(CPC) Outreach Journal #1099

USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) Outreach Journal

Issue No. 1099, 24 January 2014 Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal! As part of the CPC’s mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The CPC is seeking submissions for its annual General Charles A. Horner award, which honors the best original writing on issues relating to Air Force counter-WMD and nuclear enterprise operations. The deadline for submissions is March 31, 2014. For more information, please visit our web-site. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

FEATURED ITEM: “Defense Science Board Urges Expanded Global Monitoring.” By DoD Defense Science Board; January 2014. http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/monitoring.pdf For the first time since the early decades of the nuclear era, the nation needs to be equally concerned about both “vertical” proliferation (the increase in capabilities of existing nuclear states) and “horizontal” proliferation (an increase in the number of states and nonstate actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons). These factors, and others discussed more fully in the body of this report, led the Task Force to observe that monitoring for proliferation should be a top national security objective––but one for which the nation is not yet organized or fully equipped to address.

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U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Nuclear Missile Force Poses a Headache for US Military 2. When Do Nuclear Missteps Put Security in Jeopardy? 3. Culture of Cheating Permeates Air Force Missile Corps 4. Air Force Sect. Has ‘Picked Up on Morale Issues’ 5. Pentagon to Review Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission

U.S. ARMS CONTROL 1. Defense Science Board Urges Expanded Global Monitoring

HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. Surveillance Blimps Will Watch Over East Coast

ASIA/PACIFIC 1. Kishida Calls for Stricter Nuclear Export Controls in Asia 2. PLA Could Be Defeated in an Hour in Nuclear War with US: Report 3. U.S. Military Chiefs Highlight Growing N. Korean Threat 4. China's Nuclear Missile Drill seen as Warning to US Not to Meddle in Region 5. Ministry of Defense Calls Missile Claim ‘Speculation’

MIDDLE EAST 1. UN Inspectors Arrive in Tehran to Oversee Iran Nuclear Deal 2. Israel to Stop Distributing Gas Masks after February, Inner Cabinet Decides 3. Iran Curbs Uranium Enrichment as Nuclear Deal Takes Effect 4. Iran 'Military Nuclear Program' Will Stop: Netanyahu 5. Iranian Official on Nuke Deal: 'We Did Not Agree to Dismantle Anything' 6. WH Dismisses Iran's Nuclear Deal 'Spin' 7. U.N. Nuclear Chief Says still 'Long Way to Go' on Iran

INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. Testing of India's Agni IV Missile Advances 2. With First Nuclear Submarine INS Arihant Set for Sea Trials, Navy Wants More for Strategic Deterrence 3. Indian Agni-4 Launch Stirs Fears of Local Nuclear War in S Asia amid Arms Race

COMMENTARY 1. US Seeks Nonexistent Threat 2. The ‘Nuclear Deterrence Works’ Fantasy 3. Modernize Nukes, Save Billions in Taxpayer Dollars 4. General Confirms Enhanced Targeting Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb

Space War.com Nuclear Missile Force Poses a Headache for US Military By Staff Writers Washington, Agence France-Presse (AFP) January 18, 2014 The "missileers" who oversee America's land-based nuclear arsenal were once seen as the tip of the spear for the US military during the tense days of the Cold War. But now the crews face questions about their discipline, their professionalism and even the rationale for their job. Revelations this week that missile launch officers cheated on a proficiency exam -- the latest in a stream of embarrassing incidents -- has put the spotlight on a force that has posed a recurring headache to commanders for years. After announcing 34 officers had been suspended over the cheating at Malmstrom base in Montana, Air Force leaders called the scandal "unacceptable" and vowed to rectify the problem. But concerns about declining standards in the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force are nothing new. The trouble began after the demise of the Soviet Union, as the mission gradually received a lower priority and offered a less promising career path. "Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force level and intensity of concentration on its nuclear mission has declined conspicuously," a Pentagon review found in 2008. The report was ordered by former defense secretary Robert Gates who fired the Air Force chief and civilian secretary after accounts of negligent handling of nuclear weapons.

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 2 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama At the time, Gates said there were signs of "a degradation of the authority, standards of excellence, and technical competence within the nation's ICBM force." Reforms were enacted, but inspections over the past year have turned up fresh problems at the missile sites. In recent months, two senior commanders have been sacked for misbehavior, including the head of the ICBM force after he went on a drunken bender in a trip to Russia. In October, officials said missile officers were caught twice failing to close the blast doors on their bunkers, violating a strict security rule. And authorities say crew members are under criminal investigation for illegal drug possession. Air Force officers say the incidents do not add up to a crisis. But critics contend crews on nuclear-armed submarines or bombers do not seem to suffer the same level of disciplinary or performance problems. 'Pride in the mission' Over the years, the Air Force has tried to boost the esprit de corps of the crews by introducing special uniforms and badges. And proposals to boost pay for the missile crews have been discussed for more than a decade. While expressing shock at the cheating revelations, General Mark Welsh, the Air Force chief of staff, insisted on Wednesday the nuclear missiles were in safe, extremely competent hands. The four-star general, however, acknowledged morale is not what it was during the Cold War, when working in Strategic Air Command (SAC) carried prestige and a path to promotion. In that era "there was a pride in the mission," Welsh said. "There was a feeling that the mission was critically important." He said the Air Force had to ensure crews understood their jobs remained just as vital, maintaining missiles that officials say serve as a "deterrent" against America's adversaries. With 450 ICBMs at three bases in Montana, North Dakota and Wyoming, more than 500 officers manage the weapons around the clock in steel cocoons 100 feet (30 meters) underground, rehearsing launch protocols again and again. A former launch officer, John Noonan, has described the work as often tedious and solitary, except for the occasional "virtual" nuclear war exercise. "Being a missileer means that your worst enemy is boredom. No battlefield heroism, no medals to be won," Noonan wrote in Wired magazine's "Danger Room" blog in 2011. "The duty is seen today as a dull anachronism." Other missile veterans still see the work as necessary and argue there is no collapse in morale among the crews. For arms control advocates, the whole enterprise is absurd and the discipline problems are an inevitable byproduct. "There's no purpose to their mission anymore," said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, which promotes reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles. The launch officers "pull 12, 24-hour shifts in underground bunkers waiting to push a button they know they're never going to push," said Cirincione, an author who also has served as an adviser to President Barack Obama's administration. Commanders have said they would support reducing the costly arsenal of land-based nuclear missiles, as weapons aboard submarines are able to reach any target on the globe. But lawmakers whose states host the silos oppose any cutbacks, he said. "This is an outdated command, fielding obsolete weapons...," he said. Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 3 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama "The only mission for the ICBM is to immolate millions of innocent civilians." http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Nuclear_missile_force_poses_a_headache_for_US_military_999.html Return to Top

Boston.com When Do Nuclear Missteps Put Security in Jeopardy? By ROBERT BURNS, Associated Press (AP) National Security Writer January 18, 2014 WASHINGTON (AP) — At what point do breakdowns in discipline put the country’s nuclear security in jeopardy? And when does a string of embarrassing episodes in arguably the military’s most sensitive mission become a pattern of failure? Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel is now concerned ‘‘there could be something larger afoot here,’’ according to his chief spokesman, and ‘‘wants this taken very, very seriously.’’ The disclosures of disturbing behavior by nuclear missile officers are mounting and now include alleged drug use and exam cheating. Yet Air Force leaders insist the trouble is episodic, correctible and not cause for public worry. The military has a well-established set of inspections and other means of ensuring the safety of its nuclear weapons. But as in any human endeavor, military or civilian, the key to success is the people, not the hardware. Until recently, Hagel had said little in public about the setbacks and missteps in the nuclear missile force reported by The Associated Press beginning last May. Last week, Hagel made the first visit to a nuclear missile launch control center by a Pentagon chief since 1982. He praised the force’s professionalism, even though minutes before, officials had informed him that a few missile launch officers at another base were suspected of illegal drug use. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James, just four weeks into her tenure as the service’s top civilian official, told reporters Wednesday that the Air Force’s chief investigative arm is investigating 11 officers at six bases who are suspected of illegal drug possession. She said that probe led to a separate investigation of dozens of nuclear missile launch officers for cheating on routine tests of their knowledge of the tightly controlled procedures required to launch missiles under their control. At least 34 launch officers, all at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., have had their security clearances suspended and are not allowed to perform launch duties pending the outcome of the investigation. They stand accused of cheating, or tolerating cheating by others, on a routine test of their knowledge of how to execute ‘‘emergency war orders.’’ Those are the highly classified procedures the officers would use, upon orders from the president, to launch their nuclear-tipped missiles. The alleged cheaters are said to have transmitted test answers by text message to colleagues. That is a violation not only of their own personal integrity but also of security classification rules. The commander at Malmstrom, Col. Robert W. Stanley II, said in a telephone interview Friday it’s not ‘‘off base’’ to think that the cheating points to a deeper problem in the intercontinental ballistic missile force. ‘‘But I do think it’s far more than just us. I think this is a sort of cultural thing our society is going through’’ in which too many people have grown accustomed to ‘‘putting blinders on and just walking past problems.’’ This is reflected in the cheating scandal, he said, where 17 of the 34 did not cheat but knew about the cheating and failed to report it.

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 4 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama ‘‘In ICBMs we can’t tolerate that,’’ Stanley said. In response to the cheating, the Air Force retested every available ICBM launch control officer at Malmstrom as well as the two other bases operating Minuteman 3 missiles: F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., and Minot Air Force Base, N.D. The Air Force said Friday that of 472 officers who retook the ‘‘T-1’’ test, 21 failed and will receive new training before they can return to duty. Twenty-seven were not available to be tested this past week, according to a Pentagon spokesman, Col. Steve Warren. Thus a total of 82 launch officers, including the 34 who have been suspended, are not available to perform launch control duties, and Warren said that is ‘‘having an impact’’ on the ICBM force. He added, however, that it has not interrupted the 24/7 combat readiness of all Minuteman 3 missiles or made them less secure. Tony Carr, a recently retired Air Force officer, is calling for bold action in response to the cheating scandal. ‘‘This is deeply concerning. Not only for what it says about the readiness of the officers involved and perhaps the broader community to which they belong, but for the noticeable fraying of integrity it demonstrates,’’ he wrote Thursday in a public blog. He called integrity the Air Force’s most cherished value. ‘‘Such a brazen and broad violation of it — not among trainees or cadets still earning their way through the door, but by commissioned officers responsible for nuclear readiness — is a gravely startling thing, indeed.’’ James said she was confident that the Minuteman 3 arsenal is being safely and reliably operated and controlled, but said she was ‘‘profoundly disappointed’’ in those involved in the drug and cheating investigations. ‘‘This was a failure of some of our airmen,’’ she said. ‘‘It was not a failure of the nuclear mission.’’ James said she is reassured by ‘‘checks and balances’’ in the system, including periodic inspections at the ICBM bases. She said she would travel to each of the three ICBM bases this coming week to see for herself. ‘‘In any given organization there are issues,’’ she said when asked at a Pentagon news conference about the implications of the latest investigations. They follow a series of AP reports on nuclear missteps, including an internal Air Force complaint that the Minot ICBM group was infested with ‘‘rot,’’ and the firing in October of the two-star general overseeing the entire ICBM force. Maj. Gen. Michael Carey was relieved of duty after investigators found he had engaged in alcohol-fueled misbehavior during an official visit to Russia last summer. ‘‘Just because there are issues with individuals it does not mean that the entirety of the mission is compromised,’’ James said. The men and women who are entrusted with the keys to the nation’s 450 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with at least one nuclear warhead capable of inflicting mass destruction halfway around the globe, are among the youngest officers in the Air Force. They are mostly 20-something lieutenants and captains, a generation removed from the Cold War years of a nuclear standoff with a Soviet Union that no longer exists. Their competence is not in question, only their motivation in a job that some see as unrewarding and overly stressful. Also in question is the quality of leadership by the generals above them, some of whom never did ICBM launch duty. Loren Thompson, head of the Lexington Institute, a defense-oriented public policy advocacy group, said he thinks part of the problem may be the ‘‘diminished status’’ of the nuclear mission in the post-Cold War era. ‘‘Although missile forces remain crucial to deterring nuclear attack, they are no longer seen as a prestigious assignment in the Air Force,’’ he said. He noted that in 2008, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed worry about stewardship of the mission.

New York Times Culture of Cheating Permeates Air Force Missile Corps By HELENE COOPER January 22, 2014 WASHINGTON — Top military officials were quick to voice outrage over revelations last week that 34 officers responsible for launching the nation’s nuclear missiles cheated on monthly proficiency tests, but few expressed surprise. Cheating has been a fact of life among America’s nuclear launch officers for decades, crew members and instructors said. “When I saw that they got something wrong, I would say, ‘Go back and look at No. 5 again,'” said Brian Weeden, a former launch officer at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana who said that he routinely asked new crew members to show him their test answers before they turned them in. The same help, he said, was offered to him by his own instructors when he first began a tour of duty in which officers are expected to score 100 percent on the monthly written tests, and anything below 90 percent is a failing grade. Air Force officials insist that regardless of the cheating, there is no potential for a nuclear mistake because several backup procedures are in place. For their part, missile launch crew members say they do know the test material — which includes how to handle nuclear launch codes — but argue that the grading standards are unreasonably high. Whoever is right, the cheating scandal comes as the nation’s missile launch officers, known as missileers, are caught in a vicious cycle. They work with the lethal jewels of the nation’s arsenal, for which errors can be catastrophic, but they find themselves forgotten on the sidelines, overshadowed by combat and Special Operations forces central to the marquee mission of fighting terrorism. No one wants a nuclear conflict, but many launch officers see their lot as spending a lifetime waiting for a war that will never come. “The nuclear deterrent mission has lost much of its status in the Air Force as the Cold War ended, and many of the personnel on the mission are demoralized,” said Loren B. Thompson, the head of the Lexington Institute, a research organization. Former missileers say the cheating is also driven by what they say are onerous consequences for failing the tests, including additional time on “alert” in the isolated, cramped underground capsules from which the missiles are launched. In the language of diplomacy, they say there are few carrots for rewards and far more sticks for retribution. “The sticks are so severe, the punishment for imperfection so great, that it encourages crew members to work together to ensure no one fails,” said Bruce Blair, a former missile launch officer and a co-founder of Global Zero, which advocates the elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr. Blair said that he cheated on his proficiency tests, as did his fellow crew members. Missile launch officers must also pass practical tests that include simulations of attacks on specific cities, and are widely believed to be impervious to cheating. One former missileer who left Malmstrom in 2010 said he believed that every officer there knew about the cheating and that 85 percent to 90 percent of them — himself included — cheated on the tests. “The penalty is so severe that everyone is freaked out,” he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to avoid repercussions. “It

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 6 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama makes your life so much worse when you miss a question, and there are no real consequences to not knowing the answers, so people help each other out.” Current and former missileers described a surreal circular dance in which crew members routinely cheated on the tests, got promoted to higher rank and then officially announced their zero tolerance of cheating, all while looking the other way. “The colonels, they all did the exact same thing we did,” said one captain, who left Malmstrom in 2011 after four years there, and who said he routinely cheated. He also asked that his name not be used for fear of reprisal from the Air Force. “Then they put on a facade that they had to do the right thing now. But everyone knew.” Last week, the Air Force said that the 34 suspended launch officers, all at Malmstrom, either knew about or took part in the texting of answers to the tests. Air Force officials ordered all missile launch officers to retake the test, and said that by Friday nearly 500 had done so, with an overall pass rate of 95.6 percent. Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein, commander of the Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, said the breadth of the cheating at Malmstrom — the 34 officers represent 17 percent of the Malmstrom launch crew — “shocked” him. A former missileer himself, he said he never cheated or witnessed cheating. “I’m not saying that people did not complete a test and then tell others, be careful of this question or that question,” General Weinstein said. “But to the extent of full answer sheets being passed around, I’ve never seen that before.” Many military officials believe that demoralization may have led to a spate of recent mishaps among Air Force nuclear missile officers. In the past year, a general who oversaw nuclear weapons was dismissed for drunken antics during an official trip to Moscow, 17 officers assigned to stand watch over nuclear-tipped Minuteman missiles were removed for violating safety codes and having bad attitudes, and missileers with nuclear launch authority were caught napping with the blast door open — a violation of security regulations meant to prevent terrorists or other intruders from entering the underground command post and compromising secret launch codes. Seeking to stem the hemorrhaging, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel flew to Wyoming and Nebraska on Jan. 9 to reassure disheartened missileers that what he called their lonely work was still valued. It was the first visit to missile crew members by a Pentagon chief since 1982. “They are stuck out in the areas where not a lot of attention is paid, and I know they wonder more than occasionally if anyone is paying attention,” Mr. Hagel told reporters. But on the day of his trip, another scandal erupted as investigators reported that several missile launch officers had been implicated in an illegal drugs investigation. That inquiry eventually widened to include the cheating scandal at Malmstrom. Mr. Weeden, the former launch officer at Malmstrom, who is no longer in the Air Force, summed up the view of many missileers as he recalled the events of Sept. 11, 2001. For four days, he stayed in the underground capsule, watching the images on television and reeling from the attacks. It changed the way he thought about his job, he said, by driving home the fact that nuclear weapons are no longer the centerpiece of national security — a fact, he said, that has yet to be acknowledged by the military leaders who emphasize the necessity of scoring 100 percent on the monthly proficiency tests. “We couldn’t do anything,” Mr. Weeden said. “The mantra had always been that the nuclear deterrent would keep America safe. But it didn’t. So I felt, not only did we fail to deter those attacks, but we couldn’t do anything about it after.” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/harsh-penalties-prompt-rampant-test-cheating-nuclear-officers- say.html Return to Top

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 7 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Washington Times – Washington, D.C. Air Force Sect. Has ‘Picked Up on Morale Issues’ By JAMES MacPHERSON, Associated Press (AP) Wednesday, January 22, 2014 MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, N.D. (AP) - The top civilian leader in the Air Force said Wednesday she has “picked up on morale issues” among airmen and officers in charge of the nation’s nuclear force but remains confident in its mission. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James visited Minot Air Force Base, the latest in a string of stops from high-level officials in response to various blunders at the military installations that care for the nation’s nuclear arsenal. She visited F.E. Warren Air Force Base at Cheyenne, Wyo., Tuesday and Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls, Mont., Tuesday and earlier Wednesday. The fact-finding tour, in response to cheating and drug scandals the Air Force announced last week as well as a string of other missteps The Associated Press revealed in 2013, is aimed at finding the breadth of problems within the force that operates the nation’s Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles. “I certainly wish that this would not have happened, but it did happen and it’s a problem,” she said of the cheating and drugs. But despite the problems, James told reporters that she has “full confidence in the nuclear mission.” She made her comments after meeting with 1,700 officers and airmen away from the media. James has been on the job for a month. Last week, she said the Air Force is investigating 11 officers suspected of illegal drug possession. Three of the 11 are in nuclear missile units. She said that drug probe led to a separate investigation of dozens of nuclear missile launch officers for cheating on tests of their knowledge of the procedures required to launch nuclear missiles. At least 34 launch officers, all at Malmstrom, have had their security clearances suspended and are not allowed to perform launch duties pending the outcome of the cheating investigation. During her visit to Malmstrom, she said she believes the airmen are motivated and committed to their work, but there are unique stressors that affect morale among nuclear force, The Great Falls Tribune reported. In Cheyenne, James addressed a large crowd at the F.E. Warren base and met with airmen in smaller sessions, the Wyoming Tribune Eagle reported. She said she heard concerns about the career implications of missing an answer or two on the command’s monthly tests. Gen. Mark Welsh, the Air Force chief of staff, who accompanied James on her base visits, said last week that while he is confident in the security of the nuclear missiles, the drug and cheating probes show that “the integrity issue clearly has got to be a concern.” Minot has one of the nation’s two B-52 bomber bases and is home to the 91st Missile Wing, which operates 150 of the Air Force’s 450 Minuteman 3 nuclear missiles. Crew members who oversee those missiles, so-called missileers, spend 24-hour shifts underground in a 12-by-20 foot steel-and-concrete capsule, designed to withstand a nuclear attack. Each missile carries up to three warheads, capable of reaching a target 6,000 miles away in about 20 minutes should a presidential order come down. Missiles travel at 15,000 mph. In June, Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told hundreds of Minot airmen that nuclear weapons missteps at the base would be corrected, but he didn’t elaborate on the “failures of leadership” he blamed for causing the problems.

U.S. Department of Defense Pentagon to Review Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission By Army Sgt. 1st Class Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., American Forces Press Service January 23, 2014 WASHINGTON, Jan. 23, 2014 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has directed a review of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence forces and their ability to carry out their mission, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Adm. John Kirby said today. At a Pentagon press briefing, Kirby said the secretary still has confidence in the strategic deterrence force, but seeks to upgrade the entire nuclear enterprise. “He also recognizes that to keep it safe, secure and effective well into the future,” he said, “the whole nuclear enterprise must be supported by both a modern physical infrastructure, as well as highly capable, skilled and motivated members of the military.” Hagel was encouraged by the talent and professionalism of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force during his visit to F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., earlier this month, Kirby said. “But he was also reminded of the fact, while there, that not all of them live up to the same high standards required by the gravity of that work.” “The secretary shares the frustration of Air Force Secretary [Deborah Lee] James, and Air Force Chief of Staff General [Mark A.] Welsh, about recent reports of drug use and cheating inside the ICBM force,” Kirby said. The secretary welcomes the attention they are giving it and appreciates their leadership, Kirby said, and noted that Hagel spoke with James this morning to get a sense of her observations. “He also spoke this week with Admiral [Cecil D.] Haney, the strategic command commander, who likewise, assured the secretary that he is committed to addressing these issues,” he said. Kirby said lapses by those responsible for overseeing the strategic deterrence enterprise, combined with recently raised allegations, have created “legitimate concerns about the department’s stewardship of one of our most sensitive and important missions.” He said Hagel believes it’s time for the entire department to place a renewed emphasis on examining the health of the nuclear force, and particularly, issues that affect the morale, professionalism, performance and leadership. “He has, today, issued a memo to the senior leaders of this department, as well as those of the Air Force and the Navy, calling for the following initial steps,” Kirby said. Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 9 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama In the next two weeks, he said, the defense secretary and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will hold a meeting with key nuclear enterprise stakeholders to raise and address any personnel challenges in the nuclear force. Kirby said the secretary will direct senior leaders to develop and implement an action plan, to be delivered to him in 60 days, to: • Examine the underlying leadership and management principles governing the strategic deterrence enterprise and the health of the culture that implements those principles. • Identify successful personnel management practices within the strategic deterrence enterprise. • Identify key gaps and/or problems concerning the growth and development of the personnel within the nuclear enterprise. • Identify remedies for any gaps or problems. • Direct action to rapidly implement identified remedies and any other required actions. “Finally, the secretary is calling an independent review to conduct a broader examination of the strategic deterrence enterprise as it relates to personnel,” Kirby said. The review will involve a small number of “experienced” former officials who will assess the quality and effectiveness of the action plan, and provide a sense of any persistent challenges that could affect the performance of the deterrence mission, and then provide recommendations. “This review will be completed no later than 90 days after its start,” he said. “We hope to get it started within the next couple of weeks.” “Secretary Hagel has made it clear there is no mission more vital to our national security than that of strategic nuclear deterrence,” Kirby said. “He has called it a ‘no-fail’ mission.” Hagel, he said, recognizes that the majority of the nuclear deterrence force performs “honorably and with great pride,” but a series of individual failures has given him pause. “The secretary looks forward to meeting with senior leaders in the coming days,” Kirby said, “and to moving ahead with the important work of ensuring this department, in every way, continues to protect and defend our national interests.” http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121537 Return to Top

Federation of American Scientist (FAS).org Defense Science Board Urges Expanded Global Monitoring By Steven Aftergood January 21, 2014 While others speak of curbing intelligence surveillance activities, the Defense Science Board argues in a new report that the U.S. government should expand and accelerate global monitoring for purposes of detecting nuclear proliferation as “a top national security objective.” Intelligence techniques and technologies that are used to combat terrorism should also be harnessed to address the threat of proliferation, said the new DSB report, entitled “Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” January 2014. “The advances in persistent surveillance, automated tracking, rapid analyses of large and multi-source data sets, and open source analyses to support conventional warfighting and counterterrorism have not yet been exploited by the nuclear monitoring community…. New intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies, Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 10 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama demonstrated in recent conflicts, offer significant promise for monitoring undesirable nuclear activity throughout the free world.” The National Security Agency, among others, has pointed the way, the report suggested. A newly integrated global awareness system for counterproliferation should “build on lessons and experiences of successful national security capabilities, such as… NSA’s counterterrorism capabilities….” “The ‘big data’ technologies for extracting meaning from vast quantities of data that are being developed commercially in the information technology (IT) industry, and for other purposes in DoD and the IC, need to be extended and applied to nuclear monitoring.” In particular, “Exploiting the cyber domain should certainly be a big part of any nuclear monitoring effort. Both passive, depending on what is sent voluntarily, and active sources should be considered. Data gathered from the cyber domain establishes a rich and exploitable source for determining activities of individuals, groups and organizations needed to participate in either the procurement or development of a nuclear device…. Many of the new technology advances in data exfiltration, covert implantation, etc., hold promise for successful multi-INT collection and exploitation in non-permissive environments.” “Monitoring for proliferation should be a top national security objective — and one that the nation is not yet organized or fully equipped to address.” At the same time, the DSB report emphasized the need for increased openness and transparency, both to strengthen international confidence and stability and to simplify the challenge of global monitoring of proliferation. (As used by the DSB — and the USG — the term transparency in this context seems to mean the exchange of data among interested governments, and does not necessarily imply release of information to the public.) The DSB authors recommend “a comprehensive, sustained, policy-based diplomatic approach coordinated across the U.S. Government and with other nations devoted expressly to advance the cause of openness and transparency writ large…. This situation should be addressed with the highest priority.” “The Task Force envisions a multi-year effort, which can pay large dividends in terms of a universal transparency that would improve strategic and tactical stability against nuclear war among all nuclear weapons states, as well as achieve enhanced confidence building for nonproliferation efforts.” “All parties would benefit from the national security stability that would ensue from having transparent knowledge of the numbers/types of other nations’ nuclear arsenals, while each nation in turn makes the knowledge of their own SNM [special nuclear material] and/or nuclear weapons inventories available to the others.” (The report does not mention the case of Israel, whose policy of nuclear opacity — not transparency — is supported at least tacitly by the U.S. government.) “The Task Force does believe that the times are now propitious to move forward on a path to develop universal transparency regimes that can simultaneously fulfill these goals and requirements through an international process for achieving universal knowledge of nuclear weapon inventories and SNM inventories, and that the U.S. should lead in such an effort.” “Indeed, the U.S. has already declassified the size of its current nuclear arsenal.” Unfortunately, that last assertion is not correct. In May 2010, the U.S. government did declassify the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal as of September 2009. (At that time, there were 5,113 warheads.) But if you ask how big the arsenal is today, it turns out that the answer is once again classified. The Federation of American Scientists has petitioned the Department of Energy to revise that judgment in favor of public disclosure. The new DSB report contains several other incidental observations of interest. * To date, the U.S. has entered into roughly 25 agreements on nuclear cooperation with other countries (known as 123 Agreements). Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 11 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama * Of the nearly 1,000 active satellites in earth orbit, there are 200 engaged in earth observation. * Some non-governmental analysis of commercial satellite imagery is of poor quality and “may introduce additional noise into U.S. and international monitoring systems. Some experts are concerned that bad data and bad analysis could increasingly tarnish or mask more reliable data…. There have already been major analytical errors made by untrained imagery analysts who have published openly.” * The efficient analysis of big data can be undermined by the “transmission latency” (or delayed transfer) of data stored in a cloud-based architecture. Therefore, the DSB says that when it comes to nuclear monitoring, “the analytics need to stay near the data.” Similar concerns concerning prompt access are said to arise in the context of NSA analysis of telephony metadata. http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2014/01/dsb-monitoring/ Return to Top

Time.com Surveillance Blimps Will Watch Over East Coast Two blimp-like aircraft will have range stretching from North Carolina to Lake Erie By Denver Nicks January 23, 2014 Two surveillance blimps with monitoring capabilities that extend from Raleigh, N.C. to the shores of Lake Erie are set to go airborne in October, The Washington Post reports, sparking concerns among privacy activists over a growing domestic surveillance apparatus. The blimp-like aircraft will float at 10,000 feet while being anchored to the ground at a U.S. Army site about 45 miles northeast of Washington D.C. The system over Maryland, known as JLENS—short for Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System—will be in place first for a three-year trial period. Its role will be to detect potential cruise missile attacks and enemy vehicles approaching the eastern seaboard, the Army says. Similar systems, sometimes including sophisticated cameras, have been used at military outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on the U.S.-Mexico border. The Army says it has “no current plans” to outfit JLENS with high-powered cameras or to share data with law enforcement but declined to rule out the possibility, according to the Post. “Once a surveillance technology is put up, it’s very tempting for law enforcement or the military to use it for reasons they did not originally disclose,” said Jennifer Lynch of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. According to a March 2013 GAO report, the total program cost of JLENS is more than $2.7 billion, following cost increases and schedule delays. The Washington Post http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/23/surveillance-blimps-will-watch-over-east-coast/ Return to Top

The Japan Times – Japan Kishida Calls for Stricter Nuclear Export Controls in Asia Kyodo January 20, 2014

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 12 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama NAGASAKI – Japan unveiled a fresh initiative Monday to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and urged other Asian nations to strengthen their export controls to prevent such countries as North Korea and Iran from acquiring nuclear-related materials. “It is becoming more important for Asian countries to strengthen export control systems amid growing risks that countries with insufficient export controls may be used by North Korea and Iran as a ‘loophole’ to procure nuclear- related materials,” Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said in a speech in Nagasaki. Kishida announced that Japan will extend $455,000 to the preparatory commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to support its activities, including upgrades to a system that detects nuclear tests. Referring to Japan’s chairmanship of the commission this year, Kishida said Japan will “proactively contribute to promoting the effectuation of the CTBT and developing the verification system.” Kishida unveiled the initiative in the run-up to an April meeting in Hiroshima in which foreign ministers from non- nuclear powers will promote disarmament and nonproliferation. The minister pointed to the danger that nuclear-power aspirants may take advantage of countries with lax export control systems to import materials and technology that can be diverted to nuclear weapon and missile development. In an effort to block nuclear terrorism, he called for strengthening coordination with other countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure nuclear security. He also promised that Japan would take a leading role at a nuclear security summit slated for March in The Hague. “Expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear power globally has led to an increase in the danger of nuclear terrorism,” he said, referring to potential terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants and radioactive materials. “I believe Japan needs to properly respond to this issue.” To achieve a world with no nuclear weapons, Kishida said countries must pursue both nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, calling them “a pair of wheels.” “If the world promotes nuclear disarmament, it makes no sense to allow the emergence of countries possessing nuclear weapons,” he said. Kishida noted the need to involve such nuclear powers as Britain, France and China in nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States and Russia. He also called for boosting transparency in such countries’ nuclear capabilities, including the number of warheads and carrier vehicles they possess, which he said is essential in reducing their nuclear arsenals. Kishida said that, in collaboration with other regional powers like the United States and South Korea, Japan will keep pushing North Korea to take specific action toward denuclearization. Japan, together with other countries, will continue to strictly impose sanctions on North Korea in line with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, he said. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/01/20/national/kishida-calls-for-stricter-nuclear-export-controls-in- asia/#.Ut290X9OKSM Return to Top

Want China Times – Taiwan PLA Could Be Defeated in an Hour in Nuclear War with US: Report By Staff Reporter January 22, 2014

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 13 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The People's Liberation Army could be defeated in a potential nuclear war between China and the United States in just one hour, according to the Moscow-based Expert magazine. Military experts around the world have claimed that the United States should not underestimate the nuclear capability of the Second Artillery Corps, China's strategic missile force. The magazine said however that many of the technologies used by the PLA today come from the former Soviet Union. The report added that China's most advanced technology still comes from nuclear experts from Russia and Ukraine who defected after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China has yet to build a three-pronged nuclear capability that could challenge the United States, consisting of strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Second Artillery Corps is also unable to compete against the US in the number of nuclear warheads it has, the report said, adding that China would likely lose a full scale nuclear war in less than an hour. Vasily Kashin from the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies said that the DF-5 missiles currently equipped by the Second Artillery Corps are capable of striking continental United States. However, it will take the PLA at least two hours to fire this fragile liquid-fueled missile, which means that it can be easily wiped out by the enemy even before its launch. China's DF-4 missile, meanwhile, has a range of 5,500 kilometers but cannot reach the United States, Kashin said. The magazine reported that China is developing the DF-31A — a road-mobile, solid propellant ICBM with a range of 11,000 kilometers. It will be able to target key cities on the West Coast of the United States, including Los Angeles. However, the United States has at least 2,000 advanced ICBMs with similar capabilities to the DF-31A. In addition, both the DF-31 and DF-31A are limited to one nuclear warhead. Sources claim that China is now devoting resources to the development of the DF-41, which will have a range of 14,000 kilometers. A single DF-41 is capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, the Expert said, adding that the new missile will not begin service with the PLA in the foreseeable future. It takes between 20 and 30 years for China to deploy its ICBMs to the frontline after the first test launch of the missile, according to the magazine. As for China's new Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine, the Expert stated that it is equipped with a JL-2 missile with a range of 8,000 kilometers. Analysts from the Pentagon said that the capability of Type 094 is only comparable to the submarines of the Soviet Union in 1970s, however. In addition, it will take another five years for the first Jin-class submarine to begin service with the PLA Navy. Meanwhile, China also has a regiment of H-6K strategic bombers based on the design of the Soviet Union's Tupolev Tu-16 jet bomber, which was first produced in the 1950s. The H-6K has been upgraded with D-30KP engines and CJ-10 cruise missiles, but the country is still unable to develop a smaller nuclear warhead to be loaded aboard the strategic bomber, the magazine said. http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140122000074&cid=1101 Return to Top

Yonhap News Agency – South Korea U.S. Military Chiefs Highlight Growing N. Korean Threat January 23, 2014 By Lee Chi-dong WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 (Yonhap) -- The top commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet said North Korea is the No. 1 security threat in Asia, joining a chorus of worries about what the unpredictable communist regime might do. "Our No. 1 security concern is North Korea," Adm. Harry Harris told reporters in Singapore Wednesday (local time) on board the destroyer USS Spruance, according to local news reports.

South China Morning Post – Hong Kong, China China's Nuclear Missile Drill seen as Warning to US Not to Meddle in Region Military mouthpiece releases photos of drills involving ICBM able to reach American West Coast after Pentagon upgrades forces in Japan By Minnie Chan Thursday, 23 January, 2014 The People's Liberation Army has for the first time released photos of its most advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in action - a move seen as a response to US military moves in the region. The 17 photos published on the PLA Daily's website on Tuesday provided the first glimpse of a live drill involving the Dongfeng-31 since its delivery to the Second Artillery Corps in 2006.

Global Times – China Ministry of Defense Calls Missile Claim ‘Speculation’ Global Times, January 24, 2014 By Global Times Media reports on Thursday speculated that China was test-firing a Dongfeng-31 missile, which is said by experts to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads as far as 8,000 kilometers, far enough to reach the US.

The Voice of Russia – Russia 21 January 2014 Russia's Western Military District to Receive Iskander-M missiles in 2014 The Western Military District (WMD) is to receive a brigade set of Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles in 2014, WMD Commander Col. Gen. Anatoly Sidorov said. "In 2014 twenty formations and military units will be re-armed with new and upgraded hardware. One missile brigade will be re-armed with an Iskander-M missile complex," he said at a session of the Russian Defense Ministry collegium. "In particular, hardware acceptance facilities have already been organized in Luga for the storage of the Iskander-M complex," he said when asked by the defense minister how hardware supplies are synchronized with infrastructure preparations. Voice of Russia, Interfax http://voiceofrussia.com/2014_01_21/Russias-Western-Military-District-to-receive-Iskander-M-missiles-in-2014- 7265/ Return to Top

The Voice of Russia – Russia 22 January 2014 Russia Still Relies on Nuclear Triad – Putin Russia's President Vladimir Putin has said that the nuclear triad, a three-legged nuclear capability that is traditionally comprised of strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles, continues to be the bedrock of the country's military defense. The president today spoke before an assembly of physics and engineering students at a prominent Russian institute. When asked on the country's defense priorities, Putin said they were primarily focused on preserving the nuclear triad. Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 17 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama "I personally believe that the day will come when the human race will give up nuclear weapons, but it's nowhere in sight, meaning that not only Russia but also many other countries still have nuclear arsenals." "They [nuclear powers] are not going to scrap these weapons yet. It would be strange for the Russian Federation to take such a step in this climate, because such a move would lead to dire consequences both for our country and our people," Putin said. Vladimir Putin highlighted a number of other defense priorities, including developing new communication systems, technical reconnaissance, space technologies and high-precision weapons. He told students that Russia would continue to rely on its Air Force and Navy and added that a focus would be necessary on applied and fundamental sciences, such as the science of materials. Russian President Vladimir Putin says he believes the day will come when the human race will scrap its nuclear weapons arsenals – but it is not in the offing yet. Speaking before an audience of engineering and physics students in Moscow, the Russian leader said: “I personally believe that humanity will eventually give up nuclear weapons, but this day is nowhere in sight.” He also said that Russia would never dismantle its nuclear warheads unilaterally, since this step might have dire repercussions for the country. Voice of Russia, TASS, RIA Novosti http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_01_22/Russia-still-relies-on-nuclear-triad-Putin-1614/ Return to Top

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russia Plans Cruise Missile Tests, Bomber Patrols for 2014 22 January 2014 MOSCOW, January 22 (RIA Novosti) – The Russian Air Force is preparing to conduct a series of tests of new cruise missiles, as well as carrying out strategic bomber patrols including stops in other countries, the commander of its long-range fleet said Wednesday. “In 2014 we are planning practice launches of cruise missiles, including new models,” Gen. Lt. Anatoly Zhikharev told reporters, without specifying the missiles to be fired. Russian planes launched 15 cruise missiles last year. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said last summer that Russia was planning a 30-fold increase of its cruise missile arsenal by 2020. The buildup is planned to include the new Raduga Kh-101 cruise missile that can carry an 880-pound (400 kilogram) payload up to 6,000 miles (9,600 kilometers). Zhikharev also said that Russia’s long-range air fleet would conduct long-distance patrols this year, including stops at airbases in other countries that will be named in the future. In October last year a pair of Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bombers visited Venezuela and Nicaragua while conducting patrols over the Caribbean, in the first such visit since 2008. Columbia protested the flights and scrambled jet fighters to escort the bombers, claiming that they had violated its airspace. The Tu-160 is a supersonic strategic bomber with variable-sweep wings, designed to engage targets around the globe with nuclear and conventional weapons. http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140122/186812347/Russia-Plans-Cruise-Missile-Tests-Bomber-Patrols-for- 2014.html

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency Russia Must Protect Arctic Border from Missile Threats – Expert 23 January 2014 MOSCOW, January 23 (RIA Novosti) – Protecting Russia from potential missile attacks launched from the Arctic should be a key goal of increased Russian military presence in the region, a Russian expert on geopolitics said Thursday. According to Konstantin Sivkov, first vice president of the Russian National Geopolitical Academy, massive strikes of high-precision cruise missiles against Russia would be effective only if they were delivered from launchers deployed in the Arctic. He explained that [cruise] missiles launched from other regions would be capable of destroying targets in only certain parts of Russia due to their limited flying range. “Therefore, the creation of a low-altitude radar shield in the Arctic, covering the most probable missile approaches from the northwest, is a key task,” Sivkov said at a “round table” discussion meeting in RIA Novosti. Sivkov, who is a retired officer of the Russian military’s General Staff, also stressed the importance of strengthening the Russian naval and air contingents in the Arctic to ensure the protection of the country’s borders in the region. “At present, the strength of [Russia’s] Northern Fleet is not sufficient to accomplish even basic tasks to ensure national security in this vast region,” Sivkov said. He added that a strong contingent of fighter aircraft should be deployed there “to intercept and destroy incoming missiles during their approach” to the Russian border. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military in December to boost its presence in the Arctic and complete the development of military infrastructure in the region in 2014. The military has already started the deployment of aerospace defense units in the Arctic and construction of an early missile warning radar in the country’s extreme north, according to the commander of the Aerospace Defense Forces, Maj. Gen. Alexander Golovko. The Defense Ministry has also announced plans to reopen airfields and ports on the New Siberian Islands and the Franz Josef Land archipelago, as well as at least seven airfields on the continental part of the Arctic Circle that were mothballed in 1993. Arctic territories, believed to hold vast untapped oil and gas reserves, have increasingly been at the center of disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice. Russia has made claims on several Arctic shelf areas and is planning to defend its bid at the United Nations. http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140123/186847236/Russia-Must-Protect-Arctic-Border-From-Missile-Threats-- Expert.html Return to Top

Tehran Times – Iran UN Inspectors Arrive in Tehran to Oversee Iran Nuclear Deal Political Desk 19 January 2014

Ha’aretz Daily News – Israel Israel to Stop Distributing Gas Masks after February, Inner Cabinet Decides The decision will be reviewed at the end of the year, following a new assessment by defense authorities. By Barak Ravid January 19, 2014 Israel will discontinue the distribution of gas masks to the public at the end of February, the security cabinet decided on Sunday. The decision was taken in accordance with the assessment of the defense establishment that the danger of a chemical attack against Israel had declined substantially – primarily due to Syria's decommissioning of its chemical weapons. The manufacture of gas masks will continue at a reduced pace after February, the Prime Minister's Bureau said in a statement, but they will be for the use of emergency teams only and won't be distributed to the public. The decision will be reviewed at the end of the year, following a new assessment by the defense establishment.

Bangkok Post – Thailand Iran Curbs Uranium Enrichment as Nuclear Deal Takes Effect Agence France-Presse (AFP) 20 January 2014 Iran on Monday halted production of 20 percent enriched uranium, marking the entry into force of an interim deal with world powers on its disputed nuclear programme. The suspension started the clock on negotiating a trickier long-term accord aimed at ending the Iran nuclear standoff and averting war once and for all. In exchange for Iran's partial nuclear freeze, Western powers will slightly loosen crippling sanctions in a package worth between $6-7 billion, including $4.2 billion in frozen overseas foreign exchange assets in eight instalments starting February 1. The European Union led the way on Monday, announcing in a statement it had suspended a range of sanctions against Iran for a period of six months. Washington was expected later Monday to make a similar announcement. Mohammad Amiri, a top official of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, told the IRNA news agency that Tehran had kept to its part of the deal reached in Geneva in November with the P5+1 powers -- the US, China, Russia, France, Britain and Germany. "In line with the implementation of the Geneva joint plan of action, Iran suspended the production of 20 percent enriched uranium in the presence of UN nuclear watchdog inspectors at Natanz and Fordo sites," Amiri said. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed Amiri's comments, saying in a report passed to member states that Iran "has ceased enriching uranium above five percent" fissile purities at the Natanz and Fordo facilities. The report, seen by AFP, said that Iran was also converting its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, a particular concern to the international community since it can be relatively easily be further purified to weapons-grade. The UN atomic watchdog added that Iran "is not conducting any further advances to its activities" at Natanz, Fordo or the heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak, which could in theory provide Iran with weapons-grade plutonium. "It's all fine, all their requirements have been fulfilled," one diplomat told AFP. Soon afterwards the EU statement was issued in Brussels. "As part of the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action agreed by Iran and the (P5+1), which enters into force today, the Council today suspended certain EU restrictive measures against Iran for a period of six months," it said. Under the deal, Iran in the next months will not install or switch on new nuclear machines and will grant the IAEA more access, including daily visits to the Fordo and Natanz enrichment facilities. But the core sanctions will still bite. Over the next half-year alone, Iran will miss out on $30 billion in oil revenues, the White House says. Most of Tehran's $100 billion in foreign exchange holdings remains off-limits. Comprehensive accord Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 21 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Mark Fitzpatrick, a former US State Department official now at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the P5+1 powers will want Iran to slash the number of centrifuges to 3,000-4,000 from the current 19,000. In addition Iran will have to mothball Fordo; change the Arak reactor under construction so it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium; and cut the stockpile of low-enriched uranium to less than a bomb's worth, Fitzpatrick told AFP. Coupled with tighter inspections, this would not remove entirely Iran's capability to make nuclear weapons -- it denies having this aim -- but it would make it considerably more difficult. According to US President Barack Obama it would be "impossible". Agreeing the interim deal was hard enough, and neither side is under any illusions about the difficulty of securing a long-term agreement. Even if a deal is reached, its terms may be too tough for hardliners in Iran and too lax for their US counterparts and Iran's arch-enemy Israel, the Middle East's sole if undeclared nuclear power. Conservative newspapers on Monday opposed implementing the deal. Under the headline "Nuclear holocaust", Vatan-e Emrooz said that the Geneva accord will see most of Iran's nuclear activities come to a halt. A push by US lawmakers -- including some from Obama's own party -- to impose new sanctions could also scupper the process since this would contravene the interim deal. This would "send the message to Tehran that the United States is unable to hold up its end of the bargain," Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association told AFP, "likely derailing the initial deal and jeopardising negotiations on the comprehensive agreement". http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/world/390545/iran-curbs-uranium-enrichment-to-activate-landmark-nuclear- deal Return to Top

The Daily Star – Lebanon Iran 'Military Nuclear Program' Will Stop: Netanyahu Agence France-Presse (AFP) January 21, 2014 OCCUPIED JERUSALEM: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday that Iran's atomic drive "will be stopped," a day after a nuclear deal bringing in sanctions relief for Tehran took effect. "Iran's military nuclear program must be stopped, and Iran's military nuclear program will be stopped," Netanyahu told reporters in Jerusalem, without elaborating. Israel has long warned that a nuclear Iran would pose an existential threat to the Jewish state, and has refused to rule out a military strike to prevent that from happening. Netanyahu's remarks came a day after he said that the so-called Geneva Agreement "does not prevent" Tehran from pursuing its bid to build military atomic capability. "A nuclear armed Iran would not just endanger Israel -- it would threaten the peace and security of our region," Netanyahu said on Tuesday at a joint news conference with Canadian counterpart Stephen Harper. "It would give Iran's terrorist proxies a nuclear umbrella. "It would launch a multilateral nuclear arms race in the Middle East, it could turn the Middle East into a nuclear tinderbox," Netanyahu said.

CNN.com Iranian Official on Nuke Deal: 'We Did Not Agree to Dismantle Anything' By Tom Cohen, CNN Thursday January 23, 2014 (CNN) -- Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif insisted Wednesday that the Obama administration mischaracterizes concessions by his side in the six-month nuclear deal with Iran, telling CNN in an exclusive interview that "we did not agree to dismantle anything." Zarif told CNN Chief National Security Correspondent Jim Sciutto that terminology used by the White House to describe the agreement differed from the text agreed to by Iran and the other countries in the talks -- the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany. "The White House version both underplays the concessions and overplays Iranian commitments" under the agreement that took effect Monday, Zarif said in Davos, Switzerland, where he was attending the World Economic Forum. As part of the accord, Iran was required to dilute its stockpile of uranium that had been enriched to 20%, well above the 5% level needed for power generation but still below the level for developing a nuclear weapon. In addition, the deal mandated that Iran halt all enrichment above 5% and "dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%," according to a White House fact sheet issued in November after the initial agreement was reached. Zarif accused the Obama administration of creating a false impression with such language. "The White House tries to portray it as basically a dismantling of Iran's nuclear program. That is the word they use time and again," he said, urging Sciutto to read the actual text of the agreement. "If you find a single, a single word, that even closely resembles dismantling or could be defined as dismantling in the entire text, then I would take back my comment." He repeated that "we are not dismantling any centrifuges, we're not dismantling any equipment, we're simply not producing, not enriching over 5%." "You don't need to over-emphasize it," Zarif said of the White House language. A separate summary sent out by the White House last week did not use the word dismantle.

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 23 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama In an interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria on Wednesday, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani echoed Zarif's statement, saying the government will not destroy existing centrifuges. However, he added: "We are ready to provide confidence that there should be no concern about Iran's program." Responding to Zarif's comments to CNN, a senior administration official said "we expected that the Iranians would need to spin this for their domestic political purposes, and are not surprised they are doing just that." Iranian and U.S. officials have tried to sell the nuclear agreement to domestic opponents in their respective countries who could scuttle it. Iranian officials have called the interim pact a victory and said it failed to halt the nation's nuclear development program, while U.S. officials say the agreement essentially froze Iran's nuclear program and rolled back some capabilities. Zarif noted the political pressure facing both sides, which includes a push in Congress for more sanctions against Iran that Tehran warns would destroy any chance for success in talks on a long-range nuclear agreement intended to prevent development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. "All of us are facing difficulties and oppositions and concerns and misgivings," he said, noting he had been summoned Wednesday to Iran's parliament to answer questions. Asked about his relationship with Secretary of State John Kerry, Zarif called it "very difficult because we're both going into these negotiations with a lot of baggage." Progress has been made, he said, but "it's yet too early to talk about trust." Zarif and Rouhani traveled to Switzerland for annual gathering of world political and business leaders in Davos as a new round of Syrian talks started in Montreux before moving to Geneva. Iran, a major backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, was invited to the Syrian talks by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, then disinvited under pressure from the United States because Tehran refused to endorse conditions in a previous agreement setting up the talks. "We do not like the way Iran was treated," he said, adding "it did not enhance the credibility of the United Nations or the office of the Secretary General." Zarif expressed hope that the Syrian talks could succeed, but he criticized Syrian opposition groups and their supporters that opposed Iran's participation in the talks for what he called spreading extremism and trying to impose their will on the Syrian people. He explained Iran's support for the Syrian government, a longtime ally, by saying "Iran finds itself in a situation where we see the very prominent and serious danger of terrorism, extremism, sectarian tension being fed from outside and creating a very dangerous environment in Syria." To Zarif, an agreement among Syrians that brings a democratically elected government is the only solution, and he dismissed concerns that a free and fair vote would be impossible with al-Assad in power and running as a candidate. Kerry said earlier Wednesday in Montreux that there was "no way" al-Assad will be part of a transitional government sought by the Geneva talks. "Why don't we talk about it?" Zarif asked. "And why don't we allow the Syrians to talk about how they can conduct a free and fair election? Why do people need to set an agenda and impose their agenda on the Syrian people?" Sciutto also asked Zarif about his visit last week to lay a wreath at the grave of Hezbollah leader Imad Mugniyah in Lebanon.

The Hill January 23, 2014, 02:21 pm WH Dismisses Iran's Nuclear Deal 'Spin' By Justin Sink The White House on Thursday brushed off comments by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who, in an interview, accused the Obama administration of overstating the concessions they had gained from Tehran in a six-month nuclear deal. "How Iranian officials characterize this for a domestic audience matters far less to us than what they're actually doing," White House press secretary Jay Carney said Thursday. In the interview with CNN, Zarif said that Iran "did not agree to dismantle anything" as part of the pact. "The White House tries to portray it as basically a dismantling of Iran's nuclear program. That is the word they use time and again," he continued. "If you find a single, a single word, that even closely resembles dismantling or could be defined as dismantling in the entire text, then I would take back my comment." Under details of the plan released by the Obama administration, Iran is required to dilute any of its stockpile of uranium enriched at a level higher than the 5 percent necessary for nuclear power. The deal also mandates Iran freeze all enrichment above 5 percent, "dismantle the technical connections required to enrich" above that level and allow increased inspections of their nuclear sites. Tehran and Washington appeared to be engaging in a semantic fight over that provision, with Iranian leaders noting they had not agreed to destroy any centrifuges as part of the deal. But the White House defined "dismantling" more narrowly and said an International Atomic Energy Agency report earlier this week indicated Iran was abiding by the terms of the nuclear deal. "Iran has, among other things, stopped producing 20 percent enriched uranium, has disabled the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce it and has begun diluting its existing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium," Carney said. "So we take what the IAEA says, and assesses and verifies as our guide to whether or not Iran is doing what it said it would do." Iranian and American officials have disputed how to characterize the agreement almost as soon as it was struck. On Twitter, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani bragged that world powers had "surrendered" to Iran's "will" with the agreement.

Reuters – U.S. U.N. Nuclear Chief Says still 'Long Way to Go' on Iran By Fredrik Dahl Friday, January 24, 2014 VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear chief said on Friday there was "still a long way to go" to resolve a decade-old dispute over Iran's nuclear program, a note of caution days after Tehran curbed its atomic activity under an interim deal with world powers. Yukiya Amano, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, made the comment as he won broad backing from the IAEA's 35-nation board for the U.N. body's expanded role in Iran to check that it complies with the accord over the next six months. Many governments said they would help pay the estimated $8 million the IAEA needs to inspect Iranian nuclear sites under the deal, which took effect on Monday, diplomats who attended the closed-door meeting said. The IAEA will nearly double the number of people it already has working on Iran. Amano said the interim agreement - under which Iran will get relief from some economic sanctions - was an "important step forward towards achieving a comprehensive solution" to the nuclear dispute. But, he added: "there is still a long way to go". He told a news conference it would take "quite a long time" to resolve all outstanding issues, including a long- running IAEA probe into suspicions that Iran may have carried out research relevant for the development of nuclear weapons. In the deal with the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia, Iran agreed to suspend its most sensitive nuclear activity in exchange for a limited easing of sanctions that are battering its oil-dependent economy. After years of increasing economic isolation, Iran, under new President Hassan Rouhani, is seeking "constructive engagement" with the world, including the United States which Iranian politicians regularly refer to as the "Great Satan". TOUGH TALKS AHEAD The agreement hammered out in Geneva in November is designed to buy time for negotiations on a final settlement of the dispute over an Iranian nuclear program Tehran says is peaceful but the West fears may have military aims. Those talks - expected to start in February - are likely to be more difficult than last year's negotiations, diplomats say, as the West is likely to seek a significant scaling back of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. Refined uranium can provide fuel for nuclear power plants, Iran's stated aim, or provide weapons material if processed much further, which Western states fear may be the real goal. The IAEA already inspects Iranian nuclear facilities regularly to make sure there is no diversion of material for military purposes. That work will now increase.

Defense News.com Testing of India's Agni IV Missile Advances By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI January 20, 2014 NEW DELHI — India’s flight test of its indigenous nuclear-capable Agni IV missile today could pave the way for user trials, according to the Ministry of Defence. The surface-to-surface ballistic missile, with a range of 4,000 kilometers, can carry a warhead of up to 1 ton and is equipped with a re-entry heat shield, said a scientist at the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which is developing the missile. The two-stage, solid-propelled missile is 20 meters tall. “The Agni IV missile propelled by composite solid fuel rocket motor technology was launched from its road mobile launcher indigenously developed by DRDO. The long range radars and Electro-Optical Tracking Systems located all along the coast have tracked and monitored all the parameters throughout the flight. Two ships located near the target point tracked the vehicle and witnessed the final event,” according to a Defence Ministry statement. The missile is equipped with state-of-the-art avionics, a fifth-generation onboard computer and distributed architecture, and has features to correct and guide itself for inflight disturbances, according to the Defence Ministry statement. The missile is equipped with a ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system and supported by a redundant micronavigation system, according to the statement. The re-entry heat shield withstood temperatures in the range of 4,000 degrees centigrade, protecting the avionics within, said the statement. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140120/DEFREG/301200021/Testing-India-s-Agni-IV-Missile- Advances?odyssey=nav%7Chead Return to Top

The Times of India – India With First Nuclear Submarine INS Arihant Set for Sea Trials, Navy Wants More for Strategic Deterrence Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 27 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama By Rajat Pandit, Tamil News Network (TNN) January 21, 2014 NEW DELHI: The Navy is all gung-ho about the country's first indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant, declaring it will soon head for sea trials, complete the "nuclear weapons triad" and live up to its name "annihilator of enemies". "We expect INS Arihant to finish its harbour trials in a few weeks, a month or so, and then head for sea trials. All its capabilities will be tested as the third leg of the triad, the sea-based strategic deterrence, which will include firing of its ballistic missiles," said assistant chief of naval staff (submarines) Rear Admiral LVS Babu on Tuesday. This confidence about finally achieving its dream of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear- tipped ballistic missiles — called a SSBN in military parlance — is reflected in the naval Republic Day tableau this year. It depicts models of INS Arihant and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). But the Navy wants more, at least three SSBNs and six SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines but without ballistic missiles) in the long term. Consequently, the work on the hulls of the follow-on SSBNs to INS Arihant is already in progress at the ship-building centre at Visakhapatnam, with the second one to be named INS Aridhaman. Concurrently, India is also negotiating the lease of a second Akula-II class SSN from Russia, at a cost of about $1.5 billion, after inducting the first one INS Chakra on a 10-year lease since April 2012 after paying almost $1 billion. Nuclear submarines, which can stay underwater for prolonged periods unlike conventional diesel-electric submarines, are the hard currency of stealth combat power. The US leads the pack with around 70 nuclear submarines, followed by Russia with over 30, and China, UK and France with about 8-12 each. India for long has had the Agni missiles and aircraft that can double up as strategic bombers as the first two legs of the nuclear triad. But the underwater one in the shape of a SSBN, considered the most effective and difficult-to- detect leg, was elusive so far. INS Arihant, with its 750km range K-15 missiles, will finally plug the big operational gap. The progress, of course, has been slow. Ever since the 83MW pressurized light-water reactor on board the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant went "critical" on August 10 last year, there has been talk of "impending sea trials" but they are yet to kick off. "This is the first time we have achieved criticality of a mobile reactor in India. Everything has to be done in a methodical, careful, sequential manner. INS Arihant is in the terminal phase of the HATS (harbour-acceptance trials) now," Rear Admiral Babu told TOI. "We are very optimistic we will go for the sea-acceptance trials (SATS) soon. Remember, all technical hiccups usually happen in the HATS. Once they are over, all procedural checks are over," he added. But the K-15 SLBM is dwarfed by the well over 5,000-km range missiles of the US, Russia and China. The new Chinese JL-2 SLBM , for instance, has a 7,400km range. DRDO is developing a 3,500km SLBM called K-4 but it is far from ready. The Navy, however, is confident. "The process of developing a missile with better punch, capability and reach is in progress," said Rear Admiral Babu, adding the maritime security dynamics in the Indian Ocean region and "our extended neighbourhood" would "dictate our overall plans to augment our nuclear submarine fleet". http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/With-first-nuclear-submarine-INS-Arihant-set-for-sea-trials-Navy-wants- more-for-strategic-deterrence/articleshow/29167621.cms Return to Top

The Voice of Russia – Russia 23 January 2014

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 28 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Indian Agni-4 Launch Stirs Fears of Local Nuclear War in S Asia amid Arms Race By Sergei Duz India is launching the production of its new nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 kilometres. Experts have been concerned by assuming that the move actually amounts to a new round of the regional arms race. If the worst comes to the worst, things may result in a local nuclear conflict. The ballistic missile in question is Agni-IV, and now that it has been successfully tested three times, the Indian military is prepared to pass it into service. But two years ago, India launched its intercontinental missile Agni-V, with an effective range of 5,000 kilometres. Some experts feel that this is an excessive range for strategic missiles, if these are meant to be used in the standoff with Pakistan. Agni-V, as well as Agni-IV can well hit targets in China. This is what an expert with the Centre for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Peter Topychkanov, says about it in a comment. "India is pursuing several goals by developing its nuclear forces. The first one is to counter nuclear threats, such as the neighbouring Pakistan and China. The threats in question have prompted India to create its own nuclear triad. The air component of India's triad is currently the weakest. So Delhi lays emphasis on ground-based missiles, and eventually, on sea-based nuclear forces". A classical nuclear triad comprises land, sea and air-based weapon systems, with only Russia and the United States currently boasting this kind of triad. Even if any two components of the triad are destroyed, the third one is still capable of delivering a retaliatory strike. Aside from strategic missiles, India has other airborne vehicles to deliver nuclear charges to targets (such as the Mirage-2000 multipurpose jet fighters). India is also due to commission its own first nuclear submarine shortly, a sub that can be armed with ballistic missiles. If seen from the outside, India is clearly aspiring to regional domination and is engaged in arms race escalation, although the Indians will, of course, beg to differ. This is what a military expert Victor Baranets has to say in a comment. "India has long been trying to take its rightful place in Asia and the Pacific. The country has a number of territorial problems. There are also a number of strategic enemies, above all China. India, besides, has the vast expanse of the ocean where it wants to secure its fully-fledged presence. Nor should one forget about the factor of Pakistan". Some experts feel that the current scale of the regional arms race should leave both the potential allies and potential enemies unperturbed by a regional nation test-firing its nuclear missiles. But the arms race is one of the worst destabilizing geopolitical factors, Peter Topychkanov says and elaborates. "Delhi, Islamabad and Beijing all deny any arms race in the region. But all three nations are involved in military- industrial competition. India, Pakistan and China continue feeling threatened by one another. There is no talk of complete parity, but a certain balance is indeed kept. These countries are not prone to aggressive behaviour, but they understand that new technologies will pose new threats. That's why they start considering the possibility of the first preemptive strike. If military-technological rivalry makes some country feel vulnerable, grave talks on regional arms control may follow". But talks on disarmament are currently facing a doubtful future. Besides, it stands to reason to ask if the doctrine of nuclear deterrence can be projected onto South Asia at all. India and Pakistan are neighbours, and their missiles impact point time makes up 3 to 5 minutes, which is obviously not enough to make appropriate decisions. Hence mistrust between the countries is growing as their military arsenals grow. Pakistani arsenals are known to be inferior to those of India, yet Islamabad is in a position to make Indians feel unhappy, says Peter Topychkanov, and elaborates. "Pakistan's missile programme is based on cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, because no Indian antimissile system will be able to protect its territory, especially the areas in the vicinity of the Indian-Pakistani

China Daily – China OPINION/Commentary US Seeks Nonexistent Threat By Song Zhongping (China Daily) January 18, 2014 The US media and some of its officials have raised a hue and cry about the recent hypersonic missile delivery vehicle test by China with the obvious intention of exaggerating "China's military threat". According to the Washington Free Beacon, which first reported the test on Monday, China's hypersonic glide vehicle appears designed to be launched atop an intercontinental ballistic missile, and then glide and maneuver at 10 times of the speed of sound from near space en route to its target. It quoted a Pentagon official as saying that the test was conducted with the aim of sending warheads through the US missile defense system. The advantages of hypersonic craft include precision targeting, very rapid delivery of weapons and greater survivability against missile and space defense systems. Some US Congressmen, referring to the test, have said that the Chinese "appear to be leaping ahead of us" in terms of developing technologies. In a joint statement, Republican House Armed Services Committee members Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Randy Forbes and Mike Rogers said they were worried whether the US can maintain its technological advantage given the level of budget cuts that Congress has approved. These wordings, along with the lurid remarks on the land-based and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile test by China in late December, show that the US will not let go of any chance to spread the "China threat" theory. By continuously misinterpreting the gravity of China's weapons and spacecraft tests, the US hopes to instill a more pressing sense of crisis among its allies. The US already regards China as a core strategic rival of its "rebalancing" strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, so the uproar over "China threat", especially "China's military threat", is expected to compel Congress to increase the defense budget for advanced weapons' research and development to allow the Pentagon to maintain its advantage. Also, without an imaginary powerful enemy, US weapons' manufacturers will find it difficult to increase their sales and raise their profits. And they, along with some US politicians, see a cut in the military budget as detrimental to their interests. The US is likely to use exaggerated military might of China also to rally its allies in the Asia-Pacific to jointly counter China's growing regional and international influence. It intends to sell more weapons to its allies, too, by portraying China as a great threat to their security. Some White House officials even believe that an arms race between its Asian allies and China or a limited military conflict between them will be of immense benefit to Washington. After

Daily Times – Pakistan OPINION/Op-Ed The ‘Nuclear Deterrence Works’ Fantasy Powerful lobbies in almost all nuclear weapon states have developed stakes in vast nuclear establishments, spending budgets of billions of dollars. These vested interests always resist efforts to cut down nuclear weapons By Rizwan Asghar January 21, 2014 “One cannot fashion a credible deterrent out of an incredible action” — Robert McNamara. The concept of nuclear deterrence gained increased prominence during the Cold War period when a generation of national security scholars and practitioners, including Bernard Brodie, Kenneth Waltz, etc., advocated nuclear development as an effective deterrent. However, most academic research on the subject is directed towards explaining the theoretical modalities of nuclear deterrence rather than a systematic analysis of the empirical evidence on the efficacy of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. In the 21st century, the growing efforts to stigmatise and ultimately ban nuclear weapons reflect a shift in the nuclear weapons debate — a shift that aims at challenging the long-held myth of nuclear deterrence. Conventional wisdom suggests that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is always successful and prevented many cold war crises from erupting into full-scale nuclear war. The advocates of this theory are of the view that the overwhelming fear of mutually assured destruction provides a measure of stability in times of crisis. In their opinion, nuclear deterrence provides full security against attacks with conventional forces or nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of war between two nuclear-armed countries to a minimum. This argument gained Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 31 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama such widespread acceptance that it today emerges as a formidable obstacle in the way of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. These advocates of nuclear optimism are so assertive in their view that their influence in both academia and policy-making circles can easily be seen. More importantly though, powerful lobbies in almost all nuclear weapon states have developed stakes in vast nuclear establishments, spending budgets of billions of dollars. These vested interests always resist efforts to cut down nuclear weapons. In 2010, President Obama had to earmark $ 185 billion to modernise nuclear warheads and delivery systems over the next 10 years in the bargain for smooth passage of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia. The trump argument in favour of retaining nuclear weapons capability is that the use of nuclear weapons brought an early end to World War II. New research by a well-known Japanese historian, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, has proved it totally wrong that Japan surrendered because of the dropping of atomic bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In fact, the Japanese decided to surrender when the Soviet Union renounced the 1941 Neutrality Pact and joined the Allied Powers in war. By 1944, 66 Japanese cities had been completely destroyed by conventional weapons but the Japanese government continued military resistance — the destruction of two more cities could not make much difference. History is witness to the fact that attacks aimed at ordinary civilians are rarely given any consideration when it comes to taking vital decisions in times of war. After the end of World War II, Japan’s leaders attributed their failure to the sudden use of nuclear weapons only because it was politically convenient for them on the domestic front to blame an ‘outside’ factor. Ward Wilson, a famous nuclear expert and director of the Rethinking Nuclear Weapons Project, is of the view that nuclear deterrence is an unsound basis for the national security policy because it is neither as effective at political persuasion nor as capable of influencing military conflicts as many proponents of nuclear weapons would have us believe. For total reliance on the nuclear deterrence strategy it has to be prefect but historical records show that deterrence could work only in a few cases. Even a single case of failure has the potential to lead to a nuclear war. More alarmingly, deterrence threats, due to their inherently uncertain nature, sometimes lead enemy nations to behave in ways that are quite inimical to achieving the goal of deterring aggression. During the early years of the Cold War, nuclear proponents would claim that the presence of nuclear weapons had enormous potential to ensure success in political negotiations while preventing all sorts of conventional or nuclear attacks. However, an impartial analysis of political events during the Cold War calls the fundamental soundness of these claims into question. It is part of the historical record that the possession of nuclear capability by the US could not intimidate the Russians during talks after World War II. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 proved the second part of the argument wrong that nuclear weapons could prevent any sort of attack. Israeli nuclear capability could not prevent a number of Muslim states from starting an all-out war for regaining occupied territory and for Palestinian independence. The efficacy of the nuclear umbrella was also questioned when the UK and France developed their own nuclear capability despite concrete assurances of security from the US. As French President Charles de Gaulle famously said, the US would not trade New York for Hamburg. The Cuban missile crisis is another case often cited to support the idea of nuclear deterrence. It is generally believed that the nuclear deterrent was the main factor that brought back the US and Soviet Union from the brink of a nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. When the information regarding the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles in Cuba became known, though US President Kennedy knew that by blockading Cuba he would touch off a crisis that could lead to nuclear war, he went ahead, undeterred. The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union’s decision to withdraw nuclear missiles may be regarded as supporting the nuclear deterrence theory but Kennedy’s reaction does not support the theory. In 2008, Michael Dobbs, a British politician, wrote an insightful book titled One Minute to Midnight, revealing that the Cuban missile crisis came very close to a nuclear war at least three separate times during those decisive days and nuclear war was averted not by the efficient functioning of nuclear deterrence, but just ‘by chance’. In a nutshell, the idea of nuclear deterrence is too fragile to be relied upon and the fear of massive nuclear retaliation is not always able to prevent countries from taking the course of action they want. Ward Wilson and a number of other nuclear experts have frequently claimed in their works that the “failure rate of nuclear deterrence Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 32 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama is potentially higher than theory admits”. The emerging threat of nuclear terrorism is also a question mark on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence because terrorist groups hardly take well thought out rational decisions, as states are believed to take. The continued existence of nuclear weapons is also the reason for their gradual spread. So long as even one country has nuclear capability, others will also want to acquire that status. Rizwan Asghar is a research scholar and a former visiting fellow at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, California. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/21-Jan-2014/the-nuclear-deterrence-works-fantasy Return to Top

Roll Call OPINION/Commentary Modernize Nukes, Save Billions in Taxpayer Dollars By Eric Tamerlani January 21, 2014 While much of the United States was preparing for the holidays, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a 25-page report outlining the expected cost to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons over the next decade. The 10-year cost of refurbishing nuclear warheads, replacing delivery vehicles, and maintaining and expanding the laboratory infrastructure to support the nuclear arsenal is a colossal $355 billion. Another recent assessment by the Monterey Institute of International Studies pegged the 30-year cost at $1 trillion. The timing of the CBO report did not afford it the kind of press attention it deserved. Considering CBO’s estimate reflects the initial cost and not the total cost of nuclear modernization, the United States should be informed on options to reduce the cost of nuclear modernization. The U.S. will continue the “nuclear triad” of delivery systems – Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers. The Defense Department and Energy Department’s activities will develop new delivery systems and warheads for all three legs of the triad. The report shows $82 billion to replace the Ohio-class submarine, $40 billion to maintain and replace the long range bomber fleet, $24 billion to build a new class of ICBMs, and $7 billion to modernize tactical weapons such as the B61 gravity bomb. The $355 billion figure is roughly $150 billion more than the administration’s $208 billion, 10-year estimate delivered to Congress last year. However, the time frame of CBO’s report stops short of what nuclear weapon analysts call the “modernization mountain,” the period beginning in 2024 when the costs will steeply increase. From 2025, the United States is expected to spend roughly $33 billion on modernization; on top of the $31 billion the U.S. already spends sustaining the arsenal each year. Congress and the U.S. public need to understand and acknowledge that there are other options to pursue. Otherwise, taxpayers will end up footing the bill for a full-scale nuclear modernization in a post-Cold War era when the utility of some nuclear weapons systems is questionable. There are two initiatives the Obama administration should implement right away. In addition, there are three alternatives the U.S. Congress should consider which could save up to $55 billion dollars on nuclear modernization. The administration should issue a directive for full annual reports on nuclear modernization costs, as well as a life- cycle budget report of each weapon system to be modernized. This should happen as soon as possible to keep the nation informed. Additionally, Congress should consider reducing the scope of certain modernization programs because our current plans are unsustainable. The National Nuclear Security Administration, the organization responsible for maintaining nuclear weapons, is in the process of extending the life of 400 of the B61 nuclear gravity bombs. Half of the bombs are stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, but European political leaders are voicing a growing sentiment to remove the bombs. The estimated cost for the B61 doubled between 2010 and 2012, from roughly $4 Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 33 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama billion to $8 billion; the CBO report now puts the cost closer to $12 billion. This would amount to $30 million per bomb, making it the most expensive U.S. nuclear weapon ever. The U.S. should pursue a cheaper option called “Triple-Alt,” to extend the life of about 250 of the B61-7 bombs for another ten years, and retire the other three B61 versions including two versions stationed in Europe. A smaller scope for B61 modernization would save an estimated $5 billion. Congress should also consider reducing the number of Ohio-replacement class submarines from the planned 12, to eight boats. The submarine replacement is the most expensive nuclear modernization program the U.S. is pursuing. While the submarine leg of the nuclear triad is important for deterrence, there is money to be saved. A smaller fleet of boats could deploy the same number of warheads by increasing the number of warheads per missile, and increasing the number of missiles per boat. Building a smaller fleet would save $16 billion. Finally, in an earlier report, CBO recommended delaying the Long-Range Strike Bomber to the mid-2020s which is when the current strategic bombers will be retired. Delaying production of the new bomber would allow the incorporation of new technological advances and save $32 billion. It is time for Congress to consider our options, save the taxpayers billions of dollars and field a nuclear triad suited for the 21st century, not the Cold War. Eric Tamerlani is a program assistant for nuclear disarmament at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. http://www.rollcall.com/news/modernize_nukes_save_billions_in_taxpayer_dollars_commentary-230251-1.html Return to Top

Federation of American Scientist (FAS).org OPINION/FAS Strategic Security Blog General Confirms Enhanced Targeting Capabilities of B61-12 Nuclear Bomb By Hans M. Kristensen January 23, 2014 The former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, confirmed last week that the B61-12 nuclear bomb planned by the Obama administration will have improved military capabilities to attack targets with greater accuracy and less radioactive fallout. The confirmation comes two and a half years after an FAS publication first described the increased accuracy of the B61-12 and its implications for nuclear targeting in general and the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe in particular. The confirmation is important because the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pledged that nuclear warhead “Life Extension Programs…will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.” In addition to violating the NPR pledge, enhancing the nuclear capability contradicts U.S. and NATO goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons and could undermine efforts to persuade Russia to reduce its non-strategic nuclear weapons posture. Confirmation of the enhanced military capability of the B61-12 also complicates the political situation of the NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) that currently host U.S. nuclear weapons because the governments will have to explain to their parliaments and public why they would agree to increase the military capability. Desired Military Capability

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 34 USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama General Schwartz’s confirmation came during a conference organized by the Stimson Center in response to a question from Steven Young (video time 49:15) whether the relatively low yield and increased accuracy of the B61- 12 in terms of targeting planning would change the way the military thinks about how to use the weapon. General Schwartz’s answer was both clear and blunt: “Without a doubt. Improved accuracy and lower yield is a desired military capability. Without a question.” When asked whether that would result in a different target set or just make the existing weapon better, General Schwartz said: “It would have both effects.” General Schwartz said that the B61 tail kit “has benefits from an employment standpoint that many consider stabilizing.” I later asked him what he meant by that and his reply was that critics (myself included) claim that the increased accuracy and lower yield options could make the B61-12 more attractive to use because of reduced collateral damage and radioactive fallout. But he said he believed that the opposite would be the case; that the enhanced capabilities would enhance deterrence and make use less likely because adversaries would be more convinced that the United States is willing to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Military Implications “Nuclear capable aircraft may have many advantages. Accuracy (as compared to other systems) is not one of them,” the Joint Staff argued in 2004 during drafting of the Doctrine for joint Nuclear Operations. Test drops of U.S. nuclear bombs normally achieve an accuracy of 110-170 meters, which is insufficient to hold underground targets at risk except with very large yield. The designated nuclear earth-penetrator (B61-11) has a 400-kiloton warhead to be effective. Therefore, increasing the accuracy of the B61 to enhance targeting and reduce collateral damage are, as General Schwartz put it at the conference, desired military capabilities. Increasing the accuracy broadens the type of targets that the B61 can be used to attack. The effect is most profound against underground targets that require ground burst and cratering to be damaged by the shock wave. Against a relatively small, heavy, well-designed, underground structure, severe damage is achieved when the target is within 1.25 the radius of the visible crater created by the nuclear detonation. Light damage is achieved at 2.5 radii. For a yield of 50 kt – the estimated maximum yield of the B61-12, the apparent crater radii vary from 30 meters (hard dry rock) to 68 meters (wet soil). Therefore an improvement in accuracy from 100-plus meter CEP (the current estimated accuracy of the B61) down to 30-plus meter CEP (assuming INS guidance for the B61-12) improves the kill probability against these targets significantly by achieving a greater likelihood of cratering the target during a bombing run. Put simply, the increased accuracy essentially puts the CEP inside the crater (see illustration below).

Illustrative difference in radioactive fallout from a 360-kiloton B61-7 surface burst against Iranian underground enrichment facility at Fordow, compared with using a lower-yield option of the B61-12. Fallout calculation from NUKEMAP at nuclearsecrecy.com. No U.S. president would find it easy to authorize use of nuclear weapon. Apart from the implications of ending nearly 70 years of non-use of nuclear weapons and the international political ramifications, anticipated collateral damage serves as an important constraint on potential use of nuclear weapons. Some analysts have argued that higher yield nuclear weapons are less suitable to deter regional adversaries and that lower yield weapons are needed in today’s security environment. The collateral damage from high-yield weapons could “self-deter” a U.S. president from authorizing an attack. There is to my knowledge no evidence that potential adversaries are counting on being able to get away with using nuclear weapons because the United States is self-deterred. Moreover, all gravity bombs and cruise missiles currently in the U.S. nuclear arsenal have low-yield options. But poor accuracy and collateral damage have limited their potential use to military planners in some scenarios. The improved accuracy of the B61-12 appears at least partly intended to close that gap. Implications for NATO For NATO, the improved accuracy has particularly important implications because the B61-12 is a more effective weapon that the B61-3 and B61-4 currently deployed in Europe. The United States has never before deployed guided nuclear bombs in Europe but with the increased accuracy of the B61-12 and combined with the future deployment of the F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter-bomber to Europe, it is clear that NATO is up for quite a nuclear facelift. Initially the old NATO F-16A/B and Tornado PA-200 aircraft that currently serve in the nuclear strike mission will not be able to make use of the increased accuracy of the B61-12, according to U.S. Air Force officials. The reason is

ABOUT THE USAF CPC The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended that "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons School, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence.

Issue No.1099, 24 January 2014 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CPC Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 37