Attitudes Towards Immigration in Europe: Myths and Realities Monday 19 June 2017, 4-6Pm A5E-1, ASP Building, European Parliament

Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities Monday 19 June 2017, 4-6pm A5E-1, ASP Building, European Parliament

Agenda: 4-4.55pm 5.35-5.55pm Presentations: Academic experts will Q&A session: The audience will be present key findings from their research invited to put questions to academics, on attitudes towards immigration. moderated by the Migration Policy Group 4.55-5.35pm Policy proposals: Speakers will 5.55-6pm present recommendations of policy Reaction: Jean Lambert MEP will react changes that would help improve to presentations, proposals public opinion on immigration. and Q&A session 2 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 3

Rory Fitzgerald Thomas Huddleston and Paola Mikaba The European Social Survey Migration Policy Group

The European Social Survey (ESS) wel- Europe. The freely available data collected by Policymakers: Be as bold as your constituents GDP, employment rate and number of asylum comes you to this special event co-organised the ESS, and subsequent detailed analy- and support a welcoming Europe! applications). Furthermore, the majority (56%) with the Migration Policy Group and kindly sis by academic scholars, highlights both remain in favour of proportional allocation hosted by the office of Jean Lambert MEP. differences and similarities across European The number of immigrants moving to and even when informed that such a system countries, providing a context for single coun- settling in Europe has increased over the past would likely increase the intake of asylum The ESS is an academically driven survey try findings. decade, and so has the openness of Europe- seekers in their own country. using the highest methodological standards. ans to migrants and especially to refugees. Every two years, up to 40,000 face-to-face As Europe faces a grand societal challenge In turn, people with a migrant background An allocation mechanism based on Member interviews are conducted in participating on immigration, the ESS is continuing to are better integrated in inclusive countries. States’ reception capacity is exactly what the countries on a wide range of subjects. provide robust attitudinal data in this area. In Perhaps surprisingly, voters have not turned temporary EU relocation scheme provides. each round of the survey, a number of ques- against people immigrating or seeking asylum, However, despite public support for such a With over 100,000 registered users, over tions are asked on immigration. Additionally, neither after the 2008 economic crisis nor fol- system, only some 20,000 refugees out of the 3,000 publications using our data and clear in Round 1 (2002/03) of the ESS, a module lowing the large numbers of refugee arrivals initial target of 160,000 have been relocated in 2015. Nevertheless, policy-makers remain since 2015. This is mainly because main- evidence of impact ‘beyond academia’, the specifically on immigration was included. Our reluctant to implement welcoming measures. stream politicians fear a backlash from vocal ESS has already established itself as a Round 7 (2014/15) module on immigration far-right colleagues and voters if they publicly critical pillar of the European Research Area. was built on the design of the ESS Round 1 We wonder why politicians are less bold than support the entry of refugees. Hence, the In addition, its methods and methodological module meaning that this repeat set of ques- their constituents. Dublin System, which allocates asylum seek- research programme ensure that the infra- tions allows for direct comparisons using the ers based on the “first point of entry,” remains structure remains ‘state of the art’ and helps same measures. Trends extracted from recent survey data the status quo. to position Europe as a global leader in terms disprove the argument that the rising support of comparative social science. The 2014/15 module also included some for the far-right is due to a radical change As this latest research shows, voters are new concepts as well as detailed questions of heart among Europeans. Instead, closer generally inclined to continue to support an The ESS was established against a back- about specific groups of migrants. As with all analysis reveals that the recent large numbers open Europe. Governments therefore need ground of poor availability of academically of the modules we include in the ESS, we are of arrivals have only mobilised a specific sub- to build on this and put in place inclusive rigorous cross-national data, in particular in thankful to the external questionnaire design group of the population, namely those who policies that will further strengthen public regard to attitudes, beliefs and values. The teams who worked on the immigration mod- already viewed socio-demographic change support for immigration. This call is made all founders of the ESS, Roger Jowell and Max ules that were included in both Round 1 and as a risk to social order. In other words, it has the stronger when viewed in conjunction with Kaase, had the vision and determination to Round 7. Their endeavour through collabo- exacerbated right voters’ tendency to over-es- other studies that underline how immigrants develop the scientific blueprint for the study ration with the ESS meant that each immi- timate immigration flows and their possible living in inclusive countries have a greater and to persuade national funders, the Euro- gration module included in the survey was threats and politicised far-right voters. Voters sense of belonging and feel as patriotic pean Science Foundation and the European designed to the highest possible standards. on the left however tend to better see the op- as the local population. We therefore urge Commission that a knowledge gap existed. portunities immigrants bring and want greater politicians to listen to their voters, respect They therefore agreed to fund and nurture a Immigration continues to be one of the topics integration. relocation quotas and reform EU asylum rules rigorous, high quality, comparative general most frequently analysed by scholars and we for a fairer system. In short, to be as bold as social survey for the wider social science are delighted to be able to introduce you to Beyond this dichotomy, research shows that their constituents! community. some of those scholars today. I thank them regardless of their country’s economic situa- for taking the time to be here today. I would tion, Europeans (72%) of all ages, education This article is published in the Features sec- The ESS continues to act as a telescope for also like to thank Jean Lambert MEP and her levels and across the political spectrum sup- tion of www.migrationnewssheet.eu with all social scientists, allowing them to illuminate staff for their assistance in organising and port a fair allocation of refugees based on a relevant sources and more data. the attitudes and behaviour of the people of hosting this event. country’s reception capacity (population size, 4 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 5

Marie-Sophie Callens, KU Leuven (University of Leuven) and Integration policies and public opinion in Europe: LISER (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research) in conflict or in harmony?

Migration to Europe changed the face of Eu- icies implemented in a country are - albeit in Society’s view on immigration and integration, more likely to happen when public opinion is ropean countries, where rising levels of ethnic complex and intricate ways - related to public institutionalized through immigration laws and activated by far-right parties. diversity are increasingly becoming typical. At opinion that spreads among the population integration policies, influences the tolerance the same time, the rise of far-right parties and (Lahav, 2004; Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011). of ethnic minorities (Schlueter et al., 2013; We consider that policy responsiveness and anti-immigrant sentiments is becoming evident Weldon, 2006). policy feedback work as a policy-opinion in these countries. Several studies provide This link between policy and attitudes has circle, in which both continuously influence theoretical arguments for the existence of a been analysed from different theoretical The other mechanism, the policy responsive- each other and change public opinion and link between integration policies and public perspectives that make opposing assump- ness theory, explains that policymakers in integration policies incrementally. In the case opinion on immigrants (Bourhis et al., 1997; tions about the causality of the relationship: democratic states take into account public where more-inclusive integration policies are Favell, 2001; Jakobs and Herman, 2009). certain theories assume that policies are a preferences when designing integration poli- followed by more positive public opinion, determinant of public opinion rather than a cies, in order to reduce the risk of losing votes and again by even more inclusive integra- Public opinion on immigrants is an umbrella consequence of it (Mettler and Soss, 2004), and to avoid the likelihood of public reprisals tion policies, we describe this as a virtuous term that is used interchangeably for gen- whereas others see public opinion as the in the form of protests or public disobedience policy-opinion circle. By contrast, a cycle eral or public attitudes toward immigrants main driver of policies (Brooks and Manza, (Brooks and Manza, 2006; Howard, 2010; where negative public opinion is followed by (Ceobanu & Escandell 2010; Fetzer 2000), 2006). Unfortunately, the empirical evidence Lahav, 2004). Howard (2010) states that more-restrictive integration policies and again anti-immigrant feelings, prejudice toward that is currently available does not provide a although public opinion has an impact on the by more negative public opinion is described immigrants (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman straightforward answer to the question which restrictiveness of integration policies, this is as a vicious policy-opinion circle. 1999a) and attitudes toward outgroups. The of these mechanisms is behind the relation- term public opinion can thus have very differ- ship between policies and threat (Morales et ent meanings, often depending on the items al., 2015). Given the mixed evidence, we think available in cross-cultural surveys. that the relationship between integration poli- Various authors argue that the integration pol- cies and public opinion on immigrants should be seen as dialectic and have therefore put forward the policy-opinion circle.

The policy-opinion circle involves both policy feedback and policy responsiveness mechanisms. The policy feedback theory claims that policies them- selves reshape the political environment, and also the broader societal context and public opinion (Mettler and Soss, 2004). 6 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 7

Empirical evidence Three studies, out of which only one used MIPEX data, looked upon the relation be- James Dennison Research on the topic, and especially com- tween integration policies and voting for the parative research, remains scarce (Schlueter, extreme right. Voting for the extreme right is Migration Policy Centre Meuleman & Davidov 2013), mainly due to the not a dimension of public opinion but it can lack of quantitative measures available on in- be a consequence of it. However, none of the • Favourability towards immigration • What varies far more across time than tegration policies in different countries. Since studies found any significant effects, so this varies considerably by country. attitudes to immigration is the salience its publication in 2004, the Migrant Integration relationship still remains unclear and needs of the immigration issue. This salience, Policy Index (MIPEX) has become the most further research. frequently used index of integration policies • However, across time, attitudes to or the importance of immigration, for empirical comparative research. In summary, consistent and positive relation- immigration are highly stable and are in also varies considerably according to ships emerged in several studies between fact becoming slightly more favourable. country. Though attitudes have stayed A recent review paper (2015) looked at pub- countries with more inclusive integration stable lately, salience has risen sharply. lished articles and working papers on the sta- policies (i.e. higher MIPEX overall scores) and tistical relationship between public opinion to- lower levels of perceived threat and, to some ward immigrants and integration policies, with extent, lower levels of negative attitudes to- a strong focus on research using MIPEX. The wards immigrants. All studies are correlational, review included eighteen multivariate studies so we cannot empirically distinguish which of which ten used the ESS data. Among the exact mechanism - policy feedback theory or others there were the Eurobarometer (four policy responsiveness - is at work. studies), European Values Study (EVS) (two Percentage of population that believe it is very imporant that immigrants have work skills studies) and then other datasets, such as Nevertheless, all results show evidence of a needed in the country (blue bars) and Percentage of population that believe it is very International Civic and Citizenship Education virtuous circle, in which more-inclusive integra- important that immigrants have good educational qualifications (orange bars) (ESS 2014) Study (ICCS) (one study), the International tion policies relate to positive public opinion Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (one study) on immigrants, which in turn can lead to 80% and the SOM database (one study). even more inclusive integration policies. One should be aware that the dynamic between 70% The four studies that looked at immigrant integration policies and public opinion contin- related threat perceptions found all positive uously influence each other and in the future 60% significant effects. In countries with more in- could also become a vicious circle. clusive integration policies, people were found to have less ethnic threat perceptions. A more This summary is based on following articles: 50% recent study (Callens & Meuleman, 2016) made a distinction between the different Callens Marie-Sophie and Meuleman Bart 40% integration strands of MIPEX and found that (2016). Do integration policies relate to especially inclusive labour market policies and economic and cultural threat perceptions? inclusive political participation policies are re- A comparative study in Europe. Internation- 30% lated with lower economic threat perceptions. al Journal of Comparative Sociology. DOI: 10.1177/0020715216665437 | First Pub- 20% In the studies that looked at general anti-im- lished August 29, 2016 migrant attitudes, four out of six studies found that more inclusive integration policies lead to Callens Marie-Sophie (2015). Integration 10% more positive immigrant attitudes, while the policies and public opinion: in conflict or in other two studies did not find any effect. harmony? LISER Working paper n° 2015-02. 0% EE GB LT HU IE AT IL SI PT CZ BE CH ES PL DE FI FR NL DK NO SE

Skills (mean) Educational qualifications (mean) 8 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 9

• Individuals living in more diverse education, nationalism, cultural su- Explaining variation in attitudes regions and who have more ethnical- premicism, interest in politics or having to immigration in Europe ly diverse friends tend to hold more lived abroad, on attitudes to immigra- pro-immigration positions. tion. • Attitudes to immigration at the individ- • Attitudes to immigration are also ual level can be powerfully paredicted powerfully predicted by broader • With the above variables, we can • Attitudes to immigration, it seems, are by fundamental psychological traits, political attitudes, such as left-right explain around 40 per cent of variation the result of deep-lying psychological with individuals displaying openness self-placement, desire for egalitarian- in attitudes to immigration. differences within the electorate and and excitability more drawn towards ism and desire for a strong government are unlikely to be easily changed by pro-immigration positions and those to secure safety. Also, individuals who • Surprisingly, with the above variables exposure to new information or political displaying conscientiousness and con- are more sceptical of the motives of taken into account, we find no direct campaigns. cern over safety more drawn towards politicians tend to be more opposed to effect of university education, parental anti-immigration positions. immigration.

James Dennison ([email protected]) and Teresa Talò ([email protected]) Percentage of population that believe it is very imporant that immigrants speak the country’s official language (red bars) and Percentage of population that believe it is Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence very important are committed to way of life in the country (green bars) (ESS 2014)

90% PercentagePercentage of the population of the population that that picked picked immigration immigration as as the the most most important important issue issue facing their country between 2002 and 2016 (Eurobarometer) 80% facing their country between 2002 and 2016 (Eurobarometer)

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% GB AT BE FR NL IE SI DE LT CH HU CZ PL PT EE ES NO IL DK FI SE

Speak langauge (mean) Way of life (mean)

Funnel of causality theoretical model: how different groups of variables affect the individual’s attitude to immigration

Correlations between belief that immigrants make France a better place to live and personality traits (source: ESS, 2014) 10 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 11

Rob Ford Three things I have learned about immigration attitudes University of Manchester

1. Public opinion isn’t turning against heritage tend to be more negative. These 2. Migrants’ characteristics matter - and grades while similarly large majorities oppose immigration, but attitudes are becoming groups are diverging further over time, with skills matter most the migration of students with bad grades. In more polarised positive groups becoming more convinced the domain of family reunion migration, where about the benefits of migration while negative I have carried out a series of survey experi- the economic contribution is less clear than I have found two important trends in the over- groups become more sceptical. ments in my research, where I randomly vary for labour or student migration, respondents all structure of public opinion about immigra- the characteristics of migrants to test how show a stronger preference for European tion in Britain (Ford, Heath and Morrell 2012; This polarisation is not symmetrical in its these characteristics affect how they are over non-European migration, though they Ford and Heath, 2014) and across Europe political effects, because migration is a far perceived. Such characteristics turn out to also respond to the primary migrant’s length (Ford and Lymperopoulou, 2017). Public opin- more salient issue for opponents than for matter a great deal - native citizens do not of residence regardless of ethnicity - longer ion is not, in general becoming more negative supporters. Voters hostile to migration tend to have fixed views about all migrants, but are residence encourages higher support for about immigration, even in countries with high blame it for a range of social problems, and very responsive to who migrants are, and family reunion in all circumstances. rates of migration inflow. But Europeans are will support political parties who focus on what they have to offer. The largest effects becoming more divided about migration and reducing immigration - opposition to migra- come from skills - highly skilled migrants In more recent research I have carried out a its effects. These divides have opened up tion is the strongest predictor of support for are regarded much more positively than similar experiment on labour migration across along multiple lines, including age, education, populist radical right parties. By contrast, those with fewer skills. What is more, skills a range of European countries, comparing social class and migrant heritage. The young, supporters of migration tend to regard it as seem to trump origins - while respondents views of migrants from the largest European the highly educated, the middle class and a non-issue, and focus on other matters. in many countries have more negative views source of migration to each country with those with migrant heritage tend to be more As a result, much of the political initative on of ethnically or religiously different migrants, views of migrants from the largest non-Eu- positive about migration. By contrast, the migration often rests with opponents, even this “ethnic penalty” is reduced or eliminated ropean source of migration, and comparing old, those with few or no qualifications, the though their hostility is often not shared by entirely if the migrants are highly skilled. views of professionals and unskilled labour- working class and those without any migrant the majority of citizens. ers. The general pattern is the same as in In research focussed on Britain only, I have Britain - skills have a much larger impact than Positive views of the cultural impact of immigration among graduates under 45 (blue) and found that migrants’ characteristics matter for ethnic origins, and ethnic origins matter more “school leavers” with lowest level of formal qualifications over 65 (purple) (ESS 2014) views about each form of migration - but dis- for unskilled migration. There is, though, a lot 100 95 crimination by origins is more prevalent where of variation between countries - both skills Graduates under 45 2014 School leavers 65 plus 2014 90 the economic contribution of migrants is less and ethnicity matter more in some European clear. British respondents are more positive countries than others. 78 80 79 80 74 about labour migrants coming to fill jobs 70 67 than those coming to search for work, and 64 much more positive about skilled professional 60 migrants than unskilled labourers. Respond- ents show a preference for Eastern European 50 43 unskilled labourers over migrants from Paki- 39 40 34 stan, but show no ethnic preference between Eastern European and Pakistani profession- 30 25 22 als. In experiments asking about student 20 migration, the ethnic origin of students makes no difference at all but the grades of stu- 10 dents has a huge effect - very large majorities 0 support the migration of students with good Great Britain France Germany Ireland Netherlands Sweden 12 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 13

3. Migrants are regarded as less views of white native claimants. Economically deserving of welfare assistance secure white native respondents who express Dominik Hangartner no prejudice do not discriminate against I have also employed survey experiments to migrant or minority welfare claimants. Immigration Policy Lab, ETH Zurich investigate how migrants are viewed in the context of welfare provision. Individual mi- I have also investigated the effect of target- Scenes from the front lines of Europe’s ref- sponsibility for refugees. A high level summit grants are consistently perceived by respond- ing welfare policy at ethnic minorities. When ugee crisis depict a border overwhelmed by will take up its proposals in June of this year. ents in both British and Dutch experiments welfare assistance is targeted at, for exam- the influx of desperate people on the move. as less deserving of help than identically ple, “poor Muslim families” rather than just The Italian Coast Guard operates at full tilt While EU leaders hammer out reforms, how- described natives. However, there are also “poor families”, public support for the policy to rescue boatloads of migrants at sea; in ever, they seldom hear the voices of ordinary differences between reactions in the two falls sharply - even though policies targeted Greece, sprawling refugee camps housing Europeans debating the issue in pubs and countries. Ethnic difference has a negative at “poor families” would include assistance tens of thousands have stretched the country cafes. What kind of asylum system do they impact on perceptions of claimants in Britain, for poor Muslim families. Both of the factors to its limits. Local institutions are buckling un- want? We conducted an unprecedented but has no such effect in the Netherlands. outlined previously - economic insecurity and der a backlog of asylum applications, leaving survey of 18,000 Europeans in 15 coun- The negative effect of migrant status on views prejudice - played a similar role here. We many asylum seekers in limbo. tries to find out, and the answer was clear: of welfare claimants is also usually larger in also found that ideological factors played a Europeans would strongly prefer a system Britain than in the Netherlands. Two factors role in the very large differences in support Europe’s asylum system wasn’t built to that allocated asylum seekers in proportion to play a large role in explaining the disadvan- for income targeted and ethnically targeted withstand circumstances like this - when not each country’s capacity - even if that sys- tage migrants and minorities face. Firstly, welfare policy. The ideological beliefs which only the Syrian civil war but many entrenched tem brought larger numbers into their own economic insecurity encourages support encourage support for redistribution from rich conflicts across Africa and the Middle East country. for white native welfare claimants to a much to poor have a much weaker effect on views will continue sending people fleeing toward greater degree than migrant or minority wel- of ethnically targeted redistribution. British Europe for the foreseeable future. Under the Given the high costs and social unrest that fare claimants. Secondly, prejudice against left wingers who support income targeted current Dublin Regulation, the EU member some countries have experienced while ac- minorities depresses support for migrant redistribution are much less supportive of state where an asylum seeker first arrived is commodating large numbers of refugees, one and minority claimants but has no effect on ethnically targeted redistribution. responsible for the application. might think plenty of Europeans would want their own country’s share to be as low as pos- Since the refugee crisis hit, many have sible. Most countries would see an increase British support for welfare policies targeted at poor families in general, or at specific ethnic groups argued that the Dublin status quo is not only if the EU moved to a proportional allocation logistically unsound but also inherently unfair, system, which would take into account each 3.5 Working class Black Muslim given that most asylum seekers today will country’s population, GDP, unemployment 3 2.99 2.94 come through the southern border countries. rate, and the number of applications already 3 2.82 A campaign to reform the Common European received. Yet the principle of proportional Asylum System (CEAS) has picked up steam equality appears to be deeply engrained in 2.5 over the past year, with proponents calling for the public’s understanding of fairness in the greater solidarity and a fairer sharing of re- world. 2 1.67 1.46 1.51 1.5 1.39 1.11 0.98 0.99 1 0.87 Support for policy(0-4 scale) 0.5

0 Tax breaks for School programmes University scholarships Overall businesses 14 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 15

This preference was remarkably consistent backlash and a loss of political position. But Europeans would accept more refugees across the surveyed countries, including these results point to a consensus broad and major EU powers and new members, border strong enough to empower them to move if the Asylum System were fair and interior countries, and ones with few and confidently toward reforming the system. many asylum seekers. It With the two impulses in tension, are people - majority support for proportional equality persisted, too, among A Consensus for Change Kirk Bansak, Jens more likely18,000 to ask Europeans whether in 15 the countries asylum to Þndpolicy out, remainedpossible. Most nearly countries unchanged. would see an Thisincrease suggests respondents on the left, Hainmueller, Dominik benefits theirand the own answer country, was clear: or Europeanswhether would it is thatif the the EU movednorm tois a so proportional widely shared, allocation and so right, and center of the Hangartner (2017): Eu- designed stronglyto be fairprefer for a systemeveryone? that allocated asylum intuitive,system, which that would it doesn’t take into needaccount to each be explained. political spectrum. 0: Number of Dublin ropeans Would Support seekers in proportion to each country’s Andcountry’s when population, respondents GDP, unemployment were told how many Regulation countries with capacity—even if that system brought larger rate, and the number of applications already a Proportional Allocation We randomlynumbers assigned into their manipulations own country. to see asylumreceived. seekersYet the principle each of option proportional would send to In the years since the a majority willing to accept of Asylum Seekers, Na- which holds sway. When respondents were theirequality country, appears toallowing be deeply themengrained to easilyin the pick crisis hit, the world has more refugees under the ture Human Behaviour, informed of theiven options the high costspresented and social - unrestthe status that thepublic’s one understanding with the lowest of fairness number, in the world. proportional looked on the scale forthcoming. G some countries have experienced while With the two impulses in tension, are people status quo allocation quo, proportionalaccommodating allocation, large numbers and an of refugees,equal allocationmore likely to saw ask whether decreased the asylum support policy in most of the human tragedy number ofone asylum might thinkseekers plenty forof Europeans each country would countriesbeneÞts their but own stillcountry, won or awhether 56% itmajority. is and called on Europe- Immigration Policy want their own country’s share to be as low as designed to be fair for everyone? an countries to work 72: Percent of respondents Lab together to protect and who prefer proportional provide for the refugees. allocation of asylum seekers Stanford | ETH Zurich • Preference for Proportional Allocation of Asylum Seeker Applications Over the Status Quo Allocation Our study shows that immigrationlab.org there’s strong desire for Consequences not Shown Consequences Shown cooperation and coordi- 18: Percentage who would The Immigration Policy All Countries nation, but that desire is stick with status quo Lab is dedicated to the Austria thwarted by the Dublin design and rigorous Regulation system. evaluation of immigra- Czech Republic 7/10: Countries whose Beyond the refugee tion and integration Denmark crisis, this shows that respondents choose policy in host countries France voters care about how proportional allocation even throughout the world. international institutions By guiding and inform- Germany though they were told it are designed, not just would increase their ing the people who set Greece about the results they number of asylum seekers public policy, as well as Hungary deliver for individual those who directly serve countries. immigrant communities, Italy our research can inspire solutions, improve Netherlands European leaders may worry that any increase immigrants’ lives, and strengthen their host

Norway in asylum seekers brings the risk of public societies.

Poland

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 Preference for Proportional Allocation of Asylum−Seeker Applications over the Status Quo (%) Country would receive more asylum applications under proportional allocation Country would receive fewer asylum applications under proportional allocation 16 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities European Parliament, 19 June 2017 17

Lindsay Richards, Centre for Social Investigation, Attitudes to immigration in Europe: Nuffield College, University of Oxford how divided are we?

Immigration is a divisive issue in Europe. 2) How have attitudes changed between However, most countries became more nega- low), where the gap is 21 percentage points. Further, there is every reason to expect that 2002/3 and 2014/5? tive in their attitudes over this period. In some Age is also divisive, where it is the younger attitudes to immigration might be becoming 3) Do we see different patterns of change in cases such as the Czech Republic, Ireland and people who are more favourable to immigration more divided over time. New ‘radical right’ different countries? Switzerland the changes were quite dramatic. than are older people (17 points). political parties with anti-immigration agendas 4) How are attitudes divided along socio-eco- have been gaining ground in many countries nomic lines? In nine of the nineteen countries we find that The gap between the top quintile and the and immigration is often rated highly on the public opinion has polarized, which is to say bottom quintile of income is 15 points. political agenda by voters. Preferred type of migrant that there are fewer people with middling views, and more choosing one of the extreme Differences between migrants and non-mi- It has also been a period of social and eco- There is a clear hierarchy of preferred type of answers. grants, and between Christians and people nomic turmoil. The Great Recession of 2008 migrant. The most preferred are people from with no religion, are relatively small in compar- hit most countries in Europe, with more or the same race or ethnic group as the majority Socio-economic and ison. less dire consequences in terms of unemploy- while Jewish people are much more welcome demographic divides ment and austerity measures. This may have than Muslims, who in turn are more welcome When we compare young highly educated put additional strain on inter-group relations, than Gypsies. The strongest cleavage is between the highly to older less educated, we find the degree of with attitudes to immigrants (and to minority educated (graduates) and the less educated polarisation varies hugely across countries. ethnic groups) hardening with the pressure on Looking across the four items asked in both (those with lower secondary education or be- resources. time points, we find that the hierarchy of preferred migrants was very similar on both Attitudes towards different sorts of migrant (ESS 2014) The European Social Survey (ESS) in occasions. 100% 2002/03 and 2014/15 included the following questions: Polarising Attitudes 90%

To what extent do you think [country] should We also find that attitudes became somewhat 80% allow (1) people of the same race or ethnic more polarised between 2002/3 and 2014/5, 70% group as most [country]’s people to come and particularly so in the case of attitudes to- live here? (2) How about people of a different wards migrants from poorer countries outside 60% race or ethnic group from most [country] peo- Europe. The proportion of European publics ple? (3) people from the poorer countries in who felt that none of these migrants should be 50% Allow many Europe? (4) people from the poorer countries allowed to come increased from 11% to 20%. Allow some outside Europe? At the same time, there was an increase in the 40% proportion who felt that many such migrants Allow a few In 2014/15, additional questions were asked should be allowed entry (from 11% to 12%). 30% Allow none about: (5) Jewish people (6) Muslims, and (7) In other words European publics are becom- Gypsies ing more divided. We find variation between 20% countries in their change over time: 10% In this talk, I show responses to these items (which were none, a few, some, and many) to Several of the more positive countries became 0% attempt to answer the following questions: even more positive between 2002/3 and Same race Jewish Different Poorer Poorer Muslim Gypsies 2014/15: Sweden, Norway and Germany, for or ethnic people race or countries countries people 1) Which types of migrants are preferred? example. group ethnic in Europe outside group Europe 18 Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities

The gaps are around 50 percentage points Concluding thoughts in Britain and France, for example, compared with 20 points or less in Hungary, Lithuania Despite the evidence for polarisation, we and the Czech Republic. should keep in mind that attitudes were generally stable between 2002/3 and 2014/5. The extent of polarisation tends to be smallest We saw the largest change in attitudes to in countries like Hungary which are the most immigrants from poor countries outside Europe 18,000 citizens from 15 European countries were negative about immigration. but for other types of immigrant, there was little asked about their attitudes towards the Common change. But some of the countries which are overall European Asylum System quite positive about immigration - such as The enduring nature of attitudes within most Denmark and Finland - are also quite divided countries suggests that they may have deep in socio-economic terms. This suggests that rooted origins and cannot be explained by issues of immigration have the potential to be short-term changes. politically divisive in Nordic as well as in west- ern European countries like Britain and France. want to reform the system Percentage point gaps between the young highly educated and the older less educated 72% to fairly distribute refugees in support for allowing migrants from poorer countries outside Europe (ESS 2014) between Member States Hungary

Lithuania

Czech Republic

Ireland When shown the impact of a fair system based on

Israel countries' reception capacity : an increased intake

Netherlands of refugees in 10 out of the 15 countries

Germany

Sweden

Portugal

Norway

Poland Old lo-ed Estonia Young hi-ed Austria Gap still want to reform the system Finland 56% to fairly distribute refugees Denmark between Member States Switzerland

Spain

Belgium

France

Slovenia

0102030405060708090100 Study conducted by K. Bansak, J. Hainmueller & D. Hangartner % Allow some/ many migrants from poorer countries Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities Monday 19 June 2017, 4-6pm, A5E-1, ASP Building, European Parliament

Contact information: Jean Lambert MEP James Dennison (@GreenJeanMEP) (@JamesRDennison) Group of the Greens/ Migration Policy Centre European Free Alliance [email protected] [email protected] Rob Ford (@robfordmancs) Rory Fitzgerald (@RoryFitzESS) University of Manchester European Social Survey [email protected] [email protected] Dominik Hangartner Thomas Huddleston (@migpolgroup) (@ImmigrationLab) Migration Policy Group Immigration Policy Lab, ETH Zurich [email protected] [email protected] Marie-Sophie Callens (@MSCallens) Lindsay Richards (@csinuffield) KU Leuven (University of Leuven) Centre for Social Investigation, and LISER (Luxembourg Institute Nuffield College, University of Oxford of Socio-Economic Research) [email protected] [email protected]

Follow @ESS_Survey on Twitter Like @EuropeanSocialSurvey on Facebook europeansocialsurvey.org esswellbeingmatters.org

Follow @migpolgroup on Twitter Like @MigrationPolicyGroup on Facebook migpolgroup.com mipex.eu

The views expressed by the authors in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Social Survey

Cover photograph courtesy of Prazis/Shutterstock.com

This publication was produced by the European Social Survey ERIC, using funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 676166.