Estonia External Relations Briefing: the Outgoing Riigikogu: an External Relations Perspective E-MAP Foundation MTÜ

ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 15, No. 4 (EE)

February 2019

Estonia external relations briefing: The outgoing Riigikogu: an external relations perspective E-MAP Foundation MTÜ

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The outgoing Riigikogu: an external relations perspective

After 3 March 2019, when the new Riigikogu will be elected, a nouvelle governmental coalition (even if it will be having some or all of the current members) will be requiring an extra effort to be made in order to link the outgoing Riigikogu-associated institutional memory with the political intentions of the newly elected Estonian Parliament. There will be quite a bit to get reminded about; there will be plenty to be kept in mind; there will be a lot to be pushed for immediate resolution.

Estonia and its view on the UN Global Compact: an unfinished business? In November 2018, the Riigikogu attempted to work out the Estonian Republic’s opinion on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (known widely under a shorter title – the UN Global Compact). Before the parliamentary debates on the issue, it became known that Urmas Reinsalu (the Minister of Justice, Isamaa) and Sven Mikser (the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Social Democratic Party) expressed diametrically different visions on whether or not Estonia should be favouring the UN-issued document. The Riigikogu decided to vote in favour though, with 41 MPs being pro and 27 MPs being contra, but the Estonian Reform Party made a call to not take part in the process at all1. Indeed, as it was suggested in the December 2018 political briefing, there was a ‘ghost’ of the upcoming parliamentary elections, and the then major oppositional force in the Riigikogu simply decided to play safe.

However, since the new Riigikogu is about to be known, the same Minister Reinsalu, who is likely to return to the Estonian Parliament (together with his Isamaa, a centre-right party) after March 2019, noted that “the next Estonian coalition should distance itself from the UN Global Compact”2. More specifically, Reinsalu argued that

[t]he question is whether the Republic of Estonia can isolate itself from this document within the meaning of international law; the answer is: ‘Yes’, this option is

1 ‘Riigikogu adopts declaration in support of UN Compact on Migration’ in ERR. 27 November 2018. Available from [https://news.err.ee/880211/riigikogu-adopts-declaration-in-support-of-un-compact-on-migration]. 2 ‘UN Global Compact unfinished business, says justice minister’ in ERR. 27 February 2019. Available from [https://news.err.ee/914874/un-global-compact-unfinished-business-says-justice-minister].

completely possible, this path is perfectly acceptable within the sense of international law, and depends on the political choice of the future government.3

In fact, Estonia is not alone in terms of expressing plenty of doubts on the very idea of embracing the UN Global Compact. As reported, on 19 December 2018, during the ratification voting at the UN General Assembly, five countries (the United States, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Israel) voted against the document, while, out of the EU, Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Romania abstained, and Slovakia did not vote4. Then, Estonia supported the UN Global Compact, but considering the Reinsalu’s latest comments on the issue, there is a likelihood that the document-associated debate will soon become an important part of the grand discussion in the process of forming a new governmental coalition.

The Ukrainian theme From 2014, when the Russian Federation had illegally occupied the Crimean peninsula, the Republic of Estonia has been a sincere supporter of international sanctions imposed on the country-aggressor. It appeared that the Donbas-related developments as well as the most recent incident in the Kerch Straight had solidified the official Estonian position in regards of maintaining and, if necessary, broadening the sanctions against Russia. For example, in November 2018, Sven Mikser, the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, pushed for an additional set of sanctions to be imposed on the Russian Federation:

In connection with the events that took place in the Kerch Strait, calls to action have already been made to impose additional restrictive measures on Russia. […] As I have been saying over the last few days, this is a gross breach of international law by Russia, which must have consequences. […] In this context, I consider right the imposing of additional restrictive measures and the extension of those sanctions on Russia currently in effect.5

3 Urmas Reinsalu in ‘UN Global Compact unfinished business, says justice minister’. 4 Georgi Gotev, ‘Nine EU members stay away from UN migration pact’ in EURACTIV.com with AFP. 20 December 2018. Available from [https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/nine-eu-members-stay- away-from-un-migration-pact/]. 5 Sven Mikser in ‘Mikser wants additional sanctions on Russia’. BNS via ERR. 28 November 2018. Available from [https://news.err.ee/880605/mikser-wants-additional-sanctions-on-russia].

A couple of days before the aforementioned statement was made by the Foreign Minister, considering the seriousness of the situation, the Estonian Prime Minister Jüri Ratas called for an extraordinary meeting of the Government’ security committee to declare that

What took place in the Kerch Strait is a serious violation of international law. […] I condemn the actions of Russia seizing Ukrainian naval vessels, the closure of Kerch Strait and the aggression against Ukraine. I support the further steps of the UN, the European Union and NATO in support of Ukraine.6

Therefore, when, in February 2019, the outgoing Riigikogu processed a draft resolution for “an entry bar not only to Estonia but also the whole Schengen Zone, for those citizens of the Russian Federation who facilitated or even actively justified the [Kerch Strait] action”, it would seem to be prospectively concluded as a routine vote in favour, while showing the Parliament-wide support. The reality was somewhat different – the MPs from the Centre Party (the then leading political force of the governmental coalition and the party of the Prime Minister) decided to abstain from the vote7. What has happened since November 2018? Indeed, the proposed draft had some strong words on “the occupation of Crimea”, “the establishment of separatist puppet regimes in eastern Ukraine” and “the aggression”8, but this kind of legal discourse has already been seen in abundance in the UN- and OSCE-issued documents, which are framing the international community’s reaction on the Russian occupation of a significant part of the Ukrainian territory.

Speculatively, the answer to the Centre Party’s described coyness was directly linked to the focus of their parliamentary elections campaign. Having less than two weeks before the actual elections, Jüri Ratas and his party were, probably, trying to keep in mind that a massive share of their voters is associated with the Estonian Russian-speaking community. For some reason, perhaps, the Centre Party perceived that their vote in favour of the previously mentioned resolution could jeopardize their electoral chances among the Russian-speakers. In Estonia, many serious experts would consider such a perception baseless – after all, only Estonian citizens are allowed to vote in the parliamentary elections, and the voter’s citizenship (not

6 Jüri Ratas in ‘Prime minister calls meeting of security committee over Kerch Strait attack’. ERR. 26 November 2018. Available from [https://news.err.ee/880006/prime-minister-calls-meeting-of-security-committee-over- kerch-strait-attack]. 7 ‘Centre MPs abstain from Kerch Strait sanctions vote’ in ERR. 20 February 2019. Available from [https://news.err.ee/912466/centre-mps-abstain-from-kerch-strait-sanctions-vote]. 8 ‘Centre MPs abstain from Kerch Strait sanctions vote’.

3 her/his ethnicity or linguistic preference) is the only normative sign of her/his socio-political association with the state. In a significant addition, the Estonian Russian-speaking community is very heterogeneous, political preferences wise.

In the context of this intra-parliamentary drama on a major issue of international importance, it is worthwhile mentioning that the Centre Party still have a cooperational agreement with the United Russia, the ruling political party of the Russian Federation. Even though the document was signed in 2004, by the previous leadership, and is currently not in use, the Centre Party is constantly having a hard time from their opponents as well as local journalists who question the very need for an Estonian political party to have an agreement- based cooperation with the largest political force of the contemporary Russian state. Raimond Kaljulaid, an influential member of the Centre Party and, since 2016, the elder of the Põhja- Tallinn City Government, gave the most recent extensive commentary on the issue:

If the Center Party had abandoned the agreement with the United Russia before the local elections or did it now, Russian-speaking voters would have interpreted this move adequately – the Party would have surrendered under external pressure. […] When the parliamentary and European elections are over, the next elections will be in two years. During this time, we must solve many problems that are left over from the previous periods. This agreement is one of those. We need to calmly discuss it and make a decision.9

In few days, the 2019 parliamentary elections in Estonia will be over, and the elected parties will be busy negotiating the newest governmental coalition. Arguably, a political party’s particular attitude towards the UN Global Compact and the Russian aggression in Ukraine – in combination or separately – could play a decisive role in the process of forming a new cabinet in Estonia. Taking a vague middle ground – exactly what the Center Party has been trying to do – may ruthlessly push a political force from championing the process.

9 Raimond Kaljulaid in ‘Каверзный вопрос Центристской партии: почему вы не расторгнете договор о сотрудничестве с путинской «Единой Россией»?’. Postimees. 20 February 2019. Available from [https://rus.postimees.ee/6527699/kaverznyy-vopros-centristskoy-partii-pochemu-vy-ne-rastorgnete-dogovor-o- sotrudnichestve-s-putinskoy-edinoy-rossiey]. Translated from Russian by E-MAP Foundation MTÜ (non-official translation).