Introduction

Since 2013, the series in the World: A Survey of Chinese Perspectives on International Politics and Economics has published one volume per year. Each volume has focused on a theme that reflects important developments in China and has drawn upon the outstanding work of Chinese academics accordingly, providing western academia with an insight into the foreign pol- icy perspectives of Chinese scholars. I am pleased that this series is now in its fourth volume, Looking for A Road: China Debates Its and the World’s Future. We have consistently focused our discussion on China’s relationship with its neighbors and the rest of the world. Because our discussion will continue to revolve around this relationship, I believe it would be beneficial to briefly sum- marize China’s historical relationship with the world, especially China’s own concept of world order. The rise of China’s concept of world order can generally be divided into three phases: The first phase was during China’s feudal period more than 3,000 years ago, spanning from the Western to the . China at the time viewed the world as an outward projection of its influence. The relationship China had with other territories depended on the proximity of those countries to the son of heaven, in other words China. At the same time, cultural and moral proximity were also critical factors. China saw the world as the “land under heaven,” just as the concentric circles of a pagoda protect the center. At the center was the “son of heaven,” fol- lowed by the inner ring, the outer ring, tribute countries and peripheral coun- tries. Global relationships were fundamentally divided into two categories: the first being the relationship between feudal states and the son of heaven, as well as those between the feudal states or ‘Zhu Xia’ relationships; the second category of relationships were the ones between the son of heaven and the peripheral Barbaroi (东夷), (西戎), (北狄), and (南蛮), or ‘Hua Yi’ relationships. Although the tribute countries would engage in fierce conflict against each other, they would nevertheless band together in the face of foreign aggression. The second phase was the era of the tribute system, after having transi- tioned through the and the centralization of China by and Han. China’s view of the world did not change fundamentally during this period, but at the center of the world was no longer a “son of heaven” sur- rounded by its tribute countries, but a centralized country ruled by an emperor. The country would generally not engage in direct conquest of the neighboring countries beyond China, but rather only request that the neighboring territo- ries provide tribute and pay respects to the emperor. Sometimes, the value of

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004330818_002 2 Introduction the return gifts by China would surpass the value of the tributes paid. But this relationship was by no means equal; rather, it was self-centered. The third phase is contemporary China. In the 19th century, China was forced into entering a treaty system and into that of the nation-state. During the 20th century, there was significant development in the modern concept of sovereignty amongst Chinese people. This is noteworthy because during the feudal and tributary system before, China was primarily ruled by a minority, with the masses generally having no control over the country. A nation-state system, however, had the potential to rise the level of national consciousness in the whole nation, including the proletariat, that was non-existent before. But, such awakening was initially accompanied by humiliation: China was no lon- ger at the center of the world, in fact, for a time it was one of the world’s weaker countries. Since the founding of new China in 1949, although foreign policy was initially dictated by its revolutionary goals, a strong sense of nationalism lay dormant, rekindled in the reform and opening up period. Therefore, in view of China’s history, culture and traditions, it has always emphasized relationships with its neighbors, which were often determined by the distance or difference in position between the countries. China’s worldview was not initially one of interaction between equals, but instead a self-centered “land under heaven view” starting from itself in the center and projecting outwards. Although China’s modern worldview contains some sense of equality, the influence of its past ideologies is still apparent. China still focuses on improving itself, while also demanding respect, which is some- times more important to China than its demands for material benefits, from outside territories. This book will also be divided into three parts: First is the discussion of the relationship between China and its neighboring countries; second, a discus- sion of the relationship between China and the US; third, of China’s One-Belt- One-Road Initiative joint development strategy. There is a common saying in Ancient China that ‘neighbors are dearer than distant relatives.’ This volume begins the discussion of China’s relation- ship with its close neighbors with an article by Zhang Yunling. As a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and President of China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies, the works of Zhang Yunling often strongly influences senior level decision-making. Since being assigned to the Center on Asia-Pacific Studies in the early 1990s, his focus has primarily been on the Asia- Pacific region, especially East Asian regional issues. In his article “The Return of China’s Regional Concept and the Construction of a New Order,” Zhang discussed how, since the reform and opening up of China, especially since the start of this century, China’s relationship with its surrounding areas have