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Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia "ISIL", "ISIS", "Daesh", and "Islamic State group" redirect here. For other uses, see ISIL (disambiguation), ISIS (disambiguation), Daish (disambiguation), andIslamic state (disambiguation). Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant الدولة اللسليمية في العراق والشام ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿ Irāq wa-sh-Shām Participant in the Syrian Civil War, Iraq War (2003–2011),Iraqi insurgency, Iraq War (2014–present), Second Libyan Civil War, Boko Haram insurgency, War in North-West Pakistan, War in Afghanistan, Yemeni Civil War, and other conflicts Primary target of Operation Inherent Resolve and of the military intervention against ISIL: in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria. Flag Active 1999–present Joined al-Qaeda: October 2004 Declaration of an Islamic state in Iraq: 13 October 2006 Claim of territory in the Levant: 8 April 2013 Separated from al-Qaeda:[1][2] 3 February 2014[3] Declaration of caliphate: 29 June 2014 Claim of territory in: Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen: 13 November 2014 Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of India: 29 January 2015[4] Nigeria: 12 March 2015[5][6] North Caucasus: 23 June 2015[7] Ideology Salafism [8][9][10] Salafi jihadism [10][11] Wahhabism [11][12] Leaders Leader: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,[13] Deputy leader: Abu Ala al-Afri still unconfirmed †,[14][15] Deputy leader in Syria: Abu Ali al- Anbari,[16] Deputy leader in Iraq: Abu Muslim al-Turkmani †,[16][17] Military chief: Abu Suleiman al- Naser,[18][19] Head of the Shura Council: Abu Arkan al-Ameri,[20] Chief spokesperson: Abu Mohammad al-Adnani,[18][21][22] Chief of Syrian military operations: Abu Omar al-Shishani [18][23] Headquarters Ar-Raqqah, Syria (de facto capital) Area of operations Military situation as of 25 November 2015, in the Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebaneseconflicts. Controlled by the Iraqi government Controlled by the Syrian government Controlled by the Lebanese government Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Controlled by Iraqi Kurdistan forces Controlled by Syrian Kurdistan forces Controlled by Syrian opposition forces Controlled by al-Nusra Front Controlled by Hezbollah Note: Iraq and Syria contain large desert areas with limited populations. These areas are mapped as under the control of forces holding roads and towns within them. Detailed map of the Syrian Civil War Detailed map of the Iraqi insurgency Detailed map of the Lebanese insurgency Detailed map of the Libyan Civil War Detailed map of the Nigerian insurgency Detailed map of the Sinai insurgency Detailed map of the Yemeni Civil War Strength Inside Syria and Iraq 200,000[24] (Kurdish claim) 100,000[25] (Jihadist claim) 20,000–31,000[26] (CIA estimate) Outside Syria and Iraq 32,600–57,900 (See Military of ISIL for more detailed estimates.) Estimated total 52,600–257,900 Originated as Jamāʻ at al-Tawh ḥīd wa-al-Jihād (1999)[27] also known ,(الدولة اللسليمية في العراق والشام :The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; Arabic as theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, /ˈ a ɪ s ɨ s/), the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham, [28] Daesh, or simplyIslamic State (IS),[29] is a Wahhabi/Salafi jihadist extremist militant group. It is led by and mainly composed ofSunni Arabs from Iraq and Syria. As of March 2015, it has control over territory occupied by 10 million people in Iraq and Syria, and through loyal local groups, has control over small areas of Libya, Nigeria andAfghanistan. The group also operates or has affiliates in other parts of the world, including North Africa andSouth Asia.[30][31][32][33][34][35] The group is known in Arabic as ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿ Irāq wa-sh-Shām, leading to the Arabic pronunciation: [ˈ da ːʕ i ʃ ]),[36][37] the Arabic equivalent of "ISIL". On ,داعش) acronym Da'ishor Daesh 29 June 2014, the group proclaimed itself to be an Islamic state and worldwide caliphate, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being named itscaliph, and renamed itself ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah ( Islamic State" (IS). As a caliphate, it claims religious, political and military authority" ,الدولة اللسليمية over all Muslims worldwide, and that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organisations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah's [caliphate's] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas".[28][38][39][40] The United Nations has held ISIL responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes, and Amnesty International has reported ethnic cleansing by the group on a "historic scale". The group has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations, the European Unionand member states, the United States, India, Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other countries. Over 60 countries are directly or indirectly waging war against ISIL. The group originated as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999, which pledged allegiance to al- Qaeda in 2004. The group participated in the Iraqi insurgency that followed the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by Western forces. In January 2006, it joined other Sunni insurgent groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council, which proclaimed the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006. After the Syrian Civil War began in March 2011, the ISI, under the leadership of al-Baghdadi, sent delegates into Syria in August 2011. These fighters named themselves Jabhat an-Nusrahṣ li-Ahli ash-Shām—al-Nusra Front—and established a large presence in Sunni-majority areas of Syria, within the governorates of Ar-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir eZ- Zor, andAleppo. In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merger of the ISI with al-Nusra Front and that the name of the reunited group was now the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, Abu Mohammad al-Julani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of al-Nusra and al- Qaeda respectively, rejected the merger. After an eight-month power struggle, al-Qaeda cut all ties with ISIL on 3 February 2014, citing its failure to consult and "notorious intransigence". In Syria, the group has conducted ground attacks on both government forces and rebel factions in the Syrian Civil War. The group gained prominence after it drove Iraqi government forces out of key cities in western Iraq in an offensive initiated in early 2014. Iraq's territorial loss almost caused a collapse of the Iraqi government and prompted a renewal of US military action in Iraq.[3] [41][42][43] ISIL is adept at social media, posting Internet videos of beheadings of soldiers, civilians, journalists and aid workers, and is known for its destruction of cultural heritage sites. Muslim leaders around the world have condemned ISIL's ideology and actions, arguing that the group has strayed overwhelmingly from the path of true Islam and that its actions do not reflect the religion's true teachings or virtues.[44][45] The group's adoption of the name "Islamic State" and idea of a caliphate have been widely criticised, with the United Nations, NATO, various governments, and mainstream Muslim groups rejecting both. Contents [hide] 1Names 2History o 2.1Foundation, 1999–2006 o 2.2As Islamic State of Iraq , 2006–13 . 2.2.1Syrian Civil War o 2.3As Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant , 2013–14 o 2.4As Islamic State , 2014–present 3Worldwide caliphate aims o 3.1Goals o 3.2Ideology and beliefs . 3.2.1Eschatology o 3.3Territorial claims and international presence . 3.3.1Libyan Provinces . 3.3.2Sinai Province . 3.3.3Algerian Province . 3.3.4Khorasan Province . 3.3.5Yemen Provinces . 3.3.6West African Province . 3.3.7North Caucasus Province . 3.3.8Southeast Asia o 3.4Other areas of operation o 3.5Leadership and governance o 3.6Monetary system o 3.7Non-combatants o 3.8Strategy 4Designation as a terrorist organisation 5Human rights abuse and war crime findings o 5.1Religious and minority group persecution o 5.2Treatment of civilians o 5.3Child soldiers o 5.4Sexual violence and slavery o 5.5Attacks on members of the press o 5.6Beheadings and mass executions o 5.7Use of chemical weapons o 5.8Destruction of cultural and religious heritage 6Criticism o 6.1Islamic criticism o 6.2International criticism o 6.3Criticism of the name "Islamic State" and "caliphate" declaration 7In the media o 7.1Conspiracy theories 8Countries and groups at war with ISIL o 8.1Opposition within Asia and Africa o 8.2The Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant o 8.3Other state opponents not part of the Counter-ISIL Coalition o 8.4Other non-state opponents o 8.5Al-Qaeda 9Supporters o 9.1Iraq and Syria nationals o 9.2Foreign nationals o 9.3Groups with expressions of support o 9.4Allegations of Turkish support o 9.5Allegations of Qatari support o 9.6Allegations of Saudi Arabian support o 9.7Allegations of Syrian support 10Military and resources o 10.1Military . 10.1.1Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq o 10.2Weapons . 10.2.1Conventional weapons . 10.2.2Non-conventional weapons o 10.3Propaganda and social media . 10.3.1Anonymous o 10.4Finances . 10.4.1Oil revenues . 10.4.2Sale of antiques and artifacts . 10.4.3Taxation and extortion . 10.4.4Illegal drug trade . 10.4.5Farming . 10.4.6Donations by Saudi Arabia and Gulf states 11Timeline of events 12See also 13References 14Bibliography 15External links Names The group has had various names since it began.[46] 1. The group was founded in 1999 by Jordanian radical Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as Jamāʻat al-Tawhīdṣ wa-al-Jihād, "The Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad" (JTJ).[27] 2. In October 2004, al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and changed the group's name to Tanẓīmṣ Qāʻidat al- Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn, "The Organisation of Jihad's Base in Mesopotamia", commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).[46][47] Although the group has never called itself al- Qaeda in Iraq, this has been its informal name over the years.[48] 3.
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