Prevailing Religion and Other Religions in Greece

PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE

Kyriaki Meletsi

Abstract This article discusses the main points of the current religious situation in Greece. An issue of great importance is the relation between the state and the Greek Orthodox Church, a relation which is not only close and vital for each, but also competitive and edged. Aspects, past and present, of this ambivalent relation are described. The fact that the Orthodox Christian Church remains the prevailing religion in Greece did not prevent the steps taken for the acknowledgement of other religious communities as legal entities, or “Religious Juridical Persons”. Similarly, the modernization of the state has established the right, regarding their familial and hereditary matters, of Greek Muslim citizens to choose the Civil Law instead of sharia. The international crisis of COVID-19 has already opened a new chapter concerning the reinforced role of the state and its relation to the Christian Orthodox Church and the other religious communities.

Author Note Dr Kyriaki Meletsi holds a senior position at the Hellenic Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, specializing in topics concerning the integration of religious communities, past and present.

Keywords Prevailing religion, civil law, Orthodox Church, juridical persons, Greece

Introduction

In the sixth episode of the highly nominated TV drama series The Young Pope, the young, handsome, and mysterious pontiff, played by the famous actor Jude Law, meets for the first time with the Prime Minister of Italy, after having him wait almost nine months for this meeting. The Prime Minister, who is a man of similar age and attractiveness, is told by his councillors to be aware of the Pope, because of his cleverness and manipulative character. The Prime Minister, full of confidence, replies that the Pope is about to meet his perfect match. During the meeting, and

Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 30/2, 111-129 doi: 10.2143/SID.30.2.3288768 © 2020 by Peeters. All rights reserved. 112 KYRIAKI MELETSI after the two men exchange some vicious comments, the Pope passes a note to the Prime Minister with his requests. These include greater assistance to Catholic families, more money to Catholic schools, denial of civil law marriages, further tax and banking benefits to the Holy See, restrictions on the religious freedom of Muslims and Hindus, reopening of discussion of the Lateran Pacts (1929), and full review of the territorial boundaries of the Vatican State. These demands attract the sarcastic reception of the Prime Minister, who arrogantly enough claims that his political power derives from an undisputed 41% of the voters, unlike to that of the Pope’s, which derives from the disputed existence of God. Moreover, he points out to the Pope that his unfriendly and unsociable behaviour of isolation, and obsolete theses and views, have led the faithful to turn away from the church. It has also given him the opportunity finally to modernize the country and, by ignoring the Pope’s demands, to impose punitive taxes on the dioceses as well as to start a revolution in the areas of euthanasia, civil marriage, gay couples, abortion and scientific research. The Pope threat- ens to appear to the faithful for the first time, a few weeks before the elections, which will be enough to provoke people’s curiosity and atten- tion. Armed with his dazzling beauty, similar to that of Christ, as he claims, his powerful and imposing image as Pope and his ability to make a reassuring speech to the faithful, will enable him to restore the papal decree of “Non Expedit”, that is, to declare to Catholics that it is unac- ceptable for them to vote at the elections. The meeting ends with a clear victory for the Pope. This scene successfully presents the image of a politician who thinks that he can be a pioneer and revolutionary innovator, and that the Church is an outworn institution, one that blocks scientific and social progress. On the other hand, the Pope considers that the Church, and personally himself, can affect public opinion by offering the people reassurance and comfort at a time when they stand uneasily in front of upcoming and unknown changes. Furthermore, this scene describes a certain relationship between the Church and the State, which often is considered to be challenging, if not hostile to the Church. This happens to be the case, more or less, in Greece today, although the Orthodox Christian Church there does not have the legal identity of sovereignty as does the Roman Catholic Church. However, Greek Orthodox Christianity is defined in the Greek Constitution as the prevailing religion and the Greek Orthodox Church (GOC) is considered to have an influence on political matters and an agenda that often contradicts not only the political one, but also the PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 113 right of the religious freedom of the heterodox and non-Christian Greek people, even though this right is explicitly protected by the Greek Con- stitution. Politicians, journalists and commentators, although they often seek support from the church, frequently “evangelize” an imminent separation between the church and the state, though without attempting to define the content of this separation, or ever tried really hard to achieve it.1 What are the options of this separation, and what is the place of other religions and cults in the Greek State?

The Greek State and the Orthodox Church of Greece (COG)

Through history

A reader unaware of the Greek state-church relation history would likely assume that it is the state alone which has full legislative power and governmental and administrative authority, and thus holds the initia- tive. That has certainly been the case from the beginning of the Greek state, almost two hundred years ago. The first step was made in 1833, soon after independence from the Ottoman Empire, when the Greek state declared the Greek Orthodox Christian Church as autocephalous, that is, an independent self-governing institution. This declaration was made, however, without the permission of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which throughout the Ottoman Occupation had religious and political leadership of all Orthodox Christians – regardless of ethnicity – living within the Ottoman Empire.2 However, the Patriarchate of Constantinople was finally coerced into the recognition and acceptance of the declaration of the autocephaly of the Greek Orthodox Church, as expressed by the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 1850. Yet, this was made under the condition that the Greek Church’s “administration will be exercised according to the Sacred Canons and without any involvement or interference by the secular authority”.3 The approach of autocephalous churches was followed later by the newly-born Balkan states, as it provided the material

1 It is often remarked by scholars that this constructive ambiguity, the term which is credited to Mr. Henry Kissinger as a negotiating tactic, was also employed in this case, in order that each party can claim a convenient interpretation (Androutsopoulos 2018: 67, footnote 106). 2 The Greek State wanted to avoid a likely confrontation with decisions taken under the influence of foreign decision-making centres that could force the Ecumenical Patriarchate in such a direction (Fokas 2004: 70-77). 3 Trans. from Greek original: http://markmarkou.sites.sch.gr/ekklnom/ekklnom.htm 114 KYRIAKI MELETSI and ideological infrastructure for the nationalization of the masses (Roudometof 2010: 25). However, the Greek state soon broke the agreement and in 1852, without any prior consultation with the church, voted in a new law, the spirit of which materially impacted later legislation concerning state-church relations. This law stipulated the administrative system of the church, which was determined to be the Holy Synod of the bishops;4 its Statutory Charter, that is, the borders of the episcopacies; and, finally, the validation of the elected bishops by the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs. This state of affairs was repeated when Greece expanded geo- graphically and incorporated the New Lands, i.e. areas freed from the Ottoman occupation and once under the administrative and spiritual authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.5 The Patriar- chate, not being located on Greek soil, with the Synodal Act of Septem- ber 4, 1929, permitted the Greek Church to supervise these areas, albeit with ten conditions, including the validation of the bishops’ election in these areas by the Patriarchate. Yet the Greek State enacted a law about the ecclesiastical administration of these areas, without including all the conditions.6 This omission has been often a cause of dispute between the GOC and the Patriarchate, and it almost led to a split between the two. The problem was finally solved in 2016 when these two Church bodies declared their commitment to carry out the agreement.7 On the other hand, the new state promoted the Orthodox Christian religion as necessary for the cohesive unity of citizens and a source of their identity. This, in effect, made the state dependent upon the Church, which eagerly accepted this role as the “market of symbolic goods” (Roudometof 2010: 31). The Church does not focus on imposing rules of religious conduct and belief, but seeks to accommodate and guide the perceptions and the religious needs, as well as meet the psychological

4 It is very interesting that a letter of the first king of Greece, Otto, who was a German and a Roman Catholic, yet the Head of the Greek Orthodox Christian Church, considered the clerics’ spiritual leadership hostile to his authority. He wrote to his father that the clerics and their influence on the people could be controlled through the establishment of a synod, where a bishop could preside officially, yet without real power (Androutsopoulos 2018: 45 fn 3). 5 These areas were embedded in the Greek state during the Balkan wars and the WW I-II. 6 https://www.tovima.gr/2008/11/25/opinions/o-tomos-1850-i-praksi-1928-kai-to- syntagma-3/ 7 http://www.kathimerini.gr/864644/article/epikairothta/ellada/allagh-klimatos-meta3y- a8hnas-kai-fanarioy PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 115 needs, of the people at even a basic human level (Kokosalakis 1987).8 Popular religion, that is specific beliefs and cultic practices, involves the public, the church, and the state. It functions as a potent symbolic medi- ator between religion and political culture. Thus the state, in the effort to be organized and to create a national and cultural identity for the citizens, for many years invoked the Church in support of issues such as the acknowledgment of certain religions as known,9 the permission for the construction of temples, places of worship, or community houses, by heterodox or non-Christian religious groups, the imprisonment of the conscientious objectors on religious grounds such as in the case of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the diffusion of religious ideas by the invocation of proselytism. It also gained support for the oath of the President of the Hellenic Republic and of the members of the Parliament, civil servants, and even for matters of external politics.10 Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the Church as a Legal Entity of Public Law, although it set the Church under the official authority of the state, yet it allowed the Heads of the Church to develop political action and influence, creating often the impression of a competition between the political and ecclesiastical persons, as well as an entangled relationship between the Church and the State (Konidaris 2008d: 238). Historians, political scientists and sociologists have tried to explain the origins of this scheme of administration, identifying four major tendencies. 1) The continuity thesis, according to which the Church played a

8 Kokosalakis underlines the fact that the institutional Orthodox Church manages to absorb popular religiosity and it is distinguished because of its dramatic ritual character. Furthermore, he considers that the structure of authority in the Orthodox Church allows tenuous and informal relations between the institution and the individual. 9 According to Law 4301/2014, concerning the religious communities, a religion is known, that is not hidden or concealed, when everybody can become familiar with its teaching and cult, https://www.forin.gr/downloads/download/61036/n-4301-2014-aitiologikh- ekthesh, p. 10. Examples of religions, which were often in the past denied the recognition as known, include the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Greek Evangelical Church, and the Greek Old-Calendarists who split from the Greek Orthodox Church because they did not want to accept the use of the new calendar. 10 The party which won the elections in 1993, according to its campaign programme, intended to capitalize on Greek Orthodox identity, tradition and civilization for a more effective external relations policy. This declaration coincided with the war in the former state of Yugoslavia, when Greece, although a member of NATO, condemned the bombings. During that time, the Orthodox Religion of the Serbs was a factor that formed the public opinion and was invoked at the official political stage. The peculiarity about it, is that the same party has often declared its intention for a complete separation of state and church and yet had also followed a policy of aggressive interference of the state in the administration of the church (Konidaris 2008b: 192-198). 116 KYRIAKI MELETSI crucial role for the preservation of the nation during the Ottoman occupation, because of the Greek koine, the church language, which at the same time was a fundamental characteristic of the Greeks in the Empire. 2) The incomplete modernization thesis, according to which the Greek Enlight- enment, which started with the separation of the Greek Church from the Patriarchate, was not completed with the separation of Church and State. The reason was either the victory of the Romantics over Enlight- enment, in the 19th century, when religiosity became popular again, or the archaic social structure and functions of the Greek society. 3) The Irenist thesis, according to which Orthodoxy should not be understood as a religion per se favourable to nationalism. It was the local societies which became nationalist and this led to national autocephalous orthodox churches, and not the other way around. 4) The postmodern thesis, according to which it was through the historical struggles that Greek Orthodox nationalism formed the Greek Orthodox nation (Anastassiadis 2004:2-35).11 Regardless, though, of academic views and tendencies, the Church in Greece seemed to have reached a point where it obliterated its religious and ecclesiastical character and emphasized a political disposition by influencing the viewpoint of the politicians. Following membership of Greece in the European Union (EU), which emerged as the next big thing in the “symbols market”, and the influx of about a million legal and illegal immigrants into Greece, who were expected to change the religious and national homogeneity of the Orthodox Greek population, the Greek Orthodox Church had to face new challenges and competitors (Makrides & Roudometof 2010; Molokotos & Liederman 2003). The first awkward responses, such as the reaction to the law on civil marriage, cremation, homosexuality and especially the protest against the new form of the identity cards in 2000, where reference to nationality and religious views were omitted, provoked a quick strike from politicians inside Greece, who on TV interviews demanded the church to restrict its presence in the public sphere and to focus only in its pastoral role (Γεωργιάδου 2015).12 Simultaneously, the reaction of the church to these political and legal matters turned the GOC into an object of mockery and abusive attacks in

11 It is also considered by some scholars that religion is a more readily identifiable, clear-cut, exclusive and impermeable criterion in nation-building, even more than the language or other criteria. Examples include Holland, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, Bos- nia and, outside Europe, Israel (Mavrogordatos 2003: 117-118). 12 https://www.kathimerini.gr/707957/opinion/epikairothta/arxeio-monimes-sthles/ o-arxiepiskopos-xristodoylos. PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 117

Europe (Anastassiadis 2004:22).13 Yet, the GOC soon realised that it had to quickly respond and it was determined to change mockery to respect. Three steps were taken. 1) The improvement of relations with the Roman Catholic Church. Both the Pope and Archbishop Christodoulos, during the visit of the Pope to Athens in 2001, expressed their intention to work together in order to redress the secularization of the European polity in such a way that the Christian roots of Europe to remain inviolate (Pope John Paul II and His Beatitude Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, 2001: 392). After all, the Roman Catholic Church is by far the most active and influential at the European level. It has shown an early interest in following European developments and had established relations with the EC (now EU) since 1962 (William 1991: 172 footnote 3). 2) The rapid integration of the Church in the Europeanization process. The GOC utilized the increased interest of the European Commission in creating liaison structures with churches and religious and human- istic actors, since it recognized them as spiritual forces and invited them, through the White Paper on European Governance, to contribute to the European integration process (Commission 2001:17). The GOC established the Representative Office of the Church of Greece to the European Union, in order to be able to follow European developments and to respond to them.14 It also participates in the European developments concerning bioethics, women issues, trafficking, and refugees, as well as in transnational church activities such as the Council of European Churches, the World Council of Churches and the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe. 3) An increased role in the administration of the welfare system in Greece. This step had a focus on charity work in general, and on volunteer

13 It is often noted that the image of the Greek bishops protesting against the institution of the new ID cards proliferated a negative image of the Orthodox Church: that of an anachronistic institution incompatible with the modernity, and even a reason to exclude Orthodox countries from the European Union (Makrides & Roudometof 2010: 4). 14 The establishment of this Office enabled the latent competition between the GOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which had already established an office in Brussels, concerning the representative of the Orthodox in the European Union on the one hand, and the possible choice of the Greek State to get closer to Patriarchate in order to reinforce its position as a pilot country of integration in south eastern Europe, on the other. It was already a decade after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when a number of Orthodox Churches were set free from the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and were turning to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, favouring its “soft power” (Anastassiadis 2004: 21; Yannas 2009). 118 KYRIAKI MELETSI

movements, as well as provoking political implications. A beginning was made with an ambitious “family planning” policy in Thrace, the area at the border with Turkey, according to which a certain sum would be granted to Orthodox families having a third child. Summer camps and ordinary charity work continued on a local level, while extraordinary appeals at times of emergency at a national level were also supported (Anastassiadis 2004: 25-30). In the past decade, during which Greece suffered an economic crisis, the GOC continued its solidarity plan by establishing facilities for mentally sick people, nursing homes for the elderly, accommodation facilities for unac- companied minors, day centres for the young, social mission clinics, and programs for the support of children, students, and homeless, as well as programs for the education of the immigrants.15

The Present

During the next two decades (2000s & 2010s) the state followed a policy of secularization by passing laws that made the constitutional right of freedom of religion concretely applicable, such as the recognition of religions and cults as known; their right to be registered as legal entities and to erect places of worship and community houses; alternative military service for the conscientious objectors; and the prohibition of offence against any known religion (Καστανάς 2018b). However, certain issues pertaining to the Orthodox Christian Church of Greece remain still as subjects of social and political debate. The first is the invocation of the Holy Trinity at the Preamble of the Constitution, as well as the third article of it, which states that the Ortho- dox Church of Greece “which is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople” is the prevailing religion in Greece.16 This provision is considered by some politicians and scholars

15 http://mkoapostoli.com/en/identity/our-mission/ 16 The Preamble of the Constitution is the following: “In the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity”. The full text of the third article of the Greek Constitution is: “The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 119 to be a sign of religious discrimination on the part of the state over the other religious communities, despite the fact that the freedom of religion and religious conscience are also protected by the Constitution. Further- more, although it is accepted that the Preamble is placed there only on historical grounds, and has no regulative ramification,17 it is still considered to violate the religious neutrality of the state (Konidaris 2008e). Nevertheless, the legal explanation is that the calendar of the prevailing religion, as it has the most numerous members, defines the official holi- days or ceremonies of the state.18 Recently, scholars have attempted another explanation of the third article of the Constitution. They do not consider that the article regulates the state-church relationship but that it regulates the relationship between the Greek Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. It also stipulates the introduction of a law concerning the organization and the administration of the church (Androutsopoulos 2018: 65).19 The second major issue is whether clerics of the Orthodox Church should be considered public administrators and thus their salary should be paid from the government budget, as at present. The Greek Orthodox Church is a Legal Entity of Public Law, although the relevant legislation is rather vague and complicated,20 and it is always at the discretion of the state to decide when, how and on what issues (administration, economics, personnel) this legal identity of the church will apply (Καστανάς 2018b). Furthermore, the state gradually undertook obligation for the payment of the salaries, which is an obligation valid only for public servants. These two factors created the impression that the clerics are indeed public administrators, which they are not, as the religious nature of their function is incompatible with the core of the public administrators’ duties to serve the state, according to the Constitution (Τρομπούκης 2018).

Act of September 4, 1928”. See: https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23- 7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf 17 This is described on the Decision 1749/2019 taken by the Plenum of the Council of State, which is the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece. 18 https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/456861/eyaggelos-venizelos-sto-iefimerida-poia- einai-ta-arnitika-tis-symfonias-tsipra-ieronymoy . http://www.skaitv.gr/episode/enimerosi/ akraios/2018-12-16-10. 19 If this explanation is accepted then it is an official confirmation that the state mingles in the internal administration of the church and the fact that the Greek Orthodox Church is an established church. 20 Article 68 of Law No 4235/2014 includes the ecclesiastical legal entities in the public sector. Yet they are not included in the publication with the register of the public Bureau and agencies (Καστανάς 2018a:236). 120 KYRIAKI MELETSI

Although there were some voices protesting the payment of the clerics’ salaries by the state, the issue has remained untouched by the politicians. When Syriza, the left-wing party, which was considered to be against the church and its representatives, was in the government, developments were raised concerning the matter. In November 2018, a meeting between the Prime Minister at the time, Mr. Tsipras, and Archbishop Hieronymus ended with a common statement the main points of which concerned the acknowledgement by the state that it had expropriated the largest part of ecclesiastical property, without paying the right price for it. However, the Orthodox clergy would no longer be paid directly from the Government budget, since clerics are not public administrators, but rather the money would be transferred by the Government to the Church as an annual subsidy and the clergy would be paid directly by the church. The establishment of a company for the administration of the rest of the Church’s property would be undertaken with the state being a stakeholder in this company. The announcement was severely criticized for being one more episode of state-church entanglement. As the system of government of the Ortho- dox Church is Synodal, and so final decisions are not made by a supreme person, the Holy Synod of the Bishops decided not to accept the terms of the agreement without further legal consideration.21 On the one hand, the opposition parties criticized the government for acknowledging to the Church the ownership of recently disputed properties. On the other hand, by not having the Orthodox clergy as part of the public sector, gives an implication that the government “frees” 10,000 jobs in this sector. Indeed, the day after the announcement of the agreement, the government declared its intention to proceed in hiring 10,000 employees in the public administration sector. Another important view considered the announcement inopportune as it coincided with the Syrian civil war, which had provoked a wave of refugees. According to this consideration, the Syrian Orthodox Church was awaiting the help and assistance of the GOC and therefore it was not the right time to undermine the authority of the Greek Church.22 Despite reactions by both the Holy Synod and other parties, the government declared its determination to proceed with the implementation of the agreement, even without the consent of the Church. Yet, every

21 https://www.newsit.gr/ellada/symfonia-tsipra-ieronymou-ayto-einai-to-anakoi- nothen-tis-ieras-synodou/2659847/ 22 http://www.skaitv.gr/episode/enimerosi/akraios/2018-12-30-10 PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 121 action in this direction very quickly ceased and was not mentioned again. As a follow up, the same government proposed that the next parliamen- tary session should vote for the revision of the third article of the Con- stitution concerning the state-church relations. However, the proposal failed to attract the required majority of the votes.23 Finally, after the national elections in July 2019, a new Parliament was formed and voted, in December 2019, for the Revision of the Constitution in which both the Preamble and the third article remained unaltered. The third issue for contemporary debate on the state-church relationship concerns religious education. The 16th provision of the Constitution declares that one of the aims of education is the development of the religious conscience of the Greeks. Recently, the government decided that the relevant course should not have a confessional character and that pupils’ books should not be written with this pedagogical direction. This decision provoked a dispute and it led to litigation. The Council of State decided that this policy was not in accordance with the Constitution. When pupils enter the school, they already have a religious conscience formed by their families, according to their values and everyday life. Thus, as the prevailing religion in Greece is Christian Orthodoxy, the course should aim at the comprehension and reinforcement of the pupils’ Christian conscience. This policy does not offend the Roman Catholics, Jews or Muslim pupils, because they are taught their religion by teachers proposed by the communities they belong to. For the pupils who are atheists, or belong to a different religious community entirely, the state should provide an equivalent, relevant course such as ethics.24 Till then, they are entitled to get an exemption from the course.25 It is beyond doubt that both the state and the church are responsible for the creation of this ambivalent relationship, which seems to have reached its limits, and needs redefinition. Yet, as most scholars suggest,

23 https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/478992/itta-gia-ton-syriza-aperrifthi-i-anatheorisi- toy-arthroy-3-gia-tis-sheseis-kratoys 24 Decision 1749/2019 taken by the Plenum of the Council of State. 25 The decision taken by the European Court of Human Rights in the case Folgero and others vs. Norway is relevant to the issue of religious education on Greece. In Norway the Christian Church is also an established church, and so the ‘prevailing religion’, and those pupils who are atheists or belong to another religious community cannot be exempt from the course of religious education. The suitors considered that their rights were violated. Yet, the court decided that neither the increased place of the prevailing religion on the educational programmes nor the lack of exemption possibility violate the religious rights of the suitors (Καστανάς 2018b: 220 footnote 36; Κτιστάκης 2018: 334). The decision of the ECHR is published in Greek on the journal Επιθεώρησις Δημοσίου και Διοικη- τικού Δικαίου 2009, 257 κ. εξ. 122 KYRIAKI MELETSI the possible separation should be mild and gentle, should aim neither at the destruction of the bonds between the church and the Greek people, nor at the economic impoverishment of the church and, most impor- tantly, it should not jeopardize social unity. The recommended way is the restoration of the ecclesiastical administrative system and the loosen- ing of control of the church by the state. As a first step, measures such as the reconsideration of the status of the New Lands, the reformation of the ecclesiastical justice and the participation of the laity in the administration of the church are recommended. As a second step, a new Statutory Charter of the Church established by the Church, the strengthen of the canonical legislation, as long as they do not contradict the Con- stitution and the laws regarding the public order, and finally the introduction of a new sui generis form of legal entities for the administrative subdivisions of the church, are recommended (Ανδρουτσόπουλος 2018: 63-74).

The status of Religious Juridical Persons for Religious Communities

Orthodox Christianity is not the only religious community in Greece. There are other religious groups that have faced difficulties regarding their legal status. The lack of legal standing affected their right to freely exercise their religious life. Up until 2014, such religious associations were usually formed as unions or as non-profit societies in order to solve practical matters, such as their property or their dealings with the state. However, often they were rather large religious communities of important historical and international status. They regarded their form as unions degrading, or incompatible with, their religious role and traditions. Furthermore, the new way of life, which included a grid of new laws and digital governance, as well as the modernization of the state that changed its perspective of equality, led to the introduction of the Law 4301 in 2014 (Vazakas 2018).26 This law gave the right to religious communities of at least three hundred members in defined geographical areas of the country to obtain the status of a Religious Juridical Person, according to the Civil Law. The conditions under which religious communities could apply to the

26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akvTzcf-ez4&list=PL93pgiDq4UhKW5uVTjG N6w4IuIb4gEmlD&index=20 PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 123

Civil Courts in the first instance for the recognition of a new status were the following: 1. The religion should be a known one. 2. The religious community should not exercise proselytism. 3. The religious communities should respect the laws and the public order, as well as moral values and social mores. The procedure for the acknowledgment of a religious community as a religious Juridical Person demands the deposition of the Charter to the court. The Credo of the community would be described on the Charter, as well as the personal data of the members. This is to remain at the disposal of the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, but unpub- lished in accordance with the law for the protection of the personal data. An exclusivity provision means that members of one religious community cannot belong to or participate in a second one. The court is to examine all the supporting documentation and, if the terms are fulfilled, it should approve the granting of the legal status of Religious Juridical Person to the applicant religious community. In consequence, the religious entity is obliged to be recorded in a Reference Book of Religious Juridical Persons. Furthermore, the law gives the right to at least three united religious entities of the same religion to form a second degree Religious Juridical Law which can be called Ecclesia. In any case, the state has the right to control function of a Religious Juridical Person or of an Ecclesia to suspend it, if the requirements are not met. The reception of the law both in Greece and internationally was in general a positive one, as it systematized the legal provisions, and enabled the religious communities to have a legal status and to receive donations and legacies.27 But there is also criticism concerning the difficult bureau- cratic procedure, the large number of required members in order to qualify, and the vagueness of important legal terms, such as known religion, mores and values. Furthermore, the law has been criticized for allowing the interference of the state which regulates the way in which the members of the Religious Juridical Person should assemble, and requires the spiritual leader to administer the Juridical Person, or to participate in the governing Board of Directors.28 This provision is regarded as identifying

27 http://www.kathimerini.gr/784485/article/epikairothta/politikh/nomikh-isoths-8rhs- keytikwn-koinothtwn 28 https://www.arthro-13.com/products/papageorgioy-konstantinos-epikoyros-kathigitis- ekklisiastikoy-dikaioy-toy-apth4/ 124 KYRIAKI MELETSI the spiritual with the administrative authority and abolishing the right of self-government for the Religious Juridical Person in a way that is reminiscent of the interference of the state in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church (Καραμήτρου 2018: 192). One of the most important contributions of the law in religious affairs is the acknowledgement as a ‘Religious Juridical Person’ of the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Armenian Orthodox Church, the Evan- gelical Churches of the German speaking members, the Greek Evangelical Church, and the Assyrian Orthodox Church, even if they do not fulfil the criterion of the three hundred members in a defined geographical area (Καραμήτρου 2018: 196-199). The law does not apply for the subdivisions of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Jewish Communities in Greece, and the Muslim communities in Thrace. These three instead enjoy a special legal status.

The optional implementation of Sharī῾a

In the North Eastern Prefecture of Thrace in Greece there are Muslim citizens who comprise a religious minority, although among them there are more diverse ethnotic or religious differences, as they have different origins or belong to different Islamic sects. These citizens are the descendants of Greek Muslims who were exempted from the exchange of populations decided in the Lausanne Treaty, signed by Greece and Turkey in 1923. One of the conditions of the Treaty was that the familial law of Greek Muslim citizens would be regulated according to the Muslim customs pertaining to Sharī῾a and the role of a mufti.29 This regulation applies despite the fact that another regulation of the Treaty explicitly states that Greek Muslims fall under the same provisions about public peace as their fellow Greek citizens (Yannas 2018). Sharī῾a, though, dif- fers from the Civil Law especially on issues such as the place of women

29 A mufti is the interpreter of the Islamic Sacred Law. A Kadi is the President of the Sharia Court, who judges according to the Laws of Islam. Originally, the two institutions were different and the persons that hold the authorities were distinct. In 1913 the mufti took on also the authority of the kadi. According to the Lausanne Treaty, the religious freedom of the Muslim minorities is protected and it falls under no restriction. The personal and familial status of the Muslim citizens should be organized according to their religious customs. The state can lead legislative initiations under the condition of having the consent of the Muslim communities, (Κτιστάκις 2006: 32-33; 101-102). PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 125 in a marriage, their rights, the relationship to their children, and their hereditary rights. A girl cannot inherit as much as her brother(s), a divorced woman has to compensate her ex-husband, a widow cannot inherit from her late husband. The Civil Courts in Greece must check if the procedure for the decision of a mufti on a familial matter has been followed, but they do not have the right to regulate if these decisions are in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, which protects the rights of all civilians (Αλεξανδρίδου 2017). However, when a Muslim Greek in his will designated his wife as the heiress of his property, this led to litigation. After his death, his sisters tried to vitiate the will on the ground that the widow had no right on the property of their brother, according to Sharī῾a. The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece issued decisions according to which it was obligatory for the Greek Mus- lim citizens to regulate their familial cases according to Sharī῾a law. These decisions were subsequently voided by the European Court of Human Rights. The Greek State was then forced to issue a law in 2018 that gave Muslim Greek citizens the right to choose between the Civil Code and the Sharī῾a for their familial and hereditary cases. This law is welcomed as Greek Muslim citizens now have the right to turn to the Civil Code for their familial and hereditary matters if they so wish. There are of course critical voices who expect the Greek State to define the Civil Code as the only option for such cases and thus to strengthen the weaker members of a Greek Muslim family. It is not easy, though, to impose a different way of living upon people who have learned to live in a certain way. In addition, the difficulties which Greece faces in the field of international relations with Turkey, which tries to intervene on issues concerning the Greek Muslim civilians, complicates the obligatory application of the Civil Law regarding their familial matters. Such a step needs to be accompanied by projects concerning the education and economic independence of the Greek Muslim women, so that the prejudices and the social isolation, which they may face from their peers, should not prevent them from fighting for their rights.

Final Remarks and Conclusions

At the end of October 2018, research conducted by the Pew Research Center showed that Greeks often criticize the Christian Church and its clergy. Still, they declare their faith in the existence of God (92%), that 126 KYRIAKI MELETSI religion is a very important factor in their lives (55%), and they acknowl- edge a strong connection between the Orthodox Christian religion and Greek nationality and identity.30 Even younger citizens and those belonging to the proletarian internationalism political parties seem to have the same opinion.31 There is no doubt that those Greeks who belong to different religious communities reserve an equally high place for their religion. This research well justifies the concern with which scholars try to approach the topic of religions in general and of the Orthodox Christian Church in particular. Especially their concern that any change in the relation of the state with the church or the place of any other religion should not provoke any restlessness in the population or any feeling of being deprived, unappreciated or marginalised. In this regard, mores, values, customs and public opinion matter. Besides, this is also the core of any decree that the European Court of Human Rights takes, that is, both to form European rules concerning the human rights equally respected by all the European states and to allow the competent national authorities to estimate social needs and realities in their countries, which inevitably will set restrictions to the foreclosure of these rights (Καστανάς 2018a: 208). New situations arise, however, and in recent days have led the political authorities to create new dynamics in its relation with the various religious communities. The epidemic COVID-19 led the Greek government to take decisions concerning the isolation of the citizens in their houses and the avoidance of assemblage, even in churches, temples and mosques. At the beginning, the political authorities let the Holy Synod decide the precautionary measures that it would take for the protection of the faithful. The proposition of the Holy Synod to restrict the Sunday service to one hour, to keep offering the Eucharist, and to keep the churches open during Holy Week, however provoked the interference of the State which decided that services should be offered without the presence of the faithful, the Eucharist should not be offered to them and, furthermore, to keep the worship places of all religious communities, including all mosques, closed. The authorities did not hesitate to arrest a priest who opened the doors of the church for the faithful, and two more who tried to offer the Eucharist. One can understand the importance of this decision and the

30 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/31/greek-attitudes-toward-religion- minorities-align-more-with-central-and-eastern-europe-than-west/ 31 http://www.kathimerini.gr/894798/article/epikairothta/ellada/ena-me-thn-e8nikh- taytothta-h-or8odo3ia PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 127 determination for its implementation, even if they are aware of the special role of Easter in the Orthodox Christian calendar and the meaning of this celebration for the Greek people. Although some believe that the Church will capitalize in the end on the longing of the faithful,32 it seems that the time has come for the state to take on its corresponding role. The same is expected from the GOC in our days when a radical change in our value system is expected and new challenges will be faced by humanity.

Bibliography

Αιμιλιανίδης, Αχιλλεύς (2018), Αντιπελάργηση. Τιμητικός Τόμος Ι.Μ. Κονιδάρη. Εκδόσεις Σάκκουλα. Αθήνα- Θεσσαλονίκη. Anastassiadis, Anastasios (2004), “Religion and Politics in Greece: The Greek Church’s ‘Conservatism Modernization’ in the 1990s”, in Questions de Recherche 11, 2-35. Ανδρουτσόπουλος, Γεώργιος Ι. (2018), «Η Τυπολογία των Σχέσων Πολι- τείας και Εκκλησίας στην Ελληνική Επικράτεια: από το Πόρισμα της Επιτροπής Σταμάτη στην Πρόταση του Καθηγητή Ι,Μ. Κονιδάρη», στο έργο του Αιμιλιανίδης Αχιλλέα, 41-74. Βαζάκας, Στέφανος Ζαφ. (2018), «Ο Ν. 4301/2014: Τρία Χρόνια Μετά», εισήγηση στο Διεπιστημονικό Συνέδριο με θέμα Θρησκευτικές Κοινότη- τες: Νομοκανονικές Προσεγγίσεις Ιστορικών και Επίκαιρων Ζητημάτων», https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akvTzcf-ez4&list=PL93pgiDq4UhK W5uVTjGN6w4IuIb4gEmlD&index=20. Γεωργιάδου, Βασιλική (2015), «Διερεύνοντας την Ορατότητα της Εκκλη- σίας στη Δημόσια Σφαίρα. Σχέσεις Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας και Ελληνι- κής Κοινωνίας επί Αρχιεπισκόπου Χριστόδουλου», στο Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία: Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής και Κοινωνικής Θεωρίας 21, 129-156. Fokas, Efterpi Spiro (2004), The Role of Religion in National – EU Relations: The Case of Greece and Turkey. Dissertation. The London School of Eco- nomics and Political Science. March 2004. Καραμήτρου, Ζωή Ι. (2018), «Η Οργάνωση των Θρησκευτικών Κοινοτήτων στην Ελλάδα. Κατ’ Άρθρον Παρουσίαση του Ν.4301/2014», στο έργο του Αιμιλιανίδη Αχιλλέα, 183-204. Καστανάς, Ηλιας Ν. (2018a), «η Θρησκευτική Ελευθερία στη Νομολογία του Ευρωπαίκού Δικαστηρίου Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου – Μεταξύ Σεβασμού της Ετερότητας και Διαφύλαξη της Κοινωνικής Συνοχής», στο έργο του Αιμιλιανίδη, Αχιλλέα, 205-226. ———, (2018b), «Εντάσσονται τα Εκκλησιαστικά Νομικά Πρόσωπα στο ‘Δημόσιο Τομέα’; Σπουδή στο Άρθρο 68 παράγρ. 1 ΥΠΟΠ.3. Ν.4235/ 2014», στο έργο του Αιμιλιανίδη Αχιλλέα, 227-240. Kokosalakis, Nikos (1987), “The Political Significance of Popular Archives in Greece”, in Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions 64.1, 37-52.

32 https://www.protagon.gr/apopseis/h-ypervasi-tou-arxiepiskopou-44342030954 128 KYRIAKI MELETSI

Κτιστάκις, Γ. (2004), Ο Ιερός Νόμος του Ισλάμ και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες Πολί- τες μεταξύ Κοινοτιμού και Φιλελευθερισμού. Εκδόσεις Σάκουλα. Αθήνα. Κονιδάρης, Ιωάννης Μ. (2008), Ζητήματα Βυζαντινού & Εκκλησιαστικού Δικαίου ΙΙ. Εκδόσεις Σάκουλα. ———, (2008a), “Ζητήματα Θρησκευτικών Διακρίσεων», στο έργο του ιδίου, 41-52. ———, (2008b), «Οι Σχέσεις Εκκλησίας – Κράτους στην Ελλάδα από το 1974 έως Σήμερα», στο έργο του ιδίου, 187-200. ———, (2008c), «Η Συνταγματική Επιταγή για Ανάπτυξη της Θρησκευτι- κής Συνειδήσεως. Το Θεσμκό Πλαίσιο», στο έργο του ιδίου, 211-222. ———, (2008d), «Αλληλοσεβασμός των Αρμοδιοτήτων εκατέρου των Δύο Οργανισμών (Εκκλησίας και Πολιτείας)», στο έργο του ιδίου, 233-245. ———, (2008e), «Λαϊκό Κράτος και Επικρατούσα Θρησκεία», στο έργο του ιδίου, 259-270. Makrides, Vasilios N. & Roudometof, Victor (2010), “Introduction: Tradition, Transition and Change in the Greek Orthodoxy at the Dawn of the Twenty – First Century”, in Roudometof, Victor / Makrides Vasilios N., 1-20. Mavrogordatos, George (2003), “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case” in Journal of West European Politics 26.1, 117-136. Molokotos – Liederman, Lina (2003), “Identity Crisis: Greece, Orthodoxy and European Union” in Journal of Religion 18.3, 291-314. Pope John Paul II and His Beatitude Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece (2001), ‘Common Statement of Pope John Paul II and His Beatitude Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece. Before the Bema of Saint Paul, the Apostle to the Nations, Athens, 4 May 2001’, in Ecclesia 5, 391. Roudometof, Victor / Makrides Vasilios N. (2010), Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics. Ashgate. England–USA. Roudometof, Victor/ (2010), “The Evolution of Greek Orthodoxy in the Con- text of World Historical Globalization”, in Roudometof, Victor / Makrides Vasilios N., 21-28. Τρομπούκης, Βασίλειος Χ. (2018), «Έμμισθος και Άμισθος Εφημερικός Κλή- ρος», στο έργο του Αιμιλιανίδη Αχιλλέα, 441-461. Yannas, Prodromos (2010), “Non-Orthodox Minorities in Contemporary Greece: Legal Status and Concomitant Debates between Church, State and Inter- national Community”, in Roudometof, Victor / Makrides Vasilios N., 111- 130. ———, (2009), “The Soft Power of the Ecumenical Patriarchate” in Mediter- ranean Quarterly 20.1, 77-93. Willaime, J.P. (2002), Europe et Religions: Les Enjeux du XXIe Siècle. Fayard. Paris.

Webpages https://www.tovima.gr/2008/11/25/opinions/o-tomos-1850-i-praksi-1928-kai- to-syntagma-3/ PREVAILING RELIGION AND OTHER RELIGIONS IN GREECE 129 http://www.kathimerini.gr/864644/article/epikairothta/ellada/allagh-klimatos- meta3y-a8hnas-kai-fanarioy https://www.forin.gr/downloads/download/61036/n-4301-2014-aitiologikh-ekthesh https://www.kathimerini.gr/707957/opinion/epikairothta/arxeio-monimes- sthles/o-arxiepiskopos-xristodoylos. http://mkoapostoli.com/en/identity/our-mission/ https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24d- ce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/456861/eyaggelos-venizelos-sto-iefimerida- poia-einai-ta-arnitika-tis-symfonias-tsipra-ieronymoy. http://www.skaitv.gr/episode/enimerosi/akraios/2018-12-16-10. https://www.newsit.gr/ellada/symfonia-tsipra-ieronymou-ayto-einai-to-anakoi- nothen-tis-ieras-synodou/2659847/ http://www.skaitv.gr/episode/enimerosi/akraios/2018-12-30-10 https://www.iefimerida.gr/news/478992/itta-gia-ton-syriza-aperrifthi-i-anatheorisi-toy-arthroy-3-gia-tis-sheseis-kratoys https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akvTzcf-ez4&list=PL93pgiDq4UhKW5uV TjGN6w4IuIb4gEmlD&index=20 http://www.kathimerini.gr/784485/article/epikairothta/politikh/nomikh-isoths- 8rhskeytikwn-koinothtwn https://www.arthro-13.com/products/papageorgioy-konstantinos-epikoyros- kathigitis-ekklisiastikoy-dikaioy-toy-apth4/ https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/31/greek-attitudes-toward-religion- minorities-align-more-with-central-and-eastern-europe-than-west/ http://www.kathimerini.gr/894798/article/epikairothta/ellada/ena-me-thn- e8nikh-taytothta-h-or8odo3ia https://www.protagon.gr/apopseis/h-ypervasi-tou-arxiepiskopou-44342030954 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=akvTzcf-ez4&list=PL93pgiDq4UhKW5uV TjGN6w4IuIb4gEmlD&index=20