Testing the Ice

How International Cooperation in the Arctic Has Been Affected by the Ukraine Crisis Case Study: Norwegian-Russian High North Politics

Paul André Narvestad

Introduction. The Arctic has shown exemplary cooperation between states through establishing agreements and settling disputes over resource abundant areas. The region consists of five littoral states, Canada,

Greenland (Denmark), Norway, Russia and the United States, and is geographically unique in that it unites Eurasia and North America, which consequently creates a region involving key global actors.

This means there is a high the possibility for Arctic states to be involved in global issues outside the

Arctic. In March 2014, the Russian Federation sparked an international crisis by annexing Crimea, and further fuelling conflict in the Eastern Ukrainian provinces Donetsk and Luhansk. This has created a state of diplomatic tension between Arctic states over a non-Arctic issue. Notably, the

European Union (EU) and the U.S. have implemented sanctions on Russia. Have developments in

Eastern Europe soured cooperation in the Arctic? What can the patterns of cooperation in the midst of turmoil of the Ukraine Crisis tell us about international relations? This essay uses Norwegian-Russian

High North Politics as a case study to investigate this, and Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s theory of complex interdependence to explain the pattern of responses to the Ukraine Crisis in the Arctic.

This essay will argue that there is a twofold response, or dual reaction to the Ukraine Crisis in the

Arctic. Channels of local cooperation that exclusively concern Norway and Russia have remained stable, while channels that involve the two states on a multilateral level have been discontinued.

Cooperation in the Arctic is challenging to examine because of the vast number of projects.

Complex interdependence theory recognizes that “multiple channels connect societies”1, and this essay will investigate cooperation through a nuanced lens based on this theory. Cooperation will therefore be examined through different approaches, environmental, economic, militarily and people- to-people respectively. The essay will approach each of these channels by examining cooperation before and after the Ukraine Crisis, and use this as empirical evidence. Additionally, the essay will

1 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 24.

also outline a historical background to Norwegian-Russian relations to provide a holistic understanding of these High North societies.

The case study, Norway and Russia, share both land borders and maritime boundaries in the

Arctic. As opposed to other regions within the Arctic such as the Bering Strait, the two states share a populated border with historic human interaction. Since the end of the Cold War, cooperation has evolved progressively in fisheries, boundary limitations agreements, environmental protection, military, people-to-people, gas and oil exploration. Nevertheless, this bilateral relationship is asymmetric: a great unpredictable power and a small state bound to institutions of other great powers.

Norway is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and has close ties to the EU, which means it is tied to obligations of international institutions that oppose recent Russian aggression. The rich history, close proximity, numerous partnerships and asymmetry between theses states make this case study appropriate for the purposes of this investigation.

Complex Interdependence Theory.

“Interdependence” in global politics refers to activities in which there are reciprocal effects among states or actors, 2 and evolves out of transnational communications, economic cooperation and human interaction. 3 Complex interdependence theory examines international relations through different channels between societies: interstate relations (government elites and militaries), transnational organizations (firms and corporations) and informal non-governmental elites

(interaction between the citizens).4

The absence of a hierarchy results in a complex web of relationships. Military force loses its significance as the key power tool because states are incentivized to refrain from waging war as it

2 Keohane and Nye, Power, 8. 3 Ibid, 3. 4 Ibid, 24.

would harm themselves.5 This theory opposes the realist notion that the Westphalian state is the key actor in world politics by claiming other non-governmental elites have significance in global politics.

This dependence is normally not balanced in symmetry, which means that states would be equally dependent of each other. Rather, large states tend to dominate, and create relationships of asymmetry. In asymmetry, interdependence provides one actor with sources of power. The less dependent state can use the dependency to affect the other.6

At the moment, the Norwegian-Russian bilateral relationship cannot be described as a situation of pure interdependence. But the notion of different channels of cooperation is relevant to the argument in this paper, and explains the dynamics of the bilateral and multilateral relationships.

Also, it is important to take into account how Norway has interdependent relationships with other actors such as the EU and the U.S. This essay attempts to distinguish the numerous channels into global or regional cooperation. Global cooperation represents the state with interstate agendas on a global arena, while regional cooperation is driven by local necessities. Given the absence of hierarchy according to complex interdependence, the regional cooperation should not be affected by multilateral decision-making, and therefore not be affected by geopolitical fluctuations in global politics.

“Rich History”: Trade, Altruism and Tension.

I. Pre-Cold War.

Norway and the Russia have had a curious historical relationship. While the Hanseatic League ruled trade in Western Europe and Southern Norway, the “Pomor Trade” took place from the 1700s up until the First World War in the Barents Region between the cities of Tromsø, Hammerfest, Vardø and Arkhangelsk.7 In 1921, Norwegian Arctic explorer, scientist, diplomat and humanitarian Fridtjof

5 Ibid, 25 6 Ibid, 11. 7 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (1993). Barentsregionen: et regionaliseringsprosjekt i det nordligste Europa. (Oslo: Det kgl. utenriksdepartement): 59.

Nansen directed relief for millions of Russians dying from famine on mission from the Red Cross.8

Help for the USSR was hard to mobilise, then suspect in the eyes of Western states, but Nansen pursued this task nevertheless. Near the end of the Second World War in 1944, the Soviet Army liberated Norway’s Arctic counties Finnmark and Troms from Nazi Germany, and willingly transferred sovereignty back to the Norwegian government.9 This demonstrates some of the unique positive historical aspects of the Norwegian-Russian relationship. In spite of this, the Cold War soured relations systematically by the ideological schism of the East and West.

II. The Cold War.

Norway’s membership in NATO sent a clear message to the international community that it was a part of the Western Bloc, in opposition to the Eastern Bloc. Throughout the Cold War there were several events that strained relations between the Soviet Union and Norway in the Arctic. For example, in 1960 an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Sverdlovsk on the way to the Norwegian Air Force Base in Bodø.10 Norway was strategically important to NATO, as it was one of the countries that bordered the Soviet Union. The West’s strategy during the Cold War was based on classical geopolitical thought11, to establish a rimland to contain the Soviet Union, by a circle of military alliances surrounding the Eurasian Soviet heartland.12 The Kola Peninsula was highly militarized, hosting the Soviet Northern Fleet’s bases for submarines with nuclear missiles.

Thus, the Barents Sea was the key access route for the Soviet’s militaries to access the West.13

Norway, as the European Arctic country of NATO, became the far north stronghold comprising the rimland containing the Soviet Union. The contrasting historical narratives are important to keep in

8 The Nobel Foundation 1922. Fridtjof Nansen – Biographical. Accessed. February 17, 2015. 9 The National Archives of Norway. Frigjøring og gjenreising. Accessed February 17, 2015. 10 Alf R. Jacobsen. U-2-Affæren. (Oslo, Aschehoug & co, 2009): 5. 11 Geir Hønneland and Øyvind Østerud. “Geopolitics and International Governance in the Arctic,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 5, no. 2 (2014): 172. 12 Ibid,. 13 Ibid, 175.

mind, because they shape the behavior of the different channels of interaction between Russia and

Norway.

Post-Cold War Thaw: Evolving Interdependence?

I. Post-Cold War.

Because of the ease of tension, throughout the post-Cold War period Norway and Russia were incentivised to evolve the their Barents Sea cooperation in petroleum and fish exploitation, and combat common threats, such as environmental degradation and accidents at sea. This has been achieved through so called “joint-commissions” in fisheries, nuclear safety and environmental security. The Joint Commission on Fisheries is a rare example of Cold War cooperation between East and West. This commission has provided a platform for rules on quotas on fish and outlined a sustainable fishing.14 The Joint Commission on Environmental Protection was founded to combat pollution, and measures radioactivity, water and air pollution.15 The Joint Commission on Nuclear

Safety, established formally in 1998, has successfully led cooperation on nuclear waste management.16

The overall trend in these joint-commissions is that they became more influential and important after the Cold War according to Hønneland.17 Russian and Norwegian both share the perception of the High North is an area of potential industry and growth. To make the region viable and sustainable, both states are incentivized to equip the region with essential services.

Environmental factors do not respect human static borders, and therefore cross border cooperation is necessary to overcome complications.

II. The 2010 Barents Sea Boundary Treaty.

14 Geir Hønneland. “Norsk-Russisk Miljø-og Ressursforvaltning i Nordområdene”. Nordlit 29, no 1. (2012): 80. 15 Ibid,. 16 Ibid., 85. 17 Ibid,, 86.

Apart from challenges, the Arctic also offers valuable resources to both states. The dream of the Arctic becoming a prosperous region has driven an incentive to solve boundary disputes. The milestone in Norwegian-Russian cooperation was the 2010 Barents Sea Boundary Treaty. The

Barents Sea is abundant in fish, minerals, gas and oil with high prospects for exploitation, and herefore the Barents Sea offers valuable prospects for the Norwegian and Russian economies.

Approximately 50,000 square nautical miles (10% of the Barents Sea) was contested between the two states.18 Both governments ratified the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in

1996 and 199719, and the parties were able to agree on dividing the disputed area in exactly half.20

The agreement demonstrated how two former Cold War adversaries could cooperate to divide resource abundant areas peacefully. Furthermore the agreement outlined a “unitization agreement”, which provides a framework for Russia and Norway to exploit reserves as one entity if the reserve lies on the boundary. This agreement demonstrated to the Arctic and the world that previous Cold

War adversaries could settle disputes, and opened a channel for Norwegian and Russian oil firms to cooperate in oil rich seas.

“Norway Turns from North to West”: Sanctions and Implications.

Sanctions are political tools that can send strong messages to actors in the international community. Norway has a principle of adhering to sanctions from the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) when customary international law is breached. However, since the beginning of the

2000s Norway has been implementing the EU’s sanction politics, despite not being approved by the

UNSC. Norway is not a member of the EU, but is bound by several agreements such as the European

Economic Area (EEA) and the Schengen Agreement. This makes Norway strongly economically dependent on Europe, and obliged to adhere to Brussels in certain circumstances under the EEA-

18 Michael Byers, International Law and the Arctic, (Camebridge: Camebridge University Press, 2013), 39. 19 Ibid, 40. 20 Ibid, 46.

Agreement. Without following EU sanctions, Norway would have functioned as a loophole in the

EU’s strategy, and would have received European pressure.21

I. The Implications on Oil Ventures.

In July 2014, Norway implemented the EU sanctions on Russia, including freezing of economic assets, no-entry for designated Russian citizens and a ban on weapons exports.22 The

Norwegian government adopted this policy on the basis that Russia had broken the UN Charter. The sanctions also forbid exports of petroleum technology, 23 which was significant because of the cooperation between Norwegian oil company Statoil and its Russian partners Gazprom, Lukoil and

Rozneft in the Barents Sea. In addition, Statoil had to follow even stricter American sanctions, because it is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The Russians are highly dependent on

Norwegian offshore technology, which cannot be bought from other large petroleum states, not even

China.24 The Statoil-Roznef relationship has especially feared the sanctions due to activity onshore and offshore due an agreement signed in 2013 on joint oil exploration with prospective benefits for both parties.25 Consequently, Norway’s ties to the EU and the U.S disrupted the oil cooperation in the

Arctic, and shows how the global economic constrains can influence firms’ activities.

Despite the sanctions, the Russian-Norwegian energy cooperation has continued to a degree,

Rozneft and Statoil started their joint oil exploration in the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea in

August 2014.26 This cooperation continued because the sanctions only forbid activity in Russian waters, and not activity in the state implementing the sanctions i.e. exploitation in the Norwegian

21 Ulf Sverdrup. “Norske Sanksjoner?” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, May 21, 2014. Accessed February 20, 2015. 22 The Norwegian Government Office of the Prime Minister. (2014) Norge vil innføre nye restriktive tiltak mot Russland. Accessed February 19, 2015. 23 Norwegian Government Ministry of Justice and Public Security. (2014) Statsråd 10 oktober 2014. Accessed. February 17, 2015. 24 Arild Moe. “Russian Oil – Challenges and Possibilities”. Oxford Energy Forum 97. No. 4 (2014): 19. 25 Atle Staalesen. “Oil ministers shuttle between Russian and Norway”. BarentsObserver, June 13, 2013. Accessed February 18, 2015. 26 Rozneft. Rosneft and Statoil Start Exploration Operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf in the Barents Sea, August 18, 2014. Accessed February 19, 2015.

sector was still lawful. The Norwegian government has also sold licences for drilling in the Barents

Sea to Lukoil in the previously contested area27, showing how the Norwegian government is still willing to let Russians operate in Norwegian waters despite the Ukraine Crisis.

Norway’s ambiguous stance was further visible when Norwegian Prime Minister Erna

Solberg told DagensNæringsliv, a highly respected Norwegian financial newspaper, that “there was room for interpretation of the sanctions”, and that not all energy cooperation would be discontinued.

She specified that the terms “Arctic” and “deep water”, in particular, were loosely defined, and that

Norwegian companies could find loopholes in the agreement.28 This shows an ambivalent approach in Norwegian sanction politics; Norway wants to adhere to international principles through alliances, but realizes that joint oil exploration with Russia is important for their companies and economy.

II. Environmental Cooperation During the Crisis.

The environmental and sustainability cooperation between Norway and Russia also demonstrated a dual response. In March 2014, Russian and Norwegian ministers were supposed to meet in Moscow to discuss environmental cooperation and trade with other members of the European

Free Trade Association (EFTA). Norway chose to not send a delegation because of the Crisis.

Amongst several issues, the meeting was going to concern emissions from Pechenganikel, and the signing a memorandum of understanding on joint polar bear counting.29 During the autumn 2014,

Norwegian and Russian researchers and scientists executed a mission, on investigating whether a sunk nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea was leaking nuclear materials from its reactor. This mission was planned and organized by the Joint Environmental Commission.30 The multilateral minister meeting was cancelled because of the Norwegian Governments principle of solidarity with

27 Atle Staalesen. “Lundin, Lukoil prepare for Barents drilling” BarentsObserver. March 12, 2015. Accessed March 20, 2015. 28 Ånestad et al. “Sanksjoner Skaper Forvirring”. DagensNæringsliv, September 2, 2014. Accessed February 19, 2015. 29Alf Ole Ask. “Norge utsetter miljømøte og handelsavtale med Russland”. Aftenposten, March 19, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2015. 30 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014) NordKloden. (Oslo: Det kgl. utenriksdepartement), 61.

other EFTA states towards the Ukraine Crisis. While the investigation in the Barents Sea was controlled by joint-commissions, which deal with exclusive bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia. Therefore a dual reaction prevails in environmental cooperation because of the different channels dealing with the issue. The pattern suggests that Norway at a state level interacting globally discontinues cooperation with Russia, but regionally at the local level continues its bilateral relationship.

“The Fog of Ukraine”: Military Cooperation and Developments.

As the military tensions receded after the Cold War, the Norwegian and the Russian Armed

Forces increased their cooperation in different activities. The most notable is the joint Coast Guard cooperation, and the joint military exercises with armed units. Despite flexing muscles on each side of the border since the crisis in Ukraine, military cooperation still takes place through the Coast

Guards. Even the military have not responded to the Ukraine Crisis with a coherent single policy.

I. Discontinued Joint Military Exercises.

Norway and Russia have launched armed military exercises since the end of the Cold War.

Exercise Pomor between Russia and Norway stresses cooperation against counterterrorism and anti- piracy in the Barents Sea, and has been held annually since 1994. In addition, they have taken part in

Exercise North Eagle, initially a bilateral Arctic military exercise between the U.S. and Russia held every four years since 2004, Norway joined in 2008 and 2012. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government chose to suspend “all scheduled bilateral military activities” with Russia, due to the

“illegal annexation of Crimea”.31 As a consequence of this policy the bilateral exercise Pomor was cancelled 32 / 33 , along with multilateral exercise Northern Eagle. 34 Military exercises are not

31 The Norwegian Government. (2014) Norway suspends all planned military activity with Russia. Accessed March 13, 2015. 32 The Norwegian Government. (2015) Norway suspends bilateral military activities with Russia in 2015. Accessed March 13, 2015.

exclusively bilateral and region. For example, Northern Eagle included the U.S and therefore this cooperation becomes a global issue. Also, even bilateral military exercises between Russia and

Norway can be considered global because they are clearly noticeable to outside states.

II. Increased Militarization.

In March 2015, the Norwegian Armed Forces held a military exercise, Joint Viking, in

Finnmark. It was the largest unilateral exercise in the Norwegian Arctic since 1967, with over 5,000 soldiers participating35. Simultaneously, the Russians held a naval military exercise in the Russian high north36. This stirred a bit of controversy in the Norwegian media, because Russia had not informed Norwegian authorities about the exercise. According to the Vienna Document, states are supposed to inform other states about exercises concerning land and air forces, but because it was a naval exercise the Russians were exempt from doing this. Still the unexpected exercise, worried

Norwegian authorities. The two states were deterring each other, a Cold War strategy that sparks fears. Arguably, this militarization stems from fears exacerbated by the Ukraine Crisis.

Norway has shown signs of enhanced security measures due to recent events. Since the Cold

War the Prime Minister’s Office has declassified documents from the Cold War to promote transparency. However, in February 2015 Norwegian authorities chose to reclassify documents that had been declassified in the 1990s. 37 The documents contained information concerning defence against the Soviet Union in the Arctic, such as plans for defending Finnmark, placing dynamite under the runway on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard, and the U.S.’s utilization of Norwegian military bases and equipment. State Secretary Sigbjørn Aanes told the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporations that “we are in a new security situation [because of the Ukraine Crisis]. Most people will remember

2014 as the year security was given a lot of attention, and that influences Norway’s security

33 Norwegian Armed Forces. (2015) Pomor. Accessed March 13, 2015. 34 Norwegian Armed Forces. (2015) Northern Eagle. Accessed March 13, 2015. 35 Norwegian Armed Forces. (2015) Joint Viking. Accessed March 13, 2015. 36 Aslak Ballari and Robert Greiner. “Kan være Putin som ønsker å svare Norge”. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporations, March 16, 2015. Accessed March 21, 2015. 37 Ståle Hansen et al. “Hemmlighetsstemplet Gamle Dokumenter fra den kalde krigen”. Norwegian Broadcasting Corporations, February 2, 2015. Accessed February 15, 2015.

policies…the security environment was completely different than in the 1990s when these documents were declassified”.38 The deduction drawn from this is that the Norwegian government is pursuing securitization that resemble conditions of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union (Russia) was perceived as a threat. These are measures the Norwegian government has pursued because of its multilateral membership in NATO.

However, militarization is not necessarily the antithesis of cooperation. In Norway’s unclassified Annual Report “FOKUS 2015”, Intelligence Service Chief Grandhagen noted that despite the militarization of Russian Arctic and its activity in the Ukraine, “Russia is no immediate threat to Norway’s security”. He claimed that Russia has no rational incentive to attack Norway.

Although he claimed in the long term, Russia should be analysed thoroughly because of its recent unpredictable behaviour. 39 The importance of this statement is that it counters the Cold War rhetoric of the media, and demonstrates the two key variables in military strategy, rational (incentive) and capacity. Although, Russia has the capacity, it does not have rational ends to achieve by going to war in the Arctic.

III. The Joint Coast Guard Cooperation and Its Continuation.

The Joint Coast Guard cooperation is the most unique aspect of the military cooperation. It is constructed on nuances of cooperation, which include control over fisheries, search and rescue, and oil recovery operations. Under the Norwegian Coast Guard Act of 1997, the Coast Guard is given police authority to deal with civilian threats.40 The cooperation can be traced back to the Cold War when Norway and the Soviet Union signed agreements in the 1970s relating the Joint Fisheries

Commission. This agreement gave the parties rights to inspect the vessels of the other party to the

38 Ståle Hansen et al, “Hemmlighetsstemplet”. 39 The Norwegian Intelligence Service. (2015) FOKUS-2015: Etterretningstjenestens Ugraderte Vurdering. (Oslo: Forsvaret): 17. 40 Svein Kosmo. (2010). “Kystvaktsamarbeidet Norge-Russland: En forsettelse av politikken med andre midler?”, (Unpublished Masters diss., Forsvarets stabsskole, Oslo), 23.

agreement as long as the vessel was in the economic zone of the state carrying out the inspection.41 In the post-Cold War period this cooperation evolved progressively with several new agreements: The

Memorandum on Cooperation Arrangements for Control in 2000, and additional protocols in 2005 and 2008. These agreements specified information sharing, meeting schedules and inspector exchanges42. The Search-and-Rescue aspect of the cooperation improved and was formally accepted in 1979 through the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). The local agreement for the Barents Sea (based on the international agreement), specified responsibilities, communications, exercises and access to waters and air space 43 . The Oil Recovery Operations

Agreement was signed in 1994, Similar to the previous Agreements, it emphasized details on communications, joint action response and joint exercises organized by the Barents Regional

Council.

The Coast Guard cooperation outlined above has not been affected by the Norwegian government’s decision to discontinue “all bilateral military activities”. There is regular communication between the Norwegian and Russian Coast Guards, and in March 2015 they completed their annual Joint Coast Guard exercise Barents 2015.44 The Coast Guard cooperation is bilateral and is exclusive to Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. This means it is driven by local agendas and will not respond to international solidarity.

From this we can glean a dual response in the military domain. The government elite responded by discontinuing military cooperation. Norway has incentive to react because of its vital cooperation with NATO in other fields, such as terrorism. It is worth considering that former

Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was appointed as the new Secretary General of NATO during the crisis (October 2014).45 Due to this distinction, Norway would feel pressured to show a

41 Ibid., 42 Kosmo, “Kystvaktsamarbeidet Norge-Russland”, 24. 43 Ibid,. 44 Trude Pettersen. “Norway and Russia join forces in Arctic response drill”. BarentsObserver, March 10, 2015. Accessed March 17, 2015. 45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2014) “NATO Secretaries General”. Accessed March 23, 2015.

prominent international stance on Ukraine in solidarity with the rest of NATO. Simultaneously, the

Coast Guard cooperation continues because of its importance in maintaining security in the region, and because it is linked to civilian local issues. Again this reflects the ambivalent contrast between regional and global agendas, which can be explained through the patterns of complex interdependence which considers relations being driven by numerous agendas.

“The Untouched Borderlands”: The Barents Region and People-to-People Initiatives.

I. The Barents Region and the Ukraine Crisis.

The Barents Cooperation was initiated by the Kirkenes Declaration in 1993. This established an institutional body with two levels. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) would be a platform for the national governments of Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden, while the Barents Regional

Council (BRC) consists of counties and oblasts of the Barents region, along with representatives from the indigenous communities (mostly Sami). Created in the euphoria at the end of the Cold War, its aim is to improve relations across the previous East-West divide in the Barents Region, through industry, business and culture.46 The spectrum of cooperation ranges from environmental protection, industry, infrastructure, health care, tourism, border crossings, visas, science and indigenous exchanges. Despite the serious events in Ukraine, the regional institutional cooperation has remained unchanged.47

The Norwegian government has chosen this local channel to continue and enhance dialogue with Russia. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose to allocate $20 million to the Barents

Secretariat for the period 2015 – 2017, which is an increase of $2.5 million from the last budget for

2011 – 2014.48 At a Conference in Kirkenes in February 2015, Russia and Norway decided to

46 Geir Hønneland, Borderland Russians: Identity, Narrative and International Relations, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 37. 47 Jan-Gunnar Winther. “Ukraina-krisen”. Norsk Polarinstitutt , November 16, 2014. Accessed 14 Feb 2015. 48 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat. “Regjeringen øker støtten til Barentssamarbeidet”. February 2, 2015. Accessed February 15, 2015.

continue improving cross-border conditions, work permits and local cross-border shopping. 49

Norwegian State Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bård Glad Pedersen reported that the

Norwegian government is cooperating with Russian authorities “on other levels and by other means. 50 He stressed the importance of continuation of “the pragmatic people-to-people cooperation…in areas of common interest…including management of fisheries and environmental issues”, in the light of the Ukraine Crisis.51

There has also been opposition to the sanctions within the region. The Norwegian town of

Kirkenes has been known as “Little Murmansk”, because of its close ties to the city across the border.

Almost, every institution in Kirkenes has a Russian partner, whether hospital, school or local business.52 Northern Norwegian businesses have asked the government to abandon the sanctions because the policy is damaging the local trade in the Barents Region. The sanctions on exports on fish caused one company, Kirkenes Trading, to consider declaring bankruptcy.53 The trading in the

Barents region goes back in history to the Pomor Trade, and is sensible because of the close proximity between the cities.

II. People-to-People Initiatives During the Ukraine Crisis.

In the beginning of March 2015, diplomats from the Norwegian and Russian Ministries of

Foreign Affairs, representatives from oil companies Total, Statoil, Rozneft and representatives from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and University of Nordland met to discuss enhancing student exchanges between the two states. Both states (and the oil companies) realize that

49 Atle Staalesen. “Norway Russia Committed Barents Cooperation Despite Divisions over Ukraine”. AlaskaNews, February 10, 2015. Accessed. February 21 2015. 50 Eliese Laustsen. “Sanksjonene mot Russland, Slik beholder Norge forholdet til Russland” DagensNæringsliv, August 21, 2014. Accessed 13 March 2015. 51 Laustsen. “Sanksjonene mot Russland”. 52 Natalia Golysheva. “Ukraine crisis spells Arctic freeze in Russia-Norway ties”. BBC, October 4, 2015. Accessed 21 March 2015. 53 Rune Ytreberg. “Dropp Boikotten av Russland”. DagensNærignsliv, February 4, 2015. Accessed. February 17, 2015.

bridging culture and language gaps between these people is key for future cooperation in seismic oil exploitation in the Barents Region.54

Researchers have also stressed the importance of continued cooperation. Norway and Russia have bilateral researched numerous fields, including petroleum, nuclear technology, seismic, oceanology and other Arctic related fields. A report from the Norwegian Research Council from

September 2014 concluded that working with Russian scientists was essential to maintaining fruitful research, and working towards common goals in the Arctic.55 The interaction of humans should not be undervalued, as the bridging of cultural gaps can establish framework for cooperation in the future. This is also cooperation that does not require international solidarity, and is exclusive to the regional partnership between Norway and Russia.

“Global vs. Regional”: The Channels of Cooperation and Their Agendas.

I. Analysing the Regional and Global Channels.

A state’s foreign policy is influenced by a myriad of factors, domestic politics, internal issues, culture, demographics, balances of power, external issues and threats. The challenge is to balance these variables to shape an ideal foreign policy. Norway’s response to Russia in light of the Ukraine

Crisis, demonstrates the complexity of factors and opinions that make up the duality of their policy.

The realist notion that the state is the sole key political actor, loses its merit through the lens of complex interdependence, which prescribes a prism of channels to cooperate. In this analysis the channels are divided into “global” and “regional”. “Regional” describes the channels that exclusively concerns regional cooperation in Norway and Russia in the interest of the Barents region. “Global” concerns Norwegian-Russian relations at a multilateral state level where Norway has an interest in maintaining solidarity with its allies.

54 Stein Sneve. “Boikott hindrer ikke norsk-russisk samarbeid i nord”. AvisaNordland. January 15, 2015. Accessed February 12, 2015. 55 Norwegian Research Council (2014) “Veikart for bilateralt forskningssamarbeid: Forskningssamarbeid med Russland”, (Oslo, Forskningsrådet), 9.

The “global” channel of cooperation in the High North has been significantly affected by the

Ukraine Crisis. The Norwegian government implemented EU sanctions, suspended formal military ties and even boycotted a multilateral meeting on environmental issues. This discontinued petroleum partnership, military exercises and environmental cooperation. Global forces of solidarity and alliances with the EU and NATO drove Norway to pursue these policies.

The “regional” channel of the High North has been less reactionary to the Ukraine Crisis. The

BEAR and BRC continues its cooperation project, the Norwegian government chose to allocate more resources to this area of cooperation, the Joint-commissions and the Coast Guard Cooperation has continued. These channels deal with issues that are exclusive to Norway and Russia in their local region, therefore cooperation is not required to follow the global driving forces of solidarity for

Ukraine. Therefore the local channel will continue its activity despite fluctuations in geopolitics.

II. Other Comparable Geopolitical Fluctuations.

There are two other geopolitical events that can be compared to the current one under analysis, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Under the former, a similar pattern of events to the current crisis occurred, all NATO cooperation with

Russia was discontinued, while the regional Barents cooperation, and the Coast Guard cooperation continued untouched by the geopolitical event.56 The local cooperation was too valuable for both parties to let the cooperation be influenced by the war in South-Ossetia. This supports the hypothesis, that local cooperation is not influenced by external geopolitical events due to the actors having local interests. While global cooperation, such as NATO, reacts to aggressions because of principles of acting multilaterally in solidarity.

The Collapse of Soviet Union can functions as a unique geopolitical event. The collapse eliminated tension, borders became more porous, and sparked the local human interaction between

56 Kosmo, “Kystvaktsamarbeidet”, 45.

the previously split societies. It was a prerequisite for the local cooperation that was enabled in the post-Cold War period. The objectives of the BEAC and the BRC is to encourage more local cross border cooperation between the previously divided people of the region. Russia faced economic hardship after the fall, and had the option of selling commodities to the capitalist market. This created an incentive to export fish from the Barents Sea amongst other industries. Therefore, regional initiatives gained attention, such as the Joint Fisheries Cooperation which required significant renewal to meet post-Cold War standards. These civilian activities also brought the Joint Coast

Guard, a military unit, into operation of web of other vital non-military activities. The collapse of the

Soviet Union was a geopolitical event, but differs from the Georgia 2008 and Ukraine 2014, because it was a global event that can be simultaneously regarded as a regional event to the Barents region, because it opened for the possibility of local interaction.

Conclusion

The Ukraine Crisis’ ripple effect did not reach the local channels of cooperation in the High

North. The continued Barents Regional cooperation, and Coast Guards activities confirm this.

However, the Arctic is not immune from global politics. The Norwegian government and military elite followed the West’s sanctions, through breaking of formal ties at government level. The pattern gleaned from this is that the actors on a global scale, states, respond to fluctuations in geopolitics, while regional elites, commissions and people-to-people organizations are more resistant to respond to global events. The difference between these channels is that they have different goals, and the local initiatives are exclusively bilateral concerns that do not concern other states.

The 1970s buzzword “globalization” describes the process of barrier breaking between close- to-home interests and global issues. The evidence presented in this essay has challenged this notion by demonstrating how local cooperation does not fall victim of global paradigms. The reluctance to abide to Cold War divides in the local region of Norway and Russia demonstrates that the Barents

Region has come far with their local post-Cold War regionalization project. The Ukraine Crisis remising Cold War tensions has been a perfect test for post-Cold War cooperation in the icy regions of the High North.

Works Cited.

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