Neo-Molinism: A Traditional- Openness Rapprochement?1 Paul Kjoss Helseth

Paul Kjoss Helseth is Associate Pro- Introduction sical Molinist view of foreknowledge by fessor of Christian Thought at North- In his response to Gregory A. Boyd’s insisting that the open view, in fact, “could western College, St. Paul, Minnesota. exposition of the open view of foreknowl- perhaps more accurately be labeled neo- Dr. Helseth co-edited Beyond the edge in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, Molinism.”6 “In essence,” Boyd suggests, Bounds: and the Under- suggests, among other “[neo-Molinism] differs from the classical mining of Biblical (Crossway, things, that Boyd’s view of the future com- Molinist position only in that it expands 2003) with John Piper and Justin Tay- promises “a biblically sound doctrine of the content of ’s middle knowledge to lor and is the author of several scholarly providence” because it denies, “that the include ‘might-counterfactuals.’”7 Boyd articles. He is currently co-editing a cri- Principle of Bivalence holds for future proposes that, tique of postconservative contingent propositions and CCFs with Millard Erickson and Justin Taylor [counterfactuals of creaturely freedom].”2 Between God’s pre-creational knowledge of all logical possibilities entitled, Constructing a Center: Evan- Boyd’s distinction between a class of future and God’s pre-creational knowledge gelical Accommodation in a Post-Theo- events that can be known and a class of of what will come to pass is God’s logical Era (Crossway, forthcoming). future events that cannot be known not “middle knowledge” of what free agents might or might not do in cer- only “undermines divine omniscience” tain situations as well as of what free and “winds up destroying [both] contin- agents would do in other situations. If gency and freedom,” Craig contends, but it is true that agent X might or might not do y in situation z, it is false that it also jettisons God’s providential control agent X would do y in situation z, and of world history because it cannot account vice versa. On the basis of this knowl- edge, God chooses to have actualized for the “coalescence of human freedom and the that best suits his divine sovereignty” that work together sovereign purpose. The world God “toward his previsioned end.”3 The philo- chooses to be actualized, however, is more precisely described as a delim- sophical challenge facing open theists in ited set of possible worlds, any one general and Boyd in particular, Craig of which might be actualized, depend- insists, is “to defend the claim that the ing on the choices free agents make. Yet because God is infinitely intelli- Principle of Bivalence fails for future con- gent, he is as perfectly prepared for tingent propositions and CCFs, and . . . to whatever possible world gets actu- show that . . . [the open] view alone is able alized as if it were the only possible world that could be actualized. It’s to affirm real possibilities in the world”4 just that precisely because we accept without undermining God’s sovereign rule that God is infinitely intelligent, a neo-Molinist doesn’t suppose that over the unfolding course of world history. God must choose to falsify all might- Open theists will remain unequal to this counterfactuals in order to acquire 8 challenge, Craig concludes, as long as they this providential advantage. continue to ignore “the Molinist alterna- tive” to Calvinistic determinism on the one In short, Boyd is convinced that Craig’s hand and Free-Will theism on the other.5 critique misses the mark and that the God Later in the same volume, Boyd of open theism retains “significant provi- 9 responds to Craig’s exposition of the clas- dential control” over a future that is com- 56 prised “of both settled and open aspects”10 they do so because the actions of these agents flow either from the because the class of counterfactual propo- character God has given them (habi- sitions that God knows as true includes tus infusus, in classical terminology) statements about what agents with liber- or from the character they will acquire if they pursue a certain tarian freedom might or might not do in cer- possible course of action (habitus tain situations. This is significant, Boyd acquisitus, in classical terminology). believes, because it enables the neo- In either case the would-counter- factuals are not ungrounded, as in Molinist, first, to take “the entire open motif classical Molinism. From all eternity of Scripture” seriously and, second, to God knows that if he chooses to cre- ate free agent X, she will have the avoid the alleged pitfalls of the notorious basic characteristics of a, b and c. “grounding objection.”11 Indeed, “if we And from all eternity God knows accept that some might-counterfactuals are that if agent X freely follows a cer- tain possible life trajectory, she will eternally true,” Boyd argues, “we no longer become the kind of person who have the problem of an ungrounded eter- would do x in situation z. The nal settledness to possible worlds that would-counterfactuals for which agent X is morally responsible are include libertarian freedom, and there is no contingent on the might-counter- longer any problem accounting for liber- factuals for which she is morally 14 tarian freedom itself . . . [for] there simply responsible. is no eternal settledness to libertarian free As such, Boyd would have us believe actions. There are only eternal possibilities that neo-Molinism supplies the theoretical of what . . . [free agents] might or might framework for a rapprochement between not do.”12 How, though, does including the open view of the future on the one hand might-counterfactuals in the content of and more traditional views on the other God’s middle knowledge neutralize the because it enables open theists to affirm alleged force of the grounding objection? that God is the sovereign Lord of history The answer is found in the necessary while simultaneously insisting that the dependence of would-counterfactual Principle of Bivalence fails with respect to knowledge upon the realization in time of future contingent propositions and true might-counterfactuals, or those counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. But counterfactuals that have to do with liber- can open theists like Boyd really affirm that tarian freedom and thus with future states God is the sovereign Lord of a future that of affairs that are possibly one way or pos- has yet to be settled? In other words, does sibly another. It is this dependence, then, neo-Molinism in fact afford God significant the essential nature of which is described providential control over the unfolding below and examined more thoroughly in course of world history while at the same the forthcoming discussion, that accounts time affirming that the future is partly— for Boyd’s confidence that the God of open perhaps even mostly—open? To the best theism will accomplish “his sovereign of my knowledge, Craig has yet to publish purpose”13 for the created order without a response to Boyd’s proposal. Other schol- compromising the integrity of libertarian ars, however, are beginning to weigh in. freedom. “To the extent that would- For example, Stephen Wellum is on record counterfactuals apply to future free as believing that Boyd’s proposal is sim- agents,” Boyd concludes, ply implausible.15 And Bruce Ware is con- 57 vinced that it delivers “less than . . . [Boyd’s] cific, periodic, unilateral intervention— rhetoric might suggest.”16 In this essay, I something that might be called his select endeavor to translate some of the more sig- determinism.”18 While Nicholls certainly has nificant aspects of Boyd’s proposal into a point—most critiques of open theism do non-technical language, and then to offer suppose that “the open view utterly disal- an assessment that is both thoughtful and lows libertarian freedom to be compro- fair. What I intend to establish is that even mised or infringed upon in any way”—he if we grant that there is a possible world in writes as if unaware of those critiques that which neo-Molinism offers a satisfactory challenge openness theologians for pre- response to the grounding objection as well cisely this reason.19 A number of scholars as a coherent view of the future, it is not are convinced that openness theologians this world, as Boyd’s own exposition can affirm God’s providential control over makes more than clear. For Boyd’s view of the unfolding course of world history only the future is marred by an incoherence that because they are willing to sanction one or reduces the God of open theism to an more assumptions that are fundamentally ambivalent and arbitrary warrior for at odds with the foundational commit- whom the problem of evil is nothing less ments of the openness program. The God than the kiss of death. of open theism can retain significant provi- dential control over the unfolding course Moral Character, Compatibilistic of world history, these scholars argue, “Freedom,” and the “Infinitely either because he can, after all is said and Intelligent” Lord of History done, know at least some future contin- A recent article in the Journal of the Evan- gents, or because he knows what he is gelical Theological Society by Jason A. going to do in the future irrespective of the Nicholls correctly argues that the standard genuinely free decisions of responsible philosophical critiques of the open view of moral agents. the future tend to presume that openness theologians cannot affirm that God is the The Rather Dated Nature of the sovereign Lord of history because their Standard Philosophical Critiques commitment to the concept of libertarian Such critiques can no longer be uni- freedom knows no bounds. This presump- versally justified, however, because they tion, Nicholls argues, is based upon “a mis- betray an understanding of the open view conception about the openness view,” of the future that must be significantly namely that openness theologians are revised in light of Boyd’s more fulsome unwilling “to make room in their system exposition of the open view in his recent for the possibility of periodic instances of book, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Con- divine intervention . . . , perhaps even to structing a Trinitarian Warfare . the point of controlling, overwhelming or While my fellow critics and I have carefully overriding libertarian freedom on occa- argued that the distinction between a class sion.”17 The God of open theism “is immi- of future events that can be known and a nently capable of ‘getting what he really class of future events that cannot be known wants,’” Nicholls contends, because he is cannot be coherently sustained if the self- able “to control the final outcome of a determining freedom of contingent beings partly unforeseen future by means of spe- is regarded as “an [unlimited] end in 58 itself,”20 what we must now consider more moral agents? How, in other words, can his carefully is that openness theologians have providential control of world history really remained more or less undaunted by our involve anything more than mere “guess- arguments because many, in fact, are will- work about the future” if future contin- ing to acknowledge the coherence of at gents, in fact, do not exist to be known by least some form of . Boyd, anyone, including God, and if genuine free- for example, is eager to affirm that God can dom really is “incompatible with any form retain “significant providential control” of determinism”?23 The answers to these over the flow of world history, simply questions, as we shall see shortly, are to be because he can, in fact, have “a significant found in God’s balanced oversight of the role in steering human choices.”21 But how kinds of activity that are associated with can this be? How can theologians whose established and yet-to-be-established entire theological program to date seems characters, that is, the kinds of activity that to have been based upon a rejection of are associated with would- and might- compatibilism now be willing to sanction counterfactuals. While actions that flow a form of compatibilism? In the paragraphs from established characters can be fore- that follow I attempt to answer these ques- known and even determined, thus tions by unfolding a number of Boyd’s affording God a significant reservoir of more significant arguments in Satan and the providence-guaranteeing, would-coun- Problem of Evil, for these arguments repre- terfactual knowledge, those that flow from sent the most ambitious and creative yet-to-be-established characters can be nei- attempt to render the open view of the ther foreknown nor determined, for the future intelligible. What the reader must agent who is performing them retains note from the start is that Boyd’s propos- self-determining or libertarian freedom. als, although not entirely new, move the The agent retains the “power to do other- openness debate into a realm heretofore wise,”24 in other words, and thus might unimagined by the critics of open theism.22 possibly do one thing or might possibly do For what Boyd makes clear is that the open- another.25 ness debate has moved beyond the ques- According to Boyd, it is reasonable to tion of whether or not God can, in fact, fore- suppose that when God creates moral know the future actions of responsible agents, he gives each agent a “domain of moral agents, to the question of the kinds irrevocable freedom”26 and then “binds of responsible moral actions that God, in himself to interact with . . . [them] in ways fact, can foreknow. that honor that [gift of] self-determina- tion.”27 While the extent and duration of The Sovereign Lord of History the “domain of freedom” that is given and the Balanced Oversight of varies from agent to agent and is thus in Established and Yet-to-Be- principle unknowable to the contingent Established Characters observer,28 what remains constant (at least How, then, can the God of open theism in theory) is God’s commitment “not to retain “significant providential control” microcontrol a free agent he has created” over the flow of world history if it is logi- until that agent either oversteps “the cally impossible for him to foreknow the parameters of the gift of freedom God has libertarianly free decisions of responsible given,” or “solidifies” his character 59 through the use of his self-determining wise in a particular situation given their freedom.29 Until agents with self-determin- retention of the gift of self-determining ing freedom either go beyond the estab- freedom but also when they could not do lished bounds of their domain of freedom otherwise in a particular situation given the or their free choices “become crystallized characters they acquired for themselves by in the form of an irreversible character,” the use of their self-determining freedom.39 God “cannot by his own choice coerce . . . [or “We must remember,” Boyd notes in a pas- determine their] decisions.”30 Indeed, sage that is critically important for under- God’s “integrity” demands that he “honor” standing his exposition of the open view, the gift of self-determining freedom that he has given, for if he does not, he “under- that moral responsibility applies to the acquired character of self-deter- mines the authenticity of both freedom and mining agents even more funda- moral responsibility,” and thereby estab- mentally than it applies to the par- lishes that the gift of self-determining ticular decisions agents make which reflect and reinforce their character. freedom was never genuinely given in the Traditionally theologians have dis- first place.31 tinguished the character a person When an agent has exhausted the gift receives from God (habitus infusus) from the character they freely ac- of self-determining freedom that God gave quire (habitus acquirus) [sic]. There is him, however, God is then “under no no contradiction in the claim that a per- son is morally responsible for an act even obligation to refrain from intervening on though they could not have done other- [that] agent’s freedom,”32 for that agent has wise, so long as the character that now established his free choices in the form of rendered their action certain flowed from 33 a character they themselves acquired. It an “eternalized” character that is “irrevo- was not “infused” into them by God.… cably open or irrevocably closed to God’s Hence, if God decides that it fits his love.”34 Indeed, it is no longer possible for providential plan to use a person whose choices have solidified his character as that agent to be anything “other than [he wicked, God is not responsible for this is],” for his self-determining freedom, person’s wickedness.40 which was the “probationary means” to establishing the “kind of eternal being” he In light of the fact that morally respon- would irreversibly become, has given way sible actions can be foreknown and even to a “self-determined character”35 that is determined if those actions flow from self- defined in its “essence”36 by a kind of moral determined characters, it follows that open- orientation that is compatibilistically ness theologians like Boyd feel justified in inclined “either for or against God.”37 Since affirming that the future is both partly open “self-determining acts lead to a self-deter- and partly closed because they view the mined character” and “libertarian freedom future as an unfolding story involving [thus] becomes compatibilistic freedom,”38 God’s balanced oversight of both deter- it follows that there are two kinds of “free” mined and yet-to-be-determined compo- activity for which acting agents are mor- nents. Whereas the unfolding story is open ally responsible and which we must factor and unknowable to the extent that moral into our understanding of the open view agents retain self-determining or libertar- of the future. Contingent beings are mor- ian freedom, it is settled and knowable to ally responsible for what they do, Boyd the extent that actions flow from self- argues, not only when they could do other- determined characters that are allowed 60 to act spontaneously or are manipulated crucified by wicked people without predestining or foreknowing who compatibilistically. As the author of an specifically would betray and cru- unfolding story involving agents who pos- cify him. God orchestrated events to sess self-determining freedom, God thus the extent that certain wicked people (and certain wicked spirits, Jn 13:27; retains “significant providential control” 1 Cor 2:8) acted out their self-ac- over the story not only because he knows quired characters and did what they how particular moral agents with estab- wanted to do in conformity with his plan to have his Son betrayed and lished characters will act in particular situ- crucified. But they are still respon- ations if the contingents of history unfold sible for what they did, for they are responsible for the kind of agents in a certain fashion, but also because he they had freely become. God was can, if he chooses, have a more direct role simply employing their sinful inten- 42 in the steering of history by interacting tions to his own end. compatibilistically with moral agents who have solidified their own characters Divine Coercion: The Key to the through the use of their self-determining Continuity of History freedom. Indeed, God can accomplish his In the end, then, openness theologians loving purpose for the created order not like Boyd can affirm that the future is both only by predestining and foreknowing partly open and partly closed and that God events without ordaining from eternity “is intelligent and powerful enough to… 43 who will carry out those events, but he can accomplish all his objectives” only also orchestrate circumstances that exploit because they are willing to sanction a form the character traits of compatibilistically of compatibilism that, ironically, regards free yet susceptible moral agents so that compatibilistically free acts as coerced or those predestined events are actualized in determined acts for which the acting agent time.41 Scripture suggests, for example, is morally responsible. God is the sover- eign Lord of history, openness theologians that the Messiah’s betrayal was pre- argue, not only because he is “an infinitely destined and Jesus foreknew that intelligent chess player” who is able “to Judas would betray him (Jn 6:64, 70- 71; 13:18-19). These contentions anticipate every possible move and every do not contradict the view that mor- possible combination of moves, together ally responsible, self-determining with every possible response he might actions cannot be predestined or foreknown as long as Judas was not make to each of them, for every possible in particular chosen to carry out this agent throughout history,”44 but also deed before Judas had made himself because he will act unilaterally or coer- into the kind of person who would carry out this deed. After Judas cively when necessary, as David Basinger unfortunately hardened himself into says, in order “to keep things on track.”45 this kind of person, God wove his He will ensure that his purpose for the cre- character into a providential plan. God thus used evil for a higher good ated order is accomplished, in other words, (cf. Gen 50:20). Jesus could therefore in part by acting in ways that “override or foreknow that Judas would be the one to betray him. But nothing sug- withdraw [genuine] freedom of choice,” gests that it was God’s plan from i.e., that empty future creaturely actions of eternity that Judas would play this their uncertain or contingent nature.46 role.… [As such,] there is no diffi- culty in understanding how God could predestine and thus foreknow that Jesus would be betrayed and 61 purpose for the created order without mov- The Incoherence of the ing beyond the realm of what we might Open View of the Future call “soft” coercion—working compati- The Revocable Nature of the bilistically with agents who have estab- Irrevocable Gift of lished their own characters—into the Self-Determining Freedom relentlessly robotic realm of “hard” coer- What, then, are we to make of the will- cion—compelling agents to do what they ingness of openness theologians like Boyd otherwise might not do given their to sanction the unilateral or coercive activ- retention of the gift of self-determining ity of God in the lives of particular moral freedom.51 agents? Does their qualified endorsement Consider Boyd’s treatment of Peter’s of a form of compatibilism present any denial of Jesus. Boyd says, “it should be serious difficulties for the rest of the open- clear that this episode poses no significant ness program? In addition to undermin- problem for the open view of the future.”52 ing their stated concern for the inherently I, on the other hand, contend that it under- contingent nature of “genuine creaturely mines the coherence of his entire program. freedom,” it presents serious difficulties, I As we have seen, openness theologians like would argue, for at least three reasons.47 In Boyd are convinced that there is such an the first place, it demonstrates that the intimate relationship between established foundational convictions of even Boyd’s moral character and moral activity that more fulsome exposition of the open view when self-determined individuals are cannot be consistently applied to the analy- “squeezed” in the correct fashion, their sis of the flow of history. Openness theolo- behavior is not only “predictable,” it is “cer- gians like Boyd would have us believe that tain.”53 It is no longer contingent, in other the future is open to God as well as to con- words, but settled because it flows out of tingent beings because the “ultimate pur- the solidified nature of the acting agent, pose [of God] includes having free and for this reason the agent retains respon- agents”48 whose self-determining freedom sibility for performing the event. It is the is “irrevocable.”49 While the God of open exploitation of character in this particular theism can steer agents who have estab- sense, then, that Boyd suggests is manifest lished their own characters through the use in the case of Peter’s “divinely orchestrated of their self-determining freedom, his lesson.”54 “God,” Boyd argues, “knew and integrity demands that he refrain from perfectly anticipated (as though it was the determining the decisions of agents who only possible outcome) that if the world have yet to establish their own characters.50 proceeded exactly as it did up to the point The willingness of openness theologians to of the Last Supper, Peter’s character would allow for God to work in a fashion that vio- be solidified to the extent that he would be lates the self-determining freedom of moral the kind of person who would deny Christ agents jettisons the coherence of the open- in a certain situation.… On the basis of ness program, then, for it establishes that this knowledge and his sovereign control God cannot accomplish his ultimate as Creator, God decide[d] at some point purpose without violating a significant to providentially ensure that just this situ- component of that purpose. Indeed, it ation would come about,”55 and then establishes that God cannot accomplish his actualized the event by orchestrating 62 “highly pressurized circumstances” that and even determined even if the character “squeezed” Peter’s cowardly character out of the acting agent has yet to be “solidi- of him three times.56 fied” or “established”—and the utter Even if we grant, for the sake of argu- untrustworthiness of the God of open the- ment, that what we are calling “soft” coer- ism. Since the God of open theism coerced cion is compatible with the foundational Peter before Peter’s character was “unalter- assumptions of the openness program,57 ably”64 acquired, it is reasonable to the case of Peter’s denial of Jesus still pre- conclude that the God of open theism is a sents insurmountable difficulties for the covenant breaker who could accomplish openness program because it establishes, his purpose only by revoking the “irrevo- despite what openness theologians like cable” gift of self-determining freedom that Boyd would have us believe, that the God he gave to Peter. of open theism is willing to violate the self- determining freedom of contingent beings The God of Open Theism: in order to bring about states of affairs that The Occasional Author of Sin he really wants to bring about. Remember, In the second place, the willingness of openness theologians insist that when God openness theologians to allow for God to creates moral agents, he gives each agent work in a coercive fashion makes it much the gift of self-determining freedom “and more difficult for them to maintain consis- binds himself to interact with . . . [them] in tently that “the ultimate cause [and expla- ways that honor that [gift of] self-determi- nation] of any particular evil is the free nation.”58 In other words, he covenants not agent, human or angelic, who produced to “coerce . . . [their] decisions” until they it.”65 Consider again Boyd’s treatment of have “spent”59 their gift of self-determin- Peter’s denial of Jesus. The case of Peter ing freedom and their self-determined establishes that the God of open theism decisions have given way to a self-deter- does in fact know what particular moral mined character that is compatibilistically agents will do in the future, for he knew free and inclined either for or against God.60 that Peter would betray Jesus if his charac- What Boyd’s treatment of Peter in fact ter were “squeezed” in the correct fashion. establishes, however, is that God worked God, Boyd tells us, “saw past Peter’s false coercively with Peter before Peter’s charac- bravado and knew the effect Jesus’ arrest ter became “crystallized in the form of an would have on him.”66 In light of the fact irreversible character.”61 Indeed, Boyd that God “squeezed” Peter before Peter’s contends that God’s compatibilistic character was irreversibly established, manipulation of Peter was the “loving but Boyd must either concede that the “God necessarily harsh” means by which Peter’s of the possible” can know what openness character “was permanently changed,”62 theologians contend it is logically impos- thereby conceding that Peter’s character sible to know, namely the future free was never irreversibly established or decisions of agents possessing self-deter- “eternalized” in the first place.63 What the mining freedom, or he must acknowledge case of Peter really suggests, then, is both that God knew what Peter would do the coherence of a more full-bodied form because God knew that he would orches- of compatibilism—one that recognizes that trate circumstances that would compel Peter genuinely free actions can be foreknown to betray Jesus, in which case God forced 63 Peter to sin. brothers—we must be willing to console every murderer and kidnap- While the critic might respond that such per with Joseph’s words: “Do not be an acknowledgement would undermine distressed, or angry with yourself the foundational assumptions of the open- . . . for God kidnapped and mur- dered your victims.” We cannot ness program, open theists like Boyd universalize the mode of God’s apparently do not share this concern, for operation in this passage without this is precisely the kind of acknowl- also universalizing its implication for human responsibility.70 edgement he appears to make in his remarkable discussion of Genesis 45:5 and When we consider Peter’s “divinely 50:20. Of these passages, Boyd argues orchestrated lesson” in light of this rather that he is “largely in agreement” with strained caricature of compatiblism,71 we compatibilists who insist that this text are, it seems, left with two options, neither “illustrate[s] that God ordains evil actions of which speaks very highly of the open- for greater good.”67 The passage “seems to ness program: Either God knew that Peter indicate,” he concedes, “that God inten- would deny Jesus because he knew a future tionally orchestrated the evil intentions of contingent (which for an open theist is a the brothers in order to get Joseph into bit like saying that God can make a square Egypt.”68 But while Boyd agrees with circle), or, more likely, he knew that Peter compatibilists “that this text shows that would deny Jesus because he knew that he God may decide to orchestrate evil actions would remove Peter’s self-determining according to his sovereign will, . . . [he] freedom and make him deny Jesus (which den[ies] that this passage supports the con- calls God’s sinless perfection into question, clusion that all evil actions occur in accor- given the presumption that genuine crea- dance with God’s eternal, sovereign will.”69 turely freedom is “incompatible with any Why? Of the three reasons that Boyd cites form of determinism”). What the case of in his discussion of these texts, the second Peter establishes, then, is that openness is most relevant to the question of who is theologians can rescue God from the ultimately responsible and therefore cul- charge of being the author of coerced sins pable for the evil actions that God actual- only by advancing the ad hoc hypothesis izes through compatibilistic interaction. If that some instances of compatibilistic we take Genesis 45:5 and 50:20 “as evi- activity—even some that involve what we dence of how God always operates,” Boyd referred to earlier as “hard” coercion—are argues, intransitive. Apparently, in some cases, causing or determining or forcing an event we must accept the consequence that this passage always minimizes the does not entail responsibility for the event. responsibility of human agents. This is the conclusion Joseph himself The God of Open Theism: An draws from his observation that God used his brothers to send him to Ambivalent and Arbitrary Warrior Egypt. “Do not be distressed, or Finally and most importantly, the will- angry with yourselves,” he tells ingness of openness theologians to sanc- them, “for God sent me.” If this text is taken as evidence of how God tion coercion is problematic because it always controls human action—if makes it much more difficult to rescue God God is involved in each kidnapping and murder the way he was from being tarnished by the problem of involved in the activity of Joseph’s evil. Why? Before we consider the answer 64 to this question, note that openness theo- tolerates wickedness, he does so out of his logians would have us believe that their integrity. When he puts an end to it, he does view of evil is superior to traditional views this out of his integrity as well. Whatever not only because it helps us understand good he can do, he does. Whatever evil he that evil in general and specific evils in par- can prevent, he prevents. Whatever he ticular are simply the unfortunate conse- must out of integrity allow, he allows.”78 quences of free decisions to reject the love What, then, are we to make of the asser- of God, but also because it helps us under- tion that God can intervene to prevent evil stand why “the all-powerful Creator of the in some cases but not in others because his world” does not prevent certain events “he integrity prevents him from compromising wishes would not take place.”72 Whereas the “say-so” that is “the key to morally traditional views presume that there is “a responsible personhood”?79 Can we really specific divine reason for each specific evil rescue God from being tarnished by the in the world” and that all evils thus occur problem of evil simply by insisting that he because they are part of an inscrutable intervenes in one situation and not in divine plan, the open view insists that another because “the complex constellation certain evils occur because God simply can- of contingent variables that collectively not with integrity prevent them without constitute a particular situation” allows revoking the irrevocable gift of freedom him to intervene without rendering the gift that is necessary to love.73 Indeed, while it of self-determining freedom “disingenu- is certainly true that the God of open the- ous”?80 Boyd’s exposition leaves us with ism is always doing everything he can “to no compelling reason to conclude that we further good and hinder evil,” what he in can. Since God can and does work unilat- fact can do in each particular situation is erally from time to time to bring about “determined” less by what “God would certain states of affairs, and since this coer- desire” than it is by the “innumerable cive involvement can entail, as it did in the [contingent] variables that constitute the case of Peter, real violations of the gift of ‘givens’ of . . . [that] situation.”74 God can self-determining freedom given to moral prevent some evils but not others, in short, agents, we simply cannot say that God is neither because he lacks omnipotence nor always doing “all he could do” to prevent because he is an inherently arbitrary being, evil and promote good when what he is but because the “nonnegotiable givens” of doing falls short of a violation of the cov- some situations prevent him from interven- enant that he has established with free ing in a fashion that does not compromise agents.81 Recall again that God worked “the domain of irrevocable freedom that compatibilistically with Peter before Peter’s he has given to agents.”75 Thus, since it is character was unalterably acquired, thus impossible for contingent beings to know establishing that covenant infidelity is an all of the variables that impact God’s option available to the God of open the- interaction with free agents in various situ- ism.82 But how and on what basis does the ations,76 they must simply trust that he is God of open theism decide when he is always doing everything he can to maxi- going to violate his covenant vows? How mize good and minimize evil “given the does he determine, in other words, which situation he must work with.”77 They must aspects of the future he is going to leave trust, in other words, “that when the Father open and which aspects he is going to close 65 when the stated mechanism for making that have to do with libertarian freedom this determination does not obtain in all and thus with future states of affairs that circumstances? Without a satisfactory are possibly one way or possible another. answer to these questions—which, I sub- As such, Boyd would have us believe that mit, openness theologians simply cannot neo-Molinism supplies the theoretical coherently provide—we can only conclude framework for a rapprochement between that the God of open theism is an ambiva- the open view of the future on the one hand lent and arbitrary warrior who cannot be and more traditional views on the other trusted to rule in every situation in a way because it enables open theists to affirm an that maximizes good and minimizes evil ostensibly robust view of providence while for his creatures.83 simultaneously insisting that the Principle of Bivalence fails with respect to future Conclusion contingent propositions and counter- The Achilles Heel of open theism is factuals of creaturely freedom. In this essay found in the eagerness of openness theo- I have tried to establish that no matter how logians to sanction what Jason Nicholls innovative and therefore commendable calls “select determinism.” Critics are con- this proposal might be it must be rejected vinced that when open theists insist that not only because it is incoherent, but more the God of open theism can retain provi- importantly because it reduces the God of dential control over the unfolding course open theism to an ambivalent and arbitrary of world history only through periodic warrior for whom the problem of evil is instances of coercive intervention in the insurmountable. affairs of free moral agents, they open themselves up to the charge that their view ENDNOTES of providence is something less than satis- 1Much of the material in the second and fying simply because coercion is difficult third sections of this essay is adapted to reconcile with genuine freedom. Boyd from Paul Kjoss Helseth, “What Is at contends that neo-Molinism neutralizes Stake in the Openness Debate? The this charge by including might-counter- Trustworthiness of God and the Foun- factuals in the content of God’s middle dation of Hope,” in Beyond the Bounds: knowledge. The God of open theism Open Theism and the Undermining of Bib- retains “significant providential control” lical Christianity, ed. John Piper, Justin over the unfolding course of world history Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth without undermining the genuine freedom (Wheaton: Crossway, 2003) 275-307. This that is necessary to love, he reasons, material is used with permission. because the class of counterfactual propo- 2William Lane Craig, “A Middle-Knowl- sitions that God knows as true includes edge Response [to Gregory A. Boyd],” statements about what agents with liber- in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. tarian freedom might or might not do in James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy certain situations. Indeed, his providential (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, control of world history involves his 2001) 58, 56. According to Craig, the Prin- balanced oversight not only of would- ciple of Bivalence can be defined as fol- counterfactuals, but also of might- lows: “for any proposition p, p is either counterfactuals, or those counterfactuals true or false.” See also William Lane 66 Craig, “What Does God Know?” in 6Gregory A. Boyd, “An Open-The- ever, that the decision-making God Under Fire: Modern Scholarship ism Response [to William Lane depicted in these instances is genu- Reinvents God, ed. Douglas S. Craig],” in Divine Foreknowledge, inely free. If God is truly sovereign, Huffman and Eric L. Johnson 144. Nicholls argues, “then it must (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2002) 7Ibid. always remain within his preroga- 137-155. Must we, along with open 8Ibid., 146. tive to periodically withhold or theists, say that statements about 9Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Prob- override our libertarian freedom. future contingents can be neither lem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Indeed, it may even be true that in true nor false because the states of Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove: some selected instances that human affairs to which they refer do not yet InterVarsity Press, 2001) 130. decision-making does look some- exist? According to Craig we must 10Gregory A. Boyd, “The Open-The- thing like what Ware and other not. “To say that a future-tense state- ism View,” in Divine Foreknowledge, Calvinists would call ‘compati- ment is now true is not, of course, 14. bilistic’—though, of course, as an to say that we may now know 11Boyd, “An Open-Theism Response Arminian-minded thinker I would whether it is true or to say that [to William Lane Craig],” 147. be hesitant to call this ‘freedom’ in things are now so determined that According to the grounding objec- any genuine sense” (cf. 644-645, it is true. It is only to say that when tion, “there are no true counter- especially note 54). the time arrives, things will turn out factuals about free decisions 18Ibid., 647, 640. as the statement predicts. A future- because there is nothing to make 19For example, see Craig, “A Middle- tense statement is true if matters such statements true” (ibid., 209). Knowledge Response [to Gregory turn out as the statement predicts, 12Ibid., 147-148. A. Boyd],” 55-60; Paul Kjoss and false if matters fail to turn out 13Ibid., 146. Helseth, “On Divine Ambivalence: as the statement predicts—this is all 14Ibid., 148. Open Theism and the Problem of that the notion of truth as correspon- 15Stephen J. Wellum, “What Is at Stake Particular Evils,” Journal of the Evan- dence [which “holds merely that a in the Openness Debate? The Iner- gelical Theological Society 44 (2001) statement is true if and only if what rancy of Scripture,” in Beyond the 493-511. it states to be the case really is the Bounds, 252, 253-254, 257, 264-265, 20Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, case” (ibid., 144)] requires. Hence, 272. 190. See, for example, Ronald Nash, there is no good reason to deny that 16Bruce A. Ware, “What Is at Stake in Life’s Ultimate Questions: An Intro- future-tense statements are either the Openness Debate? The duction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: true or false. . . . Think about it for a of Christ,” in Beyond the Bounds, 330, Zondervan, 1999) 320-321; Bruce A. moment. If ‘It is raining today’ is cf. 324-331. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Dimin- now true, how could ‘It will rain to- 17Jason A. Nicholls, “Openness and ished God of Open Theism (Wheaton: morrow’ not have been true yester- Inerrancy: Can They Be Compat- Crossway, 2000) 216; and Helseth, day? The same facts guarantee that ible?” Journal of the Evangelical Theo- “On Divine Ambivalence,” 497-510. a future-tense statement asserted logical Society 45 (2002) 631, 647. It is Note that these critiques remain earlier, a present-tense statement interesting to note that in making valid critiques of openness theolo- asserted simultaneously, and a past- his case for “select determinism” gians who are consistently opposed tense statement asserted later are all Nicholls anticipates some of Boyd’s to all forms of compatibilism. true” (ibid., 144-145). proposals by conceding that occa- 21Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 3Craig, “A Middle-Knowledge Re- sionally Scripture does depict God 123. As we shall see, this steering sponse [to Gregory A. Boyd],” 55, 58. interacting with moral agents in a activity can involve God’s fore- 4Ibid., 57. way that closely resembles compati- knowing and even determining of 5Ibid., 59. bilism. He refuses to grant, how- the future decisions and actions of 67 responsible moral agents. thing more than a robotic “cha- “libertarian” or “incompatibilistic” 22It is important to note that most of rade,” human beings must be freedom, and as such it is “incom- Boyd’s proposals in Satan and the “autonomous, self-determining, patible with any form of determin- Problem of Evil are not new, but morally responsible agents” (Gre- ism” (cf. Satan and the Problem of Evil, involve more fulsome explanations gory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A 52 n. 3, 423). The class of “self- of commitments that, in retrospect, Biblical Introduction to the Open View determined acts,” on the other were largely assumed in his earlier of God [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000] hand, includes acts performed with writings. For an example of an 134, 136). They must possess, in “self-determining freedom” as well earlier discussion that is easier to other words, the authentic ability as acts that flow out of self-deter- understand in light of the material “to choose between … possibilities” mined characters. It is important to presented in Satan and the Problem that really matter, and those choices note that these latter kinds of acts— of Evil, see Gregory A. Boyd and must not be “pre-settled” in any sig- those that flow out of self-deter- Edward K. Boyd, Letters from a Skep- nificant sense (ibid., 122, 126). Note mined characters—can be foreknown tic: A Son Wrestles with His Father’s that Boyd is convinced that this and even determined by God if God so Questions About Christianity understanding of freedom—which desires. For more on this critical dis- (Wheaton, Ill.: Victor, 1994), 41-43. is based upon “the concept of inde- tinction, see the forthcoming discus- 23Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, terministic causation,” the notion sion. For a brief discussion of the 123, 423. that an event or a decision can be rather clever role that “our experi- 24Boyd is convinced that moral agents caused yet not irresistibly deter- ence/perception” plays in Boyd’s are genuinely free only when they mined or necessitated by a set of thought, see note 28 below. Finally, possess self-determining freedom. antecedent conditions (Satan and the note how Boyd’s understanding of The essential characteristic of self- Problem of Evil, 73; cf. Boyd’s discus- self-determining freedom equates determining freedom, he contends, sion of “A Theology of Chance,” determinism with coercion. This is the “power to do otherwise.” ibid., 386-393)—is supported by point will be important in the dis- According to Boyd, “This concep- Scripture, reason, “our experience of cussion that follows. tion of freedom affirms that ‘given ourselves as self-determining 25The critical nature of the relation- the same causal conditions, [free agents” (ibid., 83), and contempo- ship between moral character and agents] could have chosen or done rary science, especially quantum the two kinds of activity that God otherwise than we did.’” To put it mechanics. For a critical assessment weaves together into the unfolding differently, “In this view … the total of Boyd’s understanding of quan- story of world history is perhaps set of antecedent causes does not tum mechanics, particularly the nowhere more concisely articulated determine a truly free action. While concept of causation that informs than in the following quotation: factors outside the agent are influ- his understanding of “the comple- “Classical Molinism … affirms that ential in every decision an agent mentarity of determinism and inde- God has significant control over the makes, such factors are never coer- terminism” (cf. ibid., 151-155), see world even though agents possess cive when the decision is in fact free. John C. Beckman, “Quantum libertarian freedom because God Thus, appealing to factors external Mechanics, Chaos Physics and the knows what agents would do in to the agent can never exhaustively Open View of God,” Philosophia every conceivable situation.… The explain the free choice of the agent. Christi 4 (2002) 203-214. Note as well open view substantially agrees with In light of all influences and circum- that there is a significant distinction this position but asserts, in contrast, stances, agents ultimately determine in Boyd’s thought between “self- that God also knows what agents themselves” (ibid., 56). On the basis determining freedom” and “self- might do in certain situations. In of this conception of freedom, Boyd determined acts.” “Self-determin- otherwords [sic], classical Molinism argues that for freedom to be any- ing freedom” is the same thing as errs in limiting God’s counterfactual 68 knowledge to would-counterfactuals plays a critical role in Boyd’s always concerned with maximizing instead of including might- Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy. The goodness and minimizing evil” counterfactuals. In the neo-Molinist impenetrable mystery of evil is (ibid., 386, 215-216, 216, 196, 203, view God knows what agents might emphatically “not about God’s char- 200, 204). Please note the rather pre- do insofar as agents possess liber- acter or plan,” Boyd contends, but dictable and convenient role that tarian freedom. And God knows about “the complexity of creation.” “our experience/perception” plays what agents would do insofar as There is, he argues, “an element of in Boyd’s thought. Boyd uses “our they have received from God and impenetrable mystery surround- experience/perception” to justify through circumstances or acquired [ing] every particular contingent his take on the coherence of self- for themselves determinate charac- feature of our world. Everything determining freedom (cf. ibid., 78, ters. God knows both categories of ultimately influences everything 83), the incoherence of an Augustin- counterfactuals as they pertain to else, and … there is an element of ian understanding of sovereignty every possible subject in every pos- spontaneity at every level of being. (cf. ibid., 37 n. 13), and the unten- sible world throughout eternity. As Thus an exhaustive explanation of ability of “the mechanistic, deter- in classical Molinism, God creates anything would ultimately require ministic worldview of Newton” (cf. the world (or better, the set of pos- an exhaustive explanation of every- ibid., 153-155). “Our experience/ sible worlds) that best suits his pur- thing, and even then we would have perception” is completely disre- poses” (ibid., 425). to acknowledge that things could garded, however, when it chal- 26Ibid., 182; Boyd also refers to this have happened differently. Only the lenges a critical component of his “domain” of freedom as an agent’s omniscient God can be certain of theodicy. While “in our experience” “quality of freedom” (cf. 182, 428). why particular events happen pre- God’s “mode of operation certainly 27Ibid., 183 n. 6. God’s self-imposed cisely as they do.” Since the created appears arbitrary,” in reality it is not, commitment not to undermine the order is “so complex,” contingent for God is not an arbitrary being. In self-determining freedom of genu- beings who “observe God’s interac- short, we must trust that the God of inely free agents is captured in what tions with free subjects from the out- open theism is not arbitrary despite Boyd calls his “covenant of non- side” must recognize that they “are the appearance that he is (ibid., 196, coercion” (cf. 420). simply not in a position to know 200). It goes without saying that one 28Boyd is convinced that it is our most of the relevant facts that would can only wonder what larger ignorance of the innumerable con- explain the specifics of his inter- hermeneutical principle, if any, tingent variables that condition action in any given situation.” guides Boyd’s reliance upon “our God’s interaction with the world— Although they can know “some of experience/perception.” Without variables that are directly related to the principles on which God oper- such a principle, it is reasonable to the inscrutable domains of freedom ates,” they are largely ignorant of conclude that his employment of that he gives to every moral agent— the innumerable contingent vari- “our experience/perception” in one that accounts for the apparent arbi- ables that condition his providential way and then another is ultimately trariness of life. “Life lacks rhyme guidance of the world. In light of the informed by little more than a rather or reason,” he contends, “not fact that contingent beings simply nuanced form of special pleading. because God is arbitrary … [but] cannot know everything that goes 29Ibid., 420, 191, 188. because our perspective on reality is on “behind the scenes,” they must 30Ibid., 427, 183 n. 6. so myopic. We experience the effects trust God “despite appearances,” 31Ibid., 191, 60, 182. It is important to but can never comprehensively dis- believing that if “[they] saw what note that the domain or quality of cern the causes [of what happens in God sees, . . . [they] would under- freedom that the God of open the- history].” Note that it is this appeal stand why God did what he did and ism gives to moral agents does not to creaturely ignorance that also . . . [they] would see that he is extend to those solidified character 69 traits that are the targets of com- something, the more we become that gory A. Boyd, “Neo-Molinism and patibilistic manipulation. While it is something. We are all in the process the Infinite Intelligence of God” certainly true that the God of open of solidifying our identities by the (paper presented at the annual theism does infuse “basic character- decisions we make. With each deci- meeting of the Evangelical Theo- istics” (ibid., 128) into moral agents sion we make, we pick up momen- logical Society, Colorado Springs, 15 when he creates them, he does not tum in the direction of that deci- November 2001) 7; and idem, “An “preordain” that particular indi- sion.… So it is, I believe, in every Open-Theism Response [to William viduals will have the solidified traits area of our lives. The more we Lane Craig],” 148. that render their activity certain choose something, the harder it is 41Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, when manipulated compatibilis- to choose otherwise, until we finally 122 n. 8. Boyd is convinced that tically. Rather, moral agents them- are solidified—eternalized—in our objections to the notion that events selves establish the character traits decision. The momentum of our can be ordained without ordaining that make them susceptible to character becomes unstoppable. We the particular people who will carry compatibilistic exploitation (ibid., create our character with our deci- out those events are ultimately 122 n. 8). sions, and our character, in turn, based upon the presupposition of “a 32Ibid., 191; cf. 171 n. 42. exercises more and more influence mechanistic worldview. . . . That is, if 33Boyd, Letters from a Skeptic, 42. on the decisions we make. It’s in the a one-to-one relationship between 34Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, nature of free, created beings, and I causes and effects is assumed, then 190. don’t see how it could be otherwise. a particular effect cannot be deter- 35Ibid., 189, 188, 122 n. 8; cf. 171 n. 42. Life, I guess, is like the proverbial mined without its antecedent causes 36Gregory A. Boyd, “Christian Love snowball rolling down the hill” (Let- also being determined. But this and Academic Dialogue: A Reply to ters from a Skeptic, 41-42). For con- assumption is not necessary. To the Bruce Ware,” Journal of the Evangeli- firmation that individual character contrary, this assumption is at odds cal Theological Society 45 (2002) 242. traits—and not just entire charac- with the general direction most 37Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, ters—are solidified through the use fields of science took throughout the 189. Boyd refers to the period of of libertarian freedom, see, for twentieth century. In a multitude of time in which agents possessing example, Boyd’s discussion of differing ways we have discovered self-determining freedom are deter- Peter’s cowardice in Satan and the that reality is constituted as a mining their own characters as a Problem of Evil, 130-133. For balance between determinism and “probationary period” (cf. 171 n. 42, examples of other character traits freedom, stable laws and chance, 188-189, 427). Note that during this becoming established through the regularity and spontaneity, general period God cannot work in a deter- use of libertarian freedom, see Let- predictability and an element of ministic fashion without revoking ters from a Skeptic, 41, 42; and Satan unpredictability about specifics” the irrevocable gift of freedom that and the Problem of Evil, 122-123, 188- (ibid., 121). For a discussion of how he has given to moral agents. Note 189. Boyd’s own assumptions might be as well that during this time moral 38Ibid., 122 n. 8. According to Boyd, it coloring his reading of the scientific agents are determining not only is the self, not God, who gives deter- literature, cf. Beckman, “Quantum their whole characters as either for minateness to character. Once this Mechanics, Chaos Physics and the or against God but also those indi- determinateness has been acquired Open View of God,” 203-214. vidual character traits that eventu- God is then free to work compati- 42Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, ally become the targets of com- bilistically with the agent, and to do 122-123. As this text makes clear, patibilistic exploitation. According so with integrity (cf. ibid., 375). Boyd clearly endorses some form of to Boyd, “We tend to become the deci- 39Ibid., 392-393. the “greater good” argument (see sions we make. The more we choose 40Ibid., 122, emphasis added; cf. Gre- also ibid., 19, 396-397). Note, how- 70 ever, that these “greater goods” are William Hasker, “A Philosophical (The God Who Risks, 238-240), for not ordained from before the foun- Perspective,” in Pinnock, et al., The Hodge insists that regeneration dation of the world, as in more Openness of God, 142; Clark Pinnock, involves a moral change that takes traditional , but as the “Systematic Theology,” in The Open- place “in a manner perfectly con- narrative of history unfolds; God ness of God, 194 n. 49; and John Sand- gruous to the nature of a rational works these “greater goods” into his ers, The God Who Risks: A Theology of and active being.” It takes place, in providential plans in time rather Providence (Downers Grove: Inter- other words, “without any violence than before time, as moral agents Varsity Press, 1998), 257-261. See being done to the soul or any of solidify their characters and thereby Steven R. Tracy’s incisive discussion its laws,” for the Spirit’s activity, acquire compatibilistic freedom. of this point, “Theodicy, Escha- “though immediate, is not compul- 43Ibid., 130. tology, and the Open View of God” sive,” but “‘according to reason, and 44Boyd, God of the Possible, 127. (paper presented at the annual the natural motion of the creature; 45David Basinger, “Practical Implica- meeting of the Evangelical Theo- the understanding proposing and tions,” in Clark Pinnock, et al., The logical Society, Danvers, Mass., the will embracing; the understand- Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge November 1999) 14-29. ing going before with light, the will to the Traditional Understanding of 46Basinger, “Can an Evangelical following after with love’” (“Regen- God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Christian Justifiably Deny God’s eration, and the Manner of Its Press, 1994) 159; see Basinger’s Exhaustive Knowledge of the Occurrence,” Biblical Repertory and extended discussion of this point in, Future?” 138. Bruce Ware correctly Princeton Review 2 [1830] 255-261). “Can an Evangelical Christian Jus- notes that, “At the heart of the open- In the case of a compatibilist like tifiably Deny God’s Exhaustive ness proposal is the desire to uphold Hodge, therefore, the Spirit’s sover- Knowledge of the Future?” Christian the real relationship that exists eign activity in regeneration ought Scholar’s Review 25 (1995) 136-139. In between God and others” (God’s not be cited as evidence of what The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philo- Lesser Glory, 43). Openness theolo- Sanders calls “nonconsensual con- sophical Assessment (Downers gians are convinced that real rela- trol” (The God Who Risks, 238-240), Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1996) 32- tionships are not possible when God for the supernatural influence by 36, Basinger notes that while “Free- deals with contingent beings in a which he works in the elect both will theists believe that God does compatibilistic fashion, for compati- to will and to do his good pleasure unilaterally control some things,” bilistic interaction, they argue, com- “[does] the soul no more violence they nonetheless insist “that God, as promises genuine reciprocity by than demonstration does the intel- a general rule, must allow choice to negating the freedom of the will. lect, or persuasion the heart” be voluntary in the sense that it is While committed compatibilists (“Regeneration, and the Manner of free from coercive divine manipu- would certainly challenge this pre- Its Occurrence,” 255-261). lation.” In other words, God, as a sumption, note that it is not they 47Note that these points both echo and general rule, must allow history to who have a problem with coercion, build upon the conclusions of schol- unfold without “overrid[ing] or but those who insist that genuine ars who are troubled by the appar- withdraw[ing] freedom of choice” freedom presupposes the indeter- ently arbitrary nature of the God of (“Can an Evangelical Christian Jus- minacy of the will. Charles Hodge, open theism’s unilateral activity in tifiably Deny God’s Exhaustive for example, is by no means guilty creaturely affairs, particularly as Knowledge of the Future?” 138). On of reducing the Spirit’s sovereign this activity relates to moral evil and the sporadic nature of God’s unilat- work in regeneration to what John human suffering. See especially eral/coercive involvement in crea- Sanders calls, in a particularly Tracy, “Theodicy, Eschatology, and turely affairs, see also Nicholls, uplifting example of irenic scholar- the Open View of God,” 13-29; and “Openness and Inerrancy,” 629-649; ship, the “divine rape” of the soul Edward Wierenga, review of The 71 Openness of God, by Pinnock, et al., all compatibilistically free, even 64Ibid., 189. in Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997) 248- with regard to those character traits 65Ibid., 429. 252. See also Ware, God’s Lesser that have yet to be “permanently” 66Boyd, God of the Possible, 36, empha- Glory, 207-211; Millard J. Erickson, fixed or settled? Are not all of our sis added. The Evangelical Left: Encountering character traits solidified to one 67Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, Postconservative Evangelical Theology extent or another? What, then, does 396. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997) 105- it really mean to say that a charac- 68Ibid. 106; and Alfred J. Freddoso, review ter trait is solidified “to the extent 69Ibid., 397. of God, Time, and Knowledge, by Wil- that” it serves as a legitimate candi- 70Ibid., 396-397. liam Hasker, in Faith and Philosophy date for compatibilistic exploitation, 71Compatibilists endorse the doctrine 10 (1993) 105-106. particularly when that character of “concurrence” and thus believe 48Boyd, Letters from a Skeptic, 47. trait changes when it is manipulated that the same event is both fully 49Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, compatibilistically? caused by God and fully caused by 181-184. 56Boyd, God of the Possible, 35-37. the creature who performed it. 50Remember that the domain or qual- 57For a thoughtful analysis of “neo- Although the divine and creaturely ity of freedom that the God of open Molinism” that refuses to grant that causes “work in different ways,” the theism gives to moral agents does not compatibilism and open theism are doctrine nonetheless affirms “that extend to those specific character compatible in any way, see Ware, God directs, and works through, the traits that are the solidified targets “What Is at Stake in the Openness distinctive properties of each cre- of compatibilistic exploitation. Debate? The Gospel of Christ,” 324- ated thing, so that these things 51Note that even if we grant that 331. themselves bring about the results “soft” coercion is compatible with 58Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, that we see. In this way, it is pos- open theism, “hard” coercion still 183 n. 6. sible to affirm that in one sense presents insurmountable difficulties 59Ibid., 183 n. 6, 191; cf. 171 n. 42. events are fully (100 percent) caused for the openness program. 60Cf. ibid., 122 n. 8, 189. Again, the by God and fully (100 percent) 52Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, domain or quality of freedom that caused by the creature as well” 131. the God of open theism gives to (Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theol- 53Boyd, God of the Possible, 33-35. moral agents does not extend to those ogy: An Introduction to Biblical Doc- 54Ibid., 36. character traits that are the solidi- trine [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 55Boyd, Satan and the Problem of fied targets of compatibilistic exploi- 1994] 319). Boyd, however, appears Evil, 131. Boyd’s comments on tation. The God of open theism, in to believe that when God is active, character solidification in this other words, does not “preordain” the agent is passive, and when the quotation are vague. When he says, that certain individuals will have agent is active, God is passive. Thus “solidified to the extent that,” does the solidified traits “that would ren- he conceives of responsibility like a he mean “irreversibly” established der some of their behavior certain” pie; the more pieces God gets, the and “permanently” or “unalter- (ibid., 122 n. 8), for moral agents less the agent has, and vice versa. ably” acquired (ibid., 189)? Or, does acquire those traits for themselves Note that if what Boyd says else- he really mean something less through the use of their libertarian where about the moral responsibil- than “irreversibly” established and freedom. ity of agents who have allegedly “permanently” or “unalterably” 61Ibid., 427. acquired compatibilistic freedom is acquired? If “solidified to the extent 62Ibid., 133, 132. to be believed (cf. Boyd, Satan and that” really means something less 63Boyd, Letters from a Skeptic, 42; cf. the Problem of Evil, 122-123), this cari- than really “solid,” then how are we Satan and the Problem of Evil, 122 n. cature of compatibilism ironically to avoid the conclusion that we are 8, 132. supports the contention that Peter’s 72 character was not irreversibly estab- “our experience/perception” ulti- in other words, only because the lished when God forced him to mately reduces to a sophisticated God of open theism did not ordain betray Jesus. form of special pleading, see note before the foundation of the world 72Ibid., 16. 28 above. that certain individuals would have 73Ibid., 429; cf. 16, 423. 79Ibid., 232-233. the solidified character traits that 74Ibid., 203, 391, 392, 389 n. 3; cf. 212- 80Ibid., 422, 215. would render some of their activity 213, 232-233. “The metaphysical 81Ibid., 214. Again, remember that certain. principles that condition God’s God coerced or rendered Peter’s 83Note that it is this character flaw that interaction with free agents … activity certain before Peter’s char- establishes that there is no prin- together with all the particular acter was irreversibly established. cipled way to rescue the God of decisions and chance occurrences This is significant because the open theism from being tarnished that influenced history to arrive at “givens” that obtain in particular by the problem of particular evils, just this situation, constitute the situations include the “metaphysical whether the evils in question are ‘givens’ of a particular situation. principles” that “condition” God’s mundane and isolated or horren- The givens constitute that which interaction with contingent beings dous and large-scale. While it is cer- God is up against in responding to (ibid., 422). Among these “meta- tainly true that responsibility for a situation” (ibid., 422). physical principles” is God’s cov- horrendous evils like the Holocaust 75Ibid., 196, 231. One of the key dif- enant promise not to intervene in the is “widespread,” since, “Evil on a ferences between open theism and free activity of responsible moral grand scale always involves coop- process thought is found at this agents until those agents have eration on a grand scale,” it is also point. While the God of process established their own characters as true that the God of open theism theism “can only act in response to either for or against God. Obviously, could prevent these evils if he really decisions of free agents and he must the case of Peter calls the negotia- wanted to not only because he is respond in accordance with meta- bility of this “nonnegotiable given” willing and able to steer agents who physical principles governing both into question since he was not possess compatibilistic freedom but him and creation,” the God of open eternalized as a particular kind of more importantly because this steer- theism can intervene in a unilateral person when God manipulated him ing activity can involve, as it did in fashion if that intervention will not compatibilistically. the case of Peter, real violations of compromise the restrictions that 82That the God of open theism vio- the gift of self-determining freedom he has placed on himself. Thus, lated his covenant of noncoercion given to responsible moral agents. whereas in process thought God with Peter is established by the fact Since God has both the wherewithal exerts “the same influence at all that Peter’s character in fact did and the willingness to do to all times and in all places,” in the open change; God’s coercion of Peter was agents involved in a particular evil view of the future God can work in the means by which Peter became a or set of evils what he did to Peter, an exceptional fashion if he decides “new” man, “a man willing to lay the attempt to absolve God of that he can do so in a particular situ- down his life for the lambs the Mas- responsibility for large-scale, hor- ation with integrity, i.e., without ter entrusted to him” (ibid., 133). rendous evils by pointing to the undermining the self-determining Note that this conclusion is sound “shared nature of moral responsibil- freedom that he has given to moral only because the domain or quality ity” (ibid., 174) simply will not agents (ibid., 229). of freedom that the God of open wash. For a more extended discus- 76Cf. ibid., 196-197. theism gives to moral agents does sion of this point, cf. Helseth, “What 77Ibid., 422, cf. 196; 204, 212-213. not extend to those character traits Is at Stake in the Openness Debate? 78Ibid., 200. On the very real likeli- that are the solidified targets of com- The Trustworthiness of God and the hood that Boyd’s employment of patibilistic interaction. It is sound, Foundation of Hope,” 300-307. 73