AN ANALYTICAL and HISTORICAL OVERVIEW of BRITISH POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL by Jonathan Spyer*

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AN ANALYTICAL and HISTORICAL OVERVIEW of BRITISH POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL by Jonathan Spyer* AN ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BRITISH POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL By Jonathan Spyer* The British relationship with Israel and attitude toward the Arab-Israel conflict are crucial but often misunderstood aspects of that country's Middle East policy. Constituting the most controversial, disputatious aspect of British policy toward the region, they are influenced by broader currents both in terms of British attitudes toward the Middle East region and differing British conceptions of international relations and the making of foreign policy. This paper explores Britain's relations with Israel, emphasizing the underlying patterns and different schools of thought within the British foreign policymaking community. British policy is defined by two very regarding this conflict as the key source different, often clashing approaches to the of regional instability. region. The first, which can be termed the The second approach, termed here the "Diplomatic" approach, is based on "Strategic" view, puts more emphasis on maintaining the best possible relations dividing Middle Eastern regimes into with the existing regimes or those forces moderate and hostile ones. It assumes which seem likely to take power. that aggressive, anti-Western This approach, which remains governments and belief systems--radical prevalent in the Foreign and Pan-Arab nationalism; revolutionary Commonwealth Office, began by Islamism--are the principle threats to building British regional policy around regional stability and to British interests. the preservation of the monarchical Viewing the Diplomatic approach as regimes in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt in the often tending toward appeasement, it is immediate post-1945 period. It also, more willing to use pressure or even paradoxically, accounts for the British confrontation when deemed necessary. willingness in the late 1960s to cooperate This stance has historically been more with revolutionary Palestinian prevalent in the Prime Minister's Office, nationalism in Jordan, which was for reasons explored below. It tends to be regarded at that time as an unstoppable more appreciative of Israel as a force. Today, this viewpoint warns potentially valuable pro-Western regional against too overt support for the United power, as well as closer to the United States in the region, echoing concerns States. Likewise, it has tended to see such emerging from Arab embassies and regimes as those of Iran, Iraq under capitals. It is close to the dominant Saddam Hussein, and Syria--as well as European perspective.(1) militant and revolutionary Islamist The Diplomatic approach regards movements--as the main source of Israel mainly as an irritant, a factor regional problems as well as direct threats complicating British relations with the to British interests.(2) Arab world. Demonstrating British These differences are not merely distance from or criticism of Israel is seen ideological but also institutional, related as a way to win points in the Arab and integrally to the specific functions Muslim world. Advocates of this performed by the two key centers of viewpoint stress the solution of the Arab- foreign policymaking power within the Israeli conflict as quickly as possible, government. As is implied, other factors-- Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel while having some influence--are far less accommodation. The second orientation, determinant of the direction of British by contrast, considers that since regional policy toward Israel in particular and the tyrannies tend to rely on instability, Middle East in general. adventurism, and support for terrorism The British view of the Middle East, and insurgency as tools for legitimating and Israel's place within it, is governed themselves, they will inevitably by a number of key considerations. undermine stability. The Diplomatic .British economic interests--principally stance charges the Strategic approach oil imports--give the country an obvious with creating unnecessary conflicts; the interest in the preservation of regional Strategic stance accuses the Diplomatic stability. approach of appeasement. How to achieve this goal, however, These two broad schools of thought has been the subject of much debate view Israel very differently. Given the within the policymaking community. The deep enmity toward Israel that forms a issues are not simple, nor the solutions consensus in the Arab world, advocates always straightforward. Britain, for of the former view are more likely to example, has opposed radical and regard Israel as a factor--often as the revolutionary movements in the region. main factor--preventing smooth relations But what should it be willing to do to between the West and Arab world. They ensure that these do not succeed? Ill place great stock in the priority that Arab thought out acts may end up helping the states say they and their masses put on growth of the very anti-Western forces this issue. Israel is thus seen as the cause they are intended to oppose. Again, rather than one of the victims of Britain's sale of arms to the region, radicalism, instability, and anti-Western especially to the Gulf States and most of feeling in the Arab world. all to Saudi Arabia, are an important Israel's protestation that it shares source of revenue. Weapons' exports are Western democratic values and social now the country's most important single institutions is dismissed as a point of little manufactured export.(3) Yet, arguably importance. And while those advocating this trade can also have a destabilizing the Diplomatic view within government effect. tend to be conservative, they also adopt Does preserving stability require and the basically far left-wing concept justify good relations with those regimes prevalent in many European states--as that may be radical, repressive, and flaunt well as Arab regimes--that Israel is a hostile ideologies? Some argue that latter-day colonial power. engagement will envelop them in a web In the Strategic conception, however, of rational, mutually beneficial relations Israel's identity and value as an ally is and thus blunt their enmity. Others assert considered to be enhanced by its that only by containing and sometimes existence as a militarily strong, challenging radical states, movements, democratic, and Western-oriented state. and ideologies can they be stopped from The conflict with the Arabs and the subverting British interests. These are difficulty in resolving it are perceived as among the positions, respectively, of the simply one more outcome of a generally Diplomatic and Strategic schools and unstable regional situation in which produce opposing policy radical ideologies and regimes are recommendations. generating strife. Additionally, this The first view argues that a given approach does not take Arab statements regime's ideology or expressed anti- at face value, noting that there are many Western intentions are of less importance, other factors that shape the behavior of as these need not be taken seriously or those regimes. can be blunted by friendly Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) Jonathan Spyer Though both concepts have always Only in recent years has the Foreign been present among the circles making Office begun to make some effort to British Middle East policy, power has allocate resources to equip relevant staff shifted between them. In institutional members with the language skills terms, the Strategic approach has an necessary for understanding Israeli advantage since it is usually--though not society.(5) In such circumstances, always--centered in the more powerful promotion and career success often rest Prime Minister's Office. But the on expressing the "proper" views. Diplomatic concept has two assets: it has Of course, the stuff of maintaining always ruled in the Foreign Office and normal relations and avoiding conflicts-- those who believe it there almost always the FCO's stock-in-trade--incorporates have the last word in implementing and such built-in attitudes as avoiding interpreting policy. offense, safeguarding good ties, and not antagonizing other countries, and WHO MAKES BRITISH MIDDLE therefore, also favors the Diplomatic EAST POLICY? orientation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office An example of this approach is the (FCO) British attempt throughout the 1990s to The Foreign Office is responsible for pursue a "critical dialogue" with Iran's the conduct of relations between Britain regime despite its energetic sponsorship and all foreign countries. The Middle of terrorism against Jewish and Israeli East and North Africa Department along targets, opposition to the Oslo peace with the relevant embassies and the process, pursuit of weapons of mass Policy Planning and Research destruction, and internal repression. Departments are all involved in A very large volume of evidence producing Middle East policy. The exists to suggest that in the FCO's perception of Britain's interests in the organizational culture, the norm is one of Middle East adhered to by the Foreign a general lack of sympathy for Israel. The Office is generally accepted to have been unnamed FCO official who described not sympathetic to the Zionist cause and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the the State of Israel. The reasons for the Guardian as "The cancer at the heart of traditional tilt toward the Arab side in the the Middle East crisis" offers a perhaps Foreign Office are manifold. unusually extreme expression
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