U.S. Citizenship Non-Precedent Decision of the and Immigration Administrative Appeals Office Services

MATTER OF J-S-V-A- DATE: APR. 1, 2019

APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION

PETITION: FORMI-918, PETITION FOR UNONIMMIGRANT STATUS

The Petitioner seeks "U-1" nonimmigrant classification under sections 10l(a)(l5)(U) and 214(p), 8 U.S.C. §§ l 10l(a)(l5)(U) and l 184(p), of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), as a victim of a 2013 incident in which a necklace was stolen from his neck during a . The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the Petitioner's Form 1-918, Petition for U Nonimmigrant Status (U petition). The matter is now before us on appeal. Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LAW

To qualify for U-1 nonimmigrant classification, a petitioner must establish that he or she has suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been the victim of qualifying criminal activity; possesses information concerning the qualifying criminal activity; and has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to law enforcement authorities investigating or prosecuting the qualifying criminal activity. Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(i) of the Act.

A "victim of qualifying criminal activity" is defined as an individual who has "suffered direct and proximate harm as a result of the commission of qualifying criminal activity." 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(l4). "Qualifying criminal activity" is "that involving one or more of' the 28 types of listed at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act or "any similar activity in violation of Federal, State, or local ." Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9). The term "'any similar activity' refers to criminal offenses in which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal activities" at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9).

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has sole jurisdiction over U petitions, and a petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the . 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4); Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). As a part of meeting this burden, a petitioner must submit a Form 1-918 Supplement B, U Nonimmigrant Status Certification (Supplement B), from a law enforcement official certifying a petitioner's helpfulness in . . Matter ofJ-S-V-A- the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity. 1 Section 214(p)(l) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i). A petitioner also must provide a statement describing the facts of his or her victimization as well as any additional evidence he or she wants USCIS to consider to establish that he or she is a victim of qualifying criminal activity and has otherwise satisfied the remaining eligibility criteria. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(ii)-(iii). Although a petitioner may submit any relevant, credible evidence for consideration, USCIS determines, in its sole discretion, the credibility of and weight given to all the evidence, including the Supplement B. Section 2 l 4(p )( 4) of the Act; 8 C.F .R. § 214.14(c)(4).

11. ANALYSIS

A Procedural History and Relevant Evidence

In 2013, the Petitioner reported to officers with the Police Department that he was involved in an altercation with an unidentified individual, who during the encounter, took the Petitioner's gold necklace and swung him into a car, resulting in scratches on his chest and pain in a knee. The Petitioner filed his U petition based upon the incident, and included with the submission a report documenting the Police Department's investigation of the incident. The report identified that law enforcement responded to the Petitioner's reporting of a strong arm robbery in violation of section 211 of the (CPC) occurring two days prior.

The Petitioner also submitted a Supplement B signed in November 2013 by a lieutenant with the Police Department's Youth & Family Services ( certifying official), based on the incident. In response to Part 3.1 of the Supplement B, which provides check boxes corresponding to the 28 qualifying crimes listed in section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act, the certifying official indicated that the Petitioner was a victim of criminal activity involving or similar to the qualifying of felonious . The certifying official also checked the "Other:" box and indicated "robbery (strong arm)." In response to Part 3 .3, which requests the specific statutory citations for the criminal activity investigated or prosecuted, the certifying official listed robbery under section 211 of the CPC, and included a notation to refer to Part 4. Helpfulness of the Victim for an "explanation why this crime is equivalent to a felonious assault." The Petitioner further submitted a copy of a letter in which the District Attorney, City and County of in part, "urge[d] ... (USCIS) to recognize robbery pursuant to ... (CPC) § 211 as felonious assault ... because the city of benefits when victims are empowered to report this violent street crime."

In response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner submitted an updated Supplement B signed in March 2015 by the same certifying official, who, as in the original Supplement B, identified the Petitioner as a victim offelonious assault and "other: robbery (strong arm)" and cited the statutory provision for robbery under section 211 of the CPC as the crime investigated or prosecuted. The updated Supplement B also identified the Petitioner as a victim involving or similar to the qualifying crime of false and cited the statutory provision for false impri sonment at section 236 of the CPC.

1 The Supplement B also provides factual information concerning the criminal activity, such as the specific violation of law that was investigated or prosecuted, and gives the certifying agency the opportunity to describe the crime, the victim's helpfulness, and the victim's injuries.

2 Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

The Director issued a second RFE, again providing the Petitioner an opportunity to submit additional evidence "to demonstrate that the crimes listed on [the] law enforcement certification would be considered crimes related to those in [the U] regulation." After considering the Petitioner's response, the Director denied the U petition and affirmed the prior determination upon considering the Petitioner's subsequent motion to reconsider. The Director ultimately concluded that the Petitioner did not establish the detection, investigation, or prosecution of a felonious assault, and therefore that the Petitioner was not a victim of the qualifying crime of felonious assault or any criminal activity substantially similar to a qualifying crime.

On appeal, the Petitioner claims that he was a victim of felonious assault and false imprisonment, and that robbery involves a felonious assault, or in the alternative, that robbery is a crime substantially similar to felonious assault and .

As explained below, the record establishes that law enforcement detected or investigated strong arm robbery under section 211 of the CPC, the Petitioner was in fact the victim of strong arm robbery, and this offense is not, does not involve, and is not substantially similar to any qualifying crime enumerated at section 101 (a)( l 5)(U)(iii) of the Act.

B. Investigated Criminal Activity and of Which the Petitioner Was the Victim

The Act requires that a petitioner "has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful" to law enforcement authorities "investigating or prosecuting [qualifying] criminal activity," as documented on a certification from a law enforcement official. Sections 10l(a)(l5)(U)(i)(III) and 214(p)(l) of the Act. "Investigation or prosecution" of qualifying criminal activity "refers to the detection or investigation of a qualifying crime or criminal activity, as well as to the prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or criminal activity." 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(5). The Supplement Bis required to establish a petitioner's helpfulness in the investigation or prosecution of the crime(s) perpetrated against him or her. See section 214(p)(l) of the Act (requiring the submission of the Supplement B to show that a petitioner "'has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation or prosecution of' qualifying criminal activity) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(l2) (stating that the Supplement B "confirms that a petitioner has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity of which he or she is a victim"). While qualifying criminal activity may occur during the commission of non-qualifying criminal activity, see Interim Rule, New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity: Eligibility for "U' Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53014, 53018 (Sept. 17, 2007), the qualifying criminal activity must actually be detected, investigated, or prosecuted by the certifying agency as perpetrated against a petitioner. Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(i)(III) of the Act; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(3) (requiring helpfulness to "to a certifying agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity upon which his or her petition is based .... ").

The record demonstrates that robbery under section 211 of the CPC was the only crime investigated. Although both Supplements B referenced felonious assault, they cited only to section 211 of the CPC as the crime detected, investigated, or prosecuted; neither cited to the assault provisions contained in the CPC. The accompanying police report did not reference the detection, investigation, or prosecution of

3 .

Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

felonious assault; instead, it described a "robbery," listed the related statute as "PC 211," and provided that the officer responded to "investigate report of a possible robbery." While we acknowledge the second Supplement B additionally contained a citation to section 236 of the CPC, the police report did not provide any reference the detection or investigation of false imprisonment, or to the false imprisonment cite under the CPC. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the regulations do not require qualifying criminal activity to be listed on police reports and that we must give deference to the certifying official's determinations. In this case, however, the certifying official did not reference any additional information that was considered for concluding that felonious assault or the added crime of false imprisonment was actually detected or investigated in 2013 when the incident occurred, or otherwise explain why false imprisonment was not included in the original Supplement B as an offense that was investigated by the Police Department.

Moreover, in determining the criminal activity of which U petitioners are victims, we do not speculate about what crimes might have been charged by law enforcement. Instead, U petitioners must establish that they were, in fact, victims of qualifying criminal activity. Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(i)(I) of the Act (requiring "substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of [qualifying] criminal activity .... "); 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.14(a)(l4) (defining "victim of qualifying criminal activity"), (b )(1) (reiterating the requirement of suffering "substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of qualifying criminal activity."), (c)(2)(ii)-(iii) (requiring evidence to establish "the petitioner is a victim of qualifying criminal activity" and "[a] signed statement by the petitioner describing the facts of victimization.").

Here, the record indicates that the Petitioner was the victim of strong arm robbery. Although the Supplements B also reference felonious assault and false imprisonment, the evidence does not demonstrate that he was in fact a victim of either of these crimes. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(4) (stating "the burden shall be on the petitioner to demonstrate eligibility" and "USCIS will determine, in its sole discretion, the evidentiary value of ... submitted evidence, including Form 1-918, Supplement B .... ").

Although the Petitioner claims he was a victim of false imprisonment, as stated above, the police report indicates that the perpetrator approached the Petitioner, snatched his gold chain, grabbed him by his shirt and swung him into car, and then fled from the scene. According to the Petitioner's personal statement, the perpetrator "pulled [the Petitioner] backwards against a parked car," snatched the Petitioner's necklace and then ran away. The police report does not reference section 236 of the CPC in any part of the incident summary, the listed offenses, or the narrative of the investigation and the brief descriptions contained in the police report and the Petitioner's statement do not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement investigated the crime of false imprisonment and that the Petitioner was otherwise the victim of such crime. 2

Regarding the felonious assault claim, at the time of the offense against the Petitioner, section 245(a) of the CPC provided punishing as a , in part, "[a]ny person who commits an assault upon the person of another by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury ... ." Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(4) (West 2013). Evidence in the record, including the Petitioner' s statements, the police

2 In the brief submitted with his appeal, the Petitioner's argument regarding how the facts of his case support a finding of false imprisonment contains a description of facts pertaining to another individual.

4 Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

report, Supplements B, and photographs, indicate that the Petitioner sustained scratches causing scabs on his chest and pain in a knee upon his perpetrator grabbing for his necklace and "swinging" him into a car. The evidence also indicates that the Petitioner declined medical attention for these injuries and that he was able to walk home from the incident unassisted. While unquestionably unfortunate, these injuries as inflicted upon the Petitioner, do not meet the definitions of "great bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" as contemplated by the CPC. See id at §§ 12022. 7(±) ( defining "great bodily injury" as "a significant or substantial physical injury") and 243(±)(4) (defining "serious bodily injury" as "a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement") (emphasis added); see also People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 898-99 (Cal. 1984) abrogated on other grounds, People v. Bryant, 301 P.3d 1136 (Cal. 2013) (stating "[t]here is no indication the Legislature intended to ascribe a different meaning to ... 'great bodily injury,' or ... 'serious bodily injury"' as used in the CPC).

Based on the foregoing, the record does not establish that any crime other than robbery under section 211 of the CPC was detected or investigated and that the Petitioner was a victim of felonious assault, false imprisonment, or any crime beyond robbery.

C. Robbery Under the CPC Is Not a Qualifying Crime

At the time of the incident against the Petitioner, the CPC defined robbery as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." Cal. Penal Code § 211. Because the offense of robbery is not specifically listed as a qualifying crime at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act, the Petitioner must establish that the offense otherwise involves a qualifying crime, or that the nature and elements of the offense are substantially similar to a qualifying crime. This determination entails comparing the Federal, state, or local jurisdiction's statutory equivalency of the enumerated qualifying crime with the specific offense detected, investigated, or prosecuted as perpetrated against the Petitioner, and of which the Petitioner was the victim, to determine whether: 1) the specific offense is in fact the same as, or included within, the jurisdictional equivalent of the qualifying crime, or 2) the nature and elements of the specific offense are substantially similar to the jurisdictional equivalent of the qualifying crime. See section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act (defining qualifying criminal activity as "that involving one or more of the" 28 specified crimes or "any similar activity"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9) (defining "any similar activity" as "criminal offenses in which the nature and elements are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list" of qualifying crimes).

On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that by denying his U petition, USCIS has changed its practice of approving petitions when a Supplement B identifies section 211 of the CPC as the criminal activity for which a petitioner was a victim. The Petitioner's general assertion does not include or refer to precedent decisions. Unlike decisions issued as precedents under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c), non-precedent decisions do not bind USCIS officers in future adjudications. Moreover, USCIS has not changed its practice of adjudicating U petitions and continues to determine whether an individual has met his burden for establishing eligibility for U nonimmigrant classification in light of statutory and regulatory requirements, which- as analyzed above, includes a review of underlying circumstances and a

5 Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

determination of what crime was investigated or prosecuted and whether a petitioner was a victim of that crime, and- as analyzed below, whether the crime is a qualifying crime or substantially similar to a qualifying crime.

The Petitioner argues that unlike many other states, California does not have a specific felonious or aggravated assault provision in the CPC. He further argues that USCIS has used expansive language for considering whether state crimes constitute "qualifying criminal activity," and that USCIS must "broadly construe" the term "qualifying criminal activity," and by doing so, robbery under section 211 of the CPC is qualifying criminal activity because it "is a felony crime of violence frequently targeted at undocumented immigrants ... [that] fits squarely within the list of criminal activity listed" at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act. He emphasizes that USCIS should treat the qualifying crimes listed at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act "as general categories of crime, not limited exclusively to that list," and cites to the preamble to the U Interim Rule, averring that the list of qualifying crimes involves those for "which vulnerable immigrants are often targeted as victims." See Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53015 (stating "[t]he list of qualifying crimes represents the myriad types of behavior that can constitute domestic violence, sexual abuse, or trafficking, or are crimes of which vulnerable immigrants are often targeted as victims.").

We agree that the Act's list of 28 qualifying crimes involves general types of criminal act1v1ty; however, as stated previously, the Petitioner must establish that the crime for which he was a victim (i.e., strong arm robbery) is the same as, or included, one of the 28 enumerated qualifying crimes. Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act; see also Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53018 (reiterating that section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act "is not a list of specific statutory violations, but instead a list of general categories of criminal activity"). Although robbery may share some commonality with many of the 28 qualifying crimes (e.g., penalized as a felony, use of force), it is not listed or included as an enumerated qualifying crime. Consequently, the Petitioner must establish that strong arm robbery under section 211 of the CPC is substantially similar to qualifying crime.

D. Robbery Is Not Substantially Similar to a Qualifying Crime

The Act provides that "any similar activity" to the qualifying crimes may also be considered qualifying criminal activity. Section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act. However, the regulations explicitly define the term "any similar activity" as "offenses in which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of qualifying criminal activities." 8 C.F .R. § 214.14(a)(9); see also Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53018 (stating that the definition of"any similar activity" was needed because, and "base[d] ... on[,] the fact that the statutory list of criminal activity is not composed of specific statutory violations.").

1. Robbery Is Not Substantially Similar to Felonious Assault

On appeal, the Petitioner cites California case law and asserts that California does not have a specific definition offelonious assault in the CPC, but robbery under section 211 "is the same in all elements" as assault under section 240 of the CPC, punishable only as a felony. (emphasis in original). He also references a dictionary definition for similar and avers that if Congress intended the comparison of statutory elements to be identical, it would not have used the term substantial similarity. Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

As discussed previously, although robbery under section 211 of the CPC may share some commonality with statutorily enumerated qualifying crimes at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act, the regulations require substantial similarities in both the nature and the elements of the offenses in question. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "nature" as the "essence of something," while defining "elements of a crime" as the "constituent parts of a crime ... that the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction"). Accordingly, we must follow the language specified in the Act and regulations, and apply the resulting analytical framework. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96 (1974) (holding that both governing statutes and their implementing regulations hold "the force of law" and must be adhered to by government officials).

Also discussed above, at the time of the incident against the Petitioner, the CPC defined robbery as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." Cal. Penal Code § 211. It further defined/ear as:

1. The fear of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family; or,

2. The fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.

Id at§ 212.

It also defined assault as "an unlawful , coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another." Id at§ 240. For an assault to be classified as a felony, there must have been an aggravating factor involved, such as the use of a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury, or an assault against a specific class of persons. See id at §§ 244, 244.5, 245, 245.3, 245.5 (outlining aggravating factors, terms of imprisonment, and fines for felonious ).

In comparison, the elements of robbery and felonious assault are notably different. However, an essential for robbery includes a taking under California law, unlike a felonious assault. Robbery also does not require the use of a weapon or other aggravating circumstance like a felonious assault. Further, robbery, unlike assault, can be committed "without attempting to inflict violent injury, and without the present ability to do so .... " People v. Wolcott, 665 P.2d 520, 525 (Cal. 1983). In addition, robbery includes fear of injury to an individual's property, unlike felonious assault. Id Moreover, felonious assault contains as elements additional aggravating factors which are not included in the definition of robbery. With such differences in elements, the two crimes necessarily cannot be considered substantially similar.

In Wolcott, the Supreme Court of California referred to cases, including one cited by the Petitioner on appeal, in which the California courts "have asserted generally that robbery is a combination of assault and ." (citations omitted). Id at 524. The Court concluded, however, "[s]uch language may serve as a thumbnail description of robbery, but it lacks the precision and exactness required in Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

determining whether one offense is necessarily included in another." Id In so doing, the Court explicitly found "assault is not a in robbery[.]" Id at 522. 3

Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner has not established that the nature and elements of robbery are substantially similar to a felonious assault in California.

2. Robbery Is Not Substantially Similar to Extortion

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that robbery and extortion, a qualifying crime, share some elements; obtaining the property of another through the wrongful use of force or fear, and that they are punishable by imprisonment in the state for a term of years. He also asserts that they differ in elements "that are irrelevant to the determination of victimization and wrongdoing," and robbery is more dangerous than extortion, which would lead to incongruous results if USCIS fails to treat robbery as a qualifying cnme.

To establish his eligibility, the Petitioner must demonstrate that the nature and elements of the offenses committed against him are substantially similar to a qualifying crime; not whether the crime of which he was a victim "is therefore more dangerous" as he asserts on appeal. The Petitioner acknowledges that the CPC defined extortion at the time of the incident as "the obtaining of property from another, with his , or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right." Cal. Penal Code § 518. An essential element for extortion requires that the perpetrator either to have obtained property through consent, or the victim to have been a public officer, neither of which is required for robbery. See People v. Sales, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 527, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that extortion "differs from robbery in that the property is obtained with the consent of the victim."). Based on the foregoing, the Petitioner has not established that the nature and elements of robbery are substantially similar to extortion in California.

A preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that the Petitioner was a victim of a crime substantially similar to felonious assault, extortion, or any other qualifying crime under the Act.

E. The Petitioner Has Not Established Substantial Abuse

Upon considering information contained in the Petitioner's personal statement, the police report, the Supplements B, and a mental health evaluation, the Director acknowledged that although the 2013 incident may have been extremely difficult for the Petitioner, the record did not establish that he suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of his victimization, as section 101 (a)(l 5)(U)(i)(I) of the Act requires.

3 Although the Court ultimately determined that assault is not a lesser included offense of robbery, we acknowledge the inherently violent nature of both offenses. However, to establish eligibility as a victim of qualifying crime, the Petitioner must demonstrate that the nature and elements of the crime for which he was a victim are substantially similar to qualifying crime. For the reasons discussed, the elements of robbery and felonious assault in California are not substantially similar, and consequently, the Petitioner necessarily cannot establish that the nature and elements of the crime for which he was a victim is substantially similar to felonious assault. Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

Implementing regulations provide the following guidance:

Whether abuse is substantial is based on a number of factors, including but not limited to: The nature of the injury inflicted or suffered; the severity of the perpetrator's conduct; the severity of the harm suffered; the duration of the infliction of the harm; and the extent to which there is permanent or serious harm to the appearance, health, or physical or mental soundness of the victim, including aggravation of pre-existing conditions. No single factor is a prerequisite to establish that the abuse suffered was substantial. Also, the existence of one or more of the factors automatically does not create a presumption that the abuse suffered was substantial. A series of acts taken together may be considered to constitute substantial physical or mental abuse even where no single act alone rises to that level[.]

8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(l).

In his personal statement submitted with his U petition, the Petitioner indicated that upon being "pulled [] backwards against a parked car" he hit his left knee, and as a result of the perpetrator trying "to grab [his] chain," "had scratches all over [his] chest." He also stated that since the incident, he has nightmares, fears walking in the same area where the incident occurred, feels nervous and irritable, and is no "longer the social person that [he] once was." The Supplements B and related police report described the Petitioner's injuries as scratches on his chest, "including multiple vertical coagulated blood and scabs," along with pain to his knee. They also indicated that the Petitioner "declined medical attention." The Petitioner has been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and in the report, the evaluators indicated having discussed with him "treatment options that effectively reduce the symptoms of PTSD." On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that other evidence in the record does not contradict the information contained in his mental health evaluation, and the evaluation's probative value does not diminish in the absence of ongoing mental health treatment. However, he does not provide any further discussion of impediments or an inability to obtain mental healthcare since the evaluators' recommendation of options for treating his PTSD.

Based on the record before us, while we do not question the Petitioner's victimization and the difficult circumstances surrounding the incident and its aftermath, the preponderance of the evidence does not show that the Petitioner suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of the incident. The evidence indicates that the 2013 incident was a single occurrence of a short duration and did not have lasting physical effects or any continued threats or victimization from the perpetrator. The police report states that during the incident, the Petitioner received scratches to his chest and complains "of pain to his right knee ... He declined medical attention." In his personal statement, the Petitioner indicated that after the incident, he was able to walk home unassisted. Although the Petitioner described feeling humiliated, afraid, nervous, and more cautious, and was diagnosed with symptoms of PTSD, the evidence does not indicate that these conditions significantly impaired the Petitioner's ability to function, aggravated any pre-existing conditions, or resulted in permanent or serious harm to his appearance, health, or physical or mental soundness. Instead, the record shows that although the Petitioner experiences anxiety and fear, he has continued to work, maintains a relationship with his girlfriend, and otherwise carries on his daily activities. His evaluator further indicated that with treatment, his PTSD symptoms could be effectively reduced. Under the standard and relevant factors of the regulation, the entirety of the record, including the evidence submitted on appeal, does not

9 Matter ofJ-S-V-A-

establish that the Petitioner suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as section 101 (a)(l 5)(U)(i)(I) of the Act requires.

F. The Remaining Eligibility Criteria for U-1 Classification

U-1 classification has four separate and distinct statutory eligibility criteria, each of which is dependent upon a showing that the petitioner is a victim of qualifying criminal activity. As the Petitioner has not established that he was the victim of qualifying criminal activity, he necessarily cannot satisfy any of these criteria at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(i) of the Act.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was a victim of qualifying criminal activity. The record shows that he was the unfortunate victim of strong arm robbery in California, but this crime is not equivalent to, does not involve, and is not substantially similar to any qualifying crime at section 10l(a)(l5)(U)(iii) of the Act. Moreover, he has not demonstrated that he suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of qualifying criminal activity. The Petitioner, therefore, has not established his eligibility for U nonimmigrant classification.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

Cite as Matter ofJ-S-V-A-, ID# 2288355 (AAO Apr. 1, 2019)

10