Islam in Kyrgyzstan since 1991
by Alisher Khamidov
Abstract Kyrgyzstan‘s religious liberalism of the early 1990s gave way to a rather repressive control since the political unrest in 2010. As a result of the political exclusion, Islamic radicalization is discernable ȱȱ£ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¢¢£ǯȱȱ ¢ȱęȱȬȱȱȱ counter the radicalization.
Key words: Islam, Kyrgyzstan, Religious Politics, Radicalism, Uzbek Minority
Country background Liberal approach toward religion in the early 1990s yrgyzstan, a mountainous and predomi- Knantly Muslim country,1 gained indepen- After Kyrgyzstan gained independence in dence in 1991. After two tumultuous decades ŗşşŗǰȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ęȱ - in the post-Soviet period, the country expe- ges in the domain of religious practices. As rienced dramatic political unrest in 2010 that the country’s leadership pursued a liberal ap- culminated a violent overthrow of govern- proach to religion, the number of mosques, ment in April and interethnic violence in madrassahs, and seminaries quadrupled in June. Six years after the political upheaval, the the early years of independence and various country has made remarkable progress. In the kinds of religious missionaries established a political domain, the parliamentary system, presence throughout the country.2 Taking ad- adopted in June 2010, has grown in strength vantage of new political freedoms, various re- as coalition parties have exhibited the capaci- ȱȱȱȱȱĜ¢ȱ- ty to compromise with each other and resolve gnized voices in their communities, presiding disputes relying on the current constitutional ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭȱ arrangements. In the security realm, the cen- role of religion in public life.3 tral government strengthened the ability of law enforcement agencies to maintain law and order, which prevented the recurrence of vio- Hardening of religious controls lence. In the economic sphere, fuelled by re- in the late 1990s Ĵȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱ country’s economy grew between 2010 and A series of events in the late 1990s and the ear- 2014. In the international arena, Kyrgyzstan has deepened security and economic ties with 2 According to statistics from the Kyrgyz State Agency its Central Asian neighbors as well as with for Religious Affairs, there were only 39 mosques in Kyrgyzstan in 1991. By the year 2015, their number Russia and China. reached 2,500. The number of unregistered mosques and associations is several times higher than official figures, according to estimates by independent scholars. 3 Interviews by author with Uzbek and Kyrgyz histo- 1 Kyrgyz Muslims are Sunni Muslims of Hanafi mazhab rians of Islam in Central Asia, Bishkek and Tashkent, (school of Islamic jurisprudence). 1999.
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¢ȱŘŖŖŖȱȮȱȱęȱȱȱ ¢¢£ȱ and violent groups, some of which reportedly by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) ȱȱĴǯ6 in 1999 and 2000, and a rise in the public visi- bility of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) – prompted the government to backtrack on religious libera- The nexus between political exclusion lization and ushered in a tougher approach and religious radicalism to dealing with religious radicalism. The har- dening of government policy toward religion Political exclusion of ethnic minorities has continued after the March 2005 Tulip Revolu- been inter-linked with religious radicalism. tion. Kyrgyz security forces engaged in hund- Ethnic Uzbeks from South Kyrgyzstan repor- reds of search-and-seizure operations, arres- tedly predominate in banned religious groups ting alleged HT members. In connection with such as HT, prompting some analysts to sug- the crackdown, the security forces carried out gest that the rise in religious radicalism among several controversial shootings of suspected Uzbeks is a response to political exclusion and Islamic militants, including a popular imam ethnic discrimination. Throughout the 2000s, from South Kyrgyzstan. In 2009, the Kyrgyz Uzbek leaders called for the expansion of po- Parliament passed a new law, imposing stric- litical and civic rights for ethnic minorities. ter rules on the registration of mosques and Political mobilization by Uzbek leaders was seminaries.4 one of the catalysts of the June 2010 violence The repressive state policies toward in South Kyrgyzstan. ȱȱȱȱȱȱěǯȱǰȱ Following the June 2010 inter-ethnic despite the government‘s strict controls, mem- clashes in South Kyrgyzstan in which more bership in banned groups continued to rise than 400 people died, two trends have created throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, prompt- a more permissive environment for religious ing many experts to link the growing appeal of radicalization among Uzbeks and other ethnic radical groups to weak governance, deep eco- ¢ȱǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱ- nomic recession, and the spread of various so- ing harassment of ethnic Uzbeks by ill-trained cial vices (including HIV).5 Second, faced with law enforcement agencies. increasing state repression, many groups went After the June 2010 interethnic vio- underground and began using more secretive ǰȱ ȱȱȱǻěȱ- ȱȱǰȱȱȱĜȱȱ dominantly by ethnic Kyrgyz) raided Uzbek authorities to monitor them. Third, internal neighborhoods, arrested many residents for splits within underground groups emerged, their alleged role in the unrest, and frequently leading to the formation of more extremist extorted money for their release. Police actions not only alienated many Uzbeks from the sta- 4 In keeping with the law, registering a new mosque requires the signatures of 200 people, whereas the ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ previous legislation required only 10. Clerics must also ethnic groups and deprived a large number go through periodic exams to establish their theological/ of residents of their economic livelihood.7 The ideological reliability. The law also prohibited private religious tutoring, the unsanctioned distribution of reli- gious materials and proselytizing. In addition, it banned 6 Naumkin, Vitaly, Radical Islam in Central Asia: mosques from admitting children. between Pen and Rifle. 5 International Crisis Group, “Women and Radicalisa- 7 Human Rights Watch, “Where is Justice? Interethnic tion in Kyrgyzstan,” Report No. 1763 (September 2009). Violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath”,
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second trend was a rise in ethnic nationalism ȱĴȱȱ ¢¢£ȱȱȱ- ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱĚ- cent years. Utilizing sophisticated digital plat- ry nationalistic rhetoric in Kyrgyz-language forms and employing an extensive network press and in the number of chauvinistic vigi- of recruiters, the ISIS and other rebel groups lante groups targeting ethnic minorities. Dis- in the Middle East have been making appeals illusioned by brewing ethnic nationalism and to the global identity of Kyrgyz Muslims and ȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ- reaching out to socially marginalized and di- dents, primarily ethnic Uzbeks, have reported- senchanted groups in Kyrgyzstan. These rec- ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ ruitment campaigns are designed to persuade an escape and purpose in life.8 Kyrgyz Muslims that they must not be indif- ferent to injustices against Muslims in other parts of the world, including in Syria. Recent trend: the rising ideological appeal of global radical groups State response to rising Recent studies indicate that a growing num- religious radicalism ber of practicing Muslims in Kyrgyzstan be- lieve that they are part of an Umma, or global ¢ȱ ŘŖŗŜǰȱ ȱ ¢¢£ȱ ȱ Ĝ¢ȱ Muslim community. This change in people’s banned 20 religious organizations, 14 of which consciousness is believed to have been caused are considered terrorist or extremist in nature. by two developments. First, over the past two ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ěȱ decades, Kyrgyz citizens have come into fre- such as the distribution of banned publica- quent contact with representatives of many ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ foreign religious charities that fund the cons- threefold between 2010 and 2015.10 Appro- truction of mosques and Islamic learning cen- ximately 500 Kyrgyz citizens, primarily from ȱȱěȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱ the southern regions, have reportedly joined majority of these charities have a legal status, rebel groups in Syria. Religious radicalism is many others rely on informal means of chan- present not just in the south, but also in other neling resources and proselytizing. Second, parts of the country. According to government thousands of Kyrgyz citizens have forged data, various ęȱand ę groups, which connections with their co-religionists in Midd- openly reject the secular order, have estab- le Eastern and South Asian countries during lished a presence in the northern provinces, their travels abroad as religious pilgrims and engaging in extensive proselytizing among proselytizers.9 various layers of society, including Russian- The political turmoil in the Middle East in 2011 and the formation of the Islamic 10 Presentation by Emil Jenebekov, Head of De- ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱǻ ǼȱȱĴȱ- partment on the Analysis of Religious Situation, 10th Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the OSCE/ODIHR National Roundtable on Freedom of August 16, 2010. Religion, Bishkek, 3 February, 2015. A late September 8 International Crisis Group, “Kyrgyzstan: Widening 2016 attack against the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Ethnic Divisions in the South,” March 29, 2012. which was allegedly carried out by terrorists with ties 9 Approximately 4 thousand Kyrgyz citizens make to rebel groups in Syria, underscored the potential for annual Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. violent extremism.
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speaking communities.11 support of state-sanctioned religious edu- Alarmed by an increase in the number cation. The 2013-2017 National Strategy for of Kyrgyz nationals departing for Syria, Kyr- ȱȱȱĴȱȱ gyz authorities have taken a series of measures ȱȱ ȱ ȱěǯȱȱȱ to counter radicalization. Recognizing the link ȱȱȱěȱȱȱ - ȱĚ ȱ ȱȱȱ- ly established Centre for Religious Studies are lization, the authorities are working to reform expected to take an active role in this area. the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Responding to the exclusion of ethnic mino- rities, the State Agency for Local Government and Ethnic Relations coordinates state policy About the Author to include ethnic minority groups more fully Alisher Khamidov, Ph.D., is a Newton In- into governance structures. In 2014, Kyrgyz ternational Fellow at the University of New authorities also adopted a blueprint on state Castle in Great Britain, and an international policy in the religious sphere that outlined ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ- a series of measures to reduce religious radi siaNet. calization through community outreach and E-mail: [email protected]
11 In November 2015, Kadyr Malikov, a prominent theologian and a staunch critic of the ISIS and other radical groups, was attacked by two young men who were later identified as ISIS followers by Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies. “ISIS followers who attacked religious expert Kadyr Malikov detained in Turkey: police,” AkiPress, November 11, 2015, http://akipress. com/news:569212/.
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