The Morale of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-18
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Appendix 1 The Morale of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-18 NB: for a more thorough discussion of this topic, see G.D. Sheffield, The Morale of the British Anny on the Western Front, 1914-18, Occasional Paper No.2, Institute for the Study of War and Society, De Montfort University Bedford (1995). One of the most useful definitions of morale, which links that of the individual with that of the group, is that of Irvin L. Child: 'morale pertains to [the individual's] efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the group in accomplishing the task in hand'. 1 The relationship between individual and collective morale can be described as follows: unless the individual is reasonably content he will not willingly contribute to the unit. High group morale is the product in large part of good morale experienced by the members of that unit; and the state of morale of a larger formation such as an army is the product of the cohesion of the units that compose that army. The possession of indi vidual morale sufficiently high that a soldier is willing to engage in combat might be described as 'fighting spirit'. The nineteenth-century military philosopher Clausewitz divided morale into two components: 'mood' and 'spirit'. The mood of an army [or indeed an individual] is a transient thing, which can change quickly; but an army with 'true military spirit' keeps 'its cohesion under the most murderous fire' and in defeat resists fears, both real and imaginary. Military spirit, Clausewitz argued, is created in two ways: by the waging of victorious wars and the testing of an army to the very limits of its strength. 2 While the morale of the BEF remained fundamentally sound throughout the war, it is not being suggested that individual soldiers or indeed entire units were ecstatically happy all the time. Rather, the 180 Appendixes 181 combat performance of British soldiers reflected their commitment to winning. The first winter of the war was a terrible trial for the soldiers in the trenches, and this experience affected morale. However, as the events of 1915 proved, the 'depression' of the winter of 1914-15 did not permanently erode the military spirit of the British soldier. Morale also suffered during the following winter, but the BEF's military spirit remained essentially intact. The attritional battles of 1916-17 placed the men of the BEF under tremendous strain. The ultimate test of morale is willingness to engage in combat, and the BEF's divisions continued to fight throughout the campaigns. During the Battle of the Somme the BEF advanced about seven miles at the cost of 420000 British casualties. Yet in November 1916 a report based on the censorship of soldiers' letters stated, 'the spirit of the men, their conception of duty, their Moral (sic), has never been higher than at the present moment'. Enthusiasm had been replaced by a 'dogged determination [,] to see the thing through at any cost'.3 In 1917 further heavy losses came at Arras and at Ypres. Yet censorship reports and other evidence suggest that in the latter part of 1917 the BEF's morale was lower than in 1916 but remained sound.4 In 1918, the BEF had to relearn how to conduct mobile operations, first in a major retreat, and then advancing to victory. The initial success of the German Spring Offensive that began on 21 March 1918 has been traditionally attributed, in part at least, to a breakdown of British morale. A censorship report of July 1918, and the work of modern historians, suggests that this view is wrong.5 Had the morale of the British Army indeed collapsed, the Germans would probably have won the war, for the autumn of 1918 was to demonstrate the serious consequences of a genuine weakening in an army's morale. The events of the spring of 1918 cannot be divorced from the victo ries of the summer and autumn, when the BEF 'was at last obtaining a just reward for all its dogged and patient fighting'. 6 In the words of one temporary subaltern, the BEF fought the enemy to a standstill and then counterattacked and remain[ed] continuously on the offensive from August to November. The infantry at least had no doubt that they were winning, and their faith was justified when the greatest military Power of modern times finally collapsed in disordered retreat. 7 Appendix 2 British Army Conscripts Fifty-three point three per cent of all wartime enlistments occurred after the introduction of a form of conscription in January 1916. However, I have made no attempt to discuss relations between officers and conscripts per se. Assessing the conscripts' war experience is not easy. Relatively few soldiers who wrote memoirs or left diaries or letters admitted to the stigma of conscription.' Conscripts were drawn from a variety of social backgrounds, with a disproportionate number coming from white-collar, middle-class occupations. Moreover, conscripts had widely differing wartime experiences. Men were conscripted into every arm, and served in Regular, New Army and TF units, which themselves may have had differing approaches to discipline and officer-man relations. Not surprisingly, conscripts' attitudes towards enlistment varied greatly. Some men attested under the Derby scheme, a 'half-way house' between volun tarism and compulsion. Some deliberately avoided the army during the voluntary phase, while others who were unable to volunteer welcomed conscription. Some men, who probably would have volun teered, only reached the age of enlistment after conscription was introduced.2 Other men, such as Fred Dixon (Surrey Yeomanry) volunteered rather than await conscription, so he could join the regi ment of his choice. 3 The writer Stephen Graham, conscripted in 1917, ended up in the ranks of the Scots Guards because he declined the chance of a commission.4 In 1917, an 'old sweat' of 55th Division praised the keenness of 19-year-old conscripts, but this contrasted with the lack of enthusiasm evinced by conscripts in their mid-30s.5 Given these variables, it would be a meaningless exercise to treat 'the conscripts' as a discrete group when discussing their attitudes towards officer-man relations and discipline. 182 Appendixes 183 However, some general remarks about conscripts are not out of place. Wartime volunteer officers and rankers often denigrated the discipline, motivation and military effectiveness of conscripted soldiers.6 Thus the commander of 19th Division lamented that the replacements that arrived at the end of the Somme campaign in 1916 'lacked the cheerful eager look of the volunteer. We never had the same gallant adventurers in the ranks again.'7 To be set against this subjective view is the fact that, whatever their facial expressions, in the last week of the war the men of 19th Division advanced 18 miles over difficult terrain against a tough enemy, taking 'fairly severe' casu alties in the process.8 Judged by the yardstick of military success, 19th Division's conscripts were effective soldiers. The same was true of the men of 9/DLI who were praised by their commander for their perform ance in September 1918: [They] showed the highest form of discipline while under the enemy barrage, never flinching although caught like rats in a trap. The conduct of the men was worthy of the highest traditions of the British army.9 In 1918, as in earlier years, some units were more effective than others, and a host of reasons determined military effectiveness. Leadership, morale, training and tactical ability were among the most important. In 1917-18 new men 'blended with surviving natural leaders to keep the show going'.10 The survival of distinctive tradi tions and ethos in some units supports this contention. Conscription did not in itself affect combat performance to any great degree. David Fraser argues that in the Second World War, British conscripts accepted the demands of military life if they experienced 'competent, understanding leadership and a well-run and pride-filled unit'.11 Much the same might be said of the conscripts joining up in 1916-18, and indeed of the volunteers of 1914-15. Conscripts seem to have differed little in their attitudes to comparable volunteers. Alfred M. Hale, a 41-year-old artist and composer who loathed army life, 18- year-old E.C. Barraclough, who approached his service with enthusiasm and excitement, and F.A. Voigt, whose attitudes fell between those of the other two, are paralleled by those of volunteer soldiers.12 The conscript's attitudes and assumptions mirrored those of other soldiers of his age, social class, education, and civilian and military experience. In this respect, the method by which a man joined the army was relatively unimportant. Appendix 3 Discipline and Continuity in Small Units Trench-mortar batteries, Royal Engineer field companies, machine gun companies and similar units were relatively small, perhaps one hundred men strong, and commanded by fairly junior officers such as captains or even subalterns. Such units were often used as dumping grounds for officers and men who were not wanted by their parent units.1 Paradoxically, members of TMBs and the like regarded them selves as an elite, as craftsmen with a skilled task to perform, unlike the 'general purpose' infantry. It is not surprising that officers and men who regarded themselves as part of an elite team should develop a working relationship that set aside the niceties of military etiquette. 2 They also shared a common identity as 'outsiders', disliked by the infantry. This antagonism arose partly because of their privileged, independent existence, but also because TMBs disturbed the live-and let-live system, and drew fire on the infantry, while sappers often required working parties to be furnished by the infantry.3 Away from the supervision of more senior, perhaps Regular officers, commanders of small units often operated informal disciplinary systems.