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Prussian Army

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Prussian Army Waterloo Jun 14-18, 1815 Strategic Context Napoleon Bonaparte returns to France in February 1815, assimilating every French soldier he meets into his growing army. Bonaparte reaches Paris in March and offers peace to the opposing Allied coalition – but they choose war. Bonaparte appoints his most talented and trusted subordinate, Louis Davout, as his minister of war and begins rebuilding an army. By June, Bonaparte is able to field forces numbering over 230,000 against Allied forces of over 850,000 although the latter are dispersed and under various commands. Bonaparte deploys small, defensive armies to guard the Pyrenees, the Alps and the Rhine River against the Spanish, Italian and Austrian armies and concentrates a large, offensive army against the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies; the Russian armies march slowly but steadily across Europe. Bonaparte plans to destroy the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies before the other Allied armies can affect the situation. The French situation is not hopeless; Britain’s military is still dispersed after its war with the United States, Belgians, Germans and Poles are relatively anti-Allied while a decisive victory may force others to switch sides. Allied commander-in-chief Karl Phillipp Schwarzenberg plans an advance towards Paris by all armies on June 27 but Bonaparte strikes two weeks earlier. Stakes + A French victory would strain the Allied coalition and gain Bonaparte valuable time to build up his armies to deal with the Austrians, Russians, Italians and Spanish if need be. + An Allied victory would contain Bonaparte and demoralize the French nation, allowing the vast Allied armies to invade France. By Jonathan Webb, 2010 © Waterloo, 1815 Strength .Grande Armée .Allied Armies .Napoleon Bonaparte .Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher .Duke of Wellington .123,000 .217,000 .Well .Well By Jonathan Webb, 2010 © Prussian I Corps Tirlemont Bonaparte concentratescrosses the Sambre his army but behind traffic the congestion Sambre River. and Bonapartedesertion of plans a division to organize commander his army in inGerard’s two wings IV Corps and slowa reserve the –maneuver. left under Nonetheless, Ney, right under French Grouchy,cavalry surprise reserve Ziethen’s under himself I Corps –which and drivefalls back a wedge on Fleurus, between prompting the two Blücher opposing to orderarmies, his thusarmy invoking to concentrate a different at Sombreffe. response Pirchfrom andeach Thielmann of their vastlybegin (Ziethen) St. Truiden differentmarching butcommanders Bülow does temperament-wise. not take the report Afterseriously using and his doesreserve not tomarch. support On theone left,wing Ney and assumes crush the command most vulnerable as Reille’s army, II Corps he approachesplans to turn Quatre-Bras against the other,which defeatingPerponcher’s each 2 ndin Dutch-Belgiandetail. Wellington’s Division Anglo-Dutch resolves armyto hold. is spread Bonaparte out and orders expects Ney noto imminentoccupy Quatre-Bras, attack and feels using its his western numerical flank superiority,is secure, believingbut he itbivouacs to be Bonaparte’s for the night best instead; option. his Blücher’s units are Prussianslow to advance, army is lesshe can spread hear outfighting and is to ready his right to begin rear andconcentrating is familiar duewith toWellington’s confused tacticsbut insistent of concealing reports ofhis 30,800: Frenchtroops. preparations.Wellington meanwhile Wellington attends and Blücher’s a social eventonly plans and doesare to not concentrate send out orders at Nivelles until andlate Sombreffeat night. respectively. FrenchAnglo-Dutch IV Corps Army Anglo-Dutch Army Prussian Army Prussian Army (Wellington) (Blücher) 1st Division (Steinmetz) 2nd (Duke(Gérard) of Wellington) Subordinates RES Subordinates Division(Gebhard (Pirch) Leberecht von 3rd Blücher) Landmarks th 94,000 1st DB 123,000Division (Jagow) 4 16,700: June 1615 4th IV Division (Donnersmarck) 1st th 12 Division (Pécheux) II Corps cavalry division (Treskow) (Hill) 13th Division (Vichery) 2nd cavalry division (Lützow) GDE 14th Division (Bourmont) Prussian III Corps th II 7 Cavalry Division (Maurin) 2nd 2nd DB I Corps French II Cavalry Corps 3rd (Orange) (Thielmann) (Exelmans) 24,000: 3rd DB th th 3,100: DB I 9 Division (Borcke) 10 (+) Division (Krauseneck) th 9 Cavalry Division (Stroltz) III 11th Division (Witten) 10th Cavalry Division (Chastel) 12th Division (Stülpnagel) French I Corps (-) 1st cavalry division (Marwitz) 2nd cavalry (D’Erlon) Subordinates division (Lottum) 19,000: Grande Armée (Bonaparte) st nd 1 Division (Quoit) 2 French II Corps (+) French IV Cavalry Corps I Corps – Ziethen Division (Donzelot) 3rd Division (Marcognet) 4th (Reille) (Milhaud) II Corps – Pirch Division (Durutte) 1st 25,200: 2,900: III Corps – Thielmann Cavalry Division (Jacquinot) 5th Division (Bachelu) 13 th Cavalry 6th Division (Wathier) IV Corps - Bülow Division (Jérôme) 14 th7 thCavalry Division (Delort) Division (Girard) 9th Division (Foy) 2nd Cavalry Division (Piré) Light Cavalry Division from Guard (Lefèbvre-Desnoüettes) Prussian I Corps Tirlemont DuringNey’s occupation the night, of Quatre-Bras Wellington is provingissues difficult; orders forit takes his timeunits for to him conduct to extract forced his units marches from the trafficeast. They around make Charleroi substantial – not completely progress sure butof all of nonetheir exact reach locations Quatre-Bras – and Reille by suspects dawn. WellingtonThe French is preparing army is a intrap. firm Ney seespossession no reason of to the hurry central and rests position his units andwhile doesan aide not to Napoleonsee any bearingBritish (Ziethen) St. Truiden units,a penciled only note a findsDutch-Belgian D’Erlon’s I Corpsdivision, and ordersso Bonaparte it east, unbeknownst assumes to Wellington Ney. In the east, is withdrawing. Blücher deploys In his accordance available forces with for Bonaparte’sbattle against Bonaparteplan to who leaves Lobau’s VI Corps near Charleroi, ready to march in any direction. Wellington’s forces draw nearer to Quatre-Bras and he can only tell Blücher thatstrike he willat thesend firsttroops forceeast only which if he ispresents not attacked itself, himself. he resolves to strike at Blücher who is rushing his other corps to Sombreffe; Bonaparte orders Reille to detach Girard’s 7th Division to the right wing. 30,800: FrenchAnglo-Dutch IV Corps Army Anglo-Dutch Army Prussian Army Prussian Army (Wellington) (Blücher) 1st Division (Steinmetz) 2nd (Duke of Wellington) Subordinates Subordinates (Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher) (Gérard) Division (Pirch) 3rd Landmarks 94,000 II Corps 123,000 th 16,700: (Hill) June 16 Division (Jagow) 4 4th st 1st DB Division (Donnersmarck) 1 RES 12th Division (Pécheux) IV cavalry division (Treskow) th 13 Division (Vichery) I Corps nd (Orange) 2 cavalry division (Lützow) 14th Division (Bourmont) Prussian III Corps th 2nd 7 Cavalry Division (Maurin) 3rd GDE French II Cavalry Corps 2nd DB (Thielmann) I II 3rd DB (-) III 24,000: (Exelmans) (+) DB 3,100: 9th Division (Borcke) 10th 2nd DB I II III Division (Krauseneck) th Orange vs Ney Blücher vs Bonaparte 9 Cavalry Division (Stroltz) th at Quatre- at Ligny 11 Division (Witten) 10th Cavalry Division (Chastel) Bras 12th Division (Stülpnagel) French I Corps 1st cavalry division (Marwitz) 2nd cavalry (D’Erlon) Subordinates division (Lottum) 19,000: Grande Armée (Bonaparte) st nd 1 Division (Quoit) 2 French II Corps (+)(-) French IV Cavalry Corps I Corps – Ziethen Division (Donzelot) 3rd Division (Marcognet) 4th (Reille) (Milhaud) II Corps – Pirch Division (Durutte) 1st 20,200: 2,900: III Corps – Thielmann Cavalry Division (Jacquinot) 5th Division (Bachelu) 6th 13th Cavalry Division (Wathier) IV Corps - Bülow Division (Jérôme) 9th 14th Cavalry Division (Delort) Division (Foy) 2nd Cavalry Division (Piré) Light Cavalry Division from Guard (Lefèbvre-Desnoüettes) PerponcherFoy clears Gemioncourt deploys his division while Bachelu in a long clears thin linePiraumont, to appear making larger Perponcher’s as only Merlen’s position small west cavalry of the unit Brussels stands inroad support untenable. to the rear.Perponcher’s Perponcher forces plans retreat to hold to upBossu the Wood,French hotlyadvance pursued on three by Piré’s towns cavalry, until reinforcements and rally only arrive. in the Ney safety deploys of the Foy woods. and Bachelu By this totime, the Jérôme’s front with division Piré’s cavalrydeploys to in the front rear; of Bossuhe does Wood not knowfor the where French. the Piction’s rest of his division forces deploys are but toexpects strengthen them theany left minute. wing Neyand plansBrunswick’s to scatter corps the deploys few units along to histhe front Brussels by driving Road forin thethe Anglo-DutchAnglo-Dutch. left These wing forces and occupyarrive justQuatre-Bras, after Wellington thus separating himself who the twotakes enemy command. armies. Anglo-Dutch Army Quatre Bras (Duke of Wellington)Sart-Dames Avelines Picton 19,7808,780 Brunswick Perponcher Brussels Road Perponcher Bossu Wood Thyle Gemioncourt Piraumont Foy Bachelu Jérôme Foy Pierrepoint Bachelu Piré French Left Wing Piré Landmarks (Michel Ney) 18,30011,300 KellermannWellingtonNey continuesmaintains thepressure launches attack.cuts on Jéröme hisWellington’s a begins waytriple front.clearingback attack, Bachelu Bossuto half-heartedly recapturingWood;French Foy advanceslines. attacks Bossu butThyleNey halts whichWood, whentries Wellington his Gemioncourt toright renew wingreinforces becomes withthe and vulnerablesome
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