Influencing the United Nations Security Council – the role of representative legitimacy A qualitative comparison of elected members’ influence in decisions made on the Syrian Conflict
JOHAN LUNDIN Master's Thesis Spring 2020
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University Supervisor: Sophia Hatz and Sabine Otto Word count: 22957
Abstract This thesis investigates the topic of elected members of the United Nations Security Council by addressing the research question under what conditions is an elected member of the United Nations Security Council likely to influence decisions in maintaining international peace and security? In investigating the explanatory power of the theoretical argument ‘representative legitimacy’, which suggests that elected members making their proposed actions legitimate by anchoring these with the broader UN membership are more likely to face less opposition and thus increase the likelihood for influence, it tests the hypothesis an elected member anchoring its proposed actions with the broader UN membership is more likely to influence the UNSC decisions. The study is conducted through a structured, focused comparison of three elected members, New Zealand 2015-2016, Japan 2016-2017, and Sweden 2017-2018, and their influence in decisions made on the Syrian conflict. Chosen on a most similar case-design with dependent variable variation, and analyzed through resolutions, meeting records and statements, the empirics give partial support for the hypothesis. The results suggest that representative legitimacy can be a condition under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council, however, one case suggests that representative legitimacy is not necessary.
Keywords: United Nations Security Council, Elected members, Representative legitimacy, Council decisions, Syria, New Zealand, Japan, Sweden
Acknowledgments I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisors for helping me during this project. A big thanks to Sabine for helping me set up my research project for the first half of the semester, and a big thanks to Sophia for helping me finish the thesis during the latter part of the semester. An additional thanks goes to my study colleagues for the feedback given during this semester. A special thanks to Alex taking his valuable time offering insights and suggestions. Lastly, I would like to thank Anna for the support, and thank my family for hosting me during these unprecedented times, providing a conducive study environment.
Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1 The United Nations Security Council ...... 3 1.1.1 Defining UNSC decisions and outcomes ...... 4 2. Previous Research on the elected members ...... 5 2.1 Motivations for the study and research gap ...... 5 2.2 Measuring elected member influence ...... 6 2.3 Conditions under which elected members may influence the Council’s outcomes .... 7 2.3.1 Legitimacy ...... 7 2.3.2 Bringing special knowledge to the Council ...... 8 2.3.3 P5 stalemate and lack of P5 consensus ...... 8 2.3.4 The composition of the Council ...... 8 2.3.5 Summary ...... 9 3. Theory ...... 10 3.1 The contribution to knowledge ...... 10 3.2 A framework for assessing E10 influence ...... 10 3.3 The theoretical claim to be investigated ...... 11 3.3.1 Defining Legitimacy ...... 11 3.3.2 Procedural legitimacy and why it matters ...... 12 3.3.3 Hypothesis ...... 14 3.4 Scope Conditions ...... 14 4. Research Design ...... 16 4.1 Case selection ...... 16 4.1.1 The Syrian conflict ...... 18 4.1.2 Potential shortcomings of the case selection ...... 19 4.2 Operationalizations ...... 19 4.2.1 Operationalization of the dependent variable ...... 20 4.2.2 Operationalization of the independent variable ...... 22 4.3 Data ...... 25 5. Empirics ...... 27 5.1 The Syrian conflict and the UN Security Council ...... 27 6. Case 1 - New Zealand 2015-2016 ...... 28 6.1 New Zealand and the Security Council ...... 28 6.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes ...... 29 6.3 The role of representative legitimacy ...... 31
7. Case 2 - Japan 2016-2017 ...... 36 7.1 Japan and the Security Council ...... 36 7.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes ...... 37 7.3 The role of representative legitimacy ...... 39 8. Case 3 - Sweden 2017-2018 ...... 44 8.1 Sweden and the Security Council ...... 44 8.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes ...... 44 8.3 The role of representative legitimacy ...... 46 9. Analysis and Discussion ...... 52 9.1 Connecting representative legitimacy to Council outcomes ...... 52 9.2 Theoretical implications ...... 55 9.3 Alternative explanations and additional observations ...... 57 9.4 Limitations ...... 59 10. Conclusion ...... 60 Bibliography ...... 62 Appendices ...... 72 Appendix A – Keywords coded indicator A, guiding question 1 independent variable . 72 Appendix B – Keywords coded indicator B, guiding question 1 independent variable .. 73 Appendix C – List of all meeting records used for analysis ...... 74 Appendix D – All statements made ...... 78
List of abbreviations UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UNGA United Nations General Assembly E10 Elected Ten P5 Permanent Five OPCW Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons JIM Joint Investigative Mechanism UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Programme S/PV. Indicator for UNSC meeting followed by meeting number S/RES/ Indicator for UNSC resolution followed by resolution number S/year/ Indicator for non-adopted draft resolution followed by number
List of figures, tables, and appendices Figure 1: Causal pathway 14
Table 1: Summary of case selection based on the most similar case design 17 Table 2: Background factors kept constant in case selection 18 Table 3: Indicators for the dependent variable 22 Table 4: Indicators for the independent variable 24 Table 5: Summary of documents consulted in establishing intended contributions 25 Table 6: Summary of meeting records analyzed 26 Table 7: Summary of total amount of analyzed statements on Syria per case 26 Table 8: Summary of adopted resolutions and non-adopted draft resolutions consulted 26 Table 9: New Zealand’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A 28 Table 10: Case 1: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable 29-30 Table 11: Case 1: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable 31 Table 12: Case 1: Summary of indicators for the independent variable 35 Table 13: Japan’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A 36 Table 14: Case 2: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable 37 Table 15: Case 2: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable 38-39 Table 16: Case 2: Summary of indicators for the independent variable 43 Table 17: Sweden’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A 44 Table 18: Case 3: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable 45 Table 19: Case 3: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable 46 Table 20: Case 3: Summary of indicators for the independent variable 51 Table 21: Analysis: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable 54 Table 22: Analysis: Summary of indicators for the independent variable 54-55 Table 23: Analysis: Summary of theoretical implications 56
1. Introduction In the study of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), questions concerning efficiency in maintaining international peace and security, reform, legitimacy, peacekeeping, sanctions and other decision-making aspects, are commonly addressed. From these studies it becomes clear that the focus is on the permanent members of the Council. This is not surprising due to the structure of the Council and the disproportionate powers the permanent members have through the veto privilege. As a result, the study of the UNSC easily tends to forget that the Council have ten other members. To large extent, there seems to be a negligence towards these members, which raises broader fundamental questions on what the purpose of them being on the Council is, and why states would seek these seats if they have no agency in contributing to the Council’s purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Adding to this, the competition for the nonpermanent seats has intensified since the end of the Cold War and states launch expensive campaigns earlier and earlier to become a part of the Council. Little research exists on the conditions under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council’s decisions in maintaining international peace and security. This thesis aims to contribute to this lack of attention on the elected members by addressing the research question under what conditions is an elected member of the United Nations Security Council likely to influence decisions in maintaining international peace and security? The aim of this paper is to enhance the understanding of the elected members, and most importantly, contribute to the slim literature on the topic. Thus, this thesis also indirectly speaks to the broader fundamental questions of the elected members by empirically focusing on the conditions under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council’s decisions. The thesis builds on the slim research existing on elected members, most notably the argument that the Council’s legitimacy is something the permanent members cherish and defend. This as a disappearance of Council legitimacy would endanger the Council’s existence, which in turn would mean that the permanent members lose their most-privileged positions in the only international institution that can legally bind UN member states under its decisions. By adding insights from literature on legitimacy, this thesis develops the argument that an elected member is more likely to influence the Council’s decisions by anchoring its position with the Council members and the broader UN membership increasing representative legitimacy. This leads to the empirical investigation of the hypothesis an elected member anchoring its proposed actions with the broader UN membership is more likely to influence the UNSC decisions.
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In addressing the research question and the hypothesis developed, the thesis answers the calls for the need for comparative case studies found in the research it builds on. The Syrian conflict is used to empirically assess the hypothesis in order to narrow the focus of the investigation. This as the Syrian conflict is one of the deadliest and most protracted issues on the Security Council’s agenda, as well as the conflict where the Council has been most incapable of uniting for decisive action. The thesis applies the method of structured, focused comparison and establishes a total of 10 theoretically informed guiding questions that are asked to three cases which are chosen on a most-similar case selection model where there is variation on the outcome variable, influence in Council outcomes. The cases chosen are New Zealand 2015-2016, Japan 2016-2017, and Sweden 2017-2018. These are similar to large extent, not least in terms of being the ‘penholder’ on humanitarian issues in Syria, meaning that they have the ability to draft resolutions on the humanitarian situation, but also in their historical engagement with the UN, not being aid-dependent, and importantly being on the Council at the time of the Syrian conflict. In structuring the answers to the first guiding questions for the independent and dependent variable, a content analysis method is used which provides a structure for analyzing the data concerned. The data is primarily meeting records from the deliberations in the Security Council, Council resolutions, and secondary sources providing context. The empirical findings give partial support for the hypothesis. Specifically, there is clear variation in the independent variable investigated between two cases, Japan and Sweden, that also show variance in the outcome variable. However, the third case, New Zealand, also defined as high in the dependent variable, shows more modest levels of the independent variable which could indicate that the theoretical explanation investigated lacks support, or indicates a need for reconstruction of definitions and operationalizations of the variables. The paper is constructed as follows: firstly, a short introduction to the workings and functions of the Council is presented to provide context to what this thesis investigates. It later situates itself in the previous research on the elected members and identifies where it contributes to the field. Following this it builds a theoretical argument largely drawn from the previous research, however, develop it with adding insights from literature on legitimacy. The subsequent chapter presents the methodology used, operationalizations of variables and the data consulted, which is followed by a chapter outlining the empirical material for each case. This is followed by a comparative analysis and discussion based on the empirical findings in which theoretical implications, alternative explanations, and additional observations are discussed.
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The paper finishes with a concluding section, in which the main findings and potentials for future research are presented.
1.1 The United Nations Security Council The purpose of the UNSC is to maintain international peace and security as set out in Chapter V of the United Nations Charter (United Nations 1945). The UNSC is one of six United Nations (UN) organs, and uniquely the only international institution that can bind all UN member states under its decisions (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2016, 3; Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 28). The Council is composed by five permanent members, commonly referred to as ‘the P5’, the U.S., the UK, France, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. The P5 are accompanied by ten elected nonpermanent rotating members, often referred to as ‘E10’. The elected members are elected on two-year terms to contribute to the purpose of the Council (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2016, 3). The most obvious difference between the P5 and the E10 is the P5 members’ right to veto potential decisions discussed on the Council. In other words, a P5 member can block a draft proposition that, absent veto, and with a minimum of nine affirmative votes, would become a decision made by the UNSC (United Nations 1945). The E10 do not have such superior privileges. Another obvious difference is that the E10 are on the Council on two-year stints, while the P5 have been on the Council since its first session in 1946, with the exception of the People’s Republic of China taking the Chinese seat in the early seventies over Taiwan (the Republic of China). This latter difference, Keating (2016) argues, is a comparative advantage as the P5 are not facing learning processes like the newly elected members. This gives the P5 a unique status in continuity of experience and knowledge (Keating 2016, 153). There has been an increase in Council activity since the end of the Cold War (Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 27). It is widely cited that the Council was crippled by U.S. and Soviet national interests during this time (von Einsiedel, Malone, and Ugarte 2016, 4; Keating 2016, 139). These super-power interests created constraints which are argued to have had detrimental impact on E10 influence on the Council (Keating 2016, 143). The situation has since changed, and particularly, the usage of the veto since the end of the Cold War has declined, which has changed E10 members posture on the Council, now being more inclined to express opinions and take lead on Council agenda items (ibid). However, little systematic research on this exists.
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1.1.1 Defining UNSC decisions and outcomes It is important to define the Council’s decisions. This as I want to investigate the conditions under which E10 members are likely influence these decisions. The primary way for the UNSC to act and fulfil its mandate in maintaining international peace and security is through its decisions. Wallensteen and Johansson (2016) regard the resolutions as the most central tool in UNSC action. The presidential statements and press releases of the Council are also of great importance however it is only the resolutions that are legally binding to all UN member states (Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 28). Although these concrete outcomes seem straightforward, other accounts argue that decisions made by the UNSC also concern the decision-making processes, such as ‘working methods’ (Farrall et al. 2019). This more abstract way of defining UNSC decisions is important to acknowledge as one could argue that E10 influence in ‘working methods’ has subsequently contributed to avenues for E10 members to influence concrete outcomes of the Council (ibid). It is however beyond the scope of this paper to investigate E10 influence in these abstract, and sometimes indistinguishable decisions made on working methods. The slimmer view, adapted by Wallensteen and Johansson only account for the concrete outcomes of the Council, that is resolutions and presidential statements, and is the focus of this paper. Note that I do not address press releases in this thesis. These documents are issued in relation to almost all Council meetings held, which indicates that press releases are monotonous documents which I argue offers little value in terms of analyzing an elected member’s influence in Council outcomes.
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2. Previous Research on the elected members Most research on the elected members, or relatable to the E10 revolves around different explanations and descriptions on the campaigning for the nonpermanent seats (Malone 2000; Reinsberg 2019), the motivations and incentives for states to be on the Council (Hurd 2002; 2008; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a; 2009b), the determinants of election to the Council (Dreher et al. 2014), regional representation and leadership on the Council (Lim and Vreeland 2013; Lai and Lefler 2017), and vote buying (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Alexander and Rooney 2019). Although these could be related to the role of elected members, none directly addresses the conditions under which elected members may influence the concrete outcomes of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. Another related research topic concerns UN voting patterns and usually focuses on whether voting blocs exists (Brunn and Ingalls 1988; Monteleone 2015), where some focus more narrowly on the EU (Drieskens 2012a; 2012b; Drieskens, Van Genderen, and Reykers 2014) and others on the BRICS (Ferdinand 2014; Hooijmaijers and Keukeleire 2016). Research also focuses on how voting behaviors change (Dreher and Jensen 2013), and how change in the Council’s voting structure would impact the Council’s capacity to act (Strand and Rapkin 2011). The research on voting patterns does not focus on E10 influence through voting partly due to the rotating membership of the UNSC. There is good reason for this, although one might argue that this is the most straight forward way of observing influence. It is after all the voting that establishes whether a decision is made or not, and as nine affirmative votes for a proposed decision is required leaves, in theory, the E10 with an opportunity to at least block decisions.
2.1 Motivations for the study and research gap As mentioned, in the current state of the research on the UNSC, little attention is given to the E10, and elected members influence in the Council’s decisions. Again, this raises bigger questions concerning the purpose of having elected members in the first place and why states bother to campaign and spend larger and larger amounts of funds to win a seat if they cannot influence the Council in any way. To highlight the need for in depth case studies on the topic a telling example of the negligence of the elected members is O’Neill’s (1996) study. He uses the Shapley-Shubik index to determine the amount of voting power each member has on the Council based on the institution’s voting structures (O’neill 1996). A member’s power is the probability that its
5 change of vote changes the outcome, that is passing a resolution if voted yes, or stopping one if voting no. Assuming that all potential elected members are unitary actors with the same capacities, interests and incentives, O’neill concludes that each elected member has less than 0,2% power, while each permanent member enjoys 19,6% power in the current structure of the Council (ibid). In other words, elected members are striving for the nonpermanent seats to hold 0,2% of total Council power. At best and if the elected members join forces, they can pool a maximum total amount of 2% power over the Council, leaving the P5 with the remaining 98%. While these percentages are calculated through the Shapley-Shubik index, there appears to be something else at play since UN member states increasingly compete for the nonpermanent seats. The hesitant posture towards O’Neill’s conclusion is supported when one is consulting the above-mentioned voting patterns of the elected members. What the research on voting patterns tells us is that there is no apparent reason to study voting as a way of investigating conditions under which elected members can influence the Council, as the research consistently come back to the fact that the UN in general is a consensus driven organization, where deviating votes are rare. It can thus be established that measuring influence in decision making by the E10 through studying voting behavior leaves little to work with. That E10 members vote ‘no’, or ‘abstain’ is, since the end of the Cold War, very rare. Hence, I argue that there is reason to believe that elected members influence should not be assessed through the amount of voting power, nor by looking at how elected members vote. Even O’neill himself is transparent enough and acknowledges that his power measure is only one component of overall power that does not take into consideration other potential bases of power on the UNSC that could lead to elected member influence.
2.2 Measuring elected member influence Before reviewing the slim literature on the conditions that have been suggested to explain E10 influence, a definition of the dependent variable of this thesis is needed. Essentially, one observes E10 influence when the behavior of an E10 significantly shapes the Council’s decision-making process with regards to a particular institutional outcome (Farrall et al. 2019). Recall that these institutional outcomes are resolutions and presidential statements (Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 28). More specifically, an elected member has influence when the evolution of UNSC decisions, cannot be explained by not accounting for that elected member’s actions (Farrall et al. 2019). Again, this is beyond the mere, above scrutinized, vote
6 casting, a way not suitable for assessing E10 influence due to the overall consensus of the UNSC.
2.3 Conditions under which elected members may influence the Council’s outcomes How then, can one approach the research question of this thesis? As indicated this far, there is reason to assess the conditions under which elected members can influence the Council in maintaining international peace and security and contribute to the Council’s purpose, not least due to the lack of systematic scrutiny the E10 in terms of influence have received. As E10 influence is to large extent neglected in research, the conditions under which the E10 can influence the Council is an under-researched topic. Below, however, I outline and categorize conditions that have been suggested to explain E10 influence.
2.3.1 Legitimacy Hurd (2002; 2008) argues that legitimacy is central for the Council’s authority, meaning that the power of the Council sometimes lies on the rest of the UN membership who perceive the Council as legitimate or not (ibid; Corbett, Yi-Chong, and Weller 2018). This is relevant for all political institutions, where Binder and Heupel (2015) argue that legitimacy is key for effective governance absent means of force, in contrast to a sovereign government in possession of these means. The power the Council wields is argued to be a function of the esteem in which the body is held by the members of the UN and the permanent members acknowledge the importance of having a legitimate Council (Hurd 2002; 2007). Monteleone (2015) and Alexander and Rooney (2019) argue that the political costs for using the veto have increased, as the veto is argued to delegitimize the Council, and that the big powers’ vote buying poses threats to the Council’s legitimacy. The usage of the veto is becoming increasingly costly for the P5 not least due to the widespread opposition from E10 members who sees the veto as an outdated privilege, but also as civil society groups are more frequently campaigning against it (Monteleone 2015; Alexander and Rooney 2019). Lai and Lefler (2017) propose that elected members are better representatives of diverse regional interests which enables the E10 members to create broader bases for support for its positions on the Council, making the Council more legitimate in terms of representation (Lai and Lefler 2017). Thus, an E10 member making a proposed line of action legitimate by anchoring it with
7 a broad base of support and consultation will enhance the prospect for converting the proposed action into a Council decision.
2.3.2 Bringing special knowledge to the Council Elsewhere, Langmore and Farrall (2016) and Farrall et al. (2019) argue that bringing knowledge in specific thematical or geographical areas to the Council provides an elected member with an opportunity to influence the Council’s agenda and outcomes. This along with an assumption that E10 members are not judged by earlier decisions to the same extent as the P5. This is argued to allow for more flexibility and potential in summoning political support from states and popular movements, creating larger basis for support (Langmore and Farrall 2016), something relatable to the legitimacy argument above. This also means that states not bringing any special knowledge in any specific issue area will be harder to assess in terms of evaluating conditions under which E10 members may influence the Council (ibid). In assessing Australia’s term in 2013-2014, Langmore and Farrall (2016) argue that Australia did not have such knowledge but were able to influence the outcomes of the Council when drafting a resolution in relation to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. This is argued to portray a schoolbook example of where an elected member influenced the Council and offers an idea of how one can measure influence but fails to address the conditions that explain this particular case of influence (Langmore and Farrall 2016).
2.3.3 P5 stalemate and lack of P5 consensus Langmore and Thakur (2016) argue that when P5 consensus diminishes over certain issues, the P5 dominance is undermined, a dominance that has been an explanation for E10 irrelevance. The argument suggests that E10 members can play a bigger productive global role in times when the P5 cannot agree and are divided over certain important issues (Langmore and Thakur 2016). The joint claim is that E10 members can play crucial roles in UNSC decision making, and that the E10 members are not as powerless as earlier argued (Malone 2000; Langmore and Thakur 2016; Langmore and Farrall 2016; Freedman and Lemay-Hébert 2019; Farrall et al 2019).
2.3.4 The composition of the Council Another condition that is argued to matter for E10 influence is the composition of the Council. This is for example highlighted by Brazil wielding influence by introducing the concept of
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‘responsibility while protecting’ in light of the Libya crisis in 2011 (Lyi 2014; Langmore and Farrall 2016; Farrall et al. 2019). The importance of composition is referred to that all BRICS states were members in 2011 and that this created a receptive environment for new ideas concerning Responsibility to Protect (R2P) implementation. Returning to the evaluation of Australia’s term in 2013-2014, Langmore and Farrall (2016) argue that Australia was perceived as an effective member of the Council. The authors suggest that this could be related to its relative national economic strength compared to the other E10 members serving with Australia. It is argued that this made Australia assume greater responsibilities and thus play a bigger role than it would if other economically stronger states were serving, which indicates that the composition was central although it is vague how this actually lead to the argued influence. In line with this reasoning, the authors also suggest that capacities matter as a condition for influencing the Council and that a well-funded and well-staffed UN-mission is a contributing factor (Langmore and Farrall 2016). This is something Malone (2000) also acknowledges with arguing that smaller states may face constraints and limitations in influencing the Council based on their limited capacities and resources when on the Council (Malone 2000). These are interesting conditions, but it remains unclear from both pieces of research precisely how economic capacities work in explaining E10 influence.
2.3.5 Summary From this section it appears that there are multiple conditions under which E10 members may influence the Council’s decisions. Additionally, Langmore and Farrall (2016) conclude with listing rather ill-founded factors that enhance E10 prospects for influence. Beyond the factors already mentioned, they argue that the recognition of choosing priorities, engagement in active dialogue and networking with the other Council members, and a will to contribute to the Council’s purpose are prescriptions for influence (ibid). The above proposed conditions under which E10 are more likely to influence the Council’s outcomes seem plausible. These conditions, however, lacks substantial explanations for why and how these lead to influence. It is important to acknowledge that the research above is inductive and provides a starting point for future research on the topic, and for the testing of these proposed conditions. Most accounts reviewed calls for future research to tackle the lack of systematic case comparison on the topic, and that the conditions proposed should be tested in order to see the leverage of these theoretical arguments, and to develop the overall study of the UNSC’s elected members. 9
3. Theory
3.1 The contribution to knowledge Unsurprisingly, and as we have seen this far there are calls for more detailed and comparative studies on elected members in order to better understand how and when elected members are likely to influence the Council’s decisions. This as the work that has been done so far is selective in order to argue for E10 relevance and develop explanatory factors for E10 influence that can guide future research (Farrall et al. 2019). This is where I intend to contribute. Farrall et al. (2019) propose a four-step framework for the future study of elected members influence on the UNSC. Building on this proposed framework, and insights from earlier studies on elected members above, I outline a proposed way in which this study will assess the research question. More narrowly, I will assess and expand on the theoretical argument relating to legitimacy and assess whether this factor can explain E10 influence.
3.2 A framework for assessing E10 influence As mentioned, Farrall et al. (2019) propose a framework for the future study of E10 influence on the Council. It is argued that the conditions in the proposed framework, in most cases, will be a combination of all conditions that explain E10 influence (ibid). However, I propose that it is for the purpose of this study wise to focus on one part of the framework in order to substantially test it. Since the conditions outlined above, and in the framework have not been scrutinized substantially, I argue that it is warranted to test one of the proposed conditions and not aim at an exhaustive approach that includes each part of the proposed framework. In line with the conditions outlined in the previous section, the first part of the proposed framework is “representative legitimacy”, in which it is ascertained that the P5 need the E10. This is based on the assumption that an institution that is manipulated by big powers loses its legitimacy and relevance in the international system (Alexander and Rooney 2019), something that Hurd (2002) also argues by emphasizing that absent legitimacy, the Council would probably cease to exist (Hurd 2002), and that the perceived legitimacy of the Council is derived from the broader UN membership (Hurd 2008). It is the legitimacy given from the world’s states that gives the Council its current status. Elected members are thus given opportunities to voice their interests and make decision-making representative anchored in the broader UN membership. The elected members are elected as representatives of the world’s states and are expected to act on behalf of the collective interest of the world while serving on the Council (Farrall et al. 2019). To focus narrowly on the theoretical argument of ‘representative
10 legitimacy’ is warranted as the legitimacy factor has been permeating the research made on the UNSC, both when it comes to the E10 and other UNSC related questions. It is suggested that elected members can use representative legitimacy in two main ways to influence the Council. First, elected members can build coalitions with other E10 members, and with states outside the Council and thus strengthen and demonstrate broad representativeness of their voiced position. Second, an E10 member can strengthen its influence by using the legitimizing effect of connecting their position and arguments to the UN charter and broader conceptions of justice, fairness and appropriateness (ibid). Structured case comparison is needed to get a better understanding of E10 influence in and around the Council, and I argue that representative legitimacy is a useful starting point for such comparisons (ibid).
3.3 The theoretical claim to be investigated Although the representative legitimacy claim above seems plausible, Farrall et al. (2019) do not offer a definition of legitimacy and how legitimacy works in explaining E10 influence. In short, a clear causal explanation is lacking. As suggested, seeking and getting representative legitimacy will enable an elected member to influence the Council’s outcomes as the Council needs legitimacy in order to exist (Hurd 2002; 2007). Thus, an elected member may propose actions collectively with states on and off the Council. This in turn raises the political costs of opposing the elected member’s proposed action (Claude 1966; Monteleone 2015). States take ‘collective’ legitimacy as an important aspect of international relations (Claude 1966). The logic builds on the assumption that all states, not least the veto powers want the Council to be perceived as legitimate as the loss of these uniquely advantaged positions, in the only international institution that can bind UN member states under its decisions, would cost too much. As no explicitly outlined causal pathway for ‘representative legitimacy’ is presented in any of the work reviewed, I expand on the concept of legitimacy.
3.3.1 Defining Legitimacy This thesis does not attempt to contribute to the vast literature on legitimacy of international organizations (IO), but it lends conceptual insights from this sphere of research and how legitimacy and broader coalition building may work for the purpose of the theoretical argument outlined. Doing so, it adds strength to Farrall et al. (2019) framework which does not directly
11 offer substantial insights to how representative legitimacy may work in practice leading to E10 influence. Legitimacy refers to the belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed (Hurd 2007). Commonly, studies make a distinction between procedural legitimacy (input) and performance (output) legitimacy in the study of IOs. The former indicates that the legitimacy of an IO is derived from its decision-making process, while the latter indicates that legitimacy is derived from the outcomes (Hurd 2007; Binder and Heupel 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Corbett, Yi-Chong, and Weller 2018; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019). For the purposes of this thesis and the theoretical argument, the procedural understanding of legitimacy is adopted as I investigate the decision-making of the Council and not assessing the quality of the outcomes.
3.3.2 Procedural legitimacy and why it matters The understanding of representative legitimacy builds on insights from procedural legitimacy. The procedural aspect of legitimacy ascertains that legitimacy of an IO is derived through the availability to make input in, and the quality of the decision-making process of the IO, in this case the UNSC (Binder and Heupel 2015), and as Dellmuth and Tallberg (2015) describe it; ‘legitimacy based on the IO’s procedures for channeling and representing popular interests’ (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015, 453). The logic is thus that the UNSC gains acceptance from procedures that allow participation and representation by and of the UN member states, so called interest representation. Procedural legitimacy thus also originates in the idea that IOs are responsive to all member states, regardless size (Corbett, Yi-Chong, and Weller 2018). The logic follows that IOs with more inclusive decision-making processes will be regarded as more legitimate. Institutional disparities are expected to influence states perceptions of legitimacy (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015). The involvement of broad range of stakeholders in decisions made is perceived as more legitimate (Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019). Legitimacy requires an IO’s decision-making process to be open to the interested actors (Corbett, Yi- Chong, and Weller 2018). Alone, a state is just one of many, but collectively, less advantaged states may wield influence by attachment to groupings who share interests and positions. Numbers matter (ibid). IOs want the widest support possible from their members, where many small states are included in order to be inclusive, legitimate, and efficient, to remain relevant (ibid). As we have ascertained, the most powerful states of the UNSC want the Council to be perceived as legitimate as possible, as it otherwise would probably cease to exist, which would 12 result in the loss of the permanent powers’ upheld positions in the only IO that can make binding decisions on UN member states. This we can assume as the big powers have the option to exit the Council, but have not (Corbett, Yi-Chong, and Weller 2018). Following the structure of the Council in relation to the procedural legitimacy claim, one can establish that the UNSC suffers in legitimacy issues relating to its decision-making, something that becomes clear in the literature on the UNSC, which often portrays a lack of agency ascribed to the Council’s elected members. Legitimacy makes decisions comfortable and effective, and can more easily attract resources needed to fulfil the IO’s purpose, in the case of the UNSC maintaining international peace and security (Claude 1966; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019). Arguments exist that procedures that give certain states, like the U.S. and Russia, certain advantages through vetoes are constraining sources for legitimacy (Dellmuth, Scholte, and Tallberg 2019). Binder and Heupel (2015) argue that transparency, participation, accountability, and great power restraints are inherent problems in procedural legitimacy. The unequal participation of member states in the UNSC undermine the Council’s legitimacy (Corbett, Yi-Chong, and Weller 2018). One state, one vote is a common solution to this, but is not the case in the UNSC due to the veto, and the exclusive and disproportionate membership (ibid). How then, can these insights be of use in developing the representative legitimacy theoretical claim by Farrall et al. (2019)? Mainly, I argue, it is through building on the important collectivity aspect. The collective aspect of legitimacy is central as states need approval from a large body of member states that endorses the proposed action and legitimize it (Claude 1966). Thus, in the case of the UNSC and the E10, a single member seeking to influence the Council can tie its proposed actions with a larger pool of member states to make its proposition legitimate. As argued above, the scope of the collectivity around a proposition will have implications for how it is treated on the Council and may be a source for E10 influence. As Claude (1966) argues, collective legitimization is a tool that can be used. The understanding of representative legitimacy is hence also informed by the collectivity part of procedural legitimacy. States also weigh the significance of resolutions based on the number of states supporting it and the composition of the majorities that support it, and the language used in these. Thus, the E10 can, by coalition building, mobilize legitimacy from the masses, which increases the procedural aspect of legitimacy and interest representation which enhances the likelihood for influence (Claude 1966). The most convincing legitimacy is derived from a cumulative impact
13 of clear and repeated endorsements of a position, supported by the masses that include the most important states (ibid). Arguments on the enhancement of procedural legitimacy through reforming Council procedures are many, however unlikely in the near future. This does not mean that E10 members cannot use the lack of procedural legitimacy and its aspects as a way of influencing the Council. Those opposing a representative legitimate proposition will face increased costs in opposing. This includes the P5 who wants the Council to be perceived as legitimate. In light of the importance of legitimacy, I theorize that elected members that collectively propose actions, make it costlier for opponents to oppose, which increases the likelihood for E10 influence.
3.3.3 Hypothesis Based on the outlined theory the following hypothesis is investigated. H1: An elected member anchoring its proposed actions with the broader UN membership is more likely to influence the UNSC decisions.
Representative More legitimacy Proposed illegitimate to Increased anchored in action gains oppose likelihood for broader UN legitimacy proposed E10 influence membership action
Figure 1: Causal pathway
3.4 Scope Conditions For the purpose of this paper, it is important to note that this study only focuses on the UNSC decisions that are of direct relevance for the maintenance of international peace and security. This since all UNSC decisions are not directly concerning such questions. Wallensteen and Johansson (2016) categorize in which issue areas the UNSC has made and are making decisions. These are Interstate, Intrastate territory, Intrastate government, Terrorism/nonproliferation, and Other. The majority of decisions made after the end of the Cold War are on issues relating to intrastate government issues, while interstate was most common during the Cold War. The changing nature of conflict is apparent in the decisions made by the UNSC (Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 39). The Other-category is one in which issue areas can deviate from the purpose of maintaining international peace and security as set out by the UN charter. At least it can entail issue areas that do not directly address conflict related
14 issues. Since 1989, such decisions have included appointments to international judicial institutions and questions of UNSC reform and working methods. Although interesting on their own, decisions on these ‘deviating’ issues will not be considered in this paper as I want to assess direct E10 influence in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Summary Statement of the UN Secretary General contains a list on what issues the UNSC is seized and what the Council is mandated to deal with. As of 2020, the list contains 56 issue areas that directly relate to the maintenance of international peace and security (UNSC S/2020/10 2020). There are claims that there was a stranglehold on elected members during the Cold War (Keating 2016, 143). It is in light of the role the Council has adopted since 1989, along with the explosion in increased decision making, I argue that the scope of the theoretical argument is limited to the period following the end of the Cold War.
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4. Research Design This section outlines the way in which I investigate the relationship between the independent variable, representative legitimacy, and the dependent variable, influence in Council outcomes. I am adopting a qualitative comparative case study design and a most similar case selection method to isolate and control for potential background factors that could influence the relationship between the variables of interest. I have chosen this qualitative way for a number of reasons. Firstly, approaching the research question by quantitative means seems less conducive if one reiterates that investigating voting patterns for measuring E10 influence leaves little to work with due to the consensus driven nature of the UN. Secondly, in light of the research from which this thesis mainly draws insights from regarding conditions under which E10 members are likely to influence the Council’s outcomes, there is substantial call for comparative case studies on the topic. I intend to use this call and thus contribute to the topic. As this is an under-researched topic and as case study research designs are commonly used to get to the conditions under which a certain outcome occur, the approach fits the purpose of this study. The design allows for assessing the theoretical argument thoroughly by the intensive study of a small number of cases (George and Bennett 2005, 37). Also, as I am dealing with rather abstract concepts such as representative legitimacy, the high conceptual validity the case study design allows for may enhance the understanding of how legitimacy works in the theoretical argument which could enhance our understanding of how elected members influence the Council outcomes, but it can also help me revise the theoretical expectations for future research (ibid, 26). This chapter begins with introducing the case selection strategy and the most similar case design. It subsequently turns to the operationalizations of the variables. In operationalizing the variables, I use structured, focused comparison and design theoretically informed guiding questions for each variable, which are asked to each case studied. These guiding questions are answered through the development of empirical indicators for each question. For questions with particularly abstract indicators, I use a simple content analysis method to help the assessment of the indicators concerned. The chapter ends with presenting the data that has been used to answer the general guiding questions asked to each case.
4.1 Case selection The case selection strategy follows the logic of the most similar cases design (Gerring 2006, 131-32). This means that I chose cases based on variation in the dependent while keeping
16 background factors, that potentially could influence the outcome variable, constant over the chosen cases. The selected cases are thus as similar as possible on other characteristics than the outcome variable (Powner 2015, 113). This case selection strategy is useful when studying less researched topics and allows for testing the leverage of the theorized independent variable, holding other factors constant across the cases, and whether the hypothesized factor has any explanatory value (Gerring 2006, 131).
Case Independent Other Explanatory Dependent variable: variable: variables Influence in outcome Representative legitimacy New Zealand ? 1 More 2015 - 2016 Japan 2016 - ? 1 Less 2017 Sweden 2017 - ? 1 More 2018 Table 1: Summary of case selection based on the most similar case design (Gerring 2006, 132)
The elected members chosen, New Zealand, Japan, and Sweden share similar characteristics and capabilities, such as being industrialized countries that are not dependent on aid, which has been argued to influence developing countries behavior on the Council (see Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009a; 2009b; Alexander and Rooney 2019). The cases have high economic capabilities (World Bank 2019) and are all scoring very high on the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 2019). The cases also share a traditionally strong relationship with the UN as an organization and have all contributed to the organization with funds and materials in peacekeeping operations and similar (Capie 2015; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden 2018; Nilsson and Zetterlund 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011; 2014). They are hence well acquainted with the processes and workings of the Council, although Japan has served on the Council more regularly than the others. The cases respective terms on the Council have also been permeated by the conflict in Syria, and they have all held the “humanitarian pen” in relation to the Syrian conflict, enabling them to draft resolutions on the topic. In sum, I argue that the cases are instances of members on the Council with purposes of contributing to the Council’s agenda and the maintenance of international peace and security and thus are suitable cases to examine in evaluating the theoretical argument.
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Background factors 1: New Zealand 2: Japan 3: Sweden Penholder on the Yes Yes Yes humanitarian issue Syria HDI Very high Very high Very high Economic capability High High High Developed country Yes Yes Yes Historic UN Strong Strong Strong engagement Table 2: Background factors kept constant in case selection
4.1.1 The Syrian conflict For clarity and the scope of this thesis, I have chosen to do a between case comparison on a specific issue area of the Council in which there is variation in the dependent variable between the cases. This issue area is the Syrian conflict that has been ongoing since 2011 and I argue that this conflict is relevant to study for the purpose of this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, it is the conflict that has been subject for most contestation on the Security Council’s agenda during the time of the chosen cases’ terms on the Council. Secondly, this issue area is of most importance to peace and conflict related issues and is one of the most protracted and deadliest contemporary conflicts with a clear lack of Council decisive action. Thirdly, the conflict has received large amount of international coverage making the topic well covered offering sources for data. Fourthly, several elected members on the Council have been the penholder on the humanitarian situation in Syria during the years of conflict which allow these particular elected members to draft resolutions on the topic. In choosing the Syrian conflict as a case to study E10 influence, I have also accounted for which region the UNSC decisions are most commonly directed. Between 2003 and 2012 more than two thirds of the Council’s decisions were taken on issues relating to Africa (Wallensteen and Johansson 2016, 40). At the same time around 70% of all UN troops have been deployed to Africa since 2000 (ibid, 43). Whatever the reason for this may be is not of direct relevance to this paper, however, this suggests that the limited national interests the P5 members have on the continent minimizes friction on African issues (ibid). Recall the conditions in the previous research-section, an E10 is more likely to influence Council decisions when there is deadlock between the P5, which seldom is the case in Africa. Thus, examining influence in cases involving decision making in Africa may provide bad foundations for testing the theoretical argument of this thesis. Thus, I argue that a contested issue area, such as Syria, where UN
18 consensus often is lacking provides better foundations for examining the explanatory value of the independent variable.
4.1.2 Potential shortcomings of the case selection It is important to acknowledge that the chosen cases are not identical in some respects. One aspect, for the purpose of this investigation, is that the cases are not on the Council during the exact same time but are overlapping. However, the cases reflect a relatively tight time period spanning from 2015 to 2018. I argue that this short time as a factor potentially provoking change in the dependent variable is not as plausible as it would be if the cases were further apart in time. During the time period 2015-2018, the Syrian conflict did not experience any substantial headway on conclusive Security Council action. Another potential shortcoming is that one case was the penholder for the humanitarian situation in Syria for only one year of its term on the Council while the others held it for two years. Whether this has effect on the outcome is unknown, however acknowledged as a potential shortcoming of the case selection. It is also the case that Japan, and Sweden shared the pen in 2017 which could introduce questions of which member wielded influence in the case of Council outcome. This is overcome by firstly acknowledging that one E10 influence is not treated as exclusive, and that two elected members can co-draft a resolution treated as equal amount of influence. Secondly, it appears that little E10 influence was wielded on the humanitarian situation in Syria in 2017 in terms of outcomes. This also have implications for the scope conditions of the theory, as one should be very hesitant to generalize the findings from these cases, to elected members that have not held a pen on issues similar to the Syrian conflict.
4.2 Operationalizations In this section, I operationalize the variables of this thesis. I do this through the method of structured, focused comparison. The structured part of this method involves posing general questions that reflects the purpose of the study. The method is focused in the sense that it deals with certain aspects of the cases under scrutiny, and undertaken for the research objective and the theoretical focus outlined (George and Bennet 2005, 58-59). It thus allows for focusing extensively on the theoretical explanation suggested over the cases examined. By using the logic of structured, focused comparison, I operationalize the variables by developing a set of general guiding questions based on the theoretical argument, which are
19 asked to each case in this study. These questions have been carefully developed to reflect the study’s objective and the theoretical focus of this thesis and helps standardize the collection of data (ibid, 59). The assessment of these guiding questions is assisted by the development of empirical indicators for each question. For guiding question 1 for each variable, which contains more abstract indicators, content analysis is used to help the assessment of these. This enables me to make systematic comparison between the cases and the findings within them.
4.2.1 Operationalization of the dependent variable Influence in Council decision making has in earlier accounts been an abstract and vague concept used in ad hoc fashion. There is little guidance offered in how to distinguish and trace that an elected member has had an impact in Council outcomes. Although previous research allows for logical places to look in finding where E10 influence has been the case, one is left to come up with rather unfounded and improvised indicators that could be used to track E10 influence. However, it is helpful to, once again, resort to Farrall et al. (2019) in establishing some frames for choosing these indicators. In knowing when influence is being wielded by an elected member, I adopt and build on their conceptualization of observed influence. Essentially, one observes E10 influence when the behavior of an E10 significantly shapes the Council’s decision-making process with regards to a particular institutional outcome (Farrall et al. 2019). The authors’ threshold for observing influence is high and acknowledge that having significant impact on the decision-making process as counting as influence is abstract and subjective, meaning that they base their observations in a qualitative analysis of empirics in an inductive sense. They then explain how the E10 member exercised that influence (ibid). Something is made by the E10, or otherwise a decision is not made. This is still abstract, and I use further insights from the reviewed literature on the E10s role on the Council. I suggest a twofold strategy of indicators to observe E10 influence. First, in the campaigns to become an elected member of the UNSC, clear statements on which issues of international peace and security the elected member intend to contribute to will serve as one basis for assessing influence. I am interested in the outcomes of the Council and whether these include language in line with the elected member’s intended contributions. This way I can establish that an elected member has wielded influence. The written language in the outcomes that the elected member has not co-drafted are then compared to the earlier resolutions and presidential statements on which the outcome in question builds on. If there is a change or addition of language in line with the elected member’s intentions, influence has been wielded, all in line with earlier accounts. 20
For assessing this indicator, for guiding question 1, I use a content analysis. This to help structuring the data assessed, and to not leave the measurement of the indicator to be solely based on my own subjective logic which could make the assessment arbitrary. This is done by consulting Powner’s (2015) content analysis and its most common and straightforward form, by tracing keywords associated with respective case (Powner 2015, 118-19). This is done by examining the wordings of the outcomes of interest, and whether these correspond to respective case in relation to the elected member’s intended Council contributions. The frequency of intended contributions in the written outcomes of the Council serves as proxy for labeling an elected member as influential. These wordings are, as above, compared to earlier Council outcomes on which the outcome of interest builds upon in order to trace whether there has been a change in language in line with the elected member’s intended contributions during its time on the Council. In establishing the elected member’s intended contributions for its term on the Council a count approach of content analysis is used, where the relative balance of concepts risen by the elected member serves as basis for establishing what the elected member’s intended contributions are (ibid, 119). The intended contributions are inductively established through the frequency themes are highlighted in documents covering the period before the elected member started its term on the Council (Lamont 2015, 90). I acknowledge the limitations with assessing influence in this way in the sense that these themes and intended contributions are probably not unique to each cases’ intended contributions. Rather it is likely that the cases examined share some thematical intentions, and this also goes for any other elected member not scrutinized in this paper. However, this is a proposed way in which I trace influence as a complement to the more easily measured and concrete drafting way. Therefore, I keep a humble approach to findings here. Second, and more importantly we observe E10 influence if an elected member drafts an outcome which is adopted. If it did not draft, it would not have been a decision. The indicators assessing this operationalization is divided based on whether an outcome involves a permanent member or not in order to illuminate the possibility for an observed influence being a case of permanent member action. The theoretically informed guiding questions that operationalizes the dependent variable and its measurable indicators are found in the table below.
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Indicators for the Dependent variable Guiding Questions Indicators 1) Did adopted resolutions on Syria include A) Change in language on Syria the Elected Member’s intended Council resolutions in line with the elected contributions? member’s intended Council contributions. 2) Did the elected member issue B) Presidential statements issued on Syria presidential statements on Syria as Council in line with the member’s intended president that included language relating to Council contributions. intended Council contributions? 3) Did the elected member’s behavior C) Resolutions adopted drafted by the significantly shape the decision-making elected member alone or together with process leading to a particular UNSC other UN members (not together with a outcome? permanent member). D) Resolutions adopted drafted by the elected member involving permanent members. 4) Did the elected member draft resolutions E) Draft resolutions on Syria which the on Syria that were not adopted? elected member drafted or co-drafted that did not receive enough affirmative votes or vetoed. Table 3: Indicators for the dependent variable
4.2.2 Operationalization of the independent variable In Binder and Heupel (2015) it is argued that legitimation is an activity that can be observed through public statements, diplomatic exchanges, and practical support. The same goes for delegitimization. Following this account on legitimacy one can develop an idea of where to look for representative legitimacy occurring and operationalize it. This in line with the 4 procedural standards constituting procedural legitimacy, on which I build the representative legitimacy argument; (1) legitimacy depends on equal participation in formal decision making, (2) transparency where interested states and stakeholders can participate, (3) accountability where states affected by the decision can hold the IO responsible, and (4) great powers forcing weaker states to bow to their interests is a source for illegitimacy. Many argue that the Council does not meet these procedural standards, and the logic suggests that if E10 members can increase legitimacy through these, they may have an impact in decisions taken by the UNSC. Based on the lack of legitimacy in these procedural standards, I argue that elected members can hammer away on increasing participation in UNSC processes, as it is one of the most fundamental obstacles to legitimacy (Binder and Heupel 2015). Further below, general guiding questions and empirical indicators to observe whether representative legitimacy has been used are presented.
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Informal sessions are increasingly arranged by the Council’s members on topics relevant to the Council’s agenda. These meetings are called Arria-formula meetings and may include states outside the Council and experts on the topics discussed (Freedman and Lemay-Hébert 2019). This is argued to increase transparency of the Council’s work. Further, the Council Presidency is a monthly rotating seat, which each elected member occupies for two months of their two years on the Council. Using rule 37 and 39 of the Provisional Rule of Procedure, the Council president can invite non-Council members and individuals to meetings on the Council. This can be used to demonstrate an initiative’s representative legitimacy. In measuring representative legitimacy and whether an elected member has acquired this when proposing actions for Council decisions and whether representative legitimacy matter in the instances of influence, it is helpful to reiterate that in the build up to the theoretical argument, it is suggested that elected members can use the representative legitimacy in two main ways to influence the Council. First, elected members can build coalitions with other E10 members, and with states outside the Council and thus strengthen and demonstrate broad representativeness of their voiced position. Second, an E10 member can strengthen their influence by using the legitimizing effect of connecting their position and arguments to the UN charter and broader conceptions of justice, fairness, and appropriateness. As with the dependent variable, I assess these two ways as indicators by using a content analysis to help guide the assessment (indicator A and B for the first guiding question of the independent variable). This is a useful tool in assessing the rather abstract indicators by assessing the frequency of word use. At the same time, it also provides structure for the assessment (Powner 2015, 119). Coding was conducted through reading all statements made on Syria over the cases. For assessing the first main way, keywords representing inclusiveness, representativeness, and legitimacy were traced for (see appendix A for table summarizing keywords traced for). Although all statements made by all 3 elected members have been read in their entirety these coded keywords allow for structuring the frequency and the usage of them in a comparable and structured way. The same logic goes for assessing the second main way by coding for usage of language referring to the UN charter, the purpose of the Council and the responsibilities of the Council (see appendix B for table summarizing keywords traced for). The keywords for both main ways are assessed in the context in which they are used, meaning that the wording of ‘purpose’ must be in relation to the purposes of the Council in order to be counted as an instance of voicing the position as legitimate in relation to the guiding question.
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In assessing the other indicators of the remaining guiding questions, no content analysis is required. These indicators are more easily assessed in the sense that these questions are assessed in relation to specific meetings and resolutions, which I argue do not require content analysis due to the lesser number of documents being analyzed. Below are all indicators for the independent variable guided by questions asked to each case.
Indicators for the independent variable Guiding Questions Indicators 1) To what extent did the elected member A) Statements on the Council voice its position as legitimate? emphasizing the importance of inclusiveness, representativeness and legitimacy. B) Statements referring to the UN charter, the purposes of the Security Council, and the responsibility of the Council. 2) Did the elected member anchor its C) Number of co-sponsors to the draft. proposed action with the broader UN D) Statements on the collective aspect of membership in the case of drafting an designing the draft. adopted outcome? 3) To what extent did the elected member E) Arrangement of informal meetings on legitimize its proposed actions through Syria (Arria formula-meetings) diplomatic exchanges increasing related questions. transparency? F) Inviting non-Council members and actors during its time as Council president on Syria meetings using provisional rule of procedure 37 and 39. 4) Did the elected member anchor its G) Number of co-sponsors to the non- proposed action with the broader UN adopted draft. membership in the case a draft was not H) Statements highlighting the adopted? collectivity aspect of the draft put forward. 5) To what extent did the elected member I) Statements condemning and voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of delegitimizing an opponent’s choice no-vote or abstention leading to the non- of action. adoption of a draft resolution? J) Vetoes referred to as great power abuse. Yes/No.
6) Did opponents change vote leading to a K) Council members changing their successful UNSC outcome during the elected votes from no to yes or abstention, or member’s time on the Council? from abstention to yes on a proposed course of action that earlier was not adopted. Table 4: Indicators for the independent variable
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4.3 Data The data consulted is drawn from multiple sources. These include UNSC meeting records concerning the Syrian conflict which are first-hand accounts of the meetings in which the decisions of interest are made. The elected members make statements in these meetings, and in relation to decisions made, or not made. Also, UNSC resolutions and presidential statements, i.e. the outcomes have been consulted. Draft resolutions on the Syrian conflict that have not been adopted are also consulted. Additionally, the independent Security Council Report, which is working for enhanced transparency, offers context to decisions made and the discussed topics on the Council. Further, qualitative accounts on the selected cases are consulted for the purpose of establishing what each case’s international priorities and intended contributions are. I inductively consult the official campaigns for winning the seat on the Council and respective case’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and most importantly, statements made during the UN General Assembly (UNGA) annual debates as these have been argued to reflect a state’s international preferences (Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2017). The total number of UNGA speeches analyzed over the 3 cases is 13, of which all are speeches made before respective elected member rolled on to the Council. Below are tables showing all data used.
Document Case 1: New Zealand Case 2: Japan Case 3: Sweden Number of UNGA 6 4 3 speeches analyzed Ministry of Foreign 1 2 2 Affairs Security Council 1 0 0 Report Table 5: Summary of documents consulted in establishing intended contributions
In total there were 116 meetings on the Syrian conflict between 2015-2018. Of these 116, 64 meeting records were analyzed for statement purposes. The 52 omitted meeting records did not contain any statements made by the elected members analyzed. 10 additional meeting records concerning the broader Middle Eastern situation in which statements on the Syrian conflict were made, were also analyzed for statement purposes. Below is a summary of the number of meeting records on basis of year.
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Meeting 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total Syria 6 19 13 26 64 Broader 2 6 2 0 10 Middle East Total 8 25 15 26 74 Table 6: Summary of meeting records analyzed
The table below summarizes the total amount of statements that were analyzed in the 74 meeting records. Year Case 1: New Zealand Case 2: Japan Case 3: Sweden Total 2015 8 8 2016 20 20 40 2017 11 15 26 2018 26 26 Total number of 28 31 41 100 statements analyzed Table 7: Summary of total amount of analyzed statements on Syria per case
The total amount of adopted UNSC resolutions consulted are 21. Note that resolutions upon which these 21 builds are not accounted for. The number of non-adopted draft resolutions consulted is 6. These two types of documents are summarized below based on year.
Type of document 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total Adopted resolutions 6 8 3 4 21 Non-adopted draft resolutions 0 1 4 1 6 Table 8: Summary of adopted resolutions and non-adopted draft resolutions consulted
Two additional documents from Security Council Report were consulted for descriptive information on Arria-Formula meetings. All UN documents and UNGA statements are available on the United Nations library webpage, while the documents from Security Council Report are found on their website. The documents supplementing UNGA statements in establishing the elected members’ intended contributions are found on respective state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. A limitation with the data used in this thesis is that it does not reach into the informal consultations that occur in UNSC negotiations. It is likely that such information could have been used in conducting the analysis, however hard, if not impossible, to access. Interviews could have been used for such purposes, however, due to limitations in time and scope, this has not been considered. 26
5. Empirics The coming sections outlines the assessment of all indicators that help the answering of the theoretically informed guiding questions presented in the previous section. It is structured by firstly introducing the UN Security Council’s work in relation to the Syrian conflict. Subsequently each case is assessed by the dependent and independent variable, and the guiding questions. Each variable in each case has a summarizing table providing an overview of the assessment.
5.1 The Syrian conflict and the UN Security Council The contemporary conflict in Syria erupted in the wake of the Arab spring in 2011 and has been on the UN Security Council’s agenda ever since. The conflict has resulted in approximately 345 000 deaths caused by the various actors involved in the complex conflict and although the number of deaths has declined in recent years, the situation remains dire (UCDP 2018). The Security Council has in relation to the conflict been characterized by inaction (Whitfield 2016, 500). U.S. and Russian failure to agree has hampered the Council from taking distinctive action. Also, attempts from outside the Council, including establishing an effective Group of Friends to address the conflict, have failed. There has been a clear lack of decisive international action in response to the crisis, not least from the Security Council which, again, exists to address threats to international peace and security. There are however some Council decisions made in relation to the situation in Syria, which are at the center for the empirical investigation of this thesis.
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6. Case 1 - New Zealand 2015-2016
6.1 New Zealand and the Security Council New Zealand announced its candidacy for the 2015-2016 term in 2004, meaning that New Zealand campaigned for over 10 years. Its latest term on the Security Council was in 1993- 1994, and the 2015-2016 term was New Zealand’s fourth time serving as an elected member. During the 10 years of campaigning for the seat, the New Zealand government made uncountable statements on what it intended to do while on the Council, but intensified its campaigning as the election day in the General Assembly in 2014 came closer. ‘There is no point in joining the Council simply to make up the numbers’ was the wording the New Zealand officials used in the UNGA general debates in the years leading up to its election to the Council (Key 2013, 9; McCully 2014, 7). New Zealand was determined to contribute to the Council’s work and during the campaign that lead to the successful election in 2014, New Zealand’s most highlighted thematical issues it was bringing to the Council were enhancing the cooperation between the members of the Council, and the Council’s cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations (Key 2009; 2013; McCully 2010; 2012a; McLay 2011; Security Council Report 2014, 3), nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons (Key 2009; 2013; McCully 2010; 2012b; McLay 2011; Security Council Report 2014, 3), strengthening the rule of law and international humanitarian law (Key 2009; 2013; McLay 2011; McCully 2012a; 2012b), working to implement the Millennium Development Goals and its successor Sustainable Development Goals in the work of the Security Council (Key 2009; McCully 2010; McLay 2011), and highlighting the humanitarian issues related to conflicts (McCully 2012b; Key 2013; McCully 2014).
New Zealand intended contributions 1. Enhanced cooperation between UNSC members and the cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations 2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 3. The rule of law and international humanitarian law 4. Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals 5. Humanitarian issues Table 9: New Zealand’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A
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6.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes Did adopted resolutions on Syria include New Zealand’s intended Council contributions? It is not possible to detect influence in the New Zealand case for this indicator based on the conducted content analysis. Although New Zealand’s intended contributions are present in resolutions on Syria which it did not co-draft, the language has not changed since New Zealand took its seat on the Council. Thus, accordingly, no influence can be traced this way.
Resolution Intended contributions Change in language from Can included in language? earlier resolutions it builds on influence be traced? 2209 Condemning the use of New resolution on the use of No. (2015) chemical weapons in Syria; chemical weapons in Syrian violation of international law. conflict. 2229 Calls to respect international New resolution that does not No. (2015) humanitarian law; condemning build on earlier resolutions use of heavy weapons. directly related to Syria. 2254 Demands all parties to cease Language on cessation of No . (2015) any indiscriminate use of indiscriminate use of weapons weapons including through and language on international shelling and aerial law same in e.g. S/RES/21911 bombardment; demand (2014), humanitarian access in compliance to international S/RES/2175 (2014). humanitarian law; humanitarian situation and access for humanitarian agencies. 2257 Calls to respect international New resolution that does not No. (2015) humanitarian law; condemning build on earlier resolutions use of heavy weapons. directly related to Syria. 2268 Reiterates parties to allow No change in language from No. (2016) humanitarian access; comply to S/RES/2254 (2015). international humanitarian law. 2294 Calls to respect international New resolution that does not No. (2016) humanitarian law; condemning build on earlier resolutions use of heavy weapons. directly related to Syria. 2314 Condemning the use of Same language in S/RES/2209 No. (2016) chemical weapons in Syria; (2015), and S/RES/2235 (2015). violation of international law. 2319 Condemning the use of Same language in S/RES/2314 No. (2016) chemical weapons in Syria; (2016), S/RES/2235 (2015), and violation of international law. S/RES/2209 (2015). 2328 Alarmed by the humanitarian Same language in S/RES/2258 No. (2016) situation; humanitarian (2015).
1 S/RES/ followed by number indicates a reference to a specific UNSC resolution. In this case S/RES/2191 is read ‘resolution 2191’. 29
international law; humanitarian assistance. 2330 Calls to respect international New resolution that does not No. (2016) humanitarian law; condemning build on earlier resolutions use of heavy weapons. directly related to Syria. 2336 Calls for humanitarian access. Language included in No. (2016) S/RES/2254 (2015), and S/RES/2268 (2016). Table 10: Case 1: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable
Did New Zealand issue presidential statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to its intended Council contributions? New Zealand issued and drafted two presidential statements during its term on the Council as Council president in the months of July 2015 and September 2016. None of these were related to the conflict in Syria.
Did New Zealand’s behavior significantly shape the decision-making process leading to a particular UNSC outcome? New Zealand co-drafted three Syria related resolutions adopted by the Council, of which one was co-drafted with no permanent members (UNSC S/RES/2332 2016). This resolution concerned a renewed authorization for cross-border aid delivery in December 2016. New Zealand also co-drafted two adopted resolutions on Syria, resolution 2235 (2015), and 2258 (2015), in which permanent members were involved, meaning that these cannot be counted as equal amount of influence by New Zealand as in resolution 2332. This as it is not possible at this point to disregard the potential impact of the permanent members.
Did New Zealand draft resolutions on Syria that were not adopted? New Zealand co-drafted one resolution on the Syrian situation in December 2016 aiming to end all attacks in Aleppo for seven days (UNSC S/2016/10262 2016). It was vetoed by China and the Russian Federation. It was co-drafted with the two co-penholders on the humanitarian situation in Syria, Egypt and Spain.
2 S/year/ followed by number indicates a non-adopted UNSC resolution draft. In this case S/2016/1026 indicates a draft resolution from the year 2016, followed by identification number. 30
Guiding Question Indicator 1) Did adopted resolutions on Syria include A) No. the Elected Member’s intended Council contributions? 2) Did the elected member issue presidential B) No. statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to intended Council contributions? 3) Did the elected member’s behavior C) Yes, on 1 occasion without permanent significantly shape the decision-making member involvement (S/RES/2332). process leading to a particular UNSC D) 2 with permanent member involvement outcome? (S/RES/2235; S/RES/2258). 4) Did the elected member draft resolutions E) Yes, 1 (S/2016/1026). on Syria that were not adopted? Table 11: Case 1: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable
6.3 The role of representative legitimacy To what extent did New Zealand voice its position as legitimate? New Zealand made statements in 23 of the 49 Council meetings on Syria during its time on the Council. It also made 5 additional statements on Syria in meetings concerning the broader Middle Eastern situation. New Zealand modestly voiced the importance of inclusiveness and representativeness during its term on the Council. New Zealand did not voice the importance of inclusiveness in the Council’s work more than in 2 of the total 28 statements made (UNSC S/PV.75883 2015; S/PV.7610 2016). To larger extent did New Zealand emphasize the importance of the Council coming together by referring to its importance in 9 of its statements. This both in instances where vetoes were cast and where resolutions were adopted.
“I invite Russia and all Council members to work with us in the coming days to see if we can chart a course in a more positive direction” (UNSC S/PV.7785 2016, 15).4
This statement was made in a meeting in which the Russian Federation casted its veto on a resolution aiming at ending all military flights over Aleppo (UNSC S/2016/846 2016). New Zealand subsequently voted no on a Russian counter-resolution in the same meeting. The statement reflects and indicates an acknowledgement by New Zealand of the importance of the Council working together in reaching outcomes.
3 S/PV. Followed by a number indicates a specific UNSC meeting referred to. 4 All statements made by the three elected members analyzed are available in an appendix from the author (116 pages). 31
New Zealand occasionally presented its work together with its co-penholders on the humanitarian issue in Syria and invited Council members to join their efforts, but seldom reached further than inside the Council to enhance representativeness and broadened inclusiveness. Neither did New Zealand a single time utter the word legitimacy as important in relation to the Syrian conflict. New Zealand referred to the UN charter in 3 of the 28 statements made during its term, and not at all to the purpose of the Council. Instead, New Zealand referred to the responsibility of the Council in a total of 10 statements on Syria, making Council responsibility the most frequently referred to keyword in assessing representative legitimacy.
Did New Zealand anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case of drafting an adopted outcome? For the resolutions New Zealand were involved in drafting, most notably resolution 2332 (2016), the number of co-drafters was two, which is the clearest instance of influence in a Council outcome. In comparison to the two other resolutions which New Zealand co-drafted, which had seven and ten co-sponsors, two is a small number of co-drafters. However, resolution 2332 was adopted indicating that three elected members co-drafting were enough for a Council outcome to be produced. New Zealand, nor any of the other co-drafters made any statement in relation to the adopted resolution. What is interesting from the analyzed meeting records during New Zealand’s term is that resolution 2258 from 2015, which New Zealand co-drafted, is attributed to New Zealand, Jordan and Spain although permanent members were involved in the drafting. This becomes clear by analyzing the statements made by elected and permanent members during the meeting in which the resolution was adopted, although New Zealand itself did not speak during this meeting (UNSC S/PV.7595 2015). Resolution 2258 is argued to be authored by New Zealand, Jordan and Spain, and supported by some of the permanent members, indicating that this resolution may be more of a result of New Zealand’s actions than earlier thought (see assessment of dependent variable). In speaking for New Zealand, Jordan thanked, on behalf of the authors, for the Council’s cooperation, consensus and partnership (ibid). In relation to S/RES/2235, it is clear that this was not New Zealand’s initiative. The New Zealand representative still expressed its pleasure with the adopted resolution, and that it portrayed a rare occasion of collective Council action on Syria (UNSC S/PV.7501 2015).
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To what extent did New Zealand legitimize its proposed actions through diplomatic exchanges increasing transparency? New Zealand co-arranged one Arria-formula meeting on the situation in Aleppo in August 2016, together with France, the U.S., the UK, and Ukraine (Security Council report 2016). Three civil society speakers with experience from the ongoing situation on the ground in Syria briefed the attendees during the meeting. These speakers were representatives from the White Helmet organization, the Syrian American Medical Society, and the CNN (ibid). During its term on the Council in 2015-2016, New Zealand co-organized one additional Arria-formula meeting on another topic (Security Council Report 2020). New Zealand hosted two Council meetings on Syria as Council president in July 2015, in which New Zealand used provisional rule of procedure 39 inviting persons with an individual capacity or as representatives of the UN organs or subsidiary organs, in these cases the Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Syria (UNSC S/PV.7493 2015; S/PV.7497 2015). New Zealand hosted three meetings on Syria as Council president in September 2016. Provisional rule of procedure 39 was used in one meeting (UNSC S/PV.7780 2016). Both rule 37 and 39 inviting individuals and non-Council members were used in the other two meetings (UNSC S/PV.7774 2016; S/PV.7777 2016). In these meetings Syria was invited in capacity of non-Council member.
Did New Zealand anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case a draft was not adopted? New Zealand co-drafted one resolution which was vetoed by China and the Russian Federation, together with its co-penholders on the humanitarian situation in Syria. It aimed to end all attacks in Aleppo for seven days (UNSC S/2016/1026 2016). In responding to the veto, New Zealand argued that the penholders had been working on the draft for over a month and had consulted as many views as possible in the drafting process, believing it had reached consensus. New Zealand argued that the draft resolution was circulated to all Council members in time (UNSC S/PV.7825 2016).
To what extent did New Zealand voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of no-vote or abstention leading to the non-adoption of a draft resolution? There were three non-adopted draft resolutions on Syria during New Zealand’s term (UNSC S/2016/846 2016; S/2016/847 2016; S/2016/1026 2016). New Zealand was involved in the
33 drafting of one, S/2016/1026. New Zealand itself voted against draft resolution S/2016/847 which was a draft submitted by the Russian Federation directly after draft S/2016/846 was vetoed by the Russian Federation in the same meeting (UNSC S/PV.7785 2016). The vetoed draft aimed at ending all military flights over Aleppo. The Russian draft did not receive the nine affirmative votes needed, and New Zealand expressed its negative view on the Russian veto on draft S/2016/846 by referring to the fact that the Council has a special responsibility and that the failure of not adopting the resolution undermines the credibility of the Security Council (ibid). New Zealand did not directly condemn the Russian Federation’s veto, but spoke in broader terms of Council responsibilities, and expressed a wish to continue to work and explore future action on the topic with all Council members (ibid). In voting no on the Russian Federation’s counter-draft on the issue, New Zealand argued for its position by referring to Russia’s destructive role in the conflict and that their draft did not circulate for negotiations before it was subject for voting on the Council. This was problematic as the draft concerned such a sensitive issue of which Russia itself is a part to (ibid). It appears New Zealand was more vocally irritated by the fact that this counter-draft was presented, than it was by the veto (ibid). New Zealand’s only co-drafted resolution that was not adopted during its term concerned a draft designed to reduce the fighting and end all attacks in Aleppo for seven days (UNSC S/2016/1026 2016). It was vetoed by China and Russia (UNSC S/PV.7825 2016). The New Zealand representative argued that the Council’s responsibility and reputation suffers from the result. New Zealand also expressed distraught as the draft was prepared for over a month during which it consulted many and took as many views aboard as possible before putting it to a vote. It referred to the veto as another indictment on Russia (ibid). New Zealand thus directly condemned Russia and its supporters and argued that the veto shows that Moscow does not recognize what others do, that there is no military solution to the conflict (ibid). No vetoes were, however, directly referred to as great power abuse.
Did opponents change vote leading to a successful UNSC outcome during New Zealand’s time on the Council? As mentioned, New Zealand drafted one resolution during its term on the Council that was vetoed (UNSC S/2016/1026 2016) wishing to end all attacks in Aleppo for seven days. Although not directly relating to solely Aleppo, Resolution 2332, co-drafted by New Zealand, was adopted later in December. It concerned renewed authorization for cross-border aid delivery (UNSC S/RES/2332 2016) and cannot be traced to be an instance of an opponent 34 changing its vote on an earlier vetoed draft resolution. The proposed courses of actions are not comparable in that sense, meaning that no instances of New Zealand being able to change an opponent’s vote leading to a successful outcome on an earlier non-adopted draft can be found.
Guiding Question Indicator 1) To what extent did the elected member A) To the extent that New Zealand voice its position as legitimate? mostly referred to the importance of inclusiveness by the work done together with its co-penholders, and to some, although little extent collective responsibility of the Council. None on Legitimacy. B) To the extent that New Zealand referred to the responsibilities of the Council in approximately 1/3 of its statements. UN charter referred to 3 times. No references to the Council’s purpose. 2) Did the elected member anchor its C) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN adopted outcomes were 2 membership in the case of drafting an (S/RES/2332), 10 (S/RES/2258), 7 adopted outcome? (S/RES/2235). D) New Zealand referred to the collective aspect in relation to S/RES/2235. 3) To what extent did the elected member E) To the extent that New Zealand co- legitimize its proposed actions through arranged 1 Arria formula-meeting diplomatic exchanges increasing on Syria. transparency? F) To the extent that New Zealand hosted 5 meetings in total as Council president using rule 39 in all, rule 37 in 2. 4) Did the elected member anchor its G) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN non-adopted draft was 2 membership in the case a draft was not (S/2016/1026) adopted? H) New Zealand highlighted the collectivity aspect of the non-adopted draft. 5) To what extent did the elected member I) To the extent that New Zealand voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of directly addressed Russia’s veto on no-vote or abstention leading to the non- its own co-draft S/2016/1026. Not in adoption of a draft resolution? others. J) Vetoes were not referred to as great power abuse. 6) Did opponents change vote leading to a K) No. successful UNSC outcome during the elected member’s time on the Council? Table 12: Case 1: Summary of indicators for the independent variable
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7. Case 2 - Japan 2016-2017
7.1 Japan and the Security Council Japan is the most frequent non-permanent member on the Security Council. The 2016-2017 term was its eleventh tenure on the Council, and its latest term was in 2009-2010. Japan’s intended contributions drawn from the time leading to its entrance to the Council are following a clear Japanese line. There appears to be no apparent deviation from earlier campaigns through the years, making Japan to appear as consistent. Japan and the Security Council is mostly distinguished by its regular calls and demands to become a permanent member, and the need for Council reform, in order to make the Council reflecting the world of today and not that of 1945 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017). Japan consistently argues for its historical contributions to the UN, and its peacekeeping operations and hammer away on the fact that Japan is one of the biggest financial contributors to the organization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011; 2017). Besides the call for Council reform, Japan has a number of thematical questions which it favors with its work with the UN and wishes to highlight while on the Security Council. During the period leading up to Japan taking its seat on the Council in 2016, the most highlighted themes and intended contributions include the strengthening of women’s participation, protection and empowerment in conflict situations (Noda 2012; Abe 2013; 2014; 2015), a permeating call for focusing on human security and the humanitarian situation in conflicts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011; 2017; Noda 2012; Abe 2013; 2014; 2015), a focus on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons (Noda 2012; Abe 2013; 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011; 2017), the strengthening of rule of law and international humanitarian law (Noda 2012; Abe 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017), and the refugee situation in Syria and the Middle East (Abe 2013; 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017).
Japan intended contributions 1. Strengthening women’s participation, protection and empowerment in conflicts 2. Human security and the humanitarian situation in conflicts 3. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons 4. Rule of law and international humanitarian law 5. The refugee situation in Syria Table 13: Japan’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A
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7.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes Did adopted resolutions on Syria include Japan’s intended Council contributions? During its term on the Council there were ten adopted resolutions which Japan did not co-draft. These ten resolutions included language in line with the intended contributions emphasized by Japan.
Resolution Intended contributions Change in language from Can included in language? earlier resolutions it builds on influence be traced? 2268 Calls to release arbitrarily Language included in earlier No. (2016) detained persons, particularly resolutions e.g. 2254 (2015). women; calls for parties to follow international law. 2294 Calls parties to respect New resolution that does not No. (2016) international humanitarian law; build on earlier resolutions condemning use of heavy directly related to Syria. weapons. 2314 Condemning the use of Same language included in 2118 No. (2016) chemical weapons; serious (2013), 2209 (2015), and 2235 violation of international law. (2015). 2319 Condemning the use of Same language included in 2118 No. (2016) chemical weapons; serious (2013), 2209 (2015), 2235 violation of international law. (2015), and 2314 (2016). 2328 Human security and Yes, strengthened Yes. (2016) humanitarian situation. acknowledgement of the need for urgent humanitarian evacuation and assistance. 2330 Respect of international New resolution that does not No. (2016) humanitarian law; weapons. build on earlier resolutions directly related to Syria. 2332 Humanitarian situation; Same language included in No. (2016) refugee situation; international numerous previous resolutions humanitarian law; weapons; on which the resolution builds release of arbitrarily detained e.g. 2254 (2015), and 2258 persons, starting with women. (2015). 2336 Humanitarian access. Same language exists in 2118 No. (2016) (2013), 2254 (2015), and 2268 (2015). 2361 International humanitarian law; New resolution that does not No. (2017) weapons. build on earlier resolutions directly related to Syria. 2394 International humanitarian law; New resolution that does not No. (2017) weapons. build on earlier resolutions directly related to Syria. Table 14: Case 2: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable
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There is little evidence that Japan influenced the Council’s outcomes on Syria through the coding of its intended contributions. However, the coding indicates influence in one resolution on Syria. That is in resolution 2328 (2016) where language is added from earlier resolutions concerning an acknowledgement of the need for urgent humanitarian evacuation and assistance. Accordingly, strengthened language in line with Japan’s intended contributions is found.
Did Japan issue presidential statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to its intended Council contributions? Japan issued a total of seven presidential statements as Council president in the months of July 2016 and December 2017. None of these concerned the conflict in Syria.
Did Japan’s behavior significantly shape the decision-making process leading to a particular UNSC outcome? In December 2017, Japan co-drafted its only adopted resolution on Syria, resolution 2393. It concerned renewed authorization for cross-border and crossline aid delivery (UNSC S/RES/2393 2017). It was co-drafted with the co-penholders on the humanitarian situation in Syria, Sweden and Egypt.
Did Japan draft resolutions on Syria that were not adopted? Japan was involved in drafting four Syria related resolutions which were vetoed. Of these, one draft resolution was put forward by Japan with no co-drafters (UNSC S/2017/970 2017). This draft resolution aimed at extending the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established in 2015 to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. The other vetoed draft resolutions were co-drafted by one or more permanent members.
Guiding Question Indicator 1) Did adopted resolutions on Syria include A) Yes, S/RES/2328 included enhanced the Elected Member’s intended Council language on human security and the contributions? humanitarian situation. 2) Did the elected member issue presidential B) No. statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to intended Council contributions? 3) Did the elected member’s behavior C) Yes on 1 occasion (S/RES/2393). significantly shape the decision-making D) None with permanent members.
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process leading to a particular UNSC outcome? 4) Did the elected member draft resolutions E) 1 Japanese draft resolution vetoed; 3 on Syria that were not adopted? other draft resolutions vetoed with permanent members involved in the drafting. Table 15: Case 2: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable
7.3 The role of representative legitimacy To what extent did Japan voice its position as legitimate? Japan made statements in 27 meetings of 58 possible on Syria during its term on the Council, and an additional 4 statements in meetings concerning the broader situation in the Middle East. According to the procedure for assessing the indicator, and if Japan voiced its positions as legitimate during these meetings, little indicates that this was the case. Only in one statement did Japan refer to the importance of inclusiveness, this by emphasizing that key stakeholders should participate in consultations on the Syrian peace process (UNSC S/PV.7855 2016). The same goes for emphasizing representativeness as something important for Japan, where Japan referred to its importance in one meeting, urging all Council members to not abandon the collective efforts regarding the Syrian conflict (UNSC S/PV.7825 2016). Japan did not utter the word legitimacy in relation to the Syrian conflict. In terms of referring to the UN charter, the purposes, and the responsibility of the Council, did Japan refer to the Charter once (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017). Japan did not refer to the purposes of the Council but referred to the importance of the responsibilities of the Council in 8 of its 31 statements on the Syrian conflict. In sum, Japan did not voice its position as legitimate to large extent in relation to the Syrian conflict during its term on the Council.
Did Japan anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case of drafting an adopted outcome? Japan’s only clear instance of influencing a Council outcome was resolution 2393 (2017) which was drafted together with its two co-penholders on the humanitarian situation in Syria, Egypt and Sweden. Japan did not make any statements in relation this resolution, its only co-drafted adopted resolution. Instead did one of the co-drafters make a statement on behalf of all co-penholders for the humanitarian situation in Syria (UNSC S/PV.8141 2017). During Japan’s term on the Council, strengthened language in line with Japan’s intended contributions was also traceable in resolution 2328 (2016) which demanded UN access to 39 monitor evacuations from Aleppo (UNSC S/RES/2328 2016). However, Japan made no statement in relation to the resolution, offering no indication of the Japanese contribution to the strengthened language.
To what extent did Japan legitimize its proposed actions through diplomatic exchanges increasing transparency? Japan did not legitimize its position on Syria by increasing transparency through diplomatic exchanges by arranging informal meetings. Japan did not organize, host, nor co-host any Arria- formula meetings on Syria related questions during its term on the Council (Security Council Report 2020). Japan co-hosted two such meetings on other topics during its term in 2016-2017 (ibid). Further, did Japan host one meeting on Syria as Council president in July 2016, during which Japan used provisional rule of procedure 37 inviting Syria to participate, and rule 39 to invite the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (UNSC S/PV.7744 2016). Japan hosted three meetings on Syria as Council president in December 2017. In one of these three meetings did Japan invite Syria in accordance with provisional rule of procedure 37, and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator under rule 39 (UNSC S/PV.8142 2017). During the other two meetings no such efforts were made.
Did Japan anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case a draft was not adopted? Japan was involved in four draft resolutions that were vetoed during its term on the Council, all occurring during its second year on the Council. Although three of them involved permanent members, it drafted one completely on its own, namely S/2017/970 (2017). For the record, the three vetoed drafts Japan co-drafted with permanent members had 41 (S/2017/172), 40 (S/2017/884), and 6 (S/2017/962) additional co-drafters. In relation to three of the total four non-adopted drafts did Japan make statements highlighting the collectivity aspect of the proposed actions. In relation to draft resolution S/2017/172 Japan expressed a belief that the Security Council needs to show its shared determination against the use of chemical weapons as well as the responsibility of the Council, and that there is unity in the Council on the question of chemical weapons, and that Japan hopes the Council can come together to act (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017). 40
In relation to draft resolution S/2017/884, Japan stated that it is the responsibility of the international community to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons (UNSC S/PV.8073 2017). Most emphasis was put on the resolution Japan drafted on its own in which Japan aims to extend the OPCW-UN JIM mandated to investigate the usage of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict (UNSC S/2017/970 2017). Japan spoke before the vote on its draft emphasizing that the Council is responsible for ensuring accountability for the use of chemical weapons and that there is full agreement in the Council, and the entire international community that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, and that Japan jointly condemn the use of these weapons that has resulted in civilian casualties (UNSC S/PV.8107 2017).
To what extent did Japan voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of no-vote or abstention leading to the non-adoption of a draft resolution? Nine draft resolutions were not adopted during Japan’s term on the Council. Of these were Japan involved in the drafting of four. Japan did not condemn the vetoes cast on the non-adopted resolutions which Japan co-drafted. Japan had a modest approach stating that it was unfortunate that draft resolution S/2017/172 was vetoed (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017). In relation to the veto on draft resolution S/2017/884 did Japan instead express a belief that Russia do not oppose a renewal of the JIM mandate as such, although Japan called for the importance of its renewal (UNSC S/PV.8073 2017). Japan emphasized the importance of renewal in relation to the veto on draft resolution S/2017/962, as well as emphasizing that it is the Council’s responsibility to ensure accountability for the use of chemical weapons (UNSC S/PV.8105 2017). Japan did not, however, speak at all about the veto casted on its own draft resolution S/2017/970. Still, it was in relation to vetoed co-drafts Japan was most consistent in highlighting representative legitimacy as measured through the guiding questions. In relation to the remaining five non-adopted draft resolutions which it did not co-draft did Japan make statements regretting that the Council was not able to unite in three (UNSC S/2016/846 2016; S/2016/1026 2016; S/2017/315 2017). The remaining two resolutions did Japan not support as these were counter-resolutions from Russia (UNSC S/2016/847 2016; S/2017/968 2017). The vetoes were never referred to as great power abuse.
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Did opponents change vote leading to a successful UNSC outcome during Japan’s time on the Council? Japan’s only co-drafted adopted resolution is resolution 2393 (2017) which renewed the authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria (UNSC S/RES/2393 2017). Whether this outcome is an instance of Council members that opposed earlier attempts changing their votes is not traceable. Japan’s earlier proposed draft resolutions that were vetoed concerned chemical weapons (UNSC S/2017/172 2017), and the renewal and extension of the OPCW–UN JIM investigating the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict established through resolution 2235 in 2015 (UNSC S/2017/884 2017; S/2017/962 2017). The same goes for the sole drafting of S/2017/970 concerning the JIM. The renewal of the JIM, which Japan was involved in drafting resolutions for, was not established during Japan’s term on the Council and has since its mandate lapsed in 2017 not been renewed.
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Guiding Question Indicator 1) To what extent did the elected member A) To little extent. Japan did in general voice its position as legitimate? not make statements emphasizing the importance of inclusiveness, representativeness or legitimacy. B) To little extent. Japan did not refer to the charter, Council purposes, but made small amount of references to the responsibilities of the Council. 2) Did the elected member anchor its C) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN adopted outcome was 2 membership in the case of drafting an (S/RES/2393). adopted outcome? D) Japan made no statements emphasizing collectivity. 3) To what extent did the elected member E) Japan did not organize any Arria- legitimize its proposed actions through formula meetings on Syria. diplomatic exchanges increasing F) To the extent that Japan hosted 4 transparency? meetings in total as Council president and used rule 39 and 37 in 2 of these. 4) Did the elected member anchor its G) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN non-adopted drafts was 41 membership in the case a draft was not (S/2017/172), 40 (S/2017/884), 6 adopted? (S/2017/962), 0 (S/2017/970). H) Japan highlighted the collectivity aspect in relation to 3 of the drafts. 5) To what extent did the elected member I) To zero extent. Japan did not voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of address a veto as illegitimate. no-vote or abstention leading to the non- J) Vetoes were not referred to as great adoption of a draft resolution? power abuse. 6) Did opponents change vote leading to a K) No. successful UNSC outcome during the elected member’s time on the Council? Table 16: Case 2: Summary of indicators for the independent variable
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8. Case 3 - Sweden 2017-2018
8.1 Sweden and the Security Council Sweden launched its candidacy for its seat in 2014. The last time Sweden was on the Council was in 1997-1998, and the term in 2017-2018 was Sweden’s fourth time as an elected member. During the campaign to win a Council seat the most highlighted thematical issues which Sweden aimed to make difference on were enhancing equality and the role of women in international issues of peace and security, their rights, representation and resources (Grunditz 2014; Löfven 2015; Wallström 2016; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016), strengthening international law and international humanitarian law (Grunditz 2014; Wallström 2016; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016), enhance the cooperation between the Council members and the Council’s cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations (Grunditz 2014; Löfven 2015; Wallström 2016; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016), address the question of migration, refugees and asylum seekers (ibid), and to work with integrating the Sustainable Development Goals in the Council’s work (Löfven 2015; Wallström 2016; Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016).
Sweden intended contributions 1. Enhance equality and the role of women in international issues of peace and security, their rights, representation, and resources 2. International law and international humanitarian law 3. Enhance cooperation between the members of the UNSC, and its cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations 4. Migration, refugees, and asylum seekers 5. Integrating the Sustainable Development Goals in the Council’s work Table 17: Sweden’s intended contributions, traced for in assessing indicator A
8.2 Influencing the Council’s outcomes Did adopted resolutions on Syria include Sweden’s intended Council contributions? The resolutions adopted during 2017 and 2018 which Sweden did not co-draft, are all rather similar resolutions that are made in relation to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and are subject for Council attention twice a year. It appears that these resolutions are adopted mechanically in similar ways each time making it impossible by this study’s means to trace any Swedish influence in resolutions it did not co-draft.
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Resolution Intended contributions Change in language from Can included in language? earlier resolutions it builds on influence be traced? 2361 Call parties to respect New resolution that does not No. (2017) international humanitarian law. build on earlier resolutions directly related to Syria. 2394 Call parties to respect New resolution that does not No. (2017) international humanitarian law. build on earlier resolutions directly related to Syria. 2426 Increase number of women in New resolution that does not No. (2018) all aspects of Peacekeeping; build on earlier resolutions respect of international directly related to Syria. humanitarian law. 2450 Increase number of women in New resolution that does not No. (2018) all aspects of Peacekeeping; build on earlier resolutions respect of international directly related to Syria. humanitarian law. Table 18: Case 3: Summary of coding indicator A for the dependent variable
Did Sweden issue presidential statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to its intended Council contributions? Sweden issued a total of four presidential statements as Council president in the months of January 2017 and July 2018. None concerned the Syrian conflict.
Did Sweden’s behavior significantly shape the decision-making process leading to a particular UNSC outcome? Sweden was involved in co-drafting three adopted Syria related resolutions. Two of these were not involving permanent members, resolution 2393 (2017) and resolution 2449 (2018). These concerned renewed authorization for cross-border and cross-line aid delivery (UNSC S/RES/2393 2017), and renewed authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria (UNSC SRES/2449 2018). The third resolution involved permanent members in the drafting and demanded cessation of hostilities in Syria (UNSC S/RES/2401 2018).
Did Sweden draft resolutions on Syria that were not adopted? Sweden co-drafted three resolutions relating to Syria that were vetoed by the Russian Federation (UNSC S/2017/172 2017; S/2017/962 2017; S/2018/321 2018). These were all co- drafted with permanent members.
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Guiding Question Indicator 1) Did adopted resolutions on Syria include A) No. the Elected Member’s intended Council contributions? 2) Did the elected member issue presidential B) No. statements on Syria as Council president that included language relating to intended Council contributions? 3) Did the elected member’s behavior C) Yes, on 2 occasions (S/RES/2393; significantly shape the decision-making S/RES/2449). process leading to a particular UNSC D) 1 with permanent member involvement outcome? (S/RES/2401). 4) Did the elected member draft resolutions E) Yes, 3 with permanent member on Syria that were not adopted? involvement. Table 19: Case 3: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable
8.3 The role of representative legitimacy To what extent did Sweden voice its position as legitimate? Sweden made 41 statements on the Syrian conflict in a total of 67 meetings during its term. Two of these statements were made in meetings concerning the broader Middle Eastern situation in which Sweden raised the Syrian issue. Sweden referred to the importance of inclusiveness in its statements substantially, by doing it in more than half of its statements. This by most often emphasizing its position together with someone else, rather than on its own. Sweden also highlighted the importance of representativeness in almost half of its statements. Most common was speaking on behalf of the co-penholders and emphasizing the collective aspect of the Council’s responsibility. Legitimacy was only referred to in two statements during its term (UNSC S/PV.8195 2018; S/PV.8373 2018). Sweden referred to the UN charter nine times in a total of five statements, most notably in meeting S/PV.8233 (2018) where it was referred to four times in the same statement. Here the reference to the Charter was often combined with the emphasis of collectivity indicating representativeness, and also the importance of Council responsibility, which Sweden highlighted most during its term. Of all 41 statements made in relation to Syria the responsibility of the Council was referred to in a total of 53 times in 29 of the Swedish statements. Sweden did however not make any reference to the purpose of the Council.
Did Sweden anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case of drafting an adopted outcome? Sweden co-drafted three adopted resolutions, of which two did not involve permanent members. In terms of referring to the collective aspect of these adopted drafts did Sweden in relation to 46 resolution 2393 make a statement on behalf of the co-penholders, Sweden, Japan, and Egypt, indicating a Swedish emphasis on the collective aspect of the draft (UNSC S/PV.8141 2017). Sweden highlighted that the co-authors had worked hard with all Council members in drafting the resolution, and expressed its gratitude, on behalf of the co-penholders, to all delegations on the Council for constructive engagement during the negotiations in the drafting process leading to the adoption of S/RES/2393 (ibid). As the resolution concerns a renewal of authorization for cross-border and cross-line aid delivery (UNSC S/RES/2393 2017), Sweden also directed gratefulness to the actors within the UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners Jordan and Turkey, and also the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Relief Coordinator. This indicates an emphasis on the acknowledgment of the involvement of multiple actors in the drafting and execution of a Council resolution. Sweden also acknowledged that this adoption reflects a special accomplishment in light of the rare adoption of Council outcomes in relation to Syria and wished it could enhance the Council’s future engagement in the conflict (UNSC S/PV.8141 2017). In relation to the adoption of resolution 2449 in 2018 did Sweden again speak on behalf of the co-penholders, Sweden and Kuwait, arguing that the adoption means that the Council has upheld its obligation to millions of Syrian civilians (UNSC S/PV.8423 2018). The resolution renewed authorization for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria (UNSC S/RES/2449 2018). In preparing this resolution, Sweden highlighted that Sweden and Kuwait consulted all member of the Council and other stakeholders, including Syria and neighboring countries, indicating an anchoring of the draft inside and to some extent outside the Council (UNSC S/PV.8423 2018). On behalf of the co-penholders did Sweden thank all delegations for their engagement in the discussions and negotiations leading to the resolution, and also the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Relief and Emergency Relief Coordinator and the UN humanitarian agencies on the ground. Sweden also emphasized that they were committed to facilitating a fair, impartial and transparent negotiation process (ibid). This statement reflects the emphasis put on the collective aspect of resolution 2449. In the same meeting, speaking only for Sweden, as one of its last statements of its term, the representative ended with thanking its co-penholders, Kuwait, but also Egypt and Japan that no longer were on the Council, for excellent cooperation over the years, and that Sweden aims to continue its engagement in the Syrian conflict from outside the Council. In relation to the adoption of resolution 2401 did Sweden, before the vote, present the case that they together with Kuwait put forward the resolution, working intensively with all Council members to provide for concrete requests from the UN, the humanitarian community, and 47 particularly the civilian population on the ground (UNSC S/PV.8188 2018). The resolution is argued to provide for these requests and establishes a nationwide cessation of hostilities for at least thirty days and access for humanitarian aid convoys (UNSC S/RES/2401 2018). Resolution 2401 is also referred to by Sweden in subsequent Council meetings in 2018, where Sweden reiterates the constructive cooperation that enabled its adoption, and that the Council should continue to work on this cooperative path (UNSC S/PV.8195 2018; S/PV.8217 2018; S/PV.8332 2018). It becomes clear that resolution 2401, which is co-drafted with permanent members, is indeed attributed to Sweden and Kuwait (UNSC S/PV.8188 2018). Of the adopted resolutions were resolution 2393 co-drafted with two other elected members which shared the penholdership on the humanitarian situation in Syria, resolution 2449 involved one, Kuwait, with which Sweden shared the penholdership on the humanitarian situation in 2018, and resolution 2401 involved nine co-drafters.
To what extent did Sweden legitimize its proposed actions through diplomatic exchanges increasing transparency? Sweden co-organized an Arria-formula meeting on human rights in Syria in March 2018 together with France, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, the UK, and the U.S. During this meeting the UN Commissioner for Human Rights briefed the attendees. Sweden also co-organized such a meeting in September 2018 under the name ‘Syrian Voices on Preventing a Deathtrap in Idlib’. Here, invitees were from the Syrian Negotiation Commission in Geneva, a researcher and activist, and the chief negotiator of the Syrian National Coalition delegation in Geneva. This was arranged together with France, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK. In total did Sweden co-organize thirteen such meetings during 2017-2018, of which two directly concerned Syria (Security Council Report 2020). During its two months of Presidency in January 2017 and July 2018 did Sweden host two meetings on Syria. In the first did Sweden invite, in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme, and the Executive Director of the World Health Organization Emergencies Programme (UNSC S/PV.7870 2017). In the second meeting did Sweden use provisional rule of procedure 37 to invite Syria, and rule 39 to invite the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed conflict (UNSC S/PV.8320 2018).
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Did Sweden anchor its proposed action with the broader UN membership in the case a draft was not adopted? Sweden was involved in co-drafting three vetoed drafts. In all of these were permanent members involved in the drafting. The number of co-drafters was 41 (S/2017/172), 6 (S/2017/962), and 8 (S/2018/321). In relation to these vetoed drafts did Sweden expressed regret that the Council was unable to shoulder its common responsibility by adopting the resolutions (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017; S/PV.8105 2017; S/PV.8228 2018). As all vetoes were on draft resolutions concerning the use of chemical weapons, did Sweden argue that it is the duty of the Council members to do everything possible to enable investigations of the usage (UNSC S/PV.8105 2017), and that the Council’s credibility is at stake (UNSC S/PV.8228 2018). Sweden also emphasized that it would continue to work with all Council members on the issue (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017; S/PV.8105 2017; S/PV.8228 2018). In relation to the veto on draft S/2018/321 did Sweden express its regret by noting that the draft was circulated in time to all members but still failed to be adopted (UNSC S/PV.8228 2018).
To what extent did Sweden voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of no-vote or abstention leading to the non-adoption of a draft resolution? Nine draft resolutions were not adopted during Sweden’s term. Sweden were involved in the drafting of three of these. Sweden did not directly condemn Russia’s and China’s vetoes on S/2017/172 although it stated that the Council was not able to honor its commitments as a result of these vetoes cast by two permanent members (UNSC S/PV.7893 2017). In relation to S/2017/962 was no such statement made. In relation to the veto on S/2018/321 did Sweden in later meetings directly address Russia, and expressed deep regret over the veto (UNSC S/PV.8231 2018; S/PV.8233 2018). In relation to the remaining six non-adopted draft resolutions which Sweden did not co-draft, did Sweden regret that the Council was unable to shoulder its responsibility in four of them (UNSC S/2017/315 2017; S/2017/884 2017; S/2017/968 2017; S/2017/970 2017). In relation to one did Sweden directly address that it was Russia’s veto that blocked the decision (UNSC S/2017/315 2017), however did not label it as illegitimate as such (UNSC S/PV.7922 2017). The remaining two non-adopted resolutions were Russian counter-resolutions which Sweden did not support. Sweden never directly referred to the veto as great power abuse.
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Did opponents change vote leading to a successful UNSC outcome during Sweden’s time on the Council? The Swedish co-draft S/2017/172 (2017) concerned a draft resolution on chemical weapons used in the Syrian conflict. Sweden did not draft or contribute to an adopted resolution on the same topic during its time on the Council, meaning that the opponents did not change their votes leading to a successful outcome on the use of chemical weapons. The same goes for the other draft resolutions that were vetoed during Sweden’s term. S/2017/962 (2017) was a draft resolution aiming at extending the OPCW-UN JIM, which failed to be renewed, and lapsed in November 2017. S/2018/321 (2018) was a draft resolution aiming at establishing the UN Independent Mechanism of Investigation (UNIMI), which was supposed to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. The UNIMI was not established during Sweden’s term, and has of 2020 not been established. In terms of opponents changing vote, did Russia and China change their vote from ‘abstention’ in resolution 2393 to ‘yes’ in resolution 2401. Although these resolutions are not identical in main focus, they to some extent share focus on the humanitarian situation, access and aid deliveries. Important to note is that resolution 2401 would still have been adopted with Russia and China abstaining, meaning no change in outcome.
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Guiding Question Indicator 1) To what extent did the elected member A) To the extent that Sweden referred to voice its position as legitimate? the importance of inclusiveness, representativeness and legitimacy in more than half of statements made, with exception for legitimacy. B) To the extent that Sweden referred to the charter, and the responsibility of the Council extensively, particularly Council responsibilities. Council purpose was not mentioned. 2) Did the elected member anchor its C) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN adopted outcomes was 2 membership in the case of drafting an (S/RES/2393), 9 (S/RES/2401), 1 adopted outcome? (S/RES/2449). D) Sweden made statements emphasizing collectivity in relation to all adopted resolutions. 3) To what extent did the elected member E) To the extent that Sweden co- legitimize its proposed actions through organized 2 Arria formula-meetings diplomatic exchanges increasing on Syria. transparency? F) To the extent that Sweden hosted 2 meetings in total as Council president and used both rules in 1, and only rule 39 in the other. 4) Did the elected member anchor its G) The number of co-sponsors to the proposed action with the broader UN non-adopted drafts was 41 membership in the case a draft was not (S/2017/172), 6 (S/2017/962), 8 adopted? (S/2018/321). H) Sweden highlighted the collectivity aspect in relation to all non-adopted co-drafted resolutions. 5) To what extent did the elected member I) To the extent that Sweden directly voice an opponent as illegitimate in case of addressed Russia’s veto on drafts no-vote or abstention leading to the non- S/2017/315, and S/2018/321. adoption of a draft resolution? J) Vetoes were not referred to as great power abuse. 6) Did opponents change vote leading to a K) No. successful UNSC outcome during the elected member’s time on the Council? Table 20: Case 3: Summary of indicators for the independent variable
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9. Analysis and Discussion In this section I compare and discuss the three cases based on the empirical assessment of the variables. The empirical cases lend partial support for the hypothesis tested, that an elected member is more likely to influence the Council when anchoring its position with the broader UN membership. The supportive empirics are from case two and three, Japan and Sweden, where Japan shows little to no anchoring in the broader UN membership and shows less influence in Council outcomes, while the empirics indicates that Sweden anchored its position to extensive extent with the broader UN membership and also shows more influence in Council outcomes. However, the empirics from case one, New Zealand, indicate that the hypothesis should not be accepted as easily.
9.1 Connecting representative legitimacy to Council outcomes In the New Zealand case, empirical findings on influence show that New Zealand substantially influenced the Council with one resolution without permanent member involvement, and two resolutions involving permanent members as co-drafters. Interestingly, New Zealand was accredited as most influential in the successful adoption of resolution 2258 (2015) which was co-drafted with permanent members. This is clear based on the statements made by Council members during the meeting it was adopted (UNSC SP/V.7595 2015). The empirics suggest that representative legitimacy, by anchoring its proposed actions with the broader UN membership, was not high, not non-existing, but rather moderate in the case of New Zealand. New Zealand co-drafted its adopted and non-adopted resolutions in smaller coalitions of Council members, and only mentioned the collectivity aspect in relation to one adopted resolution, leaving rest of its influence uncommented in the Council meetings. New Zealand co-arranged one Arria-formula meeting and hosted five meetings on Syria as Council president, addressed a veto directly once, but never referred to it as great power abuse. Although the indicators’ empirical evidence show mixed results in terms of measuring representative legitimacy, did New Zealand manage to influence the Council. In the case of Japan and the empirical assessment of the dependent variable, influence in Council outcomes, it is rather clear that Japan comparatively shows less influence in Council outcomes on the Syrian conflict. The empirics suggest that Japan had influence in one resolution, and indications of strengthened language in one resolution. However, Japan did not make any statements in relation to these instances of influence. Empirically there appears to be an interesting connection between the empirics for the independent and dependent variable in
52 line with the hypothesis. Less influence and little to no representative legitimacy through anchoring its position with the broader UN membership, except for anchoring its position broadly in three non-adopted co-drafted resolutions. What this at face value indicates, is that many co-drafters do not equal success in passing a resolution. It is however also the case that these three non-adopted co-drafts involved permanent members, whose role in the drafting process is not possible to discount. Interesting is that Japan was the only case of an E10 putting a draft resolution to a vote completely alone, with complete lack of anchoring measured through the number of co-drafters. It was also vetoed. For an E10 to draft resolutions on its own and put it for a vote appears to be rare occurrences, and that Japan’s was vetoed is at first sight in line with the hypothesis, no anchoring, less likely to influence an outcome. However, this particular instance needs more attention to make such a strong claim. Japan spoke in relation to three of its vetoed co-drafts highlighting the importance of collectivity, the only occasions Japan consistently anchored its position broadly. This was not, however, done in relation to its only adopted draft. Japan also hosted four meetings on Syria in which it invited non-Council members and briefers, which indicates an instance deviating from its otherwise consistent low emphasis on representative legitimacy for its proposed actions. The meetings as Council president on Syria, however, cannot be led to any instance of influence. Additionally, Japan did not speak in its national capacity and generally only delegated these meetings as Council president. In the case of Sweden, the empirical findings show influence on three occasions, and a high level of representative legitimacy by anchoring its positions with the broader UN membership, indicating support for the hypothesis. Sweden made statements in relation to all adopted resolutions emphasizing the importance of collectivity, representativeness, inclusiveness, and Council responsibilities, co-arranged two Arria-formula meetings on Syria, and extensively voiced the importance of representative legitimacy over the meetings held. Sweden did also voice the importance of collectivity in relation to its vetoed drafts, and directly addressed two of Russia’s vetoes during its term on the Council. There is, however, instances where Sweden empirically show less representative legitimacy and anchoring of its positions, although not directly relatable to the instances of influencing the Council. For example, Sweden held the fewest number of meetings on Syria as Council president across the cases. Neither did Sweden refer to vetoes as great power abuse, and no evidence can be found that representative legitimacy has provoked an opponent into changing its vote leading to the adoption of an earlier non-adopted outcome. Although China and Russia changed their votes from ‘abstention’ to ‘yes’ between resolution 2393 and resolution 2401, this change has no influence in the adoption 53 of the draft. It could at most, perhaps, indicate that resolution 2401 is legitimately stronger as all Council members supported its adoption. This, however, cannot be answered in this thesis. Note that none of the cases had any influence in presidential statements, none were able to change an opponent’s vote leading to the adoption of an earlier non-adopted resolution, nor did anyone refer to the veto as great power abuse. These indicators should thus be further assessed and evaluated concerning their accuracy in indicating representative legitimacy.
Dependent variable: indicators New Zealand Japan Sweden A) Change in language in resolutions 0 1 0 B) Presidential statements 0 0 0 C) Adopted drafts without P5 involvement 1 1 2 D) Adopted drafts with P5 involvement 2 0 1 E) Non-adopted draft resolutions 1 4 3 Summary: Influence in Council outcomes More Less More Table 21: Analysis: Summary of indicators for the dependent variable
Independent variable: Indicators New Zealand Japan Sweden
A) Statements emphasizing inclusiveness, To some Little to no Extensively representativeness, and legitimacy extent extent B) Statements referring to UN charter, To some To little extent Extensively Council purpose, and responsibility extent C) Number of co-drafters to adopted 2, 10, and 7 2 2, 9, and 1 resolution D) Statements emphasizing the In relation to 1 No statement In relation collectivity aspect of the draft to all E) Arria-formula meetings arranged 1 0 2 F) Use of rule 37 and 39 as Council 5 meetings: 4 meetings: 2 meetings: president both rules in 2, both rules in 2 both rules rule 39 in 3 in 1, rule 39 in 1 G) Number of co-drafters to non-adopted 2 41, 40, 6, and 41, 6, and 8 drafts 0 H) Statements emphasizing the In relation to In relation to 3 In relation collectivity aspect of the draft the only one to all I) Statements condemning opponent’s 1 time directly None 2 times action towards Russia directly towards Russia J) Vetoes referred to as great power abuse No No No
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K) Opponents changing their votes No No No leading to adoption of resolution Summary: Representative legitimacy Partly Not Observable, observable in observable, except J, K, A, B, C, D, E, except H, F, and to F, H, I. Not and to some some observable in extent G extent F G, J, K. Table 22: Analysis: Summary of indicators for the independent variable (see research design for full description of indicators).
9.2 Theoretical implications Then, what do the empirical results tell for the theoretical argument investigated? Indeed, the findings lends support to the hypothesis in two of the cases. Sweden, clearly anchoring its position with the broader membership shows most influence in Council outcomes. Japan at the same time, which indicatively to much lesser extent anchored its positions with the broader membership, showed least influence in outcomes of the cases examined. New Zealand, however, based on its behavior regarding indicators shows results that render out in less support for the hypothesis, where New Zealand to lesser extent than Sweden anchored its position, but influenced the Council to the same extent, although Sweden’s involvement in all of its three adopted resolutions which it co-drafted is more likely the result of Sweden’s actions, while New Zealand’s actions indicates it was mostly influential in two of its three co-drafted adopted resolutions. This indicates that representative legitimacy as a condition under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council is a conducive condition, however not a necessary one. It appears that adopted resolutions, which the elected members were involved in drafting and thus influencing the Council outcomes, were generally co-drafted in small coalitions. It is on the contrary the non-adopted resolutions that are substantially more anchored in the broader UN membership with up to 41 co-drafters in some instances. Whether this is something that may complicate the value of the theoretical argument of representative legitimacy needs to be considered with more observations and perhaps tested statistically, which is beyond the scope of this paper. What is clear though, is that these smaller coalitions seem to work, and that formally anchoring a proposed action by chasing as many co-drafters as possible, may not be a useful strategy, and that consistently voicing its actions relating to representative legitimacy is enough to influence the Council. Thus, there might be a useful distinction between formal anchoring, and a more abstract form of anchoring including how an elected member presents its positions more generally over its term on the Council. 55
Additionally, for the theory, based on the indicators used for the assessment, New Zealand may have used representative legitimacy to a sufficient extent leading to its influence in the outcomes. If this would be the case, one would want to know whether there is a threshold for a level of representative legitimacy that is enough as a condition to influence outcomes, and whether it reaches a limit in terms of too much representative legitimacy. Little of this is known, but are questions asked to the theory in light of the empirical findings. Another interesting observation made is that Japan and Sweden were involved in drafting a number of resolutions that were vetoed, while New Zealand only had one draft vetoed. This may indicate that New Zealand perhaps was more strategic in its drafting. At the same time did Japan have four draft resolutions vetoed, while Sweden had three, but the results of the study show that Sweden managed to substantially influence the Council with three adopted resolutions, while Japan only managed to get one passed. The explanation for this through the theory of representative legitimacy is tempting as the empirics above move in that direction. However, how does one explain that the Japanese drafts that were co-drafted with 40 and 41 UN members, more than any adopted resolution, were vetoed? This could be overcome explained by Japan’s otherwise reluctance towards representative legitimacy, however, indicates that one should be hesitant to accepting the hypothesis, or at least reassess the indicator suggesting that many co-drafters is a way of measuring representative legitimacy. Further, the theoretical argument does not find support in the sense that representative legitimacy functioned to change an opponent’s vote leading to the adoption of an earlier non- adopted resolution, at least not based on the operationalization of this. Thus, the mechanism needs to be addressed further to see whether representative legitimacy works this way. In Sum, indications that the representative legitimacy argument finds partial support is nevertheless found in summarizing each case’s evaluation of the independent variable and the empirics assessed. Below is a summarizing table assessing the theoretical argument based on the study.
Case Dependent variable: Theoretically Observed level of Support influence in Council expected presence of presence of for outcomes representative representative hypothesis legitimacy legitimacy New More To high extent Moderate No Zealand Japan Less To low extent low Yes Sweden More To high extent High Yes Table 23: Analysis: Summary of theoretical implications
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9.3 Alternative explanations and additional observations Given the lack of previous research, this thesis developed the permeating theoretical argument of representative legitimacy, to large extent from the work Farrall et al. (2019), Langmore and Farrall (2016), and Langmore and Thakur (2016) had done on elected members. It is important to acknowledge that these authors to different degree suggest other ways for elected members to influence the Council, but due to the lack of earlier comparative research, their hypothesized factors have not been tested. Other factors they suggest, are summarized in the four-step framework in Farrall et al. (2019). These may constitute alternative explanations to the influence and non-influence observed in this thesis. These include diplomatic competencies and capacities. Assuming that states with most material power capabilities are able to influence the Council the most, smaller states may instead rely on diplomatic practices or personal qualities such as a charismatic ambassador. However, if this factor alone would help explain the results of this thesis is unlikely and very hard to measure. Another alternative explanation is what Farrall et al. (2019) call “favorable conditions”. It is hypothesized that timing, political context and the specific composition of the Council can be of central importance. The longer an issue is under scrutiny on the Council, the opportunities for influence increases. It is about seizing the opportunity offered by the permanent members’ silence which can open up for strategic and innovative E10 members to influence the Council’s decisions. In this case, one should acknowledge the deadlock on the Syrian conflict, and explain Sweden’s relative success in outcomes to that of Japan by the fact that the issue had been under scrutiny for longer time, enabling Sweden to influence the outcomes. However, this fails when we acknowledge that New Zealand which we would expect to have least influence based on such reasoning had more influence than Japan. Whether New Zealand and Sweden were more strategic and innovative is also not plausible if we reiterate that Japan is the most frequent elected member on the Council. The favorable condition-argument could however be an explanation for the overall amount of influence elected members have actually had on the Syrian conflict, which is rather high, something perhaps relatable to the deadlock between mainly the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Another factor that has been argued to be of importance is institutional memory. This line of reasoning suggests that states that have been on the Council more times are more likely to influence the Council as they will not face the same difficulties involved in learning processes when rolling on to the Council. This reasoning, however, is unlikely to explain the outcome in this thesis, as Japan, the most frequent elected member on the Council, should then have had more influence in outcomes. The results of this thesis show the opposite. 57
Other hypothesized factors include formal mechanisms, some of which I have included in this thesis, for example the penholdership, Council presidency, and Arria-formula meetings. Important to note is that legitimacy is permeating the proposed framework, and that the scholars mentioned believe that multiple of the proposed factors interact at the same time. Thus, I have argued that the representative legitimacy argument is a good starting point for an assessment of the conditions under which an elected member is likely to influence the Council’s outcomes. Later studies should address the role of the other conditions proposed. An important additional observation made, that was not expected from the frames set for the analysis is that, as mentioned, Sweden and New Zealand may be attributed even more influence, and thus the variation on the dependent variable could be even greater between Japan with less influence and New Zealand and Sweden with more influence than initially established. This as New Zealand and Sweden were to large extent attributed one resolution each although drafted with permanent members, as a result of their initiatives and actions. This suggest that a more nuanced or ambitious definition and operationalization of the dependent variable is required to better capture influence, which can be used to choose cases to study. Luckily, this does not provoke this thesis negatively, rather the opposite and strengthens the variation in the dependent variable across the cases with less and more influence. It also appears that holding the pen on the humanitarian issue for only one year made Japan to only draft resolutions in 2017, and none during 2016 when it did not hold the pen. This may indicate that the role of having the pen matters more than initially believed. It is not possible to state that Japan would have had more influence in the Council’s outcomes if it held the pen in 2016, but one should keep in mind that it is not possible to rule out such a possibility. Here it is important to note that it is after all not uncommon for non-penholders to co-draft resolutions on issues it holds no pen. Another additional observation made is in regard to the elected members intended contributions to the Council. Given that only one instance of influence was found by the tracing for this, it may be useful for an elected member to clearly establish where and how they intend to contribute, whether it is with specific thematic ideas, or other, it could establish intended contributions that deviate from the norm. This as it is with the content analysis hard to establish that an elected member influenced the language in resolutions as their intended contributions are broad, and probably often shared with others. Uniqueness may enhance the possibility to leave a mark in Council outcomes.
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9.4 Limitations One of the main limitations of this study is that it cannot generalize the findings to all elected members, but only to those that hold a pen on a specific issue area of which the Council is seized. Thus, the results of this thesis cannot claim to speak for all potential elected members and their potential in influencing the Council’s decisions aiming at addressing threats to international peace and security. One also needs to acknowledge that this thesis only addresses one of the issues on which the Council is seized, Syria. To highlight this limitation one can speculate that Japan may have had more influence in other questions, and that perhaps Syria is not of their primary interests, although this was not traceable in its intended contributions. Perhaps Japan made more difference on questions in Asia, something future research could address. Focusing on other issue agenda items could indeed generate other conclusions. Another limitation is that processes off the record, behind closed doors in informal consultations have not been accessible to analyze. Such information would be valuable to complement the data used in this thesis, however hard to get access to. The way in which this perhaps can be considered is through interviews with practitioners, diplomats, and UN staff. Also, the operationalizations may be developed, as indicated by the empirics, in terms of where elected members have influence. This task is however a difficult one, and the operationalizations used in this thesis were constructed with reference to the slim literature it builds on.
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10. Conclusion So, under what conditions is an elected member of the United Nations Security Council likely to influence decisions in maintaining international peace and security? This thesis has addressed the condition of representative legitimacy and assessed it through the empirical hypothesis that an elected member anchoring its position with the broader UN membership is likelier to influence the Council. Based on the findings in the empirics, and the discussion in the analysis, the answer is dual. The case of Sweden shows that an elected member is likely to influence the Council under the condition of representative legitimacy. However, this is not a definite answer, as the New Zealand case tells us, where representative legitimacy was not present to great extent but influence was, which indicates that one should be hesitant to accept the representative legitimacy argument at this point. However, that Japan influenced the Council less than the other cases and showed little to no presence of representative legitimacy makes it tempting to make a case for the hypothesis. As the overall results only partially support the hypothesis, further research on how New Zealand influenced the Council is warranted, as the results indicates that the influence New Zealand had in Council outcomes was not conditioned on representative legitimacy. Other conditions outlined and mentioned in this thesis should thus be analyzed in order to see whether the representative legitimacy argument is falsified completely or if something else was at play in the New Zealand case that can help explain its influence. Also, one must note that the operationalization of representative legitimacy could perhaps be revised and retested, in order to reassess the theoretical argument’s explanatory value. For the broader fundamental question concerning whether there is a purpose for elected members to be on the Council, the results indicate that yes, there might be a value. This becomes clear as the elected members show influence in one of the most difficult issue areas facing the Council, Syria. By reiterating the scope of the theoretical argument, it is important to conclude that the influence is applicable to elected members who are ‘penholders’ and thus have the ability to draft resolutions. As this study has attempted to make a small contribution to the overall knowledge of the under-researched topic of elected members of the UNSC, the avenues for future research remain many. There are many questions left unanswered, however this thesis has contributed to insights in how representative legitimacy may work as a condition under which elected members are likely to influence the Security Council’s outcomes.
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To reiterate a few important aspects discovered in this thesis, future research should address the mechanism in which representative legitimacy works more thoroughly. Additionally, future research should further address the role of the penholdership, not least due to the fact that Japan only held the pen for one year while New Zealand and Sweden for two. Japan did not draft any resolutions on Syria during this period which may indicate that the penholdership matter more than representative legitimacy. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether Japan drafted resolutions on other topics in 2016, to understand what role the penholdership had in explaining why Japan did not draft any resolutions on Syria during its first year. In line with this, research should address the potential influence elected members that do not hold a pen on a specific issue area, may have. This to deepen the understanding of all elected members. Future research should also assess elected members’ influence in addressing the impact of the Council’s decisions and possibly build on the other side of the legitimacy concept, output legitimacy, that an international institution gains its legitimacy based on its performance. This to see whether the decisions elected members’ have influenced actually matter for the maintenance of international peace and security in practice.
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Appendices
Appendix A – Keywords coded indicator A, guiding question 1 independent variable
Inclusiveness Representativeness Legitimacy - Inclusion - Collective - Legitimization - Inclusive - Collectivity - Legitimize - Including - Inviting - Representative - Invitation - Represent - Invite - Representing - Represented - Transparency - On behalf - Transparent - Participation - Together Summary of keywords coded for in assessing indicator A for guiding question 1 for the independent variable.
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Appendix B – Keywords coded indicator B, guiding question 1 independent variable
UN Charter Council purpose Council responsibilities Charter Purpose of the Council Responsibility UN charter Council Purpose Responsibilities United Nations charter Mandate Charter of the United Nations Maintaining international peace and security Threats to international peace and security International peace and security Obligation Summary of keywords coded for in assessing indicator B for guiding question 1 for the independent variable.
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Appendix C – List of all meeting records used for analysis
United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7493." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7493. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7419." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7419. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7430." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7430. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7433." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7433. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7490." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7490. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7501." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7501. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7560." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7560. United Nations Security Council. 2015. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7588." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7588. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7605." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7605. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7610." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7610. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7634." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7634. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7673." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7673. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7687." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7687. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7726." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7726. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7736." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7736. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7744." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7744. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7757." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7757. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7772." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7772. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7774." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7774. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7777." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7777. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7780." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7780. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7785." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7785.
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United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7792." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7792. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7795." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7795. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7798." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7798. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7815." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7815. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7817." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7817. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7822." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7822. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7825." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7825. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7834." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7834. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7839." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7839. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7852." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7852. United Nations Security Council. 2016. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7855." Accessed April 6, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7855. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7863." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7863. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7893." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7893. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7909." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7909. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7915." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7915. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7919." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7919. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7921." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7921. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7922." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7922. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7929." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7929. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7931." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7931. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.7955." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7955. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8073." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8073. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8090." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8090.
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United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8105." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8105. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8107." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8107. United Nations Security Council. 2017. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8141." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8141. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8164." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8164. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8174." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8174. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8186." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8186. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8188." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8188. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8195." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8195. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8217." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8217. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8221." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8221. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8225." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8225. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8228." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8228. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8231." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8231. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8233." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8233. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8236." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8236. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8296." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8296. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8320." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8320. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8332." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8332. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8344." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8344. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8345." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8345. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8347." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8347. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8355." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8355. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8373." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8373.
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United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8383." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8383. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8384." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8384. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8390." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8390. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8406." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8406. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8423." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8423. United Nations Security Council. 2018. “UNSC Meeting S/PV.8434." Accessed April 8, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8434.
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Appendix D – All statements made All statements made by the three elected members in their entirety. Available from the author (116 pages).
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