2013

H-Diplo Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse H-Diplo Roundtable Review Roundtable Web/Production Editor: George Fujii www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables Commissioned for H-Diplo by Thomas Maddux Volume XIV, No. 20 (2013) 11 February 2013 Introduction by M.E. Sarotte

Josip Glaurdić. The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of . Press, New Haven and London, 2011

Stable URL: http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XIV-20.pdf

Contents Introduction by M.E. Sarotte, University of Southern California ...... 2 Review by Richard Caplan, University of Oxford ...... 6 Review by Marko Attila Hoare, Kingston University ...... 9 Review by Renéo Lukic, Laval University, Canada ...... 16 Author’s Response by Josip Glaurdić, Clare College, ...... 18

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H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XIV, No. 20 (2013)

Introduction by M.E. Sarotte, University of Southern California

The Hour of Europe offers a detailed analysis of the response of Western elites to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the eruption of widespread violence Josip Glaurdić’s book on archival sources in many countries as well as on documents The Hour of Europe there. The work is based numerousthat are publicly available. is, as a result, a kind of ‘second generation’ of scholarship on these events; Glaurdić provides a scholarly analysis that adds to the works already published by participants in the events and journalistic commentators. As such, it is an addition greatly to be welcomed.

The reviewers agree that Glaurdić has put his research materials to good effect. They all find his basic argument convincing. What is that argument? As Glaurdić explains, “[w]ith Asthe a end result of the , Yugoslavia lost all importance to the West as a bulwark against Soviet advances and as an example of socialism that was not sponsored by the Kremlin” (6). , “the creators of Western policy were virtually unanimous…[in] their strong preference for Yugoslavia’s continued existence and their backing for the foundational pillars of the central government in ” (6).

In other words, the author’s focus is on the international leaders who “continuously– tended particularlyto appease the in thestrong U.S. and and push in Germany the weak – and during how various they failed internationally to end the violence.sponsored As peace he puts conferences” (7). He is interested in the responses of political elites in the West it, “our attention ought to be directed not at those who were urging the West to act, but at thoseAmong who his weremost stiflinginteresting its involvement” findings are the(7). fact

ors that shaped Washington’s response to quo,events despite in Yugoslavia. the upheavals Glaurdić o singles out the United States for particular criticism in this understandregard. He sees the newthe administration realities, the author of George argues, H. W.had Bush fateful as attemptingconsequences; to defend Washington the status f the late 1980s and early 1990s in Europe. Bush’s refusal to contrast to tried to maintain Yugoslavian unity with tragic results for the inhabitants of the region. In his handling of the policies and leaders of the Unites States, Glaurdić praises the “principled ideas of German foreign policy makers” (306) He finds that there was a German Inwillingness the interest to faceof realities and adjust policies accordingly.

U.S. interest in perpetuatingfull disclosure, the Istatus should quo add of that Cold I Warhave structures made similar into arguments the post-Cold about Wa ther Bush Administration’s response to the end of the division of Germany. I, too, saw a clear him until now, I was interested to learn that his research reached the same conclusions as era. Since I have never met the author of the present study, nor read anything written by mineThe author about concludesU.S. foreign his policy in this era. foundations of post- study by arguing that the case of Yugoslavia reveals how “the Cold War Europe” rest firmly in realist soil (308). Yugoslavia ceased to be important in security terms to the U.S. after the end of the Cold War, so its internal

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quarrels

mattered little in the 1990s. The “West’s nearly desperate pursuit of stability through the support of Yugoslavia’s unity” was, in the view of the author, “mistaken and Allunrealistic,” three of the an reviewersultimately findtragic The policy Hour (308). of Europe

to be a valuable and worthwhile contribution, particularly given the extensive source base of the book. The amount of evidence provided is one of the points emphasized by Renéo Lukic. As Lukic points out, the author not only examined presidential library sources, he also used evidence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) along with intercepted messages between Serbian leaders. t that - Similarly, Marko Hoare praises Glaurdic’s work overall. Hoare likes the fac Glaurdić begins his study of the West’s involvement not onin 1991,a few accounts,when full hoscale war broke out in the former Yugoslavia, but in 1987, when Slobodan Milošević was assuming absolute power in . Hoare does criticize Glaurdić wever. For example, Hoare finds that Glaurdić does not properly stress then extent leaders. to which Croatian president Franjo Tudjman’s “repeated retreats in the face of Serbian aggression merely encouraged” violence, just as did the similar retreats of the Wester

Richard Caplan finds that “Glaurdić has written a very importanto respond book effectively. that deserves Caplan a place on any shelf of essential books about the .” Caplan praises Glaurdić’s focus on Serbian expansionism and the failure of the West t citesalso likes U.S. andthe factother that intelligence Glaurdić makesmater ialsclear that that more information or less predicted about what the wascourse happening of events in Yugoslavia was available at the time, had Western leaders cared to look for it. Glaurdić also ofand the yet post failed-Cold to wamove elites to action. Caplan agrees with Glaurdić’s argument that the Westernfor Soviet elites dissolution. prioritized stability and continuity at the end of the Cold War and the start r period, largely out of fear that Yugoslavia might serve as an example

Finally, in his author’s response, Glaurdić thanks the reviewers for their comments. He profoundlyreiterates his negative basic argument influ once again. As he puts it: “My argument is that it was– exactly the status quo bias of the Western powers…so clearly visible at the time, that had such a ence on the calculations of Yugoslavia’s principal actors particularly those in Belgrade.”The Hour of Europe

In short, the publication of shows that it is now possible to conduct Participants:scholarly research on this important but tragic era in recent history.

Josip Glaurdić

is a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at the Departmentrrently engaged of Politics in twoand larger International Studies and a fellow of Clare College, University of Cambridge. He– earned his PhD in political science in 2009 from Yale University, and is cu research projects funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the Isaac Newton Trust “The | Page

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- Politics of EU (Dis)integration” and “Tito’s Heirs: Yugoslav Communists between M.E.Democracy Sarotte and is the Nationalism, author, most 1980 recently,1990”. of 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe. The Financial Times selected 1989 1989 German and European Studies from the Americanas one ofInstitute its books for of Contemporary the year and ForeignGerman Affairs called it a new “classic." won the DAAD Prize for Distinguished Scholarship on

AdvancementStudies (AICGS), of Slavicthe Ferrell Prize from the Society of Historians- of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), and the Shulman Prize from the American Association for the Studies (AAASS, renamed ASEEES, co winner). Sarotte, who atreceived the University her AB from of Harvard University and her Ph.D. in History from Yale University, holds a joint appointment- as Professor of History and Professor of International Relations Southern California. She will be a visiting professor at Harvard MarkoUniversity Attila in 2013 Hoare2014. of is a Reader at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Kingston historyUniversity, and London.politics ofHe the was former born inYugoslavia London and since received the early his nineties BA from and the has University lived and Cambridge in 1994- and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 2000. He has been studyingThe the Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War: A History The History of workedBosnia: Fromin Bosnia the MiddleHercegovina, Ages to Croatiathe Present and DaySerbia. He is the author of Genocidefour books: and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the ,(Hurst, London,1941-1943 2012); (Saqi, London, 2007); How Bosnia Armed (, Oxford, 2006), which won the British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow Monograph Competition in 2004; and (Saqi, London, 2004). He is currently working Richardon a history Caplan of modern is Professor Serbia. of Inter the author of Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia International Governancenational of WarRelations-Torn atTerritories: the University Rule andof Oxford. Reconstruction He is Exit(Cambridge Strategies University and State BuildingPress, 2005) and -editor, Europe’s New Nationalism: States(Oxford and University Minorities Press, in Conflict 2005). His other books include, as editor, Politica (Oxford University Press, 2012) and, as co (Oxford University Press, 1996). He holds degrees in l Theory and International Relations from the University of London (Ph.D.), the RenéoUniversity Lukic of Cambridge (MPhil), and McGill University (BA Hons). University in Can is Professor of International History in the Department of History at the Laval ada. Born in , he was educated at the University (Croatia) eightand at the University of Geneva (Switzerland). He received his Ph.D. from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in 1988. He is author, coauthor and editor of internationalbooks. He politics has written of the twentiethmore than century, 50 journal particularly articles. His in comparativework has also history appeared and in inteEnglish, Croatian, German, French and Japanese. He has a broad interest in the - East European relations and ethnic conflicts in South- rnational relations of Europe. His research work has been focused primarily onand Soviet the Eastern Europe. His published work includes a comparative study of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia 4 | Page

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Soviet Union as multinational, federal communist states and the reaction to these parallel

collapses of European and US Foreign Policy.

| Page

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Review by Richard Caplan, University of Oxford1

he collapse of Yugoslavia has spawned an enormous literature, scholarly and otherwise, offering various and varying accounts of this momentous development. T Some authors place the emphasis on political factors—the declining legitimacy of the —chronic unemployment, regional economic League of Communists (SKJ), the inflexibility of the Yugoslav political system, the crisis inover Kosovo. Others stress economic factors disparities. Still others underline the responsibility of the major domestic actors involved,—the roleparticular of international the Serbian creditors, leader the Slobodan failure ofMilošević international and, to diplomacy. a lesser extent, the Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman, while others put the emphasis on the international2 context As Sabrina Ramet observes in her magisterial study of the scholarly debates about the fall of Yugoslavia, “The literature…has produced3 a dizzying array of competing interpretations and understandings.” e, is concerned principally with the

Josip Glaurdić, in this major contribution to the literatur proximate causes of the breakup and the violenceto appreciate associated and respond with it. effectivelyHe divides toprimary the responsibility for these events between Milošević’s Serbian expansionist project and the— Thefailure Hour of theof Europe West (Europe— in particular) Ministerthreat that Jacques Milošević Poos, posed. on the It eveis the of latter view that is captured by the title of the book hour of Europe— which invokes the now infamous claim by Luxembourg’s Foreign the4 war in Yugoslavia in June 1991, that “This is the not the hour of the Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem.” ism, his

ofGlaurdić violence documents he unleashed Milošević’s against rise Croatia to power and Bosnia on the- back of militant national efforts to alter the balance of power within Yugoslavia in Serbia’s favour, and the campaign

1 A version of this review appeared previously in NationalitiesHerzegovina Papers as part of his plan to

, Explaining Yugoslavia 41(1). Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s2 Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition nd See John B. AllcockThe Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Hurst & Co., 2000); Lenard J. Cohen,Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990 , 2 edn (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Branka Magaš,Regional Development in Communist (London:Yugoslavia: Verso, Success, 1993 Failure); Susan and L. ConsequencesWoodward, Slobodan Milosevic and the(Princeton: Destruction Princeton of Yugoslavia University Press, 1995); Dijana Pleština, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Louis Sell, dward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos(Durham, and Dissolution NC: Dukeafter theUniversity Cold War Press, 2003); Warren Zimmermann, Triumph of the Lack of Will:(New International York: Time Books/Random Diplomacy and House,the Yugoslav 1996); War Susan L. Woo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995); James Gow, Thinking about Yugoslavia:(London: Scholarly Hurst Debates & Co., about 1997). the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia3 and Kosovo Sabrina P. Ramet, 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.- New York Times, 9 June 1991. Quoted in Alan Riding, “Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europeans Send High Level Team,” 2

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ofcreate source a Greater material, Serbia much from of it the new, federation in support that of hehis helped analysis to— destrincludingoy. While U.S. theand broad British contours of this story may be well enough known, Glaurdić drawsests, on witness a vast testimoniesand wide array at

documents he obtained through Freedom of Information requ the Milošević trial in The Hague, intercepts of telephone conversations between Milošević and his associates, declassified official papers, and a large number of interviews that Glaurdić conducted, in addition to his impressive command of the existing scholarship. others,The material for instance, is used persistto very in good their effect. claims For that even Germany if the broad shattered contours a delicate of this consensus story are and well enough known, they are not necessarily in all respects widely accepted. Scholars and leaptsolution ahead that of would its European p partners with its ‘unilateral’5 recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, thus “torpedoing,” in Lord Carrington’s words, any possibility of a negotiated demonstrating that Germanyreserve thewas unity acting of— Yugoslavia.not at all alone With— abundant evidence and persuasive argumentation, Glaurdić unpicks the fallacies behind this reasoning, thus on the basis of an accurate understanding of Milošević and his strategic aims and with a determination- to take decisive it.action by internationalizing the conflict so as to impede the Serbian leader, who only wished6 to preserve Yugoslavia long enough to carve off the Serb majority territories within Glaurd

ić also challenges the view that not enough was known or could be foreseen by Western leaders to warrant more decisive action and that it was reasonable, therefore, for ofthem events. to persist If sound in their analysis efforts and to counsel maintain fell the on unitydeaf ears, of Yugoslavia. it was often He for cites political numerous rather (mostly U.S.) intelligence documents that anticipated early and correctly the tragic course -on effects than intelligence reasons that Western policy makers chose to ignore it. The key external actors sought to maintain the status quo largely out of concern about the knock that the dissolution of Yugoslavia would have for the Soviet Union. “Tomorrow what we have done for Yugoslavia would be applied to other7 cases,” Roland Dumas, the French Foreign Minister, cautioned in early July 1991. - account is that Of course by December 1991 it was apparent that the Soviet Union was no more, and so the concern about knock on effects was baseless. What is clear from Glaurdić’s regardWestern for policy any sense makers of equity,still clung in ato determined the idea of efforta reconstructed to achieve Yugoslaviaa negotiated and settlement were therefore inclined to put pressure on the weakest parties to the conflict, often without

5 Carrington interview for the “The Death of Yugoslavia” television series, Brian Lapping Associates, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, 4 April 1995, Box 18, File Europe1, p. 2. and the Recognition6 of New States in Yugoslavia For my own account of Germany’s engagement in the crisis, see Richard Caplan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,New 2005), York TimesCh. 1. 7 Dumas cited in “European Community Freezes Arms Sales and Aid,” , 6 July 1991. | Page

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- that did not alienate Milošević. “From the very beginning of Milošević’s ascent to the very end of Yugoslavia’s existence and the collapse of Bosnia Herzegovina into bloody mayhem,” manyGlaurdić years concludes,— “the predominant signals of the— crucial exponents of Western policy were those of approval, lenience, and understanding for the powerful” (303). It would be not until the 1999 war over Kosovo before Western diplomats would appreciate sufficiently that Milošević was an obstacle to peace rather than the key to it. account is an oversimplified one.8 - or dual With so much emphasis on Milošević, Glaurdićnomic iscrises vulnerable that facilitated to the criticism the growth that ofhis However, Glaurdić’s explanation is not mono causal. He discusses the political and eco fissiparous tendencies in the decade preceding the breakup of Yugoslavia. He makes clear that Milošević depended on an intellectual climate to redefine Yugoslavia that predated his wererise to so power. central And to the he crisisacknowle and dgesthe manner the contributing in which itrole unfolded of other that political he deserves elites, Croatianthe attentionpresident thatFranjo Tuđman in particular, to the story. But Milosević and his Serbian project

Glaurdić devotes to him, particularly in view of the new source materialis a minor and detail that he brings to light. My only quibble is that the book lacks a bibliography and one is forced, therefore, to trawl the extensive footnotes for the source material. This Yugoslavia.weakness, however, that does not detract from the fact that Glaurdić has written a very important book that deserves a place on any shelf of essential books about the breakup of

8 See, for Slavic Review -88.

instance, Paul Shoup’s review of this book in , vol. 71, no. 2 (Fall 2012), 687 8 | Page

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Review by Marko Attila Hoare, Kingston University

-up of Yugoslavia generated an enormous literature – much of it poor, some T he break -up that competently summarise familiar information. There are of it acceptable and some of it excellent. There are several decent introductory accounts of the break- -topics or some very good studies of former Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and his regime as a whole.that do Toojustice many to theof the break olderup generation as well. There of pre are- some excellent studies of sub related topics. But there have been few truly- groundbreaking studies of the process 1991 Yugoslav-researched, experts third had- too manys; too of their assumptions shattered by the break up; too many journalists and casual scholars flooded the market in the 1990s with too many under rate work many younger scholars were handicapped by political prejudices that preventedary literature them from has addressing the truth squarely. Furthermore, the body of relevant primary sources has been vast and growing exponentially- while the body of good supporting second only slowly grown to a respectable size. In these circumstances, writing a groundbreaking general study of the break up of Yugoslavia is a difficult task that requires both a lot of talent and a lots ofThe patient Hour hardof Europe: work. Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia is such a -up go, there are only two or three that rival Josip Glaurdic’ study. As far as general accounts of the break -up; he gives this work; none that is better. A great strength of this work lies in Glaurdic’s careful balance between the domestic and international dimensions of Yugoslavia’s break equal space to each and shows carefully the interaction between them. As far as the domestic dimension is concerned, he has skillfully summarised and distilled the existing knowledge about the subject as well as anybody before him. of theBut Westwhere – thisspecifically, book is trulyof the original and groundbreaking is in its analysis– of the international-up of Yugoslavia. dimension. For this is the best serious, comprehensive, scholarly analysis of the role U.S., the European Community, and the UN in the break -up in

The mainstream literature has tended to present the West’s involvement in the break terms of a reaction after the fact: Yugoslavia collapsed and war broke out due to internal causes, and the West responded with a weak, ineffective and primarily diplomatic Michasintervention. for Greece. Some1 excellent studies of the responses of individual Western countries have appeared, most notably Michael Libal for Germany, Brendan Simms for Britain and Takis Those unwilling to acknowledge the culpability-up of ofthe Yugoslavia former regime was of actuallySlobodan Milosevic or of the Great Serb nationalists have, for their part, churned out innumerable versions of the conspiracy theory whereby the break caused or even engineered by the West; more precisely by Germany, the Vatican

1 Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia Michael Libal,Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia , Praeger, London and Westport, Connecticut, 1997; Brendan Simms, , Penguin, London, 2001; Takis Michas, , Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2002.

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alone done it well.2 and/or the IMF. But up till now, nobody has attempted to do what Glaurdic has done, let -

Glaurdic’s innovation is to begin his study of the West’s involvement not in 1991, whenntual full scale war broke out in the former Yugoslavia, but in 1987, when Milosevic was- assuming placesabsolute this power long- in Serbia. This enables him to interpret the West’s reaction to the eve considerationsoutbreak of war in not the as late a reflex 1980s to and a sudden early 1990s. crisis, butThe as most the imporresulttant of a oflong theseterm policy. He term policy in the broader context of the evolution of the West’s global Union. considerations concerned a state incomparably more important than Yugoslavia: the Soviet

-à-vis the Soviet Union and as a model of an independent, non-Soviet Yugoslavia’s principal significance for the Western alliance during the Cold War was as a buffer state vis Communist state. These factors became less important in the second half of the 1980s, when ruled the Soviet Union and the Cold War was winding down. Milosevic was initially identified by some influential Western observers as a possible ‘Balkan Gorbachev’; a Communist reformer who might bring positive Inchange his confirmation to Yugoslavia. The most important such observer was the veteran U.S. policymaker- Lawrence Eagleburger, who became Deputy Secretary of State in January 1989. hearings in the Senate- Foreign Relations Committee on 15 16 March 1989, Eagleburger stated that “there is no question in my mind that Milosevic is in terms of economics a Western market oriented fellow… [who] is playing on and using Serbian nationalism, which has been contained for so many years, in part I think as an effort to force the central Thisgovernment initial U.S. to comeappreciation to grips for with Milosevic some very dovetailed tough economic with a more problems.” (40). the fear that a collapse of Yugoslavia would create a precedent for the Soviet Union, important consideration: weakening the position of Gorbachev himself. Of decisive importance was not merely that Western and in particular U.S. leaders viewed Gorbachev as a valued friend, but the reform,extreme and conservatism actually preferred of their ideologyCommunist as regardsstrongmen, foreign n policy. Simply put, the U.S. administration of George H.W. Bush valued stability above all else, including democratic ot only in the USSR but also in – Poland, and Czechoslovakia, to the ardemocratic arsenal. This opposition led them to to them. acquiesce Bush andreadily his in team feared the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destabilisation that this threatened given, among other things, the latter’s nucle Soviet repression in Lithuania, Latvia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Their acquiescence in Milosevic’s repressive policies was a natural corollary.

Fool’s Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, Pluto Press, 2 To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia Breaking theFor South example Slav Diana Dream: Johnstone, The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia First do noLondon, Harm: 2002; Humanitar Michaelian Parenti, Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia , Verso, London, 2002; Kate Hudson, , Pluto, London, 2003; David N. Gibbs, ,Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, Tennessee, 2009. 10 | Page

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As Glaurdic shows, this conservative-realist worldview led the Bush Administration, right

up until the end of 1991, to champion Yugoslavia’satia and Slovenia. unity rather The thanirony its was democratic not only that reform. CroatianThough the and U.S. Slovenian gradually separatism lost faith wasin Milosevic, a direct responseits animosity to the in aggressivethis period policies was above of the all directed at the ‘separatist’ regimes in Cro -up of Yugoslavia as a unwillingness to oppose Milosevic and its hostility to the CroatsMilosevic and regime, Slovenes, but Washington also that the in latter practice was encouragedpromoting the the break force that was promoting the deliberate -policy.up of Yugoslavia Through its that it wished to avoid. very break accurate intelligence as to what

The problem was not that the Bush Administration lacked Milosevic’s regime was doing, but that it chose to disregard this intelligence, instead clinging blindly to its shibboleth of Yugoslav unity, indeed of Yugoslav centralisation. Thus, as Glaurdic shows, a ‘conservative realist’ ideology resulted in a highly unrealistic, dogmatic policy. In October 1990, the CIA warned the U.S. leadership that, while the latter could do little to preserve Yugoslav unity, its statements would be interpreted-determination and exploited by the different sides in the conflict: statements in support of Yugoslav unity wouldnevertheless encourage continued Serbia to while stress those its support in support for ofYugoslav human unity.rights and self would encourage the Slovenes, and Kosovars (110). The Bush Administration signalsThis meant they not received only that from the the West West. failed Milosevic to respond scar to Milosevic’s repressive and aggressive policy, but that Milosevic and his circle actually drew encouragement from the cely kept his policy a secret; at a onmeeting the ruins with of Western the old Yugoslavia,thatambassadors in would Belgrade on 16 January- 1991, he informed them that he intended to allow Slovenia to secede, and to form instead an enlarged Serbian stage include Serb inhabited areas of Croatia- and Bosnia and that would be established through the use of force if necessary. This brazen announcement provoked U.S. and British complaints, but no change in policy (135 136).

The problem was not merely ideological rigidity and mistaken analysis on the part of whoWestern – and particular –U.S. reall leaders,y did want but alsoto preserve sheer lack Yugoslavia, of interest. and Glaurdic whose describesprogramme the of economicparadoxical reform, Western in principle, policy toward offered the a Yugoslav way to achieve Federal this. Prime In comparison Minister, Ante with Markovic, the unlike Milosevic -1990, no remotely similar generous financial assistance extended to Poland in 1989 support was offered to Markovic’s government, because in U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann’s words, “Yugoslavia looked like a loser” (68). powers. Glaurdic demolishes the myth – TheCaplan United– States’s dogmatic support for Yugoslav unity was shared by the West European already exploded by authors like Libal and Richard 3 that Germany supported or encouraged Croatia’s and Slovenia’s secession from Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia 3 Richard Caplan, , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 11 | Page

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Yugoslavia. When the president of the Yugoslav presidency, Janez Drnovsek, visited Bonn on 5 December 1989, German chancellor expressed to him his “appreciation for Yugoslavia’s irreplaceable role in the stability of the region and the whole of Europe”. On the same occasion, German president- Richard von Weizsaecker informed the Yugoslav delegation that he supported a “centralised” Yugoslavia (59). A year later, on 6 December 1990, German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher told his Yugoslav counterpart, Budimir Loncar, that Germany “has a fundamental- interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia”, and consequently would make “the Yugoslav republics realise that separatist tendencies areThis damaging German opposition to the whole to andCroatian very andcostly” Slovenian (124 125). independence continued right up until ding to Gerhard Almer, a

the latter was actually declared in June 1991, and beyond. Accor German diplomat and Yugoslav specialist at the time, “Everything that was happening in Yugoslavia was viewed through Soviet glasses. [West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher's] idea was, ‘Well, Yugoslavia disintegrating is a bad example for Soviet disintegration, and this was bad for us since we-Yu neededgoslav imperialistica Soviet Union tendencies capable of on action the part because we needed to get a deal with them on our unity’. This was widely accepted in the statusministry.” quo (160). Contrary to the myth of anti of Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democraticition. government, the latter’s support for the Yugoslav in the face of Belgrade’s abuses was so rigid that it provoked strong resistance from the Social Democratic oppos -up, actually resisted this pressure from the Bundestag for a shift in German policy away from Genscher, subsequently demonised as a supposed architect of Yugoslavia’s breakghts and self-determination. The turning point for him, as Glaurdic shows, came with his visit to unbending support for Yugoslav unity and toward greater emphasis on human ri r, and the Yugoslav Belgrade on 1 July 1991, after the war in Slovenia had broken out. The combination of the overconfident Milosevic’s aggressive stance in his talk with Gensche togovernment’s his gradual shiftinability in favour to halt of the Croatia Yugoslav and Slovenia.People’s Army Even [JNA] operations against Slovenia, destroyed the German Foreign Minister’s faith in the Belgrade authorities, leading tually, after a lot more Serbian independence,intransigence and while military the EC aggression, split into pro Germany- and anti reversed-recogn itsition traditional currents policyof opinion. by 180 degrees, and came out in favour of the recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s -edged sword, since it aroused the anti-German suspicions and rivalries of other EC states, particularly Nevertheless, as Glaurdic shows, Germany’s change of heart own wasstances a double against recognition.

France and Britain, which consequently hardened their On 6 November 1991, while the JNA’s military assaults on the Croatian cities of Vukovar Commonsand Dubrovnik that hiswere government at their peak, was Douglas opposed Hogg, to the the recognition UK’s Minister of Croatia of State since for Foreignit would and Commonwealth Affairs, explained to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of

create an “obstacle” to territorial adjustments in Serbia’s favour and at Croatia’s expense (253). Several days later,- the French president, Francois Mitterand, made a similar public statement, indicating that he saw Croatia’s existing borders as a ‘problem’ that prevented its recognition (253 254). | Page

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The Bush Administration, meanwhile, acted as a brake on the EC’s shift against Belgrade and in favour of recognition, teaming up with the British and French to counter Germany’s change of policy. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and his deputy Lawrence Eagleburger,- as well as the UN special envoy Cyrus Vance (himself a former U.S. Secretary of –State) even as the waged a diplomatic battle in this period against any shift away from the West’s non recognition policy, and against any singling out of Serbia for blame for the war JNA was massively escalating its assault on Vukovar in preparation for the town’s final conquest. Eagleburger had signalled to the Yugoslav ambassador in October that, although the U.S. was aware that Milosevic was- attempting to establish a Greater Serbia, it would do opposenothing recognitionto stop him andexcept to support economic the sanctions, idea of a federaland even Yugoslavia, these only and after continued Greater Serbia had actually been established (243 246). As late as December 1991, Vance continued to - moreover to put his trust in Milosevic, the JNA and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, Glaurdicwhile viewing has marshaled the Croatians an enormous dismissively wealth as “these of documentary Croatian insurgents” evidence to (264 show265). that the

British, French and Americans, far from reacting in-scale a weak war and in Bosniaindecisive- manner to a vocallysudden supportingoutbreak of Yugoslav war, actually unity pursued and opposin a remarkablyg Croatian steady and Slovenian and consistent secession; policy of from before the war began, right up until the eve of full Hercegovina: of resisting any singling out of Serbia for blame or punishment; of opposing recognition of Slovenia and Croatia; of seeking to appease Milosevic and the JNA by extracting theconcessions former Yugoslavia from Croatia equally, as the while weaker there side; was and nofinally freezing of appeasingof the international the Serb nationalists’ assets or financialdesire to transactionscarve up Bosnia. through EC sanctions w imposed in November 1991 applied to all parts of heavily- hich the JNA funded-armed its Croatians. war. The UN Although, arms embargo, largely on whose imposition had actually been requested by the Yugoslav government itself, favoured the armed Serbian side and hurt the poorly account of Germany’s change of heart, the EC at the start of December 1991 belatedly limited its economic sanctions to Serbia and Montenegro alone, the U.S. immediately Accordingresponded to by myth, imposing the Western economic powers sanctions applied on the the whole principle of Yugoslavia. of national self-determination - in a manner that penalised the Serb nationington, and which privileged would the have non preservedSerbs. As YugoslaviaGlaurdic as a shows, the reverse was actually the case. In October 1991, Milosevic rejected the peace plan put forward by the EC’s Lord Carr region.union of Carrington sovereign consequenrepublics with autonomy for national minorities, in part because he feared it implied autonomy for the Albanians of Kosovo and the Muslims in Serbia’s Sanjak tly modified his plan: Croatia would be denied any military handpresence to suppres whatsoever in the disputed ‘Krajina’ region, despite that region being an integral afterpart of leaders Croatia of inhabited the latter byhad many organised Croats, referendums while Serbia for would increased be given autonomy, a completely and after free the s the Kosovo Albanians and Sanjak Muslims. Carrington’s offer came just

Milosevic regime had responded with concerted police repression (242).

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13 H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XIV, No. 20 (2013)

Milosevic nevertheles

s continued to reject the Carrington Plan in the understandable belief thethat que the West would eventually offer him a better deal. He consequently asked Carrington- to request from the EC’s Arbitration Commission, headed by Robert Badinter, an answer to stions of whether the in Croatia and Bosnia possessed the right to self Commission,determination, along and wofith whether a third Serbia’squestion, borders of whether with theCroatia situation and Bosnia in Yugoslavia should bewas a case considered borders under international law. Carrington submitted these to the

of secession by Slovenia and Croatia or a case of dissolution of the common state. That the thatArbitration Badinter Commission was a close ruled associate against of President Serbia on Mitterand,all three counts whose was, sympathies in Glaurdic’s were words, with a “terrible surprise for Milosevic and for many in the international community” (260),rench given

Serbia’s case. The Badinter Commission’s ruling dismayed both Carrington and F foreign minister Roland Dumas, and paved the way for international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. But it did not fundamentally change the West’s policy.

Glaurdic’s account ends with the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, which as he argues, should be seen as the logical culmination of this policy. The failure of the EC foreign-term consequences,ministers to recognise Bosnia’s independence in January 1992 along with that of Croatia and Slovenia was, in Glaurdic’s words, “the decision with the most detrimental long Europeanall of which Community were clearly had foreseeable… made regarding The ECthe had recognition missed a of great the Yugoslchance to preempt a war that would soon make the war in Croatia- pale in comparison. Of all the mistakes the av republics, this givenone was every probably indication the most that thetragic” West (281 would282). acquiesce Recognition in th em.of Bosnia at this time would have upset Milosevic’s and Karadzic’s plans for destroying that republic; instead, they were - -way partition of Bosnia- Thus, on 21 22 February 1992, Bosnia’s politicians were presented withn the the ethnic first draft of the plan of the EC’s Jose Cutileiro for the three Hercegovina into loosely linked Serb, Croat and Muslim entities. Since the plan, based o majorities in Bosnian municipalities, offered the Bosnian Serb nationalistsin order to ‘only’ accommodate 43.8% of Bosnian territory instead of the 66% they sought, their assembly unanimously rejected it on 11 March. Once again, the EC abandoned universal standards Serb intransigence, and Cutileiro modified his plan so that the three constituent Bosnian entities “would be based on national principles and would be taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria” (294), thereby opening the way for a Serb entity with a larger share of Bosnian territory than was justified on demographic grounds.

Ultimately,“The Bosnian damage presidentthat the Cutileiro Alija Izetbegovic plan did to rejected Bosnia ca thennot plan. be overstated.But as Glaurdic By writes, accepting the ethnic principle for the reorganisation of the republic, Cutileiro in essence recognised the platforms of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party led by Karadzic] and the Boban wing of the HDZ [Croat Democratic Union] and opened a Pandora’s box of ethnic division that still mars Bosnia to this very day. Cutileiro’s intent was obviously to appease the Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsor into not

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implementing their massive war machinery. However, instead of lowering tensions and giving the three parties an impetus to keep negotiating, the plan actually gave them a “charter for ethnic cleansing” (290)

In these circumstances, the West’s belated recognition of Bosnia’s independence in April 1992 was naturally not taken seriously by the Serb leaders; Milosevic rather wittily comparedMy principal it to regret the Roman is that emperorGlaurdic didCaligula not fully declaring apply histhe horselogic of to his be iconoclastica Senator (29 analysis8). correctly highlights the retrograde nationalist ideology of Croatia to his consideration of the Croatian dimension of the Yugoslav-puppet tragedy. Croatian He carefully regime and of World War II and his promotion of the partition of Bosnia- n president Franjo Tudjman, including his equivocal statements about the Nazi Hercegovina. Yet he does not properly stress the extent to which Tudjman’s repeated retreats in the face of Serbian aggression merely encouraged the latter, just as did the similarals involved retreats in arms of the procurement, Western leaders. Thus, Tudjman capitulated to the JNA’s bullying in January 1991 and agreed to demobilise Croatia’s reservists and arrest Croatian offici including the Croatian Defense Minister Martinto say Spegelj that suchhimself. Croatian Glaurdic appeasement argues that merely this “defused the [JNA] generals’ plan for a takeover” and brought Yugoslavia “back from the brink” (134), but it would be more accurate encouraged further Serbian assaults, and that the killing in Croatia began-à only-vis theweeks Yugoslav later.

Glaurdic has carefully described the Milosevic regime’s secessionism vis federation, but one significant detail omitted from his book is the promulgation on 28 September 1990ia of and Serbia’s its international new constitution, position which and statedrelations that with “The other Republic states of and Serbia determines and guarantees: 1 the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serb onlyinternational th organisations;…”. In other words, Serbia declared itself a sovereign and independent state before either Croatia or Bosnia did. This is relevant when evaluating not e Milosevic regime’s hypocrisy regarding ‘separatism’, but the extent of the West’sand to policy failure. Milosevic posed as Yugoslavia’s defender while he deliberately destroyed it. ofWestern the second leaders of these were policieshoodwinked: ensured they the sought failure both of the to first.uphold Yugoslavia’s unity appease Milosevic’s Serbia. As Glaurdic has brilliantly demonstrated, their dogged pursuit

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Review by Renéo Lukic, Laval University, Canada

its influences of Tinternational he stated goal organizations, of this book is, such according as European to author, Community, twofold: the it Conference seeks to explain for the Securit Western States (Britain,CSCE France, Germany and the United States) and

y and Cooperation in Europe ( ) and the United Nations, on the process of the Yugoslavia’s disintegration.this systemic It aims change also toand explain the disintegration the demise of of the the South Yugoslav Slav State federation are at «within the larger historical context of the end of the Cold War in Europe» (3). Thus, interplay between the core of Glaurdić’s analysis.-level analysis; it focuses on the internal dynamic of the Yugoslav disintegration and the Western diplom The book presents two a specific sequence of the atic reactions to it, step by step, during five years, duringfrom 1987 the warsto 1992. Each of the eight chapters -of the book, Western covers foreign policy goals in the Yugoslav conflictcrisis, and were the the Western preservation perception of the of politicalit. From andthe outsetterritorial of the unity Yugoslav of the crisisSouth and in Croatia and Slovenia (1991 1992) C Slav Federation. A call for the creation of- new states in Europe, advocated by Slovenia, Croatiaroatia, andSlovakia Slovenia and afterthe Baltic the fall states, of the was Berlin loudly Wall rejected was, to by put western it mildly leaders., unw The westernacknowledgment leaders. of the right to the self determination of the people evoked and claimed by elcomed by the orderly process of post-communist transition and to maintain stability in the South Eastern Europe By keeping Yugoslavia together the West hoped to and create realistic. conditions They for had acted together and if they (had7). These political goals were in 1989/90 meaningful could have worked if the European, the Community United States, (EC) in and June the of United1991 willingly States delegated to the EC handling of the Yugoslavbeen ready crisis. to back Jacques up their Poos policy, by skillful use of diplomacyand and then military the president force. As weof the ECnow Council know that Europe and not the U.S. Luxembourg’s Foreign Ministerthe of Ministers, proudly announced ‘the hour of Europe’, explicitly saying should be in charge of resolving YugoslavA conflict. Thus, Poos’s memorable phrase became a title of Glaurdić’s book. The EC peace initiative to stop the wars in Europe was supposed to be Europe’s peacebuilding hour. Few years later Poos’s duringexpression Iraq became a symbol of EC/EU diplomatic failure from whichonal EU actorforeign organically and defenseintegrating policy economic, never fully politic recovered. and military The disunitypowers. ofIt the EU members was in full display crisis in 2003. The EU never became a unifiedmore internati concerned with outmaneuvering each other than with solving real issuesfailed on in the Yugoslavia groun because its most powerfulGreat Britain memb wereers com(France,peting the with UK, each and otherGermany) as to were who would“ d” (3). France and far as the United States was concerned, it lost interest in better neutralize-state German after thediplomatic end of the initiatives Cold War. to stopIn order Serbian to preserve aggression the directedterritorial against unity ofSlovenia Yugoslavia and ,Croatia. the West As had to harness the Yugoslavia as a buffer

political ambitions of Serbia and its ally Montenegro. While the West | Page

16 H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XIV, No. 20 (2013)

was aiming to save Yugoslavia as a loos the Yugoslavian federation into - dominatede federation and within centralized existing unitary borders, state. between After the federalwars in units,Slovenia the andSerbian Croatia leader Slobodan Milošević was actively seeking to transform up a , thus changinga Serbian the broke out (June 1991), Milošević was actively striving, the to carve Western‘Greater states Serbia put pressure’ on Sloveniainternal and Croatia, borders considering between Yugoslavthem republicsthe by force. Instead of organizing strong resistanceThe to Serbia’s territorial expansionism 1991, later to be troublemakers of the regional order. Western policy of appeasement toward Serbia, in The author ledconvincingly to the wars demons in Bosnia,trates in 1992, and in Kosovo in 1999.

policies toward Yugoslavia. This politi that the British, American andtendency French foreign to appease policy themakers strong were and driven push by political realism (Realpolitik) while elaboratingds, their the political foreign principle which was guiding Western leaderscal realism during was the displayed early period as a “ of the Yugoslav crisis was . Thethe weak might during in the negotiations” (30). In other wor the Yugoslav Army. On the other hand, Germany, in the fall of 1991 distanced itself from the ‘Might is Right’ a moreYugoslav ethical foreigncase was policy represented toward former by Milošević Yugoslavia and -determination and the protection of the human rRealpolitikights. and was advocating based on values such as the right to self The empirical evidence in s. The author consulted primary sources from ew documents through the procedure of the reedom of Information Actthiss in book the Uaboundnited States and the the presidential libraries and obtained n F UK. Original documents deposited at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formerhe diplomats Yugoslavia and (ICTY) foreign were policy also consulted, as well intercepted messagesJosip between Serbian leaders.e historiography While writing this book, the author conducted 42 extensive interviews with t , to name a few.1 makers involved used in evidence Yugoslav which crisis. was Glaurdic’s book us. fits into th need toestablished wait for by authors such as Ivo Banac, Sabrina Ramet, and myselfthe Yugoslav crisis. However, he not available to Readers and scholars will the opening of the national archives to know more about international relations. Glaudic’s book reflects excellent scholarship and deserves a broad readership in the field of

1 -

See, for example, Ivo Banac, Raspad- Jugoslavije, The Break up of Yugoslavia (Zagreb, Croatia, Durieux, 2001), Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Reneo Lukic, L’agonie Yougoslave 1986 2003 (Les presses de l’Université Laval, Quebec, Canada, 2003). | Page

17 H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XIV, No. 20 (2013)

Author’s Response by Josip Glaurdić, Clare College, University of Cambridge

Caplan and – I must admit that writing this response to the reviews by Richard , Marko Hoare, eloquentRenéo form.Lukic Though has they been leave very me difficult at a loss for forme words, largely I am because I do verynot know grateful what for else to say about my book that they havealso surenot already the consensus said in suchin these generous three reviewsand will not deceive - obviously their kind endorsement. That said, I am the readers of H Diplo about the state of academic study of Yugoslavia’s– no breakup and wars. As Caplan rightly points– out, there indeed has been a “dizzyingth. array of competing interpretations and understandings”, and some of those interpretations Ofmatter course, how disagreement poorly supported over suchby evidence contentious seem issues to be as dying the Yugoslav a very slow wars dea is only natural, and we can improve our common scholarly pursuit of truth only through reasoned argument. enerated a literature that is often too long on passionate interpretation and much too short on the pursuit andNevertheless, proper treatment the study of historical of Yugoslavia’s facts. ereviolent immediately breakup seemscome to to mind have theg nationalist interpretations which have poisoned the historiographies of successor states. Scholars from the former YugoslaviaH are, however, not the only ones guilty of cavalier attitude toward facts and of clinging to arguments whichYugoslavia’s fly in the face of the West is also

olderevidence. generation I wholeheartedly of pre- agree with Hoare that lacking groundbreaking studies of the process of- Yugoslavia’s breakup at least in part because “Too many of the the 1990s with too many1991 under Yugoslav-researched, experts third had- too many of their assumptions shattered by the break up; too many journalists and casual scholars flooded the market in rate works; too many younger scholars were handicapped by political prejudices that prevented them from addressing the truth Thesquarely.” unfortunate outcome of controversies very slow progress in improving our understandingsuch weaknesse of whats has happenedbeen a field in often Yugoslavia marred and by why.useless All of debatesthis has over ‘ even though’ which the should not evenYugoslav exist inia the first place, and by documented international crisis of the past two decades – taken place breakup of is probably the best or, maybe, exactly because of it. Hoare is again right in stating that “the body of relevant primary sources has been vast and growing exponentially”. For newcomers to the field, especially for those who wish to draw forbroader those or who comparative consider themselves lessons from specialists, the Yugoslav the dissolution of and wars, this can be a daunting task leading them to rely on secondary literature with serious shortcomings. Even task adjudicating between competing of evidence is often extraordinarily difficult. The greatest challenge to contemporary history as a whole is arguably not the lack of access to official documents, but the difficulty evaluating the credibility and comparative value of the increasing numberolutions, of extremely declarations anddiverse statements sources. of In a the range case of of na Yugoslavia’stional and international dissolution and organiz wars,ations this includesand institutions; (but is not declassifiedlimited to): newspaper official documents; articles; trialtelevision witness footage; testimonies oral histories; and various res types of evidence

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choose to delve into our interpretations while relying on generated by The Hague Tribunal. Faced with such an overwhelming challenge, we often too many corners – the work of those who came before us, perhaps not even considering the possibility wars. that our predecessors may have been cutting which is exactly what has unfortunately often been the caseThe in the field historianof study of Yugoslavia’s breakup noted some and time ago– in frustration –

Cambridge David Thomson probablyast, and more often havingthat a contemporary to fight his way historian through “will acres less of newsprintoften find himselfor shelf poring after shelf over of a documentssingle document, in quest struggling to extract from it the last glimmers of knowledge about the p 1 Yet in the field of study of of relevant facts. It would surely be absurd, in such conditions, to pretend that he should, in the manner of Fustel de Coulanges, ‘continually begin afresh’.” documentsYugoslavia’s and dissolution, newsprint exactly have those works which have been based on the principle of In“continually The Hour ofbeginning Europe, Iafresh” have tried and toon do the practice of their authors poring over. My shelves hope was of 2 to help demonstrate that a solid contributedaccount and the analysis most ofto internationalour understanding policies of thetoward period. that to the greatest possible extent

TheYugoslavia’s second principal breakup goaland warsI tried can to achieve(and should) in The be Hour written of Europe with primary was to integrate sources. the story the end of the Cold War in Europe. systemicof Yugoslavia’s change breakup in Europe and and the the Western disintegration responses of tothe it Yugoslavinto the larger state story of of my analysis. In the accountsLukic is of very this muchcrucial correct period in of identifying European historythe interplay – whether between – Yugoslavia hasas muchbeing tooat the often core as somehow tive analysis. The Hourscholarly, of Europe popular, hopefully policy, demonstrates biographic, or autobiographic Asbeen left aside too special of a case to be useful for compara the extent to which there has been-term no policy need fitting for that. perfectlyHoare inrightlyto points out, I view the West’s reaction to the Yugoslav crisis not as a series of reflexes to a sudden outbreak of violence, but as the result of a long the broadetive- r context of Western (re)actions in ,Europe in the late 1980s and thatearly had 1990s. such My a profoundly argument is negative that it was influence exactly on the the status calculations quo bias of of the Western principal powers (or their “conserva realist worldview”, as Hoare calls it) so clearly visible at the time,

1 Journal of ContemporaryYugoslavia’s History

David Thomson, “The Writing of Contemporary History,” , Vol. 2, No. 1, (1967), 28. 2 study of the so- Some credit in this respect should in particular be given to the new generation of scholars from the Sregion.rpska pobunaNikica Barić’s u Hrvatskoj, 1990.-1995.called Republic of Serb Krajina,-T for example, would have been impossible without the vast original archival material acquired after Krajina’s ultimate demise. Nikica Barić, (Zagreb: Golden Marketing ehnička knjiga, 2005). A series of very Bitperceptiveka za Vukovar studies of the role of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the SlomCroatian Titove war Armije: by Davor JNA Marijan i raspad also Jugoslavije rests on both the captured documents- of the JNA and the archival sources of the Croatian Army. Davor Marijan, policy during the (Zagreb:Cold War Hrvatski and its involveme institut za povijest, 2004);- and (Zagreb: Golden Marketing Tehnička knjiga, 2007). The recent voluminous study of Yugoslavia’s foreign Treća strana Hladnog rata nt in the Non Aligned Movement by Tvrtko Jakovina is basically a distillation of the massive archive of the late Yugoslav foreign minister Josip Vrhovec. Tvrtko Jakovina, (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011). 19 | Page

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actors – particularly those in Belgrade. Unfortunately for the people of former Yugoslavia, this is the lesson Western policy- ny years.

short answer to the fewmakers critical andpoints diplomats the reviewers failed toraised learn is for needed. ma

Finally, a principal points in my discussionHoare is correct to point out that I do not discuss the promulgation of the Serbian constitution in September 1990. However, I do cover the constitution’s ggled with that issueof the Serbian referendum on its promulgationwing intheJuly events 1990 in (108). Yugoslavia, I take Hoare’sthe predominant critique of President Tudjman’s strategy in early 1991 very seriously and have stru . However, on balance and after revie eveninternational then it was opinion, modestly as well equ the state of Croatia’s police and armed forces at the time (it washas to be remembered that Croatia’scorrect. National Guard was not created until May 1991 and ipped),3 I had to conclude that Tudjman’s strategy at the time As forsensible and ultimately – it is well placed and I share have en ed, rather prosaic. The Caplan’s “quibble” regarding the lack of bibliography stillhis frustration. left with the The choice explanation of shedding is, as could be expect publisher deemed the manuscript to be too long. After significant and painful cuts, I was additional4 30and pages hopefully from willthe text or losing the bibliography. I chose the latter as a lesser of two evils. A full bibliography, however, accompanies the Croatian edition of the book be included in the paperback edition, if there is one. Copyright © 2013 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online. -

-H Net permits- the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with- full and Editorsaccurate at attribution h-diplo@h to-net.msu.edu the author,. web location, date of publication, H Diplo, and H Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the H Diplo

In this regard, I find the refutation of argument 3 – General MartinReview Špegelj’s of Croatian Historyby Davor Marijan particularly- convincing. For his most recent contribution to the debate, see Davor Marijan, “The Sarajevo Ceasefire Realism or strategic error- by the Croatian leadership?” , Vol. 7, No. 1Tokovi (2011): istorije 103, 123. - See4 also his polemical,- but very useful, critique of Špegelj’s memoirs in Davor Marijan, “Hrvatske kontroverze o ratu 1991 1995. Povodom knjige ‘Sjećanje vojnika’ generala Martina Špegelja,” No. 34 (2004): 111 Vrijeme137. Europe: Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije

Josip Glaurdić, (Zagreb: MATE, d.o.o., 2011). | Page

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