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Routledge handbook of the contemporary

Mark R. Thompson, Eric Vincent C. Batalla

The political party system

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315709215-3 Allen Hicken Published online on: 19 Feb 2018

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Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 The existing literature defines institutionalization in a variety of ways (see Huntington 1968; Huntington (see ways of variety a in institutionalization defines literature existing The sometimes and consistently has strategically optedforinstitutionsthatwereinimicaltogreater partyinstitutionalization. elite Filipino the since, decades the in arisen has reform tional institu of question the when that argue I since. ever polity Philippines the dominated has which party political of style particular a entrenching of consequence unintended the had elite ippine which democracy unfolded in the Philippines. Early decisions by colonial administrators and Phil I argue that the development of the Philippine party system is inextricably linked accounts tofor the changes thewe observe over mannertime. Specifically, like Hutchroft andin Rocamora (2003) alsoexplanation whichPhilippines,an the in has it developedas hassystem party the why for apparentchanges inthe degree ofinstitutionalization over time. Finally, presentI anexplanation under-­ indeed is firstPhilippines the I that demonstrate departure of point a as institutionalization framework Scully’s and Mainwaring Using is oneofthebiggestobstaclestodemocraticstabilityandgoodgovernanceinPhilippines. disillusionment with democracy under-­ among an Filipino citizens 1999), (Hicken (Montinola 2009b). accountability In short, politicalthe of party lack system a 2003), Rocamora and (Hutchcroft deficit” “democratic acute an including The chronic weaknesses of the party system are the source of a variety of ills, according to scholars, under-­ stubbornlyremainssystemPhilippineparty the history long itsdespite yet, And 1907. in tions local elections Direct were held 1900. under U.S. in colonial founded auspices in was 1906 followed Federal, by Partido national legislative party, elec political national first The Philippines. the No country in Asia has a longer experience with democracy and democratic institutions than does more institutionalized share two characteristics. First, there is stability in the rules and pattern of organizational dimension. is to think of institutionalization as consisting of an external/systemic dimension and an internal/ Svasand and 2002; Hicken Randall and 1998; Kuhonta 2011). Levitsky One 1995; way to Scully bring these and disparate Mainwaring definitions together 1988; Panebianco 1973; Welfling Defining institutionalization:whatisitandhowdo weknowitwhensee it? The PoliticalParySystem In this chapter I examine characteristics and causal factors related to the Philippine party system. institutionalized – regardless of how we choose to define and operationalize the concept. concept. the operationalize and define to choose we how of regardless – institutionalized 2 Starting with the external/systemic dimension, party systems that are Allen Hicken provision of public goods (Hicken 2008a) and a a and 2008a) (Hicken goods public of provision 3 38 institutionalized (inchoate). I note and discuss discuss and note I (inchoate). institutionalized 1 - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 subservient topowerfulpartyleaders. or of extensions often are and convenience of alliances temporary organized thinly be to tend institutionalized weakly are parties Where “matter.” that organizations party developed have parties simply, Put 1998). (Levitsky financiers particular or leaders charismatic any from interactions. Parties are relatively cohesive and disciplined and are independent and autonomous most closelywiththeconceptofpartysysteminstitutionalization. corresponds that dimension external/systemic this is It threat. a worse at and superfluous, best election to election. Finally, political actors in weakly institutionalized systems view parties as at from greatly vary parties individual of fortunes the – volatility electoral of degree high a also is There exit. parties existing while system, the enter regularly parties political new – rates death high and birth high both are There competition. party of pattern the in instability of degree high a see we systems party institutionalized weakly in contrast, By process. democratic the of inter-­ High degreeoforganizationalroutinization High degreeofvalueinfusion Internal/organizational dimension Parties viewedaslegitimateandnecessary Stable patternofinterpartycompetition External/systemic dimension Table levels High of election. to election from support of levels consistent receive parties of set same inter-­ of pattern stable a is there Where another. to election one from shares vote party aggregate in variation is there which to degree the captures volatility Electoral volatility. electoral of measure the is One common indicator of the stability or volatility of the party system from election to election in turn. routinization. and partieshavenodistinctpolicyorideologicalidentities. attachments to particular parties, lasting there few are no have enduring politicians links between and parties voters and society, interest groups, in roots weak have parties political tionalized, from another on the basis of its constituency and policy platform. Where parties are not institu party one differentiate can we and end an to means a as just not and itself of and in valuable is interest some and time, associations the are closely linked of to parties” (Mainwaring and most Tocal 2006, 206). it Party membership for vote and party a with identify voters “[m]ost that extent the to society in “rooted” are Parties voters. of groups and interests societal identifiable of what Levitsky calls value infusion (Levitsky 1998). There are strong links between parties and institutionalization. To begin of with, where level parties the are institutionalized term they might exhibit a we high what degree – society broader the with links parties’ the and itself, electoral volatility reflect instability in voters’ preferences from election to election and/or election to election from preferences voters’ in instability reflect volatility electoral The second internal/organizational dimension concerns the nature of the party organization So how institutionalized is the Philippine party system? Let’s consider each of the dimensions organizational is dimension internal/organizational the under falling characteristic second A 3.1 party competition. Second, political actors view parties as a legitimate and necessary part necessary and legitimate a as parties view actors political Second, competition. party Party systeminstitutionalization External/systemic dimension:stabilityofinterpartycompetition 3 Institutionalized parties have entrenched organizations and established patterns of party competition we expect to see a low volatility score, indicating that the that indicating score, volatility low a see to expect we competition party The politicalpartysystem 39 party they - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 is possible to come up with reasonable estimates of volatility using some simple assumptions. sources ofinstability–whetherficklevotersorephemeralparties(HickenandKuhonta2011). is also important to note that electoral volatility does not allow one to differentiate between the Table 3.2 to used be can election past a of result the future II, of Philippines the predictor of case good the in a – not results election are large and by elections past of results the words, other In election. to election from greatly vary to tend parties individual the of fortunes The fluid. very the calculation.WereItoincludepartylistpartiesvolatilitywouldbeevenhigher. the for House elections of Representatives. constituency In other words, the I exclude in the party candidates list seats for and party votes list parties the from only using volatility calculate I ence and . The post-­ pre- and post-­ in Asia for comparative purposes. I divide the Philippines into two periods corresponding to the |v (Σ two by divided next, the to election one from party each by lost or gained votes assess. to where there are lots of party mergers or splits, or where a candidate’s party affiliation is difficult complicated extremely prove can shares vote party tracing – means any by measure perfect a not is volatility Electoral 2007). Zoco and (Mainwaring etc. splits, party mergers, party parties, elite-­ lenging, so much so that some scholars eschew the attempt altogether. chal volatility calculating makes it but telling, is Philippines the in fluid so are labels party that claim multiple party affiliations and candidate switching (turncoatism) is common. The very fact the patternofpartycompetition. same stable less the score volatility the higher The elections. different the two across votes of percentage exactly receive parties same the means 0 of score A next. the to election one from v Thailand II Thailand I South Korea Timor Leste Philippines II Malaysia I Philippines I Indonesia Cambodia India Japan Sri Lanka Taiwan Singapore Malaysia II it+1 Table Two things stand out in Table 3.2. First, the party system of post-­ of system party the First, 3.2. Table in out stand things Two of percentage the in change net the of sum the taking by calculated is volatility Electoral |)/2). A score of 100 signifies that the set of parties winning votes is completely different completely is votes winning parties of set the that signifies 100 of score A |)/2). driven changes to the party system such as the demise of existing parties, the birth of new of birth the parties, existing of demise the as such system party the to changes driven 4 Electoral volatilityinAsia The latter is particularly a challenge in the Philippines, where candidates will often will candidates where Philippines, the in challenge a particularly is latter The 3.2 displays the volatility scores for the Philippines alongside those of other countries other of those alongside Philippines the for scores volatility the displays 3.2 martial law eras. The Philippines I covers the seven elections between independ Years 1992–2011 1979–1991 1988–2012 2001–2012 1992–2016 1955–1968 1946–1969 1999–2009 1993–2008 1951–2009 1947–2012 1947–2010 1992–2012 1968–2011 1974–2008 Marcos sample (Philippines II) covers the 1992–2016 elections. elections Number of 15 24 14 11 7 4 7 3 9 4 7 3 4 7 8 A. Hicken 40 second elections Volatility: firstand 25.1 27.4 27.7 24.6 38.1 40.8 41.9 49.0 57.0 38.8 20.4 25.2 27.9 8.6 8.6 martial-law Philippines is Philippines martial-law 5 Nonetheless I believe it last election Volatility: 11.3 16.3 20.4 58.2 32.1 35.2 22.5 10.5 36.4 43.6 29.8 23.0 11.5 14.3 9.0 19.2 16.8 16.6 15.4 volatility Average 41.1 38.4 36.5 35.8 34.8 30.6 28.0 27.5 24.4 16.5 10.8 it 6 – It - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 volatility scoresovertime.) still does not appear to be any stabilization of the party system under way. Overall the average the Overall way. under system party the of stabilization any be to appear not does still post-­ few there Marcos of fall first the Since law. martial to the prior elections two the in substantially for increased steadily decline did volatility Electoral pre-­ In Philippines. the in time over (decrease) greater stability to electoral competition, is valid, we would expect electoral volatility to improve tility pre-­ party system appears to be much more volatile after martial law than it was before. Average vola- predict the result of the next election with less than 65 percent accuracy. Second, the Philippine Source: Author’scalculations fromHartmanetal.2001,COMELEC. Figure seats in the last election, did not capture any seats in the given election. Prior to martial law won it is that parties the of percent 33 that means 0.33 of rate death A election. prior the in seats any gain not did year given a in parties the of percent 33 that means 0.33 of birthrate A lature. number system. party the depart and a post-­ from members 35 to falling election, the after turncoatism to Representatives 80 lost tion, House 93 boasted administra outgoing the of party party the Party, Liberal the contrast, the By 2016). (Porcalla members however, cleared, had dust switching party the Once 2016. in PDP-­ Duterte, Rodrigo President of party The dent. presi- incoming the of party the to switching party massive usual the witnesses we concluded election the as soon as Almost latter. the suggests evidence initial but anomaly, an or stability, Marcos low of 10.5. It is too soon to tell whether this post-­ represents a a to new 2016 trend in towards dramatically more quite fell party volatility electoral that however, Note, competition. but post-­ the for score volatility Volatility If the argument that voters’ ties to political parties develop gradually over time, bringing time, over gradually develop parties political to ties voters’ that argument the If Another indication of the instability of the party system is the high rate at which parties enter 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 both 0 5 electoral highof115(Porcalla2016). 3.1 9915 9716 9516 9519 0120 2007 2004 2001 1998 1995 1969 1965 1961 1957 1953 1949 periods experienced relatively high degrees of instability in the pattern of inter-­ of pattern the in instability of degrees high relatively experienced periods of parties for each election, all calculated using the parties that gain seats in the legis the in seats gain that parties the using calculated all election, each for parties of martial law was 18.5. Post-­ Electoral volatilitypre-andpost-martial law Years la pre-martial martial law period is higher than before martial law (34 versus 18) versus (34 law martial before than higher is period law martial Table wY Marcos the average is 34.8. ( The politicalpartysystem 3.3 displays the birth and death rates alongside the total the alongside rates death and birth the displays 3.3 41 martial law elections no clear pattern is evident. is pattern clear no elections law martial Martial Law Laban, won only three seats in the House the in seats three only won Laban, ears post-martial law ears post-martial Figure needne lcin, but elections, independence 3.1 displays the electoral 0021 2016 2013 2010 party - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 Table 3.3 of percent 74 example. for Survey, Values World 2012 a In surveys. in again and again out comes democracy Filipino of reality the and democracy of ideal the between disconnect The whether the major actors view political parties as a legitimate and necessary part of political life. about doubt lingering the is institutionalization of lack a of indications telling most the of One instability inthepost-­ while time, volatility. electoral of enter and exit the system each election, and it is these births and deaths that are the main drivers to continue parties of number substantial A sort. any of stabilization observe don’t we parties, post-­ the in This Philippines. the in used system will be discussed in more system detail below. Second, the party birth and death rates start high list party peculiar the of advantage taking parties small winning seats. This jump is driven largely, but not exclusively, by an increase in the number of opposite. During the last several elections we have seen a large increase in the number of parties post-­ system party the period earlier the Unlike system. party two the of demise the marked law martial that clear is it First, 3.3. Table from information volatility the with information this Combining parties. Nacionalista clear that the Philippine party system had become a two party system helmed by the Liberal and 3.1 we observe that the rise in seat volatility in the 1960s was driven entirely by the shifting fortunes oftheNacionalistasandLiberals,notbypartyentriesexitsfromsystem. the by entirely driven was 1960s the in volatility seat in rise the that observe we 3.1 1946 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1987 Martial law 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 Source: Author’scalculations fromHartmanetal.2001,COMELEC. Contrast this with the post-­ the with this Contrast Party birthanddeathratesduringhouseelections(seats) Marcos era, and stay that way. Not only do we not see stabilization around two around stabilization see not we do only Not way. that stay and era, Marcos Figure 3.3 charts the birth and death rates for the same set of parties. The greater The parties. of set same the for rates death and birth the charts 3.3 martial laweraisclearlyevident. Figure External/systemic dimension:legitimacy Birth rate NA 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 0.43 0.13 0.50 0.33 0.73 0.33 0.67 0.32 0.34 3.2 shows the number of parties winning seats in the House over House the in seats winning parties of number the shows 3.2 Marcos era. A couple of things are immediately apparent from apparent immediately are things of couple A era. Marcos Marcos has not tended towards two. In fact, quite the quite fact, In two. towards tended not has Marcos A. Hicken 42 Death rate NA 0.71 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 NA 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.11 0.40 0.12 0.41 0.27 # ofparties 30 27 60 60 63 7 3 3 3 2 2 2 8 7 8 8 9 Figure Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 political actors? Do other major power centers see party government as the only legitimate only the as government party see centers power major other Do actors? political 2012). (WVS democracies established in respondents expressed strong support for democracy – a number comparable to what we observe Source: Author’scalculationsfromHartmanetal.2001,COMELEC. Figure Source: Hartmanetal.2001,COMELEC. Figure 3.3 also report being dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their country (ibid.). country their in works democracy way the with dissatisfied being report also of respondentsreportsomeconfidence inFilipinopoliticalparties(ibid.). half than Less parties. political country’s the of distrust a with correlated strongly is satisfaction Rates Seats Clearly parties are viewed with some suspicion by the masses, but what about other major other about what but masses, the by suspicion some with viewed are parties Clearly 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 0 3.2 96999397911616 979295980120072004 19871992199519982001 19691965 19461949195319571961 96999397911616 979295980120072004 19691965 19871992199519982001 19461949195319571961 Number ofparties(seats) Birth anddeathrates Year Year Birth rate(seats) Birth The politicalpartysystem 7 However, a near majority of (42.2 percent) (42.2 Filipinos of majority near a However, 43 Death rate(seats) Year Year 201020132016 201020132016 8 That dis- That Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 vice-president and former president (the United Nationalist Alli Nationalist United (the Estrada Joseph president former and Binay Jejomar vice-president sitting-­ the around five timesthenumberofvotesasweakestcandidate. Within TEAM Unity the gap was even larger, with the strongest candidate receiving more than three- ­ received votes the largest and smallest vote-­ each voter would simply vote a straight party ticket.) Within each alliance the difference between primarily motivated by party loyalty we would expect one party alliance to sweep the Senate as been voters (Had seats. 3 and votes the of percent 36.8 received Unity TEAM while seats, 12 available votes. GO candidates collectively received 50.9 percent of the total votes and 7 of the their of all cast to failed and/or lines alliance crossed readily voters vote, Senate their to it came when yet, And electorate. the in division prominent most the arguably was forces ­Arroyo made up of anti-­ Macapagal-­ Gloria President of supporters of coalition tion thatvotershaveweaktiestoparticularparties. receiving roughly the same number of votes. Large differences between candidates are party an same the indica from candidates see to expect would we considerations party by motivated are vote-­ 12 top The candidate. per vote one to tors are elected every three years to six-­ The Philippines uses a block vote (or MNTV) system to elect Senators. Twelve of the 24 sena mate (AlanCayetano)wasmorethan24percentagepoints. points. In the 2016 election the vote share of President Duterte and his running-­ vice-­ their and contenders presidential top the between vice-­ and dent presi a returned elections presidential 2016 and 2010 1998, 1992, the both result, a As parties. different two between votes their split frequently voters rule, this of advantage Taking party. vice-­ a For example, Filipino voters cast two separate votes, one for a presidential candidate parties. and one different for from candidates between votes their split frequently voters Filipino election. most parties is the lack of party loyalty manifest by large numbers of voters, even within a single tility scores discussed previously. Another indication of the low degree of value infusion within the weak links between parties and cohesive societal interests in the Philippines is the high vola How deeply rooted and organizationally strong are parties in the Philippines? One indication of interventions in1986and2001toresolvepoliticalstalemates. military actual and plots coup of rumors regular with politics, Filipino of feature prominent a means to political power? Unfortunately, military intervention and coup threats continue to be first place finisher received five-­ candidate. received finisher place first the between gap the UNA For candidate. place last team’s the than votes of number the times PNoy and three by UNA. Team by filled were seats nine – loyalty party little showed again once Voters UNA). – ance In 2013 multi-­ large two were there election Senate 2007 the In labels. party of weakness the of indicator another is elections Senate during behavior Voter Internal/organizational dimension:valueinfusionandorganizational presidential candidate. These votes need not be for candidates from the same political same the from candidates for be not need votes These candidate. presidential 10 we see a similar pattern, with two large multi-­ rsdn fo dfeet oiia pris Sne 92 h aeae difference average the 1992 Since parties. political different from president Arroyo politicians. During this election the division between the pro- and anti- president, Benigno Aquino III (Team PNoy), and the other around sitting-­ around other the and PNoy), (Team III Aquino Benigno president, and-a-­ 11 In Team PNoy the first place vote-­ af ie te ubr f oe a te last-­ the as votes of number the times half getters was wide. For the GO alliance the candidate with the most and-a-­ year terms. Voters can cast up to 12 votes but are limited routinization af ie te ubr f oe a te weakest the as votes of number the times half A. Hicken getters are awarded the seats. To the extent voters extent the To seats. the awarded are getters 44 Arroyo, and (GO), Opposition Genuine and Arroyo, party alliances forming: one centered mates is more than 12 percentage 12 than more is mates party alliances: TEAM alliances: party getter received more than three lc G candidate. GO place presidential running 9 Unity, a Unity, - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 Second largestparty Largest party Party alliance2 Party alliance1 LDP; 2001: Lakas-NUCD and LDP; and Lakas-NUCD 2001: LDP; and Lakas-NUCD 1998: NPC; and Lakas-NUCD 1995: Lakas-NUCD; and LDP 1992: follows. as are parties The UNA. and Matuwid Daang ng Koalisyon 2016: UNA; and PNoy Team 2013: Unity; Team and Opposition, Genuine 2007: KNP; and K-4 2004: PnM; and PPC 2001: LAMMP; 1998: NPC; and Lakas-Laban 1995: follows. as are alliances party The returns. election from calculations Author’s Source: voters onceagainexhibitverylittleattachmenttoaparticularparty. Notes The answer is no. The two largest parties in the 2007 election, in terms of seats in the House of coalition? that within parties to loyalty more exhibit they Did election. this of purpose the for alliance. UNA the – vice-­ sitting with associated alliance the and administration-­ the was which of c b a Table 3.4 and Ramos. Aquino Marcos, Macapagal, presidents of election the after happened as party, majority the to enough party switching can occur to change the status of the president’s party from the minority many resources and favors the president possesses. In fact, within the House of Representatives the of some secure to effort an in party president’s the to opposition the from switch turncoats vice-­ and president of level the Below officials. local to dency) from president (Magsaysay, Marcos and Ramos each switched office parties elected prior of to levels winning all the at presi- occurs Philippines, the in called is it as turncoatism or switching, occurrence and politicians often claim affiliation with multiple parties simultaneously. This party common a is switching Party promiscuous. politically are Philippines the in politicians voters, election. Senate the in candidates two than more ran which for the two largest party alliances and for the two largest parties (according to seats in the House) vote-­ smallest and largest the between differentials vote the listed I’ve election each For votes respectively. The numbers are similar for other Senate elections, as displayed in vote-­ Lakas-­ were Representatives, NPC; candidate ontheirrespectiveslates. place KDM and UNA candidates winning 23 and 17 times the number of votes as the last place The NPC was actually the third largest party but the second largest party, KAMPI, ran only one Senate The Liberal Party was actually the third largest party but the second largest party, the NPC, ran only one or one only ran parties largest third and second the but party largest fourth the actually was LDP The candidate in2007. Senate candidatein2004. two Senatecandidatesin2004. Perhaps it was the case that voters felt very little attachment to these alliances – created solely run-­ the In Another indication of the degree of value inclusion is politicians’ loyalty to their party. Like c getters for each party in the Senate elections was 2.5 times and 4.4 times the number of number the times 4.4 and times 2.5 was elections Senate the in party each for getters 2010:Lakas-KampiandLiberal;2013:LiberalNPC;2016: andUNA. Vote differentialsbetweenfirstandlastplacecandidates 14 up to the 2016 election there were several major party alliances, the two largest two the alliances, party major several were there election 2016 the to up 12 Once again voters displayed no loyalty to these alliances, with the first the with alliances, these to loyalty no displayed voters again Once 2.2 3.3 NA NA 1992 CMD and the NPC. The gap between the largest and smallest and largest the between gap The NPC. the and CMD 3.5 1.4 3.9 1.9 1995 a backed alliance dubbed alliance backed 2004: Lakas-CMD and the Liberal Party; Liberal the and Lakas-CMD 2004: The politicalpartysystem 4.1 3.4 NA 4.1 1998 president and presidential candidate Jejomar Binay Jejomar candidate presidential and president 45 3.1 1.7 4.6 2.4 2001 1.8 5.6 6.1 6.9 2004 Koalisyon ng Daang Matuwid Daang ng Koalisyon 13 Similar to presidential contests presidential to Similar 4.2 2.5 5.1 3.5 2007 president the vast majority of majority vast the president 16.9 NA NA 2010

8.4 b 2007: Lakas-CMD and Lakas-CMD 2007: 2.3 5.5 3.0 2013 1.6 Table (KDM) 10.9 17.3 23.1 2016 16.1 getters 3.4. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 of institutionalization. On the external/systemic dimension the pattern of interparty competi interparty of pattern the dimension external/systemic the On institutionalization. of the toiletanytime”(Quimpo2005). down flushed or recycled repackaged, renamed, reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, others, split, with merged up, set be can that entities nebulous are parties political main country’s the organizations, programmatic stable, being from “Far way: this in parties Philippine of state the summarizes Quimpo Nathan scholar Philippines 1997). Carlos 1992; Jr. Castro (de ization and for responsibility Finally, control of financing is very decentralized, usually completely bypassing the formal party organ sanctioned. rarely are one) is there (when line party the from deviate who Members weak. notoriously also is parties of structure governance internal The for all intents and purposes, with very little in the way of active connections to party “members.” of any lasting autonomous organizational structures. In between elections parties cease to operate electoral vehicles for powerful individuals. Parties are highly factionalized and noticeably devoid as entirely almost function Parties 1995). Scully and (Mainwaring “matter” that organizations even or groups individuals, ratherthanbroaderprogrammaticconstituenciesorunderrepresentedgroups. narrow of interests the represent to come have list parties party those of case of the many In parties parties). list party of case the (in House the in seats three than more formed poorly at the per polls (in have the case of parties the Left) these or are However, constitutionally prohibited distinct. from having programmatically are that platforms party and cies well as parties that run for party list seats that tend to have clearer ties to identifiable constituen be verydifferentfromanother”(quotedinSicat1973, 437). parties a Filipino high school student tellingly quipped, “I do not believe one species of mud can political between difference the among describe to asked When 2009b). (Hicken parties political most vision ideological or policy of lack enduring the is system party the of defining characteristics the of one fact, In visions. policy distinct with parties political cohesive to opposed is 8 percent. Philippine parties are generally ephemeral alliances of locally focused politicians, as promoted their welfare (SWS 2006). The broadest support any one party receives in the survey with any political party. In a recent survey two-­ societal interests and voter groups have been very weak. Very few voters, for example, identify the basis of its policy platform? Traditionally, the ties between Philippine parties and identifiable parties rely on different/distinct constituencies? Can we differentiate one party from another on ated with particular societal interests. Two questions are especially germane. To what extent do “Noybi.” Vice-­ and Aquino “Noynoy” dent Senator “Chiz” Escudero’s endorsement of candidates from the dueling party alliances of Presi government the both for bearer standard a as run to opting sometimes – banner party one than more under run others Still parties. switching formally without banner party’s a under run to offer an – datures ficant number of candidates regularly run as independents. Other candidates accept guest candi fleeting. defined and distinct party platforms. Organizationally parties tend to be feeble, factionalized and is little there evidence of value infusion dimension – parties are not internal/organizational strongly rooted in society the and do not have On well necessary. and legitimate as parties accept voters, including society, in actors major the that clear all at not is it while fluid remains tion In short, by virtually every measure political parties and the party system exhibit low levels low exhibit system party the and parties political measure every virtually by short, In party develop to yet have Philippines the in parties routinization, organizational of terms In as Left the on parties few a are There pattern. this to exceptions some course, of are, There associ clearly are parties political which to extent the is infusion value of indicator Another signi a example, For candidates. to little mean labels party that indications other are There and one of the opposition parties (Hicken 2009a). One prominent example is example prominent One 2009a). (Hicken parties opposition the of one President Jejomar Binay in 2013, which he dubbed team dubbed he which 2013, in Binay Jejomar President A. Hicken 46 thirds of respondents reported that no party truly ------Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 eortc rniin n isiuinlzto. hy ru ta tee s dsic difference mobilizing distinct were parties political democratizers, a early In democratizers. late is and early between there that argue They institutionalization. and transition of timing democratic the between link the on emphasis (2007) Zoco’s and Mainwaring with consistent is This unfolded. democracy which in manner Philippines the by shaped the was system) party in the (including system political the how examines that work of body growing a is There particularistic constituencies. narrow, with parties fragmented highly 1994), (Shefter mobilized internally but constituencies, national with parties cohesive not were system political the dominate to came that parties the than a forum in which mass interests could be articulated and national policies debated. parties and Congress quickly became the domain of these Political powerful locally 2003). based interests, Rocamora rather and Hutchcroft 1988; Wurfel 1988; Anderson 1965; (Landé tions acquiring and strengthening political power, first locally, then nationally via congressional elec to position best the compete in for elected office werethose the oligarchs. Oligarchs werecompetition able to use electionselectoral as a means of to open thrown was system political the and fragmented nature of political life at the national level (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003). As Philippines (Tancangco1992). the oligarchs, became the patrons atop numerous patron-­ the among spread remained power economic various large land-­ and political bureaucracy result, administrative a central strong As a 2000). up (Hutchcroft build to little very did it Philippines, the in institutions democratic installed party U.S. the while First, 2003). oriented Rocamora and (Hutchroft system nationally cohesive, institutionalized, more a of development the hampering tions wereintroducedpriortothedevelopmentofinstitutionsmasspolitics. the early arrival elections, the Philippines looks a lot like a late democratizer – democratic elec despite So, parties. political institutionalized strong, for basis the formed have might that ment move independence strong a of development the undermine to combined independence of efforts. In addition, early elections, the relatively benign colonial administration and the promise mobilization mass other of development the to prior and movement independence indigenous an defeated had it after administration colonial American the by imposed were suffrage male universal with elections democratic Instead, parties. institutionalized for groundwork the laid have might democracy of pursuit in mobilization scenario either In elite. the and forces social newly mobilized social forces over entrenched elite, nor did they reflect a compromise between of victory a of result the not were Elections crucial. is introduced were elections those which tizer. After all, democratic elections were introduced as early as 1906. However, the manner in never developed(MainwaringandZoco2007). democratizers early characterized that networks and links of kinds the consequently and tions the adoption of universal suffrage. As a result, parties did not have to become mobilizing institu with, conjunction in occurred or by, preceded was parties new of formation the and elections the citizens they helped to mobilize. By contrast, in later democratizers the move to competitive of suffrage and other rights for those citizens. This helped forge strong links between parties and expansion an for pushing and system political the into citizens new incorporating – institutions Second, the early introduction of elections in the Philippines reproduced the decentralized the reproduced Philippines the in elections of introduction early the Second, of consequence unintended the had decisions government’s colonial U.S. the of Several On the surface one might expect the Philippines to bear characteristics of an early democra owning elite throughout the country. This land-­ Explaining institutionalization Socio-­ The politicalpartysystem historical roots 47 client networks spread throughout the 15 owning elite, also known as 16 In sum, - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 system that gives party leaders very little control over their members’ behavior and even who even and behavior members’ their over control little very leaders party gives that system single-­ take frequently voters advantage of. Filipino that something – parties different from candidates Senatorial generally andSenators possess little in the way of party loyalty. contests Multiple votes allow voters to split their votes between personality foremost and first are elections Senate strategies. personal of favor in strategies party eschew to candidates Senatorial encourages method This Senate. the electing for method the discussed already I’ve label. party of value the discounting while strategy personal a pursue to incentive an candidates give and party before person place factors. Specifically, historical the electoral systems and for both the sociological House and of Senate give voters effects strong incentives to the amplified, cases some in and reinforced, and This environment has remained relatively constant across the pre- and post-­ pines electoral environment have discouraged the development of greater institutionalization. Philip the of features certain above, discussed factors sociological and historical the Alongside tegic useofinstitutionalreformsdesignedtokeepthelevelinstitutionalizationlow. stra the with along environment, institutional Philippine the of features key of continuity the is era, Marcos the during and before occurred that changes significant the despite system, party similar in most respects to the pre-­ post-­ parties cohesive did the coming together of different opposition groups to overthrow Marcos translate into more mass-­ large, of creation the to lead not did oligarchs traditional the of decline relative and mobilization mass this Yet populace. Filipino the of segment ized joined together to back for president. They were supported by a large, mobil of cronies(Hawes1992). class new a empowering while authority economic and political centralize to sought he as ated acceler oligarchs the of decline relative the Marcos under First, power. from fall his following possible least at were social paths new and that imagine to economic difficult not political, is it the era Marcos given the of However, upheaval changes. other and these of face the in 1992). -­ (largely elite business This oligarchs. the of power the challenge to emerged of had elite class business new a Likewise, 1988). (Wurfel Philippines the of areas other to spreading then and 1960s the patron-­ by traditional example, For system. party institutionalized more a of emergence the for well auger seemingly would changes these of many and years hundred intervening the in changed key why explain features of the party system have endured in the Philippines completely for more than a century. Much has cannot this However, unlikely. institutionalization early made under the label of their choosing. In some cases strong/wealthy run candidates usually will can use candidates a party’s Strong label party. own their within endorsement and nomination over party. one than more of banner the under run or ents or endorsementofapoliticalparty inordertorunforoffice.Candidatesmayasindepend runs under the party banner. For example, candidates are not required to obtain the nomination lcin fr h Hue f ersnaie ae ny lgty etr I Hue elections, House In better. slightly only are Representatives of House the for Elections system party the of stickiness the for account might dependence path that argue could One The interaction of the Philippines social structure, colonial administration and early elections seat districts – by themselves often associated with weak parties – are combined with a with combined are – parties weak with associated often themselves by – districts seat based) had interests that were very different from the traditional landed-­ traditional the from different very were that interests had based) client networks were breaking down, beginning first in and around Manila around and in first beginning down, breaking were networks client Marcos. Instead, as discussed above, the party system that emerged was emerged that system party the above, discussed as Instead, Marcos. 17 Institutional obstacles–continuities Second, in their attempt tooustMarcos,oppositionpoliticalparties their Second,in 1972 party system. One explanation for the continuity of the A. Hicken 48 20 Party officials often lack strong control strong lack often officials Party based parties after the fall. Nor fall. the after parties based authoritarian periods elite (Hawes elite 18 19 - - - - -

Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 n diin o h ufvrbe lcoa icnie – cntn truhu te democratic the throughout constant a – incentives electoral unfavorable the to addition In to either votersorcandidatesforinvestingin,evenpayingattentionto,politicalparties. payoffs few very are there which in one is system the all in All penalty. without time any virtually at parties switch to free are politicians and candidates Finally, 2001). (Kasuya petition intra-­ to rise giving party, same the represent to claiming each candidates multiple with or without the party’s official endorsement (Wurfel 1988, 96). Some districts even feature for each and every one of the official candidates of such party for the respective offices” (Revised in the past, voters could write in the name of a party and the ballot would be “deemed as a vote allow for party voting. Rather than writing individual candidates’ names, as had been the norm towards greater institutionalization. Shortly after independence the election code was revised to number ofshort-­ larger a to greatly and factionalism more have discipline, party incentives less to contributed coordination has this these and diminished incumbency presidential of end the With bent. incentives to back a single challenger in order to maximize their chances of defeating the incum from within the government ranks had incentives to stay put while the opposition faced strong government resources encouraged coordination around two large parties. Would-­ of rate death and rate birth number, the in increase corresponding a and candidates presidential of number the in increase an to led it Second, from? benefit directly to able be to going not party-­ in invest to presidents sitting of incentives the undermined it First, 2009a). Hicken 2001; (Choi system party the on effects (unintended) reelection. on ban a of introduction the was reforms these among Key tators. of constitutional provisions designed to limit the power of future presidents and would-­ strength, andtheKBLquicklylostmostofitssupport. two-­ Franz2007). and apart (Geddes former the Marcos of falls fall the Upon Philippines. the in happened what precisely party is this Indeed, new created artificially the as fragment to tends the expense of the traditional parties, but Lipunan once democratic elections return Bagong the party system Kilusang then – vehicle electoral (KBL). Past experience own predicts that such parties will his tend to attract supporters and candidates of at creation the with parties existing of banning the coupled Marcos Instead, returned. elections democratic when parties strong as loyalties voter that suggests might world have the remained more in or elsewhere less experience intact and rule, the his Liberals during and Nacionalistas parties would alista have reemerged Nacion and Liberal the repressed or banned simply Marcos Had 2011). Kuhonta and Hicken ludes have important consequences for post-­ inter authoritarian during dictators by adopted strategies of types the that know We Marcos. of fall the after president the for limit term single a of introduction the and law, martial under party system,andtheyhavebeenfairlysuccessfulatdoing so. profound. nonetheless interventions other were Two consequences the but institutionalization, and system party the shape to attempts direct not were interventions these of Two institutionalization. incipient any arresting of effect the had that interventions institutional key few a been have there – periods political parties. Prior to martial law the presence of a presidential incumbent with control of Finally, there are two reforms that seem to have been specifically designed to thwart progress After the excesses of the Marcos years it is not surprising that reformers put in place a number actions Marcos’ were system party the affected indirectly which interventions two first The party system fragmented, the Liberals and Nacionalistas never fully regained their former their regained fully never Nacionalistas and Liberals the fragmented, system party lived parties,asdemonstratedearlier. Institutional obstacles–interventions were strategically calculated to prevent the development of a stronger a of development the prevent to calculated strategically The politicalpartysystem authoritarian party system (Geddes and Franz 2007; 49 building. Why build an organization you are you organization an build Why building. 21 This had two had This be challengers party com party be dic - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 is relatively under- ­ relatively is One of the things I set out to do in this chapter was to demonstrate the Philippines party system policy- programmatic, than rather interests their organizations. promote interest and narrow for protect vehicles the to be to groups appear which of many years, recent in parties small the same time, the low 2 percent threshold and three-­ grammatic campaigning and the representation of marginalized interests to party list groups. At pro leave to content largely seem politicians and parties political Mainstream interests. those ably resulted in more diverse interests being elected to Congress, it has also partially ghettoized ively kept the impact of these changed to a minimum. While the party list provision has prob tier. The limit on the number of seats and the ban on mainstream parties competing has effect list the via seats three than more receive can group or party No seat. a awarded is party a vote sectoral (or the of percent 2 every parties For votes. list party the of percent 2 seat least at receive must a organizations) obtain To competing. from barred are election previous the from parties largest five the However, seats. the for compete can organizations sectoral and parties the only reserves 20 Philippines percent of the total House seats for the party list. Both political with one half of the seats allocated on the basis of party lists using proportional representation, German- a than Rather system. party existing the on impact the minimize and years muchofthemass/civilsocietyfervorhadunderstandablywaned. measure was not passed until 1995 and not used in an election until 1998. In the intervening ten interests to be heard in the House of Representatives. However, the law fully implementing the German-­ a of adoption the proposed ers mass mobilization and civil society of activity level unprecedented in the the to response wake a of part mixed-­ in the was People This Power a Constitution. 1987 revolution. the Reform in for included provision A institutionalization. greater towards progress tion of marginalized and stronger ties between parties and their supporters, has arguably arrested party a for vote single a casting of slate. option the lacked still they but hand, by names in write to had longer no voters that meant 2010 in voting electronic of introduction The label. party opportunities to split their votes between many different parties, thus undermining the value of day. election on names 40 must voters that mean can this synchronized are elections national and local that required to write in the name of each of their chosen candidates for every elected office. Given again once were Voters 94). 1988, (Wurfel option voting party the eliminate to Election 1951 in Code the amending quo, status the to return to acted quickly politicians However, time. over parties particular to ties those stronger developed have might win voters whether and votes to “party” efforts their increased have not might parties whether consider to intriguing is Election Code of 1947, Article XI, Section 149, No. 19). Had this option remained in effect it electoral institutions reinforced this tendency. And finally a few institutional interventions at key citizenry or mass organizations, hindered institutionalization. The adoption of a particular set of introduction of early elections in the an environment that rich in argued oligarchic I’ve elite but institutionalization. lacking a of mobilized lack the for reasons the out parse to is case, single towards a low level of institutionalization. What is harder to do, particularly in the context of a In addition, opponents of the reforms were able to water down the provision substantially provision the down water to able were reforms the of opponents addition, In Finally, the adoption of a mixed-­ institutionalized. The data assembled here all point in the same direction – direction same the in point all here assembled data The institutionalized. 22 hs ubroe alt tutr poie vtr wt ample with voters provided structure ballot cumbersome This member system, ostensibly to provide for better representa Conclusion style mixed-­ style A. Hicken 50 member system which would allow new allow would which system member seat limit has led to an explosion of new, ebr ytm was system member style legislature legislature ­style write in write oriented ­oriented up to up - - - - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 under-­ that argue I Specifically, 2015). Hicken 2008b; (Hicken governance democratic affect might for things we ultimately care about? Elsewhere I have argued that the level of institutionalization matter really it does but country, to country from institutionalization of level the in differences respects. party list system, also help explain why the pre- and post-­ the of peculiarities the and reelection presidential on ban the KBL, the of creation the namely interventions, these of Three institutionalization. further towards incentives undermined times 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 (e.g., MarcosandperhapsDuterte). for anti-­ with outsiders opportunities political provide may loyalties, party weak with combined ambivalence, This ship. relative merits of the democratic the status about quo versus voters strong, some decisive, albeit among less democratic, ambivalence leader produce eventually might system extant the with accountable. collectively and individually politicians hold to voters of ability the undermines institutionalization system under-­ both are of which are problematic for the provision systems of needed public goods. Second, a party lack of party – and horizons time short parties and constituencies narrow have where to tend will First, politicians institutionalized ways. three least at in governance good 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 So, in conclusion, why should we care about the level of institutionalization? We can observe (1993). (1998). fielded onlytwo,zeroandoneSenate candidatesrespectively,whileUNAfielded six. NP) and NUP (NPC, 2–4 parties but House, the in party largest fifth the as finished actually UNA party alliances. 10 being“absolutelyimportant”74.1percentofrespondentsgavea ratingof7orhigher. effect ofloweringthevolatilityscorebyanaveragetwopointsper election. tion. Excluding the independents and “other” categories from the volatility calculation would have the calculating volatility. The average percentage for each category is less than 5 percent in any given elec volatility. I of also include independents level and “other” minor the parties as single categories understating for the purposes of of direction the in be to likely is bias any elections, several over around be to likely are that those are parties largest the that extent the To volatility. calculate to member a were Asia in the Philippines.” In Allen Hicken and Erik Kuhonta, eds. For an opposing view (i.e., that the reports of oligarchs’ deaths were highly exaggerated) see Putzel see exaggerated) highly were deaths oligarchs’ of Hutchcroft reports the and that (i.e., view (1996) opposing an For Sidel see arrangement this of consequences policy the of analysis an For This sectiondrawsonchapter5of Hicken(2009a). Liang (1970);BanlaoiandCarlos (1996); LandéHicken(2009a). For 2016 I report the vote differentials for the Liberal Party, the largest party in the House, and UNA. There wasalsoalliancesassociatedwithpresidentialcandidateGrace Poe, Candidates were not paragons of partisan loyalty either. Three candidates appeared on the slate of both There werenolargemulti-­ Together EveryoneAchieves More. Degree ofconfidenceinthegovernment. When asked how important democracy was on a scale from 1 to 10, 0 being “not at all important” and they which of party largest the I use affiliations party multiple claimed candidates where Specifically, E.g., Ufen(2008). Where possibleIfollowMainwaringandZoco’s(2007)rulesabouthowtotreatsuchsituations. Compare toLevitsky’s(1998)discussionofbehavioralroutinization. The discussionofthesetwodimensionsdrawsonHicken(2009b). This chapter is an updated version of: Hicken, Allen. 2014. “Party and Party System Institutionalization institutionalized party systems are generally a hindrance to democratic consolidation and . Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. 23 Finally, where party institutionalization is low, the disillusionment the low, is institutionalization party where Finally, party alliancesfortheSenateelectionsin 2010. party and sometimes anti-­ sometimes and party The politicalpartysystem Notes 51 democratic sensibilities to rise to power to rise to sensibilities democratic martial law party systems differ in some Party and Party System Institutionalization in Partido Galingat Puso . - - Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 15:41 02 Oct 2021; For: 9781315709215, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315709215-3 de Castro Jr., Isagani. 1992. “Money and Moguls: Oiling the Campaign Machinery.” In Lornal Kalaw-­ Lornal In Machinery.” Campaign the Oiling Moguls: and “Money 1992. Isagani. Jr., Castro de Elec Local and National 2004 the from results Election 2004. (COMELEC). Elections on Commission Elec Local and National 2001 the from results Election 2001. (COMELEC). Elections on Commission Elec Local and National 1998 the from results Election 1998. (COMELEC). Elections on Commission 1995. (COMELEC). Elections on Commission 1992. (COMELEC). Elections on Commission Choi, Jungug. 2001. “Philippine Democracies Old and New: Elections, Term Limits, and Party Systems.” 1997. R. Clarita Carlos, Banlaoi, Rommel C. and Clarita R. Carlos. 1996. Anderson, Benedict. 1988. “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams.” 23 22 21 20 19 18 Hartmann, Christof, Graham Hassall and Soliman M. Santos Jr. 2001. “Philippines.” In Dieter Nohlen, Dieter In “Philippines.” 2001. Jr. Santos M. Soliman and Hassall Graham Christof, Hartmann, Grossholtz, Jean.1964. Geddes, Barbara and Erica Frantz. 2007. “The Effect of Dictatorships on Party Systems in Latin America,” Philippine CenterforInvestigative JournalismandAteneoCenterforSocialPolicyPublicAffairs. eds. Colonel, S. Sheila and Tirol tions. www.comelec.gov.ph/results_main.html. tions. www.comelec.gov.ph/results_main.html. tions. DataonDiskette.Manila:CommissionElections. Elections ofMay8,1992 dent Fidel V. Ramos and to Congress of the Republic of the Philippines on the Conduct of the National and Local May 11,1992 of Elections Local and National Synchronized the of Conduct the on Philippines the of Republic the of Congress Asian Survey tion. : KonradAdenauerFoundation. 169: 3–33. South EastAsia, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann, eds. unpublished manuscript, UCLA. other racesontheirsampleballotinabidtobolsterownelectoralprospects. in running parties other from candidates popular include often Candidates party. one than more from other offices. Tellingly, it is not uncommon for these sample ballots to contain the names of candidates for candidates of names the and name their containing ballots sample distribute candidates most tions to theperceivedshortcomingsofpartysystem(Quezon1940). Philippines’ first president, Manuel Quezon, to guarantee a powerful presidency was in part a reaction under-­ with polities in dote may presidency hinder strong the rise of an A institutionalized party system, but run. it may also be arrows employed as an institutional anti the way which about uncertainty some is there relationship a between presidentialism and institutionalization, once they control for other factors. Second, if there is as a significant causal variable for two reasons. First, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) find no relationship parties (Lijphart et al. 1993, 322; Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, I discount a powerful president not is observation This unique to the Philippines – presidentialism is often associated with system. weaker and less-­ party institutionalized an of development the discourages generally and legislators frees and president) the of hands the in cohesiveness, policies national (leaving concerns particularistic on focus to parties party undermines goes, argument the so presidency, powerful A 1996). Carlos and Banlaoi 1988; Wurfel 1964; Grossholtz example for (see president strong a of ment party system. over the leadership of an existing party also likely contributed to the return of an under-­ See alsoMainwaringandTorcal(2006). For this reason the distribution of sample ballots to voters becomes extremely important. Prior to elec Prior tomartiallawpresidentswerelimitedtwoterms. See theearlierdiscussionofguestandjointcandidacies. establish the on system party the of state the blame who scholars Philippines of number a are There take or party political own her form to popularity her on capitalize to Aquino of unwillingness The 41:488–501. . Manila:CommissiononElections. Politics inthePhilippines:ACountry Study

Asia andtheSouth Pacific Dynamics of Political Parties in the Philippines the in Parties Political of Dynamics . Manila:CommissiononElections. institutionalized party systems (Shugart 1999). In fact, the effort of the of effort the fact, In 1999). (Shugart systems party institutionalized 1992 & Beyond: Forces and Issues in Philippine Elections Philippine in Issues and Forces Beyond: & 1992 References Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. Volume II: A. Hicken Report of the Commission on Elections to His Excellency Presi Excellency His to Elections on Commission the of Report . Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress. Report of the Commission on Elections to the President and President the to Elections on Commission the of Report Political Parties in the Philippines: From 1900 to the Present 52 . Boston:Little,BrownandCompany. . Makati: Konrad Adenauer Founda Adenauer Konrad Makati: . cohesive legislative institutionalized New Left Review . : Quezon . ------.

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How the Separation of Separation the How Pictn NJ: Princeton, . BusinessWorld Party Politics Party Beverly 21(3): 17 - .