HELSINKI'S COUNTERINTUITIVE EFFECT? OSCE/ODIHR'S ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONS & SOLIDIFICATION OF VIRTUAL DEMOCRACY IN POST-COMMUNIST CENTRAL ASIA: THE CASE OF TAJIKISTAN, 2000-2010
A THESIS Presented to the MA Programme of the OSCE Academy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Politics and Security Programme (Central Asia)
by UGULOY MUKHTOROVA
September 2013 DECLARATION
I declare that I clearly understand the OSCE Academy Essay and Master Thesis Writing and Anti-plagiarism Rules, and that the submitted dissertation is accepted by the OSCE Academy in Bishkek on the understanding that it is my own effort without falsification of any kind.
I declare that I clearly understand that plagiarism and cheating are academically fraudulent and a serious offence against OSCE Academy Rules.
I declare that I am aware about the consequences of plagiarism or/and cheating.
Name: Uguloy Mukhtorova
Signature:
Date: 25 September 2013
ii ABSTRACT This thesis focuses on the processes and effects of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe‘s election observations in post-communist Central Asia, particularly the case of Tajikistan. As OSCE participating States (pS), Central Asian governments have, since the late-1990s, been asked by the OSCE to invite the organization‘s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to monitor their national parliamentary and presidential elections. The OSCE/ODIHR‘s objectives have been to assist the Central Asian pS in holding free and fair elections and to accelerate a presumed and ongoing post-Soviet democratization process. The qualitative research of this thesis demonstrates, however, that repeated OSCE/ODIHR election observations in post-communist Central Asian states with histories of fraudulent elections, contrary to OSCE‘s assumptions, do not contribute to the flourishing of democracy and political pluralism, and may even aid in the solidification of virtual, not real, democracy—a phenomenon I label as the ―Helsinki‘s Counterintuitive Effect.‖ OSCE/ODIHR‘s election monitoring in most of the Central Asian states have continued during the past decade despite the fact that— save the outlier case of Kyrgyzstan—there have been clear signals in advance of the fraudulent nature of all national elections and hence the elections‘ foregone conclusions. Election monitoring has also continued despite the fact that OSCE/ODIHR‘s recommendations for electoral reforms have regularly been disregarded by the post-communist Central Asian leaderships. I argue that the realpolitik objectives of European Union and North American OSCE pS, which include the privileging of hard security goals over democratization, are among the reasons for the continuation of election observations in the region. I also argue that OSCE/ODIHR‘s lack of questioning of the efficacy of such election observation missions is due to ODIHR‘s eagerness to gain material benefits in the way of budgetary outlays and to maintain its raison d’être as a post-Cold War institution. In turn, the reasons behind most of the Central Asian governments‘ readiness to regularly invite OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observers despite the expected critical, though diplomatically-worded, reports, which the same election missions generate, also lie with the expectations of material, but also moral, ―democracy- contingent benefits‖ (Hyde 2011, 359) from Western states in way of foreign aid and the granting of external legitimacy through the mere holding of elections—albeit
iii fraudulent ones—and ironically in presence of observers representing the still prestigious entity of the OSCE.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis will be dedicated to my beloved (deceased) father Ismoil Mukhtorov and my dear mother Saida Mukhtorova who morally supported and encouraged me during my study at the OSCE Academy.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Mr. Payam Foroughi, who encouraged me to choose and write this thesis. This research would not have been possible without his guidance and assistance.
Moreover, I extend my appreciation to the OSCE Academy and its staff for the platform offered for Central Asian students, not only to study, but also to integrate under one roof and become close friends and colleagues forever. Thank you my beloved Academy.
iv TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ...... ii
ABSTRACT ...... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv
ABBREVIATIONS ...... vii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Research question ...... 4 Hypotheses ...... 5 Methodology ...... 6 Research significance...... 6
CHAPTER II: LITRATURE REVIEW ...... 8 Cheating in front of the IEOMs ...... 9 Western democracy promoters ...... 10 Negative and positive consequences of IEOMs...... 12 Endorsement of unfair elections and IEOM biases ...... 13 OSCE/ODIHR vs. CIS election observation missions ...... 15 ‗The Helsinki Effect‘ ...... 16 ‗Virtual Politics‘...... 17 Realpolitik of the West...... 19
CHAPTER III: POLITICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TAJIKISTAN ...... 20 Illusive peace and forgotten promises...... 21 Phantom and real political parties ...... 22 Conclusion ...... 25
CHAPTER IV: OVERVIEW OF OSCE/ODIHR‘S REPORTS ON TAJIKISTAN ... 27 OSCE/ODIHR‘s presence in Central Asia ...... 27 2000 parliamentary elections ...... 28
v 2005 parliamentary elections ...... 29 2006 presidential election ...... 32 2010 parliamentary elections ...... 34 Conclusion ...... 36
CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS...... 38 Hypothesis 1: Analysis ...... 38 Hypothesis 2: Analysis ...... 47 Hypothesis 3: Analysis ...... 51 Hypothesis 4: Analysis ...... 52
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS ...... 57 Recommendations ...... 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 61 Books and journals ...... 63 Reports and documents ...... 64 News sources ...... 65
APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS ...... 67
vi ABBREVIATIONS
AP Agrarian Party of Tajikistan
CCER Central Commission for Elections and Referenda
CIS Commonwealth of Independent State
CP Communist Party of Tajikistan
DEC District Election Commission
DP Democratic Party of Tajikistan
EU European Union
HRW Human Rights Watch
IEOM International Election Observation Mission
IFES International Foundation for Election Systems
IOs International Organizations
IRPT Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODIHR OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PDP People‘s Democratic Party of Tajikistan
PER Party of Economic Reform of Tajikistan
PEC Precinct Election Commission pS Participating States of the OSCE
RFE Radio Free Europe
SDP Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan
UN United Nations
UTO United Tajik Opposition
vii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
According to Charles Tilly, ―procedural‖ democracy reflects genuinely competitive elections that bring significant changes and is considered as the criteria and lifeblood for democracy, while fake elections and suppression of political opponents is the sign of authoritarianism (2007, 8). Considering the above mentioned criteria, many international regimes and organizations, as part of their objectives, promote liberal and democratic norms, including free and fair elections. Membership in international and regional organizations commits and obliges states—legally (if binding) and morally (if not binding)—to comply with the requirements of signed documents.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the five Central Asian states joined a slew of international organizations (IOs) as newly sovereign states. Among the many IOs joined by the post-communist states of Central Asia is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), wherein, inter alia, members or participating States (pS) admit and commit to ―democratic standards‖, including the holding of democratic elections. Thus, among other obligations, Central Asian governments, as OSCE pS, normally agree to the obligation of inviting international election observations undertaken by the OSCE‘s Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as a ―form of democratization support,‖ as indicated in the OSCE‘s 1999 Istanbul Document (Cernilogar 2005, 2). OSCE/ODIHR has become the key institution for election observation in the post- communist world and it has participated in Central Asian elections for over a decade.
Aside from post-2010 Kyrgyzstan (what I label as an ‗outlier‘ in this thesis), Central Asian states have not experienced free, fair and competitive elections in accordance with international standards during twenty years of their independence, even with the presence and support of international observers (Sjoberg 2011). Election results in these countries are for all practical purposes predictable, a forgone conclusion, and, as Andreas Schedler puts it, ―electoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections‖ (2006, 3). Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan‘s leaders, for example, have ruled for more than two decades and, despite their supposed pluralistic political systems, have maintained de facto one-party systems. The New York-based democracy promotion organization,
1 Freedom House, in its 2012 Nations in Transit report, labeled Kyrgyzstan a ―non- single dominant parliament system‖ (Walker and Habdank 2012, 299), while Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were described as ―single dominant party system rule‖ (Ibid, 532, 599) and Turkmenistan as an ―undemocratic‖ country with one party without opposition (Ibid, 552).
As a case study, this thesis looks at Tajikistan and its experience with elections and the OSCE/ODIHR parliamentary and presidential election monitoring during the 2000-2010 decade. Tajikistan has eight legal political parties and pronounces itself as a ―multiparty‖ system. However, in practice, the country is a de facto one party system as it lacks a meaningful political pluralism. The government of Tajikistan, alongside other Central Asian authorities, has repeatedly invited OSCE/ODIHR since 2000 to monitor its elections, while both the OSCE mission in Tajikistan and ODIHR have provided technical assistance prior to all elections, with OSCE/ODIHR having provided long- and short-term observers for every one of Tajikistan‘s national parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2010. After each election it has monitored, OSCE/ODIHR produces reports containing descriptions, evaluations and recommendations on the election.
Four such detailed reports exist for Tajikistan. Both OSCE/ODIHR and other observers have concluded that none of the elections during the 2000-2010 period have been fair and free from major procedural and political obstacles. For instance, in its final report for Tajikistan‘s 2010 parliamentary elections, OSCE/ODIHR writes that the elections ―failed to meet many key OSCE commitments contained in the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document and other international standards for democratic election‖—exactly the same words used in its report on the 2005 parliamentary election of the same country (OSCE/ODIHR 2010, 1). Freedom House, a New York- based think tank largely funded by the U.S. government, rates a number of democracy indicators in the post-communist world. Its score for democracy for Tajikistan has been dropping since 2003, including the score for ―electoral process‖ (one of seven democracy indicators) (see Figures 1 and 2).
Some critics, including Andrew Wilson (2005), argue that many of the post- communist states have maintained and solidified a ―virtual‖ democracy since the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and those election observations have not altered this situation. Some argue that OSCE/ODIHR is wasting time and
2 Figure 1: Freedom House ratings on Electoral Process (EP) and overall Democracy score (DS) for Central Asian states since 2000 (1.00=best, 7.00=worst) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 EP 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75
DS 6.17 6.25 6.29 6.39 6.39 6.39 6.32 6.43 6.43 6.54 Kazakhstan EP 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.25 6.00 5.50 Kyrgyzstan DS 5.67 5.67 5.64 5.68 5.68 5.93 6.04 6.21 6.11 6.00 EP 5.25 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 Tajikistan DS 5.63 5.71 5.79 5.93 5.96 6.07 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.18 EP 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Turkmenistan DS 6.83 6.88 6.93 6.96 6.96 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 6.93 EP 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 Uzbekistan DS 6.46 6.46 6.43 6.82 6.82 6.86 6.89 6.93 6.93 6.93
Figure 2: Freedom House Scores for Electoral Process and Democracy for Tajikistan
3 resources by observing what are in reality fake elections, especially, given that its recommendations throughout the years have not been taken under consideration by the many of the states whose elections it monitors (Bader 2011). Central Asian states, it is argued, are using the very presence of OSCE/ODIHR and its monitors as a form of propaganda to convince their mostly Western critics that they are interested in and are making steady progress in democracy and political pluralism by their ―cooperation‖ with OSCE/ODIHR (Foroughi 2012a).
For Tajikistan‘s 2010 parliamentary election, which was called a ―parody‖ of an election by the leader of Communist Party (CP), for example, 279 observers were sent by the OSCE and European Parliament to Tajikistan at conservatively estimated cost of up to $3 million (Hamrabaeva 2012; Foroughi 2012b). The frivolous attitude of OSCE pS towards democratic ideals via engaging in fraudulent elections in their countries has ironically not had negative influences on their membership in the organization (Lewis 2012). What is the rationale, ask critics of OSCE/ODIHR‘s nearly-unconditional missions (aside from the state‘s invitation), to continue observations where the state is not eager to hold free elections and to take into account the recommendations towards electoral and democratic reforms provided by OSCE/ODIHR‘s international election observation missions (IEOM) in given pS in the long-term?
Research question
This thesis tries to determine the reasons behind the constant readiness of the OSCE/ODIHR to observe elections in Central Asia regardless of previous electoral frauds and expert warnings of impending frauds, and without indications of real commitments of host regimes in holding competitive elections or, at the minimum, significantly improving the electoral environment. In line with that general question, another inquiry that this thesis attempts to find an answer to is: Why do post- communist states bother themselves by inviting OSCE/ODIHR observers to their elections, an organization which is almost certain, in one degree to another, to criticize and report on the host state‘s mistakes and missteps in the election process?
The study also investigates the OSCE/ODIHR missions‘ effects—whether positive or negative—on any democratization process in the post-Communist Central Asia. By focusing on OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observation missions in Tajikistan
4 since 2000, the first observed election in that country, one is able to determine whether the recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR have or have not been seriously considered by the government and, more importantly, how have the IEOMs affected the immediate political and electoral environment of the country. This research thus attempts to determine, via the case study of Tajikistan, if the role of IEOMs of the OSCE/ODIHR in post-Communist Central Asia has contributed positively or negatively to the democratization process of the region. Thus, the proposed research question is: What effects do OSCE/ODIHR observations of post-communist Central Asian elections have on the process of democratization on individual states?
Hypotheses
This thesis will test the following four hypotheses:
H1: ―Repeated OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations in post-communist Central Asian states with history of fraudulent elections have not contributed to the flourishing of democracy and political pluralism and have instead contributed to the solidification of virtual democracy in the region.‖
H2: ―The reasons for the negative effects of OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations in post-communist Central Asian states and the institutions willingness to observe Central Asian elections are found in the realpolitik objectives of influential European Union (EU) and North American OSCE pS who view the significance of Central Asia primarily as: (i) a buffer zone against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan, (ii) a logistical territory to assist the US- and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led war in Afghanistan, (iii) a region of purely business interest (in the way of natural gas and petroleum), and (iv) a venue where the presence of OSCE/ODIHR is associated with continued engagement with the regions‘ leadership to primarily achieve the said realpolitik objectives, while democratization, human rights and free and fair elections, at worst, remain at the level of rhetoric or, at best, are considered as secondary or tertiary objectives.‖
H3: ―OSCE/ODIHR‘s willingness to observe what are generally known by experts to be forgone and fraudulent elections in post-communist Central Asian states are due to ODIHR's eagerness to gain material benefits in the way of budgetary outlays from the Permanent Council and individual states and to maintain its raison d’être as a post-Cold War institution.‖
H4: ―Central Asian governments are willing to invite OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observation missions as means to: (i) maintain connections with the international community so as to gain material and political
5 benefits and (ii) utilize the presence of OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations as a form of legitimization of their regimes in the eyes of Western governments, international organizations and their own populations.‖
Methodology
Qualitative research is used as the key mode of research in this thesis. I also utilized both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source was eleven in depth interviews divided equally between representatives from political parties in Tajikistan and experts familiar with the political and electoral climate of Tajikistan and also the interviews with the local and international staff of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan were included.
The following questions were posed to the interviewees:
1. Why despite repeated OSCE/ODIHR election observations and recommendations for post-communist Central Asian states, has there been a tendency towards the solidification of authoritarianism and virtual democracy in the region?
2. What are the reasons for OSCE/ODIHR to continue its election observations in given post-communist Central Asian states despite what has—aside from the outlier case of Kyrgyzstan—become the normalization of electoral fraud and the solidification of virtual democracy in the region?
3. Despite OSCE/ODIHR‘s criticisms of violations of democratic norms and OSCE commitments on free and fair elections in the region, why do Central Asian states continue to invite OSCE/ODIHR to observe their elections?
Secondary sources include: (a) OSCE/ODIHR Final Reports of Tajikistan parliamentary and presidential elections during the period 2000-2010, (b) academic journals, (c) public opinion surveys conducted in Tajikistan by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and (e) news items during the said period.
Research significance This thesis will be of importance to policy makers and practitioners in and on Central Asia (in particular Tajikistan) and post-communist democratization (in general) for a number of reasons: (1) It discusses both the positive and negative outcomes of OSCE/ODIHR‘s IEOMs in Central Asia; (2) it focuses on real (not theoretical) results of OSCE/ODIHR IEOMs in Tajikistan, a country where little to no known analyses on the effects of the presence of IEOMs has ever been conducted; (3) the research is timely given an impending presidential election in November 2013 in Tajikistan; and
6 (4) it generates a series of recommendations to stakeholders (OSCE, Government of Tajikistan, civil society and political parties towards improving the process of election monitoring and democratization in the region.
7 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW
The participation of IEOMs is often considered as part of the assistance of the international community for promotion of democracy in developing countries, including to nations in post-communist transition. As Thomas Carothers asserts, ―election observation is the best-established, most visible, and often best-funded type of democracy-related assistance‖ (1997, 2). Until 1962 there was no initiative of international election observations documented. The growth in this field mainly took place between 1975 and 2006 (Hyde 2011). Election monitoring emerged due to the developments of norms linked with democracy and human rights. The emerging norms and visible power shifts in international relations after the Cold War created demand and supply for inviting international observers (Kelley 2008a). Supply is the willingness of the organizations and agencies specializing in election monitoring to provide information about elections and demand is the incumbents‘ enthusiasm to gain external and internal legitimacy (Kelley 2008b). Regardless of whether inviting observers demonstrates the state‘s intention to conduct free and fair elections, hosting IEOMs has become as a norm for most post-communist governments which are still under economic and political transition and potentially on a democratic path (Kelley 2008a).
Susan Hyde has two arguments that explain why inviting IEOMs has diffused as an international norm: 1) a rise in the ―democracy-contingent benefits‖, what is known as a reward by international actors for commitments of the transition states to democracy (2011, 359), and 2) facilitation of IEOMs in measuring the often difficult issue of state commitments towards democratization. During the Cold War the prizes were guaranteed for anti-communist countries, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union this tendency has radically changed. In the post-Cold War era, the idea of spreading democracy around the world theoretically comes with the promise of benefits for inviting observers and punishments for the states who do not believe in democracy and leaders whose governments are caught cheating in front of election observers. For example, the presidential election of Zimbabwe in 2002 was highly criticized by international observers for its large level of manipulation, with the
8 country subsequently encountering international sanctions, reduction of aid and other repercussions (Hyde 2011).
Following the end of the Cold War, the patronage system largely collapsed where great powers used to back alliances of stability. States, therefore, sought new alliances, cooperators and investors. The demands for legitimacy and the new international system obliged the post-communist states to invite monitors and the cost of refusing international observers in new system increased. The cost of rejecting monitors is still high, thus states – even those who will swindle election observers – are more likely to invite monitors, because the cheating would not be criticized so harshly as would the act of rejecting IEOMs. Moreover, the population of the countries under transition often compel the governments to invite observers, while also external pressure in favor of inviting them is also common (Kelly 2008a).
Cheating in front of the IEOMs
Regardless of the high risk of being caught, some incumbents have become used to cheating in front of international observers. Elections with the presence of international observers have become like a show for international and domestic audiences. Hyde presents the ―true democrat‖ and ―pseudo democrat‖ model of states (2011, 358), where the former refers to the type of leaders who in reality follow the electoral rules, obey the rule of competitive elections, and are also committed to democratization. If they lose an election, they peacefully transfer political power to the victor. In contrast, though the ―pseudo-democrats‖ also hold elections, they normally cheat in order to remain in power. The acceptance that all true democrats invite the IEOMs contributes to establishment of such norm and its diffusion, and moreover, gives logic that democracy promoters think that only true democrats invite the IEOMs, and non-inviting leaders ―must be pseudo democrat‖ (Hyde 2011, 359). At the same time, democracy promoters do not pressure governments to hold democratic elections, but only use rewards as incentives for states to choose the road to democratization.
According to Hyde, the theory of norm diffusion where democratic countries reward transition states for commitments to democracy, have yielded ―fake‖ democratization (2011, 367). Hence, this statement partially could explain the behavior of ―pseudo democrats‖ whereby they are outwardly committing themselves
9 to democracy, while simultaneously attempting to deceive observers. Such behavior of ―pseudo democrats‖ has been observed not only in the democratization process, but also in other fields such as human rights and in countries whose rights records have been under international scrutiny. At the same time, Kelley also believes that the purpose of some states is to attain ―democratic maturity‖ (2008a, 223).
Even governments known as being honest are used to inviting monitors, because of the fear of being blamed for intentional cheating (Hyde 2011). At the same time, international organizations make exceptions for some states such as Egypt with significant geopolitical value, and these states will not bother themselves with inviting monitors and implementing their recommendations as they already have immunity from international criticisms (Kelley 2008b). In contrast, sometimes international organizations specializing in election observations themselves halt the election observations. This normally happens in countries with consolidated democracy, because they do not need IEOMs—examples are those of Chile after 1992 and Czech Republic after 1993 (Hyde 2011).
Western democracy promoters
The main part of democracy promoters is derived from Western states, organizations, and international actors who have the capacity to allocate funds. The West, for example, played a crucial role in consolidation of democracy in the Eastern Europe using a variety of tools. Such efforts have been labeled as ―Western projects‖ by Karen Smith (2001, 31).
Why the steps taken by the West for promotion of democracy have not been fruitful in some states, in particular in the post-Soviet world, is explained by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. They argue that the states with strong ties to the West, like Central Europe, and the Americas took sufficient steps toward democratization after 1989 via international push. Such regions were subjected to Western leverage and linkages. In contrast, the former Soviet countries and the East Asia had low linkage with and a leverage from the West1, therefore, external contribution to democratization was less and domestic forces outweighed and maintained the competitive authoritarian regimes—defined as regimes where democratic institutions
1 Western leverage is defined as the state ―vulnerability to external democratising pressure‖ like utilization of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, or military intervention (Levitsky and Way 2006, 200).
10 exist, but where they exist for obtaining power for leaders, while the incumbents are used to abusing the opposition electoral field. The salient examples are Belarus, Russia, Croatia and Zimbabwe. Fragile, underdeveloped and aid-dependent states are much more vulnerable to external democratization than are powerful authoritarian states like China and Russia (Levitsky and Way 2006).
According to Levitsky and Way, powerful Western states utilize leverages for undemocratic countries while looking at two criterion: a) if there is significant goal vis-à-vis the country in question in foreign policy agendas of Western countries, the probability of the use of pressure is less; or if the Western states have a security or economic interest elsewhere, this country is safe from external democratization pressure and demands for reforms; b) if the authoritarian regime has economic, political, or even military support from other powerful states, the country is not susceptible to the Western leverages. For instance, Russia supported Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine and thus these states were not vulnerable to external Western democratization while China did the same in Eastern Asia (Ibid). This theory is applicable to explain Tajikistan‘s behavior in that it is not so vulnerable to external pressure: from one hand it has political support from Russia and it lies largely in Russia‘s sphere of influence, while on the other hand some may argue that Western countries have interests in Tajikistan—such as the country‘s geopolitical role vis-à-vis the U.S. - and NATO-led war in Afghanistan—which save Tajikistan from outside pressure on democratization issues.
Linkage has also been explained as the ―concentration of ties‖ between the states and EU, or US or Western organizations (Levitsky and Way 2006, 202). Five major linkages have been defined: a) economic, which includes trade, investments, credits and assistance; b) geopolitical linkage considers relationship with the Western authorities and Western-dominated organizations; c) social ties, which relates to migration, refugees, and the elites studying in Western countries; d) cross border telecommunication and internet linkage, and e) transnational civil society connections, defined as co-operation with Western based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious entities. In comparison to leverage, linkage increases the costs of authoritarian regimes as it: (a) ―heightens the salience of government abuse in the West,‖ (b) ―increases the probability of international response,‖ (c) ―creates domestic constituencies with a stake in adhering to democratic
11 norms,‖ and (f) ―strengthens democratic forces vis-à-vis autocrats‖ (Ibid, 202). Largely, it appears that the literature contends that Western leverage is workable in authoritarian states with a high level of domestic abuse, as it might mitigate the situation, but linkage is a more efficient route toward democratization and fair elections.
Negative and positive consequences of IEOMs
Most of the research on the subject of IEOMs demonstrates the positive effects of election monitoring on transition countries. Well organized election observation is said to help to hold ―shaky electoral processes‖ in countries under transition, and the involvement of international observers are thought to encourage the citizens to take elections seriously and be politically active (Carothers 1997, 3). The presence of international observers may also convince political opponents to compete in the elections (Ibid). In social science it is difficult to prove a causal linkage or cause and effect between the presence of international observers and the adoption of democratic norms, but Hyde tries to define the effect of IEOMs on detecting election flaws and as an example looks at the two rounds of Armenian presidential elections in 2003. She uses experimental research and how the observers used random selection of polling stations, thus preventing the incumbent Robert Kocheryan‘s intention to steal votes in the second round of the 2003 Armenian elections. Hyde claims that the IEOMs physical presence may affect the behavior of officials on election day, but it could not avoid pre-election and post-voting period manipulation (Hyde 2007).
Klavdija Cernilogar (2005) discusses the importance of presence of IEOMs in countries with fake democracy. She argues that despite negative experiences, the OSCE/ODIHR should proceed with monitoring elections in undemocratic states for two reasons: 1) Election observation provides the international community with information about the situation, and the state‘s commitments for democracy, and 2) presence of IEOMs will avoid isolation of given states from the rest of the world community. Cerlinogar examines the role of OSCE/ODIHR in neo-patrimonial Central Asian states, which means the existence of formal rule of law, separation of powers and political participation of the people, while in practice the incumbent ruler uses them to prolong his or her reign. She focus on case studies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and asserts that as long these two countries will continue to rule in ―neo-
12 patrimonial‖ manner, any type of democracy promotions will not change the situation (Cernilogar 2005, 43).
Cerlinogar‘s argument is that despite OSCE/ODIHR‘s attempts to support democratization in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and the number of election observations and follow-up reports, this organization‘s efforts have not brought the two states closer to democracy (2005). Some may argue that it is unrealistic to expect countries without previous experience of democracy to quickly turn into a democracy, but Cerlinogar disagrees with such a perception and emphasizes that the consolidation of democracy depends on the political will of the leaders and their commitments to democratization, and that the history of the country does not matter significantly. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are considered as neo-patrimonial states, thus, the OSCE/ODIHR has been unable to fully observe the liberal norm commitments of the said states. The OSCE/ODIHR itself operates as a ―recorder‖ of election flaws and human rights issues, but not necessarily presenting a critical view (Ibid, 79).
Alberto Simpser and Daniela Donno are among the group of scholars who have presented the negative consequences of IEOMs. The increasing presence of international observers, they claim, harms the states. More observers have the intention of inducing more pre-election manipulations. This is the unintended influence of international observers on ―institutional quality and governance‖ and is labeled as a ―spillover effect‖ of monitoring (Simpser and Donno 2012, 501). The pre-election manipulation is the restriction of freedom of mass media, negative effects on rule of law and governmental accountability. Their analysis focuses only on governance, and does not assess all range of costs and benefits of election observation. Based on the results of quantitative research, Simpser and Donno claim that the more election monitoring conducted, the lower the rule of law and media freedom one observes. There is belief that consolidation of control over the media, the arbitrary change of laws, and direct influence on electoral institutions have more serious negative outcomes than flaws over ballot boxes on election day. Election monitoring, they claim, prevents the officials from manipulation on election day, but encourages them to take extra measures on pre–election period (Ibid).
Endorsement of unfair elections and IEOM biases
13 Studies in the field have proven that the IEOMs sometimes could endorse unfair elections, and also may close their eyes to irregularities and thus also put a stamp of legitimacy on a fraudulent election. Endorsing fraudulent elections, claims Kelly, negatively impacts the ―effectiveness of future election monitoring‖ and leads to the legitimization of ―undemocratic regimes, enable[s] government manipulation, and stifle[s] viable opposition movements‖ (Kelley 2009c, 766). It may also put the principle of impartiality of IEOMs under question. In this regard, there have been a number of criticisms following the OSCE/ODIHR‘s activities. The 1996 parliamentary election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, was observed by the both the OSCE/ODIHR and the UN. The election, which was called unfair by others was nonetheless endorsed by the OSCE/ODIHR, leading to a lowering of the OSCE‘s credibility in the eyes of the local population (Kelley 2009c).
Several factors are behind this phenomenon. International observers endorse unfair elections for the interests of their member states or donors, or ―to accommodate other compelling but tangential organizational norms‖ (Ibid, 767). Explaining election observers‘ behavior and which elections international organizations agree to monitor, Kelley provides several hypotheses: One is the ―Irregularities hypotheses,‖ which claims that: (1) ―Monitors are less likely to endorse an election the greater the level of irregularities in general,‖ and (2) ―they are especially unlikely to endorse very obvious forms of cheating‖ (2009, 768). According to her, most organizations describe their tasks and form their findings based on core electoral norms, because they exist to hold certain norms. Kelley‘s next hypothesis is: ―Monitoring organizations are more likely to endorse elections in countries that are (1) significant global trading partners, (2) populous, or (3) receive foreign aid‖ (Ibid, 770). Kelley also provides the ―progress hypothesis,‖ which explains why observers would not strongly criticize one country where there have been improvements relative to a previous election observation (Ibid, 771).
Carothers offers another reason to explicate such conduct of international observers. In countries with a short history of democracy, like the former Soviet Union and states in many parts of Africa, international observers themselves have no great expectations, thus they will downplay the major problems of elections. Secondly, politeness and openness of the authorities towards the IEOM observers makes them act cautiously when criticizing the hosting state. Furthermore, some
14 observing organizations—such as the OSCE in Central Asian countries—besides election monitoring may be involved in other assistance programmes in the same country, which creates a barrier to being objective, critical or harsh when evaluating a problematic election. In addition, countries in a conflict trap are safe from observers‘ condemnation, because the IEOMs will try to avoid the escalation of the conflict which may provoke criticisms toward observers (Carothers 1997, 7).
Still, practice—rather than theory—shows diverse outcomes. In 2005, for example, when Kyrgyzstan was in the eve of conflict, OSCE/ODIHR‘s international observers were blamed by government for escalation of the Tulip Revolution (labeled as an ―electoral revolution‖ by Juraev), which ended with regime change (2006, 11). Though the IEOMs should follow the ―impartiality and objectivity‖ principles, and also should not interfere in domestic affairs of the country, the reality often shows the reverse (Juraev 2006, 10). The main point made by Juraev is that international observers‘ mission is to monitor elections and provide impartial reports, while in the case of Kyrgyzstan, international observers were engaged in an internal political game and that ―they were not serving the idea behind this institution of international observation‖ (Ibid, 16).
OSCE/ODIHR vs. CIS election observation missions
As alluded to before, different election monitoring organizations can assess the same election totally differently based on the organization‘s background. Rick Fawn (2006) compares the election evaluation of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the post-Soviet space. He examines the color revolutions in post-communist areas and the role of the OSCE in ―electoral revolutions‖ and how the organization was criticized by CIS countries. In 2004, after the color revolution in Georgia, but prior to the revolutions in Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), a number of post-Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) together condemned the OSCE/ODIHR in interfering into the domestic affairs of the post-Soviet states and utilization of ―double standards‖ as mean of focusing in work of separate states, and closing their eyes to the ―peculiarities of a single state‖ (Fawn 2006, 1141). In their ―Astana Appeal,‖ these CIS countries also demand from the OSCE to stop monitoring political situations within given states for the organization to further ―diversify its activities‖
15 (Ibid), a clear demand based on the perception by some CIS states of OSCE/ODIHR‘s contribution to the rise of color revolutions. As David Galbreath (2009) asserts, OSCE/ODIHR‘s role in post-Communist Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan was to support the political opposition which led to instability and eventually regime changes.
Among other things, as a result of the above criticisms and as a response to pS of the OSCE who had complained that election observers of the OSCE/ODIHR are not from the East of Vienna, the OSCE began to encourage observers from post- Soviet space, often from non-democratic countries, to be deployed for election observation in Western countries (Fawn 2006).
‘The Helsinki Effect’
The Helsinki Final Act, which was signed after two years of the establishment of Conference for Security and Cooperation in 1975, shaped ―society and state relations‖ in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and is thought to have had a profound influence on East-West relations (Thomas 2001, 272). Before the Cold War, governments in the Eastern Bloc were specially known as frequent violators of human rights of their citizens, despite having ratified the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
―Respect for human rights‖ as an international norm for interaction between states was an initial ideaп of European countries (Thomas 2001, 258). It was included to the main principles of Helsinki Final Act, still in effect today. The initial goals of the USSR in signing the Helsinki document were to augment its security and obtain economic benefits; it thus viewed the document as a ―political gain‖ counterbalancing further human rights related risks (Snyder 2011, Thomas 2001, 263). However, the states who ratified the Helsinki Final Act, in particular the Soviet Union, with inclusion of respect for human rights, did not anticipate its further liberalizing implications (Thomas 2001).
International theories sometimes fail to explain the causes and effects of the OSCE and Helsinki Final Act as a core document of the organization and its positive effects on international relations. Some aspects, such as why repressive governments as the Soviet Union formally accepted the norms which in places contradicted its own socialist ideology are explained by various international relations‘ theories. The constructivism approach links this behavior of the state, democratic or authoritarian,
16 to its identity as the ―basis of interests‖ to gain external legitimacy and recognition by international society (Thomas 2001, 267). Repressive governments will accept the norms only as formality, as did the Soviet Union, because for the states whose international statuses are undermined, external legitimacy plays a crucial role in eyes of its population rather than international community. For activists and dissidents this document was a tool to reproach their own governments with respect to human rights norms and there was a belief that the CSCE will watch the human rights situation in all pS, otherwise the rejection of the established Helsinki norms ―would lack credibility‖ (Thomas 2001, 270).
Unexpectedly, the Final Act provoked ―social mobilization‖ within the Soviet Union (Ibid). Activists and dissidents in the first phase were punished by autocrat authorities. Despite the harassment and pressure, these groups of people in the communist world, along with their cohorts in the West, were highly motivated and established special observing groups, held ―letter-writing campaigns‖ and created the ―Helsinki Network‖ (Thomas 2001, 273; Snyder 2011, 2). The Final Act, especially its human rights norms, acted as ―leverage‖ in the hand of Helsinki groups and movements who pushed their governments to make political reforms. Later, some communist leaders, chief amongst them Mikhail Gorbachev, who were influenced by democratic and human rights ideas at home and abroad persisted to comply with Helsinki Final Act (Snyder 2011).
The Helsinki Final Act and its implications via transnational networking over Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is said to have contributed to the demise of communism and thus played a crucial role in termination of the Cold War (Snyder 2011). None of the communist leaders had anticipated that the Helsinki Final Act could turn into a ―diplomatic Trojan Horse‖ that would ultimately bring down the regimes, otherwise they never would have signed the agreement. Gorbachev, for example, never wanted the collapse of the USSR (Thomas 2001, 282). The ―Helsinki Effect‖ demonstrated how international norms with persistent efforts of individuals ―affect the behavior, the interest, and the identity of the states‖ (Ibid, 281).
‘Virtual Politics’
Virtuality refers to the ―unreal real,‖ ―not really real and something short of reality‖ (Wilson 2005, 34). ―Virtual politics,‖ in turn, is a term used to depict the politics of
17 post-communist states, run by ―political technologist[s].‖ Andrew Wilson discusses the false politics, fake democracy, and how the democratization process has been futile and only a show for the eyes of international observers in much of the post- communist world, including Central Asia, where ―the effort [to democratize] has never really been made‖ (Ibid, xiii). Wilson writes: ―Virtual politics is the way that elites seek to manage, manipulate, and contain democracy‖ (Ibid, xvi).
The former Soviet Union was mainly ruled by KGB members, thus nearly all political technologists derived from this intelligence service and the ―people‘s will,‖ was in turn engineered ―by ex-KGB members‖ (Wilson 2005, 33). The dissolution of the Soviet Union gave independence to all of its member states, with most showing an outward commitment to democracy in order to gain external support and legitimacy. Thus, to show political pluralism and the ―real ongoing‖ democratization, oppositions were invented, new parties were established and political forces emerged; however, as Wilson argues, most of them were completely fake and they were formed as media projects. For example, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy—a former KGB agent—and his party Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is said to have been a KGB invented opposition, known as the ―Mad Vlad‖ project (Wilson 2005, xvi). Beyond the media, reality was different. Wilson covers mainly the conditions and politics in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, though he at times includes Central Asia, while he also indicates that ‗virtual politics‘ works in the entire post-communist world.
Discussing the virtuality of politics in the post-communist world, Wilson determines four conditions which make it possible to maintain a virtual political system: a) ―A powerful but amoral elite,‖ b) ―a passive electorate,‖ c) ―a culture of information control,‖ and d) ―the lack of external counterpoint or foreign intervention‖ (2005, 41). In the post-Soviet states, elites are considered the key players in politics, making the final decisions on issues and hiring the political technologists for creation of the puppet parties, pseudo-opponents and political forces. In practice, post-communist elites consider the multiparty system as ―chaos‖ (Ibid, 42) and the fragile civil society or other forces which cannot counter the ruling elites as a ―swamp‖ (Ibid, 43).
According to Wilson, elections in many post-Soviet states are held as a mere means of legitimizing the existing power structure rather than promoting democracy. As a result, the outcomes of many post-Soviet elections are manipulated to suit the
18 ruling elite (Wilson 2005). In post-communist Russia, and in all of the post-Soviet states, the media were used as a tool for virtualisation of the politics. The main instrument of controlling the virtual world and politics is media and elites take control over the media. Despite the fact that mass media and journalists call themselves independent, they are under government control. Most officials have monopolized the mass media and are used to propagate their own ideology (Ibid).
In democratic countries, political pluralism is very essential. Hence, in the countries with ―managed democracy‖ political opponents created by government itself and there are several types of made opponents: ―virtual populist, virtual neophytes, scarecrows‖ and ―soft opponents‖ or opponents who perform as a challenger to current regime in front of international community or population of the country, but in reality they are powerless as they are invented and sponsored by the ruling regime (Wilson 2005, 187). This is applicable for Central Asian context, where the leaders do not invent ―fall guy opponents,‖ but they create some opposition in order to provide for virtual pluralism in the country (Ibid, 200).
Realpolitik of the West
Discussing the role of international observers which are mainly derived from the Western countries, Wilson asserts that they could not deter political manipulation and electoral abuses. They mainly pay attention to election procedure itself on the day of election. The main point which should be highlighted is that the West has ―always combined democracy promotion with realpolitik.‖ They also work considering the balance between the own benefits and the cost of democracy promotion activities. For instance, the 2003 fraudulent election in petrol-rich Azerbaijan ―benefited from the blindest blind eyes‖ of the West (Wilson 2005, 45).
Virtuality does not mean that everything in post-Soviet world is virtual and that all post-Soviet states are ―totalitarian‖ (Ibid). Improvements toward democratization were observed in many post-Soviet states. For instance, Georgia is keen for the West and develops policies based on this, or the Baltic states which are part of European Union (EU) and influenced by EU standards. Moreover, not all parties are puppets, there are several real parties with marginalized activities, however, and the point is that real opposition remains under pressure (Wilson 2005).
19 CHAPTER III
POLITICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TAJIKISTAN
The breakup of the Soviet Union did not influence all its subordinate countries identically. After 70 years of Soviet reign, many of the member republics peacefully restored their country and enjoyed independence, while some others were engulfed in violent conflicts. The poorest and land-locked post-Soviet country, Tajikistan, began a violent civil war a year after independence (1992-1997), which may have resulted in over 50,000 deaths and substantially retarded its post-Soviet socio-economic and political growth. During the Soviet era, Tajikistan was economically dependent on Moscow and, coupled with its civil war, the newly independent state was nearing complete economic and political collapse. When looking at the history of the country, Tajikistan is a ―Soviet invention,‖ given that prior to the 1920s and the USSR, there was no state and territory in the name and boundaries of Tajik Soviet Republic (aka Tajikistan) (Foroughi 2012a, 108). Forced detachment from Moscow, lack of sufficient experience with statecraft and lingering regional division among elites are thought to have been some of the reasons for the commencement of violent conflict in post-communist Tajikistan. Moreover, diverse ideologies—communism, democracy and Islam—, which in Tajikistan were coincided with regional groups, was another significant cause of the war (Heathershaw 2009a).
Geographic affiliation in politics of Tajikistan played a significant role not only in the eventual civil war, but also in the creation of political parties by the early 1990s, and it still matters. During the Soviet period the high level political positions were occupied by the Northern clan or elites (aka Leninabadis or Khujandis), a region, which had always been more prosperous and which also received much attention by Moscow as well (Ibid). The war brought a Northern ally, the Southern Kulobi clan to power, while the Leninabadi officials were displaced from power and later further marginalized from political life. At present, the government structure of Tajikistan is dominated by the Kulobis with the leading role of incumbent President Emomali Rahmon. Rahmon, who was the head of a collective farm in the Kulob region, then head of the Kulob region‘s executive committee, and later the Speaker of Tajikistan‘s Supreme Soviet (aka Parliament), was elected on 16 November 1992 as the Chairman of the Parliament and acting head of government. And in 1994, Rahmon
20 contested the presidential election against the ex-prime minister from Leninabad, Abdumalik Abdullojonov [who is now in exile] and won the controversial vote (Ibid)
The newly established government which brought warlords to power was not recognized by the opposition. Given the intensifying violent conflict, the unsatisfied opposition fled the country and, after the passage of some time, eventually united abroad, mainly in Afghanistan and Iran, forming itself as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which composed of ex-communists, Islamists, and small group of intelligentsia who supposedly sought a democratic shift in politics of the country (Lewis 2008). The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan and its leader, Said Abdullo Nuri, played a leading role in the UTO (Ibid). Finally, after several attempts and intervention of the international community (namely Russia, Iran and the United Nations) and sympathetic politicians, on 27 June 1997 in Moscow, Rahmon and Nuri signed a Peace Accord. According to this document, the opposition should have been given a 30% quota of all high level government positions, and, among other things, its members were to have been safe from harassment and prosecution (Ibid). Among other things, the government amnestied approximately 5,000 UTO fighters and legalized formerly banned political parties affiliated with the UTO (HRW 1999).
Illusive peace and forgotten promises
Despite expectations, the ratification of the Peace Accord did not bring the country closer to a ―politically pluralistic society or to a democratic form of governance‖ (Foroughi 2012a, 108). In the beginning some points of the document were implemented and some popular opposition figures entered government structures, but were later discharged from their positions. The international community, through international organizations as the UN and the OSCE, put much effort into the peace- building process. Despite the fact that power-sharing principles were clearly present in the 1997 Accord, in reality it was not implemented and instead of power-sharing, peace, according to Heathershaw, brought a ―new order for hegemonic governance‖ to Tajikistan (2009b, 1315).
During the peace-building process instability and human rights remained the same or worsened in the country (HRW 1999). Still, in late 1999 and early 2000, two elections (presidential and parliamentary) were anticipated in Tajikistan. The two elections were accompanied with a restriction of political parties, and creation of
21 obstacles for candidates‘ registrations. For instance, the activity of the National Unity Movement was prohibited, while the Justice and Development Party (today the Social Democrat Party) was refused registration (HRW 1999). The ruling people's Democratic Party (PDP) of Tajikistan, which is headed by Rahmon, nearly has full- dominance of the Parliament. The opposition rightly claims that its contribution to the peace process has been downplayed or even forgotten. And they may be right: The 15thanniversary of National Unity Day (a holiday designated as the day the 1997 accord as signed), for example, was celebrated separately by the government and the IRP (RFE 2013a).
Phantom and real political parties
Currently, Tajikistan represents itself as a multi-party system, while in practice showing the reverse. Eight political parties legally operate in the country, which can be divided in two groups: Real parties, including the ruling PDP and its challengers, and ―pseudo‖ or ―phantom‖ parties which were created by the government in order to maintain a ―virtual‖ political pluralism in the country (Wilson 2005, 33).
The dominance of the ruling PDP, in addition to the existence of other real and phantom parties, makes Tajikistan‘s politics one of ―competitive authoritarian[ism]‖ (Levitsky and Way 2006, 202). The PDP is a party with ―nationwide significance‖ and President Rahmon also remains the leader of this party (Olimova and Bowyer 2002). Nearly all government employees and any other state-run agency workers are PDP members. The party claims that it has 210,000 members (BBC 2013). Rahmon, being a president of country, has a nationwide recognition and also control of the state-run media, which guaranteed him re-election in November 2013 (Foroughi 2012b).
The Communist Party of Tajikistan (CP) is the oldest party in the country. After independence and civil war, the CP lost its dominant position. One difference between Tajikistan and other post-communist states is that the others preserved the same Communist party, but changed its name, while in Tajikistan the CP remained and new dominating ruling PDP was created in 1994 (Atkin 1999, Feiman 2009). The CP has two seats in Tajikistan‘s Parliament, while according to its own data it has 40,000 members (BBC 2013). In reality, however, the CP has become an invisible party, its voice is not fully heard or raised in legislation process, and its increasingly
22 aging membership is fast dwindling (Foroughi 2012b). Despite the fact that sometimes the leader of the party, Shodi Shabdolov, sincerely criticizes the current regime, overall, this party does not play a significant role in politics of Tajikistan.
The IRP is considered as the main ―counterweight‖ to the ruling party; and its Islamic base makes the party unique in the post-communist world (Feiman 2009, 2). The initial goal of the IRP was to establish an Islamic state, however, the goal was altered later (Olimova and Olimov 2001). After the 2006bdeath of its leader Nuri, he was replaced by his deputy, Muhiddin Kabiri, who is widely known as a moderate, in addition to being relatively young, learned and worldly. There are two types of IRP followers: ―devout‖ and ―default.‖ The devout followers are deeply religious people who prefer an Islamic state, while the ―default‖ followers are often secular Muslims who favor the party because of its charismatic leader Kabiri, whom they may vote for as an alternative or counter-establishment candidate (Foroughi 2012b, 537). According to the party, it has 50,000 followers, most of them form among the youth (BBC 2013). In election 2010, only two representatives of the party managed to make it to the Parliament via party voting list, a low figure which makes only minimal—if any—influence during the legislation process, given PDP‘s dominant role (Feiman 2009).
The government has in the past few years associated the IRP with Islamic extremism, in addition to accusing them of initiating the civil war and bringing social and economic miseries (ICG 2003). In recent years, the IRP has faced pressures from the government, while also being blamed by its own followers for apathy for tolerating the ruling party‘s governance. The IRP leader, Kabiri, however, claims that the party is merely being patient and that it will resist the government‘s provocations, which in reality are meant to trigger an angry response by the IRP (Ashurov 2013). On the whole, the IRP has been assessed as a ―weak,‖ but ―well-organized [and] stable opposition‖ to the ruling PDP (Feiman 2009, 4).
Also considered a genuine opposition party, along with the IRP, is the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Tajikistan. With its reported 7,000 members, the SDP is another challenger to the incumbent president‘s party (BBC 2013). The SDP was established and is headed by former presidential adviser, Rahmatillo Zoirov, in 1998 (and initially registered with the Justice Ministry in 1999 as the ―Justice and Development Party‖) (OSCE/ODIHR 2005). The members of this party are from
23 different regions, most being lawyers and intellectuals. The party is less influential than the IRP and according to Tajik lawyer, Oinihol Bobonazarova, the SDP leadership is ―more romantic whereas IRP is people pragmatic‖ (Olimova 2013). As with many other parties in Tajikistan, the SDP, too, appears to be primarily active only on the eve of elections.
The Democratic Party (DP) of Tajikistan emerged in 1990s and was composed of people with different backgrounds. It was a core part of UTO during the civil war. Given diversification of interests among its members, in 1996, the party split into two—the Almaty and Tehran platforms (Olimova and Bowyer 2002), the former having become a pro-government entity, and the latter an opposition party. The Tehran platform was banned and in 2004 the leader of Almaty platform, Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, was imprisoned on corruption and banditry charges and later convicted and sentenced to a 23 year prison term (Ibid). The DP still operates, though it appears that the authorities may have intervened in its operation and induced a further division within its ranks by registering a new party leader, Masoud Sobirov in 2006. In late December 2012, in an extraordinary congress of the DP all wings of the party rejoined, even those who did not recognize Sobirov as a leader. The members of its Council were replaced and Saidjafar Ismonov was elected a new head of the party (Yuldoshev 2012).
Yet another political party is the Socialist Party (SP) of Tajikistan, which originated in 1996 with the leadership of Safarali Kenjaev. With Kenjaev‘s death in 1999, the SP was weakened and split in two branches, also likely due to government interference. The wing recognized by the government is headed by Abduhalim Ghafforov who ran in the presidential election in 2006 and recently claimed that he will put his candidacy for the 2013 presidential seat as well (RFE 2013b). Ghafforov may be a government stooge. In 2006, for example, in what many observers had seen as a problematic election, Ghafforov took the side of the government and criticized the OSCE‘s preliminary report on the presidential elections as being biased against Tajikistan. Another branch of the SP with the leadership of Mirhusein Nazriev is not been recognized by the government.
Tajikistan‘s multiparty system is said to be mostly ―superficial‖ and made up for display to ―naive Westerners‖ as a pretention to political pluralism (Foroughi 2012, 537). In line with this unspoken policy, in late 2005, in the eve of the
24 presidential election in 2006, the government registered two virtually unknown entities: The Agrarian Party (AP) and Party for Economic Reform (PER). Both are considered as ―pro-government [al],‖ of insignificant popularity among the population and widely known as ―PDP annexes‖; not surprisingly, the heads of both AP and PER work in governmental agencies bj(OSCE/ODIHR 2005, 4; Foroughi 2012b, 537).
At the time being, Tajikistan‘s formal political opposition is very weak, indolent and primarily only active in the months leading up to parliamentary and presidential elections (Milod 2013). Among other difficulties is the absence of sufficient funds for party activity and campaigning. This may also be intentional as potential opposition parties with the capital to go against the ruling regime can be short-lived. A vivid example is that of the case of unregistered New Tajikistan Party (NTP) and its leader, Zaid Saidov, a successful Tajik businessmen and former Industry Minister under Rahmon. A few weeks after announcing the imminent formation of the NTP, Saidov was arrested by the anti-corruption agency in May 2013 and charged with a variety of offences including embezzlement, bribery, polygamy and rape and was sentenced for 26 years of prison (Parshin 2013). Despite this fact, in summer 2013 the SDP, IRP and certain NGOs consolidated and established the Union of Reformist Forces of Tajikistan (URFT) with its new Concept and proposed a single candidate from the civil society to run in the November 2013 but this coalition has not been supported by DP and CP (Asia Plus 2013a). However, the consolidation was not a real and there was misunderstanding between IRP and SDP. The nominated candidate Oynihol Bobonazarova‘s campaign headquarters failed to collect the signatures required by the CCER and therefore was not registered as a candidate (Asia Plus 2013b).
Conclusion
Despite its outwardly multi-party system, the politics of the post-communist Tajikistan, a country which went through a bloody civil war in its post-independence years, is overall not much different from the model of the hard single party system of the Soviet Union in that a single party still dominates under primarily authoritarianism rather than pluralism. The domination of the clan-based system is monopolizing the politics of the country and consolidating its power over three branches of the government. At early outset of implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord, a pluralistic
25 political environment to some extent did exist. This was firstly due to the fact that there was still not a strong central power and the largely Islamist-led armed opposition was still strong and able to challenge the established government. Furthermore, without the compromise of both sides, it might have not been possible to obtain a peaceful solution to end the civil war. The Tajik government was somewhat obliged to follow the signed document—at least for a while. Moreover, there existed efforts by international organizations (chief amongst them the UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan, UNMOT, established by the Security Council in 1994) to monitor and support the peace-building process in post-conflict Tajikistan. UNMOT‘s presence therefore may have induced the government to demonstrate its commitments to some amount of democratic norms and political pluralism. Only a few years after the 1997 Accord, however, the authorities exerted pressure on political parties, and the PDP became the virtual single player in Tajikistan‘s political arena. Elections were held as a mere exhibition in eyes of the domestic population and the international community. Rather than becoming more democratic in its post- communist transition, the Tajik government, headed by Rahmon, has tended towards increased authoritarianism. The government, among other things, has taken up the policy of regularly apprehending individuals thought to pose a challenge to its rule.
26 CHAPTER IV OVERVIEW OF OSCE/ODIHR‘S REPORTS ON TAJIKSITAN
The establishment of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (previously named Office for Free Election, later OSCE/ODIHR) is considered to have been a benchmark for promotion of democracy and human rights in the history of the OSCE. OSCE/ODIHR was established in 1990 based on the Paris Charter for New Europe with accentuation on elections‘ vital importance for democratic states. The Charter reads that ―democratic government is based on the will of the people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections‖ (Paris Charter 1990, 3). The OSCE‘s 1990 Copenhagen Document, in turn, established the organization‘s election observation mandate, indicating that ―the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government‖ (Copenhagen Document 1990, 5). One OSCE document reads that democratic elections are a ―key pillar for a long-term security and stability‖ and thus the pS invite observers from OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and other institutions to observe and promote the electoral process and agree to follow up on the recommendations provided by the OSCE/ODIHR, otherwise the establishment of institution and its activity will be ―meaningless‖ (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 27).
OSCE/ODIHR’s presence in Central Asia
As subordinate republics within the USSR, all Central Asian republics since the establishment of the OSCE had been part of the OSCE/ODIHR and soon after independence established their individual bilateral relations with the same. According to the OSCE website, Kazakhstan was first among the Central Asian states to invite the OSCE/ODIHR to its parliamentary election in January 1999. In the same year and in 2000, Uzbekistan hosted the OSCE/ODIHR‘s Limited Election Assessment Mission for its parliamentary and presidential elections. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well, have repeatedly invited the OSCE/ODIHR to monitor their elections. Turkmenistan, among the five Central Asian state, remains the only state never to have hosted the OSCE/ODIHR due to its own lack of political will, in addition to OSCE/ODIHR‘s refusal to come when invited (RFE 2012a).
27 2000 parliamentary elections
Previous to the 1999 presidential election, in August of that year, the UTO had officially disbanded its armed forces, while a plebiscite during the same year approved amendments to the Constitution, including the creation of ―religious based parties‖ and also considering the inadequacies during preparation for presidential election, Rahmon and the UTO leader, Nuri, signed the Protocol on Political Guaranties for the Preparation and Conduct of the Parliamentary Elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2000, 5).
The first election observation mission in post-conflict Tajikistan was launched together by the OSCE/ODIHR and the UN was labeled as the Joint Election Observation Mission to Tajikistan for parliamentary election in 2000. The still somewhat successful 1997 Peace Accord was considered as a platform to conduct a first ―multiparty election‖ with the participation of six political parties, and the 2000 election was considered a key step in the implementation of the Accord. The elections, however, according to the OSCE/ODIHR, did not meet the key election related commitments such as ―transparency, accountability, fairness, and secrecy‖ (2000, 1).
Only six out of eleven political parties participated in the 2000 parliamentary elections, but the political climate was considered ―highly pluralistic and competitive‖ and remarked as a progress in democratization process in the country (OSCE/ODIHR 2000, 4). Among those participating in the 2000 elections were the ruling PDP, DP, IRP, CP, Socialist Party and new opposition composed of small parties such as the ―Jumbish‖ (Movement), ―Party of Justice and Development,‖ and ―Adolatkhoh‖ (Justice Seeker) (OSCE/ODIHR 2000). In compliance with the Peace Accord, a new election law was prepared, but the approval was late and, therefore, the international community and much of the civil society were not involved in the drafting process and only some minor recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR were partially accepted. In line with the Accord, the members of UTO were included to the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda (CCER). The CCER, District Election Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Election Commissions (PECs) are three bodies which administer elections and are intended to be independent from the government (Ibid).
28 In general, the level of campaigning was ―low‖, but overall political parties could campaign (OSCE/ODIHR 2000, 12). All parties were allocated time on TV for campaigning. International organizations launched voter education projects throughout the country. Pre-election political debates did not take place at all and state-run media was unwilling to provide people with unbiased information devoted to the ruling PDP. Self-censorship was a ―common feature‖ for journalists (Ibid, 15) and the lack of private printing houses obliged the press to publish at state-run companies. Overall, the winner in the 2000 parliamentary elections through ―the single mandate and party list‖ was the ruling PDP (which took 36 seats in Parliament), the Communists (considered by many as ―pro-governmental‖) obtained 13 seats, while the IRP received only 2 through the party list (OSCE/ODIHR 2000, 24).
OSCE/ODIHR‘s main suggestion to the government of Tajikistan in order to enhance the quality of future elections was to remove the ―higher education‖ requirement for candidates, which is not in line with the OSCE‘s 2000 Copenhagen Document. The neutrality of the CCER remained a major concern as well and OSCE/ODIHR‘s report encouraged the government to include all political parties into that body. Equal financial resources for campaigning and access to the media was recommended to be put in place, and domestic non-partisan observers were recommended by OSCE/ODIHR to be included in the monitoring process of future elections.
2005 parliamentary elections
According to OSCE/ODIHR, politic powers dominated by one region of Tajikistan ―attempt[ed] to consolidate power in advance of 2005 parliamentary and [2006] presidential election[s]‖ (HRW 2005). The amendments to the Constitution in 2003 increased the opportunity of incumbent president to run for office and potentially remain in power until 2020 (OSCE/ODIHR 2005, 4). The opposition, in particular members of IRP, felt undue government pressure, some even having been imprisoned on charges largely thought to have been political (OSCE/ODIHR 2005). The registration problems of political parties contradicted pluralism principles, while the OSCE/ODIHR still assessed the political situation better in comparison to the 2000 elections (Ibid). In 2002, the government of Tajikistan incorporated with the OSCE Center in Dushanbe (Tajikistan‘s capital) a working group composed of political
29 parties to consider amendments to the Election Law, including the OSCE/ODIHR‘s recommendations form the 2000 elections. The draft of Tajikistan‘s Election Law, however, as proposed by opposition parties was ignored by the government, while the PDP draft version was accepted by the Parliament in late 2004 (Heathershaw 2009a).
The 2005 parliamentary election was held in accordance with the new Election Law which in principle guaranteed the observation of elections by political parties and allowed for enhanced opposition access to the state media (OSCE/ODIHR 2005). This election was remarked as the ―first major test of Tajikistan‘s progress in consolidating democratic processes and institutions in the post-war years‖ (Ibid, 3), however, according to OSCE/ODIHR, it ―failed to meet many of the key OSCE commitments for democratic elections contained in the 1990 Copenhagen Document‖ (Ibid, 1).
Despite the fact that opposition members were included into ―mid-level election commission[s],‖ such commissions were not established in a ―politically balanced manner‖ and opposition parties did not trust them (Ibid, 3). The appointment of administrative bodies of elections (CCER, DECs and PECs) by the Parliament could not assure an adequate political balance, because the majority of Members of Parliament (MPs) were from the ruling PDP. The new Election Law increased the deposit requirement for registration of candidates and created a new obstacle for all runners, offering opportunities primarily for wealthier nominees. In the end, six political parties participated in the 2005 parliamentary elections: PDP, IRP, SDP, CP, SP and DP. As far as the OSCE/ODIHR was concerned, therefore, the 2005 elections offered a pluralistic choice for the people, even allowing (as was the case in 2000) the casting of votes for the IRP, the only legal Islamic party in the OSCE pS (Ibid).
In comparison to previous election campaigns, the 2005 elections were held peacefully. The election campaign was slow, and started only two weeks before the event. The PDP had disproportionate access to public resources while the opposition faced obstacles to campaigning. The local authorities interfered in the election campaign period and ―endorse[d the] ruling party candidates‖ (Ibid, 11). Coverage of election campaign was ―subdued‖ and no ―real debate‖ was observed (Ibid, 10). Furthermore, according to OSCE/ODIHR, the state media provided very limited information about political parties and there were lack of analytical materials on the topic of elections. The state TVs gave a floor to other candidates only in the last week
30 of election, and political parties complained about the state-run mass media. Positive or neutral media coverage about political actors in independent media illustrated that self-censorship was exercised, and according to Human Rights Watch, ―freedom of expression remain[ed] under threat‖ (2005). Some private newspapers, covered the activities of political parties, however most of the space was devoted to the ruling PDP. Overall, election campaign had a little media coverage (OSCE/ODIHR 2005).
The voting process was evaluated positively, but multiple voting was a main concern on election day. Counting procedure which should ―ensure the integrity of the process‖ was flawed and assessed as ―poor‖ or ―very poor‖ (Ibid, 19). The tabulation process was ―very low‖, and the complaint and appeals process also was inadequate (Ibid, 20). In the positive side, the political parties appointed its observers for election observation (OSCE/ODIHR 2005).
The PDP won the 2005 elections and its members received a far majority of the seats in the lower house of Parliament, while the opposition parties of IRP, SDP, and DP did not recognize the election results. Afterwards, unsatisfied parties, including the CP, signed a document which ―contested the validity of the election‖ and declared that they will boycott the local administrations and will abandon their places in National Council of Reconciliation (Ibid, 23). The CP and IRP initially claimed that they will not take their places in Parliament, but none of them gave up their seats. The second round of elections was conducted in two regions, where only three international election monitors were present. The results of the second round also favored the PDP (Ibid).
The OSCE/ODIHR proposed 25 recommendations, including advice to investigate the source of flaws and punishment for the responsible persons; it also asked that the independence of election commission be ensured. Similar to the 2000 elections, the eligibility requirements (such as higher education) which were to create obstacles to run in elections were recommended to be reconsidered. In addition, there is the requirement to obtain a mental health certificate and voiding of allegations of a criminal record, plus the issue of high registration fee and gender equality, all of which the OSCE/ODIHR considered as remaining problems. Free election campaigning for political parties and freedom of the media to assist people access to information were also recommended to be ensured. Appeals and complaints procedures were said to be in need of clarification and participation of non-partisan
31 observers in polling stations was once again told to be included in the Election Law (Ibid).
2006 presidential election
Since 2000 the political climate in Tajikistan can be characterized by rising consolidation of power by the incumbent, President Rahmon (OSCE/ODIHR/NAM 2006). The pressure on the political opposition gradually increased, some political newspapers were closed, and certain political figures were put in jail or were accused of being criminals. For instance, Iskandarov, the leader of the DP, was imprisoned, while Nuri, the IRP leader, and some members of his party were accused of slander (Freedom House 2005, HRW 2006). Nuri died in August 2006 due to what appears to have been cancer and left the IRP without a ―solid unified leadership‖ (HRW 2007). Moreover, unrests in Kyrgyzstan, and the Andijon events of May 2005 are thought to have influenced Central Asian leaders, including Rahmon, and compelled them to take some measures to prevent regime change in their countries (HRW 2006).
The OSCE/ODIHR deployed election monitors together with a delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) for the 6 November 2006 presidential election. It was the first presidential election of Tajikistan observed by the OSCE. In general, that election was ―characterized by a marked absence of competition‖ (OSCE/ODIHR 2007, 1). At the time, eight political parties were officially operating in Tajikistan. In addition to PDP, IRP, CP, SDP, PD and SP, two new parties, the AP and PER (see Chapter III), emerged in late 2005. Of those parties, only six nominated candidates and nearly all (aside from the CP) having been from pro-governmental parties: Olim Boboev, leader of the new registered PER and head of the Tajik Transport Institute; Ghafforov, leader of the SP (the pro-government wing being recognized by the Justice Ministry); Talbak Ismoilov, CP candidate; Tavarali Ziyoev of the DP (pro-government wing), and the incumbent, President Rahmon. Neither the IRP nor the SDP participated in the election, while the SDP leader, Zoirov, called the election ―unconstitutional‖ (Ibid, 4).
The Constitution of Tajikistan allows one person to run for election twice. The amendments to the Constitution in 2003 gave an opportunity for the incumbent president to stand for another two terms. According to the Presidential Election Law, the participation of self-nominated candidate is not allowed, a point which, according
32 to the OSCE/ODIHR, contradicts OSCE‘s Copenhagen Document. The threshold to nominate a candidate requires 5% of eligible voters‘ signatures, which in 2006 equaled to around 160,000, creating a barrier to run for many. The participation of domestic non-partisan observers (aside from political parties and media) was still disallowed, despite the previous recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR in that regard.
The OSCE/ODIHR considered that the composition and the appointment rules of the three regulating election bodies (CCER, DECs and PECs) put in doubt its ―independence from the government‖ (Ibid, 7). Moreover, the ―collegial‖ operation of CCER and the decision making process remained ―nontransparent‖ (Ibid, 8). Still, in comparison to previous elections, some improvements were remarked, such as the inclusion of political parties in DECs and PECs via adoption of a decree by the CCER.
Despite the fact that five candidates were nominated for the 2006 presidential election, the election campaign was assessed as ―invisible‖ and uncompetitive, but ―peaceful and calm‖ by the OSCE/ODIHR (2007, 11). Candidates did not meet with voters, and refrained from participating in debates. None countered the incumbent‘s programme, while Rahmon himself did not campaign at all. Only the CP to some extent actively campaigned and ―challenged‖ government policies (Ibid, 11). According to parties, the deficiency of resources limited them from properly campaigning. The CCER provided free air time on state TV for all parties, though in practice, the TV airtime was practically dominated by the PDP leader, President Rahmon. Some parties did not use their full allocated TV time, while Rahmon did not use his official time at all. The print media did not offer any significant amount of analytical materials on political parties and their pre-election programmes. Both state and private media provided little coverage of election campaign, and such practices on the part of the private media was considered to be self-censorship and the control of the government over the mass media (Ibid).
According to the OSCE/ODIHR‘s final report: ―Election day was calm and peaceful,‖ while it also assessed the voting process positively in most polling stations (Ibid, 17). However, proxy and family voting problems remained the same as past elections and counting steps were not assessed positively. Some technical improvements of election like publication of election results in PECs was observed,
33 but the tabulation process ―lacked transparency and accountability‖ (Ibid, 19). Overall, the OSCE/ODIHR observers declared that the 2006 presidential election— once again—―did not fully test democratic electoral practices as outlined in the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document‖ (OSCE/ODIHR 2007, 1).
The OSCE/ODIHR offered various recommendations and called on the government of Tajikistan to implement them in conjunction with previous ones. It asked for the legislative framework of elections to be amended in order to make the CCER and local election commissions independent and pluralistic. The threshold for nomination of candidates, including self-nomination was recommended to be reconsidered and amended based on international practice. Media coverage in all periods of the elections was assessed to be in need of improvement to provide the population with necessary information, and state media was encouraged to identify the distinction between president of the republic and leader of ruling party. Voting, counting, and tabulation processes was also said to be in need of transparency and accountability. The OSCE/ODIHR repeatedly advised the authorities to make legal the inclusion of observers from civil society in polling stations as an assurance of ―transparency and public confidence‖ (Ibid, 23)—a practice which is done in all CIS countries, with the possible exceptions of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
2010 parliamentary elections
The February 2010 election to the lower house of parliament was the third parliamentary election after the 1997 Peace Accord and fourth since independence. The results of the impending elections, however, had already been predicted by experts, with no ―surprise outcomes‖ expected; it was obvious, for example, that the Parliament would remain ―single party‖ dominated by the ruling PDP (Parshin 2010). Freedom House had already included Tajikistan in the category of ―consolidated authoritarian regime[s]‖ in 2009 (Chorshanbiev 2009). Before the election, the incumbent, President Rahmon, had promised ―transparent and fair‖ elections and had also invited political parties to participate in the political events (Ghufronov and Hamroboeva 2009). The election was observed by the OSCE/ODIHR and it found, once again, that it ―failed to meet many key OSCE commitments contained in the OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document and other international standards for democratic
34 elections,‖ with among other things domestic laws not being adhered to (OSCE/ODIHR 2010, 3).
The Election Law had not been amended since 2004, resulting in a situation that could not ensure pluralistic election commissions, restricted candidates‘ eligibility and freedom of speech, offered inappropriate framework for compliance and was thus unable to prevent abuses. The OSCE/ODIHR recommendations after the 2005 parliamentary elections, or those of political parties and civil society were not considered by the government. All such efforts regarding Election Law reforms were thus ignored by authorities. Moreover, the involvement of officials and PDP members in the election process put the independence of election administrative bodies under question and failed to demonstrate transparency and accountability. Also, the decision-making process of the commissions raised concerns as they did not conduct pre-election meetings with the people. The criteria to be a nominee as a candidate was not in line with the OSCE commitments. Furthermore, the law forbids military personnel and religious officials to run for election. The eligibility criteria for candidates remained the same as before. The candidate deposit requirement, the threshold of signatures needed to run for election, and the higher education requirement restricted some candidates to run (Ibid).
The election campaign was not visible, and was instead dedicated to the issue of ―Roghun‖ hydropower plant. Pro-presidential propaganda was used to advertise the PDP, which is prohibited by law. The representatives of opposition parties felt pressured during their campaigns from the state bodies. The IRP election campaign, for example, was halted in different regions by the local police. Voters who worked for state-run agencies were forced to cast vote for PDP. No debate was observed during the campaign. Pre-election media environment was ―less-controlled,‖ but self- censorship remained among journalists (Ibid, 16). Political parties used the allocated free air time, excluding, for unknown reasons, the IRP. Moreover, the pre-recorded debate of political parties was broadcast, but the state-run mass media continued to show ―bias‖ in support of the PDP (Ibid, 19). In addition, some private newspapers endured lawsuits over issues not directly related to the election, but the suits influenced the pre-election climate. The independent media coverage of political parties‘ programmes was not balanced as well.
35 The participation of women in the election was low and various minorities‘ problems and concerns were not addressed during the election campaign. Beside the international observers‘ presence, political parties and self-nominated candidates were allowed to appoint individual observers, while the participation of independent monitors from civil society was still prohibited by law. The responsible bodies did not address complains and appeals of candidates in a proper way (Ibid).
Still, the election was conducted ―peacefully,‖ and, once again, counting and tabulation was assessed ―negatively‖ in comparison to voting process (Ibid, 24). The tabulations received from PECs and DECs were not identical. The preliminary results were in favor of PDP, while opposition parties such as the IRP and CP obtained scant votes. The IRP complained to the Supreme Court challenging the final results of the elections, but the appeal was rejected. Nevertheless, OSCE/ODIHR held that it was still a possibility to hold democratic election if the existing laws had been adhered to (Ibid).
The OSCE/ODIHR recommended ―urgent attention and commensurate level of political will‖ of the Tajik government in favor of free and fair elections and electoral law reform and also indicated its readiness to assist the authorities to improve the electoral process in the country (Ibid, 29). The election law was said to be in need of serious review to make it ―closer to OSCE commitments,‖ while the culprits violating the existing law were recommended to be punished. The eligibility criteria and deposit threshold for candidates were once again asked to be reconsidered. Among the requirements of OSCE/ODIHR was (yet again) the inclusion of non-partisan observers in polling stations and the election process as a whole, a suggestion which was once again ignored by the authorities (Ibid).
Conclusion
Four final election reports of the OSCE/ODIHR (from 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2010) were summarized in this chapter. The reports contained sufficient and relevant criticisms and recommendations. The language of the reports was highly technical and diplomatic, making the OSCE/ODIHR‘s reports useful as a source of information for a limited group of people, namely researchers and government. The reports covered the pre-election period, voting day and afterwards, and provided stakeholders with recommendations. The reports focus on legal provisions, technicality of electoral
36 processes and some parts are devoted to the political context. The reports also do not foresee readership from a non-technical audience, not familiar with OSCE lingo. All reports, for example, asserted that: The ―[e]lection failed to meet key commitments contained in Copenhagen Document,‖ with the Copenhagen Document remaining undefined in the text Moreover, the reports are too long and similar to each other. All have nearly the same points, backgrounds and similar recommendations. They also fail to include their many recommendations in their first part after an executive summary so as to gain the readers‘ attention. The documents also fail to contain which recommendations from previous elections had or had not been implemented so as to show stagnation or progress in the process of electoral reform. In sum, the OSCE/ODIHR reports of Tajikistan‘s four elections during the 2000-2010 period appeared to serve as documents for registration of irregularities of elections rather than serious political document with a strong, direct language to be respected by the host OSCE pS and taken in a serious manner for implementation by the same.
37 CHAPTER V ANALYSIS
Post-communist Central Asia has no prior experience with democracy and much of it has consolidated into a hard, oppressive authoritarianism. According to Freedom House, overall democracy scores for 2013 in Central Asia—beside outlier Kyrgyzstan—continued its downward trend (Freedom House 2013). According to Schatz there are two varieties of authoritarianisms in the region: ―soft‖ and ―hard‖ (2006, 265). Excluding Kyrgyzstan, the rest of the Central Asian states belong to the latter, with Tajikistan having been somewhat of a soft authoritarian state (Ibid)— though it appears to be gradually moving towards the hard variety. Indeed, when comparing post-Soviet Central Asia with post-communist Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the first remains among the ―most repressive region[s] in the world‖ (Boonstra 2012, 1).
Why has post-communist Central Asia had such a tendency? Reasons may include: The Soviet legacy, neo-patrimonial leadership, geographic distance from the West and liberal norm endorsing communities (as opposed to its Eastern European cohorts, for example, who are either members of or living next to the EU), the general instability of Central Asian region and ingratiation to the West (given the so called ―global war on terror‖) may also be among the causes of the absence of democratic norms in the region.
Using the case study of Tajikistan, this thesis has attempted to partly link the lack of electoral democracy in much of Central Asia to the counterintuitive inadvertent engagement of the repeated monitoring of the region‘s elections by the external democracy promoter, OSCE/ODIHR. The main research question of this thesis was: What effects do OSCE/ODIHR observations of post-communist Central Asian elections have on the process of democratization on individual states? Below I address the four hypotheses which attempt to answer this question.
Hypothesis 1: Analysis
External democracy promoters are primarily from the West in the way of international and regional organizations. The involvement of democracy promoters in the region
38 has been less effective as compared to post-communist Eastern Europe2 and in some cases all together ineffective—excluding the case of post-2010 Kyrgyzstan.3All Central Asian states host the OSCE missions and have signed numerous documents stipulating commitment to fulfilling the organization‘s many liberal ideals. For instance, OSCE‘s Istanbul Summit obligated all the OSCE pS to conduct free and fair elections and be open to inviting observers for national elections and to implement the OSCE/ODIHR‘s recommendations afterwards. And the election observation assistance which has been provided by OSCE/ODIHR is considered as the most ―visible‖ programme of the OSCE (Bader 2011, 9). But has this repeated assistance by the OSCE actually contributed to democracy in a region marked with election fraud?
H1: ―Repeated OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations in post- communist Central Asian states with history of fraudulent elections has not contributed to the flourishing of democracy and political pluralism and, instead, has contributed to the solidification of virtual democracy in the region.‖
Using the case study of this thesis, i.e. the post-communist Central Asian state of Tajikistan, based on conducted interviews and literature and documents read, there is evidence in support of H1. In contrast to other Central Asian states, Tajikistan‘s transition period has been complicated due to its 1990‘s civil war and lengthy post- conflict peace-building process. Tajikistan was labeled as a ―mimicry of democracy‖ by Matveeva, this, despite its laudable liberal legislation which guarantees human rights and freedoms as in every civilized democratic state. Indeed, post-communist Tajikistan survived after its civil war as being ―stable, but not democratic‖ (Matveeva 2009, 163). At present, all indications are that authoritarianism is strengthening and democracy is further on the decline in Tajikistan (see Figure 2, Chapter I).
The less than successful role of international organizations in Tajikistan‘s post-conflict transition period and the ―emergence of legitimate order‖ in the country has been highlighted by many authors (Heathershaw 2009a, 42). The OSCE, in rank
2 Interview with Saifullo Safarov, the deputy of Strategic Research Center under President of the Republic of Tajikistan, and representative of the PDP, Dushanbe, July 2013. 3 Nearly all interviewees said that in Kyrgyzstan, external democracy promotion was more effective in comparison to other Central Asian states, but in the Kyrgyz case, they also emphasized that the people‘s awareness played a crucial role. Hence, external support for promotion of democracy is thought to have been combined with people‘s inclination towards democratic reforms in Kyrgyzstan.
39 with some other international entities, has also put its efforts into the transition process in Tajikistan and at one point had declared itself as a ―guarantor‖ of the country‘s Peace Agreement, and played a role in the country‘s post-conflict rehabilitation via, among other things, its institutions as ODIHR (ICG 2002, 3).
The peace-building process and stability of Tajikistan and post-conflict rehabilitation had been a main concern of international community, and even after the Peace Accord, the country remained the ―most vulnerable nation‖ in the region (ICG 2001, ii). The international community‘s effort and its ―intervention‖ in this process should be appreciated, as it solved many complicated tensions and misunderstandings between the warring sides (Heathershaw 2009a, 45). The OSCE Office in Tajikistan and its field offices were, for example, (at least initially) involved in prevention of human rights violation issues (HRW 2002) and general democratization process. However, as time has gone by, and possibly due to the 9/11 effect and the GWoT, the OSCE‘s effectiveness in the country appears to have significantly dwindled. According to the leader of Tajikistan‘s SDP, Zoirov: ―In the first phase [of their presence in Tajikistan], starting in the 1990s up until 2001-2002, the OSCE‘s efforts were more effective and visible [vs. today].‖4
The parliamentary election in 2000 with participation of OSCE/ODIHR monitors was a last concluding step in the ―transitional process‖ as stipulated in the Peace Accord (HRW 2000). That ―multiparty‖ election, though not in accordance to international standards, was nonetheless considered as a positive ―gesture‖ toward ―multiparty politics,‖ a step which encouraged democracy-promoters to applaud Tajikistan‘s steps towards political pluralism (Heathershaw 2009a, 89). Five years later, with yet another parliamentary election in 2005, which the OSCE/ODIHR monitored, it diplomatically criticized the election despite the symbolic presence of at least one opposition party, as real pluralism had failed to establish itself in Tajikistan.
What appears to have taken place in Tajikistan is not pluralistic politics but a mere ―simulation‖ of democratization process with multiparty elections and symbolic presence of an arch rival opposition in face of the IRP. The IRP‘s presence is still the main argument for the current regime to present itself as democratic. The international community appears to believe or have confidence that the country remains on some
4 Interview with Rahmatillo Zoirov, leader of the SDP, Dushanbe, May 2013.
40 sort of democratization path; the OSCE/ODIHR reports accentuate this point as well (Heathershaw 2009a; OSCE/ODIHR 2005). This issue was mentioned by two of the interviewees as well.5 According to Heathershaw, the international community from the beginning presented a non-existent democracy as existing in Tajikistan (2009a). The results of the elections illustrate, however, that year after year, the promise of democracy in Tajikistan has become more illusive, especially given political persecutions of opposition voices and the general widespread practice of vote-rigging and fraud during national elections, all leading to the conclusion that the country is faking democracy and democratic values in line with the theory of ―virtual politics‖ (Wilson 2005).
The repeated observations of the OSCE/ODIHR of fraudulent elections in Tajikistan since 2000 with its ensuing recommendations in favor of transparency and electoral reforms, nearly none of which have ever been implemented by the government of Tajikistan, appears to have not contributed to the flourishing of democracy in that country. This point was echoed by Tajikistan‘s opposition parties and as well as by some experts. In May 2013, in an OSCE roundtable in Dushanbe, the SDP chairman, Zoirov, blamed the OSCE‘s Office in Tajikistan for not being persistent in its position with the authorities during 10 years of its monitoring missions in Tajikistan. According to him, the OSCE is not insisting on the implementation of OSCE/ODIHR‘s many suggested recommendations during its dealings with the government (BBC 2013). The deputy chairman of the IRP, Mahmadali Hait, went even further. In the same roundtable and in front of the Acting OSCE Ambassador to Tajikistan, Markus Mueller, as well the representatives of the OSCE/ODIHR, Hait blamed the OSCE for its contribution to the democratic misfortunes of Tajikistan:
―In all troubles regarding unfair, undemocratic elections brought by current government over the Tajik population, there is a contribution of the OSCE and other entities who presented themselves as advocates of democracy; they should share this fault together. The president of the country or the head of the CCER are used to promising fair elections, but the elections in the country are in fact worsening year by year. Since 1994, we have not practiced fair, free, and democratic elections. Despite the fact that the incumbent president claimed that Tajikistan‘s government has prepared all necessary conditions for operation of political parties, in practice we see a narrow spectrum and the place for opposition parties remind us of a ―mined zone.‖
5 Interview with OSCE employee Dushanbe, June 2013, and with Country Director of IWPR in Tajikistan, Abdumalik Qodirov, Dushanbe, July 2013.
41 For instance, when initiative group with leading role of Zaid Saidov commenced to establish the New Tajikistan Party, it was dismantled [by the government] and Saidov was imprisoned. Several times the ―Committee for the Rights of Zaid Saidov‖ addressed letters to the OSCE and other [diplomatic missions], but there has been no serious reaction made to these requests. This election of 2013 is the test for the OSCE and democracy- promoting countries [in Tajikistan]. At present, there is little belief to such organizations, and if this year they continue in this manner again, and only after the election are they to announce the election unfair and undemocratic, then the limit of our belief in them will have ended.‖6
Most of the subjects I interviewed remarked that the OSCE/ODIHR‘s observation missions have been very well-organized, but have been largely ineffective and sometimes even counter-productive. For example, Parviz Mullojonov, a political analyst, said that the OSCE/ODIHR election observation overall has a ―direct influence‖ on Tajikistan‘s politics in that, in theory, it is to compel the government to take into account the OSCE/ODIHR‘ recommendations and follow the determined framework due to its commitments.7 ―In comparison to the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization‘s [SCO] election observation missions, the OSCE/ODIHR observers‘ mechanism is better and the analyses far deeper,‖ believes Abdughani Mahmadazimov, a political expert. However, he says for the OSCE and its institutions, the security issue in the region [and not democratization] is the top priority.8 Likewise, according to an anonymous local representative of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, the OSCE/ODIHR has had an effect on promotion of democracy in Tajikistan, but only for a while, and according to him Tajikistan was more democratic until the parliamentary election of 2005 in comparison to recent years.9 Another interviewee stated that the OSCE/ODIHR presence overall should not be considered ineffective, but due to subjective reasons, it is less effective.10 There might be several objective and subjective reasons behind the limited effectiveness of the OSCE/ODIHR. Zoirov sees Russia‘s criticism of the OSCE as one reason behind Tajikistan‘s indifference toward the recommendations of the organization in favor of democratization and electoral reform. He said:
6 Mahmadali Haït, Speech in the Preparatory Human Dimension Implementation Meeting of the OSCE, Dushanbe, 2 July 2013. 7 Interview with Parviz Mullojonov, political analyst, Dushanbe, July 2013. 8 Interview with Abdughani Mahmadazimov, political scientist, Dushanbe, May 2013. 9 Interview with anonymous employee of OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, June 2013. 10 Interview with Nuriddin Qarshiboev, Head of National Association of Independent Mass-Media of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, July 2013.
42 ―Before, Tajikistan was very cautious with international organizations and even used to demonstrate its embarrassment regarding irregularities during elections. However, when Russia criticized and blamed the OSCE/ODIHR for being biased toward post-communist countries and intervention into domestic affairs of [OSCE] pS, which contradicts the core idea of the Helsinki Final Act, Central Asia countries, including Tajikistan became more risqué, and showed their indifferences toward the ODIHR‘s recommendations.‖11
Moreover, Tajikistan‘s elections have not been monitored only by the OSCE/ODIHR. In each national election, the government now also hosts two other international monitoring missions, from the CIS and the SCO. In contrast to the OSCE/ODIHR, these organizations always assess Tajikistan‘s elections as free and fair. Thus, Tajik authorities unsurprisingly use such positive assessments and sometimes defend themselves with CIS and SCO results. For instance, Saifullo Safarov, deputy director of the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President of Tajikistan says: ―Why do missions of two respected organizations as the CIS and SCO announce elections of Tajikistan free and fair, while only the OSCE/ODIHR gives a negative evaluation? How come?‖12 The SDP‘s leader Zoirov believes that the presence of CIS and SCO observers has impacted on the work of the OSCE/ODIHR. ―Previously, the OSCE/ODIHR was a prestigious body, which monitored the elections, and their results did matter for the government; however, when the CIS and SCO came and provided different results, then such effectiveness were under-mined to some extent.‖13 Safarov considers the OSCE/ODIHR‘s work futile, if anything, because OSCE/ODIHR‘s observers, according to him, are incapable of understanding the Tajik culture and mentality:
―They want to impose their own democratic standards to us which are unacceptable to Tajikistan and thus their work has been without results. We‘ve tried to explain to them our condition, but they do not understand… If you [in Europe and N. America] want to see democracy, please provide us with conditions. They pressure us instead of assistance, thus we will not accept them and their recommendations are not legally binding to us… I consider what they‘re trying to accomplish as a form of ‗new colonialism.‘ We know what democracy is [and do not need outsiders to remind us of it].‖14
11 Interview with Zoirov, May 2013.
12 Interview with Safarov, July 2013. 13 Interview with Zoirov, May 2013. 14 Moreover, Safarov argues that the OSCE being an intergovernmental organization should assist the Tajik government only and not deal with NGOs. Interview with Safarov, July 2013.
43 However, also telling of OSCE‘s positive effects, Safarov said that it provides good assistance to political parties in the country and raises their trust in the international community, and that such international support normally comes during election periods.15
Some may argue that this hypothesis is unfair and superficial and overlooks the contribution of the OSCE/ODIHR in the enhancement of the electoral process in Tajikistan, firstly because the OSCE/ODIHR reports are in the end critical and the analysis is in-depth.16 But as Rajab Mirzo argued, OSCE/ODIHR‘s reports mostly draw attention to technical aspects and their recommendations normally finds its way to the government and public too late in the game, when the debate over the fraudulency of the election has ended and the autocrats may use such tardiness as pretext that OSCE/ODIHR did not present their findings on time.17 According to George Sand, head of the Economic Unit of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan who also has experience of being an observer for the OSCE/ODIHR in Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE is a consensus-based organization, with 57 pS approving the annual budget of the organization and its institutions, and sometimes they may exert political or financial pressure on OSCE/ODIHR. Therefore, the job of this entity should ―please‖ all 57 pS. ―With this reality the institution is doing an extremely good job. Balancing financial leverage of pS and also producing reports which are more or less useful. However, being a diplomatic organization, it [naturally] uses diplomatic language.‖18
To be fair, some secondary and tertiary recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR have been implemented, such as the use of transparent boxes in polling stations or the conducting of—albeit donor-provided—trainings for employees of the CESS.19 However, the main and principled recommendations which were important for improvement of the elections still remain unfulfilled. The implementation of negligible improvements appears to have been conducted to demonstrate some commitments and eagerness to work with the organization.20 In the
15 Ibid. 16 Interview with Mahmadazimov, May 2013. 17 Interview with Rajab Mirzo, representative of the DP, Dushanbe, July 2013. 18 Interview with George Sand, Head of Economic Unit at the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, July 2013. 19 Interview with ex-employee of OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, June 2013. 20 Interview with Zoirov, May 2013.
44 above mentioned conference in July 2013, political parties presented what they considered as 10 crucial recommendations, including the participation of non-partisan observers, and the equal participation of political parties in the election process as repeatedly suggested by OSCE/ODIHR for the last 10 years as part of the final reports of the 2000, 2005, 2006 and 2010 elections, all being recommendations which have yet to be agreed and implemented by the government of Tajikistan.21 Mahmadazimov in this regard said that the OSCE/ODIHR opens its Office for only a short period of time and there is no constant work in order to supervise the implementation of suggested recommendations. ―They come and go,‖ he said.22
On the whole, the interviews and inquiries conduced for this thesis demonstrated the opinion of subjects of the negative—not positive—effects of election observations on democracy and human rights in Tajikistan. For instance, Mullojonov referred to examples of government behavior toward political parties, in particular pressure toward the IRP, and the case of the disappearance of Salimboi Shamsiddinov, an ethnic Uzbek Tajikistani activist who had advocated for both Uzbek minority rights in Tajikistan (and Tajik minority rights in Uzbekistan) and free and fair elections in Tajikistan in the year prior to his likely kidnapping and disappearance in March 2013.23 Mullojonov said that these cases have not been assessed genuinely by the OSCE as an entity which works in three dimensions, including politics and human rights, and which should measure how the Helsinki Final Act is working in individual pS. According to him, when international organizations are not accentuating the problem, and no serious reaction follows, and the government of Tajikistan, in turn, is witnessing such apathy and simultaneously sees no penalties in the prospects of long-term and stable cooperation with the OSCE regardless of its own behavior, it will simply repeat the previous violations or behaviors and may do so even more rigidly as compared to the past.24
21 Rahmatillo Zoirov, Speech in Preparatory Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, sponsored by the OSCE Dushanbe, 2 July 2013. 22 Interview with Mahmadazimov, May 2013. 23 In July 2013, a body washed up on the shores of the Amu River in Uzbekistan was highly suspected to be that of Shamsiddinov [RFE. 2013. ―Ҷасади монанд ба Шамсиддинов дар Амударё ёфт шуд [A Corpse Resembling Shamsiddinov Found in Amu River],‖
45 Mirzo, in turn, argues that the OSCE/ODIHR‘s tight cooperation with government has yielded negative consequences:
―In the parliamentary elections in 2000, the first participation of the OSCE monitors did not alter the electoral process in general… The OSCE goes beyond realities on the ground and is used to monitoring technical irregularities [only]… It is only in the eve of elections when the OSCE acts to support the opposition political parties and holds roundtables and discussions. The government knows that debates around the election will continue only for one or two month and that the OSCE will assist and cooperate with them regardless of the outcome of election. Such consistent and strong ties of the OSCE with the regime, despite the latter‘s vagary has made the government spoiled and has hindered the democratization process [in Tajikistan].‖25
Kabiri, the chairman of the IRP, in turn, asserts that the presence of international organizations has had a counterintuitive effect on people of the region. He said:
―In the beginning, international organizations like the OSCE came to the region with very attractive slogans, full of hopes and this to some extent made the region‘s population lazy: they became used to relying on the organizations‘ assistance [and presumed care for democracy in the country]. Moreover, for any case requiring pressure on the authorities, the people sought backing from international organization [such as the OSCE]. Soon after, however, when the population saw that these organizations have come with a different aim in contrast to their own presented principles, they understood that this entity‘s objectives are different from that which they had pretend to be. Countries with dependency on international organizations are stuck and caught in an authoritarian rather than a democratic path.‖26
The criticisms of the opposition and those of key experts clearly are not shared by the incumbent President Rahmon, who in the OSCE Summit claimed, ―Cooperation and interaction within the Organization [OSCE] has helped to build a secular society in my country based on modern democratic principles and universal values.‖27 Overall, given the feedback on inquiries related to H1, I conclude that the hypothesis holds as there is overall consensus that repeated OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations in post- communist Tajikistan with its history of fraudulent elections has not contributed to the flourishing of democracy and political pluralism in that country and, has rather been associated with the solidification of virtual democracy, instead.
25 Interview with Mirzo, July 2013. 26 Interview with Muhiddin Kabiri, leader of IRP, Dushnabe, July 2013. 27 Statement by the president of Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon at the OSCE Summit, Astana, 2010
46 Hypothesis 2: Analysis
The above analysis of H1 implied that, through the case study of the state of Tajikistan, in post-communist Central Asia, there has been a tendency toward ‗virtual democracy and that, to a good extent the Helsinki Final Act has produced a counterintuitive effect if not on the whole region (given the outlier case of Kyrgyzstan), but on Tajikistan and much of its neighbors. That said, the question remains: What are the reasons for the OSCE/ODIHR to continue its election observations if this phenomenon is at play and if, among other things, the recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR have been regularly neglected by Central Asian leaders? Hypothesis two of this thesis attempts is an attempt to respond to this inquiry.
H2: ―The reasons for the negative effects of OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations in post-Communist Central Asian states and the institution willingness to observe Central Asian elections are found in the realpolitik objectives of influential EU and North American OSCE pS who view the significance of Central Asia primarily as: (i) a buffer zone against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan, (ii) a logistical territory to assist the US- and NATO-led war in Afghanistan, (iii) a region of purely business interest (in the way of natural gas and petroleum), and (iv) a venue where the presence of OSCE/ODIHR is associated with continued engagement with the regions‘ leadership to primarily achieve the same realpolitik objectives, while democratization, human rights and free and fair elections, at worst, remain at the level of rhetoric or, at best, are considered as secondary or tertiary objectives.‖
The ―geostrategic importance‖ of Central Asia due to emanating threats from Afghanistan, the ongoing GWoT, the discovery of deposits of natural resources, and as a logistical support for the US-led war in Afghanistan results in the Western OSCE‘s pS states, with their political, ―numerical and financial‖ dominance in the organization, engaging with the region and maintaining close relations with the mostly authoritarian leaders of Central Asia (Blank 2012, 9; Lewis 2012, 1220). As Levitsky and Way argue, regions with an economic or security significance for the West are ―less vulnerable for external democratizing pressures and demands for political reform are rare‖ (2006, 201).
Likewise, according to Klavdija Cernilogar, OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observation missions, which are considered as assistance to the democratization
47 process of post-communist states, have become missions for ―mere registry of [technical] facts‖ rather than contribution of democracy promotion (2005, 1). Furthermore, the ―[d]eteriorating security situation in Afghanistan is prompting foreign officials and observers to ―prefer a stable, rather than a democratic Central Asia‖ (Bolgar 2009). Mirzo argues that given the West‘s interests, the OSCE in turn tightly and consistently cooperates with and assists the Tajik government, and that this closeness to the authorities, as opposed to civil society and opposition parties, is well known by the government, and that it thus makes the government‘s avowed democratization principles meaningless.28
Kabiri, in turn, claims that the OSCE with its institutions had actively been involved in the democratization process in Tajikistan only in early period of their work. However, he says that for the last five to six years, the organization‘s involvement is invisible or limited. ―At present, great attention has been paid to security and border management which is overall nice, but this field should not be prioritized, downplaying the democratization and human rights issues. Currently, for nearly all Western international organizations, Tajikistan is considered a [mere] buffer zone and they will act based on consideration of their [presumed security] priorities rather than our preferences [for human rights and democratization].‖29
The OSCE‘s de facto preferred priority of security and stability has been criticized by some as not being in line with the organization‘s mantra of a ―comprehensive‖ approach to security. Mahmadazimov argues, for example, that OSCE‘s ―preferential cooperation‖ with the region‘s authorities has in essence put democratization in the secondary place.30 Ivar Vikki, the former head of OSCE Office in Tajikistan, accentuated this idea when he stated that his office primarily works for the sake of ―stability‖ in Tajikistan (Asia Plus 2013c). The politico-military dimension of the OSCE has remained a de facto and de jure priority in Tajikistan; the said dimension has, for example, consistently had a greater budget allocation throughout the years relative to the environment-economics and human dimensions. Due to the politico-military‘s dominance over the three dimensions of the OSCE in Tajikistan, the organization has been sarcastically been referred to ―mine-cleaners‖—
28 Interview with Mirzo, July 2013. 29 Interview with Kabiri, July 2013. 30 Interview with Mahmadazimov, May 2013.
48 for the ongoing and expensive project which the politico-military division has been engaged in for years in Tajikistan.31 According to an employee of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, relative stability which exists now is the main objective of the OSCE in the country; if the government of Tajikistan violates its many OSCE commitments, the organization has virtually no response to such violations.32
According to Mullojonov, as Tajikistan initially entered the organization as part of the Soviet Union in 1973, it receives little attention of the OSCE in terms of its democratization process. Only proximity to Afghanistan has increased Tajikistan‘s importance in the post-9/11 era, but this attention, too, he says, is ephemeral, and soon ahead will be reduced. Mullojonov continues:
―There is criticism about the conduct of the organization [OSCE] given that it gives priority to security rather than democratization. This fact partially could be justified by that this entity is not fully independent and is composed of [57] member states. The kernel of the organization are countries such as Germany, France and others who have their own geopolitical interests [in Central Asia].‖33
What appears, therefore, is that, firstly, for the Western pS of the OSCE, Tajikistan is a mere buffer zone against illegal drug trafficking, extremism and terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, which some claim is exaggerated. Secondly, the region is a logistical territory to assist the US- and NATO-led war in Afghanistan, and indeed it is thus significant for the powerful pS of the OSCE who are also NATO members. This significance has doubly increased after the announcement of the impending 2014 departure of the US- and NATO-led troops from Afghanistan. As such, Tajikistan‘s territory has more importance for the West than its peoples (Foroughi 2012a). Recently, Tajikistan signed an agreement with the United Kingdom to use the territory of Tajikistan for transit of its munitions, and also Defense Ministry of France is negotiating with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in this regard (RFE 2013c, Lenta.ru 2012).
The region‘s governments, in turn, play up the Afghanistan threat to their own advantages. Tajikistan‘s leader, Rahmon, for example, has expressed his concern over NATO‘s withdrawal from Afghanistan, as a consequence anticipating ―threats‖ from
31 Ibid. 32 Interview with anonymous employee of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, June 2013. 33 Interview with Mullojonov, July 2013.
49 an ―insecure neighboring country,‖ and acknowledged the ―buffer zone‖ role played by Tajikistan, having asked that the ―international community must take this responsibility into account‖ (RFE 2012b). The Afghanistan threat is thus a means to both gain political advantages and material gain from the West. Rahmon, for example, has also ―urge[d] the OSCE [and] all state parties to further contribute to success to this important situation [and] continue to provide practical support to the Tajik government‖34 One of my interlocutors also believed that the security and stability concerns of the West, as part of its realpolitik objectives, are impossible to obtain from an unstable region without cooperation with its leaders, be they democrats or authoritarians.35 The vulnerability of Tajikistan due to its proximity to Afghanistan has also been emphasized by high level US representatives (Bleuer 2012) and in 2012 by the visiting Secretary General of the OSCE Lamberto Zannier in Dushanbe: ―Tajikistan, being located in the heart of Central Asia, not only plays an important role within the OSCE but is also a key factor of stability within its region‖ (Asia Plus 2012).
If security and stability are one component behind the reasons making Central Asia important for the West and thus compelling the Western world bilaterally and multilaterally, such as through the OSCE, to cooperate with authoritarian leaders of the region, hydrocarbon reserves (oil and natural gas) is another factor. Zoirov, while referring to the EU strategy in Central Asia for 2007-2013, commented that ―economic and energy interests are among the most preferential areas for European countries who are also members of the OSCE.‖36 Indeed, the growing dependency of EU member states upon external sources of energy and ensuring security of energy supplies are issues of especial concern for them and ―Central Asia, with its significant hydrocarbon resources and [somewhat] favourable geographical location for transport routes to European markets, will play an important role in ensuring the EU‘s energy supplies. Together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan possess the world‘s second largest reserves of oil and gas…,‖ so claims the EU‘s document on Regional Strategy for Assistance to Central Asia for 2007-2013.
34 Statement by President Rahmon at the OSCE Summit, Astana, 2010. 35 Interview with Qarshiboev, July 2013. 36 Interview with Zoirov, May 2013.
50 In the EU‘s strategy for the region, human rights and democratization have been mentioned only after cooperation on security and economics, claimed Kabiri. According to him, the international staffs who come to Tajikistan as well will work under these same determined EU regional priorities.37 And according to Qarshiboev, among OSCE‘s dominant states with interests in Central Asia is Germany, which in turn is one of the decisive countries within the organization, which simultaneously seeks Central Asian natural resources.38 For Western countries, the geopolitical and economic interests take priority, claims Mirzo, rather than democratic norms. He further said the democratization chip is a front to maintain influence in the region. For Mirzo, such as policy should in reality be labeled ―petroleum democracy.‖39
Hypothesis 3: Analysis
H3: ―OSCE/ODIHR‘s willingness to observe what are generally known by experts to be forgone fraudulent elections in post-Communist Central Asian states are due OSCE/ODIHR's eagerness to gain material benefits in the way of budgetary outlays and maintain its raison d’être as a post-Cold War institution.‖
The argument is that each organization tries to keep its presence for a long time, and thus, advance its cooperation with governmental structures in host countries, try to maintain its presence and thus augment its budget, and the OSCE/ODIHR is not excluded for such modus operandi. For instance, in the 2012 Unified Budget of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, EUR 231,400 was allocated for democracy promotion for ODIHR,40 while for 2013, the budget allocation toward the same remained virtually the same—with a rise of about 1%—at EUR 234,100.41 It is a common thing for the OSCE‘s structures to spend allocated funds on time, otherwise, the budget allocation will be cut for the ensuing year. More importantly, how the funds are spent are of miniscule concern for the headquarters in Vienna. Field missions should merely provide cliché justifications for their expenditures. There is another reason behind the constant monitoring of the region‘s elections by the OSCE/ODIHR in spite of the recurring fraud and non-compliance to
37 Interview with Kabiri, July 2013. 38 Interview with Qarshiboev, July 2013. 39 Interview with Mirzo, July 2013. 40 OSCE.2012. ―Approval of the Unified Budget for 2012.‖ PC/DECISION No.1028. 41 OSCE.2013. ―Approval of the Unified Budget for 2013.‖ PC/DECISION No.1073.
51 its recommendations by host governments. Qarshiboev says that to come and observe an election is ―the mission of the ODIHR. If they will not come, the employees will have to leave their jobs. Thus, they enlarge their presence via different missions and try to compromise with the host government and be on the ground.‖42 Another interviewee says that every employee, mainly high-level personnel wants to hold his what amounts to a diplomatic and well-paid carrier for a long period and hence, will act very cautiously with authorities of host governments. He brought an example of the case of Craig Murray, the British Ambassador in Tashkent who criticized the Uzbek authorities for their violations of human rights in the Andijon events of 2005, and that subsequently he was called back and lost his diplomatic career afterwards.43
Another fact is that the organization never assumes that its work is insufficient or futile, says Mullojonov. ―The OSCE/ODIHR will never agree that it is not fulfilling its mission, on the contrary most of the time the reports about their works are [extremely] positive. Unfortunately, during the assessment of the work of the organization, the opposition or civil society will not be [sufficiently] questioned, but more often the opinion of the OSCE‘s partners will be asked, [the very people] who depend on the OSCE‘s funds!‖44
Here, we can conclude therefore that H3 holds to be true or that is null hypothesis fails to be proven and that OSCE/ODIHR‘s material-gains incentive is another factor for its uninterrupted presence in way of election monitoring in the region and its maintenance of its raison d’être as a post-Cold War institution.
Hypothesis 4: Analysis
Given most of Central Asia‘s experience (sans Turkmenistan), inviting the OSCE/ODHIR election observers, it appears, has come to be a norm, whether one is or is not respecting the organizations many democratic commitments. The question is, however, why do autocratic countries in post-communist Central Asia, who normally disagree with results of the OSCE/ODHIR‘s final reports and who do not implement the proposed recommendations of the same, continue to invite OSCE/ODIHR to observe their elections? For instance, the presidential election in Tajikistan in 2006
42 Interview with Qarshiboev, July 2013. 43 Interview with Qodirov, July 2013. 44 Interview with Mullojonov, July 2013.
52 was remarked as an election without competition and full of flaws, while the ensuing parliamentary election in 2010 was also heavily criticized. And yet, the Tajik authorities have once again invited OSCE/ODIHR to observe the 2013 impending presidential election. OSCE/ODIHR‘s Needs Assessment Mission, in turn, assessed the situation positively and proposed a relatively large monitoring team for the November 2013 election (OSCE/ODIHR 2013). Some may argue that Tajikistan is obliged to invite OSCE/ODIHR, given its Helsinki commitments; and yet, that has not prevented neighboring Turkmenistan to decline to invite OSCE/ODIHR. Hence Hypothesis 4:
H4: ―Nearly all Central Asian governments are willing to invite OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observation missions as means (i) to utilize the presence of OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations as a form of legitimization of their regimes in the eyes of Western governments, international organizations and their own populations and (ii) to maintain connections with the international community so to gain material and political benefits.‖
The above hypothesis, I argue, specially holds true for the poorest state in the post-communist world, Tajikistan, and which upon independence was anxiously seeking internal and external legitimacy, as well as material assistance. Legitimacy is interpreted as whether or not the majority of the population accepts the operating political system or existing regime, thus giving the right to them to rule (Matveeva 1999). According to Antoine Buisson, the internal legitimacy maintained by Rahmon is based on his ―political charisma,‖ which has two components: He has maintained relative peace and stability in the post-civil war era, and he has ruled over Tajikistan at a time when the country has gained recognition in the international arena, which for many in Tajikistan—rightly or wrongly—attributes to the person of President Rahmon (2007, 142). He thus has ―charismatic legitimacy‖ in eyes of Tajikistan‘s population (2007, 125). With regards to external legitimacy, Rahmon has tried and largely succeeded to convince the international community that his government prefers both stability and democracy. In addition, given that the international community prefers ―democratic legitimacy‖ rather than ―charismatic legitimacy,‖ Tajikistan has ratified a picture-perfect Constitution, upholding—at least on paper— the three branch of power, and holds regular national elections with the presence of international election monitors, including the OSCE/ODHIR, all being attributes and
53 actions which for many astute analysts remain ―mere façade[s]‖ of democracy (Buisson 2007, 124; Matveeva 2009, 163).
As Mullojonov said, the main reason behind the Tajik government‘s willingness to invite observers concerns the legitimacy of the elections: ―When elections have been conducted without international observers, it might undermine the image of Tajikistan and the operation of government will be put under question.‖45 Hence, regardless of the degree of fraud, the mere presence of observers appears to nearly always dampen criticisms and heighten electoral legitimacy. Without OSCE/ODIHR observers, ―the election will not be fully recognized,‖ added Mullojonov, ―by both opposition and the international community.‖46 This is thus a motivation for the Tajik authorities to invite OSCE/ODHIR so as to maintain the correct ―image‖ of a cooperative and democratically-leaning state.
This is an interesting phenomenon, as the presence of election observers appears to allow the state, in this case Tajikistan, to maintain its image, and as well justify the legitimacy of the government regardless of the results and fairness of the election. Indeed, OSCE/ODHIR observers will never announce that an observed election anywhere was a ―complete failure‖ and that the state failed to meet all election standards. OSCE/ODIHR reports will show shortcomings and always highlight ―improvements‖47—regardless whether the improvements were negligible. Sand relates the willingness of authorities to invite observers as a ―pragmatic‖ way to gain ―prestige,‖ thus showing that the country is open to international norms and its electoral system is open to scrutiny by the OSCE.48 And yet, the presence of the OSCE/ODHIR observers often gives false hope to a critical population [and many external observers], who may assume the very presence of monitors indicates that the election will be conducted under OSCE/ODHIR‘s full supervision and that their arrival means the recognition that the government has met minimum democratic standards.49 This internal ―public legitimacy,‖ as told by Mahmadazimov, gives a
45 Interview with Mullojonov, July 2013. 46 Ibid. 47 Interview with Zoirov, May 2013. 48 Interview with George Sand, July 2013. 49 Interview with ex-employee of OSCE Office in Tajikistan, June 2013.
54 sense of false hope to a population who may now believe that its vote can decide the future.
The Tajik public appears to have had such a delusion: In a 2010 pre-election poll, for example, when asked about expectations of fair and free elections, 74% of respondents expressed a belief that their votes will be counted fairly. This was an increase in response to the same question as compared to 1996 (64%) and 2004 (68%) (IFES 2010). With continued observing of its elections by the OSCE/ODHIR, the Tajik government appears to be more confident about its own rule and even legitimacy given the fact that despite nearly all the final reports of OSCE/ODIHR hinting on the de jure ‗illegitimacy‘ of the election results, the OSCE and the West continue their full cooperation with the Tajik authorities, hence signaling a de facto ‗legitimacy‘ of the elections and thus those ruling the state.50
In addition, Tajikistan‘s position as an aid dependent landlocked state also entices the authorities to show the country‘s openness and its maturity for democracy promotion, thus maintaining connections and gaining material benefits. Indeed, among the Central Asian states, the most aid-recipient country is Tajikistan. According to the U.N., in 2012, Tajikistan received US$26 million worth of humanitarian aid while neighboring Kyrgyzstan (which is considered as the next poorest post-communist state in the world, after Tajikistan) received $US8 million (OCHA 2012). And during 2003-2013 period, Tajikistan received 58% of all aid allocation to Central Asia from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (De Cordier 2009). Mullojonov also argued that the question of inviting observers concerns the grants and funds and this by itself obliges the government of Tajikistan to invite OSCE/ODIHR election observers. Inviting election observers is more of a push factor for poverty-stricken Tajikistan as compared to neighboring well-to-do Kazakhstan and even Uzbekistan.51 The representative of PDP says, that Tajikistan is used to inviting OSCE/ODIHR given the good relationship of the government with the OSCE. ―But it also gives benefit to the economy of Tajikistan,‖ he adds, ―in the sense that the huge delegation of observers will come and stay in hotels and spend
50 Interview with Qodirov, July 2013. 51 Interview with Mullojonov, July 2013.
55 their money here. Thus, [the mission of observers] gives [the country] more profits, rather than their [election] observation.‖52
Qodirov, in turn, believes that there is no connection between aid providing organizations and democracy promoter institutions.53 Furthermore, democracy promoters (as does President Rahmon) regularly state the country only recently (as of 1997) ended its bloody conflict and it is very difficult to build democracy in such a short span of time (Buisson 2007). Indeed, Rahmon also said in an interview given to a European television station that there is ―no shortcut to democracy‖ (Euronews 2012). Overall, openness of the government of Tajikistan to international observers signals—albeit falsely—that that country is, in one degree to another, willing to democratize and is open to democratic change (Hyde 2011). The government also never formally denounces the recommendations of OSCE/ODHIR, but—as has been the trend—merely sits on them and stalls, and yet is still open to observations for future elections. This ―political will‖ or false democratization tactic on the part of the Tajik authorities, which some post-communist states as Turkmenistan do not possess, gives a fallacy of hope in democracy for Tajikistan and encourages democracy promoters such as OSCE/ODIHR to continue their work in the country. These arguments, I believe, support the validity of H4.
52 Interview with Safarov, July 2013. 53 Supra.
56 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to scrutinize the role of the OSCE/ODIHR in the presumed democratization process taking place in the post-communist Central Asian states, using the case study of Tajikistan. The objective was also to determine, despite the fact that the OSCE‘s efforts in way of recommendations towards electoral reforms have been neglected by the majority of the region‘s countries, why the OSCE/ODIHR continues to come to the region and observe what in essence are fraudulent and meaningless elections? Furthermore, why do Central Asian states and the government of Tajikistan, in particular, continue to invite the OSCE/ODIHR to observe its elections and simultaneously refuse to implement the organization‘s recommendations for improvement of electoral process and thus hinder the prospects for democracy and pluralism in the region?
Four hypotheses were proposed to be tested and after inquiry and outcomes, this research failed to prove the null hypotheses (Ho) and thus failed to disprove the proposed hypotheses. According to chosen theoretical framework, international election observation missions reinforce the notion of ―virtual politics‖ (Wilson 2005) and ―virtual democracy and pluralism‖ in the region. Utilizing qualitative research in the way of interviews and literature review, the first hypothesis (H1) illustrated that there does exist a seeming correlation between the presence of the OSCE/ODIHR and solidification of virtual pluralism in Tajikistan, which goes contrary to the expected effects of joining the OSCE and singing the Helsinki Final Act—what I have labeled as ‗Helsinki‘s Counterintuitive Effect‘.
The second hypothesis (H2), as well, was determined not be to disproven in that there are realpolitik objectives behind prominent Western OSCE pS, which motivate them to downplay the democratization issues (free and fair elections and political pluralism) in the region in favor of more hard security matters, such as countering terrorism, fighting extremism and interdicting drug trafficking. This stand by influential OSCE pS has led to close cooperation with and kowtowing to (rather than criticizing of) the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia, and for the region‘s leaders to, in turn, taking advantage of such Western position to exaggerate their own
57 security situation in hopes of gaining additional political and material benefits and the freedom to suppress internal oppositions.
The third hypothesis (H3) concerned the reasons behind OSCE/ODIHR‘s repeated insistence of monitoring fake elections in the region. Partially based on the results of my interviews, I argued that such a position on part of the OSCE/ODIHR is to maintain itself via budgetary allocations by the OSCE Permanent Council and ensure its continued operation and raison d’être in the post-Cold War era. Hence, the real or fake nature of elections appear to be of miniscule importance to the OSCE/ODIHR as compared to the opportunity to observe the electoral motions and generate mostly broad recommendations towards electoral reforms— recommendations, which throughout the past decade have largely fallen on deaf ears of the majority of Central Asia‘s mostly authoritarian governments.
The fourth hypothesis (H4) was also failed to be disproven in that, using the case study of Tajikistan, I argued that Central Asian governments are eager to invite OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observation missions as a way to gain favors from Western states in way of foreign aid (both economic and military) and the granting to the same authoritarian regimes of a good degree of external legitimacy. The presence of OSCE/ODIHR observers is also effective in partially quelling their internal opposition and achieving internal legitimacy by the regimes.
I thus conclude that, overall, elections in post-communist Central Asia (save the outlier case of Kyrgyzstan) and using the case study of Tajikistan, have never been free and fair, and have not only shown no improvements over the period which they have been observed by OSCE/ODIHR, but worsened in their degree of being ―spectacles‖ in the eyes of much of their own populations and objective international observers. As is, there is no political will to change this system in four of five states in the region, given the ingrained corruption and subverted leaderships who prefer to maintain their rule as long as possible and pay only virtual attention to the international community‘s own haphazard democratization plans for the region.
In addition to the unwillingness of the region‘s authorities to reform their electoral system, the apathy and naiveté of international organizations, which prefer to ―engage‖ the Central Asian governments in way of expensive and abstract projects— such as the simplistic, yet costly, project by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan to educate
58 the CCER officials on technical issues (Asia Plus 2013c)—with results which are seldom measured, and with no ensuing penalty for the region‘s governments for refusing to conform to political pluralism and human rights, have made external democracy promotion efforts including OSCE/ODIHR‘s election observations increasingly futile and ineffective.
There is often the argument that the OSCE is a consensus based organization that cannot interfere into the domestic affairs of its pS. Though this largely remains a truism, it does not mean that the organization should work in favor of its individual pS‘ leaders rather than the ordinary population of the same states and the liberal principles of the OSCE, which benefit the same. Being consensus-based can also have its benefits as it can require by any one of the 57 pS from another to follow and respect its own signed documents and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act and the many additional commitments that have followed since its ratification. It is in the leverage of the OSCE pS and the organization as a whole to say: ―You signed it, you must honour it!‖ (quoted in Thomas 2001, 128).
Secondly, the OSCE has engulfed itself in a bureaucratic disease of ―projectosis‖ (Foroughi 2012a), having become a donor and funding agency for government institutions and NGOs with hundreds of expensive and often redundant projects, the timely implementation of which ironically prevents the organization from properly conducting its basic responsibilities of monitoring and encouraging the Central Asian states to follow the very core ideas and concepts of the Helsinki Final Act. There is little political engagement in the region by the OSCE and the governments show indifference towards suggestions towards democratic openness, instead preferring to use brutal methods to violate democratic norms and human rights, as a preferred method to prolong their rule. Continued engagement with such regimes, however, including the monitoring of fake elections by the OSCE/ODIHR is bound to eventually lead to the organization‘s losing of face in front of the local populations and civil society.
Recommendations
Based on the results of my research, I provide below a few suggestions to alleviate the problem at hand towards the improvement and more efficient work of the OSCE/ODIHR in Central Asia:
59 1. OSCE/ODIHR should remain in the region, but it should drastically change its work strategy. Every year, it seems, OSCE/ODIHR deploys a routine ―Needs Assessment Mission‖ prior to each national election, which conducts routine and purely technical and a-political meetings with mostly government officials and often weak to non-existent opposition forces and in the process misses the bigger picture, that of the political and human rights situations in Central Asia. The institution should fine-tune its work vis-à-vis the political environment in individual countries. The deployment of large and expensive observation missions to what are forgone fake elections should thus be avoided. A small monitoring team (of no more than four to five experts) can easily evaluate and report on the nature of such virtual politics rather than the deployment of hundreds of redundant observers.
2. OSCE/ODIHR usually does not include public opinion about the preference and awareness of people about political parties in order to make preliminary analysis. It also does not conduct its own exit polls. If it is going to spend the time, effort and money, OSCE/ODIHR may as well fund public opinion polls including exit polling in its observation missions to be able to have a much better understanding of the degree of falsifications.
3. OSCE should regularly insist on the implementation of suggested recommendations from previous elections via its field offices and in the Permanent Council and in case of lack of political will for electoral reforms in between elections by individual Central Asian pS, it should seriously use the option of refusing to monitor what in essence have become fraudulent and ‗virtual‘ elections. This refusal to monitor elections may very well act as more of an incentive for the region‘s governments to reform their electoral system than the de facto continued at-all-cost-engagement policy which OSCE/ODIHR currently upholds.
4. OSCE should embrace all three dimensions as defined in the Helsinki Final Act simultaneously and thus work towards comprehensive security. It should not downplay the liberal norms of the third dimension or show apathy towards human rights and democratization issues in Central Asian states in favor of the hard security objectives of the first dimension. 5. Though OSCE/ODIHR should work with the government to a threshold, a greater focus of the organization should be on the civil society and the population at-large, much of which is fully unaware of the presence and/or functions of the OSCE. Instead of wasting time, effort and funds in yet another training or study-abroad or conference attendance for the CCER and other government officials, OSCE/ODIHR should work with ordinary people in the country to raise their awareness about elections and OSCE‘s liberal political norms.
60 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Journals Atkin, Muriel. 1999. ―Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan.‖ In Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 277-312. Bader, Max. 2011. ―The Challenges of OSCE Electoral Assistance in the Former Soviet Union.‖Security and Human Rights 22(1): 9-18. Bleuer, Christian. 2012. ―Instability in Tajikistan? The Islamist Movement of Uzbeki- stan and the Afghanistan Factor.‖ Central Asia Security Policy Brief 7. OSCE Academy and GSCP. Bruno De Cordier. 2013. ―The EU‘s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policy in Central Asia: Past Crises and Emergencies to Come.‖ EUCAM Policy Brief 29. Boostra, Jos. 2012. ―Democracy in Central Asia: Sowing in Unfertile Fields?‖ EUCAM Policy Brief 23. Carothers, Thomas. 1997. ―The Rise of Election Monitoring: The Observers Observed.‖ Journal of Democracy 8: 1-12. Cernilogar, Klaudija. 2005. ―OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation in Central Asia: A Contribution to the Process of Democratisation or a Mere Registry of Facts? Cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.‖ MA Thesis, European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization, 89 pp. Fawn, Rick. 2006. ―Battle Over the Box: International Election Observation Missions, Political Competition and Retrenchment in the Post-Soviet Space.‖ International Affairs 82 (6): 1133–53. Feiman, Eli. 2009. ―Party Competition in Tajikistan: A Bleak Present, but a Brighter Future?‖
61 Heathershaw, John. 2009b. ―Tajikistan‘s Virtual Politics of Peace.‖ Europe-Asia Studies 61(7):1315–1336. Hyde, Susan D. 2011. ―Catch Us If You Can: Election Monitoring and International Norm Diffusion.‖ American Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 356-69. Hyde, Susan. 2007. The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. World Politics 60 (1): 37-63. Juraev, Emil. 2006. ―Election Observation: An Institution under Threat?‖ In Observing or Participating in Regime Change? Kyrgyz Perspectives on the Role of International Election Observation Missions in 2005, eds. Stina Torjesen and Indra Overland. NUPI Paper 696: 8-23. Kelley, Judith. 2009c. ―D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation.‖ International Organization 63 (4): 765-87. Kelley, Judith. 2008b. ―The Supply and Demand for International Election Monitoring,‖ Working Paper.
62 Sjoberg, Fredrick.2011. Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States. Sweden: Edita Vasta Aros. Simpser, Alberto and Daniela Donno. 2012. ―Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?‖ The Journal of Politics 74 (2): 501–13. Smith, Karen.2001.―Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy.‖ In Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, volume 2, eds. Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Snyder, Sarah 2011. Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transna-tional History of the Helsinki Network. New York: Cambridge University Press. Stephan Blank. 2012. ―Rethinking Central Asia and its Security Issues.‖ UNISCI Discussion Papers Nº 28. Thomas, Daniel C. 2001. The Helsinki Effect. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tilly, Charles. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walker, Christopher and Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczkowska. 2012. Nation in Transit 2012. Freedom House. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Wilson, Andrew. 2005. Virtual Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Reports and documents European Union. ―European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007-2013 EU Regional Strategy for Assistance to Central Asia 2007-2013.‖
63 HRW. 1999. ―Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 – Tajikistan.‖
64 UNOCHA. 2012. ―Regional Humanitarian Funding Update.” Caucasus and Central Asia Humanitarian Funding Update No. 6.
News sources Andrei Bolgar. 2009. ―Tajikistan: Is the West Showing Signs of Democratization Fatigue?‖
65 Milod, Farhod.2013. One, Two, Three … The Rising from ―Sleep‖ of Parties for the November‖
66 APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS
1. Anonymous, Employee of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, June 2013.
2. Anonymous, Ex-employee of the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, June 2013.
3. George Sand, Head of Economic Unit at the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, Dushanbe, July 2013.
4. Abdughani Mahmadazimov, Head of Tajikistan‘s Political Science Association, Dushanbe, May 2013.
5. Abdumalik Qodirov, Country Director of IWPR, Dushanbe, July 2013.
6. Parviz Mullojonov, Political Analyst, Dushanbe, July 2013.
7. Nuriddin Qarshiboev, Head of the National Association of Independent Mass Media of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, July 2013.
8. Muhiddin Kabiri, Leader of the IRP, Dushanbe, July 2013.
9. Rajab Mirzo, Representative of the DP, Dushanbe, July 2013.
10. Saifullo Safarov, Representative of the PDP, Dushanbe, July 2013.
11. Rahmatillo Zoirov, Leader of the SDP, Dushanbe, May 2013.
67