No. 34 MarchNo. 2012 5 June 2011

Turkish Stream and its implications for the EU François Koch

redirection of ’s gas flow would lead “A first assessment is that this would certain EU countries that are highly dependent not work”, EC Vice-President in charge on Russian gas – Estonia, Finland, Latvia, of Energy Union Mr. Maros Sefcovic Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech said in an interview with The Wall Republic all depend on Russia for more than Street Journal at the World Economic 80% of their gas supplies – to reach an impasse Forum in Davos on the 22nd of January. in terms of gas security around that time. He was commenting on the recent Indeed, according to ’s new plans, the announcement by President Vladimir European Transmission system operators Putin and Gazprom’s Alexei Miller. (TSO’s) would have to build the needed Indeed, the Russian gas giant’s CEO infrastructure to link their grids to Gazprom’s announced that would be new Turkish-Greek border hub by 2019. The replaced by a new project, Turkish construction of this new infrastructure would Stream, linking Russia to the European not only cost billions but would also have to part of Turkey and this in addition to start right now in order to be achieved by 2019. the existing 16 billion cubic meters Yet, for now, this scenario remains uncertain as (bcm) . it faces realities that play both in its favour and in its disfavour. Moreover, if this scenario was to This policy brief looks at the various become reality, it would be improbable for implications this new reality could have Europe’s countries to sit back and watch. Those for Europe’s energy security. countries would then rather be looking at various options to face the scenario.

BYPASSING UKRAINE WHY TURKISH STREAM IS PROBABLY HAPPENING Indeed, this new reality would significantly alter a big chunk of Russia’s gas delivery routes by Recently, various technical details were disclosed making Turkey its main transit country for gas by Alexei Miller during a meeting with Turkish deliveries to Europe in an effort to completely Energy minister Taner Yildiz. From the bypass Ukraine. Hence, with the current transit pipeline’s four threads combined and planned agreements with Ukraine’s state-owned gas capacity of 63 bcm, 15, 75 bcm will go the company Naftogaz ending in 2019, the possible Turkish grid and 47, 25 bcm to the European

EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations market through the new Turkish-Greek border On the financial side, abandoning South Stream facility. The official agreement on the pipeline is makes sense. Indeed, South Stream was planned planned for the second quarter of 2015, but no in a period of high oil prices. The current state contract has been signed yet. The first thread of of Russia’s ailing economy with the West’s the project could be active and delivering gas to imposed sanctions over the situation in Ukraine the Turkish market starting in 2017-2018. and the fall of oil prices has led to a ruble crash. Furthermore, at least five main incentives are This new economic reality would have made it pushing Russia towards finalizing the project, quite difficult for Gazprom to invest in such a including: the Third Energy Package (EU energy costly (about 40 billion USD) infrastructure as rules, notably including an ownership South Stream, hence the decision to drop the unbundling clause), avoiding loss of already project. That being said, the new Turkish Stream engaged work, the financial benefit, keeping its pipeline might turn out to be expensive as well. geopolitical influence in Europe and avoid losing face in its current stand-off with the Furthermore, by building this new pipeline, West. Russia would make it possible for its gas deliveries to Europe to completely bypass Denounced as the main reason why Russia had Ukraine (about 60 bcm through the to abandon the South Stream project, the Third Brotherhood and Soyuz pipelines), with which it Energy Package rules remain and this reality has is in a de facto state of war, and still maintain its given Moscow impetus to pursuing the new dominant position in the European market Gazprom plans. The Europeans are not likely to accounting for a third of EU’s needs, with give way on the various implications of the around 140 bcm a year. This would strengthen Third Energy Package either, so any Russian Europe’s dependence on Russian gas as well as temptation at pressuring the EU further on that increase Russia’s geopolitical relevance in would be counterproductive. The EU can’t Europe. afford to bury its energy laws if it is to achieve its single energy market. On the Russian side, Lastly, in the wake of Russia’s political standoff the emergence of a new willingness to follow the with the West in the Ukraine crisis, President Third Package rules is also highly improbable. Putin can’t be seen as losing face. With this new For Gazprom then, the prospect of building energy deal with Turkey, Russia is showing it is new pipelines on EU ground is becoming a independent, not as isolated as the west pretends liability, hence its new plan to limit its and remains capable of high investment infrastructure to the Greek-Turkish border. infrastructure projects, sanctions or not. Indeed, Russia’s traditional energy model in Europe, controlling transport routes from point WHY IT’S GOING TO BE DIFFICULT of extraction to point of final consumption is For various reasons, Russia’s new pipeline more and more constrained. project, Turkish Stream, might turn out to be Another incentive is for Russia to avoid any too complicated to develop. First, the EU losses in already disbursed cash and investments remains Russia’s top gas customer. Indeed, even in the run up to the South Stream construction though Russia and recently announced work. Indeed, most of the purchased pipes, the important gas deals (in May and November feasibility studies for the undersea part of the 2014) and the development of the Power of project and the technical capacities (pipe-laying pipeline, China is unlikely to replace vessels) will be used in the Turkish Stream Europe as Russia’s top customer in the short to project. medium term. With a maximum 68 bcm per year

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planned export capacity by 2020, Russian supply Moreover, Turkish Stream looks like a costly to China, amounting then for about 1,7 % of infrastructure when the European demand is China’s energy demand, would still suffer by weakening and the EU is actively working on comparison to Europe’s yearly 140 bcm the diversification of its supply sources, meaning demand. In addition, the negotiation with China new competition for Russian gas. Gazprom’s on price will be tough and due to the current plans to bypass Ukraine’s existing grid to switch low gas prices, the Chinese might end up paying to a new yet to-be-built route to supply Europe less than the Europeans do. Thus it is hard to thus makes little sense economically. Indeed, imagine a wise seller toying with his prime buyer Russia abandoned South Stream’s construction for too long without taking the risk of eventually because, at least partly, it was becoming too alienating him for good, this being especially pricy within the current economic conditions. true when the buyer is already cautious, “once Yet, at least, Gazprom was part of a consortium burnt, twice shy” as the saying goes. Can with , EDF and Wintershall in South Gazprom really afford to lose its main market Stream’s construction process. By contrast, the and two-thirds of its cash revenues? Russian company will have to build the whole undersea infrastructure of Turkish Stream on its Besides, numerous long term contracts signed own and will only be sharing the cost of the between Gazprom and certain European energy project’s onshore infrastructure with the Turkish companies go well beyond 2019. These company Botas but investors, Russians as well contracts are usually quite specific about the as Turkish might be hard to find given the point of delivery (currently through Ukraine). current economic environment. Hence the new Thus breaking these contracts wouldn’t come project could turn out to be as expensive as cheap as it would result in Gazprom facing South Stream. important penalties. In order to avoid such penalties, Gazprom would have to convince the The appropriateness of this huge investment European companies and Transmission System could be further challenged by the EU’s future Operators (TSO’s) to agree to both a contract renewed efforts to reduce its dependence on modification and a huge investment on their Russian gas by reducing demand, increasing its part to build the new infrastructure linking their energy efficiency and actively looking for grid to the Turkish-Greek gas hub by 2019. The alternative energy sources (renewables, only way to convince them would then probably unconventional resources) and alternative gas be to offer substantial discounts on delivery sources. Adding to this, the recent mild winters prices. So the question is, will the European and more importantly the economic crisis companies play along when they know they will impact on EU’s economy, have seen EU’s have to invest massively and won’t be supported Russian gas imports slowing continually since by an irritated European Commission in face of 2010, thus weakening Russia’s position in the Gazprom’s “fait accompli”? Indeed, those European market. In this context one wonders investments could well be redirected towards if the European demand for 47 bcm really other EU supported projects that wouldn’t exists? Of course this reality must be nuanced by reinforce Russia’s energy grip on the EU, as the the IEA’s latest EU energy policy review stating Southern Gas Corridor, for example. The EU the EU’s expected gas imports increase between would surely be looking for more reliable energy 2020 and 2030 and thus its renewed dependence sources, where it wouldn’t have to face the 2006 on Russian pipeline gas imports for the and 2009 winter crisis kind of scenario. foreseeable future.

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Finally, the European Commission is getting building new infrastructure linking Turkish ready to proceed with its antitrust case against Stream to the European market. This project Gazprom that was launched in September could also serve as a Russian retaliation towards 2012.1 The case, based on the Russian Energy the reluctant EU member states it is blaming in Giant’s presumed abuse of its dominant position the South Stream cancellation, especially in Europe’s market, could further Bulgaria. Moscow has a long history of weaken the company’s position in Europe as threatening the eventual objectors with well as its finances. Indeed, it could, if the increasing gas prices. In order to avoid being left allegations are upheld, be facing important fines, aside, Bulgaria is now actively lobbying in favour mandatory restructuring of its European of the Turkish Stream alternative, namely the activities and even mandatory sales of capacities Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its to competitors. In such a scenario, Gazprom possible European extensions, including the could be forced to change the way it is doing currently shelved Nabucco West pipeline and business in the EU. the 5 bcm Greek-Bulgarian interconnector (IGB). The prospect for all these potential GEOPOLITICS AT PLAY transit countries is to benefit from important transit fees as well as gaining in geopolitical The potential gain for Russia is quite obvious. relevance. It is interesting to see how Russia is Indeed through Turkish Stream, Putin is looking also taking advantage of Europe’s open market at achieving three main goals: reinforcing EU’s reality by confronting it with its monopolistic dependence on Russian gas by developing a new state-owned groups. However, it remains unsure delivery route, making Ukraine irrelevant when what project the EU and the European energy it comes to gas transit and strengthening companies will support. Russia’s control over the Turkish market. Russia’s energy policy is directly linked to its With Turkish Stream, Russia will also be able to grand strategy. Having understood that the EU strengthen its control over the growing Turkish won’t loosen its Third Energy Package’s rules, market. Indeed, it will add a new route to the Russia and Gazprom will leave it to the already existing ones (Blue Stream, Tans-Balkan Europeans to build the necessary infrastructure Pipeline) and link its resources to new hubs in to link the European market to the new Turkish Turkey. It will also geopolitically bring Ankara Stream. To do so, Russia is employing a divide closer and strengthen its influence in the region. and rule strategy, taking advantage of the Nonetheless, arm-twisting Turkey will be much diverging member state’s views. In fact, it is harder than arm-twisting Ukraine in case of counting on a “coalition of the willing” disputes over gas transit, or with respect to consisting of those European countries showing other political issues. Russia won’t be able to a pro-Russian stance such as Alexis Tsipras’ play the game it used to play in Ukraine. Greece, Orban’s Hungary but also Macedonia For Europe though, supporting the Turkish and Serbia. All of them have been cozying up to Stream project could be counterproductive in President Putin as witnessed by recent state terms of diversification and even strengthen its visits and diplomatic gestures. To enhance its current dependence on Russia. Indeed, Turkish relations with these countries, Russia is offering Stream would only add a new route for Russian price discounts on oil and gas deliveries but is gas to access the European market. Moreover, also providing financial help in the case of Russia would still be able to control the volumes Greece. If Russia’s efforts are successful, then, reaching Europe. Adding to this, the project these countries would likely be instrumental in might compete with the TANAP project. Both

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of them are supposed to transit through Turkey construction at the end of 2017. By contrast, the and become operational around 2020. Turkish TANAP project is based on a binding Stream might thus hurt the TANAP project by intergovernmental agreement signed by both reinforcing the sentiment of uncertainty and Azeri President Aliyev and Turkish Prime instability surrounding these huge gas Minister Erdogan on 26 June 2012. On 16 infrastructure investments. Furthermore, if March 2015, the opening ceremony marking the TANAP and its general framework the Southern start of TANAP’s construction works was Gas Corridor project were to be completed as attended by EC Vice-President in charge of planned, they could truly help Europe’s need for Energy Union Sefcovic, Azeri President Aliyev diversification as well as undermine Russia’s and Turkish Energy Minister Yildiz. interests, be they geopolitical or economic. This Furthermore, Turkey is part of the consortium explains why we might witness an actual race managing the Shah Deniz II oil and gas fields between the projects. that will be supplying TANAP.

The EU will also have to manage the rising Because of all these elements, Turkey is tensions between its member states and try to generally seen as the main winner in any convince them to stay united on the energy scenario. Both with TANAP and Turkish front. This, as witnessed already with Hungary’s Stream it gains leverage on the EU as well as on latest comments and the first signs of division Russia. It might use this new political clout to concerning the Energy Union, might turn out to constrain Russia’s grand regional strategy and be quite complex. gain weight in its EU membership negotiations. But Turkey might also deepen its dependence Turkey defends its pragmatic approach and on Russian gas by building Turkish Stream. pledges to accept all pipelines that want to cross Indeed, the country already imports more than its territory. Indeed, the country would happily half of its gas from Russia, thus adding a new see itself developing as a regional energy hub Russian route to the already existing ones is even though it might actually rather develop as a almost certain to increase this dependency. regional transit country if it doesn’t negotiate the contracts well. Currently it is letting both the EU Ukraine, on the one hand, could be losing its and Russia advance their pawns in their geopolitical relevance with the new Turkish respective pipeline projects. The EU’s Southern Stream project. Indeed, if it was to be bypassed Gas Corridor project transporting gas from the completely, it would first, lose its transit Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II fields) revenues and second, lose its political status as and eventually Central Asia and the Middle-East the main energy link between Russia and the to Europe and Russia’s Turkish Stream creating EU. On the other hand, the country could, by a new route towards the Turkish and European losing its transit role, become less dependent on markets. Even if Turkey is reluctant in openly Russia and may have the opportunity of acknowledging the existing competition between engaging in the needed political reforms with the two projects, it remains uncertain if both of less outside interference. the projects will be supported in the same way by Ankara. WHAT CAN THE EU DO? For now, Turkey has signed a Memorandum of The EU is at a crossroads. Now is the time to Understanding (MoU) with Russia but no legally take important decisions that will have lasting binding contract yet and the latest comments by implications for the European energy market. the Turkish authorities put the beginning of The Juncker Commission has understood this,

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hence the development of the Energy Union should be further exploited while the new and the launch of talks focusing on Energy potentially producing areas should be explored. Diplomacy at the EEAS. The Energy Union’s Indeed, as it becomes increasingly recognized plan, unveiled on 25 February, will aim at that British, Norwegian and Dutch production is bringing greater energy security, sustainability in decline, the Eastern-Mediterranean area and competitiveness to the European Energy (Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Palestine) could market. This plan puts forward actions focusing become Europe’s next energy production hot- on : energy security and solidarity; the full spot. Simultaneously, EU’s MS should try to integration of the European market; a renewed assess their unconventional gas (shale gas) effort on energy efficiency; progress in the resources potential that could be limiting the decarbonisation of the economy; improving impact of Europe’s declining conventional energy management and governance; further resources. Indeed, in British ’s (BP) investments in R&D and competitiveness. last Energy outlook, the company expects that by 2035 two-thirds of Europe’s natural gas will Developing the Energy Union and making sure have to be imported. the 2030 framework for climate and energy policy targets are fully implemented, could be The other solution is for the EU to find new one solution for the EU to lessen its supplying partners. Through its various dependence on Russian gas. By pushing for documents, the EC has highlighted key diversification but also interconnecting the infrastructure projects to link Europe to the national grids, developing reverse flows relevant areas when it comes to gas capacities, developing more storage facilities, diversification. On top of the list is the Southern building new LNG terminals, reducing energy Gas Corridor that would link Europe to the consumption in general with more efficiency, Caspian Sea region. This massive project is expanding the deployment of renewable energy based on the development of three pipelines: the technologies and unconventional oil and gas Southern Caucasus pipeline (SCP), the Trans- resources, the various EU member states could Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and find themselves in a more comfortable position the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This set of when it comes to energy security. Of course it’s pipelines will connect Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz not going to be easy for all the MS to move in II gas fields to the European market in the short the same direction together; it is going to be a term. In the medium to long term, it could be long-haul project. expanded and be connected to other producers as in the Eastern Mediterranean region, Nevertheless, we will here focus on gas. Russia’s Turkmenistan, Iraq, the Kurdistan region and gas is probably going to stay important in even Iran. The Southern Caucasus Pipeline (also Europe’s energy mix but for the various reasons called BTE) will be connecting Baku previously developed in this article, Europe (Azerbaijan) to Erzurum (Turkey) via Tbilisi might still be willing to diversify its supply (Georgia) and will have a 25 bcm capacity. The sources. To do so the Commission has put Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) forward various solutions in its Energy Union will link Erzurum to the Turkish-Greek border 2 3 Package , its European Energy Security Strategy and will transport 16 bcm (and up to 60 bcm in and in the list of the recognized projects of 4 2030). This pipeline will then connect with the common interest benefiting from the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that will deliver Connecting Europe Facility financing scheme. around 20 bcm capacity and link Kipoi (Greece) First, Europe should develop its conventional to Lecce () via Fier (Albania). Additional gas resources, the current production areas

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infrastructure could further be connected to this bcm Power of Siberia Pipeline deal with Russia web to link other parts of Europe (notably the (May 2014) might be pushing Turkmenistan to Balkans) with the 5 bcm Greek-Bulgarian look for new markets, Turkmenistan still interconnector (IGB), the 15 bcm Turkey- remains China’s largest gas supply source. Greece-Italy interconnector (ITGI) or even the Moreover, the 28 bcm planned Turkmenistan- 30 bcm Nabucco West piepeline project that Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) could eventually be revived and link Greece to could add another project competing for the Austria (Baumgarten) via Bulgaria, Romania and same gas even if the project is not showing Hungary. much progress since the 2010 intergovernmental agreement was signed in Ashgabat (due to the Azerbaijan’s first deliveries to Europe could take significant conflict ongoing). place as soon as 2018. The project will start with only 10 bcm, but could then be expanded in The Southern Gas Corridor could also help order to reach to up to 60 bcm around 2030. linking Europe to Middle - Eastern gas Turkmenistan could also supply Europe by suppliers. The two main regional players could connecting itself to the TANAP pipeline with be Iran and Iraq. Indeed, the Islamic Republic the 30 bcm planned undersea Trans-Caspian of Iran deserves more attention with the nuclear Pipeline (TCP) that would be connecting non-proliferation deal making serious progress. Turkmenbasy’s fields (Turkmenistan) and Of course, it remains uncertain whether the eventually Tengiz’s fields (Kazakhstan) to Baku negotiations will succeed but western energy (Azerbaijan). Both Azrbaijan and Turkmenistan companies are already being courted by the look like serious alternative supply sources with Iranians. Iran is home to the second largest gas respectively some 0.9 trillion cubic meters and reserves after Russia. It could therefore be seen 17.5 tcm. Azerbaijan’s close political proximity as a potential alternative to Russian gas, but one to Turkey convinced it to pursue the long haul must take into account the following realities. project of supplying Europe. For Turkmenistan, Iran’s gas field infrastructure is ageing, it thus things might be a bit more complicated even would take both time and heavy investments to though Azeris and Turkmens concluded an modernize it and the speed at which the EU, the agreement on the future construction of the US and the UN sanctions would potentially be Trans Caspian Pipeline in 2014. Firstly, due to lifted would be another factor to account for. the disputed legal status of the Caspian Sea, Moreover, Iran’s high domestic demand leads Russia, Iran and Kazakhstan could try to block most of its production to actually be consumed any progress in the development of the TCP internally. Finally, the EU would be competing pipeline. Indeed, Russia and Iran would with others on the client list, namely Pakistan, eventually suffer from Ashgabat’s rivalry in Oman and Turkey with whom Iran already supplying the EU gas market in the future. shares pipelines. For all these reasons, if Iran Secondly, the EU could be competing with could export gas to Europe, it would only be other actors, namely China, Pakistan and India. around 2030 at best, leaving it to others to Turkmenistan has been ramping up its energy supply the European market in the meantime. In ties to China in the last years as China is willing the long term though, Iran could turn out to be to invest in Turkmenistan’s natural gas a game changer in the gas world. production capacities. Furthermore, the Central Asia–China gas pipeline (completed in 2009) has The second regional key player is Iraq. Home to a 55 bcm capacity that could be expanded in the 3.6 tcm, the country could also help enhance future. Indeed, even though China’s recent 30 Europe’s energy security. Of course for Iraq, the necessary political stability, security and

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economic conditions are far from existing. For it various EU external energy policy publications: to develop the necessary infrastructure to supply North Africa. The main issues for the region are the European market, the country must first political stability and security. The impact of the tackle the significant internal political and weak regional stability imperils the hydrocarbon security problems it faces. Most importantly, it industry’s need for investments. The region will need to significantly degrade ISIS and regain which is already heavily connected to Spain and control of large parts of Iraqi territory that were Italy, could theoretically easily increase its captured in the last year. The same goes for the exports towards the European market. Indeed, Kurdistan region even if various major energy the 12 bcm Maghreb-Europe pipeline linking firms are already present on the ground and Algeria to Spain via Morocco, the 10 bcm Galsi working on developing the gas production pipeline linking Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and capacities. Sardinia, the 8 bcm pipeline linking Algeria to Spain, the 30 bcm Trans- The other region that could be part of the Mediterranean pipeline linking Algeria to Italy Southern Gas Corridor supply is the East via Tunisia and Sicily and the 11 bcm Mediterranean (East Med). Indeed, the East Greenstream pipeline linking to Italy are Med is home to large offshore gas reserves. currently underexploited. A good example of the Since 2009, the discovered reserves in Israel, the different hurdles encountered on the ground can Republic of Cyprus and Lebanon amount to be found in Algeria. The country holds about about 3.5 tcm. These countries have the 4.5 tcm of gas. Unfortunately, the conjunction potential of exporting more than 10 bcm within of an increasing domestic consumption, a a 30 year timeframe. Unfortunately progress has stagnant if not slowing production, a strong been rather slow. This can be explained by public opposition to new drillings especially for multiple obstacles. On the political front, the unconventional resources and alarming security long standing issues between Cyprus and Turkey issues linked to the presence of armed Islamic still poison the overall negotiations and extremist groups make it quite difficult for any especially with the legal disputes concerning land investors to be attracted to the country. A and maritime borders. Another issue is the further issue is Spain’s poor interconnection absence of transport infrastructure. The with France thus making it difficult for North construction of pipelines or LNG plants will African gas to reach the rest of Europe by pipes. necessitate heavy investments. The interested This problem could be faced by investing in investors are also facing regulatory and additional interconnectors along the Spanish- bureaucratic hurdles that are slowing any French border. Hence Algeria’s national attempt at moving forward. This in turn makes hydrocarbon industry suffers and remains it impossible for the exploiting companies to underexploited. The same could be said for develop the discovered gas fields. Thus, for Libya where the security situation appears to be now, the necessary regulatory and political even worse. If the region was to stabilize stability conditions for a better exploitation of politically and in terms of security, it could very the hydrocarbon resources are not fulfilled. If well become one of Europe’s top suppliers the local national authorities were to find when it comes to gas. political solutions, the region’s resources could then be contributing to Europe’s energy Finally, LNG capacities could also be part of the security. answer in Europe’s gas security. Various international suppliers are available on the Next to the Southern Gas Corridor, there’s market. Of course, the gas prices might turn out another region that is explicitly named in the

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to be more expensive because Europe would decide where it wants to go, what it wants to do, find itself in competition with other markets and where it wants to do it, how it wants to do it and notably the Asian one. For Europe to be able to with whom. Europe can either follow the course better profit from these sources, it has to better it has been on for decades or it can decide to use its already existing capacities as well as take a new road. This new road would stretch develop new LNG facilities as advised by the towards energy independence by taking on European Commission in multiple documents. diversification plans. Russia, as Europe’s main Only then could it have an easier access to LNG gas supplier and big neighbour will obviously supplies from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the USA and stay an important actor in Europe’s energy Canada. In order to tackle this issue, the consumption for better or worse. But this reality European Commission is currently working on a shouldn’t stop Europe from diversifying its comprehensive LNG strategy as announced in energy sources. On the contrary Europe should its Energy Union Package. stick to its guns. It should implement its various infrastructure projects, such as the Southern Gas EUROPE SHOULD STICK TO ITS GUNS Corridor, and not allow for Russian tactics to transform its projects in further Nabucco As explored throughout this article, Russia’s new scenario repetitions. pipeline project, Turkish Stream, might have important implications for Europe’s energy François Koch is Researcher at the security. Indeed, this bold move by Gazprom, European Affairs programme at Egmont – Europe’s prime gas supplier puts Europe at a Royal Institute for International Relations. crossroads. Now is the time for Europe to His research focuses on energy policies.

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ENDNOTES

1 See official press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm?locale=en 2 See official document: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1- 01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF 3 See official document: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN 4 See official document: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2013_pci_projects_country_0.pdf

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The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research. www.egmontinstitute.be

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