Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 3

Reijo Miettinen and activity theory: IsDewey’sphilosophya philosophy of cultural retooling?

Summary philosophy of cultural development or cultural A philosopher of education, Jim Garrison, has sug- retooling. He thinks that Dewey’s philosophy gested that ’s philosophy is a philosophy owes much to the everyday experience of of cultural retooling and that Dewey adopted both his working, where labor and tools are as impor- conception of work and the idea of tool as “a middle term between subject and object” from Hegel. This tant as language. According to him, Dewey’s interpretation raises the question of what the relation- or of experience “bears a ship of the idea of cultural retooling in Dewey’s work remarkable resemblance to Hegel’s dialectics is to his and to his allegiance to Darwinian of labour, tools and language” and Dewey’s biological functionalism. To deal with this problem, concept of ends-means dialectics parallels this paper analyzes how the idea of cultural retooling is Hegel’s concept of tool as “a middle term be- elaborated in Dewey’s logic and in his theory of reflec- tween subject and object”(1995, 88). tive thinking and compares it to the concept of retooling in Vygotsky and activity theory. Dewey does recognize Garrison’s reconstruction is interesting in the significance of tools in human practice and the role at least two senses. First, it differs from most of language in the formation of meaning. However, in of the interpretations of Dewey’s naturalism his theory of thinking and problem solving, he primarily and from the accounts of how Hegel influ- resorts to the biological or ecological language of the enced Dewey’s philosophy. Garrison argues organism–environment, in which the concepts of habit in the paper against the interpretation made by and situation play a central role. It is argued that this language does not deal with the functions and relation- Richard Rorty (1982, 1998), who suggests that ships of different kinds of tools and artifacts in changes Dewey was not consequent enough in his uses of activity nor supply satisfactory means of analyzing of Hegel. According to Rorty, Dewey remained the historical, institutionalized and cultural dimensions in his naturalism stuck with the idea of contin- of human activity. uation between lower and higher organisms, and had not managed to appreciate the spe- cifically human experience based on the use of language. In Rorty’s mind, Dewey should Introduction have been Hegelian all along instead of com- In his paper Dewey's Philosophy and the bining his legacy with Darwinian evolutionary Experience of Working: Labour, Tool and thought. Garrison rejects this critique and in- Language, Jim Garrison (1995, 99) suggests terprets Dewey’s philosophy as a philosophy that Dewey’s philosophy of reconstruction is a of cultural development or cultural retooling. Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 4 In this paper, I will deal with these two evolved in activity.2 It is, therefore, fruitful to interpretations to discuss the problem of the analyze the two traditions as different but in relationship between biological functionalism many respects complementary, rather than mu- and culture in Dewey’s theory and in the study tually excluding alternative theories of human of human conduct more generally. The debate activity (Miettinen 2006). is a good introduction to the question of what The exclusive focus on the differences kind of concepts and languages are needed to between social ontologies does not stimulate make sense of both the embodied and situ- useful comparisons of nor dialogue between ated (or ecological), and on the other hand, theoretical traditions. It may lead to what Par- the distributed, cultural-historical, semiotic tric Baert (2005,154) recently called an onto- and institutional of human activity and logical fallacy, an idea that methodological knowledge. questions can be reduced to ontology. Baert The second issue raised by Garrison’s rightly, in my mind, suggests that methodol- paper is the relationship between Deweyan ogy also depends on the aims and objects of pragmatism and cultural-historical activity . It is important for researchers to be theory. Similarities and differences between aware of their ontological commitments, but in the two traditions have recently been discussed addition, problem-specific intermediary con- by several authors (Garrison 2001, Glassman cepts and reflection on the unit of analysis as 2001, Miettinen 2001, Prawatt 1999). In his well as on the methods and data of empirical paper published in Mind, Culture and Activity research are needed. They cannot be derived (2001), Garrison suggests that activity theory from the ontological commitments alone.3 is, in making a distinction between internal Several theoretical communalities be- and external, a dualist approach, and suggests tween pragmatism and activity theory (and that Dewey’s concept of transactional func- the Marxist theory of practice behind it) have tional coordination constitutes an alternative been suggested. Both appreciate context over foundation for a theory of human activity.1 In foundation (Gavin 1988). Both recognize the my comment I (Miettinen 2001) disagreed. In primacy of the idea of practical activity and the my understanding, the concept of mediation changing nature of reality instead of trying to activity implies the idea of a transaction or study fixed permanent essences in the world. reciprocal causal interaction: subjects, means And both are committed to the practical trans- and object are interactively constituted or co- formation of the world. As to the last point, William James characterized the pragmatist method “as an indication of the ways of which existing realities can be changed” (1907, 45), 1 In the book collaborated on with Arthur Bentley (1946), Dewey made a distinction between self-action, interac- and Dewey underlined the importance of clari- tion and transaction redefined within the concept of fying the meaning of philosophical concepts organic interaction (organism-environment interaction) as transaction. They defined interaction as something thathappensbetweenentitiesthathaveafixedandin- dependent existence, whereas only transaction is a truly 2 Foractivitytheoryahumansubjectisemergingand relational understanding of reality; entities emerge as relational(anensembleofsocialrelationships,asde- a result of their transactions or are functional units finedbyMarx),andanobjectofactivityisalwaysa thatgaintheircharacterfromtheroletheyplayinthe transitional object. transaction (Dewey & Bentley 1949/1989, 96-130), for 3 Thisproblemcanalsobeformulatedbyaskinghowa ashortaccountseeBernstein 1967,80-86,Garrison transactionist ontology contributes to an experimen- 2001,285-289.Therelationalmaterialismofactornet- tal social method (Dewey 1927/1988, 360) or to the work theory with its principle of generalized symmetry question of practical reformation of social conditions resembles this conception (see Miettinen 1999). (ibid, 367). Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 5 as “programs of behavior for modifying the Rorty’s critique of Dewey existent world” (1916/1985, 312). This gave and Garrison’s counterargument Russell (1951) reason to compare Dewey’s concept of action to Marx’s concept of praxis suggesting that Dewey’s as defined in the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach in philosophy is a philosophy which Marx states that the task of philosophy of cultural retooling is to change the world. In the Vygotskian and the activity theoretical traditions, the idea of Garrison starts his paper by reconstructing advancing individual and social development the critique given in Richard Rorty’s essay on by instruction or by developmental interven- Dewey’s (1982). Rorty resorts in tions has been central. his essay to the well-known announcement that Besides such general communalities, Dewey made in 1949. In the new introduction there are also differences between these two to his major metaphysical work Experience theories. Stimulated by Garrison’s paper on and Nature (1925), Dewey said that had he Dewey’s theory of cultural retooling, I will an opportunity “to write or rewrite the book discuss in this paper two of those differences. today” he would have selected the concept of The first is the role of tool and retooling in culture instead of nature (Dewey 1988, 361). Dewey’s theory compared to the concept of Rorty (1982) thinks this is what Dewey should retooling in Vygotsky and activity theory. The have done but did not do in his philosophy of second difference concerns how context is un- experience. Rorty agrees with George Santa- derstood in studying and inducing change in na’s critique of Dewey’s 'empirical naturalistic human activities. metaphysics' in which Dewey suggests that an In what follows, I will first outline an ac- empirical method is needed to transcend sub- count of Garrison’s debate with Rorty and ject-object dualism (Dewey 1925/1988, 19): his interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy as “The empirical method is the only method a philosophy of cultural retooling. Second, which can do justice to this inclusive integri- to discuss the significance of retooling and ty of “experience.” It alone takes this integrat- the nature of context in Dewey, I will exam- ed unity as the starting point for philosophic ine two basic concepts in Dewey’s theory of thought.” Rorty comments (1982, 81): or reflective thought, namely habit … no man can serve both Locke and Hegel. No- and situation. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is a body can claim to offer an empirical account of theory of problem solving and a theory of the something called “the inclusive integrity of experi- reconstruction of the environment. It therefore ence", nor take this “integrated unity as a starting serves as a case of how tools and environment point for philosophic thought,” if he also agrees are included in Dewey’s concept of inquiry with Hegel that the point of philosophic thought and action. It will be argued that since these is bound to be the dialectical situation which one terms are primarily defined in biological and finds oneself caught in in one’s own historical pe- riod – the problems of men of one’s time. ecological terms, neither the historical nature of context nor the idea of cultural retooling are In a more recent essay Dewey between Hegel very visible in this theory. It will be suggested and Darwin (1998), Rorty says that Dewey that other units of analysis, instead of and in should have been consequent in follow- addition to situation, are needed to make sense ing the Hegelian legacy instead of trying to of human thought and activity. “marry Hegel with Darwin.” This idea per- sisted throughout Dewey’s whole intellectual career and is visible in his late work Logic, Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 6 The Theory of Inquiry (1938). Rorty refers Descartes or Kant. Instead it refers to the trans- to the Dewey scholars who suggest that for formative practical relationship of an organism Dewey the Hegelian legacy meant the unity to its environment, the prototype of which in or integration of subject and object, and this humans is craftwork. According to Garrison, unity was redefined in biological or ecological Dewey is a philosopher of culture, but does terms as 'organic unity' referring to the integra- not restrict culture – as Rorty does – to the tion between an organism and its environment linguistic practices of intellectuals. Instead (Hollinger 1986, Bredo 2003)4. The idea of (Garrison 1995, 90) “Dewey’s philosophy of organic unity also implied the principle of con- culture is made as much of labour and tools as tinuity of experience, an attempt to formulate it is by what, for Dewey, was tools of the tools, a concept of experience that transcends the the language.” He further suggests (ibid.) that boundaries of living species5. According to “Dewey’s naturalistic reconstruction of Hegel Rorty (1998, 297-298): restricts itself entirely to the confines of human purposes, the confines of culture.” Dewey should have dropped the term “experience”, To make the foundations of this concept not redefined it. He should have looked elsewhere for the continuity between us and brutes. He should of culture understandable, Garrison presents have agreed with Peirce with the great gulf between Hegel’s philosophy of work. He elects to con- sensation and cognition, decided that cognition was centrate on two early manuscripts of Hegel, possible only for language users, and then said that Systems of Ethical Life and First Philosophy the only relevant break in continuity was between of Spirit, for two reasons. First, these early pa- non-language users (amoebas, squirrels, babies) pers have more to say about work than Hegel’s and language users. (…) So, my alternative Dewey would have said, we can construe “thinking” as later works. Secondly, these manuscripts refer simply use of sentences–both for purposes of ar- to “the free labour of Greek artisans” and not ranging co-operative enterprises and for attribut- to the servile labor distorted by the master- ing inner states (beliefs, desires) to our fellow slave relationship that Hegel analyzed in the humans. Phenomenology of Sprit. According to Gar- rison, it is this Greek understanding of the Garrison does not accept Rorty’s critique at all. experience of labor that contributed to the He contends that Dewey’s concept of experi- construction of epistemology and metaphys- ence is not the kind of concept used by Locke, ics in Dewey. In the System of Ethical Life, Hegel suggests three 'moments ' or levels in 4 In his early essay Kant and Philosophic Method the development of an ethical life: (1884/1969)Deweydealtwiththeunityofsubjectand object.Hestatedthat“theonlyconceptionadequateto 1) Desire, imaginative awareness of what is experience as a whole is organism” and said that this ideacanbefoundinHegel’sLogic (p. 42-43). needed, 5 RortyrefersparticularlytoHollinger’sanalysis(1986, 2) Satisfaction, the possession of an object 44), according to which an important 'point of transi- of desire, which proceeds to supercede tion' from idealism to naturalism took place in 1891 when William James’s Principles of Psychology ap- the separation between subject and object, peared.Deweycontendedin 1911 thatJames’s“biologi- and calconceptionofexperience”was“perhapsafunda- 3) Tool, the permanent possession of the mental thing” prompting his reorientation. Hollinger adds (ibid.), “James’s empirism as Dewey understood means of satisfying the need and desire, it (…) was compatible with the opposition to atom- a rational synthesis. “On account of this ismandhedonism,andthecommitmenttotheideal rationality of the tool it stands as a middle of organic unity, which Dewey derived from Morris, Green, and Hegel, and never relinquished throughout term, higher than labour, higher than the hislongcareer.” object (fashioned for enjoyment), and Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 7 higher than the enjoyment at the end aimed “a thing used as an agency for some conclud- at” (Harris & Knox 1979, 122). ing event” (ibid, 105). Dewey elaborates his idea of the epistemological significance of tool Garrison cites also First Philosophy of Spirit use in craftwork as follows (ibid., 73-74): where Hegel further elaborates on the concept Labor manifests things in their connections of of tool (Harris & Knox, 230-231): “The tool is things with one another, in efficiency, productiv- the existing rational middle, the existing uni- ity, furthering, hindering, generating, destroying. versality, of the practical process. It is wherein From the standpoint of enjoyment a thing is what laboring has its permanence, that which alone it directly does for us. From that of labor a thing remains over from the laboring and the product is what it will do to other things–the only way in of work, wherein their contingency is eternal- which a tool or an obstacle can be defined. (…). ized immortalized; it is propagated in tradi- Regularity, orderly sequence, in productive labor presents itself to thought as a controlling principle. tions.” Hegel also says that the rational middle Industrial arts are the type-forms of experience that term is speech, “the tool of reason.” bring to light the sequential connections of things Garrison then develops the argument that with one another. this concept of tool and language presented by Hegel is parallel to what Dewey developed in Language is a special kind of tool that makes Experience and Nature. Garrison argues that shared meaning making possible in a human in this book Dewey, like Hegel, “believed that community. Meaning is “the acquisition of experience arose out of labour and the use of significance by things in their status inmak- tools” (p. 100) and that Dewey’s methodologi- ing possible and fulfilling shared cooperation” cal can be called “a labour theory (ibid., 142). This is achieved using language of meaning, or more fully, a labour, tools and (ibid., 145): “As to be a tool, or to be used language theory of meaning” (p. 102). Accord- as means for consequences, is to have and to ing to Garrison, Dewey’s concept of experience endow with meaning, language, being the tool concerns how ideal or imaginary objects come of tools, is the cherishing mother of all signifi- into existence. Dewey’s metaphysics “will turn cance. … Other instrumentalities and agencies out to be no more than what would be found can originate and develop only in social groups in any concrete historical situation in which made possible by language.” Meaning con- workers strive to realize their ideas and values” cerns humans and things in their relationship (Garrison 1995, 95). Craftwork is a model of in shared life-activity (1925/1988, 145): such transformative accomplishment. The meaning of signs moreover always includes As Garrison points out, in Chapter 4 of something common as between persons and an ob- Experience and Nature, Dewey deals with the ject. When we attribute meaning to the speaker as concept of tool. Tools play at least four es- his intent, we take for granted another person who sential functions in craftwork. 1) They express is to share in the execution of the intent, and also the causal relationships in nature (1925/1988, something, independent of the persons concerned, 101): “Tool is a particular thing, but it is more through which the intent is to be realized. Persons than a particular thing, since it is a thing in and thing must alike serve as means in a common, shared consequence. This community of partaking which a connection, a sequential bond of na- is meaning. ture is embodied. (…) A tool denotes a percep- tion and acknowledgment of sequential bonds The meaning also implies generalization in nature.” 2) It provides the intelligent con- from the particular situation of use. Thus trolling principle that regulates the connection every meaning is also generic or universal of things in activity and as a means to an end, (ibid., 147). It is something common between Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 8 speaker, hearer and the thing to which speech and one ideal. (…) The most convincing evidence that animals do not “think” is found in the that refers. A meaning is universal as a means of they have no tools, but depend upon their own rela- generalization. “For a meaning is a method tively-fixed bodily structures to effect results. of action, a way of using things as means to a shared consummation, and method is general, In this statement Dewey also resumes his though the things to which it is applied are metaphysics, according to which reality has particular” (ibid., 147). a practical character, objects gain meaning in With meaning made possible by language, the context of human practices, and the dis- tools achieve two other functions in addition to tinction between ideal and physical objects is revealing causal relationships between things artificial. and functioning as a means of controlling them Does the theorizing in Experience and for human purposes, i.e., functioning as means Nature suffice to support Garrison’s thesis to ends. Tools 3) consolidate meanings, that is, that Dewey’s philosophy is a philosophy of the means-ends connections objectified in tools cultural retooling, that it is “Hegelian all the can be used repeatedly. “The invention and use way” (p. 88), and that Hegel’s early philoso- of tools have played a large part in consolidat- phy of labor contributed in an important way ing meanings, because a tool is a thing used as to Dewey’s theory of experience? Does it suf- means to consequences, instead of being taken fice to show that Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s directly and physically” (Dewey1925/1988, concept of ‘naturalized’ experience inspired by 146). In addition, 4) they can be used to tran- Darwin is without foundation? My provisional scend the limits of present and local conditions answer to these questions is negative. (ibid.): “It (a tool) is intrinsically relational, As to the first question, Garrison does not anticipatory, predictive. Without reference to present evidence of the impact of Hegel’s early the absent, or “transcendence,” nothing is a theory of labor on Experience and Nature. Nei- tool.” ther does he refer to the extensive literature All these statements by Dewey show that that analyzes Hegel’s significance to Dewey the core content of Experience and Nature nor does he compare his own position to other, does not support Rorty’s critique, according alternative interpretations presented in this lit- to which Dewey did not fully appreciate the erature (e.g., Bernstein 1971, 167-172, Burke meaning of language in recognizing the speci- 1994, 18-22 Sleeper 2001, 23-28). His position ficity of human activity. This recognition be- differs from the interpretation mostly shared comes already evident in the introduction – and by this literature, according to which the con- in several other passages – in the book, where tribution of Hegel to Dewey was the idea of Dewey draws a distinction between humans organic unity (the integration of subject and and animals (1925/1988, 7 and 146): object), the ontology of change and becom- ing, and the idea that thought transforms cul- Ability to respond to meanings and to employ ture and simultaneuosly is based on it. It is also them, instead of reacting merely to physical con- tacts, makes the difference between man and other contrary to the mainstream interpretation that animals; it is the agency for elevating man into Dewey turned away from Hegelian idealism the realm of what is usually called the ideal and to a naturalism inspired by Darwin and Wil- spiritual. In other words, the social participation liam James. Studies of Logical Theory (1903) affected by communication, through language and is mentioned often as a turning point in this re- other tools, is the naturalistic link which does away spect. As Dewey himself recollected, it was the with the often alleged necessity of dividing the ob- jects of experience into two worlds, one physical “the objective biological approach of James- ian psychology” and “the idea of organism”, Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 9 “thinking of life in terms of life in action” that cepts, unity or integration and continuation.In gave a new direction and quality to his thinking Logic, the interrelationship between these con- (Dewey 1930/1988, 157-159). Richard Bern- cepts and Dewey’s phase model of inquiry (or stein’s early suggestion (1967, 46) that Dewey reflective thought) is well articulated. Dewey critically adopted the Greek understanding of defines the concepts of habit and situation in craftsmanship and skills based on custom and Logic primarily in biological and 'ecological' habit in the construction of his theory of expe- terms, that is, in terms of the equilibrium of the rience seems credible.6 Dewey found the model organism-environment interaction. Before pre- for the reconstruction of experience, missing senting the pattern or structure of inquiry in the from the Greek conception, in experimentation second part of the book, Dewey first deals with in modern natural science. the two matrixes of inquiry, biological (chapter It is true that the reading of Experience and 2) and cultural (chapter 3). In the analysis of Nature does not support Rorty’s polemical the cultural matrix, Dewey, like in Experience suggestion that Dewey did not acknowledge and Nature, very clearly articulates the social the qualitative difference between humans origins of specifically human conduct and its (language users) and animals (non-language foundations in the use of language. The evo- users). However, the concern over whether the lutionary continuity did not mean similarity to naturalistically interpreted concept of experi- Dewey (1938/1991, 26): ence limited Dewey’s attempts to develop a Continuity (…) means that rational operations grow theory of human thought and action is, in my out of organic activities, without being identical mind, justified. In trying to make sense ofhow with that from which they emerge. There is an ad- the naturalist conception of experience works justment of means to consequences in the activities in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, I will compare of living creatures, even though not directed by it with ideas presented by Vygotsky’s theory deliberate purpose. and to cultural-historical activity theory, which more strongly than Dewey underlines the qual- Instead Dewey says that what the postulate itative difference between the biological and of continuity does exclude (ibid., 31) “is the cultural and therefore has developed another appearance upon the scheme of a totally new kind of language to make sense of human ac- outside force as a cause of changes that occur.” tion. This comparison also makes it possible to Accordingly, Dewey thinks that the origins of remark on the differences in the interpretations reflection are in biological adaptive behavior of Hegel’s legacy and his theory of work. and “the ultimate function of its cognitive as- pects is the prospective control of the condi- Habit and situation in tions of the environment.” He contends that the function of intelligence is that of “taking Dewey’s logic of experience into account in which more effective and more The two main technical concepts used by profitable relations with the objects may be Dewey in the definition of the logic of inquiry established in the future” (1931, 3). are habit and situation. These terms, in turn, Vygotsky postulated more strongly than are connected to two more metatheoretical con- Dewey the idea of discontinuity; a qualitative transition from biological to cultural develop- ment played a more important role for him 6 Dewey’sstronginterestinmanualtrainingpedagogy, than for Dewey (Vygotsky 1978, 57): whichwaspopularinthelate 19th century and central inhispedagogicalthoughtmighthavecontributedto hisideaofcraftworkasamodelofexperience. Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 10 The internalization of socially rooted and histori- In the behavior of higher organisms, the close of the cally developed activities is the distinguishing fea- circuit is not identical with the state out of which ture of human psychology, the basis of the qualita- disequilibration and tension emerged. A certain tive leap from animal to human psychology. (…) modification of environment has also occurred, The internalization of cultural forms of behavior though it may be only a change in the conditions involves the reconstruction of psychological activ- which future behavior must meet. On the other ity on the basis of sign operations.7 hand, there is change in the organic structures that conditions further behavior. This modification con- Even if there were no fundamental theo- stitutes what is termed habit. (…) Habits are the basis of organic learning. According to the theory retical difference between these two interpre- of independent successive units of excitation-reac- tations, the difference in emphasis seems to tion, habit-formation can mean only the increasing have led to different vocabularies in the two at- fixation of certain ways of behavior through rep- tempts to explain human activity and thought. etition, and an attendant weakening of other be- The principle of continuity did lead Dewey to havioral activities. (…) In habit and learning the develop a theory of inquiry – as suggested by linkage is tightened up not by sheer repetition but Rorty – that covers all types of organism-en- by the institution of effective integrated interaction of organic-environing energies – the consummatory vironment relationships in terms of situations close of activities of exploration and search. using the language of biology. As a result, as I will try to show in the following, the means To understand Dewey’s concept of situation, of analyzing the historicity and specifically it is useful to trace from which scientific de- cultural contents of human activity were not bates and traditions it emerged. The different particularly well developed in Dewey’s theory elements or dimensions of the concept were of inquiry. drawn from at least four sources, and at least Situation is the unit of analysis in the study four elements or ideas are intermingled in the of inquiry. The leading European pragmatist in concept. They are 1) the doubt or crisis of a sociology, Hans Joas, suggests in his Creativity habit as a starting point for reflection, 2) the of Action (1996) that situation should be the idea of the contextual whole (unity, integra- unit of the analysis of actions instead of the tion) as a unit of analysis between atomism traditional means-ends connection or the tra- and universalism, 3) situation as immediately jectory of action as a realization of a plan. The sensed experienced world and 4) the idea that analysis of Dewey’s concept of situation may a problematic situation is objective, non-cogni- also be relevant to understanding the thesis of tive and existential by its nature being derived the situatedness of knowledge that is currently from the crisis of ongoing activity. widely defended in sociology of Ad 1). Dewey adopted the idea from Peirce and . Dewey defines his that Cartesian doubt is not the starting point basic concept of habit in Logic in terms of a of knowledge formation. Instead, it is a crisis double modification of the organism-environ- of prevailing beliefs that causes an inquiry. ment equilibrium (1938/1991, 38): Dewey adapted this and redefined it in natu- ralistic terms, stating that the crisis of a habit presumes reflection and inquiry. Therefore, as Tom Burke (1994) suggests, situation in 7 In Experience and Nature Dewey reflects on the con- sequencesofcommunicationforhumanexperience Dewey’s logic must be understood as an in- (1925/1988, 213): “Human learning and habit-forming stance of the disequilibrium of the organism- present thereby an integration of organic-environmen- environment interaction or a break down of a talconnectionssovastlysuperiortothoseofanimals without language that its experience appears to be habit (Burke 1994, 22-23): super-organic.” Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 11 Situations, occurring in the ongoing activities of unity) at the immediately experienced world, some given organism/environment system, are in- which includes those objects and aspects of stances or episodes (or “fields") of disequilibrium, instability, imbalance, disintegration, disturbance, environment that are relevant or vital for an dysfunction, breakdown, etc. (…) Such ongoing organism (1938/1991, 73): activities just are interactions which constitute in In actual experience, there is never any such iso- some manner of organism/environment integra- lated singular object or event; an object or event tion. Situations, then, occur as instances or epi- is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an en- sodes of breakdown or imbalance in this dynamic vironing experienced world – a situation. (…) Re- integration. curring to the main topic, it is to be remarked that Ad 2). The idea of the unity of integration as a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately well as a strong anti-atomism is a recurrent pervasive quality. When we describe it from the theme in Dewey’s work. As mentioned before, psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt. this was based on the Hegelianism of Dewey’s early career. The critique of the atomist con- These formulations have an affinity with the ceptions of British empirism (the association phenomenological conception of experience. of separate ideas) and of psychology (the S-R In his answer to Russell, Dewey repeats that connection and reflex arc) was a key intellec- the nature of situation as a unit of analysis tual enterprise in Dewey’s theoretical work. between atomism and universalism is based Consequently, in Logic, Dewey starts from on taking the 'empirically' definable interaction what situation is not and ends up formulating between an organism and its environment as a the idea of the contextual whole (1938/1991, starting point (Dewey 1939, 29): 72): In other words, the theory of experiential situa- I begin the discussion by introducing and explain- tions which follows directly from the biological- ing the denotative force of the word situation. Its anthropological approach is by its very nature a via import may perhaps be most readily indicated by media between extreme atomistic pluralism and means of a preliminary negative statement. What block universe monisms. Which is but to say that it is designated by the word “situation” is not a single is genuinely empirical in a naturalistic sense. object or event or set of objects and events. For we never experience nor form judgments about objects Ad 4). Finally, Dewey underlines the ‘natu- and events in isolation, but only in connection with ral,’ practical and vital needs that are behind a contextual whole. This latter is what is called a “situation.” the organism-environment disequilibrium (1938/1991, 111): Ad 3). One of the critiques that Bertrand Rus- The indeterminate situation comes into existence sell presented of Dewey’s logic concerned the from existential causes, just as does, say, the or- limits of the concept of situation. Since Dewey ganic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intel- defined the concept as something where things lectual or cognitive in the existence of such situ- interact and influence each other, Russell won- ations, although they are the necessary condition dered whether the whole universe should be of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves included in a situation (1951). This whitty they are precognitive. The first result of evocation remark raises a question of the criteria of of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged, to be problematic. To see that a situation requires defining the context and the limits of situa- inquiry is the initial step in inquiry. tion (holistic transactional unity, contextual whole) as a unit of analysis of human activity. Although each of the four elements of situa- Dewey’s solution was to draw the limits of tion have partly different origins in scientific situation (organism-environment interactive debates, they are complementary and are de- Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 12 fined by each other’s terms. Doubt or crisis designations for the phases used by Dewey in arises because the equilibrium of the organ- How We Think (pp. 201-206). The correspond- ism-environment relationship (or functional ing, slightly different titles used in Logic will coordination) is threatened. The contextual be presented in parenthesis. whole elaborated against atomism is defined using the concept of immediate experience, 1) Suggestion (The Antecedent Conditions which again is interpreted in terms of the or- of Inquiry: The Indeterminate Situation). ganism-environment relationship. The ‘natu- A disturbed, perplex situation temporar- ralistic’ or ecological organism-environment ily arrests direct activity. Dewey says that language allows the unification of these ele- a variety of names serve to characterize ments into one frame. In the following section indeterminate situations. These include dis- I will study how the concepts of habit and situ- turbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full ation elaborated using the language of biol- of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. “It ogy also constitute a central basis for Dewey’s is the situation that has these traits. We are logic and theory of thought. In addition, an doubtful because the situation is inherently ideal of the experiment in natural sciences is doubtful” (1938/1991, 110). used to make sense of the transformation of a 2) Intellectualization (Institution of a situation. It will argued, that as a result of this Problem). The indeterminate situation be- combination, paradoxically, tools do not play comes problematic in the very process of any significant role in his theory of logic. being subjected to inquiry. To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step Inquiry, continuity and learning: of inquiry. 3) The guiding idea, (The where are the artifacts? Determination of a Problem-Solution). Dewey’s definition of inquiry in Logic A possible relevant solution is suggested (1938/1991, 108-109) is based on the concept by the determination of factual conditions of situation: “Inquiry is the controlled or direct- which are secured by . Ideas ed transformation of an indeterminate situation are anticipated consequences (forecasts) into one that is so determinate in its constitu- of what will happen when certain opera- ent distinctions and relations as to convert the tions are executed under and with respect elements of the original situation into a unified to observed conditions. whole”8. Dewey presents the five phases (or es- 4) Reasoning (in the narrower sense) sential functions, aspects) of reflective thought (Reasoning). This process is composed of or inquiry in How We Think (1933/1989) and developing the meaning-contents of ideas in Logic. In the following, I will present the in their relations to other ideas. 5) Testing the hypothesis by action (The Operational Character of 8 Dewey further defines the terms he uses (1938/1991, 109):“Theoriginalindeterminatesituationisnotonly -Meanings). ‘open’toinquiry,butitisopeninthesensethatits constituents do not hang together. The determinate Dewey explains the relationship of reasoning situation on the other hand, qua outcomeofinquiry,is aclosedand,asitwere,finishedsituationor‘universe and experimental actions in Logic as follows of experience.’ ‘Controlled or directed’ in the above (1938/1991, 121): formula refers to the fact that inquiry is competent in anygivencaseinthedegreeinwhichtheoperations The pre-cognitive unsettled situation can be settled involved in it actually do terminate in the establishment only by modification of its constituents. Experi- of an objectively unified existential situation.” Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 13 mental operations change existing conditions. Rea- cal position in the analysis. Although Dewey soning, as such, can provide means for effecting the underlines the operative nature of both ideas change of conditions but by itself cannot effect it. Only execution of existential operations directed by and facts, it remains unclear how a working an idea in which ratiocination terminates can bring hypothesis is transformed into the “existential about the re-ordering of environing conditions re- operations” needed for the reconstruction of quired to produce a settled and unified situation. the situation. Can these operations of practi- cal transformation be made without the use of In characterizing the phases of reflective relevant tools? thought, Dewey mainly uses two sets of terms. Dewey’s theory of inquiry does not deal First he speaks about the constituents of situa- with how a future-oriented working hypoth- tion, which are analyzed in order to formulate esis is ‘turned’ into tools and rules that make an idea or a working hypothesis. The observa- the practical transformation of a situation pos- tion of constituents, directed by hypothesis, sible. To solve this problem by referring to produces facts. These contribute to the redefi- the operative nature of ideas and facts, in my nition of the idea (working hypothesis), which understanding, is not sufficient. Activity theory is formulated using symbols. suggests that it is essential to analyze the rela- In Dewey’s treatment of the inquiry of tionship between signs and tools, that is, the a problematic situation, the ideal of experi- relationship and interconnection between the mental natural science is visible. The work- different types of mediational means that are ing hypothesis directs the observation of the necessary for the practical transformation of constituents of the situation, which leads to any historically constituted situation. facts that contribute to the respecification of Dewey deals with the wider significance the working hypothesis. Following the model of ‘situated reflection’ in terms of continuity. of the method of experimental natural science, What has been experienced before in previous Dewey regards observation and data on one situations is used (and possibly transformed) hand, and inference and suggestion (idea) on in novel situations. From the point of view of the other, as key elements in reflective think- the individual, this transformation of experi- ing (1933/1989, 198). It is conspicuous that ence constitutes a process of “growing” and the concept of tool is not used at all9. This learning. The question of what the ‘carrier’ is is even more astonishing since Dewey used of such a temporal continuity in experience the natural-scientific experiment as a model in remains. According to Dewey, habits, or ways constructing his logic. As shown recently by of doing things enriched by intelligence, are the sociology of experimentation, instruments the carriers of the results of the previous ex- constitute a vital part of any experimental ac- perience. It, however, remains unclear what tivity (Pickering 1995, Rheinberger 1997). In constitutes the foundation of the continuity Dewey’s logic, the idea or working hypothesis of habits. In some instances, Dewey seems to is the only means explicitly discussed. Tools think that habits are first of all embodied pre- and other means remain constituents of the dispositions to ways of responding ingrained situation and have no special methodologi- in the nervous and muscular system of an or- ganism (1938/1991, 146):

I see or note directly that this is a typewriter, that 9 Only once does Dewey mention in the description of is a book, the other thing is a radiator, etc. This the phases of the inquiry that operations involve “tech- niques and organs of observation” (1938/1991, 121). kind of direct “knowledge” I shall call apprehen- He says nothing about the techniques or tools of the sion; it is seizing or grasping, intellectually, without practical transformation of objects. questioning. But it is a product, mediated through Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 14 certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit, the objectification of the results of activity in and it presupposes prior experiences and mediated cultural artifacts (1994, 256): conclusions drawn from them10. Particular knowings as , i.e. specific in- Dewey does say that thinking includes not stances of the applications of one’s dispositions, only the use of biological organs like eyes, aptitudes, and habits to solving given problems, are hands and brains but also “apparatus and appli- distinguished here from knowledge, constituting ances of all kinds” (Dewey 1916/1985, 328)11. stable outcomes of specific inquiries (in the form In Logic, the idea presented in Experience and of judgement), both of which is distinguished from Nature, according to which tools and artifacts intelligence, which is the result of the development may function as carriers of prior experience, is and accumulation (learning, habituation, standard- ization, routinization) of capabilities to act (inquire) not taken any further. Theoretically, the parts in specific ways. or constituents of environment, the affordances and potentialities of its objects, including Dewey interestingly speculates about the po- tools, belong to habits. In Logic, as well as in tential of the “by-product” of inquiry, an ob- many of its interpretations, however, the role jectified meaning (1916/1985, 22-23): “And it of mediational artifacts in the transformation may well be that this by-product, this gift of of situations is not elaborated. the gods, is incomparably more valuable for Many of the modern interpretations of living a life than is the primary and intended Dewey underline the embodied nature of hab- result of control, essential as that control to its (Joas 1996, Manicas 2002). Hans Joas, for having a life to live.” This position, the objec- example, uses the concept of body schema by tification of a hypothesis or a meaning intoa Merleau-Ponty to make the formation of hab- shared cultural artifact, is, however, not devel- its understandable. Tom Burke assumes the oped in Logic. It is the language of the biologi- position according to which accumulation of cal matrix that dominates the characterization experience and knowledge takes place without of the inquiry in the book. I think we face here a difference between pragmatism and activity theory and what they 10 On the other hand, in the Public and its Problems, draw from the Hegelian legacy. For Dewey’s Dewey characterizes the social origins and meaning ofhabitasfollows(1927/1988, 334-335):“Habitisthe pragmatism it is the idea of organic unity, and mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for for activity theory it is objectification of the themostpartundertheinfluenceofthecustomsofa activity into cultural artifacts, signs and tools. group. (…) The influence of habit is decisive because alldistinctivelyhumanactionhastobelearned,andthe Ilyenkov resumes the latter position by say- veryheart,bloodandsinewsoflearningiscreationof ing (1977, 277): “All forms of activity (active habitudes. (…) The sailor, miner, fisherman and farmer faculties) are passed on only in the form of think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of accustomedoccupationsandrelationships.Wedream objects created by man for man.” This tradi- beyond the limits of use and wont, but only rarely does tion has developed the Hegelian idea of the revery become a source of acts which break bounds...” objectification of activity into cultural artifacts. This double definition of habit as an individual ‘organ- ic’dispositionandasareproductionofacustomofa A.N Lektorsky (1980, 137) points out, “The group resembles Bordieu’s (1977) concept of habitus. instrumental man-made objects function as ob- 11 “Since these physical operations (including the cerebral jective forms of expression of cognitive norms, events) and equipments are a part of thinking, think- ingismental,notbecauseofapeculiarstuffwhich standards and object-hypotheses existing out- enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which side the individual.” Marx expressed the sig- constitute it, but because of what physical acts and nificance of cultural artifacts in The Economic appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they are employed and the distinctive results which they & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as follows accomplish (Dewey 1916/1985, 328).” (1964, 142): “The history of industry and the Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 15 established objective existence of industry conjoint reworking of the latter seems to be are the open book of man’s essential powers. vital in a change of activity12. The ecological (…) A psychology for which this … remains language based on the organism-environment a closed book, cannot become a genuine, relationship tends to remain on an individual comprehensive and real science.” If we think level and does not supply means for analyz- about the significance of the breakthrough of ing the transformation of collective human information technology and the internet for activities. the of creative work and the ca- pabilities of individuals, the relevance of this argument becomes evident. Concluding discussion Vygotsky made the distinction between Can Dewey’s philosophy be characterized as two kinds of means, tool and sign, that orient a philosophy of cultural retooling? I would be human behavior differently (1979, 55). The hesitant to do so. Dewey recognized the signifi- function of tools is to serve as a conductor of cance of tools in human practice and the role human influence on the object of activity. Sign of language in the formation of meanings. The is used as a ‘psychological tool,’ as a means idea of means for consequences was so central of internal activity aimed at mastering oneself. in his that his philosophy has In his study on the functions of artifacts in been characterized as a philosophy of technol- human activity, Wartofsky (1979, 202) made ogy (Hickman 1990). The term cultural retool- a distinction between primary artifacts (tools), ing would not, however, do justice to the per- and secondary and tertiary artifacts. A tool is manent naturalistic ideal in his work inspired a primary artifact. Secondary artifacts, in turn, by biological psychology and evolutionary the- are about the conditions, ways and patterns of ory (see e.g., Dalton 2002). I analyzed in this using tools (in ecological terms, about forms paper one expression of this ideal, the use of of interaction of the organism and its envi- biological and ecological language in Dewey’s ronment). They become objectified into “ex- theory of inquiry and reflective thought. ternally embodied representations” of actions It seems to me that the cultural interpreta- such as models. The difference between medi- tion of Dewey’s philosophy allows the signs of ating artifacts is related to the social origins of the turn to culture in the late Dewey to char- human activity and language. Signs or second- acterize the whole of his philosophy. Dewey ary artifacts originate “as instruments for co- hoped to be able to write the book on Culture operative, communicative and self-conscious and Nature (Sleeper 2001, 106). In a letter shaping and controlling of the procedures of written to Arthur Bentley in 1951, Dewey using and making technical tools (Engeström characterized how he intended to continue 1987, 61). his philosophical project (cited by Sleeper The distinction between functional types 2001, 16): of artifacts is related to the hierachical struc- If I ever get the needed strength, I want to write on ture of human activity. In an individual, learn- knowing as the way of behaving in which linguistic ing is embodied in the body’s ways of using artifacts transact business with physical artifacts, tools and signs, that is, operations. However, tools, implements, apparatus, both kind of being the important problems of human activities are collective and highly shared and call for the transformation of secondary and tertiary 12 For the significance of different artifacts in the develop- artifacts that function as means of reflection ment of work, see Engeström 1992, Engeström & al. and orientation to the future in activity. The 2005 and Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005. Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen 16 planned for the purpose and rendering inquiry of limits of such a system as well as its structure necessity an experimental transaction. remain unclear. As a result, it is also hard to The study of the semiotic mediation of the use analyze and interpret a “disequilibrium” of of tools was the starting point for Vygotsky’s the system and the nature of the problems or theory 30 years before (1978, 24): contradictions it faces13. In Logic, Dewey characterized the concept The practical intelligence and sign use can oper- of situation using the principle of immediacy ate independently of each other in young children, the dialectical unity of these systems in the human which depicts reality in terms of the individual adult is the very essence of complex human be- organism or body in its immediate environ- havior. Our analysis accords symbolic activity a ment. The principle of continuation comple- specific organizing function that penetrates the ments immediacy: the experiences of prior situ- process of tool use and produces fundamentally ations effect the present situation and the ways new forms of behavior. in which it is transformed. Luria and Vygotsky Once the discussion of the affinities between (1992, 36) maintained that human behavior is the Vygotskyan tradition and Deweyan prag- governed “not by the laws of biology but the matism started, the two have been interpreted laws of the historical development of society.” using the language of the other. It is well This implies that any situation must be located known that the concept of retooling (or reme- historically and can be understood as a part diation) is central to the Vygotskian tradition. of the development of society including its Eric Bredo, for example, has recently charac- contradictions. The biological conception of terized the Deweyan conception of learning as equilibrium does not help in achieving such a “learning to use cultural tools in situationally historical contextualization. Edwin Hutchins appropriate ways” (Bredo 2003, 100). Bredo (1995, 372) suggested in his ground-breaking further describes Dewey’s ideas of teaching study Cognition in the Wild that any moment in and says (ibid., 104): “Today we might say human practice (event or situation) needs to be that the teacher should set up a properly scaf- also understood and analyzed as part of several folded ‘zone of proximal development’.” This developmental sequences of activity, each hav- is an example of a reinterpretation of Dewey in ing a different rate of change. Hutchins defines terms of the Vygotskian tradition. It is possible three of them: acts of navigation, development that the interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy of the practitioners, and development of navi- as a philosophy of cultural retooling may be gation work (ibid.), “crystallized in the mate- influenced by this debate. rial and conceptual tools of the trade and in the Another issue that in my mind needs to be social organization of work.” The analysis of further discussed is the definition of “situa- these (and other) multiple simultaneous histo- tion” as a unit of analysis for human activ- ries supplies a vital perspective in defining and ity in terms of the organism-environment understanding the nature of situated problems relationship. In my understanding, it does not and for finding means of solving them. stimulate the analysis of the historical, distrib- At least two attempts have been suggested uted and institutional nature of human activi- to specify a social context and find a workable ties. The interpreters of Dewey have character- unit of analysis for the study of human prac- ized “situation” (holistic context, integrated unity) in systemic terms. Burke (1994, 29), for example, defines it as a “localized instance 13Foracomparisonoftheaccountsofdisequilibriumor contradictions as a dynamic source of transformation of disequilibrium of an organism/environment of activity in pragmatism, phenomenology and activity system.” However, the criteria of defining the theory, see Korchman et. al. 1998. Outlines • No. 2 • 2006 17 tices. Both of them take the concepts of object References and objectification, collective nature, and the Baert, P. (2005). Philosophy of social sciences. historicity of human activity as starting points. Toward pragmatism. Cambridge: Polity The first is the concept of an activity system Press. (Leontjev 1978), a historically formed, cultur- Bernstein, R.J. (1967). John Dewey. 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