The Denuclearization Process of the Republic of Kazakhstan

MASARYK UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Department of International Relations and European Studies

The denuclearization process of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Bachelor’s thesis

Darya Nevrayeva

Thesis Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, PhD. UČO: 439868 Field of Study: International Relations Year of matriculation: 2014

Brno, 2018

I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own independent scholarly work. All references contained within it have been correctly cited and the original authors acknowledged. No material other than that listed has been used.

Brno, May 13th 2018 Darya Nevrayeva ……………………………

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank PhDr. Petr Suchý Ph.D., the head of Department of International Relations and European Studies, for his assistance, guidance and dedicated time during the process of writing of this thesis. I am also very grateful to my family and friends for their support throughout 4 years of my studies. Lastly, I would like to thank Gavin Meyer Furrey for editing this paper.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 2. The nuclear legacy 3. Realism vs. liberalism 4. Debates and actors 4.1.Relevant actors and constitutional framework 4.1.1. The President 4.1.2. Public opinion: the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement 4.1.3. Opposition 5. The application of Scott Sagan’s models 5.1.Explanation of Sagan’s framework 5.2.The security model 5.3.The domestic politics model 5.4.The norms model 6. Conclusion 7. Bibliography

1. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear realm has been the topic that evoked a considerable academic interest for many scholars and students of international relations. This area of study offers many problems and puzzles for a researcher, and remains an authentic and unique field. The subject did not leave the author of this thesis indifferent either. This year was the 25th anniversary of the signature of the Lisbon Protocol – the document signed by three former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This decision was a result of lengthy negotiations, considerable doubts and multilateral agreements; nevertheless, it was a move, which predetermined the further position of those states in the international environment. Despite the academic interest in the topic of denuclearization in the aforementioned former Soviet republics, the denuclearization process of Kazakhstan is less frequently a subject of study. The ambition of the work is to fix this omission. Moreover, the choice of the subject of the study is justified by the fact that the author of the thesis is from the Republic of Kazakhstan. Therefore, she argues that among the variety of the nuclear weapon related scientific works, this case is quite distinctive and undiscovered.

In order to carry out a comprehensive and coherent examination of this subject, the author proposes the following structure of the paper. The first part of this work has a chapter dealing with the brief introduction of the nuclear arsenal deployed in the country prior to the dissolution of the USSR. This introduction is followed by the theoretical inclusion, where the author examines the arsenal’s relinquishment through the lenses of realism and neoliberalism schools of international relations. Greater emphasis, however, is put on the following section, which deals with the decision-making processes and actors that took part in them. In the author’s opinion, an appropriate timeframe for this segment of the work appears to be the interval between Kazakhstan proclaiming its independence on December 16 1991, and the signing of the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992. For, this extent of time could be defined as the period of uncertainty and ambiguity before announcing the final decision. Whereas the initialing of the Lisbon Protocol was de facto joining START agreement, which implied the nuclear arsenal’s relinquishment. Therefore, the signature of the Protocol was the outcome of the contemplations from the country faced with the dilemma: whether or not it should forgo nuclear weapons and how much it would affect the national interests of the state. Thus, this particular section is dealing with actors that took on essential roles during this time period and helped to form the final decision.

The following chapter is displaying the analytical framework of Scott Sagan’s models1, which helps to give a broader explanation to the issue and serves as an effective tool in answering research questions. Moreover, the application of these models is helpful for determining which particular factors played a significant role in the decision making process as well as for a general clarification of the controversy over Kazakhstan willingly giving up its nuclear legacy. By elaborating data mentioned above, it becomes possible to draw a reasonable conclusion to answer the research questions set by the author: what were main factors and motives influencing Kazakh officials to give up the nuclear arsenal? Was it in pursuit of international recognition and an overall prestige? Or because there were no major security threats for the country? What actors played the most significant role in the nuclear disarmament of the country? Was it a result of firm pressure from the outside? Or were there actors within the country who were in charge of the decision? Was it the President alone? Was there considerable initiative from other actors during this process?

The collection of data was carried out primarily by examining the literature from English, Czech, Russian and Kazakh sources. The undoubtable advantage of this thesis is the origins of the author – the Republic of Kazakhstan – which made it possible to use not only information from English and Czech scientific journals and databases, but also from Russian and Kazakh sources.

1 Scott Sagan presented the three models in the article Why Do States Build Nuclear weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb for the winter edition of 1996 – 1997 of International Security magazine. 6

2. THE NUCLEAR LEGACY

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited a considerable nuclear legacy. It became a country with the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal at that time. According to the Nuclear Status Report, when the Soviet Union disintegrated, an estimated 1,400 nuclear warheads, 104 SS–18s (the most powerful ICBM in the Soviet nuclear arsenal), and 47 heavy bombers (Bear H-6 and H-16s) were in Kazakhstan. In addition to that, 104 SS–18 silo launchers, 16 launch-control silos, two SS–18 training silos, and 26 other silo structures in Zhangiz-Tobe, Derzhavinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Leninsk. Finally, there were 194 nuclear weapon test tunnels left on the Kazakh soil (Wolsthal, Chuen, Daughtry 2001, p. 52).

It is safe to say that Kazakhstan had more than just strategic nuclear weapons deployed on its territory. On top of that, there were three nuclear weapons facilities in Derzhavinsk, Zhangiz Tobe and Semipalatinsk; the power reactor BN-350 near the city of Aktau; two research reactors in Almaty WWR-K, 36% HEU, 10 MWe; three research reactors in Kurchatov (IGR, IVG-1M, RA); last but not least there were multiple uranium processing locations including uranium mining in Stepnogorsk, uranium conversion facility (UO2) and fuel pellet production and five uranium ore processing locations (Cirincion, Wolfsthal, Rajkumar 2005, pp 369 – 370.). It is also worth mentioning that Kazakhstan was one of the main uranium producing regions of the former Soviet Union and the main fuel pellet producer. Before the collapse of the USSR, more than 70 000 t of uranium was extracted and the Ulba Production Centre provided 80% of the fuel pellets used by the USSR (Fyodorov 1997, 191).

Moreover, there were a few testing sites and many of them were kept in secret throughout the whole period of the Soviet Union existence. Among such were Kapustin Yar and Semipalatinsk testing sites (were established in 1949), Taisogan in Western Kazakhstan (established in 1952), Azgir (established in 1966), and last but not least, the anti-ballistic testing rage – Sary-Shagan (established in 1958).

Taking into consideration the amount of nuclear facilities inherited by Kazakhstan it is fair to make a conclusion that the newly independent republic was qualified enough to become an equal nuclear power. Kazakhstan had considerable uranium resources and technical capabilities to produce the pellets. It disposed the ground for both research and testing purposes and most importantly, it possessed actual nuclear munition. Altogether, it added more genuine arguments to intensify the decision making process within the country and created more doubts regarding the expediency of the final resolution: whether or not abandoning the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union was the most properly strategic choice to best serve the national interests.

3. REALISM VS. LIBERALISM

For a better understanding of the decision of Kazakh authorities to forgo the nuclear arsenal, it is imperative to analyze this process through the lens of the relevant theory. Building a theoretical framework will lead to a deeper comprehension of the denuclearization of the country, and serve as a useful structure for interpreting past events leading to it. First, let us use the help of the theory to clarify the initial acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union (which Kazakhstan was a part of) after the end of World War II. It is important to note that during that time classical realism was gaining in momentum as a dominant theory of international relations. Ideas that stand behind this theory lie in the realistic school of IR that were once described by many thinkers throughout the centuries before realism, as we know it today, adopted its main assumptions. To name a few there was Thomas Hobbes with his work Leviathan that depicted the anarchy of the international system. Hobbes made a significant contribution by describing a selfish nature of an individual as well as by pointing out ambiguous relations between states. In his work he emphasizes egoistic nature of the human being who has a “perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceased only in death (Hobbes 1651, p. 61); along with characterizing the behavior of states by saying that they are apt to enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion and they try to endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors (Hobbes 1651, p. 104).

Hobbes’ ideas inspired many social scientists later on in terms of elaborating their thoughts into new concepts within this school e.g. Herz’s security dilemma, Morgenthau’s six principle of realism etc. As a result, eventual observations and works of social scientists have given impetus for the advent of classical realism theory, which became a dominant approach in the 1940’s and remained such almost throughout the whole Cold War period.

According to classical realism, the international system is anarchic and states (as unitary actors) are doomed to rely on self-help; they act in this manner in pursuit of ways to maximize their security in order to survive. With this in mind, it is safe to say these main assumptions were proficiently used by the United States and the USSR to justify nuclear weapons acquisition. Under such circumstances, a country’s security becomes of major importance and there is no way for cooperation whatsoever. The superpowers start to acquire necessary protection tools, nuclear weapons in this case, in order to increase their chances for survival. Thus, these circumstances provide justification for nuclear proliferation. The United States and the Soviet Union took advantage of this not only to gain a considerable nuclear arsenal, but also to assure they will be capable of a second-strike. Therefore, throughout the time of the existence of the bipolar order, all

8 of the states possessing nuclear weapons, including Kazakhstan, were hostages of the uncertain anarchic environment.

The international environment, however, is not static. By the time Kazakhstan became an independent country and had to decide on the fate of nuclear weapons on its land, perceptions and ideas, over the time of the bipolar order, had reasonably changed in both academic and policy circles. The end of the Cold War, besides the new global arrangement, brought the attenuation of classical realism ideas and a shift towards neoliberal pillars – democracy, cooperation through institutions and free market competition. In the background of such values, the security matters ceased to fulfill the major significance of the state policies.

With this being said, in further contribution to the nuclear puzzle of Kazakhstan it would be useful to take a look at the authors as Etel Solingen, for instance, an American writer, who cast the light on the connection of the neoliberal theory and WMD2 proliferation. In her works she promotes the belief that democracies, which seek values like liberal economy and cooperation, often choose not to acquire nuclear weapons due to their trust to the system and reliance on the international order. Applying the theory on the cases of denuclearization, Solingen looks at the states that want to give up their arsenals through the prism of neoliberal institutionalism. She says to gain the benefits of foreign investment and better integration into the international economy, states gave up their nuclear ambiguity. This argumentation fits in with classic neoliberal institutionalism, which declares that states calculate costs and benefits to pursue stable, defined interests. As the democratic regimes took hold, they brought with them a different set of interests than the military regimes—specifically, a focus on economic growth as opposed to military might (Rublee 2009, pp. 11 – 12.).

To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the end of the Cold War (besides entailing the shift of paradigms) has brought about new perception of national interests of the state in terms of security. Since then, choices of a country could be determined not from the perspective of the surroundings (as in a realistic approach) but through the internal dynamics of the state. This idea lies in the heart of the neoliberal approach. Neoliberalists claim the assumption that to determine a state’s attitude towards the nuclear proliferation it is essential to consider internal features of the state rather than the external environment. This practice also indicates that the state is not restricted by the security only as it has multiple goals and objectives on its policy agenda. With this in mind,

2 Weapons of Mass Destruction 9 the author of the thesis finds it reasonable to explain the decision of Kazakhstan to forgo its nuclear legacy using the neoliberal school of IR.

4. DEBATES AND ACTORS

The following chapter will be mainly dedicated to the period in the history of Kazakhstan that took place shortly after the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991 up until the signing of the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992. This chapter will be paying special attention to the key actors and their actions in the given timeframe. In the author’s opinion, this particular interval of time was of crucial importance for the development of the nuclear future of the country; since for Kazakhstan (as well as for Belarus and Ukraine) the signature of this document meant the final agreement to become a non-nuclear state.

After examining the relevant literature, it is important to reflect on the three main sides of the discussion over the period in question: the position of the state officials, opposition and the public sector. It is safe to say that most sources indicate that on behalf of the leadership, the main character of the time was Nursultan Nazarbayev, as the leader of the country along with his inner circle. Nonetheless, going deeper into the topic it is worth mentioning other actors such as the Supreme Soviet (though it had comparatively small part, which was more formal in nature than determining). A rather active participant of the process that deserves devoted attention is the anti- nuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk. It was quite successful and well known even before the disarmament question arose. It is fair to say this movement closely reflected the public opinion, and in this thesis, it will be taken as a representative of the people’s attitude towards the issue. As for the opposition, its place in the literature has been given very little attention. Yet, the author believes it deserves devoted attention in this analysis. Even though the representatives of the opposition did not have that much of an influence, they were still able to present their views and to express their civil position, adding up to form a contrasting element in the discussion.

4.1.RELEVANT ACTORS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

It is safe to say in the beginning, that the legislature was not a helpful tool in the resolution of the denuclearization puzzle in case of the Republic of Kazakhstan. For, after becoming an independent state in 1991, Kazakhstan was left with a rather weak governmental apparatus (as a result of the total control of the key policies by Moscow), which led to the lack of relevant actors in state systems afterward. The constitution that was adopted in 1978 (which was left to

Kazakhstan in 1991) did not give the liberty to the Kazakh Soviet Socialistic Republic in the management of the country. What is relevant here in terms of this paper, is that there was no autonomy in matters of foreign policy and security for KSSR. Rather, there was the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Kazakh SSR, which was adopted in October of 1990. The declaration appeared as a steady platform for the creation of the future constitution of the independent state and gave the Kazakh government more power in terms of foreign policy. This declaration also raised issues of nuclear tests and the establishment of independent armed forces. Nevertheless, this document did not give executive freedom, and all the actions still had to be coordinated with the Supreme Soviet. The very first constitution of the independent state was adopted in 1993 (after the signature of the Lisbon Protocol); nevertheless, only the constitution of 1995 de facto and de jure established the parliament and the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

It is also worth mentioning that the governmental entities that were formed right after the Soviet Union dissolution, for example the Cabinet of Ministers along with the International Department, had a representative function at that time. According to Jan Šír (2013), Kazakhstan did not even possess its own relevant security institutions up until the actual proclamation of independence at the turn of 1991 to 1992. The State Defense Committee that was created afterwards was an advisory body without any executive authority. Moreover, it was concentrated on conventional forces and the coordination of the military issues within the CIS.

In place of a parliament, there was the Supreme Soviet – the predecessor of the Kazakh Parliament, a unicameral major legislative body in the country, which had the power to ratify or denounce international treaties. In reality though, the role of the Supreme Soviet was rather formal. In other words, the members of the Supreme Soviet put their trust in Nazarbayev and his advising team. Therefore, when the time came to ratify the NPT, the Supreme Soviet did so on the first call of the President, without any debates stalling the process. This is in part due to the fact, that this legislative body had many other problems at that time, for it was grappling with numerous issues in the aftermath of Soviet disintegration, including language, citizenship, land ownership and the privatization of industry (Sholk 2013, p. 5). Ultimately, the lack of authorized and skilled governmental agents led to increased responsibility of Nursultan Nazarbayev and his inner circle to determine the fate of nuclear weapons in the republic.

The so-called “inner circle” (or in other words, Kazakh officials responsible for the decision) belonged to a group mobilized by Nazarbayev, which was mainly composed from the most competent diplomats disposable at that time, skilled scientists and nuclear realms professionals. According to the article of Anuar Ayazbekov, professor at the Nazarbayev University, the three main sources below the president, which generated nuclear policy advice 11 were: State Counselor Zhukeyev; the MFA; and the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) (Ayazbekov 2014, p. 156). The role of Tulegen Zhukeyev is greatly emphasized in the sources (not only in the denuclearization process but in Kazakh foreign affairs in general). Some of the authors even refer to him as the President Nazarbayev’s ‘right-hand man’ (Burgess, Kassenova 2012, p. 2012), since it was he who signed the Lisbon Protocol in 1992 on the behalf of Kazakhstan.

The MFA led by Tuleutai Suleimenov was establishing diplomatic relations with the United States, China, Russia and other post-Soviet republics, as well as coordinating negotiations. Last but not least, it was trying to lobby for financial aid for the arsenal’s relinquishment, as this required a lot of resources that Kazakhstan did not have at the time.

The role of the CSS, according to Ayazbekov, primarily involved the development of analytical documents and memos on nuclear policies for the President and his team; as it was, for example, before Nazarbayev’s visit to USA. The head of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Omurserik Kasenov, at least at the earliest stage, had occasional access to the president, bypassing the President’s Apparatus and submitting analysis and advice to him directly (Ayazbekov 2014, p. 156).

4.1.1. THE PRESIDENT

Many sources give most of the credit for the denuclearization of Kazakhstan to Nursultan Nazarbayev. Indeed, after examining relevant literature along with the reference to the previous chapter – this allegation appears as an accurate statement. Nevertheless, the decision to give up the Kazakh nuclear arsenal was not an immediate one. Moreover, it is important to note that the position of President Nazarbayev towards the denuclearization of the country was rather ambivalent in the beginning, which has initiated a mistrust from the side of foreign diplomats along with Western media. For example, the press had found misleading the fact of the establishment of relations by newly independent Kazakhstan with Middle Eastern countries (Šír 2013, p. 142).

In a reality, even if there could have been a shred of hesitation from the side of Nazarbayev, there was not a slender chance for Kazakhstan to keep the nuclear arsenal without becoming a pariah state and facing significant economic issues within the country. Despite the fact that this former Soviet republic inherited the considerable nuclear arsenal after the USSR dissolution, the command and control was located in Moscow. Even after becoming an independent state,

Kazakhstan could not possibly use warheads in case of the national security threat without negotiating the matter with the Russian leadership. Moreover, Nazarbayev realized any effort to try to preserve nuclear status of the country would entail fundamental problems for the newly independent republic. For, attempts to gain control over the weapons or to prevent their removal to Russia would have ultimately led to confrontation with Russia. Strains in the Russia-Kazakhstan relationship would likely have jeopardized interethnic relations inside Kazakhstan, a crucial consideration given the ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan just before the Soviet collapse was about 6 million people (roughly 37 percent of total population). Even if Kazakhstan had gained control of the nuclear weapons, it would have faced serious and immensely costly technical challenges. The weapons required maintenance for which Kazakhstan had neither the infrastructure nor the capacity, at least not immediately. While there were specialists with critical weapons knowledge in Kazakhstan, there was no indigenous structure that could take over command and control of nuclear weapons, and the expertise available was not sufficient for an immediate jump-start of an independent weapons program (Burgess, Kassenova 2012, pp. 97 – 98). Besides that, the US leadership and the member states of the NPT would not wish Kazakhstan to join the treaty as a nuclear weapon state. This way, if President Nazarbayev retained nuclear armament, Kazakhstan would be facing major foreign policy problems and would be hit by the severe financial crisis.

Thus, President Nazarbayev had to be very pragmatic in his negotiations in order to assure a better image of the state. Therefore, all of the attempts of Nazarbayev to lobby for the nuclear status of Kazakhstan was nothing but pursuing a better future for the country, e.g. trying to gain some security assurance and economic aid along with the worldwide respect and prestige for the state. Therefore, he began bargaining with a message that Kazakhstan should sustain its nuclear status.

Throughout the first two months of the 1992, he continued to make ambiguous statements as to whether or not Kazakhstan would be willing to join the NPT as a nuclear (NWS) or a non- nuclear state (NNWS). For example, during the meeting with the French foreign minister, Dumas, in the beginning of 1992, Nazarbayev was claiming that Kazakhstan would join the NPT as a nuclear state. Yet multiple sources claim that in private talks with the American leadership he agreed with the non-nuclear status of the country. This was certainly confusing for the foreign powers, but at the same time it enhanced their willingness to ‘pay a higher price’ (in form of security assurance, investments etc.) to Kazakhstan for giving up its nuclear ambitions.

While lobbying for nuclear retention, Nursultan Nazarbayev and his representatives primarily used the security arguments (linked to the geopolitical explanation) and the NPT 13 legislature. In the first instance, the Kazakh leadership was expressing certain doubts about the national security of the state, which was quite logical. Since nobody could predict what kind of threats the new era, after the end of the bipolar order, would bring. Moreover, Kazakhstan shared its borders with two nuclear superpowers – Russia and China; after gaining its independence, the country did not have security assurances whatsoever, hence why it needed its nuclear arsenal.

In the second case, there was the apparent discrepancy with Kazakhstan joining NPT as a non-nuclear state, when in fact it was a NWS under the jurisdiction of the treaty. In other words, the NPT’s category of ‘non-nuclear weapon state’ did not fit with the factual situation of nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan under collective CIS jurisdiction in which Kazakhstan formally partook, nor did it fit the status Nazarbayev thought Kazakhstan deserved given its contributions to the Soviet nuclear project and its status as a Soviet successor state (Budjerin 2016, p. 264). Indeed, if Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were to join the NPT as NNWSs, it would had contradicted terms of the treaty. Therefore, it led the US and Russia to the multilateralization of START I, in order to recognize Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine as successor states, with the condition that non-Russian republics would give up their nuclear arsenals as the part of START I agreement and join the NPT as non-nuclear states.

Even though this procedure seemed to eliminate contradictions between Kazakhstan possessing nuclear weapons on its soil and joining NPT as a non-nuclear sate, it did not prevent Nursultan Nazarbayev from coming up with an attempt to once again try to sustain the nuclear status of the country. In a letter to George H.W. Bush dated in April 1992, he suggested to modify a Kazakhstani non-nuclear status to a ‘temporary nuclear state’. Those attempts, however, did not pay off, as the U.S. officials kept rejecting the fact that any other former Soviet republic (besides Russia) would be the USSR successor state joining the NPT. Moreover, the treaty had a major distinction of member states; it was either a nuclear weapon state, or a non-nuclear weapon state with no categories in between. Thus, when President Nazarbayev tried to withhold the nuclear posture of the country, Washington with help of the NPT legislature and diplomatic tools was able to deny the request of the leadership and keep moving in the direction of denuclearization. Furthermore, President Nazarbayev realized that Kazakhstan would most likely have to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. He was attempting to delay signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for as long as it needed for America and other nuclear powers to come up with security guarantees for Kazakhstan (Aitken 2009, p. 141). Thus, before sending the State Counselor Zhukeev to sign the Lisbon Protocol in May, 1992, it was important for President Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan would finally get its proper security guarantees so that the relinquishing of nuclear weapons would not be in vain.

Regarding the Chinese side, Beijing had sent the letter to Almaty, which had served both to break the ice between the states as well as to reassure President Nazarbayev there was no point in nuclear arms retention. For in the letter, the PRC assured the Kazakh authorities they did not have any territorial claims whatsoever. On the behalf of Russia, it reinforced Nazarbayev’s confidence when Kazakhstan became a party to the Collective Security Treaty (CST) on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. Secretary of State Baker, on the behalf of USA, reaffirmed Kazakh President with the provision of protection as to a non-nuclear state, in case it would be threatened with nuclear weapons. In addition to security assurances, Nazarbayev and his advisory team made sure Kazakhstan had financial benefits before signing the Lisbon Protocol and joining the NPT.

Prior to the signature of the Lisbon Protocol on May 23 in 1992, President Nazarbayev made an official working visit to Washington D.C. on May 19 – 23. The significance of this visit, besides overall building future U.S. – Kazakh relations, lied in the final negotiations about the non-nuclear status of the country. In the White House Memorandum from 18 May 1992 (prior to the meeting of the heads of the two states), it was declared that Nazarbayev had agreed to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, and to sign the START protocol. It was also mentioned, however, that some potentially major ambiguities still existed. In order to reassure that Kazakhstan was to become a NNWS, the two sides were arranging to sign bilateral economic agreements3 that were implicitly created to facilitate the newly independent republic in its readiness to give up its nuclear arsenal. At that point, it became expedient for Nazarbayev to approve the signing of the Lisbon Protocol since the negotiations about security and welfare assistance were productive enough to start earning international recognition, as well as supporting domestic plans within Kazakhstan.

4.1.2. PUBLIC OPINION

Public opinion in case of the denuclearization of Kazakhstan represents a curious subject, as even before the topic of disarmament started to emerge in 1991, the Kazakhstani community had already been worried about the negative consequences from the nuclear weapons being deployed on the territory of their motherland. In the beginning of the 1990s when the question of the disarmament was opened for discussion, citizens were supportive of the idea to get rid of the Soviet nuclear legacy. The credit for the awareness of people, without any doubt, can be attributed

3 These agreements included the Trade, OPIC, BIT treaties; moreover, there were plans for sealing the deal with Chevron Corp.; which meant so far the biggest partnership between a former Soviet republic and the U.S. at that time. 15 to the Kazakh poet, Olzhas Suleimenov, and his anti-nuclear movement – Nevada-Semipalatinsk (Nevada-Semey).

The urge for creating this movement was the radioactive discharge of gases on February 12, 1989 after another nuclear test. Unlike previous times there was no warning about the upcoming testing, after which the toxic smoke started to spread over the cities of Shagan and the nearby territories; later on, wind carried away the emission to the Altai area on the East of the country. Two days after, in 110 km away from the epicenter of the explosion radioactive background was 4000 micro roentgen per hour. This matter became the topic of the speech of Olzhas Suleimenov during the live air on national television on February 26, 1989. On February 28, two days later, he organized the protest, which led to the establishment of the Nevada- Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement4.

According to Berkinbayev (2016), above many others, there were three main objectives that the movement was trying to accomplish: to inform the society throughout the whole country about the negative consequences of the nuclear testing in Kazakhstan; to close up the Semipalatinsk test site; and to achieve the adoption of the legislature on helping the victims of the nuclear disaster. For the purposes of the thesis, the greater emphasis will be put on the first two aims5 (furthermore, their fulfillment is interconnected). First of all, in order to gain support for closing the testing site, people would have to be aware that forty years of nuclear testing had caused serious air contamination, water and soil pollution, along with irretrievable health damage for humans and animals. After all, the impact from the nuclear testing had spread out to the nearest provinces of Pavlodar, Karaganda and East Kazakhstan oblast. According to the data from 1992 (right after the legitimate closure of STS in 1991), about 1,2 million people were affected by the radiation from nuclear testing (Akimbekova 2011, 13). As a result, the average life expectancy in the region was no more than 40 – 50 years. Residents of the area were most likely to have oncological diseases, weakening of the immune system, damage of the skin integument, anemia etc.; these types of health problems were inherited by following generations.

The movement started to enlighten people with implementing of meetings and demonstrations, holding public speeches and regular rallies in the test sites areas. On the 44th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, for instance, on August 6, 1989, they organized a protesting event where nearly 50 000 people were tossing stones at the Semipalatinsk Test Site

4 Its name was chosen to show solidarity to the anti-nuclear movement in the United States. 5 The law on the social security of citizens suffered from nuclear testing on the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site was adopted in December of 1992; it exceeds the timeframe of the thesis set by the author. 16

(following the ancient Kazakh tradition of throwing rocks at evil). Furthermore, Nevada-Semey was in charge of launching petitions (which helped to both raise awareness and put pressure on the state officials, forcing them into closing the STS). According to Kassenova (2017), during the period from February to April 1989, the government of Kazakhstan received seven petitions, including four with more than 2,000 signatures each, with demands of a full ban on nuclear testing (Kassenova 2017, p. 336). The petition urging the state leadership to close the STS gained more than 1 million signatures within a couple of days. This tremendous public work had paid off rather soon, as on November 17, 1989, Chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Nikolai Ryzhkov announced that there would not be any nuclear testing for the rest of the year (1989). A week later, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Belousov announced that there would not be any testing through January 1990 (King 2010, p. 4). The activists of the movement, however, did not stop there. They kept working on their goal of closing down the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Nevada- Semey continued with demonstrations, public talks, and becoming highly vocal in the media in order to get more influence and support among the population.

The visible shift in the discussion came after October 25, 1990, when Kazakhstan adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty, which de facto did not possess an executive power. However, it de jure enabled the local government to be in control of the environmental issues of the country. As stated in article 11, Kazakh SSR has a right to prohibit the functioning of any ventures, institutions, organizations and other objects on its territory that could be the source of an ecological disaster (Deklaratsia o gosudarstvennom suverenitete Kazakhskoi SSR, 1990). It also stated the banning of weapons of mass destruction, and that Kazakh SSR had the right for a compensation for damages caused by nuclear testing. Eventually the movement reached its primary objective, and on August 29, 1991 Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree officially closing down the Semipalatinsk Test Site.

Returning to the issue of the denuclearization decision in process during December 1991 to May 1992, it becomes rather obvious that the public approved of the decision to forgo the nuclear arsenal of the state. Due to the anti-nuclear policies promoted by the Nevada- Semipalatinsk movement, Kazakhstani citizens were largely aware about the negative aspects of having nuclear arsenal deployed on the territory of the country. Thus, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist and it was time to choose between keeping nuclear weapons or to giving them up, the public unanimously supported the idea of getting rid of the nuclear arsenal. As Murat Laumulin put it, the nuclear testing problems made the people of Kazakhstan strongly "allergic" to nuclear issues (Laumulin 1993, 62). Therefore, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons was widely supported by the people of Kazakhstan.

4.1.3. THE OPPOSITION

While examining the decision making process for nuclear disarmament, it is essential to consider not only the review of the agreeing side but the opposing position as well. For the opposition has the responsibility to question the actions of the government, and throughout this process of debate authorities are able to ponder more carefully pros and cons of the issue, thus leading to a rational outcome.

In the case of Kazakhstan, it was quite difficult to find an abundant amount of data on opposing actors, because frankly speaking, not many reports of these are in plain sight. Nevertheless, agents that resisted the relinquishment of the Kazakh nuclear arsenal did indeed exist. It is important to mention in the beginning that the literature displaying this issue refers to the opposing group as the “hawks”. Most of the times, this statement applies to members of nationalistic social movements such as Alash, Azat and Zheltoksan; at times there were nuclear scientists or military staff included among the opposition. Even though there was not much information about their exact agenda or possible programs on the nuclear retention, it is safe to say there were two main arguments they used to advocate for keeping the weapon of mass destruction within the country.

The first assertion presented by the hawks was dealing with the realistic prospective of the state security. There were people like Yuri Mukhin and Dosai Abraimov who insisted that after becoming a sovereign state, Kazakhstan did not have a powerful army to protect the country from possible enemies; nuclear weapons in this case could play the role of the deterrent force that would be able to prevent the attack from the alleged aggressor. In addition, there were representatives who drew attention to the instability of the region at the moment, assuming the fact of two neighboring countries possessing nuclear arsenal. In this situation, it was not clear what kind of relationship Kazakhstan would have with Russia and China, because in the aftermath of the collapse of the bipolar order, a degree of uncertainty remained present.

The second important unit of arguments dealt with the prestige of Kazakhstan, i.e. the idea of a well-developed and strong state that did not refuse its nuclear status. The proponents of this point of view believed that in order to secure a firm position of the newly independent republic on the international level it was essential to keep nuclear weapons. That way, not only would Kazakhstan present itself as being a land protected from external threat, but also as a state with no grand offensive ambitions and willing to be on equal terms with other actors – especially with the members of the nuclear club. To give an example of this point of view, the literature refers to

18 colonel Petrushenko, whose major concerns was that Kazakhstan would be perceived as an underdeveloped African state if it was to give up its nuclear weapons:

“Foreign critiques used to call the Soviet Union the Upper Volta with Nuclear Rockets. And now in addition to the collapse of the Union, we want to deprive ourselves of this privilege. And hence position our state in one economic and political row with African states” [Abzhaparova 2010, p. 1547].

5. THE APPLICATION OF SAGAN’S MODELS

5.1. EXPLANAITION OF SCOTT SAGAN’S FRAMEWORK

In this paper, the theoretical framework created by Scott Sagan emerges as a useful tool while analyzing motives of Kazakhstan for giving up the nuclear arsenal inherited by the Soviet Union. The following section will be dedicated to the short summary of Sagan’s article, since he applies those models on different cases and analyzes reasons of the nuclear proliferation, as well as on the denuclearization issues. For the purposes of this particular thesis, however, only matters that are relevant for the topic will be covered in the upcoming summary.

The main intention of this article is to challenge the general idea of nuclear proliferation as well as non-proliferation. For the general argument of this work is the belief of the author that it is inadequate to focus on the national security only when it comes to causes of the nuclear proliferation. Since Sagan is convinced that acquiring or relinquishing nuclear weapons does not always happen due to security concerns and it is wrong to assume that the traditional realist theory is able to explain issues of growing nuclear capabilities or committing to the arsenal’s reduction. Thus, in this article, he claims that nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity (Sagan 1992, p. 55). With this in consideration, Scott Sagan designed the theoretical framework of ‘models’, where each of the models describes why states decide to sustain or to refuse their nuclear status. Sagan came up with the three of them: the security model, the domestic politics model and the norms model. While describing theь, Sagan also attempts to explain why a state would keep or forgo its deterrence through the illustration of relevant examples.

Sagan begins his explanation of the framework with the description of the security model, which has its origins in neorealism theory according to which states can only rely on self-help within an anarchical international environment. For this reason, a country could acquire nuclear

19 weapons for deterrence purposes. Nuclear restraint could be viewed through this lens as well. Although, it is necessary to mention that the decision to give up the nuclear arsenal could be made either in a situation when the security threat has been reevaluated, or when the state joins the alliance with the nuclear power (which is able to give an extended deterrence guarantees to this state). No matter this common realist explanation of nuclear proliferation, this author is convinced there are two reasons why this argument has been misused as the justification for sustaining or refusing the WMD. The first one has to deal with the statements of motivation by the key decision- makers, who have a vested interest in explaining that the choices they made served the national interest; and second, a correlation in time between the emergence of a plausible security threat and a decision to develop nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996, p. 63.). Sagan admits that in most cases scholars tend to tie up the decision of developing nuclear weapons to the existing threat that must endanger the national security. Using this strategy, they are trying to explain the denuclearization by looking for a change in the international environment, that must reassure the government in decreasing of threats for the national security. This is why Scott Sagan insists on the extension of the general framework and suggests alternative cases – the domestic politics model and the norms model.

The following model has to deal with domestic actors who either support or disapprove of the nuclear proliferation. An extraordinary thing about this model is that the acquisition of WMD does not necessarily have to serve the national security interests; in most of the cases, it contributes to the ambitions of a particular state actor. Moreover, Sagan described a strategy that such actors ensue. Often they use a security threat as an opportunity to start lobbying for an increase in military spending in order to promote nuclear weapons’ acquisition. This approach is also designed to establish a strong coalition that will be able to shape the right image of costs and benefits of nuclear weapon programs within the government. As for the arsenal’s relinquishment, the domestic actors model is relevant when major changes in the government take place. It could be a new government that is willing to change the old guideline of the state politics. It could be the shift of the course within the government. Or, the current administration might have some concerns about the future leadership, and if it will be able to implement a reliable custody over the weapons. With that being said, it is important to stress that these circumstances do not always correlate with the presence of the external security threats.

Last but not least, is the norms model which mainly focuses on nuclear weapons representing a symbolic function rather than a deterrent one. According to Sagan’s point of view, this model serves for both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity. As he states, according to this perspective, state behavior is determined not by leaders’ cold calculations about the national

20 security interests or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations (Sagan 1996, p. 73). In this context, the author is talking about the ‘nuclear symbolism’ and its impact on the nuclear weapon retention or forbearance. Shortly speaking, nuclear weapons in this case could not only serve as a security assurance but also fulfill a purpose similar to the Olympic team, national anthem or airlines, performing the symbolic function, which is shaped by the international environment.

5.2.SECURITY MODEL

According to Sagan’s security model, a state refuses its nuclear status in the situation of the absence of threats to its national security. It also means that the country’s leadership believes in the radical change of the global environment. Nazarbayev, along with his advisory team, were highly aware of the modification of the international milieu, yet they also realized that giving up the nuclear arsenal right away was not a wise move for the newly independent country. This is why after becoming a sovereign state and being engaged into the denuclearization talks, the Kazakh authorities were trying to adopt necessary security measures up to the point where it was relatively safe to let go of inherited weapon before signing any documents depriving the country of its nuclear arsenal.

First of all, the Kazakh leadership started to work on forming its state security apparatus, meaning the relevant institutions in the government, along with acquiring security guarantees in form of alliances and building up friendly relationship with other states in general. Thus, right after the dissolution of the USSR the State Defense Committee was established, and even though it had a representative role in the beginning, this agency was soon gaining its momentum and focusing on coordination of conventional forces and engaging with military issues within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Additionally, it fulfilled an advisory role in the area of state defense up until the creation of the Ministry of Defense in May 1992.

Nursultan Nazarbayev also tried to make sure Kazakhstan had at least a bare minimum of security in the region before agreeing to relinquish the nuclear arsenal. Thus, prior to the signature of the Lisbon Protocol, the delegation from Kazakhstan participated in the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States, this time in the capitol of Uzbekistan – Tashkent.

Overall, the most important outcome of this summit was a signing of the Collective Security Treaty on May 15, 1992. The general idea of the CST was creating the platform for the

21 establishment of a security alliance between Russia, Armenia and four other Central Asian republics (Šír 2013, p. 150). What is more important, however, is that this agreement was designed to provide security assistance to members of this alliance in case of an armed threat or act of aggression from external actors.

Kazakh leadership also embarked to develop friendly bilateral relations with Beijing, starting in January of 1992. It included formal visits of foreign ministers from both sides, signing agreements on economic and trade cooperation, building diplomatic relations etc. Last but not least, the afore-mentioned letter stating that the Chinese side did not have any territorial claims towards Kazakhstan also played a significant role in the formation of friendly Sino-Kazakh relations.

Another important topic in terms of this model is relations of Kazakhstan with Russia and the United States. After all, for the three former Soviet republics the endorsement and support of these two states was of major importance when it came to the arsenals’ relinquishment. Even Scott Sagan himself, while reflecting this particular model in his article admitted that long-standing ties to Moscow meant that these states did not perceive Russia as a major military threat to their security and sovereignty, and increased U.S. security guarantees to these states made their possession of nuclear weapons less necessary (Sagan 1996, p. 61.).

5.3.THE DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL

Unlike the previous model, the main concept of the domestic politics model is not sustaining or refusing nuclear weapons in order to serve national security interests, but to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actor within the state (Sagan 1996, p. 63). Moreover, previous references to Scott Sagan regarding the additional examples within the domestic politics model – major changes in the government, the coming of a new leadership or concerns of the old administration – should not be cut out of this narrative. It is safe to say that in case of denuclearization of Kazakhstan all of the above-mentioned points are relevant.

First of all, in discussing the matter with regards to interests of an individual actors, it is fair to bring back the activities of the Nevada-Semey anti-nuclear movement headed by Olzhas Suleimenov. In this case, Nevada-Semipalatinsk was trying to promote its parochial interest – the cessation of nuclear contamination for the sake of people and environment. Therefore, this organization started to carry out an informational campaign to get the attention of the citizens and

22 explain harmful outcomes for health and environment from having weapons in the country, as well as from conducting nuclear tests. This move was a necessary measure in order to acquire the approval of Kazakhstani people. Therefore, when the movement gained adequate support and resources, it started to demand the termination of nuclear tests and the closure of the STS from the government. Same parochial interests were still relevant when the question of the denuclearization arose, and the fact that this actor contributed to the closure of the Semipalatinsk Test Site indicates its commitment to the matter. This way, if President Nazarbayev would like to sustain the nuclear status, he and his advisory team would most likely be facing the confrontation from this anti- nuclear movement and its supporters.

Moreover, there was another important domestic group that contributed to the complication of the Kazakh denuclearization puzzle – ethnic Russians that lived on the territory of the country. This ethnic group constituted 38 percent of the republic's population and they were territorially concentrated in the fertile steppe region of northern and eastern Kazakhstan (Hill, Jewett 1994, p.31). Although it is true that this ethnic group did not directly shape the resolution of the arsenal’s relinquishment, the WMD-related questions were closely connected to foreign policy towards Russia. The fact that Russian population represented a significant percentage of an overall community meant that the new Kazakh government had to handle this delicate matter with extra caution. For any imprudent move or failure to cooperate over key issues connected to nuclear weapons could possibly become as an impetus for a frustration, which could cause general unrest and inter-ethnic disorder within the newly independent state.

Second, the domestic politics model helps to provide the explanation for denuclearization from the perspective of changes within the leadership of the newly independent country. In this case: a) a major shift in the governments of Kazakhstan took place; and b) the constraint in guise of Russia, which not only had the command and control over the weapons, but also represented the previous government that had reasonable concerns about the nuclear weapons remaining on territories of the three former Soviet republics. For, at the moment, it was not clear if these countries would provide a reliable custody over their arsenals or if they would contribute to further proliferation. Moreover, another important circumstance came into place for Russia – commitment to START I treaty that was signed by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991 prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Dealing with the nuclear arsenal left on the soil of three other states became a concern not only for Moscow, but for Washington D.C. as well. Since the U.S. administration realized that international security would be gravely damaged were three new nuclear weapon states to emerge from the Soviet collapse. Such states would be inexperienced in handling such weapons, would alarm their new neighbors, and may even be tempted to

23 proliferate. Almost equally alarming was the danger that the Soviet nuclear weapons legacy could pose in terms of proliferation of materials and capability to terrorists or other unauthorized groups (Davis 2009, p. 17).

Above all, the framework of the START I agreement was designed to provide deeper reduction of the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. Additionally it facilitated the strategic balance between the two states and served as a credible platform for further reduction of nuclear arsenals on the both ends. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR left arms reduction process in doubt, thereby preventing the treaty from entering into force as Russia would not be able to fulfill terms of the deal while the three former Soviet republics had nuclear weapon deployed on their soil. This is why Russia along with the United States started to come up with system of norms and levers of pressure to urge Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to give up the nuclear arsenal.

5.4.THE NORMS MODEL

Before applying the norms model on the case of Kazakhstan forgoing its arsenal, it is important to recognize the fact that the acquisition of nuclear weapons initially indicated possession of power and international prestige. Therefore, in the early 1990’s when the three former Soviet republics were induced towards denuclearization, one could distinguish the evolution of the international perceptions of WMD from its possession as a symbol of strength and power to the absence of nuclear weapon as an indicator of a state prestige and advancement. Numerous authors, including Sagan himself, justify this major shift by the establishment of the NPT regime.

Within the framework of this model as well as in the context of nuclear weapon regulations, Non-Proliferation treaty appears as a unique platform for governing nuclear weapons related issues. Not only did it indicate explicit categories of states within the treaty (nuclear or non-nuclear only, no category in between), but the context of the treaty itself suggests the limited number of acknowledged states disposing nuclear weapons, which are – USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Any further attempt of other countries to obtain nuclear arsenal, however, would not receive international approval due to the design of the internal regulations of the treaty. In other words, the NPT regime would be dealing with proliferation by de-legitimizing (and de-legalizing) the nuclear weapons programs of all states not formally acknowledged as nuclear weapons states (Frey 2006, p. 13). Therefore, if Kazakhstan was to keep the WMD on its soil, it would most likely be treated as a pariah state, as it has happened to North Korea, for instance. Yet on the other hand, joining the NPT as a NNWS (besides getting the prestige and worldwide acceptance) would show 24 the global community the willingness of Kazakhstan to follow the existing regime and obey the international system, along with willingness to become a reliable member of established community and a trustworthy ally in the future. Moreover, the regime of the treaty provided member states with certain norms that, in this case, helped both to facilitate the nuclear disarmament and to provide additional incentive, thus offering financial aid to Kazakhstan and two other former Soviet states.

Following the global norms while deciding to strive for nuclear disarmament had its own benefits for Kazakhstan. One of such benefits was comprehensive support in the denuclearization process. Another extra encouragement, in this case, was foreign investments to the state’s economy.

For Kazakhstan there existed plenty of financial opportunities within the NPT regime and outside of it, which existed to help the country to get rid of the WMD on its territory in exchange for signing the Lisbon Protocol and refusing its nuclear status. Indeed, after endorsing the document and ratifying START I, Kazakhstan received substantial financial assistance. To illustrate this, one could look at the Murat Laumulin’s report from 1995. According to this paper, the country was earmarked with aid for transporting HEU within the Operation Sapphire (approximately $15 – 30$ million); within the START agreement the state was assigned to receive between $70 – 150$ million for disarmament measures; Japan invested $11 million for Destruction of Nuclear Weapons agreement with MINATOM. Furthermore, after refusing its nuclear inheritance, Kazakhstan could have counted on foreign deals and investments. For instance, President Clinton personally confirmed this pledge in a letter to Nazarbayev dated November 13, 1993, where he stated that the US side was keen ‘to discuss steps to expand American investment in Kazakhstan, particularly in the energy sector,’ signaling that the joint venture with Chevron concluded in April 1993 was only the beginning (Budjerin 2016, p. 287).

6. CONCLUSION

One of the aims of the thesis was to cast a light on the denuclearization process of the Republic of Kazakhstan and to show the dynamics that accompanied the decision-making itself; as well as to contribute to the research field of the nuclear nonproliferation matters of Kazakhstan. The Soviet nuclear legacy that was left on the Kazakh soil considered to be the fourth largest arsenal in the world at the moment of the disintegration of the USSR; as a consequence it could be hard to perceive the final resolution appropriate for the country. This is why the author sought to display the elaboration of the procedure and to portray main actors, which contributed to the decision-making process.

In order to carry out an extensive study the author used the help of the theory to juxtapose the situation in which Kazakhstan (as a part of the Soviet Union) acquired its nuclear arsenal versus the circumstances under which the newly independent republic had to determine whether to keep or to forgo the WMD. Here the theory was able to emphasize the contrast and to provide one with the guideline as for why the leadership of the country finally made a decision in favor of the arsenal’s relinquishment. The realism approach assumes that in order to protect a state in the chaotic system, it has to possess a credible deterrence. Moreover, it is only possible to rely on self- help. On the contrary, after the end of the Cold War, there was the obvious shift of the paradigm towards the neoliberal way of thinking. One of the proofs for this was that the former Soviet republics were invited to join multiple institutions and treaties, among which was NPT.

Besides the theoretical approach, however, it is important to devote one’s attention to the actual events and participants of the denuclearization process. Thus, speaking about the relevant actors of this period, it is fair to acknowledge the leading figure – the President of the republic Nursultan Nazarbayev, since he was the key negotiator when it came to deal with other states’ representatives. It was his main responsibility to coordinate the work of his inferiors that were endeavoring to acquire security guarantees for the state. Moreover, it is essential to admit that his approach was rather pragmatic. For he was using the ‘nuclear card’ as an element that could have helped the newly independent republic to expand its economy, gain the prestige, political support and worldwide respect, in order to reassure the national security of the state by refusing the nuclear status of Kazakhstan. His main task in this rather chaotic procedure was to have an open mind, and to act in pursuit of national interests of a newly independent republic.

Besides the President, it is worth mentioning other actors in this process – Nevada-Semey and the opposition. In the author’s opinion, the role of the anti-nuclear movement along with the hawks was not insignificant but minor. With regard to the opposition, one is able to reach the

26 conclusion that its rationale was not sufficient to convince Nursultan Nazarbayev and his group of associates to keep the nuclear arsenal (despite persuasive arguments presented by its members). Yet it is important to admit the main task of an opposition in general, as its function is to challenge their opponents and to bring critical thinking into the overall discussion. The role of the anti- nuclear movement in this case was mostly representative than determinative. Even though it was envisioning a considerable counter balance to the opposition in a way, its main contribution to the matter was to show the support of the people during the denuclearization process.

In addition, the author of the thesis considers it necessary to mention the role of Russian Federation and the United States of America in the whole process. It is safe to say that these two countries were highly motivated in the denuclearization of Kazakhstan mostly because of their commitment to the START I agreement. In order to accomplish objections set by the treaty, the Kremlin along with the White House had to come up with persistent measures, sufficient policies and multidimensional approaches in order to encompass the internal dynamics of the state and assimilate it with the international demand of the nuclear balance.

As demonstrated by observing the actors of the process, the denuclearization of Kazakhstan does not come up as a simple subject to process, which is why the author of the thesis have chosen a guideline in form of Scott Sagan’s framework of models to contribute to the analytical part of the work. With that in mind, it is important to stress one immediate outcome – the decision of this Central Asian republic could not be explained from the perspective of a single model but through their combination. The mapping of the events that took place after the collapse of the USSR in this thesis have displayed that nuclear nonproliferation is a mutable and dynamic process, especially when it comes to the fundamental change of the international environment. Therefore, when justifying the nuclear choice of the Republic of Kazakhstan it is essential to look at the interaction of domestic actors, security environment, norms within and outside of the country, perceptions of international relations, economic capability of the state etc. This is why, in the author’s opinion, it is important to analyze the case using the combination of the three models.

In terms of the security model, in order to be confident in denuclearization, Kazakh leadership needed to be sure the country had a bare minimum of security guarantees within the region as well as from Russia and the U.S. – otherwise the chances of other actors taking advantage of the Kazakhstan’s vulnerable situation would be very high. The importance of the next model, the domestic politics, mainly consists of the intention to show the attitude of internal actors or the previous government towards the nuclear position of the country. In the instance of Kazakhstan, it was important to cooperate with Moscow as the representative of the previous government that had its concerns and ambitions over the nuclear arsenal remaining on the territory of the republic. 27

Last but not least, the norms model, which thoroughly covers the benefits that come with the nuclear forbearance and joining the NPT regime, since this move predetermined the future place of Kazakhstan in the world politics. Not only did this Central Asian republic obtain international recognition and credibility, it received many economic opportunities in terms of the denuclearization assistance along with foreign investments that were necessary for the Kazakh economy at the time.

Based on the presented work it has become possible to answer the research questions set in the beginning of this thesis. The first question was dealing with the main factors and motives of the Republic of Kazakhstan to forgo its nuclear arsenal. It is worth saying that it was crucial for the country to refuse its nuclear status in order to obtain international acknowledgment and prestige, without which it could have been hard to implement Kazakh foreign policy and materialize diplomatic ties. Moreover, for the newly independent state making decisions in favor of the denuclearization meant financial assistance and aid from abroad, whereas after seceding from the Soviet Union, the country did not have enough of recourses for both – building a new prosperous independent country and maintaining the nuclear realm. Another significant point has to deal with the absence of major security threat. For, the Kazakh government realized it was safe to give up such a powerful deterrence tool due to the absence of challenges to the state’s safety and welfare.

The next research question inquired about the actors that took part in the process. After analyzing the key players of the denuclearization, it makes sense to accentuate the role of the Kazakh President and Russian Federation along the United States of America. Nursultan Nazarbayev in this case made a successful breakthrough for the country in general, since he was the main negotiator as well as the leading spokesperson for the country. Assuredly, he had his associates and the people that helped him to hold talks act in the name of the country like Tulegen Zhukeev or Tuleutai Suleimenov. It should be noted, however, that Nazarbaev had a final say in such matters as a head of the state and due to the absence of relevant institutions in the country. At the time, he had to make decisions relying upon his intuition and the support of his inner circle. As stated above, however, one should not forget the role of Russia and the U.S. as well. After all, these two states stood at the root of the denuclearization process, mainly due to the commitment they made in July of 1991 by signing the START I agreement, which in a longer perspective could be explained as an aspiration to the global nuclear balance. This is why both Kremlin and the White House combining diplomatic tools with a slight pressure were trying to urge the three former Soviet republics to sustain their nuclear status.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned implications, it is worth stating that the denuclearization decision-making process and its outcome became the turning point of the modern history of Kazakhstan. After all, no matter what the environment and theoretical models that could have been imposed upon Kazakh policy makers, it could never be fully guaranteed to have a successful result; the reassurance of that could only be provided over the course of time. Nowadays, Kazakhstan is a prosperous Central Asian country that seeks peace and diplomatic ties with the rest of the world. Furthermore, after the decision in favor of the nuclear arsenal’s relinquishment, Kazakhstan has become one of the world’s prominent advocates for the nuclear forbearance especially on the UN platform by putting effort into the launching of projects and initiatives for the worldwide nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation programs. For, the main ambition of Kazakhstan in terms of nuclear proliferation is by its own example to show the world that nuclear weapons do not have a determinant role in implementing foreign policy. Moreover, it underlines the fact that nuclear weapons are not the integral part of national security of the state. Thus, Kazakhstan denuclearization is not only a way to acquire global recognition and respect, but also a way to contribute to the existing world order and to nonproliferation regime in particular.

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