AN ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BRITISH POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL By Jonathan Spyer*
The British relationship with Israel and attitude toward the Arab-Israel conflict are crucial but often misunderstood aspects of that country's Middle East policy. Constituting the most controversial, disputatious aspect of British policy toward the region, they are influenced by broader currents both in terms of British attitudes toward the Middle East region and differing British conceptions of international relations and the making of foreign policy. This paper explores Britain's relations with Israel, emphasizing the underlying patterns and different schools of thought within the British foreign policymaking community.
British policy is defined by two very regarding this conflict as the key source different, often clashing approaches to the of regional instability. region. The first, which can be termed the The second approach, termed here the "Diplomatic" approach, is based on "Strategic" view, puts more emphasis on maintaining the best possible relations dividing Middle Eastern regimes into with the existing regimes or those forces moderate and hostile ones. It assumes which seem likely to take power. that aggressive, anti-Western This approach, which remains governments and belief systems--radical prevalent in the Foreign and Pan-Arab nationalism; revolutionary Commonwealth Office, began by Islamism--are the principle threats to building British regional policy around regional stability and to British interests. the preservation of the monarchical Viewing the Diplomatic approach as regimes in Iraq, Jordan and Egypt in the often tending toward appeasement, it is immediate post-1945 period. It also, more willing to use pressure or even paradoxically, accounts for the British confrontation when deemed necessary. willingness in the late 1960s to cooperate This stance has historically been more with revolutionary Palestinian prevalent in the Prime Minister's Office, nationalism in Jordan, which was for reasons explored below. It tends to be regarded at that time as an unstoppable more appreciative of Israel as a force. Today, this viewpoint warns potentially valuable pro-Western regional against too overt support for the United power, as well as closer to the United States in the region, echoing concerns States. Likewise, it has tended to see such emerging from Arab embassies and regimes as those of Iran, Iraq under capitals. It is close to the dominant Saddam Hussein, and Syria--as well as European perspective.(1) militant and revolutionary Islamist The Diplomatic approach regards movements--as the main source of Israel mainly as an irritant, a factor regional problems as well as direct threats complicating British relations with the to British interests.(2) Arab world. Demonstrating British These differences are not merely distance from or criticism of Israel is seen ideological but also institutional, related as a way to win points in the Arab and integrally to the specific functions Muslim world. Advocates of this performed by the two key centers of viewpoint stress the solution of the Arab- foreign policymaking power within the Israeli conflict as quickly as possible, government. As is implied, other factors-- Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel while having some influence--are far less accommodation. The second orientation, determinant of the direction of British by contrast, considers that since regional policy toward Israel in particular and the tyrannies tend to rely on instability, Middle East in general. adventurism, and support for terrorism The British view of the Middle East, and insurgency as tools for legitimating and Israel's place within it, is governed themselves, they will inevitably by a number of key considerations. . undermine stability. The Diplomatic .British economic interests--principally stance charges the Strategic approach oil imports--give the country an obvious with creating unnecessary conflicts; the interest in the preservation of regional Strategic stance accuses the Diplomatic stability. approach of appeasement. How to achieve this goal, however, These two broad schools of thought has been the subject of much debate view Israel very differently. Given the within the policymaking community. The deep enmity toward Israel that forms a issues are not simple, nor the solutions consensus in the Arab world, advocates always straightforward. Britain, for of the former view are more likely to example, has opposed radical and regard Israel as a factor--often as the revolutionary movements in the region. main factor--preventing smooth relations But what should it be willing to do to between the West and Arab world. They ensure that these do not succeed? Ill place great stock in the priority that Arab thought out acts may end up helping the states say they and their masses put on growth of the very anti-Western forces this issue. Israel is thus seen as the cause they are intended to oppose. Again, rather than one of the victims of Britain's sale of arms to the region, radicalism, instability, and anti-Western especially to the Gulf States and most of feeling in the Arab world. all to Saudi Arabia, are an important Israel's protestation that it shares source of revenue. Weapons' exports are Western democratic values and social now the country's most important single institutions is dismissed as a point of little manufactured export.(3) Yet, arguably importance. And while those advocating this trade can also have a destabilizing the Diplomatic view within government effect. tend to be conservative, they also adopt Does preserving stability require and the basically far left-wing concept justify good relations with those regimes prevalent in many European states--as that may be radical, repressive, and flaunt well as Arab regimes--that Israel is a hostile ideologies? Some argue that latter-day colonial power. engagement will envelop them in a web In the Strategic conception, however, of rational, mutually beneficial relations Israel's identity and value as an ally is and thus blunt their enmity. Others assert considered to be enhanced by its that only by containing and sometimes existence as a militarily strong, challenging radical states, movements, democratic, and Western-oriented state. and ideologies can they be stopped from The conflict with the Arabs and the subverting British interests. These are difficulty in resolving it are perceived as among the positions, respectively, of the simply one more outcome of a generally Diplomatic and Strategic schools and unstable regional situation in which produce opposing policy radical ideologies and regimes are recommendations. generating strife. Additionally, this The first view argues that a given approach does not take Arab statements regime's ideology or expressed anti- at face value, noting that there are many Western intentions are of less importance, other factors that shape the behavior of as these need not be taken seriously or those regimes. can be blunted by friendly Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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Though both concepts have always Only in recent years has the Foreign been present among the circles making Office begun to make some effort to British Middle East policy, power has allocate resources to equip relevant staff shifted between them. In institutional members with the language skills terms, the Strategic approach has an necessary for understanding Israeli advantage since it is usually--though not society.(5) In such circumstances, always--centered in the more powerful promotion and career success often rest Prime Minister's Office. But the on expressing the "proper" views. Diplomatic concept has two assets: it has Of course, the stuff of maintaining always ruled in the Foreign Office and normal relations and avoiding conflicts-- those who believe it there almost always the FCO's stock-in-trade--incorporates have the last word in implementing and such built-in attitudes as avoiding interpreting policy. offense, safeguarding good ties, and not antagonizing other countries, and WHO MAKES BRITISH MIDDLE therefore, also favors the Diplomatic EAST POLICY? orientation. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office An example of this approach is the (FCO) British attempt throughout the 1990s to The Foreign Office is responsible for pursue a "critical dialogue" with Iran's the conduct of relations between Britain regime despite its energetic sponsorship and all foreign countries. The Middle of terrorism against Jewish and Israeli East and North Africa Department along targets, opposition to the Oslo peace with the relevant embassies and the process, pursuit of weapons of mass Policy Planning and Research destruction, and internal repression. Departments are all involved in A very large volume of evidence producing Middle East policy. The exists to suggest that in the FCO's perception of Britain's interests in the organizational culture, the norm is one of Middle East adhered to by the Foreign a general lack of sympathy for Israel. The Office is generally accepted to have been unnamed FCO official who described not sympathetic to the Zionist cause and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the the State of Israel. The reasons for the Guardian as "The cancer at the heart of traditional tilt toward the Arab side in the the Middle East crisis" offers a perhaps Foreign Office are manifold. unusually extreme expression of this Partly, internal institutional factors are orientation.(6) responsible. There are twenty-two slots A more representative statement of the for ambassadors to Arab countries and FCO stance and the Diplomatic view was only one for Israel, a ratio that repeats the April 2004 letter signed by 52 former itself throughout the ranks. The Arabic senior British diplomats, fiercely track at the FCO, while no longer as criticizing Tony Blair's policies toward prestigious as once it was, remains a the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian well-trodden, respectable path for British conflict.(7) career diplomats.(4) Interacting with Arab counterparts and informants, the 10 Downing Street diplomat working on the Middle East Independent-minded British prime tends to see them as his clients and ministers have tended to provide the main gradually begins to echo their beliefs and counterpoint to the FCO. The prime interpretations of events. minister has his own range of concerns In contrast, career diplomats with any and instruments. He is charged with the real knowledge of Israel and the Hebrew overall welfare of Britain, requiring the language and culture have been virtually consideration of many factors outside of non-existent in the Foreign Office British-Arab bilateral relations, or even throughout the years of Israel's existence. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel diplomatic issues and the Middle East in were identified strongly with the Jewish general. national cause throughout their Historically, prime ministers as varied careers.(11) The legacy of the bitter last as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and years of the Mandate left their mark on Margaret Thatcher of the Conservatives, relations, of course. The figure of Ernest and Harold Wilson and Tony Blair of Bevin remains an arch-villain of Israeli Labour have adopted to some degree the history, though a figure of respect and Strategic point of view. In comparison, affection for British social democracy. only Clement Attlee and Edward Heath The high profile of Bevin as foreign can be said to have completely accepted minister was in large part due to the the FCO standpoint. It is important to disinterest of Prime Minister Clement note that none of the Strategic-minded Attlee in foreign affairs. But both of the prime ministers have moved to other major post-war British Labour permanently alter the FCO consensus. prime ministers, Wilson and Blair, were Their transient term in office as well as noted for sympathy to Israel. their need to devote attention and energy In the 1970s and 1980s, a generation to other matters has also left the FCO influenced by the politics of the 1960s with considerable staying power as and the European New Left entered the regards the Middle East. Labour Party. Leading party figures of Today, 10 Downing Street is probably today such as Clare Short, Peter Hain, more powerful than ever in the making of Jeremy Corbyn and Ken Livingstone may British Middle Eastern policy. Blair has in different ways be seen as products of been criticized for "centralizing" foreign this experience. For this generation, the policymaking as well as for his stances cause of Palestinian nationalism was an on particular issues. The Observer important rallying point. A number of described him as having, "Gone further pro-Palestinian bodies have been created than any prime minister since Churchill within the party and the broader labor in overriding and by-passing the advice movement. Most prominent of these is of the Foreign Office."(8) the Labour Middle East Council.(12) Blair has also been subjected to At Labour Party conferences, one will criticism for his use of special advisers find well-attended fringe meetings of such as Lord Levy, favored diplomats both the Labour Friends of Israel and the such as Sir David Manning, and the No. Labour Middle East Council. There is a 10 Downing Street staff, rather than direct correlation with stances in other making more use of Foreign Office areas, with left-wing socialist MPs (such personnel. He has been seen as as George Galloway and Jeremy Corbyn) introducing an almost "presidential" style supporting the Palestinians, and inheritors into government. Much of this, however, of the more centrist, specifically British has to do with strong advocacy of a Labourite traditions (such as Gordon particular policy he has favored, rather Brown) having more sympathy for Israel. than bureaucratic arrangements.(9) Yet the influence of the party's left has been limited in recent years, on this as on POLITICAL PARTIES AND other issues. Blair--influenced both by PARLIAMENTARY LOBBIES European social democracy and by the The Labour Party Christian Socialist tradition--is untouched The Labour Party has a long tradition by the more hardcore left-wing currents of sympathy for Zionism, and close in Labour where support for the association with its sister party in Israel. Palestinian cause tends to be stronger. The party has an officially-sanctioned Labour Friends of Israel group.(10) Leading figures such as Aneurin Bevan Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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Conservative Party pro-Israel lobby, the Conservative The traditional, aristocratic wing of Friends of Israel, exists in the party.(14) the Conservative Party was strongly The Conservatives have no organized associated with the public service "Friends of Palestine" group, but this professions in Britain, including the reflects the old, established nature of the Foreign Office. Correspondingly, it was pro-Arab wing of the party, rather than a characterized by strong ties and sympathy total absence of support for the Arab to the Arab world, and sometimes, it has cause in its ranks. been said, a hint of anti-Semitism. But it should also be remembered that The Media and Public Opinion the old Conservative Party of the days of There is much discussion regarding the empire contained within it a romantic the attitudes of the British print and nationalist/imperial element, exemplified electronic media toward Israel. The by Benjamin Disraeli, and continued into media undoubtedly play an important role the twentieth century in the figures of Sir in shaping public perception of Israel and Arthur Balfour and Sir Winston the Arab-Israeli conflict. But observation Churchill. This stream, while no longer of the actual policymaking process in visible or relevant in modern British Britain brings one rapidly to the politics, played an important role in early conclusion that the role of the media and British support for the Jewish national the input of public opinion in the process home. is minimal. The substantive debate is one The real change in Conservative between elites. attitudes toward Israel came with the rise The British system possesses neither in the 1970s of Margaret Thatcher and powerful ethnic lobbies, nor any truly those around her in the party. Thatcher mobilized section of public opinion able was throughout her career surrounded by to exert influence on policymakers. As close Jewish associates, including Sir such, while discussion of media coverage Keith Joseph, Alfred Sherman, Leon of Israel and its influence on public Brittan, Nigel Lawson, Malcolm Rifkind, opinion may be crucial in observing the and Michael Polanyi. Her lower, middle- broader context in which decisions are class origins and the value she placed made, it need not overly detain us in our above all on the entrepreneurial spirit observation of the specifics of policy made her a natural ally of the new forces design. in the party to which these individuals were also connected. Her constituency, Between Washington and Brussels Finchley, also has a large Jewish The strategic culture of Britain is very population.(13) different from that of Continental Europe, In her foreign policy outlook, and there is none of the ingrained Thatcher's anti-communism and hostility to military involvement to be opposition to terrorism all naturally found in France and Germany. Heirs to inclined her to tilt toward Israel, as well the hardcore left-wing generation of 1968 as toward a close relationship with have never achieved the political and America. Thatcher's influence in the cultural prominence in Britain that they Conservative Party in this regard has have in some continental European proven lasting. Her successor, John countries. But Britain's many commercial Major, was no more connected to the old, involvements in the region, and its patrician, anti-Zionist wing of consequent desire not to stray too far conservatism than was she. from either the Arab or European The Conservatives are today led by a consensus, have meant that the British Jew, Michael Howard, and their wholehearted embrace of Israel as a stance regarding Israel is broadly strong, stable lynchpin among pro- comparable to that of Labour. An active Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel
Western regional powers has also not ultimately to the White Paper of 1939. taken place. The latter effectively reversed the Balfour Since Edward Heath left office in Declaration, setting out a plan for the 1974, Britain has had an uninterrupted emergence of a unitary, majority Arab run of prime ministers sympathetic to state in Palestine. Israel. Yet in substantive policy terms, The circumstances of Britain's Britain has not strayed far from the decision to withdraw from Palestine, European consensus. The extension of the taken in 1947, did not augur well for British balancing act to the Iraq issue put good relations between Britain and the the paradoxes London faces in high new Jewish state. Economically perspective, especially alongside the exhausted, distrusted by both sides and polarization between U.S. and European harried by Jewish illegal immigration and positions which Britain seeks to the militias of the Zionist right, Clement bridge.(15) Attlee's Labour government handed the problem over to the United Nations, OVERVIEW OF KEY EVENTS IN leading to the UN's resolution on BRITAIN'S BILATERAL partition in November 1947--on which RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL Britain abstained--and British departure, 1. The End of the Mandate against a background of inter-communal Zionist partnership with Britain in the war, in May 1948. The intervening, key years 1917-1930 was a crucial factor strife-torn months left a certain legacy of in the establishment of Israel. The mistrust between Britain and the new Balfour Declaration of November 1917, State of Israel. the key statement of British support for Britain's recognition of Jordanian Zionism, famously expresses the support sovereignty over the West Bank of the British government for the following the War of 1948 was indicative establishment of a "Jewish National of the direction of British policy in this Home" in Palestine. The sympathy for period. The British sought alliances and Zionist aims expressed in the Balfour patron-client relationships with the Declaration meant, above all else, that the traditional, monarchical regimes that they Zionists were able to build up the Jewish were largely responsible for installing, population of Mandatory Palestine in the i.e., the Hashemite monarchies in Jordan years 1917-29 from 55,000 to just over and Iraq, and King Faruk in Egypt. The 162,000.(16) This gave the Jewish desire for an alliance with the Arab status population, among other things, the quo was the cornerstone of British policy, critical mass necessary to begin to pursue symbolized by London's central role in independent national policies when the the establishment of the Arab League. paths of Jewish nationalism and the Jordan's status as a client state of Britain British Empire began to diverge. obviously complicated relations with Beginning with the 1930's, relations Israel, which had just concluded a between the British authorities and the victorious war against the Jordanians.(17) Jews in Palestine steadily declined. The Britain afforded Israel de facto international situation made the British recognition on January 30, 1949, in the concerned at the possibility of Arab last stages of the War of Independence, support for the Axis powers of Italy and and de jure recognition on April 27, Germany. As such, British support for 1950. Normal diplomatic relations were Zionism came to be seen as an irritant, established shortly afterwards.(18) antagonizing the Arabs against Britain. The parliamentary debates This led to increased controls on Jewish immediately preceding recognition of immigration to Mandatory Palestine in Israel give a good sense of the formation the period leading up to the war, and of the two opposing schools of thought in Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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British policymaking regarding Israel. In identification with the Jewish cause: the House of Commons on January 29, "Whether we like it or not," he said, "the 1949, Foreign Secretary Bevin, who had coming into being of a Jewish State in opposed partition and supported the Palestine is an event in world history to creation of a unitary, majority Arab state be viewed in the perspective, not of a in Palestine, squared off against a staunch generation or a century, but in the and long-term supporter of partition and perspective of a thousand, two thousand Zionism, the Leader of the Opposition, or even three thousand years." He Sir Winston Churchill. continued, "No one has done more to In a long passage, Bevin details the build up a Jewish National Home in grievances of the Palestinian Arabs and Palestine than the Conservative Party, the refugee problem that had emerged and many of us have always had in mind from the war of 1948. He expresses the that this might some day develop into a basic Arab case against Zionism, asking Jewish State.…Now that it has come into the House if the British would accept the being, it is England that refuses to slicing up of Britain to "make way for recognize it, and, by our actions, we find another race." In looking at the ourselves regarded as its most bitter Palestinian refugee problem Bevin enemies." declares that the "Driving of poor Churchill deplores what he regards as innocent people from their homes, the slowness of British policy to react to whether it is in Germany by Hitler, or by the reality of Israel, as he expresses it: anybody else, is a crime."(19) "His Majesty's Government…has always Hugh Dalton, a keen contemporary been one, or even two and sometimes observer, considers that Bevin may well three steps behind the march of events. have imbibed this view from the versions When the State of Israel was proclaimed, of events given to him by his advisers at it was recognized at once by the the Foreign Office.(20) Men such as Sir Americans. His Majesty's Government John Troutbeck, Britain's ambassador in could at least have accepted the principle Egypt, shared Bevin's suspicion of of partition laid down in the United Zionist motives and believed that Israel Nations Resolution." was likely to become an expansionist Reflecting the heated nature of the force in the region. Troutbeck was also debate, Churchill went on to accuse particularly concerned that Britain's vital Bevin of a "Very strong and direct streak strategic interests in the Suez Canal Zone of bias and prejudice" against the Jews, could be harmed if the UK were to appear claiming that this is one of the factors too accommodating toward Israel. For influencing his stance.(22) Winding up Bevin and officials like Troutbeck, Sir for the Opposition, Oliver Stanley noted Ronald Campbell and others, an that Britain had, through its actions, undoubtedly sincere sympathy for the "Forfeited the friendship of Israel without Arab cause meshed with a perception of gaining the gratitude of the Arabs." the need for Britain to come to some form Stanley concluded that the only party to of accommodation with the growing benefit from any of this was "the set of forces of Arab nationalism, for which the people who profit from chaos and eventual destruction of Israel was a confusion wherever it happens in the central tenet of faith.(21) world. If communism ever does come in An entirely contrasting outlook to the Palestine, the Right Hon. Gentleman [i.e. view of this school was expressed by Bevin] and his policy will have done Churchill and Oliver Stanley for the most to encourage it."(23) Conservative Opposition in the Churchill and Stanley saw Israel as a Commons debate. Churchill framed his natural ally of the West, and Churchill arguments in terms of interests, though certainly regarded Jewish national revival there was a clear emotional underlying in Israel as a great historic cause Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel deserving of British support. Such furtherance of any such ambitions sentiments, it should be noted, were by and would indeed support the no means limited to the Conservative side Arab states in resisting them.(25) of the House. Aneurin Bevan, one of the most prominent leaders of the Labour Such statements obviously reflect a left, was as passionate and outspoken in more or less across the board acceptance his support of Zionism as was Churchill. of the Arab view of the conflict and the Bevin, Troutbeck and their standpoint assumptions behind it. Thus were the had no sympathy for the Jewish national lines demarcated: a consensus deeply cause. They were alert to the problems wary of Israel in the Foreign Office and faced by the Palestinian Arab population, reflected in the views of important and Bevin may also justly be accused of a policy-makers but with significant studied insensitivity where the Jewish individuals in both major parties far more historical experience was concerned.(24) sympathetic, and inclined to view the But above all, they were aware of the new state as a potential asset and ally. growing force of Arab nationalism. Bevin This breakdown of opinion reflected pre- and Troutbeck were determined that existing trends for and against Zionism British interests should not suffer as a within the British policy-making result of appearing to be identified with establishment and has remained fairly the creation and sustaining of Israel. constant. As a Foreign Office Memorandum circulated by Bevin in August 1949 put 2. The Suez Crisis, 1956 it, "His Majesty's Government accepts The Suez Crisis of 1956 was a pivotal Israel as an established fact and intends to moment in post-war British political grant her de jure recognition at the history, the point at which Britain's great earliest suitable moment. At the same power status ended and the country's time they are bound to have regard to search for a new role began. After Suez, their existing friendships and alliances Britain accepted de-colonization in the with the Arab states, particularly as the Middle East as inevitable. It also latter are at present more willing than accepted that it was no longer able to Israel to commit themselves to the anti- engage in major regional initiatives Communist camp. It would be too high a without American consent and price to pay for the friendship of Israel to involvement. jeopardize, by estranging the Arabs, The crisis also marks a fundamental either the base in Egypt or Middle change in Britain's relations with Israel. Eastern oil." The British recognized in Nasser's Arab This frank statement sums up a nationalism a dangerous, destabilizing particular school of thought in British force in the Middle East. Nasser, for his foreign policy in an admirably concise part, regarded Britain as the main force of way. It continues: imperialism, and was determined to expel it from the region once and for all.(26) His Majesty's Government would Nasser was not only the leader of Egypt. not regard it as in their interest As champion of the cause of Arab unity, that Israel should acquire more he was also a symbol of pride across the Arab territory without a quid pro Arab world and a potential model for quo or that she should carry her radical movements in other Arab economic exchanges with the countries.(27) Arab states to the point of Britain was thus worried that the Free dominating them economically Officers regime in Egypt might inspire and so politically. They would not other movements which would emerge to lend their assistance to the subvert traditional, pro-Western states Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
Jonathan Spyer such as Jordan. Israel, too, had cause to known henceforth as the "secret protocol view Nasser with concern. Inflammatory of Sevres."(28) rhetoric and threats to destroy the Jewish The Israeli part of the plan was a state were a staple of Egyptian resounding success from the military propaganda, which found practical point of view. Between October 29 and expression in permitting Palestinian November 5, 1956, Israeli forces fedayeen to launch their attacks against captured Sinai in its entirety, and Israel from the Gaza Strip, then shattered three Egyptian divisions.(29) controlled by Egypt. But the Anglo-French element of the Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who as plan went awry. An unexpectedly severe a Foreign Office official in the 1930s had Soviet response to Anglo-French resigned in protest against the intervention at Port Said was coupled appeasement of Nazi Germany, saw the with severe U.S. pressure on Britain and Egyptian leader as a dangerous, France to abandon the plan to seize the expansionist dictator. Nasser's support for Canal and the operation ended in debacle. the insurgents against France in Algeria, opposition to the U.S.-sponsored, British- A Change in the British View of Israel backed Baghdad Pact, and purchases of The 1956 Sinai Campaign led to a arms from the Soviet Union after 1955 all significant change in the way Israel was served to heighten British, French, and viewed in the region and by the great American suspicion. powers. Until that time, the Jewish State Matters were brought to a head by had been seen as a weak entity whose Egypt's nationalizing of the Suez Canal long-term survival was by no means Company on July 26, 1956. Nasser certain.(30) After Israel's performance, it wanted to use the revenue of the canal for became apparent that far from being a his Aswan High Dam project on the Nile. state hovering on the brink of extinction, But for Britain the nationalization was a Israel possessed the premier fighting direct blow to its prestige and interests force in the region. This meant that for a which could not be allowed to pass. The status quo power like Britain, concerned British government owned a controlling with preventing the further toppling of interest in the company's shares. traditional regimes and halting the spread Additionally, almost one-quarter of of anti-Western Pan-Arab nationalism, British imports went through the canal, the maintenance of a strong Israel became and indeed, one-third of the total shipping an interest. Israel's military strength and passing through the Suez Canal was its ability to hit back and punish British. aggressors would act as a powerful An elaborate and bold plan was deterrent to radical Arab regimes seeking conceived by the British and French to to inflame the regional climate. regain control of the Canal area. It From 1960, as a result of this changed involved, for the first time, strategic perception, British arms began to be sold cooperation between Israel and Britain, to Israel. Arms sales to Israel did not against a common enemy. The plan, in mean that the entrenched views in the brief, was for an Israeli attack on Sinai, in Foreign Office had vanished. Nor had response to Nasser's increasing support Britain taken an ideological decision to for the Palestinian guerillas. British and draw closer to Israel because it was French forces would then intervene to democratic or Western-oriented. The 'separate the combatants,' seizing control British decision was based on the desire of the Canal Zone in the course of doing for stability and the prevention of so, and (it was hoped) bringing about the regional war. As Britain's then toppling of Nasser. On October 24, 1956, ambassador to Israel explained in a Britain, France, and Israel signed a communication to the Foreign Office: tripartite document detailing this plan, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel
We do not give the Israelis arms February 22, 1966, that in two years' time because they are pro-western or it would be evacuating all its military because we admire their bases from the Gulf area, were ominous achievement. We give them arms developments from the Israeli point of because our interests in the view. Israel believed that Britain's Middle East are to keep the place evacuation would lead to growing quiet, and to prevent war. instability in the Gulf area, which would Anything which makes war in the be exploited by Nasser.(33) Jadid's Middle East more likely is against support for the activities of Al-Fatah led the interests of the Western to an escalation in regional tensions, into powers.(31) which Nasser was drawn. The closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on Thanks to Israel's ability to ensure its May 23, 1967, seemed to make war own survival, its ability to deter its inevitable. neighbors from attacking it became an Britain regarded the Straits as an interest of any power supporting regional international waterway through which stability. As a clearly pro-Western state, a vessels of all nations had a right of strong Israel was also potentially a useful passage. Public opinion in Britain was bulwark against pan-Arab nationalist firmly behind Israel. Foreign Minister regimes in Egypt and Syria who were Abba Eban arrived in London on May 24, increasingly turning toward the 1967, on the last leg of an attempt to Communist bloc in search of arms and ensure guarantees from the West for the aid. The fall of the Hashemites in Iraq in formation of an international maritime 1958 sealed the failure of the British force that would open the Straits. He was attempt to ensure stability by supporting told by Prime Minister Harold Wilson the then-existing status quo in the region. that the Cabinet had met that morning, The events of 1956 ushered in a new and that a consensus had been reached period which would be dominated by the that Britain would join with others in an challenge of Egypt, and the pan-Arab effort to open the Straits. Wilson, a model it promoted. The regime in Cairo member of the Labour Friends of Israel and its ideology constituted the main and close to a number of Israeli Labour threat to the regional stability that stood Party figures, was considered to be at the center of British interests. Chief among the most pro-Israeli of British among the ambitions of the Nasser politicians. regime was the destruction of Israel.(32) But Wilson's declaration of support As such, a natural commonality of proved to have less to it than met the eye. interests existed between the two While Wilson himself, and his Foreign countries, based on the threat to Israel's Secretary George Brown, had been in existence and the growth of anti-Western favor of Britain's taking the lead in ideologies among the increasing number organizing an international naval force to of radical Arab regimes. keep open the Straits of Tiran, this idea failed to achieve majority support in the 3. The Six Day War and its Aftermath British cabinet on May 23.(34) Ministers, The mid-1960s saw the return of frightened at the prospect of Britain's tension between Israel and its Arab leading an international initiative of this neighbors. The emergence of the kind, rendered the policy toothless, filling extremist Salah Jadid regime in it with caveats. The end result was that Damascus in 1966 led to a de facto Britain expressed its willingness to situation of low-intensity war between constitute part of such a force, but not to Israel and that country. This, coupled lead it, and even participation was with the announcement by Britain on conditioned on the plan receiving broad Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
Jonathan Spyer international support and involvement. British policy in the crisis preceding The Foreign Office preference for a "low the war follows a familiar pattern. profile" won out against the principled Sympathy for Israel on a moral and support for Israel sought by Wilson. ideological level from senior elements in On May 31, an all-day debate in the the political echelon combined with a House of Commons on the situation in sense of a shared Western orientation and the Middle East took place. Brown opposition to subversive, Soviet- stressed the role of the UN and the need associated elements such as Jadid's Syria to return UN forces. He made clear in his and Nasserite Egypt. But this was offset speech that: by the view also present in the political echelon and dominant in the Foreign We are not setting out to 'topple' Office, according to which, in the words Nasser. . . .But neither are we of one under-secretary of state: prepared to accept that he has the right to topple another Middle The protection of our interests Eastern nation at the risk of entails preserving the best plunging us all into war. . . We possible relationship with the would consider as acts of Arab countries, in which the bulk belligerence any unilateral act to of Middle East oil lies, with close the Gulf of Aqaba or any which we do a much great[er] acts of aggression committed by volume of trade than we do with either side of the Israel-Arab Israel, valuable though that is, border.(35) which control many transit routes through the area, and whose The statement by the Leader of the relations with the [Soviet] bloc Opposition, Edward Heath, was similar in might develop in a way gravely its combination of stress on the detrimental to the West. . . .If we unacceptability of Nasser's behavior, but are to preserve the friendship of clear concern at the possibility of action the Arab governments, which we being taken against him on the basis of an need to protect our interests, unacceptably narrow coalition. The last including those in the Gulf and thing Britain wanted was to become elsewhere in Arabia we must involved in a conflict situation in the avoid giving that degree of overt Middle East, particularly without UN support to Israel.(36) support. Eban's demand that Britain declare its support for Israel's 4. Crisis in Jordan, 1970 independence and integrity, as a counter- With the ascension to power of the balance to Soviet support for the radical Conservative government of Edward Arab states, was also too much for the Heath in 1969, British Middle East policy Wilson government. The harm that such turned to a full application of the an open identification with Israel might Diplomatic approach, placing a primacy do to British political and economic on good relations with the forces in the interests in the region was clear. Arab world deemed dominant. What Eban likewise failed to obtain a clear makes this stance so unusual during the guarantee of support from the United Jordan crisis, however, was a willingness States. The failure of diplomacy made to accept the overthrow of a pro-British war inevitable. Arab regime to achieve that goal. The War of 1967 resulted in a major Jordan was Britain's closest ally in the victory for Israel and the eclipse of the Middle East. The Hashemite ruling threat of Nasserite pan-Arabism. Israel family enjoyed close commercial and made territorial gains on all fronts. military relations with the United Kingdom. In the late 1960s, however, the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel common perception in the Middle East When crisis erupted between Jordan was that traditional monarchical regimes and the Palestinians in September 1970, of the Hashemite type were doomed, and Britain took a central role in the drama. would shortly be swept away by radical The confrontation between King Hussein and revolutionary forces. and the Palestinian organizations began In the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, with the hijacking of four airliners by the the Palestinian guerilla emerged as the PFLP, who demanded the release of their new hero of the Arab intelligentsia. members held in jails in Germany, Organizations like Yasir Arafat's Fatah Switzerland, Israel and Britain. One of and the Popular Front for the Liberation the hijackings--of an El Al plane--failed, of Palestine (PFLP) led by George with one hijacker killed, and the other, Habash were invested with an aura of Leila Khalid, taken into custody in glamour.(37) With their attempts to Britain. The three other airliners were establish networks in the West Bank taken to Dawson's Field in Jordan where defeated by the Israeli security forces by they were blown up in a calculated act of the end of 1968, these movements based provocation towards King Hussein's themselves in Jordan, from where they authority. came to constitute an increasing threat to A few days later, the PFLP hijacked a the regime of King Hussein. BOAC VC10 en route from Bombay to The British opened up channels of Beirut, and took 300 hostages, 65 of them communication to the Fatah leadership in British. They demanded the release of Jordan in 1969. The British embassy in Khalid, threatening to murder the Amman began regular meetings with hostages. The British were given 72 Ahmad Azhari, deputy director of Fatah hours to reach a decision. On September for information, who was authorized by 13, the British government announced Arafat for this purpose. Britain hoped to that Khalid was to be released. The induce Fatah to use its influence on the remaining hostages were exchanged for PFLP to desist from violence against Khalid and six other Palestinians held in British targets and individuals. As one German and Swiss jails two weeks later. embassy official put it: "We should try to There was outrage at the time in encourage both the press [and British Washington and Jerusalem at the British security forces] to distinguish between decision. It placed the British in defiance Fatah, which is going out of its way to of the Tokyo Convention of 1963, to emphasize its disapproval of wanton which the country was a signatory.(39) It terrorism, and the PFLP, a small group also seriously impaired Western which does present a threat."(38) credibility in the event of future The British viewed Fatah as a rising negotiations with hijackers, as the British force, which might well be on the way to themselves admitted. power in Jordan, and which was not In an interview 30 years after the openly pro-Soviet. The Foreign Office's events, Peter Tripp, then head of the conception of pragmatism considered that Middle East Desk at the Foreign Office, such a view must take precedence over was candid as to British considerations Fatah's use of terrorism, or its practice of during the negotiations with the PFLP: subversion, which had set the movement on a collision course with the When we heard that Leila was on Hashemites, Britain's closest allies in the the plane in the UK, it was region. The British attitude was also decided that she had to be dictated, to a considerable extent, by the detained. We knew that various hope that it could appease Fatah into not powers would be very interested attacking British targets and even in getting their hands on her. We stopping allied groups from doing so. had to make sure that she was Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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kept by us as safely as possible 5. The 1973 War until her fate had been decided. When war between Israel and the We couldn't commit her to prison Arab states broke out again on October 6, because the Palestinians, the 1973, the Conservative government of PFLP or Fatah would consider Edward Heath took the controversial that we were now going to keep decision to declare neutrality, her forever. We had to find some embargoing arms supplies to "all sides." way of squaring the circle.(40) The British government also refused to allow its military facilities to be used for The incident proved the spark that the transit of military supplies to the ignited open conflict between King battlefield. Hussein's forces and the Palestinian This decision clearly adversely organizations, which broke out openly on affected Israel and not its enemies. The September 17. In the first days of combat, two Arab countries involved in the war, before the situation and Hussein's Egypt and Syria, were both Soviet client advantage became apparent, the king states who were receiving large made frantic requests for British military shipments of Soviet weapons, with some aid. His requests went unanswered. Tripp 4,000 tons of military equipment supplied admits the British considered that the in 280 flights by the Soviet Union. The Hashemites were probably about to fall. embargo extended not only to new He expresses himself in the following equipment, but also to spares and terms: "King Hussein's relationships with ammunition for items already purchased. other Arab countries were changing and Since Israel had a large number of you could not just nail your colours to modified British Centurion tanks, this that particular mast and say, well, we'll restriction was significant. go down with the ship. There's a certain The Labour party opposed this policy- amount of self-interest in all this."(41) -as did some Conservative members of Cabinet papers reveal that with the Parliament--and Wilson received daily Syrians mobilizing on his border, briefings from Israeli Ambassador apparently about to intervene to support Michael Comay throughout the war. the Palestinians, Hussein passed a Abba Eban, reflecting on the British message to London and Washington, decision on the embargo, called it one of asking the British to pass it on to Israel. "pulling back in panic before the Arab The message was a request for Israeli threat to withhold oil supplies" and aerial intervention against the Syrian describes it from Israel's standpoint "as a force. Britain declined to pass it on, specially harsh blow" which encouraged leaving the matter in the hands of the other European countries to also sacrifice Americans, who did so. Asked about Israel's interests. British contacts with Arafat at the time, In the House of Commons debate, Tripp replies, "At the time, it certainly Wilson called for an end to the embargo seemed that Arafat was a force to be and pointed out that while the reckoned with. . . He represented a very government had remained silent strong theme in Arab nationalism and it regarding past Arab aggression against seemed to us at least prudent not to cut Israel, it had sponsored resolutions off all contact. . . we had to consider that condemning Israeli military actions on this might some day be a man we'd have three occasions. Sir Alec Douglas Home, to deal with."(42) for the government, strongly rejected The British performance during this accusations that fear of Arab use of the period once again fits squarely into the 'oil weapon' was dictating government set of assumptions adhered to by the policy. Foreign Office throughout. In his speech, Wilson called for support for Israel on the basis of its being Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel the "only democracy in that region." He attitude taken toward the Hashemites then returned to the oil issue, addressing shows, the policy was one of trying to it in the following terms, a classical maintain good relations with the force statement of the Strategic view: expected to be in power regardless of the content of its policies, secure in the No one underestimates the gravity conviction that accommodation would of what is happening on this front, not increase the threat to British interests the cost, simply, of the increase in by strengthening or emboldening radical prices and its effect on inflation in forces. this country. . . but we must not be blackmailed. We must decide 6. The 1970s and 1980s what is right as a nation, as a The War of 1973 marked the last Government, as a Parliament, and occasion in which Israel and the abide by it. . . the characteristic of combined armies of the Arab states met Danegeld is insatiability. They on the field of battle. The 1970s and come again. Their appetite feeds 1980s were witness to the first halting on appeasement." moves toward the establishment of normal relations between Israel and its Parliament, however, endorsed neighbors, beginning with the U.S.- government policy, by a margin of 251 brokered Disengagement Agreement votes to 175.(43) between Israel and Egypt signed on The policy of the Heath government January 18, 1974. The Camp David was representative of Europe in the 1973 Accords of 1979 were of course the War. The Nixon Administration found pivotal event in this regard, removing itself without allies in its airlift to Israel. with one stroke the most powerful Arab Heath refused a personal request from the state from the fight with Israel. President for landing rights in Cyprus en These years were also witness to the route to Israel.(44) growth in Western Europe of a consensus Douglas-Home's denials in Parliament increasingly critical of Israel. The fear of notwithstanding, the use by Arab oil- a return to the use of the oil weapon by producing countries of the European the Arab states undoubtedly played a part reliance on Middle Eastern oil (85 in this. Less tangibly, one must also take percent of European petroleum was into account the strategic culture of the imported from the region at that time) member states of the then-European was undoubtedly an element in making Economic Community. The status of Britain reluctant to appear to be backing many European countries as former Israel. The oil weapon was used in a colonial powers, the desire to develop a direct and coordinated way by the Arab European stance separate from that of the Persian Gulf states in 1973, with various United States, and a general lack of conditions applied to European countries concern regarding the anti-Western and directly depending on their stance authoritarian nature of many local regarding the Arab-Israel conflict. political and ideological forces all The Heath government's response, contributed. There was also the beginning once again, can be understood if placed in of what would become the principal the broader framework of British Western European foreign policy attitudes toward Israel. Heath was a concept, in which the amenability of strong supporter of détente, with no problems to negotiated solution was record of support for Israel. There was taken as a given. thus no sense of a preference to be As early as November 1973, and again awarded to a pro-Western state or fellow in June 1977, the European Council democracy. On the contrary, as the expressed its support for the principle of Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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Palestinian self-determination. European member states were deeply skeptical, is a Middle East policy was clarified and prominent example of this.(47) But the crystallized in the Venice Declaration of essential contours of British policy June 13, 1980. This declaration, adopted outlined above did not alter during the in the wake of the Camp David Accords, long period of Conservative government marks a clear desire for greater from 1979-1997. involvement in the peace process. It is The most anti-Israel elements in the also very clearly an attempt to set down British debate--the old patrician anti- an alternative diplomatic route on the Zionist Tories, with their counterparts in Arab-Israel question to that forged by the the Foreign Office, and the Labour far United States at Camp David. left-wing--were further from decision- The Declaration went beyond previous making circles than ever. But as late as European statements in that it called 1985, for example, it was still possible openly for the first time for a role for the for a British company to obtain a PLO in the diplomatic process: certificate from the Foreign Office attesting to compliance with the A just solution must finally be secondary Arab trade boycott against found to the Palestinian problem, Israel.(48) More substantively, Britain's which is not simply one of thriving trade relationship with the Arab refugees. The Palestinian people. . states again meant that the country found .must be placed in a position, by it prudent not to be tarred with the "pro- an appropriate process defined Israel" brush from which many British within the framework of the diplomats consider America suffers in the comprehensive peace settlement, region. to exercise fully its right to self- During the Thatcher years, arms determination. . . .These trading with Middle Eastern states also principles apply to all the parties developed and flourished. The al- concerned, and thus: the Yamama deals with Saudi Arabia, which Palestinian people, and to the have generated an estimated $40 billion PLO, which will have to be of business, made the Saudi kingdom associated with the Britain's most important arms negotiations.(45) customer.(49) Restrictions, meanwhile, continued to operate on arms sales to Given that the PLO at this time was Israel until 1994. still unambiguously committed to Israel's destruction, this was a significant 7. The Post-Cold War Period departure and the Venice Declaration was The collapse of the Soviet Union and roundly criticized by Israel and the the subsequent birth of the Oslo process United States. Britain, for its part, voted opened up the possibility of a significant for the Declaration and British policy in improvement in British-Israel relations. the period was characterized by a desire The central reason for this is because the not to stray too far from the European zero-sum argument, whereby Britain's consensus. relations with the Arab world would Margaret Thatcher was the first inevitably suffer if relations with Israel serving British Prime Minister to visit improved, was no longer applicable. Israel,(46) and she and her successor Given the pro-Israel inclinations John Major, whose personal views were established as a norm by Margaret solidly Atlanticist and pro-Israel, took Thatcher, and continued by her successor, Britain on occasion far from the it is not surprising that a rapid European consensus on the Middle East. improvement of relations took place in Britain's support for the U.S. bombing of the 1990s. In 1995, Prime Minister Major Libya in 1986, of which most EU led a large business delegation to Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel
Israel(50), and announced during the visit to the United States.(53) During the that Britain would no longer feel British presidency of the EU in 1998, constrained by the Arab boycott. In 1994, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook raised the arms embargo on Israel was controversy and criticism in Israel when rescinded, and in subsequent years, he refused to visit the Holocaust museum Britain's defense relationship with Israel at Yad Vashem but went to observe has grown considerably (while remaining construction at Har Homa, and at a later subject to certain restrictions). On a stage in his visit demonstratively hugged symbolic level, the improved relations Arafat. were marked by the first British royal Declarative gestures notwithstanding, visit to Israel in 1998. the volume of trade between Britain and In tandem with these growing ties, Israel continued to grow. Bilateral trade Britain also became a major partner in the reached an annual rate of £2.5 billion in building up of the Palestinian Authority 2000, a 22 percent increase from 1999, (PA). In 1995, John Major became the making Israel the UK's biggest trading first Western leader to meet with Yasir partner in the Middle East in the first Arafat inside the PA area, and in years of the new millennium.(54) Israel November 1998, Britain unveiled a $100 and Britain established the Britech Fund million package of aid and assistance to in 2000, which invests some £15 million the PA and UNRWA. (51) annually to encourage collaboration in The election of Tony Blair and the research and development projects. Israel Labour Party in 1997 brought no change Aircraft Industries closed a $25 million in this pattern. Far left-wing elements in deal with the Royal Air Force in Labour in the 1980s had developed a September 2000 for British purchase of a consistent anti-Israel stance, and senior combat training system. This represented individuals close to Blair--Robin Cook, the first substantial Israeli penetration of Clare Short, and Peter Hain--were all the formerly closed British arms known as trenchant critics of Israel. But market.(55) Blair himself and his Chancellor of the In its voting pattern in EU bodies, the Exchequer Gordon Brown have strong UK is much less critical of Israel than are personal sympathies for the Jewish state. France and Italy, but is also less likely to Blair enjoys firm support in the Jewish try to block anti-Israel moves than is community and has on occasion used one Germany. Unlike France, Britain has not of his backers from within Anglo-Jewry, initiated moves to pressure Israel Lord Michael Levy, as a diplomatic economically to obtain greater envoy to Middle Eastern leaders.(52) concessions on the peace process. Unlike Yet this changed situation has not Germany, it has not openly expressed meant resolving the British position opposition to such moves. Britain has, between the two competing approaches. however, expressed consistent opposition Britain voted in favor of the Venice to the more ambitious schemes of the Declaration in 1980, which had called for French for an increased talks between Israel and the PLO. In the political/diplomatic role for the EU in the context of the 1990s and the many peace process. disputes which arose around the When the post of the special EU implementation of the Oslo Accords, envoy to the Middle East was created, Britain once more broadly followed the and its mandate was being defined, European line. British criticism of British Foreign Secretary Malcolm settlement policy and of the "military" Rifkind paid careful attention to U.S. occupation of eastern Jerusalem placed concerns at a possible European attempt the country still much closer, in to play a role in competition with the declarative terms at least, to the EU than U.S. in Middle East diplomacy. British Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
Jonathan Spyer and German pressure ensured that the committed to historic compromise on the functions of the envoy were ultimately basis of a two-state solution. These much narrower than originally intended. assumptions were based on a broader While Britain on a declaratory level tends perception of the Middle East following not to sound greatly different from other the former Communist world into a EU countries, in practice Britain supports future based on rational self-interest, an American-led peace process, and, trade, and development. Instead, in the unlike France, does not see the summer and autumn of 2000, following development of an independent European the collapse of negotiations at Camp role as a self-evident goal in itself. David, armed conflict broke out. Rather, Britain seeks to use the good The ongoing conflict has now become offices of the EU in assistance to U.S. only one facet of a much broader efforts. turbulence. The September 11, 2001, For example, in April-May 1998, terror attacks in the United States and during the period that the UK held the what has followed have pitted the presidency of the EU, Tony Blair was democratic West and several radical active in promoting the issues of the Islamist organizations against one another industrial park, airport, and seaport in in war. The toppling of Saddam Hussein's Gaza, which the EU was involved in regime in Iraq and the now worldwide financing. Blair made it clear that Britain threat of Islamist terror has created a new and the EU were fully behind U.S. efforts policymaking environment very different to break the deadlock between the parties, from that envisaged during the optimistic and reiterated that Europe had no first years after the Cold War. intention of trying to supplant the United Israel's travails in the EU since the States in its role as broker. Rather, Blair collapse of the peace process in 2000 was keen to promote British involvement have been many. The crucial year of 2002 in the peace process in cooperation with was particularly intense in this regard. the Americans.(56) There was controversy over tax This approach was adhered to abatements for Israeli goods made in consistently throughout the years of Oslo. settlements, calls for freezing or Britain, unlike Spain and Italy, remained rescinding of the trade agreement that opposed to a unilateral declaration of gives Israel benefits for sales to Europe independence by the Palestinians.(57) (its largest trading partner), and even Rather, Britain hoped that the accords calls for economic sanctions against would lead to a consensual agreement Israel. Britain and Germany have proved between Israelis and Palestinians, which the key moderating factors in this regard, would form the lynchpin of a prosperous blocking the wilder excesses and and stable post-Cold War Middle Eastern preventing all moves toward the order. imposition of sanctions. As Blair himself has expressed it, "Friendship between 8. 2000-2004, Collapse of Oslo and nations is tested in times of crisis and Renewed Conflict trouble, and Britain will not walk The year 2000 witnessed the collapse away."(58) of the Oslo process and with it the eclipse The British Trade and Industry of the assumptions that had dominated Ministry has opposed moves to change British and European thinking toward Israel's status as a preferred target market Israel and the Palestinians throughout the and Blair has been among the European 1990s. It had been widely believed that statesmen most critical of the PA's failure the conflict was winding down, and that a to act against terror. At the time of final settlement was imminent. It had Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, been assumed that the Palestinian Blair spoke in the House of Commons of leadership, above all Arafat, were the PA's "inability, or refusal, to control Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel terrorism properly." He also criticized Secretary Jack Straw and Liberal what he called the "revolving door" Democrat MP Jenny Tonge seemingly policy of the Palestinian Authority expressing understanding (or in Straw's toward terrorist suspects (i.e., the case 'compassion') for the motivations of tendency to jail terrorists and then release suicide bombers were regarded with them shortly after.) It should be borne in particular distaste by Israelis.(59) More mind, however, that such statements were substantively, the willingness of the Blair made in the context of speeches which government to host Syrian president were elsewhere very critical of Israel. Bashar al-Asad on an official visit in There is a sense here once again of the December 2002, given his regime's balancing-act aspect of British policy, continued sponsorship of terror with the prime minister hoping to stick organizations and openly expressed anti- close to the European perspective, while Semitic views, led to heated disagreement simultaneously expressing understanding with Israel. This dispute worsened when for the Israeli position. Blair declined to meet with then-Israeli Blair has also endeavored to restrain Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the pro-Arab tendencies of the Foreign during a visit by the latter to the UK two Office. Ben Bradshaw, under-secretary weeks after the Asad visit. Blair's for Middle East Affairs, who was known willingness to meet a month later with for his anti-Israel views and statements, then-Israeli opposition leader Amram was removed from his job. The strategic Mitzna did not improve matters.(60) dialogue between the two countries There have been other areas of tension. remains intact. The unique stance of the These relate to genuine policy differences Blair government showed itself once as well as merely presentational issues. more after President George Bush' speech For example, Britain's willingness to of June 24, 2002, in which he said that engage with the Islamist regime in Iran Middle East peace would not be achieved remains a point of contention between the unless Arafat was replaced. The speech two countries. These differences came was widely condemned by EU leaders, out sharply during a visit by Foreign who continued to endorse the legitimacy Secretary Jack Straw to Teheran in of Arafat as the Palestinians' chosen September 2001. Prior to leaving for Iran, leader. Blair, by contrast, expressed an Straw infuriated Israelis by arguing in a equivocal position, substantively newspaper article that one of the factors agreeing with his European colleagues, that helps breed terrorism is the "anger while expressing understanding for that many people in this region feel at Bush's remarks, given Arafat's failures to events over the years in Palestine."(61) take measures necessary to secure a Straw's words led to the canceling of a settlement. Similarly, Blair stood out planned meeting between himself and among European leaders in expressing Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. approval of Ariel Sharon's plan for On the British side, there has been unilateral disengagement. He did so, concern at the use of defense technology however, by framing his support in a originating in the UK in Israeli military perspective designed to appeal to the actions in the West Bank and Gaza. European consensus, stressing that British concerns were mostly with unilateral disengagement was the first British-manufactured elements in step in a process of Israeli territorial American equipment sold to Israel, such concessions. as the missile trigger systems used in The renewed violence between Israelis Apache helicopters, manufactured by the and Palestinians has placed strains on Smiths group. But the issue of converted British-Israel relations. The remarks by Centurion tanks being used as armored Cherie Blair, and later by Foreign personnel carriers has also been raised. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
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Such concerns have slowed the Jack Straw, on alleged 'double standards' development of the relationship between at the UN regarding Security Council the British and Israeli defense industries, resolutions dealing with Iraq and those which blossomed during the Oslo years dealing with Israel indicate the extent to of the 1990s. There have been reports of which the British government's position the British Department of Trade and sometimes sounds substantively similar Industry stalling on the granting of export to that of the European mainstream.(63) licenses for the selling of military components to Israel. CONCLUSIONS It should be borne in mind that all British policy toward Israel has been these differences have placed only a defined by three dualities. First, there has small dent in what is a very flourishing been the battle between two opposing commercial relationship between Britain conceptions of the Middle East. The and Israel. Israel remains the UK's Diplomatic view emphasizes the need to biggest export market and largest trading engage regimes, even oppressive and partner in the region, and the UK's 22nd aggressive ones, conducting relations and largest trading partner worldwide. (62) trade with no reference to these factors. It While supporting U.S. policy in Iraq views Israel as a disruptive influence in and taking strong measures against the region because its existence or radical Islamists based on British soil, the policies inflame anti-Western passions Blair government is still far from which would otherwise be insignificant. endorsing the view of Israel and U.S. The Strategic approach sees the political figures generally of a clear link Middle East's dilemma as stemming and commonality between Israel's primarily from the presence and behavior struggle with terror groups and the of dictatorial regimes which either evince challenge facing the West. The latter see or manipulate radicalism and anti- Israel's predicament--readiness to make Western feelings for their own interests concessions for peace, but faced with an and preservation. This has led to intransigent and extreme leadership on corruption, a lack of freedom, inefficient the other side--as one facet of a broader economies, and ultimately to regional clash between the West and radical violence and crises. It misdirects movements and ideologies emanating grievances which might otherwise be from the Middle East. resolved down the blind alleys of The view of France and several other extremism and excessive demands. European states instead blames Israeli The historical record shows that "intransigence" for the deadlock and Israel's own actions have a very limited violence. They urge criticism and role in effecting British policy. The two pressure to bring unilateral concessions conceptions have their own views of from Israel. In the familiar pattern, the Israel which interpret actions through British position lies somewhere in their respective lenses. between. Blair's own sympathy for Israel Second, there are two key institutions is undoubtedly sincere. But his policy has that battle over shaping and not been to radically overhaul or rethink implementing British policy toward the contours of British relations with Israel: 10 Downing Street, and the Israel, but rather to continue to operate Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The within traditional parameters. Indeed, Prime Minister is responsible for the reports suggest that Blair has been keen general direction of policy, the Foreign to try and use the influence he gained in Office for its day-to-day implementation. Washington as a result of his backing of The Foreign Office, with its staff of long Bush on the Iraq question in order to re- service, career diplomats, is the main start the negotiations between Israel and promoter of the Diplomatic approach. the PA. Comments by Foreign Secretary Independent-minded prime ministers Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) An Analytical and Historical Overview of British Policy toward Israel such as Winston Churchill, Anthony Embassy diplomatic staff in Tel Aviv did Eden, Harold Wilson, Margaret Thatcher, not include a single Hebrew-speaker. and Tony Blair have tended to a greater 6. Quoted in Ewan MacAskill, "Israel's or lesser extent to take the Strategic Tactical Indignation," The Guardian, approach. September 25, 2001. Finally, there is the duality of Britain's
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Roger, The British Empire in the Middle the centrality of the 'liberation of East, 1945-51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Palestine' for Arab nationalism. 1984). 33. Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict 18. Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, p. 228. in the Middle East, 1964-67: the Coming 19. Ibid, p. 235. of the Six Day War, p.148. 20. See Hugh Dalton, High Tide and 34. Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict After (London: London, 1962), pp. 147. in the Middle East, 1964-67: the Coming 21. Louis, William Roger, The British of the Six Day War, p.209. Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51, pp. 35. Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, p. 343. 114-5. 36. Moshe Gat, Britain and the Conflict 22. Wilson, The Chariot of Israel, p. 239. in the Middle East, 1964-67: the Coming 23. Ibid. of the Six Day War, p. 98. 24. Bevin's parliamentary Under 37. For an insightful account of this Secretary, Christopher Mayhew, wrote in moment in the political history of the his diary (May ,1948) that "there is no Arab world, see Fuad Ajami, The Dream doubt in my mind that Ernest detests Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Jews. He makes the odd wisecrack about Odyssey (New York: Pantheon Books, the 'Chosen People'; declares the Old 1998). Testament the most immoral book ever 38. See Barry Rubin and Judith Colp written and says the Jews taught Hitler Rubin, Yasir Arafat: a Political the technique of terror. 'What could you Biography (London: Continuum, 2003). expect when people are brought up from 39. The Convention deals with offences the cradle on the Old Testament' he said and certain other acts committed on board to me." See, Avi Davis, "The Hateful aircraft. It stipulates, among other things, Legacy of the British Foreign Office," the required actions to be taken by Boston Globe, January 12, 2003. signatory states in the event of unlawful 25. Louis, William Roger, The British seizure of aircraft. Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51, p. 40. Interview with Peter Tripp, UK 581. Confidential,
52. Douglas Davis, "The Man Behind 57. Lamia Lahoud, "New Talks on Blair," Jerusalem Post, September 24, Jerusalem Under Way," Jerusalem Post, 1999, and Sharon Sadeh, "The Road to August 23, 2000. Ibrahim Hazboun, "EU Damascus Passes Through London," to recognise Palestine," The Guardian, Ha'aretz, December15, 1999. Also Simon June 21, 2000. Danna Harman, "Bloody Henderson, Bush and Blair: "Tensions in Palestine," The Guardian August 28, the Relationship," Policywatch paper 1998. no.738, April, 2003. 58. Jonathan Rynhold, "British Policy 53. Christopher Walker, "Britain toward the Middle East in the '90s: Spearheads EU Drive to Halt New Israeli Between the US and the EU." Homes on West Bank," The Times, 59. See Ha'aretz, "UK's Straw Voices January 14, 1998. Christopher Walker, Compassion for Suicide Bombers," May "Britain Warns Netanyahu Not to Crush 27, 2002. Also Nicholas Watt, "Lib Dem Palestinian Hopes," The Times, June 6, MP: Why I Would Consider Becoming a 1996. Christopher Walker, "Arabs Suicide Bomber," The Guardian, January incensed by US Land Veto," The Times, 23, 2004. May 19, 1995. 60. Richard Allen Greene, "Israel, Britain 54. British Embassy to Israel website: at Odds over Forum," Jewish Telegraphic
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