COMMENTARY TURKEY’S LIBYA POLICY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Turkey’s Libya Policy: Achievements and Challenges

İSMAİL NUMAN TELCİ

Sakarya University,Turkey ORCID No: 0000-0001-8397-8503

ABSTRACT Libya has been witnessing a long and destructive civil war since the fall of Qaddafi in 2011. While countries like the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and France have an extremely damaging role in Libya, Turkey and Qatar has been trying to focus on ending the conflict and establishing a stable democratic country. Hafter’s inva- sion attempt, supported by the UAE and Egypt, failed as a result of Turkey’s intervention. In this regard, it would be correct to say that the peace process and political dialogue has only become possible with Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan equation. In Libya, where tribal ties are already effective, and centralization is weak, long-term conflicts have deeply shaken social cohesion. Furthermore, interna- tional actors have remained uninterested in Libya or preferred to fuel the problem rather than solve it. All of these factors, made it difficult for Turkey to implement its plans in Libya. Nevertheless, both Libya and Turkey have achieved major gains since the beginning of the year. In this context, this study aims to underscore the challenges of aforementioned process and consequently acquisitions of both sides.

Keywords: Libya, Turkey, Government of National Accord, Libyan National Army, France, United Arab Emirates

Insight Turkey 2020 Vol. 22 / No. 4 / pp. 41-54

Received Date: 20/10/2020 • Accepted Date: 14/11/2020 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2020224.03

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Introduction Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean are closely intertwined. After the ith the assassination of Mu­ 2000s, the efforts of countries with ammar Qaddafi in 2011, coasts on the Eastern Mediterranean Wthe violence of the conflicts to determine the borders of the con­ in Libya increased. The NATO-led tinental shelf and establish exclusive military operation in 2011 sparked economic zones have increased, and controversy about whether the in­ the instability of the countries in the tervention would succeed. Since the region has added to the complexity time of the military operation, efforts of determining which countries can to establish peace have been under­ establish partnerships with whom. taken by leading international or­ Considering the ongoing civil war in ganizations; however, low intensity Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clashes in Libya have continued de­ and Egypt’s situation under Sisi’s rule, spite these efforts and started to in­ Libya’s importance has become even crease in 2014. more evident.

Geopolitical, conjunctural, and ideo­ Given Libya’s geographical location logical developments have contribut­ and geostrategic importance, the ed to forming an environment con­ conflict there has become a critical ducive for the increase of conflict in foreign policy issue for regional ac­ Libya. In geopolitical terms, Libya’s tors in the Eastern Mediterranean. long coastline on the Mediterranean In this regard, Turkey has emerged as and its low population compared one of the most influential regional to its land area are factors that may actors in the Libyan conflict. Ankara increase the possibility of conflict. is pursuing a constructive agenda for Considering cyclical developments, the future of Libya as Turkey allies Libya’s importance has increased in itself with the internationally recog­ parallel with the exploration of large nized government based in Tripoli. amounts of hydrocarbon reserves This commentary aims to give a brief in the Eastern Mediterranean. And, overview of Turkey’s involvement in considering ideological develop­ the Libyan conflict by taking a clos­ ments, the country has become open er look at the main characteristics of to the influence of international ac­ Ankara’s policy and achievements as tors with the division of the Libyan well as its challenges in the Libyan army into different factions after the conflict. Arab uprisings.

One of the major factors that make Turkish Policy in Libya: Turning the Libyan conflict more important Points internationally is the Eastern Medi­ terranean issue. Libya has a coastline There have been multiple turning of approximately 1,770 km on the points in the ongoing war in Libya. Mediterranean. Thus, the stability of For many reasons, Turkey’s interest

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in the war in Libya has increased re­ cently and, in parallel with this devel­ One of the preliminary reasons opment, the turning points in the war in Libya have become associated with Haftar received foreign the growing partnership between support was the dominance Turkey and the Government of Na­ of his illegitimate forces over tional Accord (GNA). Turkey, which has an approximately 1,600 km long particular oil fields in Libya Mediterranean cost, signed a deal with Libya’s GNA on November 27, 2019, on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterra­ ing military and technical assistance nean following article 102 of the UN as well.6 The military and technical Charter.1 assistance agreement that came after the maritime deal consolidated Turk­ The Turkish-Libyan deal took effect ish efforts to establish peace and sta­ on December 8, 2019.2 The agree­ bility in Libya. As part of the agree­ ment constituted one of the crucial ment, ‘a quick reaction force’ that turning points of the struggle in Lib­ works with the police and military ya and the Eastern Mediterranean. in Libya was established, and the two But the deal sparked an unfair and states ensured that cooperation on unfounded backlash in the region, intelligence and the defense industry both from countries with coasts on would proceed accordingly.7 the Eastern Mediterranean and from other regional actors. France, Greece, In parallel with Turkish entrance into the Greek Administration of South­ the Libyan scene, and in keeping with ern Cyprus (GASC) and Egypt did internationally established standards, not hesitate to declare a statement Khalifa Haftar’s so-called Libyan Na­ criticizing the deal and saying that it tional Army (LNA) and its affiliated, doesn't bear any legal consequence.3 illegitimate forces quickly started to The United Arab Emirates (UAE) lose ground. In 2019, Haftar’s offen­ made similar statements later on. The sive toward Tripoli was halted fol­ European Union (EU) also opposed lowing grave realities on the ground, the Turkish-Libya deal, claiming that which forced the LNA to withdraw it constitutes an infringement based from Tarhouna only to redeploy to Ju­ on the Law of the Sea.4 However, in fra.8 With Turkish support, the GNA late 2020, the UN General Secretary gradually became the main authority registered the Turkish-Libya deal, in the regions that had been regained representing a legal victory for Tur­ from the LNA. The UN’s ceasefire key and the GNA.5 and dialogue efforts increased due to the intensifying tensions on the Turkey increased its support to Lib­ battlefield. When Haftar’s offensives ya in the wake of the deal, and signed toward the capital failed, the defense an agreement with the GNA regard­ had to start alongside the withdraw­

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fields and regions under Haftar’s con­ As the legitimate authority trol defied this order. representative of Libya, Turkey gives weight to the Libya file, the GNA has been trying to which has formed one of the key uphold its unified position to points of its foreign policy since 2020. While contacts are being made with represent the Libyan people international actors to ensure peace against a common enemy and stability in Libya, the GNA is supported in the field in the presence of the UN. Due to the military and technical support Turkey has provid­ al. Haftar forces, especially those that ed to the GNA, Tripoli has been saved redeployed to Jufra and its surround­ from falling into Haftar’s hands, and ings, had trouble holding ground rapid progress toward the Sirte-Jufra there due to an immediate count­ line has been made. Despite all these er-offensive by the GNA. developments, however, issues like protecting Libya’s unitary structure On August 21, 2020, a ceasefire was and warding off militias, which Tur­ reached on the lines of Sirte and Ju­ key has emphasized, seem unlikely fra, but it could not be implemented to be solved under the current cir­ fully.9 The ceasefire aimed to achieve cumstances in the short run. It makes the demilitarization of Sirte and Jufra, sense to mention a few internal and where intense clashes had been going external challenges for Turkey’s Libya on. The ceasefire remained fragile, policy at this point. however, due to foreign support for Haftar’s illegitimate forces. In Sep­ tember and October, the Libyan army Fragmented Political Actors and had stated that Russia had sent Syrian the Challenges to Turkey’s Role fighters to Libya to support Haftar;10 these and other mercenaries affiliat­ During the Qaddafi era, Libya’s in­ ed with Haftar refused to accept the stitutions were destabilized, and a ceasefire and made maneuvers to dis­ fragmented, non-hierarchical struc­ rupt the ceasefire environment. ture was established to centralize au­ thority and prevent those institutions One of the preliminary reasons from posing a threat to Qaddafi’s rule. Haftar received foreign support was It can be argued that tribalism is still the dominance of his illegitimate a very powerful phenomenon and a forces over particular oil fields in Lib­ basic motivation in the social struc­ ya. According to international cus­ ture of Libya. The inclusion of tribes toms and national regulations, oil in in modern political systems, who Libya should only be sold by the Lib­ have lived in deserts and vast territo­ yan National Oil Company (NOC).11 ries for centuries free and without the However, those controlling the oil strict control of any central political

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Turkey’s President Erdoğan and his top officials, authority, has been one of the coun­ represent the Libyan people against meet with Libyan try’s most serious challenges for the a common enemy. However, under Prime Minister al-Sarrj and his last decades. The discrepancies be­ heavy pressure, there have been signs accompanying tween the tribal groups that manifest of division in the leadership cadres delegation in themselves at the political level lead of the GNA. Recently, such divisions İstanbul on the institutions to act as factional and were made public following a diplo­ October 4, 2020. not inclusive. matic crisis. On August 28, 2020 the MUSTAFA KAMACI / President of the GNA, Fayez al-Sar­ AA The same inclination is present in the raj, demanded an investigation into post-Qaddafi era in every institution Fathi Bashagha, the Minister of the and organization that has been estab­ Interior, who was on a visit to Turkey lished through various agreements when the investigation decision was or necessities. Many institutions and announced. Bashagha’s response was organizations harbor conflict within clear; he demanded that the investi­ themselves and with each other, es­ gation should be conducted in front pecially high-level institutions like of cameras and that there should be the GNA and the High Council of further investigations of corruption State, as a reflection of this inherited, in the government ranks. A crowd long-standing mistrust. An example welcomed Bashagha when he re­ of this internal division took place in turned from Turkey to his hometown August 2020. Misrata, and he left the airport with a spectacular convoy. The presence of As the legitimate authority represen­ multiple military vehicles attracted tative of Libya, the GNA has been try­ attention, and it became clear after ing to uphold its unified position to the investigation that Bashagha, who

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has a military background and who involved. As part of its diplomatic ef­ tends to focus on military issues de­ forts to establish peace and bring sta­ spite his civilian position, would not bility to Libya, Turkey was one of the possibly work in coordination with participants in forming the Skhirat Sarraj for a long time even though he Agreement (Libyan Political Agree­ would return to his job. ment), and Ankara has provided continuous support to the UN-rec­ This crisis was an important devel­ ognized GNA.12 opment, as it weakened the unified stance of Libya’s legitimate leader­ From 2014 onward, illegitimate forces ship. Similar cases of diverging agen­ under the leadership of former Gen­ das were also witnessed in the cases eral Khalifa Haftar gained ground in of oil production and the appoint­ the East of Libya. In particular, the ment of high-ranking defense officers illegitimate forces started to be active by the Sarraj leadership. The lack of in garnering support from local and unified vision and commitment to regional allies, and from internation­ working together among members al actors. Haftar’s forces have been of the GNA constitutes one of the supported primarily by Russia, Egypt, most critical challenges for Turkey, as France, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Ankara urges the GNA to take con­ especially in his offensive toward the structive, unified steps by exercising capital, Tripoli, in April 2019. The its legitimate power. GNA, in turn, has been supported by Turkey and Qatar.13

External Challenges to Turkey’s When the external factors are con­ Objectives in Libya sidered, the Trump Administration, which drove the CIA-linked Haftar Turkey and Libya have historical, po­ to the stage, called for a ceasefire and litical, economic, and cultural ties. used the initiative to lead the peace Turkey was one of the first countries talks, mediated between the two to immediately recognize the state of sides on the production and export Libya following its foundation as an of oil−but still does not follow a clear independent state in 1951. During policy in finding a solution. In the the turbulent period in the Middle meantime, Russia, France, the UAE, East following the Arab uprisings, and Egypt are continuing with their Turkey did not refrain from pursuing policies that threaten peace and sta­ relations with Libya. Through its dip­ bility in Libya. Given the conflux of lomatic missions, Turkey has been a multiple external agendas, Turkey’s staunch supporter and a vigilant ob­ policies that prioritize stability and server of Libya’s stability on the road peace face major difficulties. to democracy. Since 2014, Libya’s political disputes have turned into a Although the U.S.’ Libya policies after deadly civil war, where regional and 2011 have been consistent, they have international actors have increasingly also been self-contradictory. After

46 Insight Turkey TURKEY’S LIBYA POLICY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

the assassination of the U.S. Ambas­ sador in Libya, John Christopher Ste­ The inclusion of NATO member vens, the U.S. withdrew from Libya to a great extent and returned mil­ France in the Russian camp in itarily to face the emergence of ISIS addition to Egypt and the UAE, in the region. Washington, which the U.S.’ most significant allies had driven Haftar to the field, turned a blind eye to his war crimes. Ghas­ in the region, worried the U.S. san Salamé, who served as UN Spe­ cial Representative for Libya between June 2017 and March 2020, criticized The U.S.’ Libya policy is not solu­ the U.S.’ indecisive policy in a pro­ tion-oriented and instead pursues gram he joined on October 15, 2020. stabilization. Russia, which is unof­ He stated that at the Berlin Confer­ ficially present in Libya through the ence Haftar had approached him Wagner group, in contrast to its offi­ and said, “John Bolton told me to be cial military presence in Syria, clear­ quick if I wanted to take Tripoli, I do ly does not consider the ceasefire of not understand why you criticize me August 21 a long-term settlement, as this much.”14 Trump’s meeting with it continues providing Haftar with Haftar on April 4, 2020 a few days af­ military equipment. Russia has in­ ter his attempts to invade Tripoli, is a creasingly been one of Haftar’s pri­ clear sign of U.S.’ support, which has mary backers in his fight against the been known from the first day on. GNA.15 Pursuing a two-track strat­ egy in Libya, Russia strengthened When Haftar failed to achieve a mil­ Haftar’s failed efforts to claim Tripoli. itary victory in Libya, the Trump The first track of Russia’s strategy in Administration halted support for Libya is established by Wagner. The his forces. In the following period, second is established on the premise Haftar became increasingly engaged of supporting Haftar’s offensives both with Russia, and his presence in the on the ground and in the diplomatic field was integrated with Wagner arena. In this respect, Haftar has been mercenaries. The inclusion of NATO shouldered by Vladimir Putin who member France in the Russian camp bets against any American initiative in addition to Egypt and the UAE, in the Libyan conflict. the U.S.’ most significant allies in the region, worried the U.S. Washington Another primary international back­ led the ceasefire in Sirte and Jufra on er of Haftar is France. Although August 21, 2020. The U.S. Embassy in French President Emmanuel Macron Libya stated on September 12, 2020 has been quite explicit in express­ that Haftar’s blockade on oil pro­ ing France’s support for a peaceful duction and sales would be lifted; six solution for Libya, his intimate re­ days after this statement, Haftar lift­ lations with and diplomatic support ed the eight-month embargo on oil to Haftar call into question France’s production. overall aims. While Macron blocked

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Turkish Defense Minister Akar (2nd L) and his Qatari counterpart al-Attiah (2nd R) arrive to meet with Prime Minister al-Sarrj of Libya’s UN-recognized GNA in the capital Tripoli, on August 17, 2020. Getty Images

most of the international efforts to Loong II Unmanned Aerial Vehicles resolve the conflict in Libya, Paris has (UAVs) and Russian-made Panstir also consistently undermined the sta­ S-1 air defense systems.17 Egyptian bility of the international legitimate autocrat Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has also government (GNA) in Tripoli. As an funneled weapons to Haftar, and important NATO ally, France’s sup­ there has been tactical and logisti­ port to Haftar, who is strengthening cal cooperation between Haftar and its relationship with Russia increas­ Sisi.18 Saudi Arabia, in turn, has pro­ ingly, has led to some questions about vided Haftar with the financial capa­ the future of France within the North bility to buy the cooperation of tribal Atlantic Alliance. leaders.

Along with their international part­ Although Haftar has been supported ners, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the financially, logistically, and militarily UAE have been Haftar’s most ar­ by a set of regional and internation­ dent supporters. Many reports have al partners, most of the territorial claimed that the so-called LNA was gains the illegitimate forces have re­ established with UAE support and corded have been overturned by the that its military capability is reliant strengthening of the Libyan people. on the UAE for air support.16 It has Yet Libya, which has its own internal been revealed that the UAE provid­ conflicts between East and West, has ed Haftar with Chinese-made Wing yet to formulate a coherent structure

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among its factions. The involvement of multiple actors and their efforts Turkey will be present in both to benefit from the ongoing war has made the process intractable. As a the Northern and Southern result, the search for a political solu­ parts of the Mediterranean, as tion and the negotiations for a lasting its military presence at those ceasefire, which have remained con­ stantly on the agenda in Libya, have bases will not be limited to so far failed to reach a final result. times of conflict Although Ankara prioritizes the Lib­ ya file, the complex structure in Lib­ ya remains a major obstacle to Tur­ key’s efforts to maintain peace and establish their maritime jurisdiction. stability. Greece and the GASC made efforts to deprive Turkey of this wealth by ex­ cluding it from the region. The GASC Turkey’s Achievements in Libya signed a maritime agreement with Egypt in 2003, Lebanon in 2007, and Following the Turkish Parliament’s Israel in 2010. Events like the Eastern approval of the decision to keep Mediterranean Gas Forum, to which troops in Libya on January 2, 2020, Turkey was not invited, were orga­ the de facto withdrawal of Haftar’s nized within this frame; it too aimed militias began.19 This decision and its to deprive Turkey of its natural rights results were clear gains for Turkey. in the region.21 Turkey signed a Con­ Ankara has been keen on achieving tinental Shelf Delimitation Agree­ a sustainable victory against Haftar’s ment with the Turkish Republic of forces by supporting the GNA. As re­ Northern Cyprus in 2011, and later cent developments reveal, Turkey was signed an agreement with Libya in able to reach its objectives20 not only 2019, in keeping with international in the Libyan field, but also in the law and in response to the ambitious Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, countries of the region, especially as Turkey maintained its determined Greece and the GASC. position, the Tripoli leadership has been able to provide security and Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Nat­ trust to the Libyan people. It has to ural Resources, Fatih Dönmez, stated be noted that Turkey has made prac­ at the end of May, 2020, that Turk­ tical, tangible, political and diplomat­ ish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye ic achievements toward resolving the Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, TPAO) Libyan conflict. had applied to explore oil in the li­ cense-granted areas within the scope With the discovery of hydrocarbon of the agreement with Libya, and that resources in the Eastern Mediterra­ its first activities would start with­ nean in the early 2000s, the countries in months.22 A high-level delegation in the region began taking steps to that included Turkey’s Minister of

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Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, a major role in confronting Haftar’s Turkish Presidential Spokesperson attack on Tripoli and approaching İbrahim Kalın, then the Finance the Sirte-Jufra line after maintaining Minister Berat Albayrak, and the control in the Western part of Libya. Director of the National Intelligence The UAVs, which undertook more Organization Hakan Fidan paid an detailed and difficult tasks in Libya unannounced visit to Libya on June compared to their operations in Idlib, 17, 2020 to discuss significant issues have successfully proven their worth concerning energy and banking.23 in terms of both defense and attack The efforts of Haftar’s militias to im­ capabilities. Necessary modifications pose embargoes, especially on elec­ were made based on the experience tricity, in areas under GNA control gained from the field, paving the way has prompted Turkish companies to for the development of more sophis­ provide services for Libya in the field ticated systems. The videos provid­ of energy. ed to Haftar’s militias by the UAE of Russian-made air defense systems Libya’s cooperation with Turkish being destroyed by Turkish UCAVs companies, particularly construction became known worldwide in the me­ companies, goes back to 1972. It is dia.25 A video circulated by the press estimated that the total value of the unit of Operation Volcano of Rage, contracts signed by Turkish compa­ affiliated with the GNA, showed the nies until 2011 is around $40 billion. destruction of an air defense system The GNA, which controls the West­ in the city of Terhune, and significant ern part of Libya, has prioritized and press organizations like The Washing- initiated reconstruction and repair ton Post, Le Monde, and Die Welt have activities. The head of the Turkish drawn attention to the success of Tur­ Contractors Association, Mithat Ye­ key’s domestically made UAVs. nigün, underlined in an October 2020 statement that the projects set Therefore, it can be concluded that to take place in Libya in the upcom­ Turkey’s support for the GNA also ing era will be worth at least $50 bil­ represents a step forward for its in­ lion.24 Considering Turkish compa­ digenous defense industry. Turkey’s nies’ successful experiences in Libya unmanned combat aerial vehicle, the over the past half-century and Pres­ Bayraktar TB2 attracted particular ident Sarraj’s special invitations to attention and achieved its first export Turkish companies during his visits success after the Syrian operations to Ankara and İstanbul, it is not hard Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch. to predict that the Libyan market will When the Akıncı UAV completed its contribute significantly to the Turk­ check flights successfully, Turkey be­ ish economy. came one of the top 3-4 most efficient countries in the field of UAVs. With Akıncı and Bayraktar, Turkish UAVs the capacity to remain in the air up and UCAVs (Unmanned Combat to 24 hours at 40,000 feet, the Akıncı Aerial Vehicle) respectively, played is also capable of carrying 1.5 tons of

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cargo. The Akıncı increases the op­ erational power of the Turkish army By establishing strong and reduces the warplanes’ load of operation and flight costs, and has partnerships with the also become a significant option for legitimate authorities in Libya, other countries. Turkey will continue to be an It seems certain that Turkey’s do­ active supporter of peace and mestic defense industry products, stability in the country especially the UAVs and UCAVs that proved themselves in Libya, will ap­ peal to a larger market in the upcom­ ing era. In this context, Turkey’s 2023 thanks to Turkish support. Turkey goal of $10.2 billion in exports from will continue to have a military pres­ its indigenous defense and aerospace ence in the Misrata and al-Watiya air industry seems likely to be achieved, bases to maintain this dominance. thanks to its successful intervention Turkey will be present in both the in Libya. Northern and Southern parts of the Mediterranean, as its military pres­ The Libyan experience has brought ence at those bases will not be limited abstract but significant gains in the to times of conflict. Thanks to its stra­ long run for Turkey, a country that tegic cooperation with the GNA, and has increasingly become a region­ keeping Libya’s geopolitical location al game-changer. Turkey’s National in mind, Turkish air forces in al-Wa­ Intelligence Organization (MİT), tiya have gained the ability to per­ which made it possible to give the form sudden operations in African Libyan army support in tactical and countries, especially Egypt, Tunisia, technical terms, achieved significant Algeria, Sudan, and Chad. success and increased its capabili­ ty to perform overseas operations. All of these gains obtained by Turkey President Erdoğan, who highlight­ have resulted in its being the greatest ed the organization’s role in Libya at international stakeholder in the Lib­ the opening ceremony of MİT’s new ya case. As a result of Turkish author­ center in January 2020, stated that the ities’ intense efforts in the Libya case, intelligence and operational support particularly the Ministries of Foreign provided by MİT was game-chang­ Affairs and National Defense, the in­ ing.26 Put simply, Turkey’s success in ternational arena has acknowledged a conflict zone overseas with multiple Turkey’s priorities as well as objec­ actors through its national means has tives on Libya remarkably. It has be­ increased Ankara’s influence in inter­ come apparent that no Libya plan can national politics. be designed without Turkey. Turkey’s success in the field of diplomacy will It is widely accepted that the GNA has undoubtedly not be limited to Lib­ succeeded in holding Western Libya ya. Turkey’s breakthrough in terms

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tive role by supporting the interna­ Turkey will continue to tionally recognized government and strengthening its institutions. Turkish support the legitimate contribution to Libya’s state-build­ demands of the people, rather ing efforts is crucial in establishing a than the autocratic projects democratic political structure. While Turkey has been calling for regional aspiring to dominate the and international actors to positive­ region ly engage in the Libyan conflict, it has also been encouraging the Lib­ yan parties to sit together to find a common ground to overcome the of indigenous military technology is long-running stalemate. matched by its breakthrough in di­ plomacy, and its success in Libya has In this sense, Turkey is a strong sup­ accelerated this process. porter of the local peace initiatives and meetings that are held to find a To conclude, Turkey, which does not peaceful and Libyan-based solution follow an imperial or a self-seeking to the ongoing complexity. Both re­ agenda, has provided the necessary gional (Bouznika Conferences) and help for Libya to the full extent of its international (Berlin Conference) power, acting on its responsibility as attempts have tried to come up with a neighbor in the Mediterranean and concrete outcomes. The most recent in keeping with its historical ties to of such initiatives, the Libya Political the Libyan people. Turkey’s continu­ Dialogue forum, took place in Tuni­ ing solidarity with the Libyan people sia on November 9, 2020, with the is evident in its refusal to abandon participation of the representatives their fate to a warlord who spent a of the warring parties. The forum, significant part of his life in America. where foreign countries were not di­ rectly on the table and the broadest scope of participants from Libya took Conclusion place, was a crucial event in the hope to find a lasting solution to the crisis. The Libyan conflict has turned into The forum resulted with a number a complex situation where the inter­ of concrete decisions such as the one vention of regional and international about the next election, which is set actors became a reality. The nature of for December 24, 2021. Despite some the involvement of these actors differs positive steps taken in the Libyan Di­ significantly. On the one hand coun­ alogue forum, there are many issues tries like the UAE, Egypt, and France that still remain unclear. have been increasingly contributing to the destabilization of Libya, while As these initiatives unfold, Turkey on the other hand Turkey and Qatar continues to be one of the most con­ have been playing a very construc­ structive external parties in Libya.

52 Insight Turkey TURKEY’S LIBYA POLICY: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

Like many countries in the region, nean,” The United Nations, (November 27, 2019), retrieved October 3, 2020, from https://www. Turkey is negatively affected by Mid­ un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ dle Eastern instability, and Ankara STATEFILES/TUR.htm. must ensure its security by pursuing 3. “Turkey, Libya Deals ‘Void:’ Egypt, France, a foreign policy designed to meet its Greece, Cyprus,” Al Arabiya, (January 9, 2020), national agenda. In this sense, Turkey retrieved October 3, 2020, from https://english. alarabiya.net/en/News/north-africa/2020/01/09/ does not evaluate the Libyan conflict Turkey-Libya-deals-void-Egypt-France-Greece- and the Eastern Mediterranean ques­ Cyprus-.html. tion separately. The regional projects 4. “EU Condemns Turkey-Libya Deal Despite Ac- aimed at limiting Turkey’s role in the cordance With Int’l Law,” Daily Sabah, (December Eastern Mediterranean could also be 13, 2019), retrieved October 3, 2020, from https:// www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/12/13/ found in Libya. But Turkish foreign eu-condemns-turkey-libya-deal-despite-accor- policy, while abiding by internation­ dance-with-intl-law. al law, is responding to the legitimate 5. Gunerigök, “UN Registers Turkey-Libya Mari- demands of the people in the region time Deal,” Anadolu Agency. and preventing those regional proj­ 6. Burak Dağ, “Turkey’s Support for Libya Will ects from becoming a reality. Continue,” Anadolu Agency, (October 2, 2020), retrieved October 4, 2020, from https://www. aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkeys-support-for-lib- By establishing strong partnerships ya-will-continue/1993165https://www.aa.com.tr/ with the legitimate authorities in Lib­ en/africa/turkeys-support-for-libya-will-contin- ya, Turkey will continue to be an ac­ ue/1993165. tive supporter of peace and stability 7. “Turkey to Establish Military Base in Libya,” Mid- dle East Monitor, (December 18, 2019), retrieved in the country. Ankara also supports October 5, 2020, from https://www.middleeast- constructive international dialogue monitor.com/20191218-turkey-to-establish-mili- and the platforms that aim to estab­ tary-base-in-libya/. lish a fair future for the region. Tur­ 8. Enes Canlı, “Libya: Haftar Use Daesh/ISIS Tactic key will continue to support the legit­ While Withdrawing,” Anadolu Agency, (May 23, 2020), retrieved October 6, 2020, from https:// imate demands of the people, rather www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/libya-haftar-use- than the autocratic projects aspiring daesh-isis-tactic-while-withdrawing/1851072. to dominate the region. 9. “Libya’s GNS Says Pro-Haftar Mercenaries De- ployed in Jufra and Sirte Despite Ceasefire,” Mid- dle East Eye, (August 30, 2020), retrieved October Endnotes 8, 2020, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/libya-gna-military-pro-haftar-mercenar- 1. Daren Butler and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Turkey ies-deployed-jufra-sirte-ceasefire. Signs Maritime Boundaries Deal with Libya,” Re- uters, (November 28, 2019), retrieved October 10. Mücahit Aydemir, “Libya: Russian Plane Brings 2, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com/article/ Syrian Fighters to Sirte,” Anadolu Agency, (October us-turkey-libya-idUSKBN1Y213I. 3, 2020), retrieved October 8, 2020, from https:// www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/libya-russian-plane- 2. Servet Günerigök, “UN Registers Turkey-Libya brings-syrian-fighters-to-sirte/1994770. Maritime Deal,” Anadolu Agency, (October 1, 2020), retrieved October 2, 2020, from https://www.aa. 11. “NOC Recognised as Sole Legitimate Lib- com.tr/en/middle-east/un-registers-turkey-lib- yan Oil Corporation by International Commu- ya-maritime-deal/1992682; “Memorandum of nity,” National Oil Corporation, retrieved Oc- Understanding between the Government of the tober 8, 2020, from https://noc.ly/index.php/ Republic of Turkey and the Government of Na- en/new-4/3773-noc-recognised-as-sole-legit- tional Accord-State of Libya on Delimitation of imate-libyan-oil-corporation-by-internation- the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterra- al-community.

2020 Fall 53 COMMENTARY İSMAİL NUMAN TELCİ

12. “Press Release Regarding the Signing of the October 14, 2020, from https://www.aa.com. Libyan Political Agreement,” Republic of Turkey tr/en/turkey/turkish-parliament-ratifies-lib- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (December 18, 2015), ya-troops-motion/1690396. retrieved October 9, 2020, from http://www. 20. İsmail Numan Telci, “Why the Eastern Medi- mfa.gov.tr/no_-308_-16-december-2015_-press- terranean Is of Strategic Importance for Turkey,” release-regarding-the-signing-ceremony-of- Politics Today, (May 13, 2019), retrieved October the-libyan-political-agreement.en.mfa. 15, 2020, from https://politicstoday.org/why-the- 13. Ramy Allahoum, “Libya’s War: Who Is Sup- eastern-mediterranean-is-of-strategic-impor- porting Whom?” Al Jazeera, (January 9, 2020), tance-for-turkey/. retrieved October 9, 2020, from https://www. 21. İsmail Numan Telci, “Turkey’s Quest for Influ- aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/9/libyas-war-who-is- ence in the Mediterranean in the Post-Arab Up- supporting-whom. risings Era,” in Robert Mason (ed.), Transnational 14. “Libya and the New Global Disorder: A Con- Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean, (Cham: versation with Ghassan Salamé,” Carnegie En- Palgrave, 2020), pp. 171-173. dowment, (October 15, 2020), retrieved Octo- 22. “Turkey to Launch Oil Exploration in East Med ber 20, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/ Soon under Pact with Libyan Government,” Dai- watch?v=XPo1Mk67GoA&t=1s&ab_channel=- ly Sabah, (May 29, 2020), retrieved October 18, CarnegieLive. 2020, from https://www.dailysabah.com/busi- 15. Brian Katz and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Mos- ness/energy/turkey-to-launch-oil-exploration-in- cow’s Next Front: Russia’s Expanding Military east-med-soon-under-pact-with-libyan-govern- Footprint in Libya,” Center for Strategic Interna- ment. tional Studies, (June 17, 2020), retrieved October 23. “Turkey’s Foreign Minister Visits Libya for Talks 9, 2020, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/mos- with GNA,” Al Jazeera, (June 17, 2020), retrieved cows-next-front-russias-expanding-military-foot- October 18, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera. print-libya. com/news/2020/6/17/turkeys-foreign-minister- 16. Mücahit Aydemir, “Haftar Losing Ground de- visits-libya-for-talks-with-gna. spite UAE Spending Fortune,” Anadolu Agency, 24. “Turkey-Libya Deal to Complete Unfinished (May 21, 2020), retrieved October 10, 2020, from Construction Projects Enters into Force,” Daily https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/haftar- Sabah, (October 16, 2020), retrieved October losing-ground-despite-uae-spending-fortune-/ 18, 2020, from https://www.dailysabah.com/ 1848499. business/economy/turkey-libya-deal-to-com- 17. Aishwarya Rakesh, “Libyan Military Destroys plete-unfinished-construction-projects-en- Haftar Forces’ Pantsir Air Defense System, Wing ters-into-force. Loong Drones,” Defense World, (May 18, 2020), 25. Alex Gatopoulos, “Largest Drone War in the retrieved October 11, 2020, from https://www. World: How Airpower Saved Tripoli,” Al Jazeera, defenseworld.net/news/26999/Libyan_Military_ (May 28, 2020), retrieved October 18, 2020, from Destroys_Haftar_Forces____Pantsir_Air_De- https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/28/ fense_Systems__Wing_Loong_Drones. largest-drone-war-in-the-world-how-airpower- 18. “Egypt Sends more Arms to Libya’s Haftar,” saved-tripoli. Middle East Monitor, (June 7, 2019), retrieved Octo- 26. Çağatay Zontur, “Turkish Intel Helps ber 12, 2020, from https://www.middleeastmon- Cross-Border Operations Succeed—Erdoğan,” itor.com/20190607-egypt-sends-more-arms-to- Anadolu Agency, (June 6, 2020), retrieved October libyas-haftar/https://www.middleeastmonitor. 18, 2020, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/ com/20190607-egypt-sends-more-arms-to-lib- turkish-intel-helps-cross-border-operations-suc- yas-haftar/. ceed/1694021https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/ 19. “Turkish Parliament Ratifies Libya Troops Mo- turkish-intel-helps-cross-border-operations-suc- tion,” Anadolu Agency, (January 2, 2020), retrieved ceed/1694021.

54 Insight Turkey