~fer of funds, and procuring wt:apons, explosives, and OIher supplies.

• Reporting suggests tbat Goulcd carried out one operational mission for Abu Talha: during Septemher~ October 2003. he cased the US mili1llry base in Djibouti...... camp Lt.monicr- as part of Abu Talha' s plot to conduct a ,uicidc truck-bombing attack, He also was !.asked by Abu Talha to purchase two rocket-propelled grenadcs, fivc AK-41 assault rifles and four 9mm pistols, which he delivered to Abu Talha in mid·2003,

• Couled was privy to several terrorist plOlS under consideration by his AW cell. including shOOling down an EthiopianjetJiner landing at an airport in Somalia in 2003 and kidnapping Western workers of nongovernmental organil.alions in Hargeysa. Somalia, in 2002 as a means to raise money fOl'" future AlAI operations, Following Gouled's arrest, AlAI tcrt1)risls on 19 March 2004 tried unsuccessfully \0 kidnap a German aid worker and murdered a Kenyan contract employee in Hargeysa,

Gouled was born in Mogadishu in 1914: when !he Somali civil waterupted in 1991. hiS parenu scm him 10 Gcnnany, where he lived in a refugee camp, He t.rnveled to Sweden and gained asylum there in 1993. 10 1994, he attempicd t.rnvelto!he United States 001 was turned back in Iceland because of bis fraudulenl ,

• While in Sweden. Gouled attended a Somali mosquc, whose imam arranged for Gouled and his friend, future AlAI bombmaker Qasim Mohamed, to t.rnin in Afghanistan before joining tlle Somali war effort, Gooled trained at Khaldan camp in weapons and explosi\'cs from January Ihrough October 1996 and at another camp in Khowst in assassination techniques for several TTH)IIths, By late 1996, he returned 10 Somalia.

Gouled became a member of AlAI in 1997 OUI of a commitment to support lhe Somali war against Ethiopia and to win the Ogadcn region of Ethiopia back for Somalia, He fought against the Elhiopians in Ogadcn off and on from 1m to 2002 and trained AlAI fighters, He allegedly became associated with al-Qa'ida becausc iu membcrs were in Somalia and his AlAI cell supported al ·Qa'ida,

• Gooled was intmduccd to Abu Talha aI-Sudani- who came to Mogadishu \0 hide following the Mombasa attacks in Novembcr 2002- in early 2003 by his AlAI ccllleadcr, Gooled was recruited 10 work for Abu Talha. in pan, because he had trained in Afghanistan : ~pok e , English, some Swedish, and Somali: and had a high-school education.