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For Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, It Was “One Damn Thing After Another.”

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For Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, It Was “One Damn Thing After Another.” Gatesormer CIA chief Robert M. ponents, “I was convincedversus they were far drone from the ground with a joystick the Air Force Gates brought a very negative less likely to occur than messy, smaller, was not as career-enhancing as flying view of the Air Force with unconventional military endeavors.” As a an airplane in the wild blue yonder,” him when he took the job of result, he moved to quash any programs Gates says. Secretary of Defense. In his like the F-22 that were meant to counter He recalls that when he was CIA book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at a world-class threat. chief in 1992, “I tried to get the Air FWar, he describes USAF as “one of my The services, Gates claims, yearned Force to partner with us in developing biggest headaches”—a perception Air to “get back to training and equipping technologically advanced drones,” but Force leaders were never able to turn our forces for the kinds of confl ict in the it “wasn’t interested because, as I was around during his fi ve-year tenure at the future they had always planned for.” They Pentagon. In the book, Gates sticks to his obsessed about big, set-piece confl agra- story about why he sacked the service’s tions involving “massive formations,” top leadership and shot down the Air instead of winning the wars at hand, Force’s most important programs, but he charges. The Air Force could only his memoir reveals he often based his think in terms of “high-tech air-to-air decisions on cherry-picked facts. combat and strategic bombing against During his tenure, Gates fi red Sec- major nation-states.” All branches, but retary of the Air Force Michael W. particularly the Air Force, suffered from Wynne and Chief of Staff Gen. T. Mi- “next-war-itis,” Gates writes, claiming chael Moseley. He also killed the F-22 USAF was not championing the needs fi ghter, Next Generation Bomber, and of troops in combat. Airborne Laser; delayed USAF’s new In a recent interview, Moseley told aerial tanker; and stymied an increase in Air Force Magazine he thinks Gates USAF manning, all of which he boasts suffered from “this-war-itis.” of in the book as “notches on my budget “I think you have to be able to walk gun.” He complained of having to coax and chew gum at the same time,” the Air Force to supply enough intelli- Moseley said. “You have to do both: gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Fight today’s fi ght and prepare for the assets to the war effort, famously saying future. ... It’s not either-or.” For former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, it was “one damn thing after another.” it was like “pulling teeth.” In fact, the Anxious to give fighting troops service had maxed out its ISR assets all the ISR they could possibly use, and was adding more at the limits of Gates said he “encountered a lack of the manufacturer’s capacity—which enthusiasm and urgency” in USAF, Gates knew—but he kept up a public where he’d served in his youth as a tirade against the service anyway, all the junior intelligence offi cer in Strategic while ignoring the Army’s withholding Air Command. of similar assets from the fi ght. The Air Force in 2007, he says, was Gates’ feud with USAF started almost dragging its feet in ramping up pro- from the beginning, as a major subset of duction of ISR “drones,” the ground what he calls his “war on the Pentagon.” stations needed to process their data, He asserts that he was “brought in to and in training pilots to fly them. turn around a failing war effort” in Iraq He said USAF “insisted on having and Afghanistan and was appalled at flight-qualified aircraft pilots—all anything the services did that was not officers—fly its drones,” unlike the aimed squarely at that singular goal. He Army, which used warrant officers derides all the branches for treating the and noncommissioned officers. Were wars in Southwest Asia as “unwelcome it not for USAF’s cultural bias against aberrations, the kind of confl ict we would enlisted people, Gates suggests, it never fi ght again—just the way they felt could have found all the remotely after Vietnam.” And while Gates claims piloted aircraft operators it needed in to have backed some preparation for short order. Moreover, “the Air Force possible future wars against peer op- made it clear to its pilots that flying a 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 By John A. Tirpak, Executive Editor Gates versus thetold, people join the Air ForceAir to fl y the intervening 14 years,Force USAF had had almost a thousand Shadows. He airplanes and drones had no pilot.” vaulted far into the lead on unmanned beat up the Air Force, which had about Wynne, in a 2008 interview with Air systems, developing the Global Hawk, 100 Predators.” Force Magazine, said that when Gates arming the Predator, and upgrading All this led to what Gates describes left the CIA, “that was the ‘photograph’ to the A-10-sized Reaper. It was also as an “unseemly turf fi ght” with the he took with him” of USAF’s views pushing hard to shift the focus away Army and Navy wherein the Air Force on unmanned systems. However, when from the number of unmanned aircraft sought to be the executive agent for Gates became Defense Secretary, he to the amount of data each could pull unmanned aircraft, organizing their apparently didn’t appreciate that in in, developing wide-area surveillance development and production and por- systems like Gorgon Stare that could tioning them out to various users for make one unmanned aircraft as power- maximum effi ciency. ful an ISR tool as six others. “The Army resisted, and I was on Still, Gates charges USAF had just its side,” Gates says, claiming the Air eight Predator combat air patrols in Force was “grasping for absolute control 2007 and “had no plans to increase of a capability for which it had little those numbers; I was determined that enthusiasm in the fi rst place.” Gates says would change.” he “loathed” this kind of interservice It was already changing, Moseley rivalry, and “I was determined the Air said. He’d gone to Gates asking for Force would not get control.” authority to gear up to build more Gates admits that each service “was Predator/Reaper-type aircraft and got pursuing its own programs” in un- it. Moseley then went to Thomas J. manned aircraft and that “there was Cassidy Jr., head of General Atom- no coordination in acquisition, and ics’ aircraft division (the Predator no one person was in charge to ensure and Reaper manufacturer), and said, interoperability in combat conditions.” “Here’s the check. We’ll take all you Plus, the undersecretary of defense for can make.” intelligence, the director of national Gates cheered the development intelligence, and the CIA “all had their of the MQ-9 Reaper—an Air Force own agendas. It was a mess.” initiative he does not credit—but Moseley observed, “That’s a recipe praised himself and his top lieuten- for having an executive agent. He just ants for maximizing its production made the case for it.” Moseley noted and deployment. that there was a practical reason for Moseley also ratcheted up training of placing one entity in charge: Medium new RPA pilots, assigning pilots from altitude unmanned systems fl y in the other systems involuntarily. Moseley same airspace as manned aircraft. volunteered to close the unmanned If their operations are not centrally aircraft schoolhouse and put all the controlled, there is a persistent risk of instructors to work running combat collision. It happened on more than missions—a move that “would have one occasion—in one instance, a C-130 taken five or six years to recover from.” collided with an RPA—but luckily, no Nothing moved Gates, Moseley said. In one was killed. his book, Gates says Moseley resisted Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., speeding things up. vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Part of the Air Force’s frustration the head of the Joint Requirements was that the Army had hundreds of Oversight Council, agreed with the Shadow unmanned ISR aircraft, but Air Force. He sent a memo to Gates’ these were slaved to the battalions deputy Gordon England in July 2007, owning them. When the battalions saying the JROC endorsed executive finished a deployment, they took their agency for unmanned systems operat- Shadows home and out of the fight. ing at medium and high altitude to the Gates complains in the book that “of Air Force. USAF was to “standardize” nearly 4,500 US drones worldwide, only and “streamline acquisition” of these a little more than half” were in Iraq and systems, but all the services would still Afghanistan, but later acknowledges get to defi ne their own requirements that most of these were in Army hands. for them. Wynne, in the 2008 interview with Air Gates, lobbied hard by the Army, Force Magazine, said of the acrimony, overruled the JROC and did not give the “He didn’t beat up the Army, which Air Force executive agency. Instead, he AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2014 55 allowed various RPA committees to be formed. They were Wynne and Moseley both were pushing for the F-22 supposed to coordinate service unmanned aircraft efforts, against Gates’ wishes, and Wynne said in a July 2008 but these were staffed by low-ranking offi cers with no clout.
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