SAFERWORLD january 2016 PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES briefing A Ugandan soldier serving with AMISOM holds a rocket-propelled grenade at sunrise, on the frontline in Maslah Town, on the northern city limit of Mogadishu. © un photo/stuart price SAFERWORLD PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

SAFERWORLD PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT. BUILDING SAFER LIVES

SAFERWORLD APREVEN neTING VIOLENTw wCONFLICTa. BUILDINGr o SAnFER LIVEtSerror or a new search for peace? Learning the lessons of Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen

From 2001, the global war on terror traumatised KEY LESSONS Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen, and helped Experience from Afghanistan, foment turmoil across the Middle East and North Somalia and Yemen suggest Africa – all at huge military, financial and human a fresh response to terror and cost. Yet it failed to reverse the growing global security threats is needed that is: threat from Islamist militants. n Less reliant on military In 2016, in the wake of spectacular terror attacks, some Western nations have moved approaches – and more fast to commit to war against Islamic State (IS). Echoing the reaction to 9/11, Western strategic about peace countries are now doubling down on a mix of airstrikes, targeted killings and support n Tougher on abuse, corruption to regional and local forces to eliminate IS in Iraq and Syria. Nonetheless, militancy continues to intensify and spread: armed groups have pledged support for IS in and bad governance 19 countries,1 and the Taliban, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda all remain undefeated. n More discerning about As refugees flee conflict in numbers not seen since World War II, a renewal of the partners and how to engage global war on terror could turn crisis into catastrophe. The West cannot afford to ignore with them the lessons of the past 15 years – and needs a strategy that leads to peace. This brief n draws on new Saferworld reports analysing Western counter-terror, stabilisation and More focused on working statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen since 2001. The track record with societies to achieve just of these efforts is poor, but lessons from them could be the basis for more effective and lasting peace and constructive strategies to achieve peace in the face of terror and instability. 2 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? | 3

“It was assumed… that a grab Focusing strategy on bag of ‘doctrinally sound’ military actions would somehow achieving peace – and relying add up to a strategic win.” General Karl Eikenberry, former U.S. Ambassador less on military approaches to Afghanistan6 In Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen, counter-terror objectives and military “When you drop a bomb from approaches have predominated, crowding out a focus on effective conflict a drone... you are going to management, human security and peacebuilding. Direct use of force has A boy waits for food after fleeing cause more damage than you violence in the Sa‘dah province of sometimes pushed militants back, but failed to defeat them and secure peace. are going to cause good.” northern Yemen. In 2015–16, escalating Violence – especially when indiscriminate and unaccountable – has also violence and aerial bombardment US Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, former head displaced millions of Yemenis, leaving harmed civilians and created resentment. In the wake of military efforts to of the Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence Agency7 hundreds of thousands of children combat ‘terrorists’, crucial drivers of conflict have been neglected and proved acutely malnourished. © paul stephens/irin difficult to address, and the public has become disillusioned.

A member of the Afghan National Police patrols In Somalia, international actors have other actors has been lacking.8 The lack Despite extensive Western counter-terror the capital and the presidential palace.9 through a poppy field in Mian Poshteh. © kate holt/irin failed to underpin their military assertive- of unity amongst international actors has and stabilisation engagement in Yemen – Much military equipment supplied by ness with a coherent long-term peace decreased their focus on other – more including drone strikes, years of military the US to Yemen’s forces is “unaccounted strategy. Despite international processes important – drivers of conflict. and intelligence collaboration and for”10 – and some has reportedly been to set common objectives such as the New Alongside these other agendas, the backing for offensives by the Yemeni used by Houthis in recent assaults on Deal, international actors lack a unified security needs of the Somali people have Government – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Aden and Taiz.11 purpose beyond the military defeat of often taken a back seat. For instance, while Peninsula (AQAP), its domestic wing In 2015, military approaches remained al-Shabaab, which is viewed as a source the African Union Mission in Somalia Ansar al Sharia (AAS) and other militant to the fore, as a regional coalition led by of global terror and the foremost threat (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army groups have grown in strength. Saudi Arabia and backed by the US and to Somalia’s long-term peace. The primary (SNA) have recovered territory from The US programme of targeted killings UK intervened against Houthi rebels – focus on combating al-Shabaab belies al-Shabaab, political strategy to address in Yemen has eliminated some violent whom the Saudis view as Iranian proxies. the reality that international actors have governance deficits and establish a individuals. However, it has also been A naval blockade, indiscriminate bombing, a range of competing security-related sustainable peace in these areas has criticised for targeting the wrong people and the deployment of troops and objectives that frequently work lagged behind. Such governance gaps through questionable methods, causing mercenaries by the regional coalition at cross-purposes. have allowed other forms of conflict to at least 87 civilian deaths and perhaps have plunged Yemen into new depths of In Afghanistan, dominant military sophisticated engagement by experienced In support of their own national security re-emerge – and made civilians vulnerable turmoil. By November 2015, at least 5,700 doctrines underpinned behaviours and civilians. However, at times, young, significantly more. Such killings have interests both Kenya and Ethiopia have to renewed al-Shabaab attacks. people had been killed, with 2.3 million tactics that created resentment and inexperienced soldiers on brief tours led enflamed anti-US sentiment and appear sought to back sub-national actors that Efforts to recover territory from people displaced and 21.2 million people fuelled further conflict. Civilian casualties, activities on the ground, while senior to have increased recruitment by militant are more loyal to them than to the al-Shabaab have been accompanied by requiring humanitarian aid. night raids, house searches and culturally military officers provided civilian leader- groups – as evidenced by the trebling in Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). In international airstrikes and targeted Yemenis are unlikely to welcome the insensitive behaviour, drone strikes and ship mentoring to Afghan civilian size of AQAP between 2009 and 2013. contrast, the US, UK and EU have backed killings. However, the successful targeting violent reinstatement of the Hadi regime the rendition of Afghans all created officials.3 Like the expensive generators The secrecy surrounding targeted killings sub-national actors that are more closely of al-Shabaab’s leadership has not by foreign armies. External investment resentment among the population and bought for Kandahar that the authorities in Yemen has made it harder to mitigate tied to the FGS, but have struggled to diminished its capacity to carry out high- in violence without a coherent vision for contributed to support for the Taliban could not afford to keep going, COIN resultant grievances, creating an absence coordinate their military efforts. Looking profile attacks. In addition, targeted promoting peace in Yemen may have and associated groups. While NATO forces projects were often innovative but of accountability for civilian deaths and further afield, Turkey and Arab actors killings have led to civilian casualties and fomented a long and bitter war. attempted to reduce civilian casualties, unsustainable.4 injuries. have tried to gain influence with the hardened the resolve of al-Shabaab’s the Afghan people clearly observed inter- Combining military and non-military Security assistance to a repressive, FGS by providing military assistance and leadership, arguably undermining efforts national forces overlooking the account- interventions under Provincial Recon- corrupt state has occasionally met limited training, but again coordination with to resolve the conflict. ability and human rights principles they struction Teams often compromised the security objectives, but has also fuelled preached. space for independent development and injustice and conflict. For well over a Initially, the military objective was to humanitarian work, potentially putting AMISOM soldiers stand atop a tank in an area decade, the Yemeni establishment has defeat the Taliban quickly by killing their aid actors in the line of fire.5 It also had a outside the Somali port of Kismayo. AMISOM demonstrated a lax commitment to its leaders and key fighters, leaving space for negative impact on the Afghan people’s and the SNA continue to face challenges in newly counter-terror partnership with the West: recovered areas and lost control of several towns harbouring and making use of Islamist longer-term development and statebuild- views of the non-military aspects of the in southern and central Somalia in 2015. ing to occur. Instead, the list of targets intervention. © un photo/stuart price fighters, and failing to prevent prison to kill or arrest kept expanding, and the With limited progress on key govern- breaks en masse by significant al-Qaeda need to address conflict drivers through ance and corruption drivers of conflict, members. non-military approaches was neglected.2 the military-led approach has failed to As early as 2002, there was advance From 2009 a counter-insurgency (COIN) bring peace to Afghanistan. The Taliban warning about the excessive risks that strategy beefed up the civilian component was not defeated militarily, and in late military aid to Yemen for fighting “The West focused on Western of the military-led campaign. But the 2015 – early 2016 achieved some notable terrorism would be misused by the priorities – short-term aims tension between military and non-military military successes, alongside military regime. Nonetheless, the US supported objectives and the lack of a consistent operations by both IS and local militias. Yemen to develop capable and well- and short-term stability – strategy for a political solution to the In response, the UK and US have deployed trained counter-terror forces. However, without enough thought about conflict undermined the effort. The task more advisers and special forces personnel President Saleh’s family controlled these the long-term impacts.” of supporting Afghan institutions to grow to work alongside the Afghan security forces, which were not primarily used Nadwa al-Dawsari, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, could have benefitted from long-term, forces. to tackle terrorism, but rather to protect Project on Middle East Democracy 4 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? | 5

“the Afghan people were ready “Over 15 years the West has Being tougher on for a strong international role believed that trading justice that would do away with both for security, and human abuse, corruption warlord and Taliban rule… But… rights for counter-terrorism the process would be led not by was possible – but every and bad governance genuine representatives of the time human rights have been Afghan people, but by a group of ignored, this has created more As Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen became battlegrounds in the war on terror, the mostly rapacious individuals.” terrorists.” West kept partners on board by compromising its opposition to abuse, corruption Frances Vendrell, Former UN Envoy for Afghanistan Farea Al-Muslimi, Visiting Scholar, and bad governance. Yet the evidence is clear that these are the primary drivers Carnegie Middle East Opposition protests in Sana’a, Yemen in 2011. Elite- of conflict and rebel/terrorist violence around the world.12 By aiding and abetting level corruption has been one of the major drivers of conflict in Yemen. For instance, under the Saleh abuse, corruption and bad governance in Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan, regime the nation’s primary institution for tackling Western actors fell into the ‘stabilisation trap’: trading away a long-term focus corruption – the Central Organisation for Control and Auditing – was used by Saleh to control political on rights and governance for short-term stability – but ultimately guaranteeing opponents rather than to tackle Yemen’s deep- abusive governance, chronic instability and deep public resentment. seated corruption problems. © obinna anyadike/irin

In Afghanistan, the international com- of funds by powerful individuals within After years of degradation by kleptocratic Guard and Central Security Forces com- munity supported a warlord-dominated the police and government.16 Equipment elites, large swathes of Yemen now lack mitted serious human rights violations. government under a victor’s peace agree- provided to the police has also allegedly electricity, water, gas, healthcare and Such abuses deepened grievances against ment in an effort to accommodate those been sold for private gain.17 The return of education. Precious few actors within both the state and its foreign backers, able to continue the conflict. But the the warlords meant an upsurge in local- Yemen are prepared to address key drivers and predictably fuelled rebellions. Mean- entrenchment of corruption, warlord and level violence and criminality. Inefficiency of conflict in the public interest. The state while, development and statebuilding militia networks and criminal activities and corruption have also presented has long failed to play a constructive role efforts foundered because donors ultimately undermined everything inter- serous challenges within the state judicial in addressing the drivers of its instability lacked a strategy to build political will national actors sought to achieve and service.18 and poverty, and is crumbling in the among the shadowy, elite figures who tarnished them by association. International support at times face of multiple armed rebellions as a actually wielded the power to improve To retain buy-in from actors with the accounted for 90 per cent of Afghan consequence. governance. power to break the peace, the Ministries public expenditures.19 Such aid volumes Since serious terror threats emerged The West did support Saleh’s removal of Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs overwhelmed local absorptive capacity in Yemen in 2000, the West has invested and pushed for greater political inclusion and the National Directorate of Security and sustained a rentier state, further significantly in counter-terror and from 2011. However, deals made in were all given to known warlords in the aggravated by proceeds of the illegal stabilisation. Alongside direct military the post-Saleh transition ultimately first two post-Taliban administrations.13 drugs economy.20 The huge transfers An SNA soldier travels through the streets of action, Western actors backed the Yemeni entrenched the same kleptocratic elite Mogadishu, Somalia. The US, UK and the EU have They staffed the ministries with their of funds were not perceived to benefit provided significant resources to the SNA in recent state’s efforts to fight, prosecute or punish whose behaviour was driving Yemen followers, institutionalising patronage ordinary Afghans,21 but rather unaccount- years. Despite this investment, SNA forces trained terrorists, and gave capacity-building into the ground – and Saleh was allowed networks and corruption.14 Continuing able elites at the centre, whose alliances by AMISOM continue to suffer defections with support to institutions, hoping to address to remain in Yemen with impunity to estimates ranging from ten to 80 per cent. to back these leaders while the political within ethnic groups, armed militias or the weakness of a fragile but willing state. wreak further havoc.27 Mounting public © zoe flood/irin process remained exclusive and un- sections of the security forces upheld But Yemen’s corrupt and authoritarian grievances fed into rebellions by Houthis, accountable only fuelled grievances and impunity, corruption and human rights ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh was uninterested Southern secessionists, tribes, AQAP/AAS conflict. abuses.22 The intervention also came to be In Somalia, the global counter-terror “partisan agendas that constitute threats in effective governing institutions and and IS. The short-term instinct to reinforce Despite enormous investments in seen by some Afghans as biased towards agenda has excused a range of counter- to peace and security”.26 Al-Shabaab cemented international backing by state-led stability ultimately multiplied the the security sector, systemic corruption, Tajik warlords and their (often criminal) productive behaviours by national, poses a real threat to the FGS and sub- allowing al-Qaeda to regroup from 2006. instability it was intended to suppress – human rights abuses and factionalism networks, thus feeding ethnic divisions.23 regional and Western actors that have national administrations, but these In response, foreign backers led by the while Yemen’s institutions decayed to blighted the Afghan army and police, While there were efforts to balance undermined efforts to build lasting peace. counterproductive behaviours are gravely UK pledged US$8 billion in aid to help the point where peaceful transition has undermining stability and the effective ethnic representation, tackle corruption, The focus on terrorism – and the blanket endangering long-term stability. Western maintain stability. The US alone spent proved impossible. reach of the state.15 Police support was combat the drugs trade, control aid funds labelling of al-Shabaab as ‘terrorist’ – actors have continuously failed to over $600 million on security assistance to While the West has supported injustice neglected in the early years, but then more carefully and reform predatory has oversimplified Somalia’s conflict, adequately address such allegations of the regime. Playing host to anti-Western and gravely harmed Yemen’s people scaled up too fast, enabling the diversion elites, these could not prevent the and obscured the complex reasons why corruption effectively. militants had thus become a lucrative to combat al-Qaeda, AQAP positioned legitimacy of the political elites from individuals choose to affiliate with or join endeavour, and external pressure to itself as a “lightning rod for entrenched crumbling. The US and its allies were the group. These reasons include political reform melted away. grievances” by criticising the abusive increasingly seen as propping up an dynamics, particularly at the local level, “While [al-Shabaab are on the By providing material support and and corrupt Yemeni state and providing unaccountable and predatory regime, and the absence of economic alternatives. Foreign Terrorist Organisation] training to security actors implicated in services to the public in some locations.28 whom they feared to remove lest this By presenting themselves as the alter- grand corruption, torture, violence However the West approaches al-Qaeda, removal undermine security.24 Despite native to al-Shabaab, successive Somali lists, the [Somali] federal against civilians, and repression of political sustainable peace in Yemen cannot be various anti-corruption efforts, many governments have secured considerable government benefits because protests and free speech, the West achieved without much greater attention Afghans now see corruption as among military, security and aid resources from they have a huge wildcard that abandoned its core principles in Yemen. to addressing the people’s grievances. the greatest threats the country faces, Western actors, despite extensive corrup- they can play at will. No one Although prior to 2011 security institutions and in some areas the Taliban is seen as tion and the diversion of weapons and supported to achieve counter-terror being more accountable in local govern- other supplies. The FGS has been accused recognises that al-Shabaab objectives were rarely deployed outside ance and thus preferable to the regime.25 of diverting 70–80 per cent of the funds represent genuine concerns Sana’a, they were used by former it has received: according to the United President Saleh to bolster and retain his Afghan National Police officers guard the office of people.” of the Governor of Bamyan Province. Nations Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Somali civil society representative – Saferworld family’s grip on power during the 2011 © un photo/eric kanalstein Group, these were used to advance interview, Mogadishu, 10 November 2014. uprising. At that time both the Republican 6 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? | 7

“Have we become an aircraft carrier?…This huge military presence hasn’t translated into something positive on Rethinking partner issues like democracy.” Fara Abdillahi Miguil, Chairman of the Djibouti relations Human Rights League47 ‘Terrorists’ are seldom the only problem in conflict contexts. Lasting peace in contexts “Everything is getting like Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen will prove elusive as long as regional ‘partners’ militarized all in the name continue to play cynical or abusive roles. The West needs to find effective ways of of fighting terrorism.” challenging damaging behaviour and encouraging constructive contributions. Kenyan civil society representative

Aerial View of Kismayo, South Somalia, just after In Afghanistan, the US ‘partnership’ with WESTERN ENGAGEMENT IN THE GULF it fell to the SNA, AMISOM and Ras Kimboni forces Pakistan has been problematic. Pakistan in 2012. Since then the UN Monitoring Group on receives significant US military and other the rationale the cost Somalia/Eritea has alleged that Kenyan actors assistance, but due to a range of political and the Ras Kamboni militia have exported charcoal worth millions of dollars in violation of and strategic reasons, elements within “To shift the military balance … in favor of “Our biggest problem was our allies… a UN export ban. © un photo/stuart price the Pakistan government (including its Shared our Gulf partners… DOD has approved more the Saudis, the Emirates, etc …They poured intelligence directorate and the military) than $75 billion in U.S. arms sales to GCC hundreds of millions of dollars and tens, have at times supported the Taliban and objectives? states since 2007. These sales […] are worth thousands of tonnes of weapons into failed to act against al-Qaeda. At the nearly as much as those made… totally in anyone who would fight against Assad.” same time, the Pakistan government has the previous 15 years.… These are the most US Vice President Joe Biden, October 201430 also supported peace talks between the advanced capabilities we have ever provided “It has been an ongoing challenge to Afghan government and the Taliban. […] to this region. […] our partners in the persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist The US-Pakistan alliance has therefore region, are staring down the same threats financing … as a strategic priority […] been contradictory in terms of achieving […].” donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most stability in Afghanistan. Finding logistical Then-US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, partners for the Afghan intervention December 201329 significant source of funding to Sunni also sometimes led the US to work with terrorist groups worldwide.” authoritarian governments in Central Then-US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, December 201031 Asia, risking negative impacts on govern- In Somalia, regional actors such as Kenya of the UNSC praised Uganda’s “significant ance dynamics and conflict throughout and Uganda have leveraged Western role in the maintenance of peace and the Afghan neighbourhood. “We should be at the forefront of this “the UK has… knowledge that weapons reliance upon them for the execution security in several countries, particularly Arms sales: market, supporting British jobs and British or related items exported to Saudi Arabia of counter-terror and stabilisation in Somalia”.42 In Yemen and the wider region, short- allies, and that’s why last week, in the Gulf, would be used in future attacks directed objectives to support their own interests. Such trade-offs are also evident in term energy, security and economic Profit and loss I was pushing for new contracts for Typhoon against civilian objects or civilians […], or Despite the UN imposing an export ban other countries – such as Djibouti, where interests have locked the West into jets worth billions of pounds and thousands in the commission of war crimes in Yemen on charcoal, Kenyans have allegedly the US has been accused of failing to support for Saudi Arabia. In 2015–2016, of jobs. That’s vital new business for Britain. […] it should halt with immediate effect profited from the charcoal trade, thereby champion human rights in order to the US and UK gave arms, advice, logistical And I make no apology for going out there all authorisations and transfers of relevant boosting the finances of al-Shabaab, who maintain military bases for counter-terror and political support to the regional and trying to help win it.” weapons and items to Saudi Arabia, capable control key transport routes into the port operations in Somalia and Yemen.43 military intervention to repel the Houthis UK Prime Minister David Cameron, November 201232 of being used in the conflict in Yemen.” city of Kismayo.38 More recently, a report Another problematic aspect of regional and reinstate the Hadi regime. However, Legal Opinion by Prof Philip Sands (Queen’s Counsel) alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces, partnerships focused on tackling al- backing Saudi Arabia to play out its et al, December 201533 the Interim Juba Administration and Shabaab is the way the counter-terror rivalry with Iran in Yemen has been an “our estimate is roughly two thirds of the al-Shabaab were all profiting from facili- agenda has been adopted and used by unmitigated disaster – failing militarily civilian casualties – around 2800 killed tating and taxing the Somali sugar trade, regional actors such as Kenya, leading to 39 while causing tremendous human civilians… were reportedly killed by valued at $200–$400 million annually. outcomes that are counterproductive to suffering and escalating the conflict for coalition airstrikes.” Western diplomats’ protests against such the goal of ending conflict in Somalia. the long term. As Yemenis grow angrier behaviour to the Kenyan government While the regional counter-terror agenda Rupert Coleville, Spokesman, UN High Commissioner about external violence, they become for Human Rights, discussing the Saudi-led intervention have had little impetus because Western has to some extent emerged organically more likely to reject the violent reinstate- in Yemen, January 201634 forces need access to military facilities in response to attacks by al-Shabaab, ment of a repressive and corrupt political both in Kenya and Kismayo. Needless to Western actors have strongly encouraged order – including through further trans- say, tolerating Somalia’s war economy for these efforts by providing significant “Sometimes we have to balance our need “the mass execution of 47 people in a single national militancy. Yemen exemplifies the sake of security priorities could prove funds. In Kenya, Western support has Counter- to speak to them about human rights issues day, including Shia Muslim cleric Sheikh how Saudi foreign policy, including the counterproductive.40 come despite considerable evidence of with immediate concerns that we have in Nimr al-Nimr, sent shockwaves across the export of fundamentalist ideologies In 2012, Uganda threatened to with- abuses perpetrated by Kenyan security terror vs terms of countering terrorism or dealing region.[…] the authorities have used the and reinforcement of authoritarian and draw from “all regional peace efforts” forces in the name of fighting terrorism.44 with regional stability.” 2014 counter-terror law and the Kingdom’s illegitimate governance, has not served human rights including AMISOM in response to a Such abuses have been described as a President Obama, January 201535 notorious “counter-terror” court, […] to to contain terror and instability – but leaked United Nations Security Council ‘decisive’ factor in pushing Kenyans to systematically clamp down on all forms rather to exacerbate them. (UNSC) report accusing the Ugandan join organisations like (or linked to) “… we continue to believe that the UK’s of activism… This is at a time when Saudi government of providing support to al-Shabaab45 and has in turn enabled ability to influence reform and best practice Arabia has stepped up its horrendous armed rebel groups in eastern Democratic al-Shabaab to pursue an agenda that will be most effective if we are cooperating execution spree with at least 151 people Republic of the Congo.41 The report was transcends the Somali conflict more on counter-terrorism.” executed between January and November 46 36 subsequently quashed and the President easily. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, November 2012 2015.” Amnesty International, January 201637 8 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? | 9

“The transition overlooked An Afghan community group set free local grievances, which drove white doves to celebrate the International Working with Day of Peace in Khost, Afghanistan, 2007. most conflict in Yemen. © un photo/khost office societies to achieve No solution can be achieved without taking into account just and lasting peace the views and needs of local people.” In all three contexts, the pursuit of quick wins via questionable partners and Nadwa al-Dawsari, Senior Non-Resident Fellow, top-down technical efforts to build institutions has undermined much-needed, Project on Middle East Democracy long-term engagement with wider society. Support for the public and civil society is needed to break cycles of violence, redress injustice and fix corrupt, weak institutions. Engaging with society to achieve constructive change is a long-term, challenging endeavour upon which external actors desperately need to improve their record.

Before the 2001 invasion, Afghan society these were ad hoc and faced many In Yemen, the failure of narrow objectives interests in Yemen must have options had suffered from decades of war. Amid challenges: long years of war had changed (combating terrorists and ‘Iran-backed’ to renounce violence and pursue their deep divisions, it had struggled to estab- local structures, and many traditional rebels) illustrates the need for a broader, interests through political channels. lish representative governance structures leaders were replaced by unaccountable longer-term strategy to get to a lasting Yemen’s youth, women and rural popula- capable of delivering services. In such and illegitimate warlords.50 Yet some and just peace accepted and upheld by tion must also have a stake in shaping a contexts, the emergence of a peaceful would say that the structures created the people of Yemen. Only through a more just and inclusive future. To help a state inevitably takes time, and the ability by the National Solidarity Programme broader focus on addressing what drives constituency for peace to emerge in the of international actors to influence showed promise in terms of creating conflict in Yemen can the terror problem country, external actors must engage with change can be limited. Quick results locally legitimate and accountable be resolved. a wider group of actors – outside Sana’a were unlikely, and the focus should have governance arrangements. Approaching Yemen with a prede- and across Yemeni society, including in been placed more strongly on long-term A jirga is a traditional Pashtun assembly termined view that AQAP/AAS and the the South. support for development, peacebuilding for making decisions by consensus. Houthis are spoilers to be defeated or Allowing transformation to occur on and governance, led by a broad and The international community supported A Somali girl walking near the town of Jowhar, marginalised at all costs has obscured the Yemenis’ terms will require much more inclusive constituency of Afghan players. two important Loya Jirgas (for making Somalia. At the time of the 2011 famine, low levels need for elites, political parties and state support to human rights defenders, of pooled funds and restrictions on agencies from moderate political, religious and tribal Supporting more accountable leaders national decisions) at the time of the operating in al-Shabaab areas – some of the most structures to respond to public anger and who are genuinely interested in peace Bonn negotiations in 2001 and again ten acutely affected by the famine and humanitarian reform the state. Belligerent approaches actors, civil society groups, community is a difficult task. In complex conflict years later. This was one way of getting crisis – were used as a tactic to undermine the have left little room for creative experi- voices and local development initiatives environments like Afghanistan, demo- input from a broader representation of group. An estimated 258,000 people died during mentation with alternatives that could – both within any future peace talks and this famine. © un photo/tobin jones cratic, peaceful actors are often in short society. Yet truly inclusive peace processes help end violence. over the long term. If Western actors supply, are difficult to identify and may need to reach beyond tribal leaders into Because the US backed the regime, the explain that this is what they want and take time to emerge. The empowerment marginalised constituencies, especially in Alongside the focus on terrorism and a context where clan divisions are used Houthis became explicitly anti-American, back this with their deeds, it could attract of warlords and their militias for security rural areas, and including women, young the military-first approach inSomalia , to consolidate power. In some instances, and the ranks of both the Houthis and popular backing from moderate Yemenis – purposes has undermined the potential people, the diaspora and religious leaders. statebuilding and stabilisation efforts Western actors have sought to curtail AQAP/AAS swelled with support from or at least reduce wholesale resentment for peaceful actors to emerge as well as Past efforts have often been tokenistic have been procedural and top-down – reconciliation efforts aimed at tackling aggrieved Yemenis. Those currently of the West in Yemen. the central state’s ability to bring sub- and short-term. Negotiating with and supporting the establishment of institu- localised roots of conflict, fearful that choosing violence to pursue their national actors under control.48 resourcing corrupt elites in effect excludes tions (particularly Somali security actors they could disrupt efforts to form interim In Helmand, the UK deployment initially other social forces from emerging and and interim administrations) while administrations.52 worked with a governor who was close to asserting a voice and vision for the future. neglecting the concerns of Somali citizens. International strategies for Somalia are President Karzai, and fairly adept at main- Engaging local shura/jirgas at the start Pressure to complete critical peace- often developed with limited Somali input, taining alliances and accommodations of the international intervention may building and statebuilding processes in beyond Mogadishu’s elites and certain with different tribes. However, he also have generated quick impacts on local haste has resulted in tensions and conflict. members of the diaspora. However, had links with the poppy industry and was conflict and justice issues and opened up Most recently this has led to several bargaining with elites can amount to implicated in the drugs trade and broader space for conversations about the future. rounds of violence in Galkayo between rewarding violent behaviour with power, corruption. Yet when the governor was At the same time, early interventions the Puntland administration and the resources and a place at the top table. removed, this led to a weaker provincial to strengthen the rural economy and Interim Galmudug Administration. Similar Neglect of inclusion limits the prospects government which in turn gave the agriculture may have helped to improve violence has been seen in Guri’el, Baido for a fairer, more responsive Somali state Taliban the space to reposition itself.49 people’s livelihoods and give them a stake and Kismayo over the establishment of to emerge. Until the ultimate focus of This example suggests that compromises in peace. all three current interim administrations policy is the wellbeing of Somalia’s can sometimes be necessary to move Future engagement needs to focus in southern and central Somalia. In all population, outside efforts will fail to beyond violence. If so, the utmost effort on initiatives that bring society into these cases, the external drive to establish create the conditions under which long- must still be made to support gradual, the government-led peace process, for authorities has fuelled instability. term stability can emerge. constructive change, not only through instance building on initiatives by the Processes of political accommodation tackling narco-networks, but also by Afghanistan Civil Society Organisations or negotiation have been in and of them- offering people viable economic alterna- Network for Peace (ACSONP), the UN selves insufficient to address a legacy “Reconciliation doesn’t happen tives, and supporting society to apply Assistance Mission in Afghanistan of violence and mistrust among many pressure for justice and accountability. (UNAMA) and other civil society actors to communities. Absent from most of these in Somalia – it happens in Arta, While there were attempts to engage discuss and agree on local and national processes of political reconciliation is Cairo, London.” with alternative local power holders, peace priorities (see box on p.11).51 a wider focus on social reconciliation in Saferworld interview, Mogadishu, 8 November 2014. Anti-government protesters demand change in Sana’a, Yemen in 2011. © obinna anyadike/irin 10 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace? | 11

Peace doves fly over the grounds of the historic Hazrat-i-Ali mosque, in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan. The doves were part of a campaign launched by UNAMA in observance of the International Day of Peace. The way © un photo/helena mulkerns forward Counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant drawbacks in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, the lessons from these contexts suggest a constructive way forward to sustainable peace and security.

Focusing strategy on achieving Being tougher on abuse, corruption Rethinking partner relations Working with societies to achieve peace – and relying less on military and bad governance just and lasting peace approaches n Western engagement with conflict contexts needs to explore n Because anti-Western militants feed on public experiences n Rather than assuming that groups designated as ‘terrorists’ n Peaceful states can only be crafted by strong societies. alternatives to the use of force wherever possible. of abuse, injustice and corruption, it is critical for the West are always the biggest threat to peace, Western actors need In addition to challenging abuse and repression, external n Because ‘outsourcing’ the use of force to partners can cause to demonstrate its unambiguous commitment to justice and to understand how all actors’ motives and behaviours are actors must deepen their analysis of all actors, maintain suffering, resentment and conflict, partners must also human rights to the public in countries experiencing conflict. impacting on conflicts, and factor this into their strategies openness to dialogue and engage consistently in support of explore all possible alternatives to violence. n To avoid fuelling conflict, all forms of external support for for achieving peace. human rights defenders, moderate political, religious and tribal actors, civil society groups, community voices and local n Military intervention should only be undertaken as part corrupt or abusive actors need to be more carefully thought n As part of these strategies, Western actors must do more development initiatives. of an overall political strategy for achieving peace by through in order to avoid reinforcing negative dynamics and to discourage violence, repression and injustice and to addressing conflict drivers and avoiding violence where to provide meaningful incentives to improve governance. incentivise respect for human rights and democratisation n Justice and reconciliation initiatives are crucial priorities for possible. n In contexts where partner governments fail to demonstrate by regional actors. overcoming divisions and conflict. They can help improve community-level relationships and link local progress to n If force is used, it is important to adhere to international commitment to make progress on inclusion, rights, n Considering the strong economic and military ties between national peacemaking processes. humanitarian and human rights law, in particular by doing corruption and public wellbeing, donors should avoid the West and its regional partners, greater influence is the utmost to avoid civilian casualties. reinforcing damaging behaviours by exploring alternatives available to Western actors than is typically exerted. Given n Collective efforts to discuss, understand and address the to channelling funds through state institutions. the strategic importance of stemming the tide of global drivers of conflict at all levels should underpin the forward n Accountability for the use of force is critical, and any conflict, Western actors should abandon or significantly agenda. Rather than being imposed, authorities and wrongdoing must be openly acknowledged, investigated n In such contexts, assistance can be provided directly to cool alliances with regional actors that are unjust and fuel institutions should emerge from dialogue in which society and prosecuted. people through non-governmental actors or other actors and institutions that are opposed to political violence and terror, and abstain from irresponsible supply of arms and is supported to have a stake. n Using the police, courts and prisons to interdict violent committed to public goods. These can include NGOs and military expertise in support of regional actors who violate n Inclusive locally led processes are thus a priority. They are behaviour, in line with human rights principles, is an tribal, informal or subnational entities, such as local health international law or fuel conflict. unlikely to conform to external templates or timetables. important alternative to the use of military force and and education ministries. As with other partners, the agenda They should include all sections of society and provide the rendition. and legitimacy of such actors should also be carefully The Afghan People’s Dialogue for Peace’s 10-point plan foundation for a common peace agenda. This requires n Military action and security engagement should prioritise examined. for sustainable peace provides a useful example of the carefully supporting progressive initiatives that emerge people’s security needs ahead of national, regional and n Security strategies need to be consistent with a long- priorities that people identify when asked for their from the context, being patient about the time required international security goals. The West must do more to term peace strategy – enabling rather than undermining perspective on conflict. to agree a way ahead, and supporting initiatives with demonstrate to the public in conflict contexts that their transformation in state-society relations. Providing experimentation and creativity. security and rights matter. 1 Promote responsive state institutions and tackle corruption security and justice to conflict-affected people should take n Political settlements need to be inclusive. Dialogue n Arms, equipment and capacity support should not be given precedence over other national, regional and international 2 Strengthen security institutions and curb violations by them between all actors – even with apparent ‘spoilers’ – is to security actors unless the provider has a high and explicit security objectives. Supporting society to reshape security 3 Disarm and disempower illegal armed groups and other always worthwhile. Careful sanctions and incentives level of confidence that the assistance will be used by the institutions can be as important as supporting security pro-government militias should be developed to encourage all actors to engage in stated end-user for a pre-agreed purpose. When support institutions themselves – and checks and balances are vital 4 Promote human rights, rule of law and tackle impunity peace processes and to work in support of people’s rights is provided, more robust arrangements must be made to across the system to address abuse and corruption. 5 Promote women’s rights and their role in peacebuilding and interests. Compromises are sometimes necessary to monitor and prevent its diversion for unintended purposes. n Reform priorities such as anti-corruption and effective 6 Enable youth through fostering job creation and end violence, but they should not sacrifice the rights and service delivery are long-term endeavours. Beyond use strengthening the education system prospects of the wider population. of force or the provision of capacity assistance, careful 7 Realise equitable social and economic development n Before and beyond peace negotiations, consistent support application of sanctions and penalties on those profiting 8 Ensure inclusivity in the peace process for people’s voices – promoting incremental improvements from grand corruption or using violence for political ends 9 Strengthen community-based dispute resolution in inclusion and justice – is crucial for the long term. Even can incentivise reform and strengthen those pressing for mechanisms when they question counter-terror and stabilisation peaceful change. agendas, it is crucial that international actors assiduously 10 Neutralise spoilers of peace (including neighbouring states) ensure that people’s voices are heard by all conflict actors – These priorities strongly echo the lessons from all three case including their national and regional allies. studies and underline the need to work with societies in new ways to take the agenda forward. 12 | saferworld briefing A new war on terror or a new search for peace?

CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES: SAFERWORLD’S WORK In recent years Western actors including actors and their the US, UK, and the EU have put responses partners to a to terrorism, violent extremism and vicious circle instability among their foremost priorities. that they can Yet, despite the investment of huge ill afford: resources – primarily military, but also multiplying financial, human and political – the results instability of this action have been mixed at best. wherever they There has not been sufficiently full and attempt to reduce it, and in response This briefing introduces three in-depth frank public debate about the lessons becoming ever more belligerent in the reports on Afghanistan, Somalia and of past engagement in countries where face of renewed threats, while compro- Yemen. Together, they explore the issues there a global terror threat has been mising their commitments to democracy, identified in the initial discussion paper identified, nor about how future engage- justice and human rights. In the discussion through detailed examination of specific ment could be improved in the interests paper, Dilemmas of counter-terror, country contexts from a peacebuilding of building lasting peace founded on stabilisation and statebuilding Saferworld perspective – in order to stimulate further the fulfilment of human rights. However, provided a review of global evidence on debate on the lessons learnt. failure to recognise and pursue effective the impacts of existing approaches, and peacebuilding alternatives to these suggested a number of constructive These reports can be found at approaches could condemn Western directions for improved policy. www.saferworld.org.uk/resources

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Comprehensive Approach and state-building in society’ in S Chesterman, M Ignatieff, R Thakur (eds) 38 Anderson D M, McKnight J (2014), ‘Kenya at war: Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping, 18:1, pp. 64– Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of 78, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.527513 al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa’, African Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University), Affairs, http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 6 Op. cit. Eikenberry K W (2013). pp. 193–209; Barfield T (2010), Afghanistan: A early/2014/12/19/afraf.adu082.full 7 For an overview of Turkey’s approach to Somalia, see Cultural and Political History (Princeton: Princeton 39 Journalists for Justice (2015), ‘Black and White: Kenya’s Wheeler T, Sazak O, Achilles K, Woods A (2015) Turkish University Press); Transparency International UK (2015), criminal racket in Somalia’, November, p. 2. aid agencies in Somalia: Risks and opportunities for ‘Corruption: Lessons from the international mission 40 Ibid, p. 3. building peace, (London: Saferworld; Istanbul: The in Afghanistan’, p. 16. https://www.transparency.org/ Istanbul Policy Centre), March. files/content/pressrelease/2015_Corruption_Lessons_ 41 Pflanz M (2012), ‘Uganda says it will pull out of Somalia 8 Ibid. From_Afghanistan_EN.pdf in UN row’, The Telegraph, 2 November. 9 International Crisis Group (2013), ‘Yemen’s military- 23 Edwards L M (2010), ‘State-building in Afghanistan: 42 Imaka I (2012), ‘United Nations distances itself from security reform: Seeds of new conflict?’ p. 11; A case of showing the limits?’, International Review Congo report’, Daily Monitor, 4 November. Human Rights Watch (2013), ‘“Between a drone and of the Red Cross, pp. 967–991 pp. 975–976. 43 Mak T (2015), ‘Inside the tiny police state with seven al-Qaeda” The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in 24 Suhrke A (2012), ‘Waging war and building peace in armies’, Daily Beast. Yemen’ p. 17. Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping, 19(4), 44 KNCHR (2015), ‘The error of fighting terror with terror’, 10 Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate pp. 478–491; Op. cit. Eikenberry K W (2013). September, p. 6. (2010), ‘Following the money in Yemen and Lebanon: 25 Op.cit. Braithwaite J, Wardak A (2013). 45 Botha A (2014), ‘Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment Maximizing the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance 26 United Nations (2014), ‘Letter dated 10 October 2014 to Al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council’, and international financial institution lending’, from the Chair of the Security Council Committee September, p. 20. (Washington: Government Printing Office), One pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) 46 International Crisis Group (2014), ‘Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, 5 January, concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Closer to Home’, September, p. 12. p. 10. President of the Security Council’, 13 October, p. 9. 47 Op. cit. Mak T (2015) 11 Porter G (2015), ‘Houthi arms bonanza came from 27 Salisbury P (2015), ‘Federalism, conflict and 48 Op. cit. 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