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No. 172 Strategic Forum June 2000 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe by Jeffrey Simon

As Central and East European (CEE) 23,000 in 2000, 21,000 in 2004, and 20,000 in Key Points armed forces are reduced and restructured over 2009, by which time 85–90 percent of con- he transformation of Central and East the next decade, human and financial re- scripts will provide support services. The Czech European (CEE) armed forces into sources will be stretched and stressed, in some Republic can meet its force goals. The main Tmodern contributors to Euro-Atlantic cases beyond capacity. CEE governments and problem it faces is how to develop warrant security during the next decade will be more societies will likely experience civil-military officers and recruit extended-service NCOs. To difficult than in the last, because euphoria tension. Due to resource shortages, CEE Mem- date, programs to do this have failed. over joining the West is dissipating, and bership Action Plan (MAP) partners, who aspire had a defense establishment of attention is turning to problems of reform. to NATO membership, will be tempted to exag- 60,000 in January 1999, less than 40 percent of CEE governments have been unable to gerate defense planning and enlarge forces to the strength a decade earlier. Hungarian demo- provide long-term plans and to guarantee accommodate their political objective of Euro- graphics severely limit the number of conscripts resources to build military capabilities. Plans Atlantic integration. available for military service; the cohort of still must be developed, especially in Slova- The accompanying chart (see page 3) draft-age males declines from 90,000 in 1998 to kia and , and reliable projections of illustrates trends in CEE defense establishments 50,000 in 2003. This decline is aggravated by a resources are sorely needed in . and budgets discussed below. 9-month conscription term, which the govern- Downsizing and restructuring militaries ment would like to reduce to 6 months. and integrating general staffs within min- New NATO Members Though Hungary approved its “Principles of Security and Defense Policy” in December istries of defense can create friction in civil- The had a defense 1998, its defense plans must now be reconsid- military relations; the could establishment of 78,580 in January 1999, only ered, because the government is unwilling to help mitigate such problems through retrain- 60 percent of its strength in January 1993. The provide adequate resources and cannot meet ing aimed at alternate careers and merit- government approved the security strategy of NATO target goals. based career development programs. the Czech Republic in February 1999 and the After Hungarian Chief of Staff Ferenc In moving to all-volunteer forces, CEE military strategy in March 1999. Defense was Vegh resigned over these issues, and over partners will lose an instrument for shaping allocated 1.9 percent of integrating the general staff into the defense the citizens of young democracies (such as (GDP) in 1999 and 2.0 percent in 2000. The ministry, his replacement, Fodor Lajos, noted ) and manpower pools from which “Concept for Development of Forces 2003– that the forces were short 10 billion forints and to recruit extended-service volunteers (like 2008” establishes guidelines for future develop- must renegotiate commitments to NATO. ). NATO allies could provide partner ment, under which the military will be cut Prime Minister Viktor Orban added that the programs focused on conscription to foster roughly 25 percent by 2004. In terms of opera- government planned to cut the military from civic virtues and help define training for tional posture, the armed forces are divided 55,000 to roughly 35–40,000. In mid-July, the specific military roles and missions. into immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction cabinet passed a so-called secret resolution to Confusion prevails over the appropriate forces, and main defense forces, with readiness streamline the armed forces, which purport- length of conscription for each CEE country. times of 10, 20, and 30 days, respectively. edly will ease financing bottlenecks and in- However, terms of 6 or 7 months can only The ratios among officers, warrant offi- crease professionalism. prepare reserve forces and are not adequate cers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) In late July 1999, the government an- to meet operational requirements. will alter significantly. The officer corps will nounced that it would not meet its predeces- decrease, while warrant officers and NCOs in sor’s commitment to NATO to raise its defense extended active service will increase. The num- budget to 1.8 percent of GDP. Instead, it would ber of 12-month conscripts will decline to

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spend only 1.51 percent in 2000, increasing to 45,000. Extended-service volunteers (now fewer was approved by parliament as a law. Conse- 1.61 percent by 2004. (The previous, already than 100) will increase, while professional quently, problems might result when guaran- modest, plan had proposed 1.8 percent by officers will decline, which will create serious teed resources come due. ( A currency board 2001.) In addition, personnel will decline social dislocation (as will the release of 23,000 and a stabilized economy improve prospects for roughly 10,000 (mostly officers) while NCOs civilians). In 2000 alone some 5,150 officers success.) Also, because the general staff—not increase to a ratio of 2:1 with officers. will be discharged. (The officer pyramid now the parliament or local communities–decided had a defense establishment of consists of roughly 3,300 lieutenants and which bases to close, political opposition and 285,000 in January 1999, about 50 percent of senior lieutenants; 3,570 captains, 3,560 ma- pressure might alter the plan as implemented. the 1988 levels. The government approved the jors, 3,010 lieutenant colonels, and 2,400 Romania had a defense establishment of “National Security Strategy” in November 1999 colonels, and 53 generals.) Because of demo- 150,000 in 1999, about 55 percent of the 1990 and the new defense doctrine, “Assumptions of graphic trends, the number of conscripts will total. In 1998 alone, 11,000 officers and NCOs State Security Policy,” in December and pro- decline as the overall force shrinks; the 42,000 left the forces, of whom 85 percent were majors, vided 2.1 percent of GDP to defense in 1999 conscripts in 1999 will fall to 25,000 by 2004. lieutenant colonels, and colonels who did not and 2000, down from about 2.4 percent during leave happily; 75 percent were over 40 years of most of the 1990s. unlike Hungary and the age. Though already In April 1998 the defense ministry issued Czech Republic, have substantially downsized, more reductions “Order No. 60” reducing the defense establish- are to come. Personnel development policy ment to 180,000 by 2003. In May 2000 the enjoys popular support needs to be based upon merit and competition government approved a 150,000 variant. for the military and structured both to correct a reverse officer Senior officers would decline by 19,000 (or pyramid and to achieve balance among the 22,200, if a 160,000 variant were adopted). Bulgaria is a late starter on reform. Most officer and NCO corps. Service as an NCO also Social dislocation would be further magnified documents have been developed in the last two must be made more attractive. by changes in the numbers of commissioned years—a “National Security Concept” in Romania approved a “National Security officers (declining 50 percent by 2003) and Spring 1998, and “Military Doctrine” in June Strategy” and a “Military-Defense Doctrine” in warrant and noncommissioned officers (in- 1999. Bulgaria used the U.S. Defense Reform 1994. Since 1998 these documents have been creasing by 150 percent). The 2003 goal calls (Kievenaar) Study in preparing its Military rewritten, but not yet approved. Romanian for 90,000 cadres consisting of 20 percent Doctrine and Plan 2004, which was adopted in armed forces need an approved national strat- commissioned officers, 40 percent warrant October 1999 and determines the organiza- egy from which to derive defense strategy, officers, and 40 percent NCOs. tional development of the armed forces and military doctrine, and strategic directives. The Council of Ministers adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Nevertheless, with the assistance of the United “Program for Integrating and Modernizing the Unlike Hungary and the Czech Republic, Kingdom and United States (Kievenaar Study), for the Years 1998–2012” Bulgaria enjoys popular support for the mili- a “National Defense Framework Action Plan” on 15 October 1998. As military reductions tary and spends more—roughly 2.1 percent of (FAP) for 2000–2005 and a “Long Term commenced, the retention of officers with GDP in 1998—on defense. Like Hungary and Framework” to 2010 have been established appropriate skills became an issue. During the Czech Republic, Bulgaria aims to join with the objective of joining NATO by 2005 and 1997, roughly 4,000 officers left the ; NATO and the (EU). To the EU by 2010. The plan identified three during 1998, 7,850 regular members departed, achieve this, Bulgarian defense planning military options varying from 87,000, to of whom more than half were officers, 400 of includes information planning, developing 112,000, to 140,000. (According to the army whom had completed English courses. Of immediate and rapid reaction forces, and reform, by 2004 the overall defense establish- those who left, roughly 85 percent were resig- international force contributions (e.g., Multi- ment will decline to 140,000.) The 112,000 nations and less than 2 percent dismissals. national Peacekeeping Force South Eastern military variant was a political decision taken This led Deputy Defense Minister Robert Lipka Europe [MPFSEE], headquartered at Plovdiv). because of Romania’s financial limitations. to complain that “unfortunately, the wrong Bulgaria also plans to develop a Law on Crisis Phase one of the FAP (2000–2003) is to people are leaving.” Management, which will draw on restructure the forces to achieve minimal While Poland can meet its force goals, it experience, especially relations with NATO operational capability; that is to provide credi- shares with other countries many problems and neighbors. ble defense and NATO interoperability. Phase that degrade morale, including social condi- Bulgaria’s Plan 2004 is well-conceived, two (2004–2007) expects to witness equipment tions, housing, and pensions. The relatively but did not receive parliamentary support; the modernization and achievement of operational healthy economy also draws talent away from “Military Doctrine” (which assumes no threat) capability. Romania’s conscript cohort of the professional forces. 135,000 is more than adequate to meet its MAP Partners Bulgaria in January 1999 had a defense Jeffrey Simon is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense establishment of 112,000, slightly lower than in University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on European security affairs including NATO 1991. In 2004 this number will decline to Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Dr. Simon can be reached by phone at (202) 685–2367, by fax at (202) 685–3972, or via e-mail at [email protected].

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Comparative Trends in Defense Establishments and Budgets for a Democratic (HZDS) party domi- nate ASR through politicization and budget manipulation from September 1994 to Septem- Strength of Defense Establishments Defense Budget as Percentage of GDP Conscription Term ber 1998. Promotions were stalled after 1994. Past Current Projected Past Current Projected (Months) The Slovak Army had only 14 general officers Czech Republic 1993 1999 2004 1993 1999 2000 because of Meciar’s refusal to make new ap- Total 131,965 78,580 60,000 2.6% 1.9% 2% 12 Military 106,679 56,935 47,200 pointments, until President Michal Kovac Civilian 25,286 21,630 12,800 finally appointed eight new generals in May Hungary 1989 1999 2001 1997 1999 2000 1997. Then without consulting the defense Total 155,700 60,000 45,000 1.4% 1.6% 1.51% 9* minister or chief of staff, in August 1998 acting Military 122,400 52,200 37,000 President Ivan Gasparovic (HZDS) appointed Civilian 33,300 7,800 8,000 eight new brigadier generals, promoted five Poland 1988 1999 2003 1994 1998 2000 officers to major general, and named a new Total ± 400,000 285,000 150–180,000 2.4% 2.26% 2.08% 12 Chief of Staff. Military 205,000 Fiscal constraints became extremely Civilian 80,000 harsh. Inflation, coupled with defense reduc- Bulgaria 1991 1999 2004 1996 1998 2000 tions from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1995 to 1.7 Total 117,000 112,000 45,000 2.6% 2.1% 2.3% 12** Military 82,000 40,000 percent in 1999, prevented replenishment of Civilian 30,000 5,000 limited stocks inherited from Czechoslovakia Romania 1990 1999 2003 2000 2007 after the 1993 split. Slovak forces also are Total 320,000 180,000 140,000 NA 1.8% 2.1% 12 plagued with social problems, including hous- Military 275,000 150,000 87–112,000 ing shortages that have delayed army restruc- Civilian 5,000 30,000 28,000 turing and impeded retention of officers. Slovak Republic 1995 1999 2002 1995 1999 During 1997, the budget shortfall also had Total 47,000 35,000 25–30,000 2.6% 1.7% NA 12** a negative impact on conscripts, professional Lithuania 1999 2008 1995 1999 2002/2005 officers, and training. The army command Total NA 12,200 23,000 0.5% 1.51% 2%/2.5% 12 failed to call up 6,000 draftees (25 percent of Slovenia 1999 1999 2010 the annual call-up) for lack of funds. Hence, Total NA 8,200-to-9,400 NA NA 1.55% 2.1% 7 the projected downsizing of ASR to 35,000 by * possible reduction to 6 the year 2000 became a reality in the fall of ** possible reduction to 9 or 6 1997. As a result the army had to develop a new concept entitled “An Integrated Program of 12-month requirements, which were 67,000 in personnel reductions could aggravate civil- Development in the Army and Slovak Arms 1998 and will be reduced to 25,000 after 2000. military tensions. Industry to the Year 2010, with a View to the The officer corps pyramid is malformed The Slovak Republic had a defense Year 2015.” The 1998 defense budget of and needs to be streamlined. Hence, before establishment of roughly 47,000 in January Sk14.05 billion represented a 21 percent de- 2003 the current 30,000-strong Romanian 1995, despite having been built from scratch crease from 1997 in real terms and had a officer corps must be halved. For example, its after independence in January 1993, As of 1995, dramatic negative impact on troop training 2,300 colonels must be reduced to 630; the the force consisted of 13,900 professionals and preparedness. Chief of Staff General Jozef 5,618 lieutenant colonels to 1,800; the 7,800 (10,100 officers, 3,400 warrant officers, and Tuchyna candidly noted that, because the majors to 2,200; and the 9,908 captains to 400 NCOs) and 33,000 12-month conscripts. budget in 1988 was inadequate, he would be 4,050. At the same time lieutenants should be Slovakia’s “Long-Term Defense Plan” projected “compelled to reduce some tasks.” increased from 3,051 to 3,750, and second the total force in the year 2000 to be 35,000, Defense reform, which has been energized lieutenants from 2,218 to 2,400. Also generals comprising 20,000 professionals (5,000 officers, since Mikulas Dzurinda took over from Meciar will increase from the current 101 to 120. 10,000 warrant officers, and 5,000 NCOs) and in 1998, faces a significant challenge to undo Restructuring this unbalanced officer corps will 15,000 conscripts. four years of damage. The new government in be a difficult and painful process. The Army of the Slovak Republic (ASR) is November 1998 overturned the August 1998 In order to finance the transformation, the most respected institution in the country, appointment of Marian Miklus and named the 2000 defense budget of $710 million would enjoying more than 70 percent support, com- General Milan Cerovsky as the new ASR Chief constitute 1.8 percent of GDP, and is planned to pared to 60 percent for the church and consti- of Staff. Also the new government pursues steadily increase to 2.2 percent ($1.2 billion) in tutional court. But perhaps for that very reason, NATO integration with greater vigor. In March 2007. Romania, in contrast to Bulgaria, will ASR found itself in political and fiscal trouble. 1999 it announced that it would send a 150- seek parliamentary approval for its plan. De- Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in- man engineering unit to SFOR, and signifi- spite a well-conceived plan, if the Romanian creasingly exerted efforts to have his Movement cantly bolster its 35-man troop support for the economy does not stabilize, a lower 87,000 United Nations on the Golan Heights. But since variant might result, and further military Slovakia’s economy is now a problem, the

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government has had to further reduce the 1999 conscription not only to build its reserve forces laudable, but seems to far exceed the physical defense budget (Sk13.8 billion), which meant for total defense but also to build the citizens of capacities of a country with only 2 million that toward the end of 1999 funds were not a young democracy. Hence, conscripts will people. In comparison, the three Baltic states, available to feed—let alone train—conscripts. continue to constitute roughly 50 percent of the , , and Lithuania, with a com- In spite of these problems, Slovakia wants armed forces. Though Lithuania has benefitted bined population almost four times that of to provide NATO with one rapid deployment from the U.S. Defense Reform (Kievenaar) Slovenia, are working with to con- battalion for peace support operations and Study concluded in Spring 1998, it remains struct the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT)—which eight MiG–29 aircraft. In addition, Slovak is very dependent upon external support. The objectives are to reduce the armed forces to we need to enlist NATO goal of developing a battalion-strength unit 25–30,000 by 2002, increase professionaliza- diverts scarce resources from the objective of tion, reduce the number of recruits, and em- allies to provide partner providing main defense forces. A better ap- ploy more civilians in defense. Conscription is programs that focus on proach to providing peace support to the inter- to be reduced from 12 months to 9 by mid- using conscription to national community, might be to build on 2000, and eventually to 6 months. Finally, the existing trilateral military cooperation with general staff (in Trencin) is to be fused with foster civic virtues and Hungary. This would allow Slovenia the defense ministry (in Bratislava) and both to acquire NATO interoperability and to partici- structures reduced. Not only will this be costly, concerned about the danger of force imbal- pate in peace support operations in a way that it probably will produce civil-military friction. ances developing from its participation in the is more compatible with its limited physical There seems to be a disconnect between NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP), capacity. Slovenia (like Slovakia) needs U.S. Slovak political goals and defense capabilities. and hopes that the MAP feedback will be useful assistance to conduct a defense reform assess- The country needs an outside defense reform in preventing such distortions from occurring. ment that will assist it to build armed forces assessment to help the government rationalize Slovenia is a small country of two mil- that are more compatible with its physical its political objective to join NATO with the lion that was a former republic in the Federal limits and operational needs. capabilities it would like to build and with its Republic of Yugoslavia. Like Lithuania, Slove- limited human and fiscal capacities. nia aims to join NATO and the EU and is build- Lithuania has planned for growth in ing up its armed forces, which range in In conclusion, because restructuring the armed forces from the January 1999 total of strength from 8,200 to 9,400. Variations result officer corps is likely to cause civil-military 12,200 (including 2,000 officers and NCOs) to from the number of conscripts (4,000 to tensions, Washington might provide retraining 23,000, plus 15,000 in the National Volunteer 5,500), who serve for 7 months—a term that is programs for alternate careers and for develop- Defense Force (NVDF) by 2008. Lithuania too short for any meaningful activity aside ing NCO corps, and merit-based career develop- committed 1.51 percent of GDP in 1999 (724 from basic training for territorial defense. ment programs. Since the United States has million Litas or $180 million), which is to Constitutional prohibitions prevent the use of all-volunteer forces, we need to enlist NATO increase to 2 percent in 2002 and 2.5 percent conscripts in peace support operations. allies, such as Germany, to provide partner in 2005. After the 1968 invasion of programs that focus on using conscription to In contrast to the former non-Soviet Czechoslovakia, the defense ministry became foster civic virtues (Innere Führung in the Warsaw Pact (NSWP) partners, Lithuania was a responsible for territorial defense. Because German experience), providing a recruitment republic in the former . It pursues this ministry performs many functions nor- pool for extended-service volunteers, and defin- a policy and doctrine of total defense, desires mally found in former NSWP interior min- ing the length of time necessary to adequately Euro-Atlantic integration, and—as a MAP istries, its already low budget—1.55 percent of train for specific military functions. partner—seeks NATO membership. The core of GDP in 1999, without pensions—is relatively its ground forces is the 3,600-troop, six-battal- even smaller. It should increase to 2.1 percent ion “Iron Wolf” motorized rifle brigade. There in 2010. also are a Jaeger special forces battalion, engi- Slovenia may be overreaching in its at- neering and staff battalions, an 850-man air tempts to join NATO. The stated goal of creat- force, and small navy. The NVDF—composed ing a 700-man Peace Support Battalion is of 200 companies organized into battalions in 10 territorial defense formations—numbers around 10,000, with an additional 1,600 full- The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research books, monographs, and reports on national security by members of the National Defense University as well time officers. strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. as other scholars and specialists in national security As Lithuania builds its officer and NCO For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions corps, it also plans to increase its 2,300 12- http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also expressed or implied in this publication are solely those produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the of the author and do not necessarily represent the views month conscripts in 1996 to 7,700 in 2001. The Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: of the National Defense University, the Department of assisted in establishing a http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm. Defense, or any other governmental agency. conscript training center that puts an end to INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NDU PRESS Soviet-style practices and provides health care Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano William R. Bode George C. Maerz and English language training. Lithuania uses Director Director of Publications General Editor Supervisory Editor

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