The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations Disarmament Yearbook A rich source of historical knowledge of developments, trends and achievements of multilateral disarmament for more than 40 years. Part I contains an annual compilation of text and statistics of disarmament-related resolutions and The United Nations decisions of the General Assembly. Part II presents the main topics of multilateral consideration during the year and a convenient issues-oriented timeline. Available online at www.un.org/disarmament. DISARMAMENT
UNODA Update YEARBOOK An electronic newsletter giving information on the activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in all relevant areas of disarmament. Available at www.un.org/disarmament.
Occasional Papers A biannual publication with edited presentations made at international meetings, symposiums, seminars or workshops organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs or its regional centres in Lima, Lomé or Kathmandu. Available at www.un.org/disarmament.
Website—www.un.org/disarmament A comprehensive website on all issues in the purview of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, featuring:
• Searchable database of disarmament resolutions and decisions going back to the fifty-second session (1997) of the General Assembly • United Nations Register of Conventional Arms—unique information exchange on international arms transfers Volume 43 (Part II): 2018 • Text and status of treaties and agreements—database • Dedicated working websites for conferences and meetings • Education resources Volume 42 (Part II): 2018 • and more
ISBN 978-92-1-139172-5
asdf 1909036 Office for Disarmament Affairs New York, 2019
The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK
Volume 43 (Part II): 2018 Guide to the user
The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, in print and electronic format, is designed to be a concise reference tool for diplomats, researchers, students and the general public on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues under consideration by the international community. Part I of the 2018 Yearbook was published in April this year. It contains all the resolutions and decisions of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly. Part II is divided among the main multilateral issues under consideration throughout the year. It includes developments and trends on the issues and a convenient issue-oriented timeline, as well as short summaries found in appendix II, of First Committee and General Assembly actions taken on resolutions and decisions. Because much of the background information is condensed, it is helpful to consult previous editions for expanded historical knowledge. Factual information is provided in the appendices. Websites of United Nations departments and specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations are referenced as hyperlinks in the online version of the Yearbook. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Hyperlinks to these documents are included in the online version of the Yearbook. Alternatively, they can be accessed, in the official languages of the United Nations, from https://documents.un.org/. Specific disarmament-related documents are also available from the disarmament reference collection at https://www.un.org/ disarmament/publications/library/.
Electronically available in PDF format at www.un.org/disarmament
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.19.IX.4
ISBN 978-92-1-139172-5 eISBN 978-92-1-004533-9
Copyright © United Nations, 2019 All rights reserved Printed at the United Nations, New York Contents Page Foreword ...... xi Acknowledgements ...... xix Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2018 ...... xx
Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation Developments and trends, 2018 ...... 3 Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 6 Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ...... 6 Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty . . . . 14 Entry into force and universality ...... 14 Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ...... 15 Science Diplomacy Symposium ...... 16 Youth Group ...... 17 Group of Eminent Persons ...... 17 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization ...... 18 Integrated capacity-building, education and training ...... 18 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ...... 19 Bilateral agreements and other issues ...... 20 Implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ...... 20 Implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty . 20 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) ...... 22 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ...... 25 International Atomic Energy Agency verification ...... 30 Nuclear verification ...... 30 Safeguards conclusions ...... 30
iii Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small‑quantities protocols ...... 32 Verification activities ...... 33 Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East ...... 35 Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel ...... 36 Nuclear security ...... 36 Export controls ...... 39 Missile Technology Control Regime ...... 39 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation . . . 40 Nuclear Suppliers Group ...... 41 Political declarations and other initiatives ...... 42 Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament ...... 42
Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons Developments and trends, 2018 ...... 45 Chemical weapons ...... 47 Fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties . . . 47 Twenty-third session of the Conference of the States Parties . . . . 48 Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention . . . 49 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ...... 50 Use of chemical weapons in the United Kingdom ...... 52 National implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and promoting international cooperation . . . . 52 Biological weapons ...... 55 Meetings of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention . . . . 55 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention . . 63 Work of the Implementation Support Unit ...... 67 Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons ...... 70 Export controls ...... 72 Australia Group ...... 72
iv Chapter III. Conventional weapons Development and trends, 2018 ...... 77 Arms Trade Treaty ...... 79 Fourth Conference of States Parties ...... 80 Small arms and light weapons ...... 82 Programme of Action on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons ...... 82 Security Council ...... 84 Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium . . . . 86 Coordinating Action on Small Arms ...... 87 Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures . . . 88 Ammunition ...... 89 General Assembly ...... 89 Programme of Action on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons ...... 91 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and United Nations SaferGuard activities ...... 91 Improvised explosive devices ...... 93 General Assembly ...... 94 Security Council ...... 96 Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ...... 97 United Nations Mine Action Service activities ...... 98 Explosive weapons in populated areas ...... 98 Depleted uranium ...... 101 Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures . 102 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms ...... 102 Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures ...... 104 Export controls ...... 106 Wassenaar Arrangement ...... 106 United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation ...... 107 Confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms . . . 108
v Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ...... 109 Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ...... 110 Twelfth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V . 112 Twentieth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II ...... 113 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons ...... 115 Cluster munitions ...... 117 Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions ...... 117 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: Intersessional activity and seventeenth Meeting of the States Parties ...... 119
Chapter IV. Regional disarmament Development and trends, 2018 ...... 127 Nuclear-weapon-free zones ...... 130 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) ...... 132 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) ...... 133 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) . . . 134 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia ...... 134 Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction ...... 135 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres . . . . 136 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa ...... 136 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean ...... 141 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific ...... 143 Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level ...... 145 Africa ...... 145 Americas ...... 151
vi Asia ...... 152 Europe ...... 154 Middle East ...... 164 United Nations Development Programme ...... 165 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ...... 167
Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues Developments and trends, 2018 ...... 173 Emerging issues ...... 176 Armed uncrewed aerial vehicles ...... 176 Lethal autonomous weapons systems ...... 177 Hypersonic weapons ...... 178 Emerging technologies relevant to small arms and light weapons . . 179 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security ...... 180 Cross-cutting issues ...... 182 Gender and disarmament ...... 182 Terrorism and disarmament ...... 191 Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control . . 196 Relationship between disarmament and development ...... 196 Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation ...... 197 Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament ...... 198 Outer space ...... 198 Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) . . . . . 203 Status of implementation ...... 203 Monitoring and national implementation ...... 204 Assistance ...... 205 Cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations ...... 205 Transparency and outreach ...... 207
vii Chapter VI. Disarmament machinery Developments and trends, 2018 ...... 211 First Committee of the General Assembly ...... 212 Nuclear weapons ...... 214 Other weapons of mass destruction ...... 216 Outer space ...... 217 Conventional weapons ...... 218 Emerging technologies and other issues ...... 219 United Nations Disarmament Commission ...... 221 Nuclear weapons ...... 222 Outer space ...... 223 Conference on Disarmament ...... 225 Nuclear disarmament ...... 227 Fissile material ...... 229 Prevention of an arms race in outer space ...... 230 Negative security assurances ...... 231 Other agenda items ...... 231 Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters ...... 232 High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group . . 235 Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament ...... 236
Chapter VII. Information and outreach Developments and trends, 2018 ...... 239 Disarmament Information Programme ...... 242 Print and e-publications ...... 242 Websites ...... 246 Databases ...... 247 International days ...... 248 Media ...... 250
viii Disarmament and non-proliferation education ...... 253 Disarmament education website—a resource for learning . . . . . 254 Training activities ...... 255 Commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ...... 255 Disarmament fellowships ...... 256 Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs . . 258 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research ...... 259 Weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons . . . . . 261 Conventional arms ...... 261 Security and technology ...... 262 Gender and disarmament ...... 262
Appendix I. Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements ...... 269
Appendix II. Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter ...... 283
ix
Foreword
It is my pleasure to introduce Part II of the 2018 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. This forty-third annual edition of the publication, like those before it, is intended to provide diplomats, professionals and the interested public with comprehensive and objective insight into the year’s developments in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Decades after its first volume went to press, theYearbook continues to provide a consistent measure of international progress in tackling some of our most consequential challenges. The year 2018 was marked by an acceleration of worrying trends affecting international peace and security, including dangerous rhetoric, growing military budgets, nuclear modernization and weaponization of developments in science and technology. Yet these developments inspired advocates around the world to act with renewed resolve. Drawing on this resolve, and responding to a deteriorating international security environment characterized by mistrust, an absence of real dialogue and a growing preference for arms over diplomacy, Secretary-General António Guterres launched his “Agenda for Disarmament”, aiming to help societies pursue sustainable peace and security through political dialogue and negotiations. As he unveiled the Agenda at the University of Geneva on 24 May 2018, the Secretary-General noted a fundamental paradox: “When each country pursues its own security without regard for others, we create global insecurity that threatens us all.” In his Agenda, entitled Securing Our Common Future, the Secretary- General committed to taking 40 actions aimed at strengthening security with the diverse “disarmament toolbox”, including prohibitions, restrictions, confidence-building and, where needed, elimination of weapons. These actions would target three broad categories of threats—weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and emerging weapon technologies—with practical measures operationally linked to advancing other core United Nations priorities, including those articulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In undertaking these actions, the United Nations would strengthen partnerships for disarmament between its own offices and with Governments, civil society and the private sector. As he introduced his Agenda’s first priority—“Disarmament to save humanity”, aimed at eliminating all weapons of mass destruction—the Secretary-General stressed that “our world is going backwards” in its efforts to achieve to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the year included setbacks in two key areas: the entrenchment of strategic tension between the major powers and the ongoing deterioration of existing disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control arrangements. Reflecting the
xi heightened strategic competition, the United States laid out plans in 2018 to rely more heavily on its nuclear arsenal under more varied circumstances, and the Russian Federation announced that it was pursuing new strategic weapons systems while taking into account the defensive capabilities of its adversaries. Throughout 2018, the United States and the Russian Federation each continued to allege that the other was in non-compliance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of 1987. In December, the United States declared its intention to suspend its obligations under the landmark cold war–era arms control agreement. The United States also ceased participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an agreement it had reached in 2015 with the Islamic Republic of Iran, five other States and the European Union with the subsequent, unanimous backing of the Security Council. Yet the year also saw encouraging nuclear-related developments. Discussions on the Korean Peninsula shifted increasingly towards diplomacy and dialogue, and the year passed with no new nuclear tests or flight trials of ballistic-missile technology by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Separately, the General Assembly entrusted to the Secretary-General the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, giving new force to an ambition set out 23 years earlier within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Governments also maintained efforts throughout the year to consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while divergent on many issues, nonetheless reiterated their commitment to pursuing a successful outcome at the Treaty’s next review conference. Separately, many Member States signalled their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through support to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which had 69 signatories and 19 ratifications at the end of the year. Governmental experts met twice to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, underscoring the importance that many Governments placed on identifying verification measures to not only achieve but also maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. Additionally, a high-level expert preparatory group called for negotiations to begin without delay on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States also acted in intergovernmental forums to enhance peace and security in outer space and, in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, relevant United Nations entities committed to deeper engagement with Member States on the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and on the elaboration of effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
xii As allegations of chemical attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic sadly continued, the year saw a renewed sense of global urgency to prevent and respond to the use of chemical arms, including to hold accountable the perpetrators of any use of these horrendous weapons. In one notable response taken without consensus, States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention voted to put in place arrangements for the perpetrators of these attacks to be identified by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Separately, the Secretary-General committed, in his Agenda for Disarmament, to working with the members of the Security Council in order to build new leadership and unity in restoring respect for the global norm against chemical weapons. The implementation of key obligations under the Convention also continued, including with the destruction of the remaining chemical weapons production facilities in Iraq and the two remaining above-ground facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic. States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention continued their efforts to strengthen the agreement’s implementation during five intersessional Meetings of Experts and a Meeting of States Parties. The Central African Republic, Niue and the State of Palestine contributed towards the Convention’s universalization by becoming States parties, leaving five signatory States that had yet to ratify the agreement and 10 additional countries that had yet to sign it. Separately, in the absence of an investigative mechanism within the Convention’s framework, the Secretary-General committed in his Agenda for Disarmament to work under pre-existing authority with Member States, including through the General Assembly, to enhance the level of preparedness and strengthen the capacity to conduct independent investigations of the alleged use of biological weapons, in accordance with existing mandates. No incidents concerning the potential use of biological weapons were reported during the year. In presenting the second priority of his Agenda, “Disarmament that saves lives”, the Secretary-General stressed the potential for international action to reduce and mitigate the impact of the use of explosive conventional weapons, including improvised explosive devices, in populated areas. He also underscored the continued rise in global military expenditures, which would reach an estimated $1.82 trillion over the course of 2018, and stressed the need to “rethink” responses to contemporary security challenges that could not be solved with a gun or tank. Despite the discouraging growth of the global conventional arms trade during the year, international efforts to enhance its transparency, responsibility and accountability continued. In one milestone, reached in December, the Arms Trade Treaty gained its one hundredth State party four years after entering into force, and a total of six States from Latin America and Africa ratified the Treaty over the course of 2018. Meanwhile, the Treaty’s Voluntary Trust Fund continued to support efforts aimed at enhancing the implementation capacities of States parties, and non-governmental organizations continued monitoring adherence by
xiii States to the agreement’s provisions. Separately, on the issue of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, the United States continued consultations on elaborating guidelines based on the Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, issued in 2016, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research undertook a new phase of its work on increasing relevant transparency, accountability and oversight. In addition, the international community pursued new initiatives in 2018 to address the growing threats to urban populations from explosive weapons. The Secretary-General committed in his Agenda for Disarmament to supporting the efforts of Member States to develop a political declaration, as well as appropriate limitations, common standards and operational policies, related to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Speaking in Geneva in May, he underscored the need for further collection of civilian casualty data in order “to effect changes to policies, military operational procedures and behaviour, and create stronger global standards to protect civilians”. Meanwhile, the specific risks of improvised explosive devices continued to receive close attention from Governments in the separate contexts of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The year also saw new action on a trend highlighted by the Secretary- General as a key driver of armed conflict and violence: the excessive accumulation of and illicit trade in conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons. In June, Governments convened for the Third Review Conference on the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, recognizing the Programme’s relevance to combating gender-based violence while also making direct reference, for the first time, to ammunition in a Conference outcome document. Dangers from illicit small arms and light weapons also received close attention from the Security Council, which continued to explicitly address weapons and ammunition control measures in the mandates of peace operations. In parallel, the United Nations Secretariat developed two relevant publications: an aide-memoire on mainstreaming weapons and ammunition management into the work of the Security Council as well as a handbook for effective weapons and ammunition management in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. In another positive development, more than 100 countries had, by the end of the year, applied the guidance contained within the Modular Small- arms-control Implementation Compendium, intended to support the design and implementation of measures to regulate and control small arms. At the regional and subregional levels, a range of conventional weapons issues remained central to efforts aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts while enhancing security. Significant work in this regard took place within the African Union, which acted within the framework of its flagship initiative on “Silencing the Guns by 2020” as part of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
xiv Activities within this framework promoted stronger commitment to tackling illicit small arms and light weapons, including around the September “Africa Amnesty Month” for the surrender, collection and destruction of illegally held arms. In two other important developments, the Security Council unanimously extended support for the historic peace process launched in 2016 between the Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC)—including an agreement for the “laying down of arms”—and the Council of the European Union adopted a new strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. Meanwhile, the European Union and various donor countries enabled further contributions by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, through its three regional centres, towards reinforcing State-level capacities for weapons and ammunition management, particularly through projects aimed at enhancing physical security and stockpile management and at strengthening forensic ballistic capabilities. Through the third pillar of his Agenda for Disarmament, “Disarmament for future generations”, the Secretary-General highlighted the need for vigilance in our understanding of new and emerging weapon technologies that could imperil the security of future generations, and he stressed the importance of ensuring that developments in science and technology were used for the good of humankind. “The combined risks of new weapon technologies could have a game-changing impact on our future security”, the Secretary-General said as he launched the Agenda. “Our joint disarmament efforts in this area must have a game-changing preventive impact.” In multilateral contexts, Member States took significant new steps to address the possible impacts of new and emerging technologies on international peace and security. In one landmark development, the General Assembly approved two new processes for taking forward multilateral deliberations on cybersecurity. On emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the Group of Governmental Experts established under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held its 2018 session over two separate weeks, agreeing to 10 possible guiding principles and deciding to continue its work in 2019. New developments in weapon design and production methods were another priority discussion point in 2018; in the framework of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, States considered new technological developments in areas such as additive manufacturing (3D printing), seeking to ensure that these developments would not negatively affect tracing and prevention of diversion and, in addition, to leverage developments that could enhance small arms control. The activities of States to address possible security implications of new and emerging technologies were complemented by initiatives within the United Nations system. Weeks after launching his Agenda for Disarmament,
xv the Secretary-General advanced one of its commitments by issuing, at the General Assembly’s request, a report on current developments in science and technology and their potential impacts on international security and disarmament efforts. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research separately undertook a range of initiatives on emerging weapons technologies, including a study on hypersonic weapons that it completed in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Meanwhile, the Office published The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web as part of its Disarmament Information Programme, reporting on the first empirical investigation into the role of the dark web in facilitating trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives. In the final chapter of his Agenda, “Strengthening partnerships for disarmament”, the Secretary-General underscored the urgent need to reinvigorate the principal institutions of our disarmament machinery. The Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission “will soon be 40 years old, and both have produced very little for the last half of their lifetimes”, he said at the Agenda’s launch. Speaking to students at the University of Geneva, he urged for these forums to be opened to new voices, in particular by achieving equal, full and effective participation of women in all related decision-making processes; by establishing more education and training opportunities to empower young people; and by improving the engagement and integration of experts, industry and civil society representatives. Through its information and outreach activities in 2018, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs helped build and strengthen partnerships for disarmament across diverse sectors, including by highlighting the contributions that disarmament can make towards achieving many of the Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, the Office released a booklet entitled How weapons control fosters development, explaining how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development places disarmament, arms regulation and peace and security squarely within the scope of development policies. In my own capacity, I advocated in newspapers and other publications for the vast potential of disarmament efforts to help advance the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly by reining in excessive military spending. Additionally, to further underscore the deep relevance of the Agenda for Disarmament to all work of the United Nations, the Office maximized attention to its launch through a robust social media campaign, a dedicated website, multi-stakeholder consultations, extensive outreach to journalists and other education and awareness-raising efforts. The Secretary-General also prioritized advancing partnerships at the regional level, in particular through activities carried out from the three regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Through these centres, the Office pursued efforts aimed at advancing regional dialogue and other
xvi confidence-building measures in Africa, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Asia and the Pacific. The centres supported Member States in building capacities for adhering to and implementing disarmament and arms control instruments, and they facilitated contributions by Governments in frameworks such as the consultative process for the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group. In a separate step aimed at further supporting regional-level partnerships, the Secretary-General pledged in his Agenda for Disarmament to increase engagement with regional organizations to explore new opportunities and strengthen existing platforms for regional dialogue on security and arms control. Also during 2018, the critical role of gender equality to advancing our shared disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control goals became more deeply understood, producing new, concrete advances in multilateral decision-making. This trend was particularly apparent in the General Assembly First Committee, where a groundswell of interest in women’s full and equal participation resulted in the adoption of an unprecedented number of resolutions containing language on women’s equal representation. There was also a noted increase of awareness about the gendered impact of weapons and the need to include gender considerations in the pursuit of disarmament and arms control. Meanwhile, in a series of opinion pieces, I presented cases for acting to prevent armed violence against women and girls as well as for pursuing gender parity in international disarmament and arms control negotiations. These developments, and all of the others explored in these pages, reflect both our era’s turbulence and its immense opportunities to builda more peaceful and secure world. I encourage every reader of this edition of the Yearbook to personally take up the challenge that the Secretary-General first gave to university students in May 2018, as he unveiled hisAgenda for Disarmament: “Use your power and your connections to advocate for a peaceful world, free from nuclear weapons, in which weapons are controlled and regulated, and resources are directed towards opportunity and prosperity for all.”
Izumi Nakamitsu Under-Secretary-General High Representative for Disarmament Affairs August 2019
xvii
Acknowledgements
Volume 43 (Part II) of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, like preceding editions, was a collaborative project to which the staff of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs devoted considerable time and effort. It was prepared under the overall direction of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, and the Director of the Office, Thomas Markram. I would like to extend my gratitude to the following writers and other contributors: Nora Allgaier, Ismail Balla, Belen Bianco, Katja Boettcher, Aaron Buckley, Tam Chung, Amanda Cowl, Courtney Cresap, Radha Day, Amy Dowler, John Ennis, Estela Evangelista, António Ėvora, Daniel Feakes, Ivor Fung, Claudia Garcia Guiza, Melanie Gerber, Gillian Goh, Takuma Haga, René Holbach, Ana Izar, Soo Hyun Kim, Christopher King, Peter Kolarov, Tsutomu Kono, Kathryn Kuchenbrod, Yuriy Kryvonos, Qi Lai, Hermann Lampalzer, Valère Mantels, Tak Mashiko, Hideki Matsuno, Patrick McCarthy, Silvia Mercogliano, Jiaming Miao, Aleksander Micic, Willa Nathan, Charles Ovink, Trine Pejstrup, Daniël Prins, Katherine Prizeman, Cecile Salcedo, Fiona Simpson, Ingmar Snabile, Mary Soliman, Michael Spies, Jonah Glick- Unterman, Ngoc Phuong van der Blij, Xiaoyu Wang and Anselme Yabouri. I also wish to thank all of the contributors who supported this publication on behalf of other organizations and agencies.
Diane Barnes Editor-in-Chief August 2019
xix Multilateral disarmament timeline Highlights, 2018
January February March April May June July August September October November December
8 Feb 2–20 Apr 1 July 90th anniversary: United Nations 20th anniversary: 3 June 18 Aug 21–30 Nov entry into force of Disarmament entry into force of 5th anniversary: United Nations Regional Fourth Review Conference the 1925 Geneva Commission the Inter-American opening for Centre for Peace and of the Chemical Weapons Protocol session Convention signature of Disarmament in Asia and Convention Against the Illicit the Arms Trade the Pacific opens its office in 13 Jan Manufacturing Treaty Kathmandu 10 years ago 25th anniversary: of and Trafficking opening for signature of the 14 May–29 June in Firearms, 2 Dec Chemical Weapons Convention Conference on Ammunition, 35th anniversary: Disarmament, Explosives and entry into force of the 2nd session Other Related Convention on Certain Materials Conventional Weapons
1 July 50th anniversary: 4 Oct–8 Nov 24 May opening for Seventy-third session Launch of the Secretary-General’s signature of the (Photo: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical of the First Committee Weapons) Agenda for Disarmament Treaty on the Non- of the General Assembly Demolition of explosive remnants of war by Proliferation of the United Nations Mine Action Service. Nuclear Weapons (Photo: United Nations Mission in South Sudan)
22 Jan–30 Mar 7 July Conference on 1st anniversary: 3 Dec Disarmament, adoption of the 10th anniversary: 1st session Treaty on the A photo mosaic created using images from opening for signature Prohibition of the 2018 high-level meetings of the General Assembly. (UN Photo/Rick Bajornas) of the Convention on Nuclear Weapons Cluster Munitions
Secretary-General António Guterres during the presentation at the University of Geneva. (UN Photo/Jean-Marc Ferré) 5 Oct 40th anniversary: 18–29 June 30 July-14 Sept entry into force of the Third Review Conference of the Conference on Convention on the Programme of Action on Small Disarmament, Prohibition of Military or Arms and Light Weapons Treaty 3rd session Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification A BLU-61 submunition marked for destruction Techniques in the Basra governorate of Iraq. (Photo: United Nations Mine Action Service)
10 Oct 55th anniversary: entry into force of the (Photo: Sgt Marc-André Gaudreault/NATO) Partial Test Ban Treaty chapter Nuclear disarmament I and non-proliferation An exhibit during the second Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Science Diplomacy Symposium, held at the Vienna International Centre from 21 May to 1 June 2018.
Photo: Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization C h a p t e r I
Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
And today, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains our priority, to which I reaffirm my commitment. But efforts to achieve this goal are in state of severe crisis.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Developments and trends, 2018
In 2018, amid a deteriorating international security context, nuclear disarmament efforts stalled and, in some cases, experienced reversals. Relationships between States possessing nuclear weapons became increasingly antagonistic and differences among Member States over how to achieve the common goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons continued to grow. Many Member States signaled their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through support to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which at the end of 2018 had 69 signatories and 19 ratifications.2 Nevertheless, the Treaty remained divisive, with States that possess nuclear weapons and their allies continuing to articulate their opposition. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 review cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), States parties reiterated their commitment to the Treaty and its goals, as well as to pursuing a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.3 However, unlike in 2017, the session was also marked by heated debates and the exposure of significant divisions between States parties, primarily regarding the implementation of article VI of the Treaty but also about the implementation of the 1995 resolution on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. That rhetoric spilled over into the First Committee of the General Assembly. Relations between States possessing nuclear weapons worsened significantly during 2018, with consequences for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In February, the United States launched its Nuclear
1 Launch of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, Geneva, 24 May 2018. See also António Guterres, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.IX.6). 2 The treaty text and adherence status are available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tpnw. 3 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.41.
3 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2018: Part II
Posture Review, in which it announced the return of great-power competition and the concomitant need for the United States to rely more heavily on its nuclear deterrent under more varied circumstances. The Review outlined, inter alia, an intent to develop two new varieties of low-yield submarine- launched nuclear missiles, largely as a corrective to a current lack of flexible capabilities required for the United States to tailor its deterrence strategies.4 Less than one month later, the President of the Russian Federation used his annual address to the Russian Parliament to outline six forthcoming strategic weapons systems that could reportedly evade the missile defences of the United States. Those systems, which were being researched, developed or tested by the Russian Federation, included an intercontinental ballistic-missile system with “unlimited range”.5 On 4 December, after more than four years of accusation and counter- accusation relating to compliance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of 1987, the United States declared that it had found the Russian Federation to be in material breach of the Treaty and that it would suspend its obligations in 60 days, unless the Russian Federation returned to compliance.6 In response, the Russian Federation reiterated its claim that the United States had violated the Treaty with its deployment of an anti-missile launch system in eastern Europe. As the first agreement to eliminate an entire category of nuclear-capable weapons, the Treaty was widely seen as a pillar of the international arms control regime. Its potential demise also placed in doubt the future of a second arms control agreement: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). In parallel, throughout 2018, all States that possessed nuclear weapons continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals in ways that increased their lethality, further underscoring concerns about a multipolar, qualitative nuclear arms race. The United States ceased its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which had been agreed upon in 2015 between the E3/EU+37 and the Islamic Republic of Iran, resulting in doubt over the future of the Plan. The remaining participants reaffirmed their commitments to its full and effective implementation. Throughout 2018, the European Union, China
4 United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018. 5 Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, 1 March 2018. 6 Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States, press availability at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, Brussels, 4 December 2018. 7 China, European Union, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
4 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the Russian Federation pursued various initiatives to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in conformity with resolution 2231 (2015). Meanwhile, in his Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary-General reaffirmed the elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations and pledged to help Member States return to a common path for the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. In support of that aim, he made eight substantive commitments under the Agenda’s first pillar, “Disarmament to Save Humanity”. Additionally, there were several positive developments. A group of governmental experts was established to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. The group met twice in 2018, building upon the commonly held priority of many Member States to identify verification measures to both achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons. The group examined existing verification techniques as well as the need for capacity-building, and it discussed a series of possible guiding principles. In 2018, the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty issued a final report containing eight recommendations, including a call for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating without delay a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The group’s work was broadly welcomed, especially its collection of views in two open-ended informal consultative meetings in which all Member States could participate. Separately, the Conference on Disarmament decided8 on 16 February to establish subsidiary bodies on, inter alia, the cessation of a nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The subsidiary bodies were a welcome initiative aimed at deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement. A significant development also occurred in December, when the General Assembly entrusted to the Secretary-General the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The situation on the Korean Peninsula also saw notable improvement in 2018. In the context of a growing emphasis on diplomacy and dialogue, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not conduct any nuclear explosive tests or flight tests using ballistic-missile technology during the year.
8 CD/2119.
5 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2018: Part II
Issues related to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons The Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons9 held its second session in Geneva from 23 April to 4 May 2018, with Adam Bugajski (Poland) serving as Chair. Representatives from 112 States parties,10 nine international organizations11 and 66 non-governmental organizations12 participated in the session. The Committee adopted a procedural report.13 In her statement14 to the Preparatory Committee, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs stressed that the success and credibility ofthe Treaty “cannot and should not” be taken for granted. She highlighted the deteriorating geopolitical environment and real concerns about the erosion of the global arms control regime. The High Representative further underscored
9 The treaty text and status of adherence are available at http://disarmament.un.org/ treaties/t/npt. 10 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 11 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, European Union, International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, League of Arab States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 12 For the list of non-governmental organizations, see NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/INF/5/Rev.1. 13 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/13. 14 Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, statement at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 23 April 2018.
6 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that “a strong and credible Treaty is vital to enhancing our collective security as an international community”.15 The Preparatory Committee set aside six meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Committee. It heard 87 statements by States parties,16 as well as 18 statements by non-governmental organizations. Unlike the first session of the Preparatory Committee in 2017, the second session was marked by occasionally heated rhetoric between States parties that highlighted obstacles to securing a successful conclusion to the 2020 Review Conference. External sources of division included a deteriorating international security environment, characterized by a re-emergence of strategic tension between major powers, and regional security issues such as conflict in the Middle East. Among the dynamics contributing to the fissures between States parties were ongoing frustration over the implementation of past treaty commitments—especially those related to disarmament—and diverging views on how to achieve and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons, as reflected by supporters and opponents of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Nevertheless, States parties reaffirmed both their commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its status as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. They emphasized the vital contribution of the Treaty to international peace, security and stability while stressing the importance of full and effective implementation of and compliance with Treaty obligations. They also emphasized the importance of ensuring the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy—and noted their mutually reinforcing nature. States parties recalled the need for the full and effective implementation of decisions 1 and 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted at that meeting; the Final Document adopted at the 2000 Review Conference; and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. States parties committed themselves to making all efforts to achieve a successful outcome at the Review Conference in 2020, the fiftieth year since the Treaty entered into force. Following the general exchange of views, the Committee organized its meetings into three clusters, according equal time to each of the Treaty’s three pillars: (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and
15 The treaty text and status of adherence are available at http://disarmament.un.org/ treaties/t/npt. 16 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.1–6.
7 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2018: Part II
international peace and security; (b) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (c) the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. The clusters addressed three specific issue areas, respectively: (a) nuclear disarmament and security assurances; (b) regional issues, such as the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and (c) peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty. Discussion also took place on the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process.
Cluster 1 States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. In that regard, they recalled the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, and the responsibility of all States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race andto nuclear disarmament. Disagreement persisted among States parties over the pace and scale of nuclear disarmament, with many expressing concern that the slow progress to date was inconsistent with obligations made under the Treaty and in various review conference outcomes. Similarly, it was asserted that some modernization programmes in nuclear-weapon States were not consistent with commitments to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. In response, nuclear-weapon States argued that modernization programmes were intended to increase the safety and security of nuclear arsenals. Many States parties highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. In that context, they believed that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was an “effective measure”, as defined under article VI, as that Treaty created a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons and strengthened the existing disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. That argument was rejected by some States parties on the grounds that the Treaty would not contribute to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons. It was also noted that the international security environment was not currently conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament and that all States had a responsibility to work together to improve the geopolitical environment and create the conditions conducive to further nuclear disarmament. In that regard, States parties encouraged steps that promoted
8 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation international stability, peace and security and that were based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all. Participants also emphasized the importance of increased transparency in building confidence and trust at regional and international levels while helping to establish common ground for future arms control initiatives and further negotiated reductions of nuclear weapons. Specifically, States parties welcomed efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency related to their nuclear arsenals, and they espoused a strong belief that the review cycle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should better incorporate transparency through regular reporting. With regard to doctrine and posture, it was recalled that nuclear-weapon States had committed to reducing the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems in ways that promoted international stability and security. States parties discussed the relevance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances, including through legally binding instruments. States parties highlighted the need for a robust and credible verification and compliance mechanism for nuclear disarmament as an essential element for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. They welcomed efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities, including through the Group of Governmental Experts established by the General Assembly. Although the nuclear-weapon States did not deliver a joint statement, they informed States parties about their ongoing dialogue on matters that included strategic stability. In turn, participants acknowledged the significant reductions of nuclear arsenals by several nuclear-weapon States. In particular, States parties welcomed the achievement, announced on 5 February, of the central limits of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Participants encouraged the United States and the Russian Federation to extend that Treaty for a period of up to five years, as provided for in its articles, and to commence negotiations on further bilateral arsenal reductions. States parties also reiterated the value of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles to regional and international security, calling on the two parties to continue active dialogue to preserve it. Furthermore, the States parties reaffirmed the status of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and the urgent need for that Treaty to enter into force. Its link with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was
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emphasized, and States that had not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty—especially the remaining eight Annex 2 States— were urged to do so without delay. All States were encouraged to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty pending its entry into force. Participants expressed deep regret at the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. However, States parties welcomed the decision of the Conference on 19 February to create subsidiary bodies to reach understanding on areas of commonalities; deepen technical discussions and broaden areas of agreement; and consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiation.
Cluster 2 States parties emphasized that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards were fundamental to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly to the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation. They reaffirmed the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements, undertaken in fulfilment of their Treaty obligations to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses. They also stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in that regard. States parties welcomed the fact that 174 non-nuclear-weapon States had brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and those States without such agreements were encouraged to bring them into force as soon as possible. Many States parties noted that, although comprehensive safeguards agreements were successful in providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material, an additional protocol, which could increase confidence about the absence of undeclared material, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, constituted the current verification standard. They welcomed the growing number of States parties, which had reached 132, that had brought additional protocols into force. However, the Committee also emphasized that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol. The Committee stressed the importance of continued strengthening of the safeguards system. In that context, some States parties welcomed the work undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualization and further implementation of State-level approaches to safeguards to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system. In response to concerns about non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, participants stressed the importance of complying with all such obligations and of addressing all non-compliance matters, both to the Treaty’s integrity and to the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. States parties highlighted the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with
10 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation safeguards obligations in full conformity with the statute of the Agency and the respective legal obligations of States parties. In addition, they underlined the primary responsibility of the Security Council in cases of non-compliance. Participants also recalled the need to ensure that all nuclear-related exports were undertaken in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty. While concern was expressed regarding restrictions on exports, a number of States parties expressed the view that export controls were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty. In addition, States parties highlighted the need to provide effective physical protection for all nuclear material and facilities. All States, within their responsibility, were called upon to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including by protecting sensitive information and by providing physical protection both for nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and for the associated facilities at all stages in the life cycle. Reaffirming the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the global nuclear security framework and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, States parties encouraged the Agency to continue to assist States upon request in strengthening their national regulatory controls on nuclear material, including through the establishment and maintenance of State systems to account for and control nuclear material. Participants expressed concern regarding the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In that connection, they recalled the obligation of all States to fully implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). They also encouraged all States that had not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible. Separately, States parties recognized the contributions to the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation made by (a) internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and in accordance with the guidelines adopted in 1999 by the Disarmament Commission and (b) the parallel declarations concerning the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. States parties also encouraged increased cooperation among the members of those zones. Additionally, participants highlighted the importance of the expeditious signing and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. States parties reaffirmed universal support for the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, describing it as an essential element of the Conference outcome and as a key basis for the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. States parties recalled the affirmation of the
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resolution’s goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. They also expressed continued disappointment and regret at the postponement of the conference, which was to be held in 2012, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Support for a conference was reaffirmed, with some States parties calling for the Secretary-General to convene a conference aimed at launching a process to negotiate and conclude a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. Others stressed that the achievement of a Middle East zone could occur only through direct dialogue among all States of the region and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region. It was also noted that the 2010 mandate was no longer valid and that States of the region had a responsibility to undertake efforts, including through direct regional dialogue, to pursue the political and practical steps leading to such a zone. Participants strongly supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an important contribution to the non-proliferation regime and a successful, multilateral endeavour endorsed by the Security Council. States parties underscored the vital role played by the IAEA in verifying and monitoring its implementation and emphasized the importance of strict adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to all its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and its full cooperation with the IAEA to achieve international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. All parties concerned were encouraged to maintain constructive positions to ensure continued progress towards the full implementation of the Plan. While States parties expressed grave concern about the nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, they also welcomed the Inter-Korean summit on 27 April and the Panmunjom Declaration for the Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (Panmunjom Declaration) as a positive development for the Korean Peninsula. They strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programmes; return, at an early date, to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards, to come into full compliance with the Treaty and cooperate promptly with the IAEA in the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards; and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States parties reiterated that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States were called upon to comply fully with relevant Security Council resolutions.
12 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
Cluster 3 As in previous years, States parties agreed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties tothe Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. That right, they agreed, constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. They also stressed that the use of nuclear energy must be safeguarded at all stages and accompanied by high levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties’ national legislation and respective international obligations. The indispensable role of nuclear science and technology in achieving social and economic development for all States parties was recognized, as was the need for enhanced international cooperation to expand the utilization of nuclear sciences and applications to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world. Such enhanced cooperation, it was agreed, could support the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. In that context, the Committee welcomed the convening by the IAEA, from 28 to 30 November, of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology: Addressing Current and Emerging Development Challenges. States parties acknowledged the centrality of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme in enhancing the application of nuclear science and technology, especially in developing countries. Recognizing the Technical Cooperation Fund as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the Programme, they stressed the need to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities were sufficient, assured and predictable. States parties noted the ongoing collaborative efforts by the IAEA and its member States to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Programme. They also welcomed progress made in the construction of new IAEA laboratory buildings and infrastructure, judging the additions to be central to the Agency’s efforts to provide opportunities for training in and research and development of nuclear applications. States parties recognized that although the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with individual States, the IAEA played a central role in promoting international cooperation on matters relating to nuclear safety, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. States that had not yet done so were called upon to become parties to the relevant nuclear safety instruments, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Participants welcomed the provision by the IAEA of international peer review services, support to regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of Member State infrastructure, noting with appreciation the continuous work of the Agency to strengthen nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety and emergency preparedness and response.
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On the issue of article X and withdrawal, participants recalled that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. However, it was also underscored that, under international law, a withdrawing party would remain responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal. Pursuant to his mandate, the Chair presented delegations with a factual summary of States parties’ deliberations17 on the three pillars of the Treaty—nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—as well as on regional issues and other provisions of the Treaty. Because States parties could not reach agreement on the factual summary to be part of the report, the Chair decided to issue his factual summary as a working paper under his own authority. Two working papers commenting on the Chair’s summary were submitted by Brazil and New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.18 The Chair also submitted to the conference a document with his reflections on the state of the Treaty,19 which sought to outline challenges and opportunities facing States parties in their efforts to achieve a successful conclusion to the 2020 Review Conference.
Issues related to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Entry into force and universality In 2018, political support continued to increase for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty20 and its entry into force and universalization. Following Thailand’s ratification and Tuvalu’s signature on 25 September, the Treaty had 167 ratifying States and 184 States signatories. Of particular note, at the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 review cycle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the majority of States parties expressed strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime, reflecting the Treaty’s central role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Separately, the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Lassina Zerbo, and the Minister
17 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.41. 18 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.39 and NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.40. 19 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/12. 20 The treaty text and adherence status are available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ctbt.
14 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of Foreign Affairs of Japan issued a joint 21 appeal in July underscoring the vital importance of the Treaty in the framework of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In the appeal, the authors referenced international efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and, in that context, reiterated calls for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty.
Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was held on 27 September at United Nations Headquarters as the General Assembly opened its seventy-third session. The Meeting was organized by foreign ministers of the Group of Friends of the Treaty—Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands— in cooperation with Iraq and Belgium, co-coordinators for the 2017–2019 Article XIV process.22 The Meeting began with a video message from the Secretary-General,23 after which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan gave remarks identifying the Treaty as “the most concrete and practical measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation”.24 The Executive Secretary thanked Thailand and Tuvalu for their support and resolve, and he emphasized that any agreement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula must include the signature and the ratification of the Treaty by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Additional participants provided remarks on behalf of the Meeting’s other State organizers and Thailand, and a representative of the Preparatory Commission’s Youth Group delivered a statement in a show of intergenerational support for the Treaty. Federica Mogherini, a member of the Group of Eminent Persons,25 spoke in her capacity as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
21 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “Joint Appeal by Mr. Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization”, 5 July 2018. 22 The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty, or “Article XIV Conference”, is held every two years. 23 Secretary-General’s video message to the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 27 September 2018. 24 For the statements during the meeting, see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “2018: Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT”, 27 September 2018. 25 For more information about the Youth Group and the Group of Eminent Persons, see the sections later in this chapter.
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The meeting concluded with the adoption of a Joint Ministerial Statement26 by participating foreign ministers. In the statement, they urged all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so without further delay, stressing that voluntary moratoriums on nuclear testing did not have the “same permanent and legally binding effect” as the entry into force of the Treaty. Additionally, they urged all States signatories to support the Preparatory Commission’s efforts to complete its verification regime and promote relevant civil and scientific applications.
Science Diplomacy Symposium The Preparatory Commission’s second Science Diplomacy Symposium was held from 21 May to 1 June in Vienna.27 Participants came from around the world, including from many countries yet to ratify the Treaty, and many of its more than 350 registrants participated virtually through the Commission’s Knowledge and Training Portal. The Symposium aimed to raise public awareness about the Treaty’s contribution to international peace and security while inspiring cooperative research and innovation on monitoring technology for nuclear tests. Participants were also prompted to think creatively about possible political, legal and diplomatic solutions to the challenges facing the Treaty. The Symposium placed special emphasis on youth engagement and over 40 members of the Commission’s Youth Group participated as panellists and attendees. Members of the Group of Eminent Persons also participated and lent their expertise. The two-week event consisted of a wide range of thematic discussions and hands-on simulations, as well as a field trip to the Vienna University of Technology’s Atominstitut. A high-level session on 25 May featured an all-female panel, including the Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs of Austria, Karin Kneissl; the Minister of Science, Technology and Environment of Cuba, Elba Rosa Pérez Montoya; and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu. Afterwards, an expert dialogue, entitled “Assessing the Current Global Security Context: Successes, Challenges and Possible Ways Forward”, took place with speakers Desmond Browne, Vice Chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and former Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom; and Michelle Ndiaye, Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme and Head of Secretariat of the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa. An informational visit for government representatives from non-ratifying States was held in conjunction with the Symposium, drawing nearly 40 official participants. Attendees also participated in the full Symposium and
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint“ Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”. 27 For more information, see Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization, “2nd CTBT Science Diplomacy Symposium”.
16 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation met with the Executive Secretary, exchanging views on possible ratification of the Treaty.
Youth Group Members of the Preparatory Commission’s Youth Group28 took part in various events held on the margins of the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They provided their views on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In addition, members participating in the session presented an independent research project, entitled “A Blueprint for Stability on the Korean Peninsula”, which considered lessons learned from the Treaty and nuclear- weapon-free zones. During the second Science Diplomacy Symposium held in May, Youth Group members participated in discussions, took part in simulations and organized several events held on the margins of the Symposium, including one on reframing the debate around nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Youth Group members also worked on developing regional strategies for promoting the Treaty’s entry into force and universalization, notably during the “2018 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Group of Eminent Persons–Youth International Conference” from 28 August to 2 September in Astana. The Conference, co-hosted by the Preparatory Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, offered a forum for participants to explore ways to strengthen the Treaty’s profile under the theme “Remembering the Past, Looking to the Future”. On 26 and 27 November, at the invitation of the German Foreign Office, the Youth Group organized a workshop in which 30 students and young professionals discussed the Treaty’s challenges and prospects.
Group of Eminent Persons In 2018, members of the Group of Eminent Persons29 contributed to a range of outreach initiatives in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime. Their activities included participation in high-level conferences and events, such as the 2018 session
28 The Youth Group was launched in January 2016 during a symposium entitled “Science and Diplomacy for Peace and Security”. It is open to students and young professionals dedicated to achieving the Treaty’s entry into force and universalization, as well as promoting its verification regime. Since its launch in 2016, the Group has grown to almost 600 members, including a considerable number from non-ratifying Annex 2 States. 29 Launched on 26 September 2013 at United Nations Headquarters, the Group of Eminent Persons comprises eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts who examine political and technical developments related to the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty to identify concrete actions and new initiatives to accelerate its entry into force.
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of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, the second Science and Diplomacy Symposium, the “II Edoardo Amaldi Lecture” (entitled “North Korea: The Most Challenging Nuclear Test”), the Group of Eminent Persons–Youth International Conference in Astana and the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization The fiftieth and fifty-first sessions of the Preparatory Commission were held from 2 to 4 July and from 5 to 7 November, with Maria Assunta Accili Sabbatini (Italy) serving as Chair. At each of the sessions, the Executive Secretary reported on recent high-level meetings and his bilateral exchanges with States signatories. He also welcomed recent bilateral and multilateral efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and addressed various technical issues, including a new contract for the Global Communications Infrastructure and the installation and certification of additional International Monitoring System stations.
Integrated capacity-building, education and training Throughout 2018, the Preparatory Commission continued its integrated capacity-building, education and training activities for States signatories and other key stakeholders. The aim of those efforts was to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s entry into force and universalization while helping participants more actively reinforce the Treaty, the international norm against nuclear testing and the verification regime. In addressing technologies associated with the three pillars of the verification regime—the International Monitoring System, International Data Centre and on-site inspections—as well as the Treaty’s political, diplomatic and legal aspects, the Commission’s courses and workshops helped strengthen national scientific and decision-making capabilities in relevant areas and assisted in developing capacities in States signatories to effectively confront the political, legal, technical and scientific challenges facing the Treaty and its verification regime. With regard to the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre, the activities included a regional National Data Centre workshop and training event in Tunisia from 12 to 16 February, a technical meeting on the International Data Centre validation and acceptance test plan in Vienna on 3 and 4 May, the 2018 National Data Centre Workshop in Algeria from 6 to 10 May and a training course in Vienna from 18 to 29 June on access and analysis of waveform data of the International Monitoring System and products of the International Data Centre. In addition, participation continued to increase in an e-learning course for National Data Centres on accessing and
18 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation applying International Monitoring System data and International Data Centre products. In addition, the twenty-third On-Site Inspection Regional Introductory Course for the Latin American and Caribbean States region was hosted by Argentina from 8 to 15 April, with 43 trainees from 17 States signatories. An expert meeting on visual observation techniques was held from 7 to 9 March to advance the development of relevant technology, which was followed by a meeting on resonance seismometry from 23 to 25 May. In Arniston, South Africa, the On-Site Inspection Advanced Course of the Third Training Cycle for surrogate inspectors was held from 7 to 26 October, and the Ground and Airborne Visual Observation Course took place from 22 to 26 October.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
In 2018, 13 States30 signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 15 States ratified 31it and the Cook Islands acceded to it. As at 31 December, the number of signatory States stood at 69, and the number of ratifying or acceding States at 19. According to its article 15, paragraph 1, the Treaty would enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. At a signature and ratification ceremony held for the Treaty on 26 September, on the margins of the general debate of the General Assembly, seven States signed the Treaty and four States deposited their instruments of ratification.32 In her remarks at that event,33 the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs noted that the Treaty was well on its way to reaching the threshold of 50 ratifications needed for its entry into force, which would render the Treaty an important element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework.
30 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Saint Lucia, Seychelles and Timor-Leste. 31 Austria, Costa Rica, Cuba, Gambia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Palau, Samoa, San Marino, State of Palestine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam. 32 The States that signed the Treaty were Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Guinea-Bissau, Myanmar, Seychelles and Timor-Leste. Those that ratified the Treaty were Gambia, Samoa, San Marino and Vanuatu. 33 Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, remarks at the signature and ratification ceremony for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2018.
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Bilateral agreements and other issues Implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms On 5 February, the United States and the Russian Federation met the central limits of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). Under the Treaty, the parties must possess no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and no more than 1,550 warheads associated with those deployed launchers. According to data published by the parties pursuant to the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty, as at 1 September, the parties possessed aggregate total numbers of strategic offensive arms as laid out in the table below.
New START aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms
Category of data United States Russian Federation
Deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed submarine- launched ballistic missiles and deployed heavy bombers 659 517 Warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, on deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers 1,398 1,420 Deployed and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed and non-deployed launchers of submarine- launched ballistic missiles and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers 800 775
Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Fact Sheet, 2 October 2018.
The Treaty remains in force until 2021, although it can be extended for a period of up to five years without legislative approval.
Implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty On 20 October, the United States announced that it intended to withdraw from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) of 1987. The Treaty prohibits parties from possessing, producing or conducting
20 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation a flight test for ground-launched missiles with a range capability from 500 km to 5,500 km or from possessing or producing launchers of such missiles. Since 2014, the United States has alleged that the Russian Federation has been in violation of the Treaty through the development, testing and deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile with a prohibited range. In November 2017, the United States revealed the specific missile of concern to be the SSC-8, designated by the Russian Federation as 9M729. The SSC-8 was alleged to have entered into service in February 2017 and to have an approximate range from 1,500 km to 2,000 km. On 4 December 2018, the United States declared that it had found the Russian Federation to be in material breach of the Treaty and that it would suspend its obligations in 60 days, unless the Russian Federation returned to compliance.34 After the 60-day phase concludes on 2 February 2019, the United States will commence the six-month withdrawal period allowed for by the Treaty. In announcing the intended suspension, the United States cited the following reasons: (a) the testing of the SSC-8 (9M729) missile by the Russian Federation “gravely” undermined the security of the United States and that of its allies and partners and (b) the Treaty did not cover other States, including China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which were thus free to develop and deploy intermediate- range missiles. The United States again called on the Russian Federation to admit its violations and fully and verifiably to return to compliance.35 In reaction, the Russian Federation reaffirmed its position that the accusations of non-compliance were “groundless”.36 Its Foreign Minister later asserted that the United States had not responded to requests by the Russian Federation for working-level consultations.37 The Russian Federation separately reiterated its own concerns regarding alleged violations of the Treaty, focusing on the deployment by the United States of the ground-based MK-41 vertical launch system, which can launch, inter alia, missile defence interceptors and cruise missiles.38 The United States
34 Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States, press availability at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, Brussels, 4 December 2018. 35 Ibid. 36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,Briefing “ by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, December 5, 2018”. 37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign“ Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with the international news agency Rossiya Segodnya, December 24, 2018”. 38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy“ Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s briefing on developments involving the INF Treaty, Moscow, November 26, 2018”.
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had stated that the launchers deployed in eastern Europe had been capable only of launching missile interceptors.39 On 14 December, the Russian Federation submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”.40 The resolution was defeated by a vote of 46 to 43, with 78 abstentions. Under the draft, which was identical to one that the Russian Federation had attempted to submit to the First Committee in October, the Assembly would have, inter alia, recognized the role of the Treaty “as a cornerstone for maintaining global strategic stability, world peace and regional security”, called upon the Russian Federation and the United States to continue consultations on compliance, called upon States parties to strengthen and preserve the Treaty, and decided to inscribe an item entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty” in the provisional agenda of the next session of the General Assembly.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) On 8 May, President Donald Trump of the United States announced that his Government would take all appropriate steps to cease its participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In that connection, he ordered the United States Government to immediately begin moving to reimpose all United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the Plan of Action, to be accomplished within 180 days. In a letter to the Secretary-General, the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, denounced the decision of the United States. He stated that if the Plan of Action was to survive, its remaining participants and the international community would need to fully ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran was compensated unconditionally through appropriate national, regional and global measures. He further stated that the Islamic Republic of Iran reserved the right to take appropriate action in response to the decision of the United States if, after the exhaustion of available remedies, the rights and benefits of its people were not fully compensated. Expressing concern about the announcement, the Secretary-General reiterated that the Plan of Action represented a major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation and diplomacy and had contributed to regional and international peace and security. He emphasized that it was essential that all concerns regarding the implementation of the Plan of Action be addressed
39 United States Department of State, “Refuting Russian Allegations of U.S. Noncompliance with the INF Treaty”, 8 December 2017. 40 A/73/L.70.
22 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through the mechanisms established in the Plan. It was also essential, he said, for issues not directly related to the Plan to be addressed without prejudice to preserving the agreement and its accomplishments. The Secretary-General called on other participants in the Plan to abide fully by their respective commitments and on all other Member States to support it. At the meeting of the Joint Commission of the Plan of Action on 6 July and during the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+241 and the Islamic Republic of Iran held in New York on 24 September, the remaining participants in the Plan of Action reaffirmed their commitments to its full and effective implementation. Throughout 2018, the European Union, China and the Russian Federation pursued various initiatives to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate business with the Islamic Republic of Iran, in conformity with resolution 2231 (2015).
Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action The IAEA continued to report each quarter to its Board of Governors and to the Security Council on the Islamic Republic of Iran, shifting its focus to verification and monitoring in light of Council resolution 2231 (2015). Throughout 2018, the IAEA continued to verify and monitor the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The Agency also continued to (a) verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to the country’s safeguards agreement and (b) carry out its evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the country. In its report of 22 February,42 the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had stated an intention to “construct naval nuclear propulsion in the future”, prompting the Agency to seek further information from the Government. Reporting on 24 May,43 the IAEA said the Islamic Republic of Iran had communicated that it did not intend to build any new facilities under that programme for its first five years, that information on new facilities would be “delivered to the Agency in due time” and that the planned “nuclear-fuelled engines/reactors” would be for civilian applications. In May, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, announced that Israel had raided a facility in the Shor-abad district of Tehran in February, obtaining more than 100,000 documents and videos documenting past nuclear-weapon research and development by the Islamic Republic of Iran.44
41 China, European Union, France, Germany, Russian Federation and United Kingdom. 42 GOV/2018/7. 43 GOV/2018/24. 44 The IAEA issued its final assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme (GOV/2015/68) on 2 December 2015. It assessed that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear
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In September, the Prime Minister further asserted that the Islamic Republic of Iran had recently removed up to 300 tons of nuclear-related equipment and material, including 15 kg of radioactive material, from a nearby facility in the Turquz-abad district of Tehran. In that context, he called on the IAEA to investigate the two sites. In its report of 12 November,45 the IAEA reaffirmed that it continued to verify and monitor other nuclear-related commitments by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan of Action, including those commitments set out in section T of annex I, covering “Activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device”.
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) The Security Council endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in its resolution 2231 (2015) and subsequently requested the Secretary- General to report every six months on the resolution’s implementation. In his fifth and sixth reports,46 which were issued on 12 June and 6 December, respectively, the Secretary-General continued to focus on the provisions set forth in the resolution’s annex B, which included (a) restrictions applicable to nuclear-related transfers, ballistic missile–related transfers and arms-related transfers to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran and (b) provisions for asset freezes and travel bans. In the two reports, the Secretary-General reported on the outcome of a review of information and material made available to the Secretariat regarding allegations of the transfer of ballistic missiles, parts thereof or related technology by the Islamic Republic of Iran to Houthi forces in Yemen that possibly had been used in ballistic-missile launches aimed at the territory of Saudi Arabia. The Secretary-General also reported on other allegations related to the alleged transfer of arms by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Security Council met once in 2018, on 4 December, to discuss issues related to ballistic-missile activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.47 The meeting followed accusations by France, the United Kingdom and the United States that the Islamic Republic of Iran had test-launched a medium-
explosive device were conducted in the Islamic Republic of Iran before the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort and that some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assessed that those activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency reported that it had no credible indications of activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran after 2009 that were relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. 45 GOV/2018/47. 46 S/2018/602 and S/2018/1089. 47 It was the third time since January 2016 that the Council met in response to launches conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first was in March 2016 and the second in January 2017. The Council also met three times to discuss launches conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, in March 2016, February 2017 and September 2017.
24 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation range ballistic missile on 1 December. The three States considered that the launch was an “activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons” and was therefore inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). However, the Russian Federation continued to maintain that the resolution contained no legal prohibition on the development by the Islamic Republic of Iran of missile or space programmes. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated its argument that the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime were not internationally agreed upon and thus could not be used to define “ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea In 2018, the situation on the Korean Peninsula improved significantly as States turned towards diplomacy and dialogue and away from the provocations and intense rhetoric that had prevailed in previous years. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea did not conduct any nuclear explosive tests or flight tests using ballistic-missile technology in 2018. In his traditional New Year address, Kim Jong Un—Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army—defended the nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programmes of his Government while also highlighting the need for inter- Korean efforts to reduce military tensions. He also raised the possibility of involvement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the 2018 Winter Olympic Games, which would be held from 9 to 25 February in Pyeongchang, Republic of Korea. On 9 January, the first high-level inter-Korean talks since 2015 took place at Panmunjom. In a joint press release,48 the two Koreas announced, inter alia, that they would hold military-to-military talks and a further high-level inter- Korean meeting. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea also informed the Republic of Korea that it would reopen an inter-Korean military hotline in the Yellow Sea, continuing a resumption of communications that the country had suspended following the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in February 2016.49
48 Preparatory Committee for the 2018 Inter-Korean Summit, “남북고위급회담, 2018. 1. 9. 판문점 평화의집, 공동보도문” [Inter-Korean high-level talks, 2018. 1. 9. Panmunjom Peace House, joint press release], 9 January 2019. 49 On 3 January, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reopened a separate military hotline at Panmunjom. It had closed both hotlines following the February 2016 closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, an industrial park launched in 2004 on the northern side of the demilitarized zone and jointly run by the two Koreas.
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Additionally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that it would send a high-level delegation to the Winter Olympic Games. One day after this delegation arrived in the Republic of Korea on 9 February, Kim Yo Jong—Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Workers’ Party of Korea and sister of Chairman Kim—met with President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea, delivering a letter from Chairman Kim and conveying his wish to meet President Moon in Pyongyang at an early date. On 5 and 6 March, a presidential delegation of the Republic of Korea visited Pyongyang under the leadership of the Director of the National Security Office. During the visit, which included a meeting with Chairman Kim on 5 March, the two parties agreed to hold an inter-Korean summit at Panmunjom in April. On 8 March, during a subsequent trip to Washington, D.C., the Director of the National Security Office conveyed to President Donald Trump an invitation from Chairman Kim to meet, prompting an announcement by the President that he would respond positively. On 26 and 27 March, Chairman Kim visited Beijing and met with President Xi Jinping of China. In a report to the third plenary of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea on 20 April, Chairman Kim, inter alia, repeated his November 2017 declaration that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had completed its state nuclear force, announced that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea no longer needed to conduct nuclear tests or test fire intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles and announced that the mission of the “northern nuclear test ground” had come to an end. He further affirmed the commitment of the Workers’ Party of Korea to a world free from nuclear weapons, provided that the security of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could be reliably guaranteed. In a resolution adopted at the meeting, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed, inter alia, to immediately halting nuclear explosive and intercontinental ballistic-missile flight tests, dismantling the northern nuclear test ground and never transferring nuclear weapons or technology except in the case of a nuclear threat. Chairman Kim and President Moon met for the first time at the third inter-Korean summit, held in Panmunjom on 27 April.50 The two leaders issued the Panmunjom Declaration,51 which included a reaffirmation of the common goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and an agreement to replace the armistice with a peace regime, to cease all hostile acts and to continued dialogue and negotiations. On 7 and 8 May, Chairman Kim met with President Xi for a second time in Dalian, China.
50 The first and second inter-Korean summits took place in 2000 and 2007, respectively. 51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Panmunjom“ Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula”, 27 April 2018.
26 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
On 9 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released three previously detained nationals of the United States during a visit to Pyongyang by the Secretary of State of the United States. According to non-governmental expert analysis of commercial satellite imagery, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea destroyed its Iha-ri missile test stand over a period of days or weeks in May. The Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile had been tested from this site, which had been the State’s only known facility for conducting land-based, canister-launched ballistic-missile ejection tests. On 24 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea detonated explosives to close three of the four tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. The fourth tunnel was reportedly already closed. The event was witnessed by a group of international journalists, but no international experts were invited. Also on 24 May, the White House issued a letter from President Trump to Chairman Kim cancelling their planned summit, which had been scheduled for 12 June in Singapore. Two days later, on 26 May, Chairman Kim and President Moon met for a second summit at Panmunjom. On 1 June, following a meeting with the Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, President Trump announced that the 12 June summit would proceed as originally planned. The first summit between the leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States was held in Singapore on 12 June. The resulting Joint Statement52 included, inter alia, a reaffirmation of the commitment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a commitment by the United States to provide security guarantees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also contained a commitment to continue high-level follow-on negotiations. In remarks to the press following the summit, President Trump said that Chairman Kim had informed him that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would destroy a “major missile engine testing site”. He also said that the United States would suspend its joint “war games” in the region. On 22 June, the Department of Defense of the United States announced the indefinite suspension of select military exercises on the Korean Peninsula, in coordination with the Republic of Korea, to support implementation of the outcomes of the Singapore summit.53 On 19 and 20 June, Chairman Kim met with President Xi for a third time in Beijing.
52 The White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”, 12 June 2018. 53 United States Department of Defense, “DoD Indefinitely Suspends Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Other Exercises”, 22 June 2018.
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According to further non-governmental analysis of commercial satellite imagery, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted some dismantlement activities in July and early August at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station vertical engine test stand and launch pad. The Secretary of State of the United States again visited Pyongyang from 5 to 7 July, but he was unable to meet with Chairman Kim as was reportedly planned. On 7 July, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, quoted by the country’s state media, said that the United States delegation had made a “unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearization just calling for [complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization], declaration and verification, all of which run counter to the spirit of the Singapore summit”.54 On 30 July, the Washington Post quoted an unnamed United States intelligence source as saying that intelligence agencies of the United States had observed through satellite imagery signs consistent with the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, believed to be Hwasong-15 missiles, at a large research facility in Sanumdong, on the outskirts of Pyongyang. On 20 August, the IAEA Director General confirmed that the Agency still could not conduct safeguard activities or implement any safeguard measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.55 As such, the IAEA remained unable to verify the correctness and completeness of declarations made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under its safeguards agreement, according to the annual report of the Director General to the Agency’s Board of Governors. The document noted that while the IAEA knowledge of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was limited and declining, the Agency continued to monitor relevant developments and evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it, generally through analysis of commercial satellite imagery. The Agency reported observing indications consistent with the continued operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e) plutonium production reactor), the Radiochemical Laboratory and reported centrifuge enrichment facility within the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. The IAEA observed several short shutdowns of the plutonium production reactor, none of which were sufficiently long for the complete reactor core to have been discharged, according to the report. The Agency said that it did not observe any indications of further construction at the experimental light water reactor at Yongbyon. Additionally, the IAEA said that it could not confirm the nature of a site near Pyongyang identified by non-governmental experts in July as a covert uranium enrichment facility.
54 Korean Central News Agency, “FM Spokesman on DPRK–U.S. High-level Talks”, 8 July 2018. 55 GOV/2018/34-GC(62)/12.
28 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
On 17 September, the Security Council met to discuss the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, devoting significant attention to an unpublished report prepared by the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). The leaders of the two Koreas met for the third time in 2018 at the fifth inter-Korean summit, which took place in Pyongyang from 18to 20 September. The meeting resulted in two documents: the Pyongyang Joint Declaration56 and, as an annex, the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historical Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain. In the Joint Declaration, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, inter alia, committed to dismantling the Dongchang-ri57 missile engine test site and launch platform under the observation of “experts from relevant countries” and expressed willingness to permanently dismantle nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Centre if the United States took “corresponding measures”. The Agreement annexed to the Joint Declaration elaborated various steps to implement the military commitments made by the two sides in April. The Security Council discussed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at a ministerial-level meeting chaired by the Secretary of State of the United States on 27 September. Japan and the Republic of Korea also participated in the meeting.58 In addition to issuing strong statements of support for ongoing diplomatic efforts related to the Korean Peninsula, many Council members called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fully comply with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. On 7 October, the Secretary of State met with Chairman Kim again in Pyongyang. He later reported that Chairman Kim had agreed during their meeting to allow inspectors into the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. On 20 December, the state media of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea asserted in an article that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, as mentioned in the Joint Statement at the Singapore summit, referred to the removal of all nuclear threats, not only from the territory of the two Koreas, but also from surrounding areas “from where the Korean peninsula is targeted”.59 It was also further stated that the elimination of the nuclear deterrence of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea would occur only after the complete removal of nuclear threats to the country from the United States.
56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Pyongyang“ Joint Declaration of September 2018”, 21 September 2018. 57 Also referred to as the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. 58 S/PV.8363. 59 Korean Central News Agency, “It Would Be Better to Search for New Way Rather than Facing Barrier on Old Way”, 20 December 2018.
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International Atomic Energy Agency verification
Since its founding in 1957, the IAEA has served as the focal point for worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for promoting global nuclear security and safety and, through its verification activities, for providing assurances that States’ international undertakings to use nuclear material and facilities for peaceful purposes are being honoured. The following is a brief survey of the work of the IAEA in 2018 on nuclear verification, nuclear security, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel assurances.60, 61
Nuclear verification A major pillar of the IAEA programme involves activities that enable the Agency to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities. The IAEA verification programme thus remains at the core of multilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by verifying that States are complying with their safeguards obligations.62
Safeguards conclusions At the end of each year, the IAEA draws safeguards conclusions for each State, with a safeguards agreement in force for which safeguards are applied, based upon the evaluation of all safeguards-related information available to it for that year. For a “broader conclusion” to be drawn that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities”, a State must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement63 and an additional protocol64 in force, and the IAEA must have been able to conduct all necessary verification and evaluation activities for the State and found no indication that, in its judgment, would give rise to a proliferation concern. For States that have a comprehensive safeguards agreement but no additional protocol in force, the IAEA draws a safeguards conclusion regarding only the non-diversion of declared nuclear
60 The designations employed and the presentation of material in this section, including the members cited, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency or its member States concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. 61 The referenced number of States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on the number of instruments of ratification, accession or succession that have been deposited. 62 For more information, see www.iaea.org/safeguards. See also article III (1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 63 Comprehensive safeguards agreements are based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the IAEA and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”. 64 Additional protocols are based on INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards”.
30 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation material, as the IAEA does not have sufficient tools to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. For those States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn, the IAEA was able to implement integrated safeguards—an optimized combination of measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols—to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its safeguards obligations. In 2018, safeguards were applied for 182 States65, 66 with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Of the 129 States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force,67 the Agency concluded that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities in 70 States;68 for 59 States, as the necessary evaluation regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of those States remained ongoing, the Agency was unable to draw the same conclusion. For those 59 States, and for the 45 States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement but with no additional protocol in force, the Agency concluded only that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. During 2018, integrated safeguards were implemented for 67 States.69, 70 For the three States for which the Agency implemented safeguards pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency concluded that nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. Safeguards were also implemented with regard to nuclear material in selected facilities in the five nuclear-weapon States party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty under their respective voluntary offer agreements. For those five States, the Agency concluded that nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards, as provided for in the agreements.
65 Those States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion. 66 And Taiwan Province of China. 67 Or an additional protocol being provisionally applied, pending its entry into force. 68 And Taiwan Province of China. 69 Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam. 70 And Taiwan Province of China.
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As at 31 December, 11 States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to Article III of the Treaty. For those States parties, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusions.
Safeguards agreements, additional protocols and small‑quantities protocols Safeguards agreements and additional protocols are legal instruments that provide the basis for IAEA verification activities. The entry into force of such instruments therefore continues to be crucial to effective and efficient IAEA safeguards. The IAEA continued to implement the plan of action71 to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, which was updated in September. The Agency organized an outreach workshop, held in Vienna in June, for diplomats from permanent missions and embassies located in Berlin, Brussels, Geneva and London; a national workshop for Nepal held in Kathmandu in December; and country visits to Sao Tome and Principe and Cabo Verde in June. During those outreach activities, the Agency encouraged States to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, as well as to amend their small-quantities protocols. In addition, the Agency held consultations with representatives from a number of member and non-member States in Geneva, Jakarta, Lisbon, New York and Vienna at various times throughout the year. During the year, a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a small-quantities protocol based on the revised text and an additional protocol entered into force for Liberia. In addition, the Board of Governors approved a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a small-quantities protocol for the State of Palestine.72 An additional protocol entered into force for Serbia. An additional protocol was signed for Algeria, and the Board of Governors approved an additional protocol for Sri Lanka. A voluntary offer agreement and an additional protocol thereto was signed for the United Kingdom. The IAEA also continued to communicate with States to implement the Board’s 2005 decisions regarding small-quantities protocols, with a view to amending or rescinding such protocols. During the year, the small-quantities protocol for Malaysia was rescinded; and the small-quantities protocols for Paraguay, Tonga and the United States were amended.73 Fifty-eight States
71 IAEA, “Plan of Action to Promote the Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols”, September 2018. 72 The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. 73 The United States has amended its small-quantities protocol to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States and the Agency pursuant to
32 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have operative small quantities protocols in force based on the revised standard text.
Verification activities Throughout 2018, the Agency continued to verify and monitor the nuclear-related commitments of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. During the year, the Director General submitted four reports74 to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council entitled “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”. In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”,75 covering relevant developments since the previous report in August 2016.76 The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of the Agency that would have had an impact on the Agency’s assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by the Syrian Arab Republic.77 In 2018, the Director General renewed his call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. The Syrian Arab Republic has yet to respond to those calls. On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and all other safeguards-relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2018, the Agency concluded for the Syrian Arab Republic that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. In August, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled “Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”,78 which provided an update
Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, covering the Protocol I territories of the United States of America. 74 IAEA, documents GOV/2018/7, GOV/2018/24, GOV/2018/33 and GOV/2018/47. 75 IAEA, document GOV/2018/35. 76 IAEA, document GOV/2017/37. 77 The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote), had, inter alia, called on the Syrian Arab Republic to urgently remedy its non- compliance with its safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and with access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and to resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. 78 IAEA, document GOV/2018/34-GC(62)/12.
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of developments since the Director General’s report of August 2017.79 The Director General provided a further update on developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in his introductory statement to the Board of Governors on 22 November. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the safeguards agreement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able to implement any verification measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and has not been able to do so since April 2009. Therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In 2018, no verification activities were implemented in the field, but the Agency continued to monitor developments in the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to evaluate all safeguards- relevant information available to it, including open-source information and satellite imagery. The Executive Group and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Team, created in August 2017,80 intensified their efforts. The Team increased monitoring of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea through more frequent collection of satellite imagery and enhanced its readiness to promptly undertake any activities it might be requested to conduct in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Actions to enhance readiness included formulation and updating of verification approaches and procedures, identification of potential inspectors for initial activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and provision of specialized training for them, and ensuring the availability of appropriate verification technologies and equipment to support the initial activities. All those efforts related to the Agency’s enhanced readiness were conducted within available resources, including extrabudgetary contributions from a number of member States. Once a political agreement has been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in a timely manner, if requested to do so by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and subject to approval by the Board of Governors. The Agency evaluated all safeguards relevant information, including satellite imagery and open-source information, about a group of buildings within a security perimeter in the vicinity of Pyongyang. The size of the main building and the characteristics of the associated infrastructure were not inconsistent with a centrifuge enrichment facility. The timeline of construction
79 IAEA, document GOV/2017/36-GC(61)/21. 80 IAEA, document GOV/2017/36-GC(61)/21, para.12.
34 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was not inconsistent with the reported uranium-enrichment programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.81 The Agency did not have access to the Yongbyon site or to other locations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Without such access, the Agency could not confirm either the operational status or configuration/ design features of the facilities or locations, or the nature and purpose of the activities conducted therein. The continuation and further development of the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea during 2018, including activities in relation to the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)) reactor, the use of the building that houses the reported centrifuge enrichment facility and the construction at the light-water reactor, were clear violations of relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2375 (2017), and were deeply regrettable.
Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East As requested in operative paragraph 13 of resolution GC(61)/RES/14 on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East adopted at the sixty-first regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA in 2017, the Director General submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its sixty-second regular session a report82 on the implementation of the resolution. The report on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East described, inter alia, the steps undertaken by the Director General in his efforts to further the implementation of his mandates conferred by the IAEA General Conference in resolution GC(61)/RES/14 and in decision GC(44)/DEC/12. In September 2013, following the discussions of the Board of Governors, the Director General provided to the member States of the IAEA the “background documentation prepared for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction”, which described the work the IAEA undertook and the experience it gained with regard to modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East region.83
81 IAEA, document GOV/2011/53-GC(55)24, para. 30. In addition, in GOV/2011/53- GC(55)/24, para. 50, reports were noted on the provision of centrifuge enrichment technology to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and indications that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could produce UF6 prior to 2001. 82 IAEA, document GOV/2018/38-GC(62)/6. 83 The 2010 Review Conference endorsed that the IAEA and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 30, para. 7 (d)). See also IAEA, document GOV/2013/33/Add.1-GC(57)/10/Add.1.
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Assurances of supply of nuclear fuel In December 2010, the establishment of a Low-Enriched Uranium Bank84 was authorized by the IAEA Board of Governors. Following the Agency’s solicitation for a host State, Kazakhstan offered to host the Low-Enriched Uranium Bank, which will be located in the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Storage Facility at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The Low-Enriched Uranium Bank will be a physical stock of up to 60 Type 30B cylinders containing standard commercial low-enriched uranium hexafluoride with enrichment levels of up to 4.95 per cent. Itwill serve as a supply mechanism of last resort if an eligible member State’s supply of low-enriched uranium is disrupted and cannot be restored commercially. Progress continued to be made in 2018 towards the establishment of the Low-Enriched Uranium Bank. The transit agreement with China entered into force, and two transport contracts were signed: one with the authorized organization from the Russian Federation and one with the authorized organization from Kazakhstan. The Plan of Specific Activities is nearing completion, having addressed issues including those related to Kazakhstan’s regulatory framework, site safety and security. Representatives from the Agency signed two contracts to purchase low-enriched uranium, which it aimed to have delivered to its storage facility before the end of 2019.
Nuclear security Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021 The IAEA continued to assist States, at their request, in making their national nuclear security regimes more robust, sustainable and effective. In implementing the Nuclear Security Plan 2018-2021,85 the Agency provided support in the areas of needs assessment, information and computer security, external coordination, the nuclear security framework, coordinated research projects, self-assessments and advisory services, human resources development, and risk reduction and security improvement.
International nuclear security framework In 2018, continued progress was made towards the universalization of the principal binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security, both of which had been adopted under the auspices of the IAEA: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment thereto of 2005. During the year, the number of States parties to the original Convention increased to 157; 118 States were party to the Amendment, which entered into
84 Other assurances of nuclear fuel supply mechanisms are described in previous editions of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. 85 IAEA, document GC(61)/24.
36 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation force in May 2016, establishing a legal basis for a strengthened framework to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. Meanwhile, the IAEA continued to promote universal adherence to the Amendment through technical meetings, regional workshops and promotional efforts. In an informal meeting of 50 States parties that the Agency facilitated in December, participants initiated preparations for a conference in 2021 to review the Amendment. The IAEA also organized the fourth Technical Meeting of the Representatives of Parties to the Convention and its Amendment in Vienna, drawing 60 States parties for a discussion of universalization efforts for the Convention and its Amendment. The IAEA also held three regional training events, in May, June and November in Japan (for South-East Asian countries), Côte d’Ivoire (for French-speaking African countries) and the Russian Federation (for Russian-speaking European countries), respectively.
Nuclear security guidance for member States One of the Agency’s functions is to develop comprehensive nuclear- security guidance with the active involvement of experts from member States for issuance in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series. In 2018, the IAEA held two meetings of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, to which 57 member States had nominated representatives, and released five new editions in its Nuclear Security Series, bringing the total published volumes in the series to 32. The Agency also approved 10 draft publications for the series while overseeing the development of 14 others. In addition, the IAEA issued translations of six publications initially released in English in the other official languages of the United Nations.
Incident and Trafficking Database The IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database continued to be an important source of information assisting the IAEA secretariat, participating States and selected international organizations in strengthening nuclear security. In 2018, Benin and the Republic of the Congo contributed to the Database, bringing the total number of participating States to 138. The Agency held two national and two subregional information-exchange meetings to share information between current and potential participating States. In 2018, States reported 253 incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, 7 of which were either confirmed or likely acts of trafficking,86 increasing the number to 3,497. The Database is a component
86 To accurately categorize all reported trafficking incidents and distinguish them from other unauthorized activities, a definition of “trafficking” had been agreed onfor communication purposes among the Points of Contact of the Incident and Trafficking Database. According to that definition, incidents are grouped based on whether the intent to commit an act of trafficking or malicious use is confirmed, is not known or is absent.
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of the information management systems supporting the implementation of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan.
Nuclear security human resource development The IAEA continued to provide comprehensive assistance to States on human resource development related to nuclear security, including through programme development, needs analysis, training events, instructor training, educational programmes and further development of nuclear security support centres. In 2018, the IAEA conducted 105 security-related training activities—42 at the national level and 63 at the international or regional level—providing training to more than 2,200 participants from 139 States. The Agency’s 16 e-learning courses on nuclear security generated over 3,500 completion certificates by almost 900 users. In April, the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics hosted the annual “Joint IAEA–ICTP International School on Nuclear Security” in Trieste, Italy, providing a comprehensive introduction to the field of nuclear security. In June, the “International School on Nuclear Security for Spanish-speaking Countries” took place with the same curriculum in Valdemoro, Spain, and the “Regional School on Nuclear Security for Asia and the Pacific” was held in Jakarta. The IAEA also convened the annual meeting of the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres from 5 to 9 March in Tokai, Japan, and the annual meeting of the International Nuclear Security Education Network in Vienna from 9 to 13 July. Additionally, IAEA fellowships helped five students from four developing States to attend a master’s programme in nuclear security at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia. Agency fellowships also supported four students from four developing States in attending a nuclear security master’s programme at the Brandenburg University of Applied Sciences in Germany.
Nuclear security peer reviews and advisory services The IAEA continued to implement peer reviews and advisory services to help States evaluate their nuclear security regimes. It conducted such missions with a focus on national nuclear security regimes, including practical security measures for nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities. In 2018, the Agency carried out several expert missions and workshops to provide guidance to States on drafting regulating principles, reviewing regulatory frameworks and finalizing nuclear security regulations and associated administrative measures.
38 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
Meanwhile, the IAEA carried out four missions of its International Physical Protection Advisory Service, bringing the total number of missions since 1996 to 85. The Agency also completed revisions of guidelines aimed at improving assistance to States through this advisory instrument.
Coordinated Research Projects The Agency continued to coordinate with educational, research and development institutions to implement Coordinated Research Projects focused on various scientific and technical areas of nuclear security, including the establishment and sustainability of national nuclear security regimes. In 2018, the IAEA launched two new projects, one on applying nuclear forensic science to respond to a nuclear security event and the other on improving preventive and protective measures against insider threats. In addition, the Agency circulated to member States the report and findings of a separate project focused on the development of nuclear security culture enhancement solutions.
International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material Also in 2018, the Agency organized the “International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material: The Way Forward for Prevention and Detection” from 3 to 7 December in Vienna. The objective of that meeting was to foster the exchange of practices related to security and regulatory control over use, transport and storage of radioactive material, as well as of measures for detecting radioactive material out of regulatory control. The Conference drew 550 participants from 100 States and 15 international organizations.
Risk reduction The IAEA continued to advise States on formal threat characterization and assessment; the development, use and maintenance of design-basis threats; the conduct and evaluation of exercises; methodologies for accounting and control of nuclear material for security purposes; and the evaluation and inspection of physical protection systems. The Agency also continued its assistance throughout 2018 in securing vulnerable radioactive sources and upgrading facilities.
Export controls Missile Technology Control Regime The Missile Technology Control Regime did not hold a plenary meeting in 2018 as no member was elected to serve as Chair for the 2018–2019 period.87 Instead, a Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting was held in Paris in December.
87 New Zealand was elected to serve as Chair for the 2019–2020 period.
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Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation The subscribing States of The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation held their seventeenth annual regular meeting in Vienna on 28 and 29 May.88 Delegations from 72 States were present. Participants reaffirmed the importance of the Code as a unique confidence-building and transparency instrument against ballistic-missile proliferation. Poland, as outgoing Chair, outlined efforts made during the past year to enhance the universalization of the Code and its implementation by subscribing States as well as to raise awareness of the Code. Sweden, in its capacity as Chair for the period 2018–2019, introduced its priorities: (a) fully implementing the Code in all its aspects and (b) promoting support for the resolution on the Code to be adopted at the seventy-third session of the General Assembly. Subscribing States emphasized the importance of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. States also stressed the importance of encouraging new subscriptions to the Code, especially by States with capabilities related to space-launch vehicles and ballistic missiles. States welcomed the subscription of Lesotho to the Code in 2017 as a good example for the process of universalization. Subscribing States reaffirmed the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Participants noted the developments related to the ballistic- missile programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since the 2017 annual regular meeting and were encouraged by the country’s statement announcing the suspension of ballistic-missile launches. Subscribing States further reaffirmed the right to the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, as provided for in the Outer Space Treaty. Participants emphasized the need to exercise necessary vigilance in considering assistance to programmes related to space launch vehicles so as not to contribute to, support or assist any ballistic-missile programme of a State in contravention of international norms and obligations. Subscribing States agreed to continue promoting universalization of the Code, including through a resolution to be adopted at the seventy-third session of the General Assembly First Committee. With regard to implementation, subscribing States stressed the importance of pre-launch notifications and the timely submission of annual declarations, and they declared their intention to encourage and achieve improved performance in those areas.
88 Hague Code of Conduct subscribing States, press release on the seventeenth regular meeting of the subscribing States to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Vienna, 29 May 2018.
40 Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
Nuclear Suppliers Group The Nuclear Suppliers Group89 held its twenty-eighth plenary in Jūrmala on 14 and 15 June, chaired by Jānis Zlamets (Latvia). The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Edgars Rinkēvičs, delivered welcoming remarks. In a public statement90 on the plenary meeting, the Group reiterated its firm support for the full, complete and effective implementation ofthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. During the plenary, the Group noted developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since its 2017 plenary and reconfirmed its commitment to Security Council resolutions 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), as well as previous relevant resolutions of the Council. The Group also noted that the supply of all controlled items to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was prohibited according to these resolutions. The Group took note of the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and reconfirmed its commitment to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Since its prior plenary meeting, the Group continued to receive briefings from the coordinator of the Procurement Working Group, established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, regarding the work related to the procurement channel—the mechanism through which Member States and international organizations participate in the supply, sale or transfer of nuclear, ballistic-missile or arms-related dual-use equipment and material to, or activities with, the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Group expressed interest in receiving further such briefings. Also at the plenary meeting, members of the Group exchanged views and agreed on several proposals to clarify and update its control list and guidelines. The Group further emphasized the importance of updating its guidelines to keep pace with technical developments in nuclear-related industries. In addition, the Group exchanged views on national practices for raising awareness, interacting with industry and engaging with academic and research institutions. In that regard, the Group held discussions both at its plenary meeting and at an informal meeting in November that addressed technical,
89 Currently, the participating Governments of the Group are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The European Commission and the Chair of the Zangger Committee participate as permanent observers. 90 Nuclear Suppliers Group, public statement of the 2018 plenary meeting of the Group, Jūrmala, Latvia, 15 June 2018.
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legal and political aspects of participation in the Group by States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, members of the Group continued to consider all aspects of the Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation of 2008 with India and discussed their relationship with that State. The Group decided that Latvia would chair the Group for the 2018–2019 biennium.
Political declarations and other initiatives Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament At the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Kono, presented the Chair of the Committee with recommendations developed by the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament. The Group, comprising Japanese nationals and international members from nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear- weapon States, was established in 2017 to recommend ways to rebuild trust among States with different approaches to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The Group recommended measures to enhance the implementation of the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as to build confidence and prepare for the convergence of different approaches.91
91 Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, Building Bridges to Effective Nuclear Disarmament: Recommendations for the 2020 Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018).
42 chapter Biological and II chemical weapons Participants at the fourth regional basic training course on assistance and protection against chemical weapons in Tunis, held from 11 to 16 November 2018.
Photo: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons C h a p t e r I I
Biological and chemical weapons
I am outraged by the continued reports of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I reiterate my strong condemnation of the use of chemical weapons by any party to the conflict and under any circumstances. Their use is abhorrent and a clear violation of international law.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Developments and trends, 2018
Sadly, allegations of the use of chemical weapons continued throughout 2018, capturing worldwide attention. Progress in that area included ongoing activities to complete the destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), as well as efforts to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in that country. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support the Secretary-General’s good offices in furthering the implementation of the resolution. The States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention)2 took various steps in 2018 to advance the Convention’s implementation. In a decision3 adopted in June during its fourth special session, the Conference of the States Parties called on the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to put in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. During the fourth Review Conference4 of the Convention in November, the States parties reviewed the past activities of OPCW and future priorities. Other achievements during the year included destruction of the remaining chemical weapons production facilities in Iraq and the two remaining above-ground facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic. Furthermore,
1 Remarks to the Security Council, New York, 13 April 2018. 2 The text and adherence status of the Convention are available at http://disarmament. un.org/treaties/t/cwc. 3 OPCW, document C-SS-4/DEC.3. 4 The Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is also known as the Fourth Review Conference.
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OPCW continued activities in the Syrian Arab Republic both to clarify elements of the Government’s initial declaration through engagement with the Syrian authorities and to establish the facts surrounding allegations of chemical weapons use in the country. Separately, the Technical Secretariat of OPCW continued to strengthen its efforts and build capacities, both internally and in member States, for preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons. It also worked to further enhance cooperation with key stakeholders on promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry; advance scientific and technological cooperation; counter threats posed by non-State actors; and expand partnerships with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the chemical industry and other entities. OPCW continued to pursue universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention, urging the remaining four States not party5 to join without delay or preconditions. The State of Palestine deposited its instrument of accession with the Secretary-General on 17 May and became the 193rd State party on 16 June.6 Meanwhile, in May, the Secretary-General committed in his Agenda for Disarmament, Securing our Common Future, to taking three actions7 aimed at ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons. In 2018, the State of Palestine and Niue acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention)8 on 9 January and 14 June, respectively, and the Central African Republic ratified the Convention on 25 September, becoming the 182nd State party. As at 31 December, five signatory States9 had not yet ratified the Convention, and 10 10States had neither signed nor ratified it. No incidents concerning the potential use of biological weapons were reported in 2018. Meanwhile, States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention held five intersessional Meetings of Experts in August and a Meeting of States
5 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan. 6 The Convention entered into force on the thirtieth day after the State of Palestine submitted its instrument of accession, per article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Convention. 7 The three actions are as follows: Action 9—Restore respect for the global norm against chemical weapons; Action 10—Readiness to investigate alleged use of biological weapons; and Action 11—Develop framework to respond to any use of biological weapons. 8 The text and adherence status of the Convention are available at http://disarmament. un.org/treaties/t/bwc. 9 Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania. 10 Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia (Federated States of), Namibia, South Sudan and Tuvalu.
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Parties in December as part of a previously adopted intersessional programme for the years 2018 to 2020.11
Chemical weapons Fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties Following the non-renewal in November 2017 of the mandate of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism established by the Security Council to identify the perpetrators of the chemical-weapon attacks confirmed by a separate fact-finding mission, a group of States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention requested the Director-General of OPCW to convene a special session of the Conference of the States Parties. Their stated objective was to secure a decision providing OPCW with the authority to attribute responsibility for the use of chemical weapons, with an emphasis on the Syrian Arab Republic. The convening of a special session was strongly opposed by some States parties that considered that the Conference would serve to undermine the foundations and legitimacy of OPCW and the Convention. The fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention12 was held in The Hague on 26 and 27 June. After extensive discussions, the Conference adopted by vote a decision entitled “Addressing the Threat of Chemical Weapons Use”13 by which it called on
11 At the 2017 Meeting of States Parties, participants reached consensus on an intersessional programme for the period 2018–2020, allocating eight days each year to holding five Meetings of Experts and four days each year to an annual Meeting of States Parties, where participants would consider the reports of the five meetings. Each meeting in the intersessional programme was to be presided over by a different regionally nominated Chair, breaking from the previous intersessional practice of designating one Chair for all meetings of the Convention in a year. 12 OPCW, “Report of the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties”, document C‑SS‑4/3. 13 Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 was adopted with 82 votes in favour (Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Vanuatu) and 24 against (Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Eritrea, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam).
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the OPCW Technical Secretariat to, inter alia, put in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. It also enabled the OPCW Director-General to provide technical expertise, if requested, to a State party investigating possible chemical weapons use on its territory. Some States parties rejected the legitimacy of the decision and expressed the view that the Conference had gone beyond the scope of its mandate in granting additional authority to OPCW. Pursuant to the decision, the Technical Secretariat presented to the twenty-third session of the Conference of the States Parties elements related to how it could establish the capability to provide such expertise.
Twenty-third session of the Conference of the States Parties The twenty-third session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention14 took place in The Hague on 19, 20 and 30 November. It was attended by representatives of 160 States parties; a signatory State; a non-signatory State; and six international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies. A record number of 75 civil society organizations, represented by 210 individuals, received approval to participate in the Conference and the fourth Review Conference (see the following section for more information about the Review Conference). The Conference of the States Parties reviewed the status of Convention’s implementation in all programme areas, including disarmament, assistance and protection, international cooperation and efforts for the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Delegates also received a briefing on the ongoing progress made over the past year in destruction activities by the United States. The Conference considered and approved by vote the 2019 programme and budget, which included funding for the decision adopted during the above-mentioned fourth special session. It also adopted decisions to create two special funds, respectively for (a) cybersecurity, business continuity and physical infrastructure security and (b) information technology infrastructure to support the implementation of the decision adopted by the fourth special session. The Conference also considered efforts to foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities, the further deepening of engagement with the chemical industry and the scientific community, the annual report by the Director-General on the implementation of the action plan on universality, the OPCW Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa and the activities of the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach.
14 OPCW, “Report of the twenty-third session of the Conference of the States Parties, 19, 20 and 29 November 2018”, document C-23/5.
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Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention The fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (fourth Review Conference) was held from 21 to 30 November in The Hague. Its attendees comprised representatives of 150 States parties;15 a signatory State;16 a non-signatory State;17 seven international organizations, specialized agencies and other international bodies;18 the chemical industry; and the scientific community. A record number of 57 civil society organizations, represented by 120 individuals, participated. Additionally, the Secretary-General offered a message that was delivered by Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. The Open-Ended Working Group on the Future Priorities of the OPCW, established in June 2016, concluded its work in July 2018 by submitting a co-chair’s report19 with recommendations for consideration by the fourth Review Conference. Building further on the discussions, the Open-Ended Working Group for the Preparation of the Fourth Review Conference met at regular intervals from January to October and, in the final two months,
15 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 16 Israel. 17 South Sudan. 18 Caribbean Community, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, World Customs Organization and World Health Organization. 19 OPCW, “Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on Future Priorities of the OPCW recommendations to the fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, document RC-4/WP.1.
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reviewed all aspects of Convention’s operation and prepared a draft report20 for consideration by the Review Conference. As requested by the Convention, the fourth Review Conference undertook reviews of the implementation of all articles of the Convention. With its participants unable to reach consensus on an outcome document, the Chair issued a report21 under his sole authority and responsibility containing his assessment of a convergence of views among States parties on recommendations to, inter alia, enhance the OPCW verification system, augment capacity development programmes and strengthen organizational governance. The report also mentioned issues on which no agreement was reached. Also during the fourth Review Conference, States parties marked the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare on 30 November.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons On 25 July, Fernando Arias (Spain) succeeded Ahmet Üzümcü (Turkey) as OPCW Director-General. As at the end of the year, 96.64 per cent (68,126 tons) of the total amount of Category 1 chemical weapons declared by member States had been destroyed. The destruction of all Category 1 chemical-weapon stockpiles declared by “a State Party, Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic” had been completed previously.22 The aggregate amount of Category 2 chemical weapons destroyed stood at 1,811 tons, or 100 per cent of the total amount declared. Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States had completed the destruction of all declared Category 2 chemical weapons. The United States continued to make progress in its efforts to destroy all of its declared chemical weapons. As at 31 December, the country had eliminated 91.47 per cent of its Category 1 and all its Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons. China and Japan continued to work together on the recovery of abandoned chemical weapons and destruction operations in China. At the twenty-seventh Trilateral Meeting, held in Beijing from 31 January to 1 February, China, Japan and the Technical Secretariat discussed practical and technical issues regarding abandoned-chemical-weapons destruction projects.
20 OPCW, “Report of the Chairperson of the Working Group for the preparation of the fourth Review Conference”, document RGRC-4/1. 21 OPCW, “Chairperson’s report of the proceedings of the fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention”, document RC-4/3/Rev.1. 22 OPCW, “Opening statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its twenty-second session”, document C-22/DG.20, para. 50.
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In 2018, Iraq completed the destruction of its remaining declared chemical weapons production facilities, a milestone that the Technical Secretariat verified in February. As at 31 December, OPCW had conducted over 3,800 Article VI inspections in more than 80 countries. In 2018, the OPCW Laboratory provided training to representatives of 16 States parties in its current facility. In addition, OPCW achieved progress in a project to upgrade its laboratory and equipment store into a new Centre for Chemistry and Technology, further extending its training and technological capabilities. In line with a needs statement23 issued by the Technical Secretariat in 2017 to member States, the Organisation made progress over 2018 in securing contributions for the realization of that project from Belgium, Canada, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Poland and the Republic of Korea. In Serbia, the Technical Secretariat conducted a refresher workshop from 5 to 9 February for a Rapid Response and Assistance Mission. The workshop was followed by a contingency field operation exercise that it carried out from 18 to 22 June in Kruševac, Serbia, with a focus on reconnaissance and sampling. Separately, OPCW inspectors contributed to the exercise “Balkan Response”, held in Kruševac from 21 to 25 May, and to “Exercise Precise Response”, completed in Canada from 9 to 27 July. Cooperation with the chemical industry continued to expand in 2018. The International Council of Chemical Associations presented its views on the review of the Convention to the Open-Ended Working Group for the Preparation of the Fourth Review Conference and submitted a position paper24 to the fourth Review Conference. In addition, the Chemical Industry Coordination Group and the Joint Steering Committee of OPCW and the International Council continued to hold meetings to further discuss issues such as verification, chemical security, cooperation in outreach and public information initiatives, and efforts to further increase cross-participation in events of OPCW and the International Council. The OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach participated in the preparatory process for the fourth Review Conference, where a representative of the Board delivered a statement.25 Building on its 2017 report, the Board published a brochure containing strategies and practical recommendations for effective education and outreach activities for State parties in support of the Convention’s implementation.
23 OPCW, “Needs statement for upgrading the OCPW Chemical Laboratory to a Centre for Chemistry and Technology”, document S/1564/2017. 24 International Council of Chemical Associations, “ICCA position paper for the Fourth Review Conference”, 24 July 2018. 25 Alastair Hay, member of the OPCW Advisory Board on Education and Outreach, statement to the fourth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (RC-4/ WP.12), The Hague, 23 November 2018.
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Use of chemical weapons in the United Kingdom On 12 March, the United Kingdom alleged that a nerve agent had been used in Salisbury on 4 March during an attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer, and his daughter, Yulia. One police officer who responded to the incident was also hospitalized. In addition to its own criminal investigation, the United Kingdom made a request under article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention for technical assistance from OPCW. In response, a team from the OPCW Technical Secretariat carried out a technical assistance visit to the United Kingdom from 21 to 23 March. The findings of that visit confirmed the conclusions of the Government relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury. OPCW conducted a second technical assistance visit from 15 to 18 July, following a request made by the United Kingdom on 13 July regarding a toxic-chemical incident in Amesbury on 30 June, where two citizens of the United Kingdom were admitted to the hospital and were found to have been poisoned by a nerve agent. That visit also resulted in a confirmation of the Government’s conclusions concerning the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Amesbury. As a result of those two incidents, three States parties submitted a proposal26 in October to modify Schedule 1 of the Convention’s annex on chemicals, followed by an additional proposal by one State party in November.27 The OPCW Executive Council was expected to consider those requests separately in 2019. In response to those incidents, the United Nations Secretary-General expressed his deep concern over the reported use of a nerve agent in the United Kingdom to harm or kill people. He also reiterated that the use of nerve agents as a weapon under any circumstances was unacceptable and its use by a State would constitute a serious violation under international law.
National implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and promoting international cooperation Meanwhile, the Technical Secretariat continued to assist States parties towards achieving full and effective implementation of the Convention in the
26 On 16 October, Canada, the Netherlands and the United States submitted to OPCW a “Joint Proposal by for a Technical Change to Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals to the Chemical Weapons Convention”. For more information, see OPCW, “Report of the sixty- second meeting of the Executive Council”, document EC-M-62/2. 27 On 30 November, the Russian Federation submitted to OPCW “Proposals to introduce additions to the schedules of chemicals of the annex on chemicals to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. For more information, see OPCW, “The sixty-third meeting of the Executive Council: Documents”.
52 Biological and chemical weapons areas of national implementation, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and promoting international cooperation. In 2018, the Technical Secretariat conducted over 96 training courses, workshops, seminars and other capacity-building programmes, benefiting 2,016 participants. In the field of assistance and protection, OPCW addressed the medical aspects of chemical emergency response under article X through the newly launched capacity-development programme that aimed to train medical professionals to care for individuals exposed to chemical warfare agents or toxic chemicals. In addition, the Technical Secretariat convened at OPCW headquarters on 28 and 29 June a symposium on medical treatment of chemical weapons victims, the first event of its kind. To help promote the peaceful uses of chemistry, OPCW held the third Symposium on Women in Chemistry on 24 June with the theme of strengthening the role of women in that area. The event provided a platform for member States to discuss and highlight women’s contributions in the implementation of the Convention, including in chemical safety and security management. On 26 October, the Technical Secretariat hosted a conference to address the potential contribution of the OPCW capacity-building programme towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Mission to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons programme The OPCW mission to verifiably eliminate the Syrian Arab Republic’s declared chemical weapons programme continued in 2018. The two remaining above-ground chemical weapons production facilities were verified as destroyed, and the continuous monitoring systems installed in former underground production facilities were operating normally following maintenance. As part of the yearly agreed verification activities, the Technical Secretariat visited the five destroyed underground structures in November and verified the integrity of installed interior plugs. Meanwhile, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continued to gather all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2018, the Technical Secretariat issued three mission reports. The first determined that chlorine was likely used asa chemical weapon in Saraqib on 4 February 2018.28 The second determined that sarin was very likely used as a chemical weapon in Ltamenah on 24 March 2017 and that chlorine was very likely used as a chemical weapon in Ltamenah on 25 March 2017.29 The third concluded that the Fact-Finding Mission could not confidently determine whether or not a specific chemical was used as a weapon in the incidents in the neighbourhood of Al-Hamadaniyah on 30 October 2016 and in the area of Karm al-Tarrab on 13 November 2016.30
28 OPCW, document S/1626/2018. 29 OPCW, document S/1636/2018. 30 OPCW, document S/1642/2018.
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On 6 July 2018, the Technical Secretariat issued an interim report31 regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma on 7 April 2018. In addition, the Technical Secretariat undertook two rounds of inspections in 2018 at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in the Syrian Arab Republic pursuant to the Executive Council decision of 11 November 2016. The Technical Secretariat also continued working with the Syrian Arab Republic through its Declaration Assessment Team to ensure that all declaration-related requirements had been met in accordance with the Convention and the decisions adopted by the OPCW Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat’s analysis of the documents submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in November 2017 was reported in March 2018 to the eighty- seventh session of the Executive Council. Throughout 2018, the Syrian Arab Republic remained engaged with the Declaration Assessment Team through the exchange of correspondence; the information provided was solely related to the outstanding issue of the declaration of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre.
Science and technology–related activities The Technical Secretariat continued its engagement with the global scientific community throughout the year, both to augment its ability to monitor developments in science and technology and also to strengthen its ties with scientists and scientific societies. In March, the Scientific Advisory Board met for its twenty-seventh session, during which it reviewed and finalized its report on developments in science and technology to the fourth Review Conference.32 The Board also initiated a new Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology, which was expected to conduct an in-depth review of the methods and technologies applicable to the Technical Secretariat’s investigative work. An update on the Temporary Working Group’s progress was presented to States parties on the margins of the fourth Review Conference. In response to the findings of OPCW during its technical assistance visit to the United Kingdom in March,33 the Director-General tasked the Scientific Advisory Board with providing advice on toxic chemicals that had been
31 OPCW, document S/1645/2018. 32 OPCW, document RC-4/DG.1. See also a brochure that contains only the executive summary: OPCW, “Scientific Advisory Board’s recommendations to the fourth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention”. 33 OPCW, “Summary of the report on activities carried out in support of a request for technical assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical Assistance Visit TAV/02/18)”, document S/1612/2018.
54 Biological and chemical weapons identified as, or were suspected of being, new types of nerve34 agents. The Board delivered a report and briefed States parties on the matter in July.35
Biological weapons Meetings of Experts to the Biological Weapons Convention The five Meetings of Experts, which took place back-to-back, respectively addressed the following topics: cooperation and assistance, with a particular focus on strengthening cooperation and assistance under article X (7 and 8 August); review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the Convention (9 and 10 August); strengthening national implementation (13 August); assistance, response and preparedness (14 and 15 August); and institutional strengthening of the Convention (16 August). Owing to the technical nature of those meetings and the limited time available to address all their subtopics, none had any general debate. At each Meeting, States parties adopted a concise procedural report36 that included, as an annex, a Chair’s summary of considerations, lessons, perspectives, recommendations, conclusions and proposals drawn from the presentations, statements, working papers and interventions. The Chairs produced those summary reports under their responsibility and initiative, in consultation with States parties. At each Meeting of Experts, the Chair closed by expressing satisfaction with the substantive discussions and the high number of concrete proposals presented. The Chair of the 2018 Meeting of States Parties, Ljupčo Jivan Gjorgjinski (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), also highlighted the importance of the six meetings held in the framework of the Convention in 2018: “This is the first and therefore critical year of our work programme. The quality of the discussions that took place this year will set the standard for forthcoming Meetings of Experts in 2019 and 2020. We all six Chairs worked in a concerted and consistent manner to ensure a common strong message.”
Meeting of Experts on Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X The Meeting of Experts on Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X37 took place on 7 and 8 August in Geneva and was the first meeting of the 2018–2020
34 OPCW, “Request for information from States parties on new types of nerve agents”, document S/1621/2018. 35 OPCW, “Response to the Director-General’s request to the Scientific Advisory Board to provide advice on new types of nerve agents”, document SAB-28/WP.1. 36 BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/3, BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/3, BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/3, BWC/MSP/ 2018/MX.4/3 and BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/3. 37 Under article X of the Convention, States parties undertake to facilitate and promote the peaceful uses of biology.
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intersessional process. The Meeting was chaired by Maria Teresa Almojuela (Philippines), who was nominated by the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Meeting included representatives from 95 States parties,38 two signatory States39 and one State not party40 to the Convention. The national delegations were joined by officials from four United Nations entities,41 nine specialized agencies or other international organizations,42 two guest organizations43 and 26 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.44 In its working sessions, the Meeting considered the following topics: • Consideration of the reports45 of the States parties on their full and comprehensive implementation of all provisions of article X • Review of the report46 by the Implementation Support Unit on the operation of the assistance and cooperation database established by the seventh Review Conference and renewed by the eighth Review Conference and consideration of its further operationalization, including
38 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. 39 Haiti and the United Republic of Tanzania. 40 Israel. 41 Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 42 Caribbean Community, European Union, International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, ICRC, INTERPOL, International Science and Technology Center, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, South Centre, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health. 43 At the invitation of the Chair, in recognition of the special nature of the topics under consideration at the meeting and without the intention of establishing a precedent, two organizations participated in informal exchanges in the open sessions as guests of the Meeting of Experts: the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and the Stimson Center. 44 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/INF.1. 45 United Nations Office at Geneva,2018 “ BWC Meeting of Experts on Cooperation and Assistance, with a Particular Focus on Strengthening Cooperation and Assistance under Article X” (Official documents). 46 BWC/MSP/2018/MX.1/2.
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measures to further strengthen the operation of the database, including in the light of BWC/MSP/2017/4 • Identification of challenges and obstacles to developing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in the biological sciences and technology, including equipment and material, for peaceful purposes to their full potential, and possible ways and means of overcoming them • Development of guidelines and procedures for mobilizing resources, including financial resources, on a voluntary basis to address gaps and needs • Facilitation of education, training, exchange and twinning programs and other means of developing human resources in biological sciences and technology related to implementation of the Convention, particularly in developing countries • Promotion of capacity-building, through international cooperation, in biosafety and biosecurity and for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological weapons attacks, including in the areas of preparedness, response and crisis management and mitigation • Collaboration with international organizations and networks related to combating infectious diseases at all levels, as well as regional and subregional cooperation to promote implementation of all articles of the Convention. During the Meeting, States parties emphasized the importance and usefulness of Government reports on the implementation of all cooperation and assistance provisions of article X, and they discussed options to improve voluntary reporting. Participants also discussed measures to strengthen the operationalization of the assistance and cooperation database and to further enhance its functionality, visibility and effectiveness. In discussing obstacles to international cooperation, assistance and exchange, States parties exchanged views on the need to bridge gaps between developed and developing countries in biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. States parties also explored new approaches and instruments for effectively and sustainably addressing cooperation and assistance needs under article X through resource mobilization guidelines. In addition, participants considered existing international and regional platforms for education, training, exchange and twinning programmes in the biological sciences, noting numerous university-based programmes and technology exchanges involving scientists and academics between and among developing and developed States. The States additionally underscored the importance of promoting South-South cooperation in the field of capacity-building for detecting, reporting and responding to outbreaks of infectious disease or biological-weapon attacks, encouraging further measures to facilitate such initiatives. States parties
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also acknowledged the merit in continued coordination and cooperation with international and regional organizations that were playing important roles in disease surveillance, prevention, detection and response.
Meeting of Experts on Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention The Meeting of Experts on Review of Developments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to the Convention took place on 9 and 10 August in Geneva. It was chaired by Pedro Luiz Dalcero (Brazil), who had been nominated by the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and Other States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. The Meeting included representatives from 96 States parties,47 two signatory States48 and one State not party.49 The national delegations were joined by two guests of the Meeting of Experts50 and officials from four United Nations entities,51 eight specialized agencies or other international organizations52 and 26 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.53 In its working sessions, the Meeting considered the following topics: • Review of science and technology developments relevant to the Convention, including for the enhanced implementation of all articles
47 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. 48 Haiti and United Republic of Tanzania. 49 Israel. 50 At the invitation of the Chair, in recognition of the special nature of the topics under consideration at the meeting and without the intention of establishing a precedent, representatives of two organizations participated in informal exchanges in the open sessions as guests of the Meeting of Experts: Professor Michael Imperiale, University of Michigan, and Professor Weiwen Zhang, Tianjin University. 51 Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 52 Caribbean Community, European Union, International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, ICRC, International Science and Technology Center, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, South Centre, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health. 53 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/MX.2/INF.1.
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of the Convention, as well as the identification of potential benefits and risks of new science and technology developments relevant to the Convention, with a particular attention to positive implications • Biological risk assessment and management • Development of a voluntary model code of conduct for biological scientists and all relevant personnel, and biosecurity education, by drawing on the work already done on that issue in the context of the Convention, adaptable to national requirements • Genome editing, taking into consideration, as appropriate, the issues identified above • Any other science and technology developments of relevance to the Convention and also to the activities of relevant multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the OPCW. Participants reviewed technologies such as genome editing, metabolic pathway engineering, gene drives and gene synthesis. It was noted in the discussions that although scientific and technological advances were transforming the world and could bring many benefits, emerging dual-use technologies raised concerns about potential malicious applications prohibited by the Convention. In assessing prospects for the malicious use of a biotechnology, States parties considered factors including its nature and capability, its potential for weaponization and its scope of possible damage or impact. However, the discussion also touched on a need to weigh such considerations against mitigating factors, which could include capabilities for preventing misuse and for recognizing a biological attack should one take place. In considering codes of conduct for the biological sciences, many States parties noted that such voluntary codes can raise awareness among scientists about the risks of misuse. Meanwhile, they acknowledged the challenge of balancing scientific freedom against the potential for research outcomes to be harnessed for malicious purposes in war or by non-State actors.
Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation The Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation took place on 13 August in Geneva. It was chaired by Julio Herráiz España (Spain), who was nominated by the Western Group. The Meeting included
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representatives from 100 States parties,54 two signatory States55 and one State not party.56 The national delegations were joined by officials from four United Nations entities,57 five specialized agencies or other international organizations58 and 26 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.59 In its working sessions, the Meeting considered the following topics: • Measures related to article IV of the Convention • Submissions of confidence-building measures in terms of quantity and quality • Various ways to promote transparency and confidence-building under the Convention • The role of international cooperation and assistance under article X, in support of strengthening the implementation of the Convention • Issues related to article III, including effective measures of export control, in full conformity with all articles of the Convention, including article X. States parties shared their views on measures related to article IV of the Convention and noted the importance of implementing effective national biosecurity regimes, including biosecurity cultures, to address those risks. Participants considered the importance of confidence-building measures as tools for enhancing transparency and building confidence between States parties, and they put forward concrete proposals to enhance the utility and use
54 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. 55 Haiti and United Republic of Tanzania. 56 Israel. 57 Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 58 European Union, ICRC, International Science and Technology Center, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health. 59 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/INF.1.
60 Biological and chemical weapons of such measures. Furthermore, States parties informed the Meeting of Experts about various voluntary ways to improve transparency and build confidence in the implementation of the Convention in the absence of a compliance mechanism, such as peer reviews, voluntary visits and transparency exercises. States parties also discussed issues related to article III, exchanged views regarding its implementation and shared proposals to strengthen effective export control measures.
Meeting of Experts on Assistance, Response and Preparedness The Meeting of Experts on Assistance, Response and Preparedness took place on 14 and 15 August in Geneva. It was chaired by Daniel Nord (Sweden), who was nominated by the Western Group. The Meeting included representatives from 100 States parties,60 two signatory States61 and one State not party.62 The national delegations were joined by officials from three United Nations entities,63 seven specialized agencies or other international organizations64 and 26 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.65 In its working sessions, the Meeting considered the following topics: • Practical challenges facing the implementation of article VII and possible solutions • A set of guidelines and formats to assist a State party, if required, when submitting an application for assistance in the framework of article VII • Procedures, including the establishment and use of the assistance database, to improve the prompt and efficient response without preconditions to a request of assistance by a State party under article VII,
60 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. 61 Haiti and United Republic of Tanzania. 62 Israel. 63 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 64 European Union, ICRC, INTERPOL, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health. 65 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/MX.4/INF.1.
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and coordination and cooperation among States parties and with relevant international and regional organizations such as the World Health Organization, the World Organisation for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, as appropriate • Examination of how the concept of mobile biomedical units might contribute to effective assistance, response and preparation, with a view to enhancing implementation of the Convention • Exploration of approaches by which States parties, individually or collectively, might contribute to the strengthening of international response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate in origin • Exploration of means to prepare for, respond to and render assistance in case of the possible hostile use of biological agents and toxins against agriculture, livestock and the natural environment. While discussing the practical challenges facing the implementation of article VII and possible solutions, States parties noted the lack of institutional and operational structures and considered the advantages and inconvenience of using existing mechanisms and resources to create a mechanism in accordance with the Convention’s provision. Furthermore, discussions on the guidelines and formats for an assistance request under article VII featured prominently during the Meeting and received considerable attention by many States parties. Another widely discussed issue was the development of an article VII assistance database to support implementation of article VII by matching offers and requests for assistance. States parties considered a proposal on mobile biomedical units, which could be deployed under the aegis of articles VI, VII and X. States parties also explored approaches to strengthening international response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate in origin. Finally, while exploring means to prepare for, respond to and render assistance in case of possible hostile use of biological agents and toxins against agriculture, livestock or the natural environment, States parties highlighted the severity of the economic and human consequences that such an attack could cause.
Meeting of Experts on Institutional Strengthening of the Convention The Meeting of Experts on Institutional Strengthening of the Convention took place on 16 August in Geneva. It was chaired by Otakar Gorgol (Czechia), who was nominated by the Eastern European Group. The Meeting included
62 Biological and chemical weapons representatives from 100 States parties,66 two signatory States67 and one State not party.68 The national delegations were joined by three United Nations entities,69 five specialized agencies or other international organizations70 and 26 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.71 The Meeting devoted working sessions to the consideration of the full range of approaches and options to further strengthen the Convention and its functioning through possible additional legal measures or other measures in the framework of the Convention. States parties expressed strong support for strengthening the Convention and making progress in the framework of the Meeting of Experts, and they highlighted that the agreement provided the only forums for addressing the threats posed by biological weapons in a holistic manner. In that context, participants discussed approaches to strengthening the Convention, the importance of its universalization, challenges it faced, additional legally binding measures in the framework of the Convention, verification, the strengthening of the Implementation Support Unit and the Convention’s financial stability and sustainability.
Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention The 2018 Meeting of States Parties took place in Geneva from 4 to 8 December, although there were no formal sessions on 6 December after a funding shortage forced the Meeting to be shortened from four days to three. During the Meeting, participants reached agreement on measures to address structural and financial issues. The Meeting was chaired by Ljupčo Jivan Gjorgjinski (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) from the Eastern European Group, and
66 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen and Zimbabwe. 67 Haiti and the United Republic of Tanzania. 68 Israel. 69 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 70 European Union, ICRC, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health. 71 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/INF.1.
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included representatives from 116 States parties,72 four signatory States73 and two States not party.74 The national delegations were joined by officials from three United Nations entities,75 10 specialized agencies or other international organizations76 and 37 non-governmental organizations and research institutes.77 The 2018 Meeting of States Parties was mandated to consider the factual reports of the Meetings of Experts, a report78 from the Chair on universalization activities and the annual report79 of the Implementation Support Unit. It was also responsible for managing the intersessional programme, including taking necessary measures with respect to budgetary and financial matters, by consensus, with a view to ensuring the proper implementation of the intersessional programme. The Meeting of States Parties also approved the office-holders and the dates for the Convention meetings in 2019. From 4 to 7 December, the Meeting of States Parties devoted sessions to each of the items on its agenda.80 The Meeting opened with a statement from the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, delivered by Anja Kaspersen, Director of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. After adopting the
72 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 73 Egypt, Haiti, Syrian Arab Republic and United Republic of Tanzania. 74 Israel and South Sudan. 75 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 76 Caribbean Community Secretariat, European Union, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, ICRC, INTERPOL, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, World Organization for Animal Health and World Health Organization. 77 For the list of participants, see BWC/MSP/2018/INF.1. 78 BWC/MSP/2018/3/Rev.1. 79 BWC/MSP/2018/4. 80 BWC/MSP/2018/1.
64 Biological and chemical weapons agenda, programme of work81 and rules of procedure,82 the Meeting entered a general debate,83 during which 62 States parties,84 three signatory States,85 one observer State86 and three observer organizations87 participated. At an informal session that followed, the Meeting heard a joint statement88 endorsed by 15 non-governmental organizations and 27 individuals. On 7 December, a session was devoted to progress towards universalization of the Convention and the annual report of the Implementation Support Unit. As mandated by the 2017 Meeting of States Parties, the Chair prepared an information paper89 on measures to address the financial predictability and sustainability of the intersessional programme. Given the urgency of the financial situation, the Chair also prepared a non-paper90 containing elements of a decision on measures to address the financial predictability and sustainability of the Convention. Based on those documents, States parties considered the financial situation of the Convention and recognized that the Convention’s financial difficulties stemmed from three principal sources: non-payment of contributions by some States parties, delays in receipt of contributions from other States parties and financial requirements of the United Nations with respect to activities not funded from the United Nations regular budget. In order to address those issues, the 2018 Meeting of States Parties endorsed measures to encourage timely payment, ensure liquidity, avoid deficit spending and accumulation of liabilities, and report onand review these agreed procedures. In addition, the Chairs of each of the five Meetings of Experts orally introduced the reports of those Meetings and submitted their personal reflections and proposals91 for possible outcomes of the Meeting of States
81 BWC/MSP/2018/2/Rev.1. 82 BWC/CONF.VIII/2. 83 Statements are available from United Nations Office at Geneva, “2018 Meeting of States Parties” (Statements and presentations). 84 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). 85 Egypt, Haiti and United Republic of Tanzania. 86 South Sudan. 87 European Union, INTERPOL and Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). 88 United Nations Office at Geneva,Joint “ NGO Statement to Biological Weapons Convention”, 5 December 2018. 89 BWC/MSP/2018/5. 90 BWC/MSP/2018/CRP.1. 91 BWC/MSP/2018/CRP.2, BWC/MSP/2018/CRP.3, BWC/MSP/2018/CRP.4, BWC/MSP/ 2018/CRP.5 and BWC/MSP/2018/CRP.6.
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Parties. However, although decisions were reached on financial matters at the Meeting of States Parties, no consensus could be reached on the deliberations, including over possible outcomes of the Meetings of Experts.92 The Meeting of States Parties also considered progress towards universalization of the Convention and welcomed the increase in the number of ratifications of and accessions to the Convention. In that regard, States parties reaffirmed the particular importance of the universalization ofthe Convention, urging signatory States to ratify the agreement without delay and non-signatories to accede without delay. The Chair also introduced his report93 on progress towards universalization of the Convention. The report summarized universalization activities that had been undertaken and reported either to the Chair or the Implementation Support Unit in 2018. Universalization activities undertaken by the Chair, the Unit and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, with the support of the European Union, included the following: • A universalization mission and national workshop in Port-au-Prince from 21 to 23 March, co-organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Haiti, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Implementation Support Unit to promote the universalization of the Convention, under European Union Council decision 2016/51/CFSP in support of the Convention • A universalization workshop from 3 to 4 October, co-organized by the Intergovernmental Authority and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, for States not party to the Convention in the region of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, under European Union Council decision 2016/51/CFSP • A discussion, held in October on the margins of the General Assembly First Committee, between the Chair of the Meeting of States Parties and representatives of the following States not party to the Convention: Kiribati, Micronesia (Federated States of), Namibia, Tuvalu and United Republic of Tanzania • A universalization workshop, co-organized by the African Union and the Office for Disarmament Affairs in Addis Ababa on 11 and 12 December, for States not party in Africa, under European Union Council decision 2016/51/CFSP
92 Closing the Meeting of States Parties on 7 December, the Chair noted with satisfaction that “All delegations showed flexibility and dedication this week. We all worked hard together in order to address the difficult financial situation faced by the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention]. The financial measures endorsed by the States parties this week are a first step to ensure predictability and sustainability for the BWC and its [Implementation Support Unit].” He added, “These financial issues need to be further discussed at the forthcoming Review Conference, in order to secure a robust BWC regime.” 93 BWC/MSP/2018/3/Rev.1.
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• A regional workshop on universalization for the Pacific Region, held in Nadi, Fiji, on 12 and 13 December, co-organized by the Implementation Support Unit and Fiji, with the financial support of the Permanent Mission of Australia in Geneva. All three States in the Pacific region not party to the Convention (Kiribati, Micronesia (Federated States of) and Tuvalu) participated.
Work of the Implementation Support Unit At the Meeting of States Parties, the Chief of the Implementation Support Unit94 presented an annual report95 summarizing its support for the administration, national implementation and universalization of the Convention; confidence-building measures; maintenance of the database for assistance requests and offers; and the Convention sponsorship programme. The Unit’s role in the administration of the Convention included acting as the substantive secretariat of the Meetings of States Parties and the Meetings of Experts; developing and expanding its website; maintaining regular contact with relevant international organizations, as well as professional, commercial and academic institutions and associations; and organizing and participating in relevant workshops, seminars and meetings. Regarding national implementation, the Unit continued to collect and update details of national points of contact for the Convention. As at 31 December, 118 States parties had nominated a national point of contact. Two signatory States, three States not party and one regional organization had also provided points of contact.96 Contact information for those national points of contact was available in the restricted area of the Convention’s website. Furthermore, participation by the Unit in workshops and seminars continued to play a crucial role in raising awareness of the Convention and its implementation for national Governments and other relevant actors, including international and regional organizations, the scientific community, professional associations, academia and the private sector. The Unit co-hosted and otherwise supported the planning and organization of several meetings and events directly related to improving implementation of the Convention. In addition, it accepted invitations to participate in a range of meetings and events throughout the year. In the area of confidence-building measures under the Convention, the Unit maintained capabilities for the electronic submission of reports by States parties; compiled and distributed submissions; provided routine administrative
94 At the Convention’s sixth Review Conference in 2006, States parties decided to establish the Implementation Support Unit within the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs to provide, inter alia, support and assistance for administration, national implementation, confidence-building measures and obtaining universality. 95 BWC/MSP/2018/4. 96 BWC/MSP/2018/4/Amend.1, Annex II.
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assistance and advice; took part in or organized workshops on promoting confidence-building measures; and wrote to States parties, reminding them of the deadline for submission. Additionally, in its report97 to the Meeting of States Parties, it provided details on information previously submitted under the confidence-building measures. The Unit received 78 submissions of confidence-building measures in 2018, the second-highest rate of participation to date. Furthermore, the Unit developed an electronic platform98 for confidence- building measures in accordance with the request of the seventh Review Conference. The new platform, successfully tested in April, enabled the electronic submission of confidence-building measures in all six official United Nations languages and also provided States parties with search capabilities for all submitted data. The new tool was introduced at the Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation in August before becoming available in 2019 for use by States parties.
Participation in the Biological Weapons Convention confidence-building measures
90 82 78 78 80 71 72 72 68 69 70 66 65 65 63 58 60 51 52 52 50 46 43 43 42 42 41 41 39 40 40 38 47 40 35 44 42 42 44 43 42 40 41 42 29 37 39 38 30 21 19 29 30 30 17 20 26 25 24 23 22 24 24 23 24 24 22 19 17 10 14 12 11 0 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Number of con dence-building measures submitted Percentage of States parties submitting con dence-building measures
Meanwhile, the Unit supported the Chair of the 2018 Meeting of States Parties in his activities to promote universalization of the Convention, including by assisting him in corresponding with States not party and in preparing for and participating in meetings with representatives of such States. The Unit also supported States parties in promoting universalization, coordinating their activities and informing them of progress by States not party towards accession or ratification. Furthermore, the Unit promoted universalization during many of the seminars and events in which it
97 BWC/MSP/2018/4. 98 Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, “BWC Confidence-Building Measures Portal”. Available at http://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch.
68 Biological and chemical weapons participated, and it provided information and advice on the Convention to several signatory States and States not party.99 The Unit also continued to maintain and administer the cooperation and assistance database and facilitate contacts between States parties offering or requesting assistance. As at 31 December, the database contained 61 offers of assistance from 11 States parties and one group of States parties, as well as 48 requests for assistance from 14 States parties. While the offers of assistance were publicly available,100 the requests for assistance were available only to other States parties. The Unit also continued to administer the Convention’s sponsorship programme, which was designed to “support and increase the participation of developing States Parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme”. In 2018, voluntary contributions to the sponsorship programme were received from three States parties.101 In addition, other States parties supported the sponsorship programme through bilateral arrangements. As a result, experts from 16 States parties received support through the sponsorship programme to participate in the 2018 Meetings of Experts and experts from 13 States parties were sponsored for the Meeting of States Parties. In 2018, several States parties provided voluntary contributions through the Office for Disarmament Affairs for specific activities in support ofthe implementation of the Convention: • The Permanent Mission of Australia in Geneva provided a voluntary contribution of $A 50,000 to the Office to support a universalization workshop in the Pacific for the three remaining States not party in the region.102 The workshop, which took place in Fiji in December, was jointly organized by Australia, Fiji and the Implementation Support Unit. • Canada provided a voluntary contribution of US$ 665,000 to the Office for the second phase of a project on strengthening global mechanisms and capacities for responding to deliberate use of biological agents. A portion of the contribution was expected to be used in 2019 to support the Unit’s travel and to hire an administrative assistant to enhance the ability of the Unit to carry out its mandated tasks. • Germany provided a voluntary contribution of €35,000 to the Office to support a regional workshop on scientific and practical implementation issues for Central Asian States parties. The workshop, co-organized by Kazakhstan and the Unit, took place in Almaty on 23 and 24 October.
99 More detailed information on these universalization activities, and the results to date, can be found in the report of the Chairman on universalization activities (BWC/MSP/2018/3). 100 Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, “BWC Article X Assistance and Cooperation Database”. Available at https://bwc-articlex.unog.ch/. 101 Australia, Canada and Germany. 102 Kiribati, Micronesia (Federated States of) and Tuvalu.
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• Japan provided two voluntary contributions to the Office. The first, totalling $80,000, was for a planned 2019 training by the Unit on domestic implementation of the Convention for national points of contact from member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The second contribution, amounting to $819,250, was intended for improving the preparedness of the United Nations Secretariat and relevant international organizations to ensure a coordinated international response to the potential use of biological or chemical weapons. • Norway provided a voluntary contribution of NKr 365,000 for the Office to hold two workshops in Geneva, on 22 June and 23 November, respectively, to address article X of the Convention. During the Meeting of States Parties, Norway announced that it would further support the Convention from spring 2019 by funding a three-year project to support cooperation and assistance activities under article X. Meanwhile, the European Union continued to support the Convention through Council decision 2016/51/CFSP, of which the Office for Disarmament Affairs was the implementing agency. The Council decision—the fourth European Union instrument to support the Convention and the third to be implemented by the Office—involved a financial contribution to the Office of €2,340,000 over three years for activities in support of the Convention. Implementation of the project began in February 2016 and continued throughout 2018. Under the decision, numerous activities were undertaken, primarily in developing States parties, and two staff were employed within the Office’s Geneva Branch. With the Council decision expected to expire in early 2019, the Office began discussions with the European Union in 2018 about a potential follow-on decision.
Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Following the most recent activation of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons103 in 2013, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs began undertaking activities to identify and implement lessons learned from the 2013 experience in the Syrian Arab Republic104 as part of an overall effort to
103 The Mechanism’s mandate is derived from General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987. For further information, see Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons” (available at www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/secretary-general- mechanism/). 104 On 19 March 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic requested the Secretary-General to investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons on its territory, and other United Nations Member States subsequently requested the investigation of separate allegations of chemical- weapon use in the Syrian Arab Republic. Accordingly, the United Nations Mission to
70 Biological and chemical weapons ensure the Mechanism’s operational readiness. As at 31 December 2018, the Office’s roster for the Mechanism comprised 421 qualified experts, 32 expert consultants and 66 laboratories, nominated by Member States on a voluntary basis, whose services could be made available at short notice. In 2018, the Office continued working with Member States to design and deliver training for rostered experts, giving particular focus to potential allegations of biological-weapon use.105 Building on the lessons learned from 2013, the Office implemented during the year a training approach that emphasized the core competencies of an investigative team, giving equal weight to theory and practice.106 The Mechanism also continued to play a limited role with regard to chemical weapons, notwithstanding the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.107 In February, the United Kingdom held a training course on mission planning as well as command, control and communications at the Police National CBRN108 Centre in Ryton-on-Dunsmore. The workshop, which was the third of its kind offered by the United Kingdom to experts onthe Mechanism’s roster, balanced instruction and practice through inclusion of a two-day table-top exercise. Fourteen additional rostered experts received the additional specialized training. That was followed by an advanced training course administered in November to 12 rostered experts at the headquarters of the INTERPOL in Lyon, France. The course focused specifically on interview skills, and
Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was established on 21 March 2013 by the Secretary-General, based on the authority granted to him by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Mission presented a final report in December 2013 (A/68/663-S/2013/735). The most recent previous investigations were conducted in Mozambique and Azerbaijan in 1992 (S/24065 and S/24344). 105 Following the 1997 entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, updates to the guidelines and technical appendices for the Mechanism duly emphasized the relevant aspects of an investigation of an alleged use of biological weapons, absent an equivalent organization for the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. For that reason, future training activities focused on the use of biological weapons. 106 This approach was in line with a commitment, contained in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, for the Office for Disarmament Affairs to work to establish a minimal but effective operational capacity to conduct effective, credible and independent investigations into an alleged use of biological weapons. See António Guterres, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.IX.6), p. 26. 107 If an alleged use of a chemical weapon occurred in a State not party to the Convention, as was the case in 2013 with the Syrian Arab Republic, or in the case of such an alleged use in territory not controlled by a State party, the Secretary-General may cooperate with OPCW in that regard, through the modalities set out in the 2012 Supplementary Arrangement to the 2001 Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and OPCW (A/55/988). 108 Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear.
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INTERPOL staff contributed further practical instruction on evidence collection and management. Meanwhile, the United Nations and other international organizations continued to increase their cooperation within the framework of the Mechanism. OPCW and INTERPOL, as well as the World Health Organization and the World Organisation for Animal Health, continued to participate in relevant training courses, providing both instructors and trainees.
Export controls Australia Group India joined the Australia Group on 19 January, increasing its membership to 42 States.109 Later in the year, those member countries and the European Union met in Paris from 4 to 8 June for the Group’s thirty-third plenary meeting.110 Participants emphasized the issue of the re-emergence of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as in Iraq, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. In that connection, the Group agreed to several amendments to the “Syria Specific Control List” for use by its participants and reiterated its support for OPCW and its Director-General. Participants in the plenary meeting were also briefed on the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, and those countries not yet participating were invited to join. Separately, participants in the Group condemned what they characterized as “the reprehensible actions of those countries that have enabled or have continued to shield those who have used chemical weapons from being held to account”.111 In addition, the Group discussed reinforcing efforts to increase awareness of emerging technologies, including the potential exploitation of the cybersphere, as well as scientific developments that could be used for the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons. The Group also agreed to intensify its focus on preventing the proliferation of goods, technologies and information to terrorists and non-State actors that could enable the production or delivery of chemical or biological
109 The members of the Australia Group are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. 110 See Australia Group, “Statement by the Chair of the 2018 Australia Group Plenary”, 8 June 2018. 111 Australia Group, “Statement by Australia Group Participants on Chemical Weapons”, 8 June 2018.
72 Biological and chemical weapons weapons. In that regard, participants placed particular emphasis on the issues of intangible technology transfers, proliferation financing, procurement, and trans-shipment and broader proliferation networks. In support of its plan to continue an active programme of outreach to non-members in 2018 and 2019, the Group reinforced the importance of enhanced coordination with industry and academia. Favourably recalling a relevant dialogue with African countries in March, the Group agreed on the need for follow-up aimed at encouraging all States to adopt the Group’s export controls as the model for international best practice. The member countries of the Group concluded that there would be value in holding one or more intersessional meetings before its next plenary meeting, in particular to discuss effective implementation; “catch-all” controls; and a possible listing of nerve agents, including fourth-generation agents such as Novichok and their precursors. The participants of the Group accepted an offer by France to host the 2019 plenary meeting in Paris from 3 to 7 June.
73 chapter Conventional III weapons The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean conducts a demonstration of laser marking of small arms ammunition, held in Lima in July 2018. C h a p t e r I I I
Conventional weapons
Military industries are producing ever-more weapons. The arms trade is seeking ever-expanding markets. Countries are building up massive stockpiles of conventional arms, especially in the most conflict-prone regions of the world. And we must counter these destabilizing trends.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Development and trends, 2018
The Secretary-General devoted a pillar of his Agenda for Disarmament, “Disarmament that saves lives”, to dealing with challenges associated with the excessive accumulation of conventional arms, as well as the illicit trade and proliferation of such weapons. Those challenges included a worrisome growth in global military expenditures that continued into 2018, reaching a new high of approximately $1.82 trillion, according to available data.2 In inflation- adjusted dollars, that amount was approximately 2.6 per cent more than what Governments had spent on military capabilities the prior year. Trends in the international trade in conventional arms were more nuanced. Although the volume of global weapons transfers was 7.8 per cent larger from 2014 to 2018 than during the previous five years, most regions of the world received fewer major arms over the period that began in 2014; the only exception was the Middle East, where the flow of weapons increased by 87 per cent and accounted for approximately 35 per cent of transfers.3 In another reflection of the tensions and conflict that persisted across the region, the arms imports of some Middle Eastern countries from 2014 to 2018 doubled in volume compared with the levels during the previous five years. Meanwhile, Mozambique ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in December, becoming the Treaty’s 100th State party four years after its entry into force. The historic milestone was marked by a high-level event on 14 December, organized in New York by the Government of Latvia. As the Treaty entered
1 Remarks at the University of Geneva on the launch of the Agenda for Disarmament, Geneva, 24 May 2018. 2 Nan Tian, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, April 2019. 3 Pieter D. Wezeman, Aude Fleurant, Alexandra Kuimova, Nan Tian and Siemon T. Wezeman. “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, April 2019.
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its fourth year of implementation, its Voluntary Trust Fund4 continued to provide funding for activities aimed at enhancing the implementation capacities of States parties. In addition, civil society organizations continued to monitor compliance with the Treaty’s provisions while exerting pressure on States parties to exercise responsibility and accountability regarding their international transfers of conventional arms. The international community’s efforts to prevent the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons also continued to advance in 2018. The third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was held in July, concluded an intensive two-week session with the adoption of a consensus outcome document. In an unprecedented development, the document made direct reference to ammunition and recognized the relevance of the Programme’s implementation to efforts to combat gender-based violence. Additionally, the threats to peace and security posed by the illicit trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons remained an important issue for the Security Council. In that regard, the Council continued its recent practice of explicitly addressing weapons and ammunition control measures in the mandates of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, including activities to improve weapons and ammunition management. In parallel, the United Nations Secretariat developed an aide-memoire as a resource for Council members, among others, on the development of related language for use in resolutions. Also in 2018, the Secretariat developed a handbook for effective weapons and ammunition management in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, providing a new go-to resource, in particular for peacekeeping missions, on improving all aspects of weapons management. Separately, the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium5 continued evolving as a recognized set of de facto international standards for the design and implementation of measures to regulate and control small arms. In 2018, well over 100 countries had applied the standards. Throughout the year, Member States partnered with the United Nations, regional organizations and civil society to hold informal consultations and other activities in preparation for forthcoming sessions of the group of governmental experts on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, to be convened in 2020.6
4 The Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, established under Article 16 of the Treaty, is a mechanism intended to assist requesting States parties that require international support in implementation. For more information, see the website of the Trust Fund (www.thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html). 5 The Compendium was formerly called the International Small Arms Control Standards. 6 The General Assembly mandated the establishment of the group by resolution 72/55 of 4 December 2017.
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Participants helped identify various issues that could be explored further, including ammunition and stockpile management practices, challenges associated with diversion to conflict areas, and possible international cooperation and assistance mechanisms. The dangers of improvised explosive devices continued to pose a serious threat to urban populations in areas of conflict, as the frequency, scale and sophistication of such devices continued to increase during the year. The seriousness of the threat remained an important issue in the agendas of relevant multilateral forums, such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and meetings held within the framework of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Arms Trade Treaty
In 2018, six States7 deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General in his capacity as depositary of the Arms Trade Treaty.8 With those expressions of consent, the number of States parties rose to 100, a milestone commemorated in December with an event organized in New York by the Government of Latvia, which had been elected to the presidency of the fifth Conference of States Parties in 2019. The Treaty’s imbalance in regional participation persisted in 2018. As at 31 December, only 6 of 54 Member States in the Asia-Pacific Group had joined the Treaty; by contrast, 25 of 31 Member States of the Western European and Others Group and 18 of 23 from the Eastern European Group were States parties. Of the six States that joined the Treaty in 2018, three belonged to the Latin American and Caribbean Group, 26 of 33 members of which were States parties; the other three new States in 2018 belonged to the African Group, 25 of 54 members of which had joined the Treaty.
7 Chile (18 May), Cameroon (18 June), Brazil (14 August), Suriname (19 October), Guinea- Bissau (22 October) and Mozambique (14 December). 8 The Arms Trade Treaty entered into force in December 2014 with the aim of enhancing transparency, responsibility and accountability in the global conventional arms trade, providing a set of commonly agreed international standards to help guide Governments in deciding whether or not to authorize arms transfers to other countries. The Treaty provides criteria to ensure that international transfers of arms and ammunition do not lead to serious violations of international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law. It prohibits transfers that would violate arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council or be used in genocide or the commission of war crimes, and it requires States parties to put in place measures to prevent weapons diversion. The Treaty requires States parties to establish national systems of export controls to ensure compliance in decisions on arms transfers.
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Fourth Conference of States Parties The fourth Conference of States Parties was held in Tokyo from 20 to 24 August under the leadership of Nobushige Takamizawa (Japan).9 The Conference was preceded by two informal preparatory meetings, held in March and May, as well as three working groups that the third Conference of States Parties had established in 2017. The 2018 Conference began with a statement10 by Taro Kono, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary- General and United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, also delivered a video message for the opening session. The Conference undertook a thorough review of the Treaty’s implementation, as well as efforts to promote its universalization. In particular, it noted the importance of the Voluntary Trust Fund, established in 2016 pursuant to article 16 (3) of the Treaty as a mechanism to support States in implementing their obligations under the agreement. At the time of the Conference, donors had committed $1.3 million for implementing 15 projects approved by the Fund’s Selection Committee during its first cycle (2017) and an additional $800,000 for 10 projects chosen during its second cycle (2018).11 The Conference considered that, in the short period since its establishment, the Trust Fund had presented a viable facility under the Arms Trade Treaty to give effect to international assistance in the Treaty’s practical implementation.12 Among other actions, the Conference agreed on the following:13 • Adopting the Co-Chairs’ document entitled “Outreach strategy on reporting”, which emphasized the importance of transparency and reporting • Calling on relevant stakeholders and interested States parties to discuss the possible organization of regional information sessions on reporting
9 The Conference was attended by 108 States, including 76 States parties, 2 States that had ratified the Treaty but for which it had not yet entered into force, 22 signatory States and 8 observer States (Botswana, Canada, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, Gambia, Oman and Tajikistan). Its other attendees comprised seven international and regional organizations and 32 civil society entities, including non-governmental organizations and industry representatives. 10 Statement to the fourth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. 11 Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, report on the work of the Trust Fund for the period August 2017 to July 2018 (ATT/VTF/2018/Chair/359/Conf.Rep). 12 Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, final report of the fourth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT/CSP4/2018/SEC/369/Conf.FinRep.Rev1), para. 4. 13 ATT/CSP4/2018/SEC/369/Conf.FinRep.Rev1.
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• Endorsing a three-tier approach14 to sharing information on diversion, subject to each State’s national laws, practices or policies • Directing the Working Group on Treaty Universalization to focus its attention on four approaches15 to activities between the fourth and fifth Conferences of States Parties • Tasking the three Working Groups to continue exploring linkages between the Treaty and the Sustainable Development Goals that were relevant to their mandates in the context of their respective workplans • Entrusting the Arms Trade Treaty secretariat with the administration of the Treaty’s sponsorship programme • Inviting interested States to submit a detailed proposal on a possible expansion of the Management Committee for consideration during the informal preparatory process of the fifth Conference of States Parties16 • Adopting the budget for the fifth Conference of States Parties • Mandating the Management Committee to undertake further work and prepare a detailed proposal to address the problem of assessed contributions, for consideration at the fifth Conference of States Parties • Electing, by acclamation, Benin, Chile, Ireland and the Republic of Korea as the four Vice-Presidents for the fifth Conference of States Parties.
14 That three-tier approach included the following: policy-level exchanges on diversion, within a sub-working group of the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation; intersessional exchange of policy-related and relevant operational information via an information exchange portal, then under development; and an informal meeting among interested States parties, and possibly signatory States, to discuss concrete cases of detected or suspected diversion with which they were dealing or had dealt. 15 Those approaches were (a) targeting regions with the lowest numbers of States parties; (b) taking advantage of the Working Group Co-Chairs’ States of origin and seeking the assistance of States parties from focus regions to facilitate universalization efforts in those regions; (c) engaging with parliamentarians, on a continuous basis, to facilitate domestic ratification processes; and (d) utilizing regional events to engage with a broad range of stakeholders involved in the Treaty. 16 At the third Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechia and Panama were appointed for a period of two years, through the fifth Conference of States Parties. Sweden had been appointed for one year to serve in the period up to the fourth Conference of States Parties and the Netherlands had been appointed for a period of one year, to serve in the period following fourth Conference and until the fifth Conference. The variation in the length of each appointment was due to differences in the manner in which the various regional groups designated their respective representatives. The third Conference noted that difference in approaches to regional representation in paragraph 44 of its final report ATT/CSP3/2017/SEC/184( /Conf.FinRep. Rev1). Additionally, in para. 45 of the same report, it underlined that the matter required further discussion and clarification.
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The Conference decided to hold its next formal annual session, the fifth Conference of States Parties, in Geneva from 26 to 30 August 2019. It elected, by acclamation, Jānis Kārkliņš (Latvia) as the President of the next meeting.
Small arms and light weapons Programme of Action on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons In 2018, States held their third conference to review the progress made in implementing the two global frameworks for coordinated efforts to combat the illicit trade in small arms and weapons: the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects17 of 2001 and the International Tracing Instrument of 2005.18
Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons The third Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was convened from 18 to 29 June in New York19 under the chairmanship of Jean-Claude Brunet (France).20 At its conclusion, States unanimously adopted an outcome document in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of both the Programme and the related International Tracing Instrument. In addition, States re-emphasized that the implementation of both instruments
17 Flows of illicit small arms and light weapons were a key factor in triggering and prolonging conflict and in fuelling criminal armed violence. Such arms could be diverted from State stockpiles or other legal circuits, recycled from previous conflicts in a concerned State or in neighbouring countries, supplied by States to sponsored proxies, strategically cached in anticipation of conflict, illegally manufactured or obtained by other means. Inthe Programme of Action (A/CONF.192/15), States committed to improving national small arms laws, import and export controls and stockpile management, and to engaging in relevant cooperation and assistance. 18 The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, or the International Tracing Instrument, aims to facilitate international cooperation in tracing illicit small arms and light weapons by requiring States to ensure that weapons are properly marked and that records are kept. Moreover, it provided a framework for cooperation in weapons tracing, fulfilling one of the commitments States made in the Programme of Action. 19 Between review conferences, Biennial Meetings of States are held. Additionally, countries have held Meetings of Governmental Experts to benefit from the knowledge of technical specialists on matters pertaining to small arms control. For an overview of past meetings, see Office for Disarmament Affairs,Past “ Meetings”. 20 Before the Conference, States submitted national reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. The number of submitted reports reached 119, the highest level of reporting since 2002. The Office for Disarmament Affairs processed information and statistics in those reports and disseminated them through the Programme of Action website (https://smallarms.un-arm.org).
82 Conventional weapons contributed to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular Goal 16 and its target 16.4 on reducing illicit arms flows. In the context of historically divergent views held by Member States on the inclusion of ammunition in the two instruments, States included for the first time direct references to ammunition in the outcome document of a review conference of the Programme of Action. In the first of two references, States welcomed the General Assembly’s decision for a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2020 to undertake a study on the problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus.21 In the second reference, the Conference acknowledged that States that applied the Programme of Action’s provisions to ammunition could exchange and apply relevant experiences, lessons learned and best practices in strengthening implementation.22 Owing to objections expressed by two States,23 the two paragraphs referencing ammunition were submitted to a vote, which marked a departure from the long-held practice of decision-making by consensus on substantive matters under the Programme’s process. By contrast, gender-sensitive approaches to the small arms issue received broad backing from all States, resulting in the inclusion of progressive language on gender-related topics in the outcome document. The Programme’s implementation was recognized for the first time to be key to combating gender-based violence, with Member States including specific language on the impacts of the illicit small arms trade on women, men, girls and boys. States also agreed in the document to strengthen the full participation and representation of women in processes related to the Programme of Action; reaffirmed the need to mainstream gender dimensions into small armsand light weapons policies and programmes; committed to ensuring coordination between national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Programme of Action and those national authorities responsible for women’s affairs or gender equality, as well as women’s civil society groups; and encouraged the collection of gender-disaggregated data and their submission through national reports. Additional issues addressed by the Conference in its outcome document included the illegal reactivation of deactivated weapons, the link between small arms and terrorism, and the diversion of weapons to unauthorized recipients. Emphasis was placed on recent developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design and their possible implications for the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument.
21 General Assembly resolution 72/55 of 4 December 2017, para. 16. 22 Ibid., para. 18. 23 Israel and United States.
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With regard to procedural matters, States agreed to a follow-up process that would include biennial meetings of States in 2020 and 2022 and a review conference in 2024. The one-week biennial meeting of States in 2020 would address the issue of diversion and illicit international transfer of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients.
Security Council The Security Council addressed small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in the context of both thematic and country-specific agenda items. Various dimensions of the challenges posed by illicit transfers of weapons and the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms, ammunition and related materials were also considered in the framework of relevant United Nations peace operations, including those in Afghanistan, the Abyei region of Sudan, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Libya and Somalia.24
Weapons and ammunition management Weapons and ammunition management remained an important consideration of the Council, especially in the context of ongoing conflicts; arms embargoes; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes; and the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Various Security Council resolutions referred to weapons and ammunition management, with related language continuing to evolve in accordance with the growing diversity of United Nations operations and the changing dynamics of conflict. For example, the Council mandated peace operations in the Central African Republic and Mali to assist national authorities in weapons and ammunition management activities while requesting the Secretary-General to report on the movement, presence, destruction and confiscation of weapons within the Abyei region of Sudan.25 In a presidential statement26 issued in January, the Council recalled the impact of illicit small arms and light weapons on international peace and security, with particular reference to their effects in West Africa and the Sahel, including the significant loss of life. In July, in the context of the situation in South Sudan, the Council authorized all Member States to dispose of seized embargoed materiel.27 Meanwhile, the Council continued to stress that illicit transfer, the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons posed a significant threat to peace and security in challenging country contexts,
24 Security Council resolutions 2405 (2018), 2410 (2018), 2441 (2018), 2444 (2018), 2445 (2018) and 2448 (2018). 25 Security Council resolution 2399 (2018), operative para. 3, 2423 (2018), operative para. 34 (b), and 2416 (2018), operative para. 32. 26 S/PRST/2018/3. 27 Security Council resolution 2428 (2018).
84 Conventional weapons including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. On 30 January, the Security Council, in its resolution 2399 (2018), called for authorities of the Central African Republic to address the small arms challenge, including through explicitly calling for the collection and destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons and ammunition. It further requested that such arms-related elements be incorporated into security sector reform and demobilization and reintegration programmes. The Council included similar provisions in resolution 2409 (2018), on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in resolution 2423 (2018), on Mali. In the latter resolution, which was adopted in June, the Security Council authorized the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to assist national authorities with weapons and ammunition management, and the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices. The Council further called upon authorities in Mali to address the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In that context, the Security Council also stressed the importance of the two resolutions on small arms and light weapons that it had adopted in 2013 and 2015.28 In September, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement29 recognizing the contribution of an aide-memoire,30 issued by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, outlining conceptual and linguistic issues related to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and to small arms and light weapons. In the aide-memoire, the control of and reduction in the availability of illicit small arms and light weapons as a means of protecting the civilian population was acknowledged. Drawing upon that practice, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs published in October a separate aide-memoire, entitled Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Decisions ofthe Security Council31 to support Security Council members and other Member States in mainstreaming those issues into the Council’s work. The publication was aimed at providing guidance on comprehensive and effective weapons and ammunition management practices in challenging environments, concluding with a catalogue of language derived from a wide range of country-specific
28 Security Council resolutions 2117 (2013) and 2220 (2015). 29 S/PRST/2018/18. 30 Aide Memoire: For the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, May 2016. 31 Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and AmmunitionManagement in Decisions of the Security Council, October 2018.
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and thematic resolutions, as well as presidential statements adopted by the Security Council over the past 30 years.
Perpetration of terrorist acts The Security Council also continued to recognize the connection between the perpetration of terrorist acts and the illicit flow and broad availability of small arms and light weapons. In resolution 2405 (2018), adopted on 8 March, the Council strongly condemned the flow of weapons (including small arms and light weapons, military equipment and components of improvised explosive devices) to the Taliban, Al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant affiliates and other terrorist groups, violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups and criminals. In that regard, the Security Council continued to raise concern over the acquisition of weapons by terrorists, in line with resolution 2370 (2017).
Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium The Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium, formerly called the International Small Arms Control Standards, continued to provide Governments and organizations with voluntary, practical and authoritative advice on small arms control based on good practices, codes of conduct and standard operating procedures developed at regional and subregional levels. As at the end of 2018, its modules32 had been used by 110 Member States and applied to the development of national controls over the entire life cycle of small arms, reducing the risk of such weapons being diverted to criminals, terrorists or others who would misuse them. A variety of United Nations and other entities applied the modules in education settings throughout the year. For example, the Compendium components were part of a 15-day intensive training course entitled “Licensing, Investigation and Enforcement Policies and Procedures in Relation to the Arms Trade Treaty”, conducted from 5 to 19 February in Manila by the Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime ofthe Philippines in partnership with Nonviolence International Southeast Asia, a non-governmental organization.33 In addition to using the Compendium during instruction on marking, tracing, storage management, collection and destruction of weapons, the organizers drew from the Compendium’s glossary of terms34 to provide a common understanding of definitions of terminology
32 The Compendium’s modules cover topics like the establishment of national small arms commissions, small arms and light weapons action plans, stockpile management and weapons marking. The newest modules focus on designing and implementing community safety programmes and raising awareness about the gendered nature of small arms and light weapons. 33 The course was funded by the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund. 34 United Nations, Coordinating Action on Small Arms, Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations (ISACS 01.20:2018(E)V1.5).
86 Conventional weapons and concepts used under the Programme of Action, the Arms Trade Treaty and other international instruments. In a post-training assessment, it was recommended that future training sessions incorporate other Compendium modules to establish common standards on weapons control in the Philippines. Separately, building on prior uses of the modules in training sessions conducted by the regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa integrated the Compendium’s components into its physical security and stockpile management activities during the year. The modules and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines were also fundamental components of a handbook entitled Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context,35 published in January by the Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In its annual resolution (73/69) on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, the General Assembly noted the role and utility of the Compendium and other web-based tools developed by the Secretariat in assessing progress in implementing the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
Coordinating Action on Small Arms After the Secretary-General in 1998 designated the Office for Disarmament Affairs36 as the Organization’s “focal point” on small arms, the Office helped establish the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms, a consultative mechanism of diverse member entities37 seeking to ensure that the United Nations system as a whole addresses the challenges posed by small arms and light weapons in a comprehensive, coordinated and coherent fashion.
35 Savannah de Tessières, Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context: A Handbook for United Nations DDR practitioners (United Nations publication, 2018). 36 The Office was then called the Department for Disarmament Affairs. 37 The following United Nations entities currently participate in the Coordinating Action on Small Arms: Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, Department for Economic and Social Affairs, Department of Global Communications, Department of Peace Operations, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, International Civil Aviation Organization, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of Counter-Terrorism, Office of the Special Adviseron Africa, Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Office of Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United Nations Mine Action Service, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women and World Health Organization.
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In May, the principals of the 24 partners of the mechanism met to harmonize support in the United Nations system for the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, with a particular focus on its vision for a coherent funding mechanism for small arms control, the Saving Lives Entity. The principals also approved the completed modules of the Modular Small-arms- control Implementation Compendium and endorsed a plan for the United Nations SaferGuard Programme. In addition, the principals approved three main objectives for the mechanism’s strategic framework for the period from 2019 to 2024: • To enhance the contribution of the mechanism to the achievement of Goal 16 and target 16.4 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development • To promote and support implementation by Member States of relevant United Nations agreements, international guidelines and tools • To develop and consolidate United Nations policy on arms-related topics within the purview of the mechanism. In the mechanism’s five working-level meetings in 2018, the member entities drafted a statement38 for the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held consultations on physical security and stockpile management, and facilitated information- sharing on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement.39 In addition, the mechanism coordinated the preparation of inputs for indicator 16.4.240 of the 2030 Agenda, for reports of the Secretary-General on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and on improvised explosive devices,41 as well as for a report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the impact of civilian acquisition, possession and use of firearms on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.42
Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures The Group of Interested States43 continued to serve as a New York–based forum for Member States on practical disarmament activities.
38 Statement, New York, 20 June 2018. 39 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Resource book on the use of force and firearms in law enforcement (HR/PUB/17/6), Criminal Justice Handbook Series. 40 United Nations, “SDG Indicators”. See also United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs and Office on Drugs and Crime,SDG “ indicator 16.4.2”, joint non-paper, June 2018. 41 A/73/168 and A/73/156, respectively. 42 A/HRC/32/21. 43 The Group of Interested States was established pursuant to the 1997 General Assembly mandate (resolution 52/38 G, operative para. 4), with a view to operationalizing “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping” (A/47/277-S/24111) and its supplement (A/50/60-S/1995/1).
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The emergence of the Programme of Action on illicit small arms, and the increased attention to the urgent need to address the small arms issue in other mandates of the United Nations, had led to the realization that the Group’s work had been successfully taken up by many relevant parts of the Organization. To streamline the work of the General Assembly’s First Committee, Member States agreed to discontinue the Assembly resolution entitled “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures” upon adoption of its 2018 iteration (73/53).44 In that context, the Office for Disarmament Affairs was entrusted with ensuring that relevant issues would continue to be addressed by the most appropriate forums, political frameworks and mandates.
Ammunition
Unintended explosions at munitions sites and diversion of ammunition to illicit markets continued to be of serious concern to States throughout 2018. The Secretary-General, in his Agenda for Disarmament, recognized that unintended explosions could have devastating ramifications for communities, which resulted in high levels of casualties, injuries, displacement and environmental damage. Explosions at ammunition depots in South Africa and Ukraine during the year illustrated the severe humanitarian consequences that could result from such accidents.
General Assembly Member States continued to address the safety and security aspects of conventional ammunition through multilateral dialogue, building on the momentum initiated in 2017 with General Assembly resolution 72/55, “Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus”, and the informal consultative process established therein. Engagement by States on the matter, both in the General Assembly and in regular thematic exchanges, reflected increased interest in addressing conventional ammunition as a stand-alone issue. Although resolution 72/55 was not on the agenda for the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, the session featured a series of informal consultations held within the resolution’s framework. Germany, acting in its capacity as the resolution’s main sponsor, organized three informal consultations in February, March and October to identify issues in which progress could be made and could inform the work of a group of governmental experts that the Secretary-General was expected to convene in 2020.
44 By operative paragraph 7, the General Assembly decided to “remain attentive to the matter”, instead of including the item in the provisional agenda of a future session.
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The first of those informal consultations, convened on 20 February, was attended by more than 50 delegations and featured presentations by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the non-governmental organization Conflict Armament Research. Discussants addressed trends in ammunition diversion as well as the availability of technical guidelines and resources for the safe and secure management of ammunition (e.g., the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines). Many States welcomed the informal consultations in advance of the 2020 group of governmental experts on the topic. States also identified various issues that could be explored further, including ammunition-stockpile-management practices, challenges associated with diversion to conflict areas and international cooperation and assistance mechanisms. A second informal consultation was held on 21 March, with a focus on the provision of technical assistance and capacity-building efforts. Representatives of non-governmental organizations addressing munitions clearance, as well as United Nations entities and donor and recipient States, were invited to reflect on their experiences regarding international cooperation and assistance. Discussants included the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Mines Advisory Group, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. During the informal exchange of views, several States underscored the importance of international cooperation and assistance, including institutional capacity-building, and noted the paramount importance of national commitments to ensure sustainability. At a third informal consultation held on the margins of the seventy- third session of the General Assembly First Committee, States were invited to reflect on national stockpile-management practices, including surplus assessment and diversion prevention. Guiding questions offered by Germany before the 25 October consultation covered topics such as national policy frameworks and lessons learned regarding diversion prevention. Germany also invited proposals for areas of study by the group of governmental experts that will convene in 2020. Representatives from Albania, Ghana and Japan shared perspectives concerning ammunition stockpile management and a non-governmental organization45 offered remarks on ammunition diversion with emphasis on supply-chain challenges. Following the presentations, States acknowledged in open discussion the value of the practical guidance offered in the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines for improved safety and security of ammunition stockpiles. Consideration of a global instrument to address ammunition diversion and national implementation measures was also discussed. Other substantive issues addressed were the challenges associated with implementing existing international, regional and subregional ammunition instruments and the relationship between conventional
45 Conflict Armament Research.
90 Conventional weapons ammunition management and peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustainable development. Germany announced its intention to convene in 2019 a series of regional consultations within the framework of General Assembly resolution 72/55 in Africa, Asia Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean before the adoption of the next First Committee resolution in October 2019.
Programme of Action on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons In parallel to the General Assembly process, Member States considered the treatment of small arms and light weapons ammunition within the framework of the Programme of Action, ultimately including two references to the issue in the outcome document46 of the third Review Conference (for more information on the Review Conference, see the separate section on the Programme of Action in this chapter). However, a clear divergence of views persisted between Latin American, Caribbean and African States on the one hand, which overwhelmingly supported the explicit inclusion of ammunition, and, on the other hand, a handful of States that remained opposed to explicitly taking up ammunition when discussing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Consensus on the matter eluded the Conference, which decided in separate votes to adopt both paragraphs. The first of those paragraphs welcomed the process established by General Assembly resolution 72/55 to address the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus and the second paragraph acknowledged that States applying provisions of the Programme of Action to small arms and light weapons ammunition could exchange and, as appropriate, apply relevant experiences, lessons learned and best practices.47
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and United Nations SaferGuard activities Validation process Under the United Nations SaferGuard Programme, the dedicated United Nations knowledge management platform overseeing dissemination of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support global application of the Guidelines through the development of a process for validating ammunition technical experts. As part of SaferGuard’s quick-response mechanism, validated experts could be rapidly deployed to assist States, upon request, in the urgent management of ammunition stockpiles, including after events such as unintended explosions.48
46 A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3, annex. 47 Ibid., part I, para. 16; part II, para. 18. 48 The quick-response mechanism is part of the Programme that allows ammunition experts to be deployed rapidly to assist States, upon request. The General Assembly
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In 2018, SaferGuard was focused on (a) refining a standardized set of ammunition staff competencies in line with the Guidelines and (b) populating a roster of validated ammunition technical experts to offer technical assistance to interested States. Built on a pilot exercise held in Switzerland in 2017, a validation exercise and sensitization course on the Guidelines was conducted back-to-back in Vienna in August. The activities involved instructors from Austria and Germany and drew 11 expert technical participants representing national authorities, United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations. Through round-table discussions, individual technical exercises, group role-play exercises and presentations, the experts demonstrated their ammunition competences in line with the Guidelines and were assessed according to the SaferGuard validation methodology. Nine experts from eight countries49 passed the validation, demonstrating their strong technical knowledge of the Guidelines and “soft skills” that would benefit the quick- response mechanism. Additionally, observers from Austria, Germany, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland offered recommendations on the assessment’s methodology, timetable and substance.
Regional outreach activities and Technical Review Board Under the SaferGuard Programme, a series of regional training and outreach events was conducted in 2018 to further disseminate the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and raise awareness about the importance of ammunition management. In that context, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining co-organized a regional technical workshop, held in Lima in July, during which 14 technical ammunition experts from nine Latin American and Caribbean countries were briefed about SaferGuard, the Guidelines and the Programme’s implementation support tools. The participants were also given opportunities to reflect on national ammunition management practices and share good practices and lessons learned. In November, two subregional training courses were held in Kathmandu under the Programme, drawing 17 ammunition experts from 10 countries in Central, South and South-East Asia. Participants learned about the purpose, principles and framework of the Guidelines, as well as other priority topics such as the United Nations explosive hazard classification system and codes, inventory management and accounting, implementation support tools for
first welcomed efforts to operationalizeer aSaf Guard quick-response mechanism in its resolution 68/52 of 5 December 2013. With a view to ensuring the availability of technical expertise to respond to such requests, the Programme initiated an expert validation process in 2015. 49 France, Nepal, Peru, Republic of Moldova, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and United States.
92 Conventional weapons the Guidelines, and tables on the Guidelines to quantify risk. Presenters also introduced the SaferGuard Validation Process, encouraging diverse regional participation in future validation exercises. Additionally, a survey of national ammunition-management systems enabled participants to support further refinement of the standardized validation methodology and of criteria for rostered ammunition experts. Two courses were organized under the Programme in line with its objective of preventative capacity-building for safe and secure ammunition management. The events were held in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Separately, the annual meeting of the SaferGuard Technical Review Board and Strategic Coordination Group50 took place on 28 and 29 November in Geneva. The discussion’s central themes were the version 3 update of the Guidelines in 2020, including a proposed new module on organizational capabilities; the review and further improvement of the implementation support toolkit for the Guidelines; and the review and approval for publication of three implementation support documents: • Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines • A Guide to Developing National Standards for Ammunition Management • Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in Conflict- Affected and Low Capacity Environments (published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research).
Improvised explosive devices
The challenges posed by improvised explosive devices remained deeply problematic for the international community throughout 2018. Civilians endured significant harm from the use of such devices in terrorist attacks and from their detonation in populated areas. The proliferation and utilization of improvised explosive devices increased in scale, lethality and diversity in conflict-affected States such as Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. The design and detonation methods of those devices grew markedly more sophisticated in 2018, prompting continued multilateral discussions in the General Assembly and within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on countering the threat. The Security Council retained
50 In order to ensure that the Guidelines respond effectively and fully to the needs on the ground and maintain the highest quality, a Technical Review Board, composed of selected national technical experts, and a corresponding Strategic Coordination Group, comprising expert organizations, were established. The annual meeting served to update members on developments related to the SaferGuard Programme, through which the dissemination of the Guidelines is overseen and assistance on next steps is provided.
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its focus on improvised explosive devices in the context of terrorist acts and underscored the critical importance of denying access to precursor materials. In July, the Secretary-General published the second comprehensive report to the General Assembly, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”.51 In the report, the Secretary-General recognized the civilian impact resulting from the increasingly urban nature of conflict and the indiscriminate use of such devices, and he noted specific consequences related to the use of those devices for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. He called for further research and data collection to inform effective, evidence-based responses. Meanwhile, the United Nations continued to pursue a whole-of-system approach in comprehensively and effectively responding to the threat posed by improvised explosive devices in accordance with the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. In support of a more coherent, system-wide approach, the United Nations Mine Action Service initiated a mapping exercise to identify and analyse responses related to the issue across the United Nations system. Initial findings confirmed that attacks and incidents using improvised explosive devices adversely affected United Nations programme and mandate delivery, especially with regard to protecting civilians and providing humanitarian assistance.
General Assembly Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/72 of 5 December 2016, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”, an informal consultative process began under the leadership of Afghanistan, the resolution’s main sponsor, on matters of coordination between the various existing initiatives and approaches relating to improvised explosive devices in the United Nations system and beyond. In line with the resolution’s subsequent iteration, 72/36 of 4 December 2017, States continued such consultations in 2018 in preparation for the seventy-third session of the General Assembly. On 21 May, Afghanistan convened a consultation in New York with a focus on stemming the flow of potentially dangerous precursor materials through enhanced engagement with the private sector. Discussions also focused on the contribution of standards, good practices and guidelines for mitigating and preventing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. To support the work of States in those areas, experts working on humanitarian mine action and arms regulation, including from the private sector, engaged in debate on combating the threat. In its interventions, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research highlighted the need to address precursors of improvised explosive devices and constructively engage with the private sector to stem the flow of potentially dangerous materials.
51 A/73/156.
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Meanwhile, the International Chemical Trade Association—a network of chemical associations, federations and companies—emphasized the particular vulnerability of chemicals to diversion after their manufacture. It also highlighted industry-led initiatives such as its Responsible Care programme, representing a voluntary commitment by industry to safeguard chemicals for peace, as well as various joint initiatives of industry and Government on the provision of intelligence, cybersecurity, training and awareness-raising. Separately, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) highlighted several of its programmes to help detect, deter and disrupt access by non-State actors to high-risk chemicals. In a subsequent exchange of views by States on engagement with the private sector and related good practices, many delegations highlighted the responsibilities of Governments and the private industry, as well as the need to enhance cooperation among stakeholders. The second thematic discussion of the consultation focused on standards, good practices and guidelines. The Office for Disarmament Affairs presented the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and resources of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme to help prevent the diversion of precursors of improvised explosive devices through effective stockpile management. The United Nations Mine Action Service described its role in threat mitigation related to such devices at the operational level through training, mentoring, advising and equipping troop-contributing nations, while also noting its part in developing relevant strategic-level documents such as the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards.52 In that context, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining highlighted the importance of ongoing work to update the International Mine Action Standards in response to improvised explosive devices. In his report to the General Assembly in July on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices,53 the Secretary-General highlighted the need to leverage existing mechanisms and initiatives to comprehensively and effectively address the multifaceted issue. He called for enhancing international cooperation, assistance and information-sharing, including greater coordination among United Nations entities. He also determined that recommendations54 contained in his previous report on the topic remained valid and, therefore, called for their further consideration by States, relevant international and regional organizations, non-governmental entities and the private sector. Furthermore, the Secretary-General offered new recommendations for enhancing discussions on improvised explosive devices
52 United Nations Mine Action Service (document 2018.05). 53 The report (A/73/156) was issued pursuant to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 71/72. 54 The previous report of the Secretary-General on the topic (A/71/187) recommended 32 concrete measures regarding prevention, preparedness and response related to improvised explosive devices.
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in all relevant forums—including the General Assembly and under Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons—as well as practical, operational measures for preventing and mitigating threats in contexts such as peace operations, stockpile management, training and the development of guidance. In December, the General Assembly adopted a fourth iteration of its resolution on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” (73/67), in which it noted the Secretary-General’s July report and recommendations while retaining focus on coordinating related activities. In that connection, the Assembly encouraged States to continue holding open, informal consultations focused on awareness-raising, prevention and coordination within the United Nations and beyond, with a view towards maintaining a comprehensive overview of relevant global activities. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to report to its seventy-fifth session on awareness and prevention strategies.
Security Council The Security Council remained seized of the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, principally as it related to the perpetration of terrorist attacks. In the context of thematic issues on its agenda, the Council in May adopted resolution 2417 (2018) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, in which it noted with deep concern the serious humanitarian threat posed by such devices. In its resolution 2427 (2018) on children and armed conflict, adopted in July, the Council expressed deep concern at the high number of incidents of indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations, including attacks involving improvised explosive devices. In resolutions related to the situations in Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia, the Security Council took explicit note of the threat that the devices posed to civilian populations. In March, the Council adopted resolution 2405 (2018) on the situation in Afghanistan, by which it condemned all attacks using improvised explosive devices that targeted Afghan and international forces, while also noting the need to enhance coordination and information-sharing between Member States and the private sector. The Council also condemned the flow of components of improvised explosive devices to the Taliban (including the Haqqani Network), Al-Qaida, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant affiliates and other terrorist groups, violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups and criminals. In June, the Council adopted resolution 2423 (2018) on the situation in Mali, by which it noted serious concern over the presence of improvised explosive devices in the country. By its resolution 2444 (2018), adopted in November, the Council decided that the Panel of Experts on Somalia would continue investigations related to the export of chemicals that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, such as the precursors ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, potassium nitrate and sodium chlorate.
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Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons The Group of Experts of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which met in Geneva on 11 and 12 June, continued its discussions on improvised explosive devices in accordance with decisions55 taken by the High Contracting Parties in 2017. France and Colombia, as the Coordinators on the issue, reported on the work of the Group of Experts to the twentieth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II in November.56 (For more information on the Convention and its 2018 meetings, see the separate section in this chapter.) Building on its work on the issue since 2009, the Group of Experts covered seven overarching objectives in its 2018 discussions on improvised explosive devices: to exchange general views, to present updates on the compilation of reference documents in the framework of the Convention and other similar initiatives, to exchange methods of humanitarian clearance and campaigns and practices on risk education, to explore general features and new types of improvised explosive devices, to share information on how to fight unlawful use of such devices, to update the questionnaire on countering improvised explosive devices that was first circulated as a working 57 paper in 2015 and to take stock of developments related to such devices in other forums outside of the Convention. The discussions illustrated the complexity of responding to the threat posed by improvised explosive devices. Participants underscored areas of growing concern that could merit further discussion in the Amended Protocol II forum, including clearance of such devices in urban environments. Additionally, they underscored the importance of continuing to exchange information and enhance cooperation, including through submissions of responses to the questionnaire on countering improvised explosive devices and the compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and recommendations.58 Several experts emphasized the value of addressing improvised explosive devices in the framework of Convention’s Amended Protocol II, in particular focusing on the humanitarian dimension. At the same time, many participants noted the value of developments outside the Convention, such as the informal consultative process under General Assembly resolution on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (72/36). In that regard, several participants encouraged cross-fertilization of information across forums.
55 CCW/AP.II/CONF.19/4, para. 29. 56 CCW/AP.II/CONF.20/2. 57 CCW/AP.II/CONF.17/WP.1. 58 High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, “Compilation of existing guidelines, best practices and other recommendations aiming at addressing the diversion or illicit use of materials which can be used for Improvised Explosive Devices”.
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The twentieth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II decided to renew the Group’s 2018 mandate with only minor changes—namely to include more technical discussions on the methods of humanitarian clearance of improvised explosive devices and to emphasize innovation.
United Nations Mine Action Service activities In May, the United Nations Mine Action Service finalized the development of the Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards,59 providing guidance to operators undertaking disposal activities in complex, non-humanitarian contexts. Concurrently, in light of the evolving threat posed by such devices and related challenges to humanitarian mine action, the International Mine Action Standards Review Board continued its work on the issue. The Review Board established working groups to address definitional and substantive issues regarding humanitarian operations where improvised explosive devices were present and part of the contamination. Specific areas of discussion included terminology related to improvised explosive devices, disposal competencies and the deployment of such devices in urban areas. Building on the completed Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and in partnership with Member States and other relevant stakeholders, the Service also began development of standardized training material on the disposal of those devices and conventional munitions. In December, the Service and the Netherlands convened two awareness-raising workshops in New York, reflecting the important role of threat-mitigation approaches of the United Nations related to improvised explosive devices. The events emphasized the crucial contribution of the United Nations in supporting information-sharing, including information- related device technology. Additionally, the workshops demonstrated the need for adequate training and funding, including for safety equipment. In its field programmes, the Service continued to work with Member States and troop-contributing countries to provide training, technical equipment, mentoring and advisory support related to addressing the issue of improvised explosive devices. It supported national authorities through, inter alia, technical capacity-building to safely manage such devices, coordinate mitigation responses and adhere to international standards.
Explosive weapons in populated areas
The Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament included protecting civilians against the urbanization of armed conflict as a central objective of the Agenda’s pillar “Disarmament that save lives”. Observing that civilians
59 United Nations Mine Action Service (document 2018.05).
98 Conventional weapons continued to bear the brunt of armed conflict around the globe, the Agenda identified as a leading concern the use in populated areas of explosive weapons with wide-area impacts, including weapon systems, munitions and tactics used by State and non-State actors, which could result in a high proportion of incidental civilian harm if employed where civilians were concentrated.60 According to data collected by Action on Armed Violence,61 a non-governmental organization, more than 31,900 civilians were killed or injured by explosive weapons in 2017. When such weapons were used in populated areas, civilians accounted for over 90 per cent of casualties. The countries with the highest number of civilian casualties included Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. In his 2018 report62 to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Secretary-General again called on parties to conflict to avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. He also welcomed the increasing interest in the problem among High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and among the 19 States that had adopted the communiqué63 of the African regional meeting on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, held in Maputo in November 2017. He supported constructive engagement by all Member States in multilateral efforts to address the problem, including the Austrian-led process to achieve a political declaration on the subject and the German initiative to discuss the problem within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Secretary-General recommended, inter alia, the development of national policy frameworks on the protection of civilians, which should include the following: (a) establishment of specific capabilities to track, analyse, respond to and learn from allegations of civilian harm, as well as joint civilian and military planning for the protection of civilians and a clear presumption against explosive weapons with wide-area effects in towns, cities and other populated areas; (b) strengthened protection of civilians by partner forces through establishment of clear lines of communication, regular dialogue and conditions under which assistance would be withheld; (c) the development and adoption of legislation that conditioned the export of arms on respect for international humanitarian and human rights law and required
60 Problematic types of weapons include indirect-fire weapons, such as artillery, rockets and mortars, weapons that fire in salvos, such as multi-launch rocket systems, large air- dropped bombs, and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. Such systems variously involve munitions with a large destructive radius, weapons with inaccurate delivery systems or weapon systems that deliver multiple munitions over a wide area. 61 Action on Armed Violence, “Burden of Harm: Monitoring Explosive Violence in 2017”, 12 April 2018. 62 S/2018/462. 63 International Network on Explosive Weapons, “Communiqué from Maputo regional conference on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas”, 28 November 2017.
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pre-export assessments of the risk of unlawful use and end-use monitoring, including through the Arms Trade Treaty; and (d) establishment of specific urban warfare training schools and greater resort to scenario-based training. In support of discussions on the issue within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Germany, with the support of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, convened a two-workshop series in Geneva. The aim was to facilitate dialogue on international humanitarian law and the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, with a view to building support for including the issue as a separate agenda item at the 2018 meeting of the High Contracting Parties of the Convention. The matters addressed at the first workshop, held on 14 June, were the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, the legal framework applicable to such use and the adaptation of military practices to mitigate risks to civilians. The second workshop, held on 12 September, focused on the role of information in military decision-making and collateral damage assessments, requirements for targeting and weaponeering, and additional measures to mitigate humanitarian impacts. In the 2018 session of the First Committee of the General Assembly, the issue continued to gain prominence in the thematic discussions on conventional weapons. Many States welcomed the priority that the Secretary- General afforded the matter, including in his Agenda for Disarmament and his call for States to develop measures designed to address the humanitarian impacts. Ireland, on behalf of 50 States, delivered a joint statement64 in which they expressed grave concern over the humanitarian harm caused by such use, including the long-term impacts. They expressed intent to continue supporting civil society in addressing those challenges and to remain seized of efforts to address the issue through the achievement of a possible political declaration and through support for other initiatives, such as regional conferences. (For more information about the activities of the First Committee, see chap. VI.) The 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held from 21 to 23 November, discussed the issue under its agenda item “Emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention”. Under that item, delegations discussed a working paper submitted by Germany65 entitled “Mitigating the civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas”. In the context of statements by some delegations that the Convention was not the right framework to address the issue, the Meeting agreed to place on the agenda of its next meeting the item “Emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention”, under which it encouraged the High Contracting Parties to submit related working papers. A number of High Contracting
64 A/C.1/71/PV.18. See also Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, statement on behalf of 50 States, New York, 25 October 2019. 65 CCW/MSP/2018/WP.1.
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Parties indicated that they would submit such working papers, including on the challenges presented by the use of certain conventional weapons in armed conflict and their impact on civilians, particularly in areas where there were concentrations of civilians. (For more information on the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, see the separate section in this chapter.) From 5 to 6 December in Santiago, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile convened a regional meeting in partnership with the International Network on Explosive Weapons on protecting civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. The 23 attending States adopted the Santiago Communiqué,66 in which they acknowledged the need to avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas and supported the negotiation and adoption of a political declaration on the matter.
Depleted uranium
At its seventy-third session, the General Assembly adopted its seventh resolution entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (73/38), in which it again requested the Secretary-General to submit an updated report on the topic. Echoing previous iterations of the resolution, which was first introduced in 2007, the Assembly addressed the potential harmful effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium on health and the environment, and it called for further research to assess those risks. Reaffirming language it adopted for the first time in the biennial resolution’s previous iteration (69/57), the Assembly also encouraged Member States to provide assistance to countries affected by the use of such arms, in particular by identifying and managing contaminated sites and material. Pursuant to the request of the General Assembly in the resolution’s prior iteration, the Secretary-General issued a report67 in June containing input from the International Atomic Energy Agency and 10 Governments68 on the effects of the use of such arms and ammunitions. In the report, the International Atomic Energy Agency emphasized that it had not been involved in any additional assessments on the matter after those described in a 2010 publication related to southern Iraq.
66 International Network on Explosive Weapons, “Communiqué from Regional Meeting on Protecting Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas”, Santiago, December 2018. 67 A/73/99. 68 Brunei Darussalam, Cuba, Jordan, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Oman, Peru, Qatar and Ukraine.
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Transparency in conventional arms transfers and military expenditures United Nations Register of Conventional Arms To promote transparency in international transfers of conventional arms, Member States voluntarily reported to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms their imports and exports of conventional arms during the prior year in the following seven categories: (a) battle tanks; (b) armoured combat vehicles; (c) large-calibre artillery systems; (d) combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles; (e) attack helicopters; (f) warships; and (g) missiles and missile launchers. Member States were also encouraged to report on imports and exports of small arms and light weapons, and they were invited to provide, as background information, additional data on procurement through national production, military holdings and national policies on arms transfers.
Follow-up to the 2016 Group of Governmental Experts In 2018, actions continued to be undertaken to the implement General Assembly resolution 71/47 of 5 December 2016, entitled “Transparency in armaments”, as well as the recommendations69 of the 2016 Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. In February, the Office for Disarmament Affairs circulated anote verbale calling upon all Member States to submit their national reports to the Register. In line with the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts, Member States were encouraged to provide, on a trial basis, information on their international transfers of small arms and light weapons in parallel with the seven categories of the Register.70 Also pursuant to the resolution mentioned earlier, the note called upon Member States to complete a questionnaire developed by the Group to better understand the reasons for the decline in reporting and to gather data on Member States’ views on the desirability and implications of including small arms and light weapons as an eighth category of the Register, on a par with the major conventional arms systems covered through categories I to VII of the instrument.71 As at the end of 2018, the following Member States had forwarded their completed questionnaire to the Office: Argentina, Bhutan, China, Madagascar and the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs conducted two briefings for Member States as part of its activities to promote the Register, familiarize
69 A/71/259, paras. 8–94. 70 A/71/259, para. 83. 71 Ibid., annex V.
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Member States with the electronic database and online reporting tool, and encourage States to submit their national reports.
Annual report to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms In 2018, 60 States submitted reports, including “nil reports”,72 on transfers of conventional arms that had taken place in 2017. Of the national reports received by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, 36 were included in the relevant report73 of the Secretary-General, and all were made available in the Register’s electronic database,74 with the exception of one that was submitted in an incompatible format. The number of reports received in 2018 represented a slight increase from the previous year, during which 57 States had submitted reports to the Register. Eleven of the 60 reports received in 2018 were nil reports. Of the other reports, 30 contained information on exports and 32 contained information on imports in the seven categories. In addition, 20 States provided background information on military holdings, 9 on procurement through national production and 37 on international transfers of small arms and light weapons.
Reported small arms and light weapons transfers as a percentage of total submitted reports
100%
90%
80%
70% 60% 60% 60% 62% 56% 56% 58% 60% 53% 49% 50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
The rate of participation by Member States differed significantly from region to region, as in previous years, and the reporting rate of each region
72 Nil reports are those in which the submitting States indicated that they had no transfers of weapons in the Register’s seven categories in 2017. 73 A/73/185. 74 Office for Disarmament Affairs,Transparency “ in the Global Arms Trade”.
103 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2018: Part II also showed little change in 2018. The number of reports submitted by African States increased by 2 (3 compared to 1 in 2017) while the number of reports by Latin America and Caribbean States remained unchanged (4 reports). Reporting by States from Asia and the Pacific decreased by 1 (11 compared with 12 in 2017). The number of reports submitted by Eastern European States remained the same as in 2017 (18 reports), and those of Western European and other States (24 in 2018, 22 in 2017) registered an increase.
Table 1. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 2008–2018
Total Member States by region 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Africa (54) 8 4 4 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 3 Asia and the Pacific (55) 21 18 16 18 11 12 9 10 13 12 11 Eastern Europe (23) 22 19 19 21 16 18 19 19 18 18 18 Latin America and the Caribbean (33) 11 13 8 17 6 8 8 8 5 4 4 Western Europe and other States (30) 29 26 25 27 21 25 21 23 18 22 24 Total 91 80 72 85 56 65 58 60 55 57 60
Database The data provided by States were made available on the Register’s interactive, map-based information platform,75 which presented information submitted to the Register since 1992. Government officials, researchers, journalists and the general public could view, gather and compare data, including by comparing details submitted by exporting and importing States on any transfer. Additionally, Member States could use an accompanying online reporting facility to submit their annual reports online, feeding directly into the database.
Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures United Nations Report on Military Expenditures The United Nations Report on Military Expenditures was established by the General Assembly in 1980, with the aim of increasing transparency in military spending.76 Under the relevant resolution, entitled “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures”, Member States are called upon to voluntarily provide information on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available. Member States are encouraged to provide such information in the
75 Office for Disarmament Affairs,The “ Global Reported Arms Trade”. 76 It was originally called the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures and was renamed in 2011 following a review of the instrument by a Group of Governmental Experts.
104 Conventional weapons templates developed by the United Nations (standardized form or simplified form) or, for those Member States that did not have military expenditures, to provide nil reports. A “single-figure” form, adopted following a recommendation of the 2016–2017 Group of Governmental Experts to review the Report, may be used by Member States that wish to report only the total amount of their military expenditure. The United Nations makes the submitted information publicly available, through publication of reports of the Secretary- General and an online database.77
Annual report on military expenditures In accordance with the General Assembly’s most recent resolution entitled “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures” (72/20), the Office for Disarmament Affairs in February sent a note verbale to all Member States calling for the submission by 30 April of reports on military expenditures. In response, the Office received reports from 35 States, including one nil report. Thirty-one national reports were included in the report78 of the Secretary-General on the matter. All the reports received were included in the electronic database. Seven fewer reports were submitted in 2018 than in 2017, when 42 reports were submitted. If nil reports are excluded from the count, reporting in 2018 changed only slightly (a decrease of one report) from 2017, when seven nil reports were submitted (compared with one in 2018). In 2018, as in previous years, the rate of participation varied greatly across regions. The regional distribution of the States that reported in 2018 was as follows: none from Africa (same as in 2017); 2 from Asia and the Pacific (compared with 6 in 2017); 5 from Latin America and the Caribbean (same as in 2017); 14 from Eastern Europe (compared with 16 in 2017); and 14 from Western Europe and Other States (compared with 15 in 2017).
Table 2. Regional participation of Member States in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures: 2008–2018
Total Member States by region 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Africa (54) 5 2 3 3 2 3 4 1 0 0 0 Asia and the Pacific (55) 13 9 13 8 9 3 11 7 6 6 2 Eastern Europe (23) 21 19 16 18 14 21 19 14 17 16 14 Latin America and the Caribbean (33) 11 7 4 9 11 11 12 7 12 5 5 Western Europe and other States (30) 27 21 21 19 15 21 22 17 13 15 14 Total 77 58 57 57 51 59 68 46 48 42 35
77 Office for Disarmament Affairs,UNARM “ ”. 78 A/73/154.
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Export controls Wassenaar Arrangement The Wassenaar Arrangement reported that it continued its efforts to promote transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, including by updating its List of Dual-Use Goods and the Technologies and Munitions List.79 In accordance with the object and purpose of the Arrangement, Participating States worked to ensure the detection and denial of undesirable exports and to update and improve the scope and clarity of the Wassenaar Arrangement control lists for licensing authorities and exporters. As noted at the Arrangement’s twenty-fourth plenary meeting, held from 5 to 6 December in Vienna, the Arrangement’s work continued to be informed by international and regional security developments, technological change and market trends. Considering those developments, Participating States worked to refine the scope of the control lists. The Chair of the plenary meeting, Leigh Turner (United Kingdom), issued a statement80 recognizing that further efforts were needed to respond rapidly and coherently to new challenges facing the Arrangement. The Chair summarized the work of Participating States in 2018, including ongoing exchanges of information on licit and illicit transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies; adoption of new export controls in a number of areas like quantum-resistant cryptography, algorithms, air-launch platforms for space launch vehicles, electromagnetic pulse-resistant software and explosives; approval of new tools to further promote consistency among licensing and enforcement authorities in the interpretation and application of Wassenaar Arrangement Control Lists; review of principal outreach activities with a view towards further refinement in 2019; and maintenance of informal technical contacts with the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group on control list matters. The Participating States also noted the Arrangement’s alignment with the Arms Trade Treaty, affirming that its secretariat would continue to monitor opportunities to contribute to international cooperation in that regard. It was announced that the next plenary meeting would take place in Vienna in December 2019, to be chaired by Greece.
79 “Summary of Changes List of Dual-Use Goods & Technologies and Munitions List as of 6 December 2018”. 80 United Kingdom, “Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary Chair Statement 2018: [United Kingdom] statement as 2018 Plenary Chair for the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies”, 10 December 2018.
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United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation
The United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation was created in 2013 to provide a flexible small-scale funding mechanism for conventional arms control. The Trust Facility, administered by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, extended in 2018 its successful record in mobilizing assistance for the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. From 2013 to 2018, financial and policy support for the Trust Facility was drawn from 13 donor countries81 to fund, on an aggregated budget of $11 million, 80 projects selected based on applications from regional, subregional and civil society organizations. Throughout the year, 80 Member States in all regions benefited, directly or indirectly, from projects funded using the Trust Facility. Those activities enabled 18 implementing partners to promote key themes and issues under the Programme of Action that included gender considerations, application of technical guides and data collection for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Key thematic activities funded using the Trust Facility in 2018 included the following: • Producing records of seized weapons and establishing a regional tracing mechanism in West Africa • Transitioning craft producers of weapons to alternative livelihoods • Assisting in the effective regulation of weapons brokering in southern Africa • Facilitating support by civil society and parliamentarians for the United Nations small arms process, including the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action • Conducting capacity-building training sessions for implementing the Arms Trade Treaty, preventing gender-based violence and advocating for the women, peace and security agenda • Collecting gender-specific and Sustainable Development Goals–related data on armed violence and presenting it online • Conducting studies on end-use and end-user controls. In 2018, the number of applications for funding increased by 30 per cent. The Trust Facility’s implementing partners formulated and carried out their project proposals in line with national needs for international assistance, as expressed in national reports on the Programme of Action submitted by
81 Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
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Member States.82 Following the 2018 call for proposals, a total of $2 million was expected to be disbursed to fund the implementation of 16 projects in 2019.83 Coordination between the formulation and implementation of funded activities continued to be prioritized and, in 2018, implementing partners submitted more than 30 coordination plans that were prepared in consultation with recipient countries, regional organizations, United Nations system entities and active players in the field. In a related effort, administrators of the Trust Facility and the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund regularly exchanged information to avoid duplication of work.84
Confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms
In his Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary-General noted that confidence-building mechanisms designed to prevent arms competition were underutilized and underdeveloped. In that context, he called on the Office for Disarmament Affairs to support opportunities for regional dialogue on confidence-building measures to foster cooperation and reduce military tension. At its seventy-third session, the General Assembly adopted its eighth biennial resolution on “Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms”73/51 ( ). In addition to encouraging Member States to continue to adopt and apply confidence-building measures, by the resolution, the Assembly invited Member States to voluntarily submit to the Secretariat information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. Pursuant to the resolution, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to maintain an online repository85 of military confidence- building measures, submitted by Member States, from all regions of the world. By the resolution’s most recent iteration, the General Assembly renewed its request to the Secretary-General to assist interested States in confidence-building activities and in the organization of seminars, courses and workshops aimed at enhancing the knowledge of developments in the field of conventional arms. In accordance with that mandate, the Office engaged with interested States and regional organizations to develop and advance regional confidence-building measures and processes.
82 Office for Disarmament Affairs, Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, “International Assistance”. 83 Office for Disarmament Affairs,UNSCAR: “ UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation”. 84 Arms Trade Treaty, “Voluntary Trust Fund”. 85 Office for Disarmament Affairs,Repository “ of military confidence-building measures”.
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For the first time, the General Assembly included a reference inthe resolution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, underlining that confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms were key tools in strengthening conflict prevention and reducing armed violence, thereby contributing to the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions. The General Assembly further welcomed the United Nations Disarmament Commission’s 2017 adoption of recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons, noting that those recommendations encouraged Member States, as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, to exchange information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons at the bilateral, subregional, regional and international levels.
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
As a framework agreement, the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] has served as a flexible platform for the progressive elaboration of limits on the means and methods of warfare, in accordance with international humanitarian law. The value and relevance of the [Convention] is not only reflected in the specific restrictions contained in its protocols. It is also reflected in the ability of the High Contracting Parties to pursue timely and dynamic discussions on new weapons.
Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs86
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons87 initially entered into force in 1983, with the aim of banning or restricting the use of specific types of weapons considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. Consisting of a chapeau Convention and annexed Protocols, it was deliberately designed to ensure flexibility to address future developments in conventional weapons technology and the conduct of armed conflicts, specifically by developing international humanitarian law through the negotiation of new protocols. In 2014, High Contracting Parties to the Convention began within its framework to discuss questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
86 Message to the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons delivered by Anja Kaspersen, Director of the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva, 21 November 2018. 87 The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects entered into force with its first three Protocols on 2 December 1983.
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As at 2018, the Convention’s five Protocols respectively addressed fragments undetectable by X-ray, landmines and other devices, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weapons and explosive remnants of war. The Convention had 125 High Contracting Parties at the end of 2018.88 All of the year’s planned meetings for the Convention took place despite a continued funding shortage that resulted in the absence of dedicated staff for its Implementation Support Unit. However, beyond those meetings, continued implementation of the Convention was limited. The Chair of the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Jānis Kārkliņš (Latvia), in cooperation with the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the High Contracting Parties, continued to seek measures to bolster the secretariat’s support to the Convention and to ensure the Convention’s financial sustainability.89
Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems The Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems90 met twice in 2018, first from 9 to 13 April and then from 27 to 31 August. Chaired by Amandeep Singh Gill (India), the Group continued to attract the participation of a large number of High Contracting Parties, observer States, international organizations and civil society organizations, as well as representatives of industry and academia.91 A high number of media representatives also attended the meetings of the Group, reflecting the topical nature of its work. The multifaceted nature of the Group’s work also was evident from the large number of working papers prepared for both sessions by High Contracting Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross, in addition to the broad range of topics addressed in events—organized by High Contracting Parties, civil society organizations and academia—held on the margins of the meetings. The work of the Group during its 2018 sessions was guided by four main agenda items:92 • Characterization of the systems under consideration in order to promote a common understanding on concepts and characteristics relevant to
88 The Convention’s text and status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ ccwc. 89 CCW/MSP/2017/8. In 2018, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office at Geneva continued their efforts to make the High Contracting Parties aware of the Convention’s financial difficulties and to clarify that the United Nations financial rules and regulations require that funds be received in advance of any and all incurring expenditures, such as the organizing of meetings and staff costs. 90 Established by the fifth Review Conference in 2016 CCW/CONF.V/10( , decision 1). 91 For the list of participants, see CCW/GGE.1/2018/3, sect. II. 92 CCW/GGE.1/2018/1.
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the objectives and purposes of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons • Further consideration of the human element in the use of lethal force; aspects of human-machine interaction in the development, deployment and use of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems • Review of potential military applications of related technologies in the context of the Group’s work • Possible options for addressing the humanitarian and international security challenges posed by emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention without prejudging policy outcomes and taking into account past, present and future proposals. While the meetings consisted mainly of intergovernmental discussions, one panel discussion on the review of potential military applications of related technologies took place in both meetings of the Group, also including panellists from industry and academia. At the close of its second meeting in 2018, the Group adopted by consensus a report93 containing both a set of possible guiding principles and a recommendation to the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties that the Group should meet for another two weeks in 2019 based on its existing mandate. Through those possible guiding principles, the Group reaffirmed the applicability of international humanitarian law to all weapons systems, including the potential development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. The guiding principles also stressed the need to retain human responsibility and accountability throughout the various stages of technology development, deployment and use. High Contracting Parties also agreed that any future policy measures should not impede progress in or access to peaceful uses of intelligent autonomous technologies and that those technologies should be seen as attributes and should not be anthropomorphized. High Contracting parties also reaffirmed the suitability of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons for continued discussions on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems. The 2018 Meeting of High Contracting Parties supported the extension of the Group’s mandate in 2019; however, it shortened the suggested meeting duration from 10 to 7 days, comprising one five-day session and one two-day session. The Meeting also decided that the Group would be chaired by Ljupčo Jivan Gjorgjinski (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 2019.
93 CCW/GGE.1/2018/3.
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Twelfth Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V The Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, also known as the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, was designed to prevent and minimize the humanitarian impact of unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive weapons long after the end of a conflict, with provisions on the clearance and destruction of explosive remnants of war, the protection of civilians, recording of the use of explosive ordnance, international cooperation and assistance, and victim assistance. The twelfth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Protocol V took place on 19 November. In accordance with decisions taken by the eleventh Annual Conference, the 2018 Conference focused on the clearance of explosive remnants of war, victim assistance and the implementation of article 4 on recording, retaining and transmitting information. Preparation for the Conference took place on 12 and 13 June at the Meeting of Experts for which the President-elect, Mouayed Saleh (Iraq), issued a brief summary report94 as an official document.95 The President-elect was not able to preside over the Conference itself, however; in accordance with rule 4 of the rules of procedure, the Vice-Presidents-designates, Terhi Hakala (Finland) and Yury Ambrazevich (Belarus), agreed to preside over the Conference’s morning and afternoon sessions, respectively. Of the 95 High Contracting Parties to Protocol V, 60 participated in the Conference. In addition, eleven High Contracting Parties to the Convention also participated, as well as two signatory States and three observer States. Other participants included the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Mine Action Service (on behalf of the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action), the European Union and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and 13 other civil society organizations.96 In its final document,97 the Conference welcomed the addition of new parties to Protocol V. With the newest consent to be bound, by Mauritius, the total number of High Contracting Parties to the Protocol increased to 95.98 The Conference also welcomed a workshop held at the Meeting of Experts in June on article 4, concerning “Recording, retaining and transmission of
94 CCW/P.V/CONF/2018/4. 95 As recommended by the fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in 2016, a workshop on article 4 on “Recording, retaining and transmission of information” took place during the 2018 Meeting of Experts. The workshop was facilitated by Ireland and Sweden. See CCW/CONF.V/10. 96 CCW/P.V/CONF/2018/INF.1. 97 CCW/P.V/CONF/2018/5. 98 The text and adherence status of Amended Protocol II are available from http://disarmament. un.org/treaties/t/ccwc_p5.
112 Conventional weapons information”.99 It decided to continue work on article 4 in 2019, tasking the President-designate, with the support of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, to work with High Contracting Parties to share national best practices on the implementation of article 4 and on generic preventive measures, following also the guidance provided in the Technical Annex of the Protocol, and to make the compilations of national best practices available on the Office’s website. The Conference decided that, under the overall responsibility of the President-designate, High Contracting Parties would continue their efforts to encourage a higher rate of national reporting, including the implementation of the measures100 adopted at the eleventh Annual Conference. High Contracting Parties were also encouraged to consider measures101 to improve reporting methodology. With regard to victim assistance, the Conference also decided to give particular focus to the exchange of information and experiences on implementation of the relevant commitments at the national and community levels, the provision of updates on the latest approaches and innovations in that field, and exchanges of practical experiences and lessons learned with other relevant legal instruments and forums. While the Conference agreed to hold the next Meeting of Experts “for a duration of up to one-and-a-half days”, the Convention’s 2018 Meeting of High Contracting Parties ultimately decided to reduce the duration of that Meeting to one day. The Conference nominated Terhi Hakala (Finland) as President-designate for the thirteenth Annual Conference, as well as Yury Ambrazevich (Belarus) and a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement as Vice-Presidents-designates.
Twentieth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II On 20 November, Yann Hwang (France)102 presided over the twentieth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, also known as the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996. Amended Protocol II was designed to limit the indiscriminate harm caused by such weapons and requires that High
99 This workshop took place in line with the recommendation of the fifth Review Conference in 2016. See CCW/CONF.V/10. 100 CCW/P.V/CONF/2017/5, para. 27. 101 CCW/P.V/CONF/2018/5, paras. 28–30. 102 In 2017, the nineteenth Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II nominated Alice Guitton (France) as President-designate of the twentieth Annual Conference. Following her departure from Geneva and the issuance of a silence procedure on her succession, Yann Hwang (France) ultimately presided over the twentieth Conference.
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Contracting Parties take all feasible precautions to protect civilians when they are used. In accordance with decisions103 taken at the nineteenth Annual Conference, work under Amended Protocol II continued to focus on the operation and status of the Protocol and on improvised explosive devices. In the framework of a meeting of experts that made preparations for the Conference on 11 and 12 June, the Coordinators on improvised explosive devices, France and Colombia, issued a report104 on relevant discussions. At the Conference itself, the Coordinator on the status and operation of the protocol, Eszter Kroll (Hungary), provided an oral briefing on the work carried out in 2018. (For more information about improvised explosive devices, see the separate section in this chapter.) With Mauritius expressing consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II, the total number of High Contracting Parties to the Protocol reached 105. Of those States, 66 participated in the twentieth Conference. Seven other High Contracting Parties to the Convention also participated, in addition to two signatory States and three observer States. Also taking part were the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Mine Action Service (on behalf of the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action), the European Union and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and 13 additional civil society organizations.105 In its final document,106 the Conference decided that, in 2019, the Amended Protocol II Group of Experts would consider measures to increase the rate of national reporting and the consistency of the current reporting methodology in the framework of Amended Protocol II. On improvised explosive devices, the Conference decided to renew the Group’s 2018 mandate (with only minor changes), which included a greater focus on technical innovations and developments in its discussions on humanitarian methods for the clearance of improvised explosive devices. The Conference further decided in its final document to accept a proposal107 by the President to reinforce the effectiveness of Amended Protocol II by conducting focused exchanges on various relevant aspects of its implementation. In that regard, the Conference decided that each future President-designate may select one or more articles of the Protocol which, upon approval by the High Contracting Parties, the Annual Conference would address under that President-designate’s authority under the agenda
103 CCW/AP.II/CONF.19/4. 104 CCW/AP.II/CONF.20/2. 105 CCW/AP.II/CONF.20/INF.1. 106 CCW/AP.II/CONF.20/5. 107 Letter dated 25 September 2018 from the Yann Hwang (France) to the High Contracting Parties of Amended Protocol II.
114 Conventional weapons item “Review of the status and operation of the Protocol”, without prejudice to a comprehensive and balanced discussion on the Amended Protocol and the Convention. Accordingly, the Conference encouraged High Contracting Parties, on a voluntary basis, to share experiences, provide information on national legal measures or present a set of skills and knowledge. The Conference also agreed that the President-designate of the twenty- first Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties would consult with delegations on possibilities to include discussions on good practices in implementing the Protocol with respect to mines other than anti-personnel mines, particularly for protecting civilians, based on the agreement of the High Contracting Parties. While the Conference agreed that the 2019 session of the Group of Experts would be “for a duration of up to one-and-a-half days”, the 2018 Meeting of High Contracting Parties ultimately decided to reduce the duration of the Meeting of Experts to one day.108 The Conference nominated a representative of the Eastern European Group as President-designate for the twenty-first Annual Conference, as well as representatives of China, the Netherlands and the Non-Aligned Movement as Vice-Presidents-designates.
Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons The Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was held in Geneva from 21 to 23 November. Representatives from 83 of the 125 High Contracting Parties, as well as two signatory States and five States not party to the Convention, participated in the Meeting. Three United Nations entities, three international organizations and 23 non-governmental organizations and other entities also attended.109 The Meeting of High Contracting Parties took note of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and the conclusions and recommendations contained therein.110 The Meeting decided that the Group would meet for seven days in 2019 in Geneva, first from 25 to 29 March and then on 20 and 21 August. (For more information on the Group, see the separate section in this chapter.) Under the agenda item “Other matters”, the Meeting took note of the report111 presented by the Chair on the informal consultations on how best to address the continuing differences of views on mines other than anti-personnel
108 CCW/MSP/2018/11. 109 CCW/MSP/2018/11, paras. 10–14. 110 CCW/GGE.1/2018/3. 111 CCW/MSP/2018/3.
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mines. In light of the decision by the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II on the issue of such mines112 and given their divergence of views, the Meeting did not mandate that the President of the 2019 Meeting continue informal consultations on the matter. Under the agenda item “Emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention”, delegations considered developments in science and technology that may be relevant to the work of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and referred to a working paper113 submitted by India and Switzerland on consideration of developments in science and technology that may be relevant to the work of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Under the same agenda item, delegations also addressed a working paper114 submitted by Germany on mitigating the civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and related issues. Divergent views persisted among delegations over how to take the issue forward and whether the Convention was the right framework for doing so. Following in-depth consultations among the High Contracting Parties, the Meeting agreed to maintain on the agenda for the following year the item “Emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention”. The Meeting also encouraged the High Contracting Parties to submit working papers on relevant developments in science and technology, as well as on any other relevant emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention. In addition, the Meeting underlined the Convention’s relevance as an appropriate forum to address such issues because it provided the High Contracting Parties with an opportunity to engage with the scientific and technical community, civil society, academia and other relevant stakeholders. In that context, a number of High Contracting Parties expressed their intention to submit working papers on the challenges presented by the use of certain conventional weapons in armed conflict and their impact on civilians, particularly in areas where civilians were concentrated. In a clarification of financial measures adopted in 2017, the Meeting agreed that unused funds in the Convention’s accounts at the end of each calendar year could be used to fund mandated activities of the Convention before the following July, when there would be reasonable assurance that the High Contracting Parties would pay to cover those expenses before the closure of the previous year’s financial accounts. In addition, the Meeting decided that remaining funds would be returned to the High Contracting Parties, if requested. The Meeting also agreed that no High Contracting Party could claim back any credits before the closure of the financial accounts of the year in question.
112 CCW/AP.II/CONF.20/5, para. 34. 113 CCW/MSP/2018/WP.2. 114 CCW/MSP/2018/WP.1.
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On a related issue, the High Contracting Parties decided to ask the Chair of the 2019 Meeting to continue consultations regarding measures to improve the stability of the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit. Recalling the decision115 on the Unit’s establishment, which remained effective, the Meeting also requested the Office for Disarmament Affairs to provide temporary staff support to the Unit to support Convention activities and services in 2019, provided that sufficient funding existed, without prejudice to the Unit’s future staffing arrangements. The Meeting elected Farukh Amil (Pakistan) as Chair of the 2019 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention.
Cluster munitions
The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force in 2010, prohibiting the use, development, production, transfer or stockpiling of cluster munitions under any circumstances. It also created a framework for cooperation and assistance with regard to victim assistance, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles, as well as risk-reduction education in affected communities.116 As at the end of 2018, the Convention had 105 States Parties.117
Eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/54 of 7 December 2015 and the decision of the Convention’s first Review Conference, the Secretary- General convened the eighth Meeting of States Parties from 3 to 5 September in Geneva. Hernán Estrada Román (Nicaragua) presided over the Meeting, in which 79 States participated, including six signatory and 13 non-signatory States. The observers in attendance included the United Nations Mine Action Service, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, the Cluster Munition Coalition, the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery of James Madison University, the Mines Advisory Group, the Norwegian Red Cross and the Halo Trust. The Office for Disarmament Affairs served as secretariat of the Meeting. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs delivered a video message to the Meeting.118 The participants also heard addresses by Sabrina
115 CCW/MSP/2009/5, paras. 34–37. 116 For more information, see the Convention’s website (www.clusterconvention.org). 117 The Convention’s status and text are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/ cluster_munitions. 118 Text of the video message, Geneva, 3 September 2018.
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Dallafior Matter, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament; Gilles Carbonnier, Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and Hector Guerra, Director of the Cluster Munition Coalition. During the thematic discussion, the Meeting welcomed the accession by Sri Lanka and the ratification by Namibia to the Convention, expressed strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in various parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor in accordance with article 21. The Meeting said that it was encouraged by the tremendous progress made in stockpile destruction, including the fulfilment by all States parties of their article 3 obligations before the completion date of 1 August. In particular, the Meeting congratulated Croatia, Cuba and Spain for having reported compliance with their article 3 obligations ahead of the deadline. The Meeting also adopted the draft Article 3 Declaration of Compliance,119 the Guidelines for the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 3 Extension Requests120 and the Guidelines for the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Extension Requests.121 The Meeting welcomed the progress report122 of the eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions submitted by the President and expressed satisfaction at the progress made in the implementation of the Dubrovnik Action Plan. The meeting also considered a working paper123 submitted by Germany on the establishment of a process for the selection of the presidency of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Following an exchange on the proposals in the document, the Meeting recognized the need to continue to reflect upon that important issue and to explore a sustainable process to make the succession of presidencies more predictable. In that context, the Meeting agreed to further consider the matter at the ninth Meeting of States Parties and to aim to reach an agreement at the second Review Conference, when the whole machinery of the Convention would be reviewed. In considering the Convention’s financial status, the Meeting noted with concern the financial situation due to the arrears in payment of assessed contributions. Underlining the importance of ensuring full compliance with article 14 obligations, it requested the President of the 2019 Meeting of States Parties to consult and prepare a document on possible measures to address financial predictability and sustainability, in consultation with
119 CCM/MSP/2018/WP.4. 120 CCM/MSP/2018/9, annex II. 121 CCM/MSP/2018/WP.2/Rev.1. 122 CCM/MSP/2018/5. 123 CCM/MSP/2018/WP.3.
118 Conventional weapons the Coordination Committee and accounting for discussions held in other disarmament conventions. States parties adopted the final report124 of the Meeting by consensus and appointed new coordinators125 to guide the intersessional work programme in 2018 and 2019. Additionally, the States parties designated Aliyar Lebbe Abdul Azeez (Sri Lanka) as President of the ninth Meeting of States Parties and Sabrina Dallafior Matter (Switzerland) as President of the Second Review Conference in 2020.
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: Intersessional activity and seventeenth Meeting of the States Parties
The seventeenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention126 took place in Geneva from 26 to 30 November, pursuant to article 11 of the Convention and decisions by its third Review Conference and prior meeting of the States parties. It concluded with the adoption of a final report.127 The Meeting built on informal intersessional meetings of the Convention that had taken place on 7 and 8 June in Geneva under the overall responsibility of Suraya Dalil (Afghanistan) as President, with representatives of Algeria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, Iraq, Switzerland and the United Kingdom serving as Vice-Presidents.128 The intersessional meetings addressed, inter alia, highlights of requests by States parties129 for an extension of the deadline
124 CCM/MSP/2018/9. 125 The appointed coordinators were the following: working group on the general status and operation of the Convention: Germany (until the end of the ninth meeting of States parties) working with Zambia (until the end of the second Review Conference); working group on universalization: Panama (until the end of the ninth Meeting of States Parties) working with Chile (until the end of the second Review Conference); working group on victim assistance: Ireland (until the end of the ninth Meeting of States Parties) working with Spain (until the end of the second Review Conference); working group on clearance and risk reduction: Lao People’s Democratic Republic (until the end of the ninth Meeting of States Parties) working with Sweden (until the end of the second Review Conference); working group on stockpile destruction and retention: Mozambique (until the end of the ninth Meeting of States Parties) working with Austria (until the end of the second Review Conference); working group on cooperation and assistance: Peru (until the end of the ninth Meeting of States Parties) working with the Netherlands (until the end of the second Review Conference). 126 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction entered into force on 1 March 1999. Its text and adherence status are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/mine_ ban. 127 APLC/MSP.17/2018/12. 128 The committees to be headed by the Vice-Presidents are the following: Committee on Article 5 Implementation; Committee on Cooperative Compliance; Committee on Victim Assistance; and Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance. 129 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan and United Kingdom.
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for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with article 5 of the Convention and an update from Ukraine, which was due to submit an extension request; progress made in fulfilling article 4 obligations by States parties that had failed to meet their respective stockpile destruction responsibilities; and continuing exchanges of views between the office holders on victim assistance under different treaty regimes.130 Additionally, activities conducted throughout the year by the four Convention committees informed the work both of the seventeenth Meeting of the States Parties and of the prior intersessional meetings. The Meeting heard messages by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, Salahuddin Rabbani;131 the Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Yves Daccord;132 the Convention’s Special Envoy, Prince Mired Bin Ra’ad Bin Zeid Al Hussein of Jordan;133 the Director of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Hector Guerra;134 the Director of Fundación Red, Jesus Martinez135; and the President of the Council of Foundation of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Barbara Haering.136 The Meeting condemned the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor, expressed concern about the number of victims of anti-personnel mines in various parts of the world and reaffirmed both the determination of the States parties to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and their aspiration to meet the Convention’s goals to the fullest extent possible by 2025. The Meeting also reaffirmed that the Convention applied to all States parties at all times and in all circumstances and did not allow derogations from its provisions. In addition, States parties welcomed the accession in 2017 of Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine to the Convention and took note of the report of the President on the status of the Convention’s universalization. The Meeting included a panel discussion entitled “Implementation of Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention”—moderated by Vincent Choffat (Switzerland) and featuring representatives of Colombia, Mozambique and the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit—generating
130 The treaties concerned are the following: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 131 Salahuddin Rabbani, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018. 132 Yves Daccord, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018. 133 Mired Bin Ra’ad Bin Zeid Al Hussein, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018. 134 Hector Guerra, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018. 135 Jesus Martinez, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018. 136 Barbara Haering, statement, Geneva, 26 November 2018.
120 Conventional weapons findings137 intended to provide further guidance to the States parties in declaring completion of their article 5 commitments. Separately, the Meeting considered and took note of the reports of the Convention committees,138 which had held regular meetings throughout 2018 and reported on their activities and conclusions as follows: • The Committee on Article 5 Implementation held exchanges of communications and information with States parties reporting a need to request extensions in 2018139 and with the 31 States parties in the process of implementing their article 5 obligations. It prepared observations on, inter alia, clarity regarding remaining challenges; progress in implementation; national plans for clearance and survey; the application of land release standards, policies and methodologies; actions related to commitments in extension requests and decisions on requests; and mine risk reduction efforts. The Committee presented to the seventeenth Meeting’s general conclusions140 and country-specific conclusions141 on article 5 implementation by the States parties that had submitted updated information, and it provided analyses or observations of requests by States for an extension of their article 5 deadlines.142 • The Committee on Cooperative Compliance continued its cooperative dialogue with States parties confronted with allegations of use of anti-personnel landmines.143 • The Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance focused its work on three areas: continuing development of the individualized approach to cooperation and assistance, using information exchange tools to foster partnerships between States parties and mapping needs and challenges. The Committee concluded, inter alia, that the individualized approach had generated growing recognition as a practical tool for implementation of the Convention and could serve to create a group of States that worked in cooperation with an affected State to assist with the completion of its obligations under the Convention.144
137 The Committee on Article 5 prepared a document (APLC/MSP.17/2018/10) based on the discussion. 138 Additionally, the Coordinating Committee of the Convention had held regular meetings to (a) manage work flowing from and related to formal and informal events ofthe States parties and (b) implement its responsibilities related to the accountability of the Implementation Support Unit. The third International Pledging Conference was also convened, in Geneva on 27 February, to help strengthen both the Convention’s architecture and Implementation Support Unit. 139 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. 140 APLC/MSP.17/2018/3. 141 APLC/MSP.17/2018/WP.5, WP.14, WP.17, WP.18 and WP.21. 142 APLC/MSP.17/2018/WP.8, WP.10, WP.24, WP.12, WP.16, WP.23, WP.20 and WP.20/ Corr.1. 143 South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. 144 APLC/MSP.17/2018/6.
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• The Committee on Victim Assistance continued activities aimed at improving the implementation of the victim assistance commitments by States parties with significant numbers of landmine survivors. The activities included a victim assistance retreat on 22 February to increase cooperation with relevant parties, briefings on 26 and 27 November for States parties with mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control and a series of awareness-raising activities. The Committee noted that casualties continued to be reported by States parties and that, in some cases, the number of casualties had increased owing to the use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature. The Committee encouraged States parties to provide additional information on victim assistance.145 Furthermore, participants welcomed announcements by Oman on the completion of its article 4 obligations on stockpile destruction and by Mauritania on the completion of its article 5 responsibilities on mine clearance. Participants also welcomed updates by States parties indicating responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors. In accordance with the agreed process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to deadlines pursuant to article 5, the States parties assessed and granted extension requests by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, Ukraine and the United Kingdom for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas.146 Furthermore, the Meeting emphasized that the obligation under article 5 implied that all areas falling under the definition of a “mined area” and containing “anti-personnel mines” must be addressed in order to meet the article’s obligations, independent of the difficulty of accessing a “mined area” or of the type of anti-personnel mines emplaced. The Meeting also reconfirmed specific understandings on the implementation of article 5.147 Emphasizing the importance of article 7 transparency reporting, the Meeting encouraged States parties to make use of the tools developed to facilitate reporting, including the Guide to Reporting,148 as adopted by the fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties. The States parties noted with concern the financial situation of the Convention due to late payment and arrears of assessed contributions and underlined the importance of ensuring full compliance with article 14 obligations. In particular, the Meeting called upon the States parties and States not party that participated in the Meetings to address issues arising from outstanding dues and to proceed promptly with the payment of their
145 APLC/MSP.17/2018/4 and Add.1 to 5. 146 APLC/MSP.7/2016/L.3 and APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, para. 27. 147 APLC/MSP.17/2018/10. 148 APLC/MSP.14/2015/WP.2.
122 Conventional weapons share of the estimated costs as soon as the assessment invoices were received. The Meeting welcomed the President’s paper149 on financial predictability and sustainability of United Nations assessed contributions and decided to continue the dialogue on the matter, to closely monitor the financial situation and to address the issue at the fourth Review Conference. The participating States decided that the fourth Review Conference of the States Parties would be held in Oslo from 25 to 29 November 2019, preceded by intersessional meetings to be held from 22 to 24 May in Geneva and two preparatory meetings to be held on 24 May and 18 September. The States parties elected Hans Brattskar (Norway) by acclamation as President of the fourth Review Conference and decided on the new membership of the Convention’s committees.
149 APLC/MSP.17/2018/WP.1.
123 chapter Regional IV disarmament Peruvian soldiers filling a burning tank with small arms ammunition ready for destruction in Pisco, Peru, in November 2018. C h a p t e r I V
Regional disarmament
The United Nations and regional organizations should work together to strengthen existing platforms for regional dialogue on security and arms control.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Development and trends, 2018
In 2018, regional disarmament activities continued to focus on a wide range of concerns related to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional arms, in particular the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The United Nations maintained regular engagement with regional and subregional organizations through regular policy dialogues, long-term projects and exchanges. To achieve further progress at the regional level, the Secretary-General pledged in his Agenda for Disarmament that the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs would increase engagement with regional organizations to explore new opportunities and strengthen existing platforms for regional dialogue on security and arms control.2 Meanwhile, serious concerns persisted with regard to the security environment of various regions. The leaders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States held a summit in Singapore on 12 June, opening an avenue for direct negotiations on nuclear disarmament and prompting a suspension of nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests, but progress in negotiating the dismantlement of nuclear weapons proved difficult and slow. Separately, the United States announced in May thatit intended to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, prompting widespread concerns about future implementation of the agreement on the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In Asia and the Middle East, arms races continued and intensified against a backdrop of growing concerns about territorial disputes and maritime security. Subregional conflicts in Africa and the Middle East continued unabated, as did threats to security and stability in those areas from terrorism and other violent extremism.
1 António Guterres, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.IX.6), p. xi. 2 Ibid., p. 65.
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In Colombia, the peace process that had ended 52 years of armed conflict between the Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo continued with broad support from the international community. On 13 September, the Security Council unanimously extended the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission for an additional year.3 Additionally, regional and subregional organizations continued to facilitate various efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and to enhance regional and global security. At the eighth Summit of the Americas, held in Lima on 13 and 14 April, countries agreed to adopt methods of combating corruption in line with international conventions and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.4 On 15 and 16 November, Heads of State and Government of the Americas attended the twenty-sixth Ibero-American Summit in Antigua, Guatemala, joining counterparts from Spain and Portugal and reaffirming their commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 16 on promoting peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Also in 2018, the African Union held its thirtieth summit in Addis Ababa from 22 to 29 January and its thirty-first summit in Nouakchott from 25 June to 2 July. The meetings addressed counter-terrorism and security issues related to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan. Within the framework of “Silencing the Guns by 2020”, the flagship project of Agenda 2063, the African Union urged member States after its thirty-first summit to plan activities that would mark September 2018 as Africa Amnesty Month, aimed at encouraging the voluntary surrender of illegally owned weapons. On 23 May, the Commissions of the European Union and the African Union held their ninth Commission-to-Commission meeting in Brussels to further strengthen their long-standing partnership and future cooperation. On 19 November, the Council of the European Union adopted a new strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, entitled “Securing arms, protecting citizens”. Additionally, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa convened its forty-sixth meeting in Brazzaville from 29 May to 1 June and its forty-seventh meeting in N’Djamena from 3 to 7 December. The Committee discussed the activities
3 Security Council resolution 2435 (2018) extended the mandate the Mission, whose purpose was to accompany the parties and verify their commitments regarding points 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Peace Agreement on the reintegration of former members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo and on measures to guarantee their protection and security, as well as those of communities affected by the conflict. 4 States called upon the Joint Summit Working Group to support the implementation and strengthening of national human rights–based programmes to develop the capacity of the police, public prosecutors’ offices, the judiciary and domestic oversight agencies to combat acts of corruption related to, inter alia, trafficking in firearms and other weapons. See Summit of the Americas, “Lima Commitment”, para. 51.
128 Regional disarmament of mercenary and armed groups in the region, as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, including progress in national ratifications of the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention).5 In that context, the Committee welcomed the holding of the first Conference of parties to the Kinshasa Convention from 11 to 13 June in N’Djamena. At the thirty-second and thirty-third summits of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—held in Singapore on 28 April and 13 November, respectively—member States reaffirmed their shared commitments to maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force.6 They also reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Association’s Community Vision 2025 and adopted the Leaders’ Vision for a resilient and innovative Association, highlighting their resolve to fully tap the opportunities arising from the digital revolution while staying responsive to emerging issues, including non-traditional security threats and environmental challenges, and ensuring sustainable development.7 Separately, the Pacific Islands Forum held its forty-ninth annual meeting in Yaren, Nauru, where its leaders called for closer regional security cooperation and stronger collective action. Governments also maintained efforts throughout the year to consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Within the framework of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty), the fourth ordinary session of the Conference of States Parties took place in Addis Ababa on 14 and 15 March, followed by the first extraordinary session on 14 June.8 Meanwhile, the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations continued to implement the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) following a 2017 decision to extend the agreement’s Plan of Action for another five-year implementation period, from 2018 to 2022. To further strengthen the implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean held the twenty-sixth special session of the Agency’s General Conference in Mexico City on 15 November,
5 The text and adherence status of the Kinshasa Convention are available from http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/kinshasa. The Convention entered into force on 8 March 2017. 6 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), “Chairman’s statement of the 32nd ASEAN Summit”, 28 April 2018. 7 ASEAN, “Chairman’s statement of the 33rd ASEAN Summit”, 13 November 2018. 8 In addition, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy held its ninth ordinary session in Addis Ababa on 8 and 9 October.
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focusing on its activities during the year and on current nuclear disarmament challenges. In 2018, the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Asia and the Pacific, continued to support Member States in promoting adherence to and implementation of disarmament and arms control instruments—such as the Arms Trade Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)—particularly through capacity-building activities. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons gained substantial support in Latin America and the Caribbean9 and in Asia and the Pacific.10 In addition, six States from Latin America and Africa ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in 2018.11 The centres also promoted regional dialogue and other confidence- building measures, including by providing Member States with information relevant to important events and activities in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. In particular, the centres provided Governments with regional- and subregional-level support in preparing for (a) the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and (b) the consultative process for the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group. Furthermore, in partnerships with the European Union and other donor countries, the regional centres continued to help build national capacities in weapons and ammunition management, especially through projects aimed at enhancing physical security and stockpile management, and strengthening forensic ballistic capabilities.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
Nuclear-weapon-free zones continued to provide a regional approach to strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms, and promoted peace and security at both regional and international levels. The legal foundation for such zones rests with the United Nations Charter and its language concerning “regional arrangements or agencies” to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security. Their importance is recognized in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
9 In 2018, the Treaty was ratified by six Latin American and Caribbean States (Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)) and signed by five States in the region (Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Dominican Republic and Saint Lucia). 10 In 2018, the Treaty was ratified by six Asian and Pacific States (New Zealand, Palau, Samoa, State of Palestine, Vanuatu and Viet Nam) and Cook Islands, and signed by four States in the region (Brunei, Kazakhstan, Myanmar and Timor-Leste). 11 In 2018, the Treaty was ratified by Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Suriname.
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Weapons, which states, “nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories”. As at 31 December, more than 100 States were parties or signatories to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, representing almost 60 per cent of the membership of the United Nations. Five regional nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established under the following treaties: (a) the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1969); (b) the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty, 1986); (c) the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty, 1997); (d) the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty, 2009); and (e) the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (2009). In addition, on 5 December 2018, the General Assembly once again recognized Mongolia as a self-declared, single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone in its biennial resolution entitled “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon status” (73/44), first adopted in 1998. In 2018, nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons maintained varying positions with respect to adherence to the above-mentioned treaties. Under relevant protocols to each of the treaties, the States could commit to respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the respective specified areas and undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties. All five nuclear-weapon States had adhered to Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Meanwhile, four of the nuclear-weapon States had ratified Protocols 1, 2 and 3 to the Treaty of Rarotonga; Protocols I and II to the Pelindaba Treaty; and the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The United States had signed all the protocols but had not yet ratified them. None of the five nuclear-weapon States had signed the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. See the following table for the status of adherence to the protocols that provide negative security assurances.
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Status of ratification of the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones As at December 2018
Russian United Protocol Status China France Federation Kingdom United States Additional Protocol II to the Signed 21 Aug. 1973 18 July 1973 18 May 1978 20 Dec. 1967 1 Apr. 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco Ratified 12 June 1974 22 Mar. 1974 8 Jan. 1979 11 Dec. 1969 12 May 1971 Protocol 2 to the Treaty of Signed 10 Feb. 1987 25 Mar. 1996 15 Dec. 1986 25 Mar. 1996 25 Mar. 1996 Rarotonga Ratified 21 Oct. 1988 20 Sep. 1996 21 Apr. 1988 19 Sep. 1997 –a Protocol to the Bangkok Signed – – – – – Treaty Ratified – – – – – Protocol I to the Pelindaba Signed 11 Apr. 1996 11 Apr. 1996 5 Nov. 1996 11 Apr. 1996 11 Apr. 1996 Treaty Ratified 10 Oct. 1997 20 Sep. 1996 5 Apr. 2011 12 Mar. 2001 –b Protocol to the CANWFZ Signed 6 May 2014 6 May 2014 6 May 2014 6 May 2014 6 May 2014 Treaty Ratified 17 Aug. 2015 17 Nov. 2014 22 June 2015 30 Jan. 2015 –c Note: The status of signature and ratification of the treaties and protocols are available from the Disarmament Treaties Database of the Office of Disarmament Affairs. a The Protocol was submitted on 2 May 2011 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification. See United States, Message from the President of the United States transmitting Protocols 1, 2, and 3 to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed on behalf of the United States at Suva on March 25, 1996 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 2011). b The Protocol was submitted on 2 May 2011 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification. See United States, Message from the President of the United States transmitting Protocols I and II to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, signed on behalf of the United States at Cairo, on April 11, 1996, including a Third Protocol Related to the Treaty (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 2011). c The Protocol was submitted on 27 April 2015 to the United States Senate for its consent to ratification. See United States, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, signed at New York on May 6, 2014 (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 2015).
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) The Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone covering a densely populated area. Following its opening for signature on 14 February 1967 and its entry into force on 25 April 1969, the Treaty gained recognition as an innovative and successful regional approach to nuclear disarmament and as a model for the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. The subsequent entry into force of the Rarotonga (South Pacific), the Bangkok (South-East Asia) and the Pelindaba (Africa) Treaties established nuclear-weapon-free zones covering nearly the entire southern hemisphere. On the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September, member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
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Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean issued a declaration12 in which they demanded that nuclear weapons not be used again, under any circumstances, by any actor. Member States of the Agency also reiterated the call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, (a) to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their security and defence doctrines and policies and (b) to comply fully with their legal obligations and unequivocal commitments to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay. At the General Assembly First Committee, the Agency’s Secretary- General delivered a statement13 during the general debate and an intervention14 on 17 October during a high-level exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other senior officials on the current state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament. On 15 November, the Agency’s member States held their twenty-sixth special session of the General Conference in Mexico City, focusing during the general debate on the activities of the Agency in 2018 and on current nuclear disarmament challenges.
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone, also known as the Bangkok Treaty, remained the only one of the five above- mentioned treaties without legally binding negative security assurances in force. At the thirty-second Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit, held in Singapore on 28 April, the Heads of State and Government of member countries reiterated15 their commitment to preserve the South-East Asian region as a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Bangkok Treaty and the Association’s Charter. They also reaffirmed their commitment to continuously engage with the nuclear-weapon States and intensify the ongoing efforts of all Parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Additionally, at the fifty-first Foreign Ministers’ meeting of the Association, held in Singapore on 2 August, ministers issued a joint
12 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, “Declaration of the Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean”, 26 September 2018. 13 A/C.1/73/PV.9. See also Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, statement, New York, 17 October 2018. 14 Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, intervention, New York, 17 October 2018. 15 ASEAN, “Chairman’s statement”, 28 April 2018.
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communique16 in which they stressed the importance of the 2018–2022 Plan of Action17 to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The member countries also highlighted during the 2018 session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly their commitment to preserving the South-East Asian region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.18
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) During the 2018 sessions of the General Assembly First Committee19 and the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,20 the African Group reiterated its commitment to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which reaffirmed the status of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and provided a shield for the African territory, including by preventing the stationing of nuclear explosive devices on the continent and prohibiting testing of those weapons on the African continent. The African Group also reaffirmed the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their contribution to addressing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation across all regions of the world.
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia In a statement21 to the First Committee on 30 October, Kazakhstan, as a State party to Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, reiterated its commitment to consolidating the efforts of all countries constituting nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means to expand and establish new zones throughout the world and foster cooperation among them. In addition, Tajikistan stressed the importance of the accelerated ratification of the Treaty’s Protocol on negative security assurances.
16 ASEAN, “Joint communiqué of the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, 2 August 2018. 17 ASEAN, “Plan of action to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (2018–2022)”, 4 August 2017. 18 A/C.1/73/PV.2. See also Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, statement delivered on behalf of ASEAN, New York, 8 October 2018. 19 A/C.1/73/PV.10. See also Omar Hilale, Permament Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, statement delivered on behalf of the African Group, New York, 17 October 2018. 20 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/SR.4. See also Sabine Böhlke-Möller. Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva, statement on behalf of the African Group, Geneva, 24 April 2018. 21 A/C.1/73/PV.23. See also Zhangeldy Syrymbet (Kazakhstan), statement, New York, 30 October 2018.
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Establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction One of the most significant developments during the seventy-third session of the First Committee of the General Assembly was the adoption, on 22 December, of decision 73/546 by which the General Assembly decided to entrust to the Secretary-General with the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The Assembly also decided that the conference was to take place no later than 2019 for a duration of one week at United Nations Headquarters. All States of the Middle East,22 the three co-sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,23 the other two nuclear-weapon States24 and the relevant international organizations were to be invited. The General Assembly adopted the decision by a vote of 88 to 4, with 75 abstentions. Israel and the United States opposed the draft decision, characterizing it as an attempt to impose terms and modalities on the pursuit of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Of the remaining nuclear-weapon States, China and the Russian Federation voted in favour, while France and the United Kingdom abstained. The establishment of such a zone had previously been discussed in the context of the preparatory sessions and the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.25 In decision 73/546, the General Assembly stipulated that the conference to be convened by 2019 “shall take as its terms of reference the resolution the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference” of the Treaty (para. (a) (i)).26 The issue played an important role at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty, held in Geneva from 23 April to 4 May 2018. In a working paper for the session, the United States stated that “the recommendations on the Middle East contained in the 2010 Review Conference Final Document”, which built upon the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, “while well-intentioned, can no longer
22 This is as defined in the report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East (GOV/2018/38- GC(62)/6). 23 Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States. 24 China and France. 25 A decision by the 2010 Review Conference to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 2012 was not implemented owing to political differences among States of the region. 26 For the resolution on the Middle East, see 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.
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be considered an appropriate basis for action on this issue”.27 The Group of Arab States, which had been unable to reach agreement on the issue at the previous year’s Preparatory Committee session, found a common position in 2018. In its own working paper,28 the Group “reject[ed] the substance of the working paper that was submitted by the United States” and stated that “no State can abrogate obligations that [had] been agreed upon at previous Review Conferences”. (For more information about the second session of the Preparatory Committee, see chap. I.)
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs regional centres United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa In 2018, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa continued to support African Member States, as well as regional and subregional organizations, in their efforts to promote disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. By strengthening the capacities of those entities and providing them with technical, legal and substantive assistance, the Centre contributed towards sustainable peace and security in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. During the year, the Centre completed a European Union–funded project on physical security and stockpile management in six countries of the Sahel region.29 The overall objective of the project was twofold: preventing the diversion and trafficking of small arms, light weapons and ammunition from Government-owned stockpiles; and addressing the danger of accidental explosions at those storage sites.30 The project’s activities in 2018 included (a) 18 “train-the-trainer” workshops for storekeepers and managers of Government armouries responsible for directly overseeing storage sites in line with validated national standard operating procedures; (b) support for the construction or rehabilitation of 16 weapons and ammunition depots by technical partners, including the United Nations Mine Action Service in Mali and the Mine Advisory Group; (c) an assessment of the use of new
27 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.33, para. 9 (c). 28 NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.34/Add.1, p. 2. 29 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. 30 More than 500 people participated in consultations and training activities organized by the Centre under the three-year project. Its phases before 2018 included national consultations at senior political and technical levels, a review of national legislation and administrative procedures and the development and validation of national standard operating procedures by national authorities in accordance with the Modular Small-arms- control Implementation Compendium (formerly the International Small Arms Control Standards) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.
136 Regional disarmament security technologies at weapons and ammunition stockpiles in the Sahel region, including identification of two pilot sites in Burkina Faso and Chad; and (d) a regional workshop, organized in August in Ouagadougou, where private companies specializing in physical security and database management showcased potential future products for enhancing stockpile management and securing arms and ammunition storage sites. In November, the Centre organized a regional conference in Dakar, where beneficiary countries and participating regional organizations evaluated the project’s activities and considered options to consolidate its achievements, including through a common strategy for physical security and stockpile management, as well as complementary action at the regional level. In December, the Centre launched, with the support of the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund, a new project, Support African States Towards the Vision of Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020.31 The aim of the new initiative was to provide technical and legal capacity-building that would strengthen the readiness of 11 Central African States32 to effectively implement the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention). Participants planned to produce and disseminate a new guide on implementing the Kinshasa Convention, hold a regional technical capacity- building workshop for all 11 Central African States and organize a regional legal assistance training workshop for States that ratified the Convention.33 In another project contributing towards the African Union’s vision of Silencing the Guns by 2020, the Centre supported Madagascar and Togo in their efforts to mark arms, rehabilitate depots and destroy obsolete weapons and ammunition. Through that initiative, the Centre also helped advance efforts to achieve target 16.4 of the Sustainable Development Goals, aimed at significantly reducing illicit arms flows. Through separate technical assistance in Madagascar, the Centre helped strengthen the commitment of national authorities, as well as the private sector and civil society, to effectively implementing Arms Trade Treaty provisions. In November, Malagasy authorities held a national workshop in Antananarivo as part of that effort, drawing 70 participants from the public and private sectors, as well as civil society, to be briefed by the Centre on the
31 The official launch of the project took place on 7 December, when the Centre signed a memorandum of understanding with the Economic Community of Central African States and the United Nations Office for Central Africa that formalized the institutional arrangements for its implementation. 32 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe. 33 The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa was expected to formally conclude the project at its forty-eighth ministerial meeting in June 2019.
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Treaty’s history, content and ratification status; complementarities with other international and regional instruments; and the Treaty’s Voluntary Trust Fund. Separately, in preparation for the Third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Centre organized a series of regional preparatory meetings to support African Member States in developing a common approach to the upcoming discussions. The meetings, which were held with financial support from the European Union, brought together national commissions on the control of illicit small arms, subregional and regional organizations and civil society entities to discuss issues such as stockpile management, weapons marking, record-keeping, tracing, collection and destruction, border controls, assistance and cooperation, ammunition, and challenges and opportunities from new technologies relevant to countering the illicit arms trade. In June, the Centre hosted a training course on weapons and ammunition management for practitioners of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. That pilot training, administered jointly by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, enabled planners to evaluate the course’s teaching style and further align its content with international best practices and the needs of United Nations field personnel. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research helped design the course, which emphasized content from a newly published handbook entitled Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context. The Centre also continued to help African States strengthen their implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In October, in collaboration with experts from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee), the Centre facilitated a presentation in Mali on how stakeholders could help the Government draft its national report on implementing the resolution. During a workshop in Djibouti that same month, the Centre’s staff briefed member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development about efforts by the Centre to support implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention in Africa and beneficial overlaps in activities to implement the Convention and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).34 Then in December, the Centre joined 1540 Committee experts at a national round table in Malabo to help relevant national authorities in Equatorial Guinea develop a better understanding of the resolution’s effective implementation, including the roles of various stakeholders. The Centre also circulated information on available assistance mechanisms to encourage requests by Member States for implementation support.
34 Their presentation also highlighted the Centre’s work to assist African Member States in implementing the resolution, the Convention, the Sustainable Development Goals and the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament.
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With support from Canada and in order to facilitate the participation of African States in the consultative process of the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group, the Centre helped organize a dialogue, held in March in Togo, between francophone Member States on the implications of a future treaty and its relationship with existing global and regional instruments. The meeting allowed experts involved in nuclear security issues to share knowledge and information relevant to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Centre also continued to provide substantive support to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. It took part in the forty-sixth and forty-seventh meetings of the Committee, which were respectively held in Brazzaville from 29 May to 1 June and in N’Djamena from 3 to 7 December. Additionally, the Centre continued its efforts to promote youth participation in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation initiatives.35 In collaboration with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Centre carried out three seminars on youth training and integration in Togo, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, entitled “African youth, the main actor of peace and sustainable development”. Training sessions addressed the issues of disarmament, peace education and preventing the spread of small arms and light weapons among youth.
Ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa held two ministerial meetings in 2018 to examine continuing and emerging peace and security challenges in the region and help Member States address them collectively. Giving particular attention to the growing, transnational threats to stability from mercenary groups and migratory livestock farming, the Committee made security recommendations to Member States in contexts where disarmament remained a priority—including the Central African Republic and the Pool region in the Congo—and it continued to concretely address the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons as an enabler and multiplier of security threats. During its forty-sixth meeting, held in Brazzaville from 29 May to 1 June, the Committee discussed the regional activities of mercenary and armed groups. In its ministerial declaration, the Committee highlighted the dangerously negative impact of those entities on peace and security, as well as their potential to erode trust among Member States in the region. Making
35 The Centre pursued its youth outreach in line with recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124).
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specific reference to recent attempts by mercenaries to destabilize Equatorial Guinea, the Committee underscored the importance of strengthening bilateral and multilateral collaboration and cross-border security cooperation to effectively address the threat of mercenary and armed groups in the region. It also highlighted security threats related to the easy access to arms used by herders and farmers in conflicts with attackers, including criminal groups. Taking stock of progress related to the Kinshasa Convention, the Committee called on four Member States that had not ratified the agreement36 to do so as soon as possible. It also welcomed progress made in the Convention’s implementation, notably through (a) activities of five national commissions previously established in the context of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa37 and (b) ongoing efforts by the Economic Community of Central African States to set up such commissions in Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Gabon. The Committee also reported on a field visit conducted by its Bureau in Congo from 17 to 20 April, providing the basis for recommendations to Member States, the United Nations and the Economic Community on, inter alia, the urgent need to implement national programmes on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to include women, youth and affected communities. The Committee also reaffirmed women and children associated with combatants as integral to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. At its forty-seventh meeting from 3 to 7 December, the Committee continued to review regional security and peace trends. In that regard, it reiterated concerns over mercenary activities in the region and, in particular, their links with transnational organized crime and illegal trafficking, including poaching. In its ministerial communiqué, the Committee called on the African Union, the United Nations and the Economic Community to strengthen cooperation on the issue of mercenary activities. The Committee also welcomed the first Conference of States Parties to the Kinshasa Convention,38 which had been held from 11 to 13 June in N’Djamena, with a focus on access to small arms and light weapons by non-State actors, the creation of a permanent secretariat for the Conference and its financing, and the holding of national conferences to support the implementation of the Kinshasa Convention in the region. The Committee
36 Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda. 37 The treaty text and status of adherence are available from Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, “Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States”. 38 The Secretary-General convened the Conference in accordance with article 34 of the Kinshasa Convention.
140 Regional disarmament also noted progress towards ratifying the Kinshasa Convention by the four remaining member States of the Economic Community; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the National Assembly on 22 November adopted a draft bill that, if enacted, would allow the country to ratify the Convention. Returning to the issue of migratory livestock farming, the Committee continued to highlight transhumance as an emerging threat to peace and security in the region, with links to conflict, criminal networks and small-arms proliferation. The Committee reported on a field mission by its Bureau to Chad39 and, in that context, endorsed recommendations to the Economic Community’s member States, as well as to its secretariat and the United Nations, related to strengthening border security and exploring a possible disarmament programme targeting herders and farmers.
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean The United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to support States of the region in implementing disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, as well as adhering to international standards and norms. In 2018, the Centre expanded its technical assistance in areas including small arms and ammunition destruction, improving interdiction capacities, and marking and tracing practices. It also provided legal and policy support to Governments facing security challenges related to illicit arms trafficking. In that regard, the Centre aided States in strengthening national frameworks to reinforce import and export controls for both conventional weapons and dual-use goods. Throughout the year, the Centre carried out more than 90 activities in response to official requests for assistance by Member States, reaching close to 1,500 national representatives and participants. At the request of Member States and partners, it provided expertise relevant to multiple national and regional initiatives aimed at addressing public security issues related to illicit arms and ammunition trafficking. The Centre’s full range of activities included law enforcement capacity-building, technical assistance in stockpile management and specialized advice on controlling conventional arms and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Through such efforts, the Centre further strengthened its partnerships with regional organizations and United Nations agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Volunteers and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.40
39 The field mission took place in the localities of Maro, Sarh and Sido in Chad, situated near the country’s border with the Central African Republic. 40 The Centre continued to enjoy strong financial support from Canada, Germany and the United States for its programmes on conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, and its national and subregional work related to Security Council resolution
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In support of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Centre, with funding from Germany, continued efforts aimed at utilizing innovative X-ray identification tools to improve capacities for combating arms trafficking through postal systems, customs channels, private couriers and airport security. The Centre also helped train private security companies in managing arms and ammunition stockpiles, strengthening their capacities to counter risks of weapons diversion. Additionally, the Centre supported the destruction of more than 19,000 obsolete weapons in Peru and provided technical assistance to the Peruvian Army in destroying, inter alia, 10 human-portable air-defence systems, 140 helicopter bombs and 20,000 pieces of small arms ammunition in compliance with international standards, while improving the safety and security of Government arsenals. Through training initiatives and national seminars attended by 70 personnel, the Centre assisted eight Caribbean States41 in enhancing their forensic ballistic capabilities in line with the International Tracing Instrument. In related activities, the Centre provided specialized training on the proper handling of firearms-related evidence; supported improvements to the physical infrastructure of forensic laboratories, including new, contained test-firing ranges; and organized a regional meeting of 35 representatives from Member States and international organizations, as well as ballistics experts on combating gun crime through improved operational ballistic measures. Separately, the Centre acted as the main implementing partner of several States for activities under the Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund, delivering related on-site training to government officials from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay. The Centre also continued to help five States42 implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), providing technical assistance on adopting both national control lists and licensing regimes to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Centre continued to support States in drafting voluntary action plans on national implementation, organizing or participating in national and regional discussions in Guyana and Suriname that also included experts from the 1540 Committee. Separately, the Centre held a series of national workshops on explosive chemical precursors as part of a collaborative partnership with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Centre continued its local-level support of the Sustainable Development Goals,
1540 (2004). The Centre also benefited from ongoing bilateral voluntary contributions from Guyana, Mexico and Peru. 41 Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and Tobago. 42 Dominican Republic, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
142 Regional disarmament specifically Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, by engaging local youth in measuring violence and insecurity through participatory indicators. Building upon its prior experience in that area, the Centre trained more than 60 youth volunteers who conducted over 5,000 surveys in Peru and Colombia focusing on targets 16.1 and 16.4. A publication showcasing the main findings of the community-based survey was released. As part of its ongoing promotion of women’s participation in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation initiatives and in line with General Assembly resolution 65/69 of 8 December 2010, the Centre increased its efforts to mainstream gender as a cross-cutting theme in the design and implementation of all of its projects and in new training activities. With funding from Canada, the Centre launched a new multi-year project entitled “Building Momentum for the Regional Implementation of A/RES/65/69 on Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control”, with technical training activities in Colombia and El Salvador throughout the year.
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific continued to assist Member States of the region in strengthening their national implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Arms Trade Treaty and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The Centre also organized events on various issues related to a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; safe and secure ammunition management; and women, peace and disarmament. In January, the Centre convened a national round-table meeting in Ashgabat that concluded a programme to support regional implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in Central Asia and Mongolia. Held as a collaboration between the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the programme led to the development of four national implementation action plans submitted by four States43 to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).44 Separately, the Centre cooperated in 2018 with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Maritime Organization with a view to substantively supporting their efforts to counter maritime terrorism and financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in South Asian States in the framework of resolution 1540 (2004).
43 Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 44 Additionally, Timor-Leste submitted its first national report in January following a national round-table meeting organized in October 2017 by the Centre in cooperation with the Committee’s Group of Experts.
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The Centre’s activities also included organizing a regional meeting of Asian States in March to support preparations for the third Review Conference on the Programme of Action. Funded by the European Union and carried out in cooperation with the Conventional Arms Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the event brought together representatives of 19 States in Bangkok to address national and regional implementation of the Programme of Action, including related challenges. The meeting also focused on complementary aspects of the Arms Trade Treaty and other relevant agreements, small-arms tracing and stockpile management, the relationship of ammunition to the Programme of Action framework, and how developments in small arms manufacturing technology could impact implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. Additionally, using funds from the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, the Centre organized two subregional workshops, for South-East Asia and South Asia, on addressing gun violence and illicit trafficking in small arms from a gender perspective. The events—one held in Bangkok in July for participants in South-East Asia and the other held in Kathmandu in September within the framework of the “Kathmandu Process”—brought together 23 civil society representatives, most of whom were women, and 13 national parliamentarians with experience working on gender and arms control issues in 12 States. The gender perspective of the events was aimed at enhancing control of small arms and light weapons by equipping women with skills and insights to take related action. In that regard, the purpose was to strengthen implementation of the Programme of Action and adherence to the Arms Trade Treaty while also sensitizing decision makers to the distinct impact of gun violence on women and girls. In August, the Centre celebrated International Youth Day in Nepal by bringing together 50 students from high schools, colleges and universities in Kathmandu together with Government ministries and United Nations agencies. The students discussed what peace and disarmament meant to them and how the youth could actively engage on those issues in meaningful ways. In November, the Centre organized two training courses on conventional ammunition management in cooperation with the Conventional Arms Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, reaching national authorities from South Asia, South-East Asia and Mongolia. With financial support from Sweden, the training increased awareness of the United Nations SaferGuard Programme and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. It also enhanced the capacity of 17 government officials and experts in the safe and secure management of ammunition stockpiles, specifically in minimizing the risk of unintended explosions and diversion to illicit markets. Both subregional events were held in Kathmandu under the framework of the Kathmandu Process.
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In cooperation with the Geneva Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Centre conducted three regional workshops—in Bangkok in March, in Astana in September and in Nadi, Fiji, in December—on the implications of a potential treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In that context, the discussions addressed the relationship of such a treaty with current global and regional instruments, as well as outcomes of the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group, which had concluded its workin February. Funded by Canada and the European Union, the two events covered the entire Asia-Pacific region, with participants facilitating dialogue among officials from 23 States on ways forward and possible challenges related to such a treaty.
Disarmament and arms regulation at the regional level Africa African Union Activities addressing weapons of mass destruction, including the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) Throughout 2018, the African Union supported a range of activities carried out in Addis Ababa on issues related to weapons of mass destruction. Those efforts included two meetings within the framework ofthe African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: the fourth ordinary session of the Conference of States Parties, held on 14 and 15 March; and the first extraordinary session of the Conference, convened on 14 June. From 14 to 16 August, the African Union partnered with the 1540 Committee to organize a training course for national points of contact on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) from French-speaking member States. Separately, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy held its ninth ordinary session on 8 and 9 October, and the African Union collaborated with the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit to convene a meeting on awareness-raising for non-States parties on 12 and 13 December. In addition, experts met in Vienna on 14 and 15 December, commencing the development of an African Union Model Law on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security.
Activities related to conventional arms The African Union collaborated with the Small Arms Survey to achieve two milestones during the year: the launch of a pilot project in Addis Ababa on 4 and 5 December entitled “Strengthening National Institutions in Developing a System of Indicators on Firearms” and the completion and validation of a draft study on illicit arms flows in Africa.
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Also in 2018, member States developed and validated a draft African Union policy entitled “Management of Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons in Peace Support Operations”. In another activity, the African Union provided technical and training support to its member States pursuant to the Initiative on the Safe and Secure Management of Ammunition. The African Union also convened a consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on 6 December to help develop a coherent regional response to improvised explosive devices.
Activities related to peace, security and disarmament in general In 2018, the “Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region”,45 developed by the African Union in collaboration with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, was launched. A key pillar of the strategy was related to screening, prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of Boko Haram–associated persons. Also during the year, the African Union supported the development and validation of two operational guidance notes, one on “Foreign Fighters” and the other on “Countering Violent Extremism in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Contexts”.
Other relevant activities or institutional developments On 24 May, the African Union Peace and Security Council adopted, at its 776th meeting, a communiqué on “Illicit Flows and Financing of Arms in Africa: Sources of Conflicts and Impediments to Silencing the Guns in Africa”.46 Later in the year, the Council dedicated its 793rd meeting, held on 4 September, to commemorating the Africa Amnesty Month and launched a working paper47 to guide national efforts in that regard.
Economic Community of West African States Weapons of mass destruction–related activities The Economic Community of West African States hosted an international workshop from 16 to 18 October in Abuja entitled Role of implementing legislation on the Chemical Weapons Convention in addressing threats arising from non-State actors. The workshop explained how national legislation for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention could help address threats from non-State actors, including potential acts of chemical terrorism, while also enhancing elements of legal and regulatory frameworks on chemicals.
45 African Union, “Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region”, August 2018. 46 African Union, document PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCLXXVI). 47 African Union, document PSC/PR/BR.(DCCXCIII).
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Representatives of relevant countries and organizations attended the event, which was organized by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in collaboration with the Economic Community’s Commission and the Nigeria National Authority on Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.
Activities related to arms control During 2018, Germany funded various activities in the Economic Community’s region to support implementation of the African Union road map for Silencing the Guns by 2020. Within the framework of that support, the Economic Community and its member States held a regional meeting in Dakar on 16 and 17 May aimed at fostering regional and national ownership of the road map’s vision. Participants in the meeting, which was the first of its kind, adopted both regional and national priorities for implementing the road map in each member State. The Economic Community also supported regional initiatives to activate national commissions to control illicit small arms in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, which had yet to achieve functional bodies of that kind. For example, the Economic Community presented two assessments on weapons and ammunition management to the President of Gambia, Adama Barrow, to help strengthen the security of government weapons storage facilities in line with the Economic Community’s Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials48 and the road map for Silencing the Guns by 2020. In December, the Economic Community held consultations in Abuja with delegates from Guinea-Bissau to contribute towards enhancing national institutional capacities. Additionally, the Economic Community supported a five-day pilot programme entitled “Multi-phase Competence Building Course in Physical Security and Stockpile Management”, which was part of a project funded by Germany and facilitated by advisors from the Bonn International Center for Conversion. During that activity, depot and weapons-storage-facility managers received technical support on physical security and stockpile management from representatives of the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group. The event took place at the Martin Luther Agwai International Leadership and Peacekeeping Centre in Jaji, Nigeria.
Activities related to peace, security and disarmament With the Economic Community of West African States–European Union Small Arms Project in its closing phase, participants continued efforts in 2018 to deliver on previously established goals and benchmarks. The project’s
48 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, article 16.
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achievements during the year included collecting significant quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosive remnants of war in the countries of the Mano River and Sahel regions, enhancing cross-border community safety and security in those areas.
Economic Community of Central African States In 2018, the Economic Community of Central African States continued pursuing a five-year plan the organization had developed in 2017 for implementing the Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention).49 In that regard, the Economic Community’s secretariat worked to, inter alia, provide technical assistance to member States for establishing national commissions on controlling illicit small arms and light weapons.50 At the first conference of States parties and signatories to the Kinshasa Convention, held in Yaoundé from 11 to 13 June, participants decided to establish an arms control office within the Economic Community’s secretariat and a trust fund to cover its operating costs and activities. Also in 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ratified the Convention and promulgated its ratification act on 13 December. In August, Cameroon became the Economic Community’s third member State to become a State party to the Arms Trade Treaty.51 The Economic Community’s secretariat continued encouraging member States to ratify the Treaty in view of its positive security implications for the subregion.
Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa In line with its mandate, the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa continued to support relevant coordination between member States of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and
49 Efforts by member States of the Economic Community to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons led to the adoption of the Kinshasa Convention on 30 April 2010. As at the end of 2018, seven countries had become States parties to the Convention: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe. The text and adherence status of the Convention are available from https://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/kinshasa. 50 Under the five-year plan, the secretariat was expected to address a broader range of challenges in controlling small arms and light weapons in the region, which included illicit weapons held by armed groups and unauthorized civilians, inadequate management of some weapons stockpiles by defence and security forces, insufficient physical security measures for certain weapons and ammunition stockpiles, an absence of institutional coordination mechanisms in some States, and national arms control regulations not in alignment with relevant regional and international legal instruments. 51 Central African Republic and Chad previously became States parties to the Treaty.
148 Regional disarmament the Horn of Africa.52 The Centre received support for various activities from those States and from several development partners: the African Development Bank, the United States Department of State, the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group, the German Federal Foreign Office, and the Bonn International Center for Conversion. Through the Weapons Removal and Abatement Grant provided by the United States Department of State, the Centre supported activities related to physical security and stockpile management that included the following: • Constructing four armouries in the United Republic of Tanzania to safely store firearms and ammunition in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Moshi and Zanzibar • Providing training on physical security and stockpile management to 120 personnel from police and military law enforcement agencies in Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania • Supplying 150 steel “arms boxes” and 48 gun racks to Kenya for safe storage of stockpiled weapons • Developing A Practitioner’s Manual, a guide for physical security and stockpile management of small arms and light weapons in the Centre’s member states • Procuring a firearms crushing machine and delivering it to Kenya in support of the country’s environmentally friendly firearms disposal initiatives. Under Phase II of the African Development Bank project entitled “Strengthening Regional and National Institutions for Reduction of Proliferation of Small Arms”, the Centre undertook the following activities: • Supported capacity-building in the national institutions of the Central African Republic responsible for managing and controlling small arms and light weapons • Assisted in the rapid assessment of national action plans in five States53 to control and manage illicit small arms and light weapons • Supplied training on best practices in physical security and stockpile management to 80 personnel drawn from police and military law enforcement agencies in the Central African Republic and from national intelligence service, correctional and fire brigade entities in South Sudan
52 See Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, “Nairobi Protocol”. 53 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.
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• Provided specialized technical and managerial training for 11 staff members of the Centre’s secretariat, increasing its capacity to coordinate regional programmes and initiatives to control illicit small arms and light weapons • Supported high-level consultative meetings with selected Centre member States, including Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. With funding from the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation, the Centre supported a regional sensitization workshop for seven States54 on ratifying or acceding to the Arms Trade Treaty, drawing senior government officials and delegates from selected civil society organizations. It also helped convene national-level sensitization workshops on the Treaty in those States, also with participation by senior officials and representatives of selected non-governmental organizations. As part of a project funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, the Centre supported the development of national baseline assessments on civilian disarmament initiatives and practices in Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. Furthermore, it contributed to conducting national awareness-raising campaigns on civilian disarmament in selected regions in South Sudan.55 The Centre also supported a range of physical security and stockpile- management activities in partnership with the Bonn International Center for Conversion and the Multilateral Small Arms and Ammunition Group. The activities included the following: • Finalizing and printing a handbook on the Centre’s firearms record- keeping software • Training 26 Sudanese police and military officers through a national- level course on physical security and stockpile management • Conducting a “train-the-trainer” workshop on physical security and stockpile management in Kenya, reaching 36 officers • Translating several training modules on physical security and stockpile management into French and Arabic.
54 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania. 55 Similar campaigns in Kenya and Uganda were scheduled for implementation in 2019.
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Americas Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security Activities related to peace, security and disarmament The Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security implemented and supported initiatives in the areas of peace, security and disarmament throughout 2018. Drawing on financial support from the tenth European Development Fund, the Agency worked to secure the borders of Caribbean Community member States by (a) expanding and upgrading its Advanced Passenger Information System, which facilitates the pre-screening of air and sea travelers by checking them against regional and international watch lists and (b) advancing the legislative framework for a new Advanced Cargo Information System to screen all regional cargo manifests and standardize cargo reporting data. Those efforts—aimed at both strengthening border intelligence and information-sharing to promote peace, security and disarmament—were managed by the Joint Regional Communications Centre, one of two subagencies providing risk management services to Caribbean Community member States. As part of those efforts, the Agency assessed and upgraded hardware and software in the 10 States56 participating in the Advanced Passenger Information System, while expanding the system to two additional States and one territory.57 It also helped all Caribbean Community member States to draft and enact national-level legislation for implementing the Advanced Cargo Information System. Also in 2018, the Agency delivered training, both online and in person, to immigration and customs personnel, and coast guard and police officers, attended by 91 border security officials in two States and one territory.58 As at 31 December, the Agency had trained 1,019 border security officers from 15 member States. In addition, the Agency expanded the Caribbean Community’s Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network to Trinidad and Tobago, enabling the Government to share ballistic information with Barbados, Belize and Jamaica, which had joined previously. Meanwhile, local law enforcement agencies in three countries59 received training and equipment for “double casting”,
56 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. 57 Belize, Haiti and Montserrat. 58 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica and Montserrat. 59 Dominica, Haiti and Saint Kitts and Nevis.
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building on similar past preparations and extending that forensic evidence- sharing capability to all Caribbean Community member States.60
Asia Association of Southeast Asian Nations During the year, steady progress continued in the implementation of the Bangkok Treaty, following a 2017 decision by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to extend the agreement’s Plan of Action for another five-year implementation period, from 2018 to 2022. Speaking on 14 November at the thirty-third Summit of the Association, the Chair reiterated the shared commitment to preserve the South-East Asian region as a region free of nuclear weapons, to continuously engage with the nuclear-weapon States and to intensify the ongoing effort of all States parties to the Bangkok Treaty to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the Treaty’s objectives and principles.61 Earlier in the year, the Association’s Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy adopted a new five-year work plan for the years 2018–2022 at its Fifth Annual Meeting, held in Singapore on 26 and 27 June. Preparations were nearly complete for a new practical arrangement to formalize the Association’s relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, promising a strengthened institutional relationship that would promote greater cooperation, as well as sharing of experiences and best practices in the areas of nuclear science and technology. The engagement could extend to areas including human health; food security and agriculture; nuclear safety, including radiation protection, radiation monitoring and emergency preparedness and response; nuclear security; and nuclear safeguards. The tenth Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the Association’s Regional Forum, held in April, took note of the preparation for the 2020 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It also noted the efforts of Meeting participants to strengthen and implement current non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Participants also considered the close connection between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Also in 2018, the Association’s Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime for the first time convened its new Working Group on Arms Smuggling.
60 Double casting enables law enforcement agencies to create identical plastic casts of original evidence, such as used bullets and gun cartridges, for other countries to store and analyse with automated ballistic information systems, comparing it and potentially matching it with evidence collected from separate crime scenes. 61 ASEAN, “Chairman’s statement”, 13 November 2018.
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During the proceedings, the member States highlighted their respective national strategies and efforts to address arms smuggling, while also exploring the need for an instrument of the Association in that area.
Pacific Islands Forum In keeping with its established focus on regional security, the Pacific Islands Forum continued throughout 2018 to engage on disarmament issues, as it had since its 1971 inception. The Forum’s activities during the year included continued efforts by its secretariat to raise awareness about the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, a key instrument of the Forum that establishes a strong regional legal framework to ban the use, testing and possession of nuclear weapons, as well as the dumping of radioactive waste. The Forum also participated in two regional meetings in Nadi, Fiji: (a) one held on 12 and 13 December to address the universalization of the Biological Weapons Convention and (b) a second convened on 13 and 14 December on issues relevant to possible future negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Fiji hosted both events with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Building on an initiative they launched in 2016, the Forum’s member States and secretariat continued to work with specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, to review the Forum’s Model Provisions on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime62 in view of significant international developments in response to the evolving nature of the terrorist threat and transnational criminal groups. Participants had identified specific areas for focused technical review—in particular the matter of targeted financial sanctions concerning terrorism, proliferation or financing of related activities—and developed a new set of model provisions specifically for targeted financial sanctions.63 Member States were expected to consider the new model provisions for potential endorsement in 2019. At the Forum’s forty-ninth annual meeting, held from 3 to 6 September in Yaren, Nauru, Forum Leaders called for strengthened regional security cooperation and collective action through the assertion of the will and voices of peoples of the Pacific. In that context, they endorsed the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, reaffirming the region’s commitment to existing Forum security declarations, such as the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement
62 Such model provisions drew upon on one or more regional security declarations (e.g., the Honiara Declaration of 1991 and the Nasonini Declaration of 2002) aimed at promoting cooperation and action in support of regional security objectives. 63 Pacific Islands Forum, Forty-ninth“ Pacific Islands Forum, Yaren, Nauru, 3–6 September 2018: Forum communiqué”.
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Cooperation of 1992, the Biketawa Declaration of 2000, the Aitutaki Declaration of 2002 and the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security of 2002.
Europe European Union On 19 November, the Council of the European Union adopted a new strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, entitled “Securing arms, protecting citizens”.64 The European Union also continued to be guided by its Global Strategy for foreign and security policy,65 which was unveiled in 2016, and by its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Activities addressing weapons of mass destruction, including the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) In keeping with its view of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the European Union continued to support all three of the Treaty’s pillars in 2018, while seeking to promote its universalization and strengthen its implementation. For example, the Union provided assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency throughout the year in carrying out its responsibilities in the areas of non-proliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear safety, nuclear security and technical cooperation. Together with its member States, the Union was the second largest donor to the Agency’s Nuclear Security Fund in 2018. The European Union also supported the peaceful use of nuclear energy by drawing from €325 million it had allocated for the period 2014–2020 to promote nuclear safety, radiation protection and the application of efficient and effective safeguards in third countries. The Union and its member States constituted the second largest contributor to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme, which remained an important tool to enable the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology and to meet the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
64 European Union, “Outcome of Proceedings, Council Conclusions on the Adoption of an EU Strategy Against Illicit Firearms, Small Arms & Light Weapons & Their Ammunition”, document 13581/2018. 65 The EU Global Strategy, inter alia, acknowledged the growing threat emanating from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems while reaffirming the European Union’s strong commitment to the universality, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. See European Union, “A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, 15 December 2016.
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Other important European Union objectives included the early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. All European Union member States had ratified the Treaty and continued in 2018 to provisionally apply its basic obligations. Additionally, the Union consistently promoted the Treaty’s benefits and value to peace, security and non-proliferation—including through civil applications in areas such as seismic monitoring—while helping to fund the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Also in 2018, the European Council adopted a decision66 to strengthen the Preparatory Commission’s monitoring and verification capabilities through a two-year, €4.5 million financial package. Financial support from the European Union also enabled the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to organize three workshops to help States from Africa, Asia Pacific and the Caribbean to participate in the consultative process of the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group.67 The main objectives of the project were to promote regional-level dialogue, enhance knowledge and understanding on the substance and process of the Group’s work, and broaden and strengthen the participation of all States in future negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second anniversary of the Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was on 16 January. The Plan of Action, the agreement reached by the Islamic Republic of Iran and endorsed unanimously by the Security Council through its resolution 2231 (2015), remained a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and an important achievement of multilateral diplomacy. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy continued to serve as Coordinator of the Joint Commission established under the Plan, and the Union repeatedly expressed its resolute commitment to the Plan’s full and effective implementation as long as the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to implement its commitments in full. The European Union intended to continue fully supporting the related monitoring and verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency; as at 31 December, the Agency had issued 13 consecutive reports on the implementation of those commitments by the Islamic Republic of Iran. (For more information on the Plan of Action, see chap. I.)
66 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/298 of 26 February 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 56 (28 February 2018), pp. 34–45. 67 The programme was in line with a decision reached in 2017 to provide support to States in Africa, Asia Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean. See European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) Decision 2017/2284 of 11 December 2017, Official Journal of the European Union, L 328 (12 December 2017), pp. 32–37.
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In 2018, the Union provided €2.67 million in support of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).68 The aims of the funding were to help enhance the relevant national and regional efforts and capabilities, primarily through training, capacity-building and assistance facilitation in close coordination with other Union programmes and other actors involved in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004); to ensure synergies and complementarity; and to contribute to the practical implementation of specific recommendations of both the 2009 and 2016 comprehensive reviews of the status of implementation of the resolution. In line with Council decision 2017/237069 of 18 December 2017, the European Union also continued to ensure financial and political support for The Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, to which all the Union’s member States had subscribed. Meanwhile, the European Union continued in 2018 to pursue the universalization and full and effective implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, including through the negotiation of a new European Council decision70 extending the Union’s financial support to the Convention over the period 2019–2022. The Union had provided more than €6 million since 2006 for core activities of the Convention, including the promotion of national implementation, universalization, intersessional activities, and regional and national awareness on the impact of science and technology on biosafety and biosecurity. With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the European Union maintained its financial support for the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In 2018, the Union’s support included €2.52 million for its general operations and €1 million for its work in the Syrian Arab Republic. With regard to the organization’s chemical safety and security efforts, the Union contributed €3 million for activities in Libya and €1.43 million for its work in Ukraine.
Activities related to conventional weapons On 28 May, the European Council adopted conclusions on a common position for the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.71 Then, in November, the Council
68 On 11 May 2017, the European Council adopted decision 2017/809, in order to support implementation of the 2016 comprehensive review outcome, as well as the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. 69 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2370 of 18 December 2017, Official Journal of the European Union, L 337 (19 December 2017), pp. 28–33. 70 This decision was adopted in early 2019. See European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97 of 21 January 2019, Official Journal of the European Union, L 19 (22 January 2019), pp. 11–19. 71 A/CONF.192/2018/RC/WP.9.
156 Regional disarmament adopted a new strategy against illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition, entitled “Securing arms, protecting citizens”.72 Meanwhile, the European Union continued its political and financial support for the fight against the illicit trade and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. In that regard, the European Council adopted the following measures: • A Council decision73 in support of combating the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the member States of the League of Arab States • A Council decision74 in support of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons for the implementation of the regional road map on combating illicit arms trafficking in the Western Balkans75 • A Council decision76 on countering illicit proliferation and trafficking of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition and their impact in Latin America and the Caribbean • A Council decision77 in support of gender-mainstreamed policies, programmes and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in line with the women, peace and security agenda. In addition, the European Union continued to support the fight against illicit small arms and light weapons and ammunition through several other projects with a global scope. Those initiatives included the iARMS database, implemented by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), as well as efforts by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimeto implement the Firearms Protocol to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.78
72 European Union, document 13581/2018. 73 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1789 of 19 November 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 293 (20 November 2018), pp. 24–31. 74 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1788 of 19 November 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 293 (20 November 2018), pp. 11–23. 75 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), “Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024”, 1 February 2018. 76 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2010 of 17 December 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 322 (18 December 2018), pp. 27–37. 77 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/2011 of 17 December 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 322 (18 December 2018), pp. 38–50. 78 Of the initiatives aimed at implementing the Firearms Protocol, those covering the Western Balkans took place with support from the United Nations Development Programme and from the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Meanwhile, efforts to implement the Protocol in Africa took place with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union.
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Separately, the European Union continued promoting the universalization and effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in line with its long-standing support for the instrument. In addition to its diplomatic efforts in that area, the Union continued to support the Treaty through an implementation support programme to which it had committed to provide more than €8 million from 2017 to 2019. The European Union also provided technical assistance to beneficiary countries in Latin America, Africa, Central and South-East Asia, and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in strengthening their national systems in line with the requirements of the Treaty.
Other relevant activities or institutional developments At the sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction held in Geneva in January, the European Union held a formal launch of a Council decision79 by which it extended support for national stakeholder meetings in up to 10 States parties and for the promotion of the Convention in States not yet party. Meanwhile, the Union continued to implement its policy on the inclusion of articles on non-proliferation and arms control in cooperation agreements with third countries, building upon arrangements finalized in 2017 with Japan and Mexico, as well as ongoing negotiations with the Southern Common Market, Azerbaijan, Chile and Kyrgyzstan. In 2018, the European Union’s support for the its Non-Proliferation Consortium of think tanks took place within the framework of a new European Council decision80 covering the period 2018–2021. Separately, the seventh European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference took place on 18 and 19 December in Brussels.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reaffirmed the importance of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in its 2018 Summit Declaration.81 The NATO Allies continued to see the need to preserve, strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency and host nation consent. In Vienna, the Allies continued to support efforts within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to preserve the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, modernize the Vienna Document 2011
79 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/1428 of 4 August 2017, Official Journal of the European Union, L 204 (5 August 2017), pp. 101–109. 80 European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/299 of 26 February 2018, Official Journal of the European Union, L 56 (28 February 2018), pp. 46–59. 81 NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration”, 11 July 2018.
158 Regional disarmament on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and address compliance issues related to the Open Skies Treaty. In one success in 2018, Allies and partners resolved an impasse over the Open Skies Treaty; Allies looked forward to the Treaty’s full implementation in 2019. At the same time, Allies remained concerned by the Russian Federation’s selective implementation and non-implementation of many important commitments and obligations under the above-mentioned agreements, as well as its violation of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. In October, NATO held its Annual Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Reykjavik to discuss current challenges and reinforce the importance of global non-proliferation norms. Attendees emphasized the importance and centrality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the global non-proliferation, disarmament and safeguards regimes, stating that they would not support any approaches to disarmament that undermined the Treaty. On the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), NATO Foreign Ministers stated their strong support for the finding by the United States that the Russian Federation was in material breach of its obligations under the Treaty. In that regard, they found that a Russian missile system, the 9M729, had prohibited capabilities and posed significant risks to the Euro-Atlantic security. Allies continued to call on the Russian Federation to (a) return to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty and (b) consult collectively and with the Russian Federation to seek a positive way forward. NATO remained committed to supporting the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Arms Trade Treaty. In that context, the Alliance continued to cooperate with international organizations and more than 40 partner countries to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In 2018, Allies initiated relevant efforts in the context of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue,82 and they supported activities by France and Germany to address threats posed by illegal and excess small arms and light weapons in the Western Balkans region. As at 31 December, NATO and its partners had destroyed 626,000 weapons, 46,700 tons of ammunition, 5.65 million anti-personnel mines and 3,350 tons of chemical weapons. During the year, the Alliance conducted 20 training courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, on small arms, arms control, non-proliferation and defence against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
82 On 8 and 9 October, NATO experts on small arms and light weapons, with Allies, took part in a seminar aimed at identifying future avenues of regional and bilateral cooperation between the Alliance and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, in complementarity with other existing international efforts.
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Throughout 2018, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) continued to assist participating States in implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). For example, OSCE used European Union funding to assist States of Central Asia in (a) developing and carrying out national action plans to implement the resolution and (b) building foundations through national legislation for controlling dual-use exports. Through such efforts, OSCE strengthened its cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in support of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and its Group of Experts.
Small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition On 2 and 3 October in Vienna, OSCE held the Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. By following up on actions suggested at the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, participants created new impetus for OSCE efforts to streamline and update norms, best practices and mechanisms to effectively combat proliferation of such weapons while strengthening the safety and security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition. Also in 2018, OSCE adopted the Best Practice Guide: Minimum Standards for National Procedures for the Deactivation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.83 The guide contributed to common approaches and procedures for permanently deactivating those armaments, and it recommended how participating States could incorporate the standards into their national norms and mechanisms. Meanwhile, some participating States continued to exchange information on small arms and light weapons in accordance with the relevant OSCE document84 on the implementation of commitments related to, inter alia, the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Responding to a drop in recent years in the number of States providing related data—in particular information on imports, exports and destruction of small arms and light weapons—OSCE and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to jointly promote a previously launched online tool for reporting such information to both organizations simultaneously. The tool’s aim was to decrease the reporting burden on participating States and
83 OSCE, publication FSC.DEL/250/17/Corr.2. 84 OSCE, “OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons” (FSC.DOC/1/00/Rev.1).
160 Regional disarmament encourage a coordinated approach to reporting. In addition, OSCE helped 12 participating States in 2018 to fulfil their commitments related to small arms, light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition by mobilizing financial resources and developing and implementing targeted assistance projects. Through such projects, OSCE addressed security and safety risks through the following measures: destruction of surplus conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices; disposal of rocket fuel components; upgrade of physical infrastructure and practices in the field of physical security and stockpile management; clearance and disposal of explosive remnants of war and landmines; and combating illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
Activities related to general security and disarmament Recognizing the need to reverse negative developments concerning conventional arms control and Europe’s architecture of confidence- and security-building measures, OSCE launched the “Structured Dialogue” in 2016 to address challenges and risks to security.85 In 2018, that process incorporated a dual-track approach on threat perceptions and risk reduction, including meetings at the political and military expert levels that focused on force postures and military exercises, as well as a joint analysis of trends in military forces. Additionally, OSCE and the Office for Disarmament Affairs jointly launched an initiative entitled “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education Partnership for the OSCE Area”, aimed at preparing women to help prevent and resolve conflict through arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As part of that effort, the partner organizations administered the Scholarship for Peace and Security training programme, helping to build equal opportunity for young women to participate in relevant policymaking, planning and implementation processes. (For more information on the Scholarship for Peace and Security, see chap. VII). Separately, the overall implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures remained constant in the OSCE region, with no major changes to the extent of military information exchanged among participating States. OSCE also continued to support implementation of the agreement on subregional arms control86 through assistance to its four States parties.
85 This process was established to help foster understanding on security issues that could serve as a common basis for a way forward. Its launch followed the adoption of the OSCE declaration on the twentieth anniversary of the framework for arms control in 2016. 86 “Measures for Sub-Regional Arms Control” in “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (A/50/790-S/1995/999), attachment, annex 1-B, article IV.
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South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons In 2018, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons87 continued work to strengthen the capacities of national and regional stakeholders to control and reduce the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in South-East Europe. The year was marked by a renewed commitment among regional actors to ending the risks caused by the misuse of weapons in the Western Balkans and Europe at large, specifically through the adoption of a new regional road map for small arms and light weapons control.88 Developed by the authorities of the Western Balkans under the auspices of Germany and France and with support from the Clearinghouse, the road map and its related action plans covered all aspects of arms control, from weapon destruction to mainstreaming gender in security policies to countering arms trafficking, making it the most comprehensive arms control exercise in the region and a model with global applicability. The Clearinghouse was expected to oversee and coordinate the road map’s implementation with support from the European Union. Additionally, with support from the European Union and the United States, the Clearinghouse continued to implement disarmament and arms control activities in the subregion, achieving the following: • Increased strategic and operational regional cooperation and knowledge-sharing through regional platforms—namely, small arms and light weapons commissions in South and East Europe, as well as the South-East Europe Firearms Experts Network • Enhanced evidence-based policies, developed through a regional survey on small arms and light weapons, as well as the Armed Violence Monitoring Platform, a web-based platform collecting daily media and police reports on firearm-related incidents from the region • Increased transparency in arms exports, established through the publication of the ninth89 and tenth90 regional arms export reports,
87 The Clearinghouse was launched on 8 May 2002 with a mandate by the United Nations Development Programme and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (later succeeded by the Regional Cooperation Council) to function as an executive arm of the Regional Implementation Plan on Combating Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was formulated and adopted by the Stability Pact in November 2001 and revised in 2006 and in 2014. 88 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, “Roadmap”, 1 February 2018. 89 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Regional Report on Arms Exports in 2015 (Belgrade, 2018). 90 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Regional Report on Arms Exports in 2016 (Belgrade, 2018).
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covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • Stronger gender-responsive policies on small arms and light weapons, achieved by implementing a “gender coach programme” with the heads of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Commissions in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, as well as through specialized training and development of knowledge products91 • Reduced stockpiles, realized through the destruction of over 2,500 small arms and light weapons, approximately 1,500 parts and components, and more than 202,000 pieces of ammunition • Enhanced capacities for physical security and stockpile management, achieved through infrastructure security upgrades of several arms and ammunition storage locations and evidence rooms throughout the region, as well as through specialized training • Strengthened forensics capacities for tracing and increased firearms investigation capabilities of law enforcement institutions, developed through provision of specialized equipment and training • Establishment of Firearms Focal Points, which received training and specialized analysis software and equipment.
Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation In 2018, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre–Centre for Security Cooperation92 organized nine activities consisting of lectures and presentations, discussions and exchanges of experience with practical elements related to arms control, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear security. More than 270 experts and other participants joined the following events:
91 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Gender and SALW: Gender Aspects of SALW and How to Address Them in Practice (Belgrade, 2018). 92 Since its inception in 2000 as a regionally owned entity with a diplomatic status under the Vienna Convention of 1961, the Centre aimed to foster dialogue and play a leading role in confidence- and security-building measures by addressing, inter alia, issues such as arms control treaties and agreements, physical security and stockpile management, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear security. Through all its activities, the Centre seeks to bring together experts from various military, political, diplomatic and academic provenances to produce a vibrant and productive discussion on arms control issues, propose future developments and tackle the possible challenges that impact the current political and security developments.
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• Ninth, tenth and eleventh workshops on “Counter–Weapons of Mass Destruction”93 national strategies, respectively entitled “Current Threat Environment and Cyber Elements of a Counter–Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy”, “Regional Cooperation” and “Proliferation Security Initiative Table Top Exercise” • Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons • Open Skies Treaty Aerial Observation Course to train personnel from South-East European countries to plan, organize and execute an aerial observation mission • Annual compliance and verification course on the Vienna Document 2011 • Orientation course on the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (Dayton Agreement, article IV) • Arms Control Symposium, covering also the issues of physical security and stockpile management, as well as small arms and light weapons • Fourth workshop on nuclear security detection architecture awareness, entitled “Planning, Implementing and Evaluating Detection Operations” and held in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, as a member of the Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction Steering Committee, the Centre co-organized the tenth workshop, funded by the European Union, on a regional approach to reducing stockpiles of conventional weapons and munitions.
Middle East League of Arab States Throughout 2018, the League of Arab States undertook a range of initiatives pursuant to one of its key roles: coordinating and elaborating a unified regional and international position on arms control and disarmament issues among its 22 member States.
Activities addressing weapons of mass destruction During the year, the League convened three meetings of the Arab Senior Officials Committee in Charge of Nuclear Weapons and other issues related to weapons of mass destruction. The committee’s recommendations contributed to the adoption of Ministerial Council resolution 8251 of 7 March. By that resolution, as well as by resolution 8302 of 9 November 2017, the
93 The Centre launched the Counter–Weapons of Mass Destruction Network in 2015 in close cooperation with the United States Department of Defense. The aim of this strategic-level project was to facilitate the development of national strategies for countering weapons of mass destruction.
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Council addressed, inter alia, preparations for the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, planned General Assembly actions aimed at implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted by that Treaty’s 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and carried out coordination for the sixty-second session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Activities addressing conventional arms In Cairo, the League’s regional focal point on small arms and light weapons convened the “Twelfth meeting of Arab national points of contact regarding the United Nations Programme of Action to Combat the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons”. The League encouraged its member States to submit their national reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action. The League also actively participated in the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, held from 18 to 29 June in New York. (For more information on the Review Conference, see chap. III.)
Other relevant activities or institutional development The League’s Department for Arms Control and Disarmament cooperated with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to organize, on 4 June, a round-table discussion on advancing confidence- and security- building measures. During the discussion, held at the League’s headquarters in Cairo, the organizations exchanged views on facilitating and promoting functional regional processes for successful confidence- and security-building measures in the Arab region. The meeting was attended by 32 League officials from various sectors, and the participating organizations agreed to convene a second round-table discussion in 2019 for high-level staff of the League.
United Nations Development Programme The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) pursued a wide array of disarmament-related activities in Latin America and the Caribbean, which remained one of the world’s most violent regions. In areas characterized by high gun violence and porous borders, UNDP built capacities at regional, national and municipal levels to help control small arms and light weapons, as part of a “citizen security” approach that contributed to community violence reduction. The capacity-building efforts of UNDP included two regional projects launched in 2014: Infosegura, covering Central America; and CariSecure, extending to 10 Caribbean States. In 2018, UNDP continued work through those initiatives to address information management gaps and contribute towards improving public policies on citizen security, particularly with respect to the operations, tactics and strategies of law-enforcement and other security institutions. In their first phase of implementation, the two regional initiatives contributed to the development of, inter alia, institutional
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capacities to collect, process, analyse, disseminate and use quality information; knowledge tools in various countries to facilitate tracking of crime and violence related to small arms and light weapons; and processes for evidence-based decision-making on related policies in the region. In West Africa, UNDP continued to support implementation of the Small Arms Project undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States and the European Union.94 Through that project, UNDP supported community engagement and sensitization efforts on the importance of reducing small arms and light weapons for community safety, reaching 25,500 people (10,300 women and 15,200 men) in 2018. During the year, those efforts contributed to the voluntary surrender of 37,896 pieces of weapons and ammunition in 25 cross-border communities, contributed to an unprecedented increase in the Niger’s bilateral cooperation with both Nigeria and Mali, and fostered new trust between communities along Liberia’s borders with Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. As at the end of 2018, 25 border communities had benefited from community-based projects provided through the initiative in return for surrendered weapons.95 After the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire successfully completed its mandate in June 2017, UNDP began helping the Government to consolidate security gains from the peacekeeping mission, specifically through a comprehensive approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as security-sector reform. In 2018, UNDP activities in that regard included helping the national commission on small arms and light weapons in Côte d’Ivoire to encourage the voluntary surrender of illegally held arms and ammunition, leading to the collection of 914 weapons, 105 pieces of ammunition and five grenades. UNDP also supported training on human rights, citizenship and ethics for 400 former combatants who had been integrated into the Penitentiary Guards Corps, enhancing their public- administration capacities. In addition, it supported the installation of five new civil-military committees, providing unique spaces for the population to engage in regular dialogue with the military and receive support in addressing their security concerns. UNDP also prepared 10 such committees to conduct “socio-security diagnoses” and to develop action plans for addressing any risks identified in the assessments.
94 This initiative, which began in 2015 and was scheduled to conclude in 2019, covered seven countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. 95 Community-based projects carried out under the multi-year initiative included a rehabilitated health centre, community school and hand water pumps in Côte d’Ivoire; hand water pumps and milling and oil extracting machines for women’s groups in Guinea; a rehabilitated town hall in Liberia; replenishment of livestock herd and food in the Niger; and hand water pumps in Sierra Leone.
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Through its Global Firearms Programme, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continued in 2018 to promote the ratification and implementation of the Firearms Protocol to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Also through the Programme, the Office provided States in the Balkans, Latin America, Maghreb and the Sahel with further technical assistance to prevent and combat the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms and of their parts, components and ammunition. In pursuing work under the Global Firearms Programme’s five interconnected pillars, the Office mounted successful responses to the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, as well as their parts, components and ammunition; addressed interconnected forms of organized crime; and contributed towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular target 16.4 on reducing illicit financial and arms flows.96 In 2018, progress was achieved under the Programme’s first pillar, which concerned legislative and policy development. In one example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime completed an initiative to support Chad in drafting new, comprehensive legislation on firearms, a milestone that the Office marked by presenting the draft law to national authorities on 25 May. Also in 2018, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted two new regulations for marking imported firearms after receiving relevant technical assistance through the Office’s Global Firearms Programme. In addition, the Office provided related legislative support to Côte d’Ivoire over the course of the year. To advance the Programme’s second pillar, on fostering the implementation of crime prevention and firearms security measures, the Office continued a range of efforts aimed at supporting such measures. In West Africa, the Office had contributed, as at the end of the year, to marking more than 50,000 firearms and achieving the voluntary surrender of more than 700 armaments. In the context of its Education for Justice initiative, the Office continued developing teaching modules to assist tertiary-level educators in engaging students on topics such as the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of firearms, as well as their parts, components and ammunition. In June, the Office presented 14 draft modules to 40 educators and thematic experts during two regional meetings organized in Panama City and Vienna. The completed modules were scheduled for release in early 2019.
96 The Office incorporated considerations about gender, human rights and civil society participation and oversight into the Global Firearms Programme’s activities. For additional details on the Office’s work on firearms in 2018, see the report of the Secretariat to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC/COP/2018/4) and the Global Firearms Programme website.
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With a view to strengthening the criminal justice response to firearms trafficking cases, the Programme’s third pillar, the Office continued toroll out a comprehensive training curriculum on investigating and prosecuting firearms-related crimes, including in weapons-trafficking cases. Using the curriculum, the Office trained more than 90 officials from Chad, Mali and the Niger during 2018. In addition, the Office introduced a new training course on detecting firearms trafficking at land border–crossing points, strengthening the capacity of 50 customs officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina to detect and counter that crime. Under the Programme’s fourth pillar, aimed at increasing international cooperation and information exchange, the Office continued to promote regular dialogue among firearms control and criminal justice practitioners through community settings and an initiative to elaborate a digest of illicit firearms cases. In that regard, the Office brought together practitioners from West Africa and the Western Balkans, as well as from Ukraine and selected European Union member States, to share and discuss experiences, good practices and lessons learned in investigating and prosecuting firearms trafficking cases. The Office also supported an INTERPOL operation entitled “Trigger MENA” (Middle East and North Africa), providing training and expert advice that promoted a proactive investigative approach and an effective criminal justice response to firearms trafficking. The INTERPOL operation resulted in the seizure of more than 50 firearms and the arrest of 17 individuals. In line with the Programme’s fifth pillar on identifying and monitoring illicit firearms flows, the Office launched the “Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire” in June with two aims: (a) creating an evidence base for firearms trafficking trends and patterns and (b) collecting data tomeasure progress under indicator 16.4.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals.97 The Office continued to hold outreach events on that new data-collection methodology, including regional meetings for the Western Balkan States, and it planned to convene one additional meeting in early 2019 for Middle East and North Africa. At the policy level, the Office acted to enhance cooperation with other organizations that were addressing the relationship between terrorism and organized crime, including by launching development of a new strategy to tackle firearms trafficking in the context of that nexus. Meanwhile, the Office cooperated in the development of two regional strategies on firearms and interconnected security challenges: (a) the “African Union Silencing the Guns
97 Indicator 16.4.2 reads: “Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments”.
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Plan of Action on Controlling Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons”98 and (b) the “Roadmap for a sustainable solution to the illegal possession, misuse and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in the Western Balkans by 2024”.99
98 African Union, Silencing the Guns, Owning the Future: Realising a Conflict-free Africa (Durban, South Africa, 2015). 99 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, “Roadmap”, 1 February 2018.
169 chapter Emerging, cross-cutting V and other issues At a Scholarship for Peace and Security training course, held in Vienna in February 2018, jointly organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. C h a p t e r V
Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues
The impacts of new technologies on warfare are a direct threat to our common responsibility to guarantee peace and security.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Developments and trends, 2018
Emerging and cross-cutting issues continued to draw increasing attention from the disarmament community in 2018. In particular, Member States built on their previous work to respond to new and emerging technologies and their possible impact on international peace and security, placed greater emphasis on the need to build gender perspectives into all disarmament efforts and bodies, and renewed efforts to better connect disarmament activities with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Those trends were reflected in the Secretary-General’s new Agenda for Disarmament and its third pillar, “Disarmament for future generations”, in which he called for vigilance in understanding new and emerging weapon technologies. In the Agenda, the Secretary-General also noted that such technologies posed possible challenges to existing legal, humanitarian and ethical norms, as well as to non-proliferation, international stability, peace and security. Responding to those challenges, he presented specific actions aimed at, inter alia, raising awareness and facilitating dialogue among diverse actors on emerging means and methods of warfare; engaging scientists and industry to ensure responsible innovation; supporting Member States’ efforts to ensure that humans remain at all times in control over the use of force; and, in relation to cyberspace, contributing to the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflict as well as fostering a culture of accountability for behaviour. The Agenda also reflected growing calls from Member States in a number of bodies—most notably in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems—for greater transparency in legal weapons reviews as one strategy for addressing some of the concerns raised by emerging means and methods of warfare. It was also underscored in the Agenda for Disarmament that full and equal participation of women in disarmament and international security
1 Address to the General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2018.
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processes was needed, along with addressing the gendered impact of arms, reflecting the continued centrality of gender perspectives to discussions on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. In the General Assembly First Committee, there was a groundswell of interest in women’s full and equal participation amid a growing recognition of the importance of gender equality and gender considerations to advancing collective goals in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The Committee adopted an unprecedented number of resolutions containing language on women’s equal representation, the gendered impact of weapons or the need to include gender considerations. Additionally, a growing number of delegations spoke about gender and disarmament in their statements, and Namibia, on behalf of 56 States, delivered a statement dedicated to gender and disarmament. Member States continued to draw attention to the contributions that disarmament could make to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, including through General Assembly resolution 73/37 of 5 December, concerning the relationship between disarmament and development. In that context, the Agenda for Disarmament provided a detailed description of how disarmament was relevant to a range of individual Sustainable Development Goals. In response to a request by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General issued a report2 in July on current developments in science and technology and their potential impacts on international security and disarmament efforts. That report provided an overview of relevant developments in the following thematic areas: artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, biology and chemistry, advanced missile and missile-defence technologies, space-based technologies, electromagnetic technologies and materials technologies. The report also considered cross-cutting impacts on security and disarmament, available processes for responding to these developments and beneficial applications of such technologies for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Meanwhile, for the second time in two years, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (73/32) under its agenda item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament. In a related area, developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security continued to draw widespread attention from Member States. In that regard, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions establishing separate multilateral processes on international cybersecurity: an open-ended working group with the participation of all Member States (73/27) and a group of governmental experts composed of 25 members (73/266). The international community took significant steps in 2018 to enhance peace and security in outer space, including through deliberations in the
2 A/73/177.
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General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Notably, in accordance with resolution 72/250, the Secretary-General established a group of governmental experts to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This Group held its first meeting in Geneva from 6 to 17 August, and it benefited from technical presentations by external experts and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Separately, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems held two sessions in 2018, agreeing to 10 possible guiding principles and deciding to continue its work in 2019 under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Secretary-General also took up the matter of autonomy in weapon systems. In addition to pledging in his Agenda for Disarmament to support Member State efforts to ensure human control over the use of force, he drew attention to this issue at several high-level events in 2018, including his address to the high-level segment of the General Assembly at its seventy-third session. Throughout the year, new developments in weapon design and production methods remained a priority discussion point in the context of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument. Within those frameworks, States discussed how to (a) ensure that new technological developments would not negatively affect efforts to effectively trace and prevent diversion and (b) leverage those developments that could enhance small arms control. On the issue of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, the United States continued consultations on elaborating guidelines based on the Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, issued in 2016. Meanwhile, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research pursued a second phase of its work on increasing transparency, accountability and oversight of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, including by preparing a series of research briefs and convening a table-top exercise. Additionally, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research partnered to prepare a study on hypersonic weapons. To inform the forthcoming study, the partners co-hosted a track 1.5 meeting on the topic on 12 and 13 November in Geneva. That meeting was attended by a small number of invited Government officials and non-governmental experts.
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Emerging issues Armed uncrewed aerial vehicles According to one non-governmental study,3 as of July, the armed forces of more than 90 States possessed some type of uncrewed aerial vehicle. Of these, 24 States possessed armed uncrewed aerial vehicles and 13 States had been documented as using such weapons to carry out attacks. Concerns about such systems continued to focus on their use to conduct targeted strikes outside of so-called “traditional battlefields” in circumstances of secrecy and in situations in which the applicable international legal framework governing the use of force was under dispute. There had also been reported instances in which non-State armed groups had adapted commercially available uncrewed aerial vehicles as improvised aerial explosive devices. The Secretary-General observed in his Agenda for Disarmament that increasing transparency and accountability on the use of armed drones could increase confidence in adherence to international law; promote common standards to reduce the potential for unlawful acts; protect civilians; promote international peace and security; promote the democratic legitimacy of counter-terrorism operations; assist in the investigation of human rights violations; and facilitate implementation of export controls. He further noted that increasing transparency and accountability on holdings and on the transfer of armed drones could facilitate implementation of export controls and other international arrangements and help combat illicit transfers. Meanwhile, the United States continued to lead consultations in 2018 on the elaboration of guidelines on the basis of the Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.4 Also during the year, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research pursued a second phase of its work on increasing transparency, accountability and oversight of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, building on its 2017 study5 and with the support of Germany. The aim of the second phase of the project was to facilitate informal multilateral dialogue to explore possible ways forward, as well as to contribute to inclusive facts-based discourse and situate multilateral discussions on the matter within the context of emerging trends in unmanned military technology, proliferation and use.
3 Wim Zwijnenburg and Foeke Postma, Unmanned Ambitions: Security Implications of Growing Proliferation in Emerging Military Drone Markets (Utrecht, Netherlands, PAX, 2018). 4 United States Department of State, “Joint Declaration for the Export and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): Fact sheet”, 16 October 2017. 5 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Increasing Transparency, Oversight and Accountability of Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Resources (Geneva, 2017).
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Under that project, the Institute prepared a series of research briefs, including on the expanding development, transfer and use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles;6 disruptive developments in armed uncrewed aerial vehicles technology;7 and the relationship between armed uncrewed aerial vehicles and international stability.8 It also convened a table-top exercise to explore decision-making processes relevant to the use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles, an effort aimed at encouraging States both to consider whether the low-risk nature of deployments of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles may lower the political threshold for the use of force and to demonstrate the importance of transparency, oversight and accountability for their use.9
Lethal autonomous weapons systems The Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems10 met in Geneva from 9 to 13 April and from 27 to 31 August. The Group achieved consensus on a report,11 including 10 possible guiding principles, that was submitted to the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. (For more information, see chap. III.) Meanwhile, in his Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary-General observed growing concerns about the implications posed by the potential development of autonomous weapons systems. Noting that further consideration of those issues within the framework of the United Nations remained essential, the Secretary-General called for States to exercise restraint in developing and acquiring weapon systems whose conformity with international law was uncertain. He further committed to supporting the efforts of Member States to elaborate new measures, either political or legally binding, to ensure that humans remain at all times in control over the use of force. The Secretary-General raised the issue of autonomous weapons at several high-profile events, including the opening of the General Assembly’s seventy- third session. Addressing the Assembly during its high-level segment on
6 George Woodhams, Weapons of Choice? The Expanding Development, Transfer and Use of Armed UAVs, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Resources (Geneva, 2018). 7 David Hambling, Change in the Air: Disruptive Developments in Armed UAV Technology (Geneva, 2018). 8 George Woodhams and John Borrie, Armed UAVs in Conflict Escalation and Inter-State Crisis, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Resources (Geneva, 2018). 9 UNIDIR, Summary Report: Tabletop Exercise on Armed UAVs, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Resources (Geneva: 2018). 10 The Group was established by the fifth Review Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. See the decisions contained in the final document of the Fifth Review Conference CCW/CONF.V/10( ). 11 CCW/GGE.1/2018/3.
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25 September,12 the Secretary-General noted that the prospect of weapons that could select and attack a target on their own raised multiple alarms and could trigger new arms races. He added, however, that he was encouraged by the 10 possible guiding principles elaborated by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. The Secretary-General took up the subject again on 5 November at the Web Summit in Lisbon, where he said in a speech13 that machines with the power and the discretion to take human lives were politically unacceptable, were morally repugnant and should be banned by international law. He echoed that sentiment less than one week later, in a statement14 he delivered to the Paris Peace Forum on 11 November.
Hypersonic weapons In 2018, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research partnered to prepare a study,15 in line with a prior recommendation by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Reporting to the Secretary-General on its 2016 sessions, the Board had noted that “the development of long-range conventional weapons (including those using hypersonic technologies) could eventually upset strategic stability”; stated that “an international conference could be held by all key actors to discuss the issues” as a first step towards preventing a new arms race; and, to that end, recommended a study to inform its future consideration of the issue and enable it to “make practical recommendations for practical arms control measures”.16 As a contribution to the forthcoming study, the Office and the Institute co-hosted a track 1.5 meeting on hypersonic weapons on 12 and 13 November in Geneva. Attended on a not-for-attribution basis by a small number of Government officials invited on the basis of equitable geographical distribution and non-governmental experts with an interest in the issue of missiles, the meeting had a threefold purpose: to raise awareness about hypersonic weapons and their possible implications, to promote intergovernmental discussion and to gather views on possible arms control approaches. The exchange demonstrated that States had significant interest in learning more about those technologies and continuing discussion on their associated risks, implications and possible strategies for their management.
12 Address to the General Assembly, New York, 25 September 2018. 13 Remarks at the Web Summit, Lisbon, 5 November 2018. 14 Address to the Paris Peace Forum, Paris, 11 November 2018. 15 The study was published in February 2019. 16 A/71/176.
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Emerging technologies relevant to small arms and light weapons Throughout 2018, new developments in weapon design and production methods for small arms and light weapons remained a central point of discussion under the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument. (For more information on the Programme of Action, see chap. III). Within those frameworks, States discussed means of (a) ensuring that new technological developments would not negatively affect efforts to effectively trace and prevent diversion and (b) leveraging developments that could enhance small arms control. Multilateral discussions of relevant technological developments principally took place at the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, held from 18 to 29 June at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Building on previous years of discussion at the technical and policy levels on subjects such as the increased use of polymers in small arms manufacturing, States noted, inter alia, that the difficulty of permanently marking such materials created dangerous potential for unauthorized actors to erase serial numbers on arms. With regard to modular weapons and the possibility for removable parts of a weapon to affect marking, tracing and record-keeping practices, States considered how an “essential or structural component” of such armaments could provide a remedial means of identification. The challenges posed by additive manufacturing—sometimes referred to as three- dimensional printing—were also raised in this context. Acknowledging the implications of such developments for the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, States expressly committed to applying unique markings to the “essential or structural component” of modular weapons. In addition to ensuring that all weapons were marked uniquely and durably in line with the provisions of the International Tracing Instrument, States resolved to address challenges in this area by (a) sharing national experiences and (b) taking advantage of available opportunities to utilize relevant technology to effectively combat the illicit arms trade. In that regard, the Review Conference recognized the value of strengthened cooperation with the private sector, industry and law enforcement agencies. In addition, States committed to raising awareness of the possible risks associated with recent technological developments. The Review Conference requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States with regard to recent developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design, particularly polymer and modular weapons, including on their associated opportunities and challenges, as well as their impact on the effective implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, and to make recommendations on ways of addressing them. The General Assembly, by its resolution 73/69 of 5 December, endorsed
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the outcome of the Conference and requested the Secretary-General to report those views and recommendations to the Assembly’s seventy-fourth session.
Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security Under agenda item 96, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, the General Assembly adopted in December two resolutions, by which it established an open-ended working group to meet in 2019 and 2020 (resolution 73/27) and a new group of governmental experts to meet from 2019 to 2021 (resolution 73/266).
Open-ended working group On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 73/27, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”. By operative paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Assembly decided to convene, beginning in 2019, with a view to making the United Nations negotiation process on security in the use of information and communications technologies more democratic, inclusive and transparent, an open-ended working group acting on a consensus basis, to continue, as a priority, to further develop the rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States listed in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, and the ways for their implementation; if necessary, to introduce changes to them or elaborate additional rules of behaviour; to study the possibility of establishing regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations; and to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings, existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to address them and how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States, as well as confidence-building measures and capacity-building and the concepts referred to in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution. The open-ended working group would convene for the first time in 2019 and report back to the General Assembly in 2020. The resolution also provided the possibility of holding, from within voluntary contributions, intersessional consultative meetings with interested parties, namely business, non-governmental organizations and academia, to share views on the issues within the group’s mandate. By operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, the General Assembly invited Member States to continue to inform the Secretary- General of their views and assessments on issues of information security; efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security and promote international cooperation in that field; and possible measures that could be taken by the international community to strengthen information security at the global level.
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Group of Governmental Experts On 22 December, the General Assembly adopted resolution 73/266, “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security”. By operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a new group of governmental experts to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings and effective implementation, possible cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, including norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, as well as how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States. The group would meet for the first time in 2019 and submit its report to the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly in 2021. The report would include an annex containing national contributions of the participating experts on the subject of how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States. By operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Office for Disarmament Affairs, through existing resources and voluntary contributions, to convene a series of consultations with regional organizations, such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to share views on the issues within the mandate of the group. By operative paragraph 5, the Chair of the group was requested to organize two informal consultative meetings with all Member States to engage in interactive discussions and share their views with the group of governmental experts. In addition, by operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly invited Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on efforts taken at the national level to strengthen information security, taking into account previous reports17 of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.
E-learning programme on information and communications technology in the context of international security Throughout 2018, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs worked intensively on the development of an e-learning programme in partnership with Singapore. Based on the reports18 of the previous Groups
17 A/65/201, A/68/98, A/70/174. 18 Ibid.
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of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, the training course aims to provide interested Member States, researchers and students with a greater understanding of the challenges that the use of information and communications technologies presents to international security and the work that has been done at the international level to address them. The course was expected to be released and made publicly available in 2019.
Cross-cutting issues Gender and disarmament In 2018, gender perspectives remained central to discourse among Member States on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. States demonstrated a renewed commitment to the full, equal and effective participation of women in disarmament, and gender considerations, as a cross- cutting issue, were raised in a variety of contexts. In his Agenda for Disarmament, launched in May, the Secretary-General prioritized ensuring the equal, full and effective participation of women in all decision-making processes related to disarmament. In the Agenda, States were also called upon to incorporate gender perspectives in the development of national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control. In addition, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs became an “International Gender Champion” and, as such, pledged to promote the full, equal, and effective participation of women in disarmament. She also participated in the launch of the International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group, chaired by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in collaboration with Ireland and Namibia. On 8 March, the High Representative explained in an opinion piece published in the magazine Teen Vogue why the fight against nuclear weapons needed women more than ever. Entitled “The Women Who Have Shaped Policies on Nuclear Weapons”, the article coincided with the 2018 commemoration of International Women’s Day.19
Gender and nuclear weapons During the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, States parties endorsed the importance of promoting the full, equal and effective participation and leadership of women in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. States parties also welcomed the increased participation of women at the preparatory
19 Izumi Nakamitsu, “International Women’s Day 2018: The Women Who Have Shaped Policies on Nuclear Weapons”, Teen Vogue, 8 March 2018.
182 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues meetings for the Treaty’s 2020 Review Conference and highlighted the importance of actively supporting the participation of female delegates in their own delegations. The disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation on women was also noted. In the General Assembly First Committee, a groundswell of interest in the full and equal participation of women in disarmament resulted in the adoption of an unprecedented number of resolutions with language on women’s equal representation, the gendered impact of weapons and the need to account gender considerations in future deliberations. A growing number of delegations spoke about gender and disarmament; Namibia, for example, delivered a full statement20 about the issue on behalf of 56 States, noting that the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission had recognized the impact of gender norms on disarmament approaches more than a decade earlier.21 Several States used the Committee’s general debate to emphasize the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation. Member States also raised gender considerations during the debate on nuclear weapons, with Ireland noting22 references to gendered impacts in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Philippines calling23 for the inclusion of gender considerations in discussions about such weapons. In the debate on other weapons of mass destruction, Timor-Leste noted24 the effect of the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on vulnerable groups, including women. Additionally, the resolution entitled “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (73/62) recognized for the first time the importance of gender parity to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
Gender and conventional weapons In his annual report25 to the Security Council on women, peace and security, the Secretary-General noted the continued spread of small arms that
20 A/C.1/73/PV.25. See also “Joint Statement on Gender and the Disarmament Machinery”, 31 October 2018. 21 Carol Cohn with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, paper no. 38 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Stockholm, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2005). 22 A/C.1/73/PV.12. See also Jamie Walsh, Deputy Director of the Disarmament Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland, statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, New York, 19 October 2018. 23 A/C.1/73/PV.14. See also Ariel Rodelas Penaranda, Minister of the Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the United Nations, statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to the First Committee of the General Assembly, New York, 22 October 2018. 24 A/C.1/73/PV.9. See also Francisco Vital Ornai, Counselor of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, New York, 17 October 2019. 25 S/2018/900.
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were contributing to violence in the context of forced displacement, as well as sexual and gender-based violence, including killings of women by intimate male partners. The report, which was issued on 9 October, also highlighted the continued devastating impact of violence perpetuated by terrorist and violent extremist groups, including indiscriminate violence against civilian populations and the targeting of civilian objects, discrimination against women and girls as an organizing force and the strategic manipulation of gender norms and stereotypes. The Secretary-General further reiterated the importance of mainstreaming gender perspectives in disarmament and placing gender equality and the meaningful participation of women at the centre of all efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace. Significant challenges persisted with regard to meaningful participation of women in conflict resolution, he said, adding that women remained significantly underrepresented across disarmament efforts despite their historic roles in disarmament movements. Gender perspectives also featured prominently in the 2018 review process of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In his report26 to the General Assembly on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, issued on 16 July, the Secretary-General noted the significant progress made on gender-related issues at the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, where Member States had for the first time adopted an outcome document27 containing specific reference to the implementation of the Programme of Action as a key to combating gender- based violence. In the outcome document, States had also agreed to promote the full participation and representation of women in all implementation processes, encourage the collection of gender-disaggregated data through national reports, ensure coordination between national authorities responsible for the implementation of the Programme of Action and those responsible for women’s affairs or gender equality, and take into account the differing impacts of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on women, men, girls and boys in policy and programme designs. Later in the year, many delegations to the General Assembly First Committee noted their support for the outcome document’s inclusion of gender dimensions. The Assembly, in its annual resolution on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (73/69), recognized the need for strengthened women’s participation in decision-making and implementation processes related to the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. In addition, the Assembly reaffirmed in that resolution the need for States to mainstream gender dimensions in their implementation efforts. During the First Committee, many States both welcomed the increased mainstreaming of gender perspectives into processes related to conventional
26 A/73/168. 27 A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3.
184 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues weapons disarmament and highlighted the gendered impact of those weapons. Several States noted that the destabilizing impact of small arms and light weapons on societies disproportionately affected women, who were also bearing high costs from their illicit trade. Canada noted28 that conventional weapons could exacerbate existing structural gender inequalities and undermine the Sustainable Development Goals, and Burkina Faso pointed29 specifically to the negative effect of cluster munitions on efforts to achieve the Goals and advance women’s empowerment. In a joint statement30 delivered by Ireland on explosive weapons in populated areas, 50 countries called for further research on the gendered aspects of such weapons. Additionally, in the resolution on countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (73/67), the General Assembly recognized for the first time the gendered impact of those weapons. During the First Committee’s debate on conventional weapons, many Member States noted that small arms and light weapons exacerbated sexual and gender-based violence. In that context, States welcomed the provision in the Arms Trade Treaty requiring State exporters to evaluate the risk that exported weapons would be used in gender-based violence, and Latvia announced31 that it would focus on that provision in 2019 as a special theme of its presidency of the next conference of States parties to the Treaty. Previously, at the fourth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, held from 20 to 24 August, several States had noted the precedent set by the Treaty on addressing gender-based violence and the role that the Treaty could play in preventing such violence. In November, at the 2018 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, several States highlighted both the gendered impact of conventional weapons and the underrepresentation of women in disarmament efforts. Some States also called for increased incorporation of gender perspectives into the work of the Convention.
28 A/C.1/73/PV.18. See also Kaya Dunawa-Pickard, statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, New York, 25 October 2018. 29 A/C.1/73/PV.22. See also United Nations Web TV, “First Committee, 22nd meeting— General Assembly, 73rd session” (webcast), New York, 30 October 2018. 30 A/C.1/73/PV.18. See also Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations, joint statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, delivered on behalf Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, El Salvador, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Indonesia, Italy, Ireland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay and Zambia (New York, 25 October). 31 A/C.1/73/PV.18. See also Andrejs Pildegovičs, statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, New York, 25 October 2018.
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Regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs Taking into consideration the Gender Action Plan of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/69 on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, the Office’s regional centres and its Vienna Office continued to promote the participation of women in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation initiatives while including gender perspectives in the design and implementation of their projects and activities. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa continued to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, including by holding a workshop in Lomé on 7 February to support Togo in drafting a national implementation action plan.32 Additionally, the Centre incorporated gender considerations in six “training of trainers” workshops that it organized under the physical security and stockpile management project in the Sahel region. The aim of those workshops was to train defence and security forces from the six Sahel countries33 on relevant standard operating procedures, enabling them to train additional officers in charge of Government-owned arms and ammunition stockpiles. As women remained underrepresented among weapons armoury managers and storekeepers and continued to be largely confined to administrative duties rather than operational activities, the Centre insisted that efficient stockpile management required greater involvement by women, both in defence and security forces and in physical security and stockpile management. Through those training events, the Centre alerted participants to the link between poorly managed stockpiles and the disproportionate effect that illicit small arms and light weapons circulation had on girls and women. The workshops also provided an opportunity to promote women’s participation in policy decision-making, planning and implementation while also encouraging national authorities to increase involvement by women in arms control activities and training sessions. Additionally, the Centre continued to promote the inclusion of gender perspectives in various activities that it organized or attended. In June, during a Joint Pilot Training on Weapons and Ammunition Management that the Centre convened in Lomé for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration practitioners, presenters called for those practitioners and for field-based personnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations to utilize both gender- sensitive contextual and cultural analysis as well as gender-related qualitative and quantitative indicators. At the “Africa Security Symposium, West, North and Central”, held on 7 and 8 November in Dakar, a panellist from the Centre
32 Government of Togo, “Plan d’action national pour l’implication des femmes Togolaises dans la resolution des conflits et la consolidation de la paix : Strategies de mise en œuvre des resolutions 1325 et 1820 du Conseil de Securite des Nations Unies”. 33 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.
186 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues underscored the equal importance that women placed on security issues such as the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons; discussed relevant international instruments, including for arms tracing, physical security and stockpile management and arms database management; and explained gender perspectives in arms control. Meanwhile, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean increased efforts to mainstream gender issues as a cross-cutting theme in the design and implementation of all of its projects and new training activities. With funding from Canada, for example, the Centre launched a new multi-year project, entitled “Building Momentum for the Regional Implementation of A/RES/65/69 on Women, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control”, with technical training activities that the Centre hosted in Colombia and El Salvador. Overall, women made up 33 per cent of participants in the Centre’s programmes. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific initiated a region-wide project on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, for which it conducted two subregional workshops from a gender perspective. Those two events—a July workshop for South-East Asia on gun violence and a September meeting for South Asia on illicit small-arms trafficking—brought together 23 representatives of non-governmental organizations and 13 members of national parliaments, of which 72 per cent were female. The Centre designed the events to apply a gender lens to its activities and provide practical training in awareness-raising and campaigning, thus equipping women with skills and knowledge needed to help strengthen efforts in controlling illicit small arms and light weapons. The Centre also endeavoured through these workshops to sensitize decision- makers to the distinct impact of gun violence on women and girls while strengthening the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and adherence to the Arms Trade Treaty. Additionally, the Centre delivered presentations on that project at subregional forums on small arms and light weapons control and gender issues in Asia and the Pacific. The Centre’s other relevant activities included facilitating a meeting in Bangkok for States in Asia to prepare for the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, placing focus on the relationship between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the gender aspects of small arms control. In May, the Centre contributed to an event organized in Beijing by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs on enhancing the women, peace and security agenda34 in North-East Asia, presenting on the gender
34 See Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015).
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aspects of maintaining peace and security in Asia and the Pacific; of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament; and of its own activities.
Vienna Office of the Office for Disarmament Affairs The Vienna Office continued to promote women’s participation in disarmament and non-proliferation education and in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict resolution. In 2018, the Office’s activities included partnering with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to implement their fifth training course, in which participants received online and in-person instruction on issues related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. In addition, the initiative allowed young women professionals from the wider OSCE region to network with others active in relevant fields. The Vienna Office and OSCE provided 60 scholarships for participation by early-career female professionals from the OSCE region through the Scholarship for Peace and Security, a programme they jointly decided to relaunch in 2019.
Gender and peacekeeping Mine action The United Nations Mine Action Service continued to address the needs of men, women, boys and girls from diverse groups in programmes, activities and policies related to mine action. In 2018, the Mine Action Service led consultations across the United Nations system to develop the United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2019-2023.35 United Nations entities agreed that gender mainstreaming required focused attention in the Strategy, prompting a decision to address gender inclusion and diversity as a cross-cutting strategic outcome for the first time. Accordingly, the United Nations emphasized enhancing the integration and mainstreaming of age, gender and diversity considerations across all United Nations and country strategies, programmes and operations for mine action, extending to staffing, management and reporting. The United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes36 also underwent review and received updates through an inter-agency consultative process coordinated by the Mine Action Service. The updated Guidelines provide practical guidance for the sector on gender mainstreaming. In addition, the Mine Action Service continued to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment by employing women in a range of roles, including as deminers, trainers, mentors, risk educators and programme managers. By participating in mine action activities, women were further integrated as active agents of peace in their countries and directly contributed to the protection of civilians and peacebuilding.
35 United Nations Mine Action Strategy 2019–2023 (New York, United Nations, 2019). 36 Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes (New York, United Nations, 2010).
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Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration As both combatants and community peacebuilders, women continued to fulfil a variety of roles in fomenting and preventing conflict. Accordingly, it remained essential that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes implement interventions specific to the particular needs of women. In 2018, women contributed significantly to community-based efforts through their participation in community violence-reduction initiatives. In 2018, women represented 26 per cent of the demobilized combatants receiving support from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes with technical and logistical support provided by the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. While only 30 per cent of the funding for the programmes was allocated to initiatives specifically targeting women, those women-focused initiatives served 46 per cent of all direct beneficiaries of community stabilization projects and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives. Additionally, by promoting vocational training and income-generating activities, the Operation contributed to mobilizing and empowering women across Darfur’s various jurisdictions. In Haiti, women represented the majority of direct beneficiaries (51 per cent) targeted through community violence reduction projects. In two related efforts, the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti promoted the establishment of a gender-sensitive recruitment mechanism for the Haitian National Police and supported community mobilization against sexual and gender-based violence. For the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, women represented 33 per cent of direct beneficiaries of community violence reduction. The Mission achieved an increase in women’s participation, in part by supporting a new requirement that they constitute at least 20 per cent of the intended beneficiaries of proposed projects. The selection of beneficiaries by local committees at target locations also helped ensure women’s participation in all community violence- reduction activities.
Security sector reform Through its support for security sector reform in 2018, the United Nations continued to foster the establishment of effective and accountable security institutions on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect for human rights and the rule of law. During the year, the Security Sector Reform Unit of the United Nations Mission in Liberia advised the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms on the development of regulations regarding the use of firearms. The goal of this assistance was to help ensure the full implementation of the Firearms
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and Ammunition Control Act of Liberia, which banned the possession of firearms where there was a risk of serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. The Unit also supported the establishment of a dedicated gender capacity within the Liberia National Commission on Small Arms, resulting in enhanced prevention of and protection against gun-related violence against women. Furthermore, the Unit supported the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Liberia National Police in launching a gender-sensitive campaign aimed at raising awareness to protect civilians from explosive remnants of its civil war. In Yemen, the security sector reform team within the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen facilitated the participation of women-led civil society organizations in discussions on disarmament options for armed groups as part of the country’s peace process. In Burkina Faso and the Gambia, security sector reform advisers continued to support each State in designing gender-sensitive assessments and policies to ensure effective civilian control and oversight over its armed forces. In the Central African Republic, the security sector reform component within the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic promoted the establishment of a mixed brigade of internal security forces37 to prevent violence against women, while also advocating for the inclusion of gender dimensions in the Government’s national security policy and security sector reform strategy. In addition, the Mission encouraged the Government to establish effective vetting mechanisms to prevent the integration of individuals responsible for conflict-related sexual violence into the armed forces. In Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali supported the integration of gender perspectives in the work of the National Security Sector Reform Committee and throughout the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015, which established a requirement for at least 30 per cent of participants in the country’s security institutions to be women. In Somalia, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia–United Nations Development Programme Integrated Security Sector Reform Section promoted enhanced participation of women-led civil society organizations in security sector oversight. It also supported the implementation of the Security Pact of 2017, which requested all security sector institutions to adopt a gender strategy. In addition, the entity advocated including gender provisions in a newly enacted Pensions and Gratuities Bill for the security forces and in the maritime security commitments made by the Government.
37 The official name of the brigade isUnité Mixte d’Intervention Rapide et de Répression des violences sexuelles faites aux femmes et aux enfants.
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Meanwhile, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan facilitated dialogue on the implementation of gender provisions in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, including a women’s participation quota of 35 per cent across government and pre-transitional institutions. However, women remained significantly underrepresented, particularly in security-related committees.
UN-Women In 2018, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) was an active member of the Inter- Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. It also continued to be a part of the review process for the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, providing gender expertise for mainstreaming gender throughout the entire policy. Additionally, UN-Women contributed to the event organized by the International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group during the General Assembly’s seventy-third session. Ireland and Namibia organized that event in collaboration with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Also in partnership with the Office, the UN-Women Training Centre worked to elaborate an online course on gender and disarmament.
Terrorism and disarmament Throughout 2018, the United Nations expanded efforts to pursue disarmament for counter-terrorism purposes, including through endeavours related to weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and improvised explosive devices. In one initiative to address potential threats of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime hosted a workshop, held in Vienna in March, entitled “Universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment”. The referenced conventions and amendment provided an important multilateral legal framework for countering terrorist threats by, inter alia, offering tools to prevent acts that they established as offences. Efforts to achieve universal participation in the instruments remained ongoing as at the end of the year.38
38 As at 31 December, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism had 115 signatories and 114 parties. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material had 44 signatories and 157 parties, 118 of which had also ratified the 2005 amendment.
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Separately, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to maintain a roster of experts and laboratories provided by Member States in support of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Under the Mechanism, the Secretary-General could call upon the rostered experts to carry out fact-finding activities concerning reports of the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, including by non-State actors. (For more information on the Mechanism, see chap. II.) On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 73/55 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As in previous iterations of the resolution, the Assembly emphasized the urgent need for progress in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism. It additionally urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The international community also continued to address the relationship between the availability of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, and materials for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. The Security Council and the General Assembly both addressed this relationship in 2018. The Security Council continued to consider the nexus of weapons and terrorism pursuant to its resolution 2370 (2017), in which it acknowledged the link between the supply of conventional weapons and the perpetration of terrorist acts. For example, the body addressed multiple necessary activities for eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists, including proper stockpile management and marking and tracing procedures for weapons in country- specific contexts, including peace operations. (For more information on the Council’s work related to small arms and light weapons, see chap. III.) In the context of the Central African Republic, the Council emphasized by resolution 2399 (2018) the risk that the ongoing violence and instability could create an environment conducive to transnational criminal activities (e.g., arms trafficking) and the spread of radical networks. In the context of the situation in Mali, the Council expressed by resolution 2423 (2018) serious concern over the country’s insecurity, which was exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorists and criminal networks; the presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war; and the continued illicit proliferation of weapons. In June, the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons considered the linkage between illicit small arms and terrorist acts. Participants acknowledged that a larger supply of illicit weapons in circulation would raise the chance of terrorist actors acquiring such armaments. States expressed specific concerns about the use of small
192 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues arms and light weapons in terrorist attacks around the world in recent years. In that connection, they underlined the essential contribution that the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument made to the global fight against all forms of violence and crime, including terrorism. Looking ahead, the Review Conference agreed to address concerns about the illicit international transfer of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients during a one-week biennial meeting of States on the Programme of Action scheduled for 2020. The discussion was expected to be informed by a report of the Secretary-General that would include views of Member States on relevant best practices, lessons learned and new recommendations and, additionally, views from the United Nations system. (For more information on the Programme of Action, see chap. III.) Meanwhile, improvised explosive devices remained a weapon of choice for terrorist actors—such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups and entities—to target civilians in countries such as Afghanistan, Mali and the Syrian Arab Republic. Such devices continued to cause the most civilian harm of all explosive weapons, owing to their indiscriminate deployment and effects, and Afghanistan was especially impacted by improvised explosive devices in that context.39 In its resolution 2405 (2018), the Security Council condemned all attacks, including attacks using those devices, targeting civilians and Afghan and international forces. In December, in response to the comprehensive and multifaceted threat posed by improvised explosive devices, the General Assembly adopted the fourth iteration of the resolution on the issue (73/67), in which it acknowledged the indiscriminate use and effects of such devices, in particular through the perpetration of terrorist acts. Through the resolution, the Assembly recognized the increasing use of improvised explosive devices in terrorist activities and stressed the paramount need to prevent terrorists and the networks that support them from obtaining, handling, financing, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives that could be used to manufacture those devices. It also encouraged States and the private sector to increase prevention efforts by taking measures to stem the transfer of knowledge of improvised explosive devices and their construction and use by illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients, as well as measures to stem the illicit acquisition of components over the Internet. (For more information on developments related to improvised explosive devices, see chap. III).
39 In his June report on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, the Secretary-General noted that the use of tactics employing improvised explosive devices, including complex, suicide and non-suicide attacks, caused 1,018 civilian casualties (311 persons killed and 707 injured), comprising 45 per cent of all civilian casualties. See A/72/888–S/2018/539.
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Work of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force On 23 February, the Secretary-General signed the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, a system-wide agreement to improve the coordination and coherence of the Organization’s activities to support Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy. A replacement of the earlier coordination arrangement of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Compact was an agreed framework between the Secretary-General and the heads of United Nations task force entities. Its aims were to strengthen (a) a common action approach to coordination and coherence in the work of the United Nations system to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism and (b) the support to Member States, at their request, in the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and other relevant resolutions and mandates. The first meeting of the Compact’s Coordination Committee took place in New York on 6 December. There, the Committee considered strategic priorities for 2019 and 2020 based on the sixth review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, relevant Security Council resolutions and Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate assessments, and requests by Member States for technical assistance. The Committee also discussed the organization of work and ways to improve the delivery of “All-of-UN” capacity-building support to Member States through inter-agency thematic working groups. Following the Secretary-General’s sixth review40 of the Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy,41 the General Assembly adopted resolution 72/284 on 26 June, by which it recalled the establishment of the Office for Counter- Terrorism42 and its functions, including, inter alia, ensuring the balanced implementation of the four pillars of the Strategy. In addition, the Assembly renewed its commitment to strengthening international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reaffirmed that any acts of terrorism were criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. Furthermore, on 28 and 29 June, the United Nations Office for Counter- Terrorism held the first High-level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States at United Nations Headquarters in New York.
40 A/72/840. 41 General Assembly resolution 60/288, annex. 42 The Office was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/291 of 15 June 2017.
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Contribution of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to global counter-terrorism efforts Within the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism and its technically oriented Sub-Working Group on Non-State Actors continued to highlight where OPCW could work productively to advance its contribution to global counter-terrorism efforts. In that regard, their discussions focused on the role of international legal cooperation in bringing perpetrators of acts of chemical terrorism to justice; the importance of national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, particularly article VI, in combating the threat of non-State actors; and lessons learned from other international efforts to build national capacity against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. On 7 and 8 June, the Technical Secretariat of OPCW hosted the Conference on Countering Chemical Terrorism, bringing together participants from more than 65 States parties and representatives from the chemical industry, non-governmental organizations and academia. By involving both counter-terrorism and chemical weapons experts in the meeting, OPCW aimed to stimulate new thinking and precipitate further action on chemical terrorism, which was seen as one of the most pressing threats to the global norm against chemical weapons. The event further underscored the widely shared concern about the threat and the contributions that OPCW and the Convention could make to tackling it. Separately, OPCW began providing specific counter-terrorism capacity- building support to States parties to the Convention. In October, OPCW held a workshop in Abuja for experts from the Sahel and West Africa on how national legislation for implementing the Convention could help address threats posed by non-State actors. Other international organizations that participated in the workshop included the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the International Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the World Customs Organization. In addition, OPCW became a signatory to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and participated as an observer in the first United Nations High-level Conference on Counter-Terrorism. The Organisation also continued to chair, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks, which aimed to take further steps to enhance coordination among international organizations and the chemical industry to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorism. Enhancing the ability to respond to the hostile use of a toxic chemical remained a priority for OPCW. In that regard, the Technical Secretariat’s
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Rapid Response and Assistance Mission remained on standby to deploy on short notice to assist States parties dealing with the use of toxic chemicals by a non-State actor, including terrorists.
Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control Emphasizing the importance of observing environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements and mindful of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted without a vote resolution 73/39 on 5 December. In the resolution, the Assembly called upon States to pursue unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures to ensure the application of scientific and technological progress in international security, disarmament and other related spheres without detriment to the environment or to attaining sustainable development. The Assembly also invited Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General the measures they had adopted to promote objectives envisaged in its language, and it requested that he submit a report containing that information to the General Assembly at its seventy- fourth session. For the seventy-third session, the Secretary-General included replies received from five Governments in his report submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to resolution 72/47 of 4 December 2017.43
Relationship between disarmament and development By resolution 72/46, which was tabled by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and adopted by consensus on 4 December 2017, the General Assembly repeated its call for the international community to devote to economic and social development some of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements. The Assembly also invited Member States to provide the Secretary-General with information regarding measures and efforts being undertaken to that effect. Accordingly, the Office for Disarmament Affairs sent a note verbale in February to all Member States calling for the submission of information. The resulting submissions were included in a report44 of the Secretary- General issued on 2 July. In the report, the Secretary-General noted that the United Nations continued to strengthen its role regarding the relationship between disarmament and development through inter-agency coordination on matters that affected peace, security and development; coordination of efforts towards achieving the goals set in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development;45 and promotion of transparency and confidence-building
43 Replies were received from Cuba, Lebanon, Panama, Qatar and Ukraine. See A/73/92. 44 A/73/117. 45 See General Assembly resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015.
196 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues in military spending. Pursuant to resolution 72/46, the report included information submitted by Brunei Darussalam, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Peru, Ukraine and the European Union. Cuba also submitted information46 in response to the resolution. By resolution 73/37 of 5 December, the General Assembly repeated its earlier calls for the international community both to (a) reference how disarmament could support the Sustainable Development Goals when it reviewed progress towards their achievement and (b) make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian action and development. Goal 16 and its target 16.447 on reducing illicit arms were particularly relevant in that regard, as they related directly to the link between security and development. The Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime continued to serve as co-custodians for Indicator 16.4.2, “Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments”, and to collect data from Member States using the tools they maintained under the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Firearms Protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In addition, the Office conducted a broader review of opportunities for disarmament activities to help achieve targets of the Sustainable Development Goals with a view towards operationally linking disarmament concepts with the Goals and highlighting the relationship between disarmament and development. The Office planned to continuously monitor progress under the designated targets to ensure that disarmament efforts contribute towards their attainment.
Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation In its resolution 73/41 of 5 December, the General Assembly called upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In addition, the Assembly requested the Secretary- General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report on the matter to the Assembly at its seventy-fourth session. Pursuant to resolution 72/48 of 4 December 2017, the Secretary-General submitted
46 See the letter dated 5 April 2018 from the Government of Cuba addressed to the Office for Disarmament Affairs with reference to the General Assembly resolution 72/46 of 4 December 2017 on the relationship between disarmament and development. 47 Target 16.4 reads as follows: “By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all formsof organized crime”.
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to the Assembly at its seventy-third session his report on this subject, with replies from 10 Governments.48
Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament The General Assembly adopted resolution 73/32 on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament on 5 December without a vote. By the resolution, the Assembly, inter alia, called upon Member States to remain vigilant in understanding new and emerging developments in science and technology that could imperil international security, welcomed the report49 of the Secretary-General on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts, requested an updated report be submitted at its seventy-fourth session and asked the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to convene a seminar on the topic in 2019. The potential impact of emerging technologies on international security was considered in a number of other forums in 2018. For example, Subsidiary Body 5 of the Conference on Disarmament considered new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (see also chap. VI). In addition, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters addressed “current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament” as part of its agenda50 for 2018 (see also chap. VI). At the annual Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, delegations considered technological developments of possible relevance to the Convention under the agenda item “Emerging issues in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention” (see also chap. III).
Outer space
The international community took significant steps in 2018 to enhance peace and security in outer space, including through progress in the deliberations of United Nations bodies such as the General Assembly (see also chap. VI), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (see chap. VI), the Conference on Disarmament (see also chap. VI) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Their efforts included recommendations on the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, the elaboration of guidelines for the long-term sustainability
48 Replies were received from Austria, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Lebanon, Mexico, Portugal, Qatar and Ukraine. See A/73/95. 49 A/73/177. 50 A/73/259.
198 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues of outer space and recommendations on elements for an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
Group of governmental experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space In resolution 72/250, the General Assembly requested the Secretary- General to establish a United Nations group of governmental experts, with a membership of up to 25 Member States, chosen on the basis of fair and equitable geographical representation, to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. In accordance with the resolution, the Secretary-General invited 25 Member States,51 selected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, to nominate experts to participate. Before the first session, the Group benefited from the International Workshop on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which was convened in Beijing in July by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, together with the ministries of foreign affairs of China and the Russian Federation. The workshop enabled the nominated experts to come together before the official session to discuss all issues relevant to their mandate, including the evolving space security landscape and the prospects for and consequences of an arms race in and the weaponization of outer space; the status of international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the relevance and sufficiency of applicable norms and principles; and possible elements related to an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. The Group held its first session in Geneva from 6 to 17 August. External experts and staff of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research delivered technical presentations, briefing the Group on a variety of topics. The Group also greatly benefited from the active engagement, presentations and working papers of its own members.
Existing legal regime in outer space and elements of general principles The Group considered that principles, rules and norms contained within the existing international treaties, conventions, instruments and other sources were relevant to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. Experts generally affirmed or recognized the relevance to that aim of
51 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.
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principles in the Outer Space Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and related disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. While those principles, rules and norms had played an essential role in fostering cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space, the view was expressed that they remained insufficient to prevent an arms race in outer space. There was no dispute that international law, and the Charter of the United Nations in particular, applied in outer space. There were concerns, however, about engaging in a discussion on the application of international humanitarian law, owing to the possibility that such a discussion could signal acceptance of the notion that armed conflict could be conducted in outer space. In particular, any attack in low-earth orbit could create long-lasting debris that could persist for decades or longer, posing a serious hazard to any spacecraft operating at the same altitude. An attack in higher orbits could create debris that persists indefinitely. A small number of attacks resulting in the break-up of space objects could negatively impact wide areas of earth orbit and pose a consequent hazard to the safety and security of space operations and could result in unpredictable incidental harm to other spacecraft. There was some convergence of views about focusing on the regulation of behaviour, including the possible prohibition or limitation of harmful or hostile acts that result in permanent damage or destruction of space objects.
Elements of general obligations The Group discussed various possible threats to outer space activities and a potential scheme for classifying threats on a continuum from low-intensity, characterized by reversible and disruptive impacts, to high-intensity, characterized by irreversible and destructive impacts. One proposed scheme included the following: (a) electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing of radio transmissions; (b) cyberattacks, including directly on outer space objects and on space-related terrestrial infrastructure and commercial operations; (c) directed energy attacks, which can be launched from ground-, air-, sea- or space-based platforms and which currently had the capability of blinding, dazzling or damaging sensitive equipment; (d) orbital-based anti-satellite systems with the capability to rendezvous with and physically interact with or impact space objects; (e) ground-based anti-satellite weapons, which could destroy space-based objects through kinetic or explosive impacts; and (f) nuclear detonations. The Group considered that a legally binding instrument should address at least three scenarios: space-to-space, space-to-ground and ground-to-space attacks. Experts also discussed attacks against terrestrial infrastructure related to space objects. They additionally examined the challenge of dual-use systems, in connection with systems with legitimate civilian applications but that could be used to carry out attacks. Such capabilities included those used in remote
200 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues and proximity operations and those used for active debris removal. The problem of dual-use capabilities was regarded as one of the challenges for the development of an effective and verifiable legally binding instrument. Experts considered that there could be a varied approach to rules on harmful or hostile acts against outer space objects, based on the nature of the threat, taking into account challenges associated with attribution, verification and the dual-use application, civil and military, of outer space objects and capabilities. They also believed that any instrument should prohibit the use of outer space objects to attack terrestrial targets. Some experts placed high priority on regulating behaviour, including by prohibiting various types of intentionally harmful or destructive acts. There were various views on whether an instrument should focus more narrowly on intentional acts that could result in the generation of long-lasting debris in earth orbit. Opinions converged, however, on addressing attacks against outer space objects, regardless of whether such attacks originated from other space- based systems or if they were launched from a terrestrial-based missile. A number of experts regarded the prohibition on placing any weapon in outer space as the primary purpose of any legally binding instrument. There was a robust discussion on the potential dual-use nature of space activities complicating effective verification of such a prohibition, and it was suggested that an instrument could prohibit the placement of outer space objects specifically designed for use as a weapon. Experts expressed various views on whether an instrument would require an article on definitions. Some considered that the need for definitions should emanate from the scope.
Elements related to monitoring, verification and transparency and confidence-building measures Many experts considered that some degree of verification would be possible for rules covering the various possible harmful or hostile acts that could be included in an instrument. They also considered that the strictness of the verification approach could vary for each prohibited act, and that acts subject to stronger prohibitions could be subject to more stringent verification. There were various views on whether verification needed to be an integral part of a legally binding instrument or whether such measures could be negotiated subsequently and included in a protocol. There was discussion of some novel approaches, such as mandating “keep out” zones that would limit the distance to which one could approach without consent a space object owned by another party. Pre-launch inspections were also suggested. The Group also discussed the importance of building capacity in space situational awareness as a means for characterizing or verifying the behaviour
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of outer space objects. In light of the fact that the national technical means of States varied considerably, a number of experts emphasized the importance of multilateral verification of a legally binding instrument. It was stressed that voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures could not substitute a legally binding instrument. It was also noted, however, that disarmament and arms control treaties could incorporate compulsory or non-compulsory transparency measures. A number of experts suggested various measures that could form the basis for elements in a legally binding instrument, including information exchanges on military strategies and doctrines, pre-launch notifications, pre-launch inspection of dual-capable space objects, enhanced registration of space objects, public access to national space registries, notification of scheduled manoeuvres, familiarization visits to space facilities and launch sites, and technology demonstrations.
Elements related to international cooperation, institutional arrangements and final provisions With respect to international cooperation, a number of experts considered that the instrument should contain operative provisions on the right to develop technology for peaceful purposes and on positive obligations for international cooperation in promoting the peaceful uses of outer space. It was emphasized that an instrument should be designed to avoid hampering peaceful activities or hindering access to dual-use technologies, such as orbital robotics and active debris removal. Support was expressed for including provisions on capacity-building related to various aspects of an instrument and its implementation, including assistance in the development of national legislation, reporting and transparency, verification, space situational awareness and the responsible use of outer space. Various views were expressed on the institutional arrangements, including on the need for a dedicated secretariat or an implementation support unit. A number of experts emphasized the importance of limiting the institutional costs as much as possible. Experts expressed various views on the requirements for entry into force. Many experts supported an approach based on a low number of ratifications (e.g., 20) required for entry into force in addition to the participation of a qualified category of States, such as major space-faring nations.
Guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space In 2016, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space agreed that consensus had been reached on the text of a first set of 12 guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities52 and that negotiations
52 A/71/20, para. 130 and annex.
202 Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues on those had been carried out and concluded.53 The Committee continued its deliberations in 2017 and 2018 on the preamble and the text of other guidelines through the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Science and Technical Subcommittee. In 2018, the Working Group confirmed that consensus had been reached on the preamble and on the text of nine additional guidelines.54 The Committee thus noted that during its mandate, the Working Group had reached consensus on a preamble and 21 guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. The Committee also noted that, while the Working Group had not been able to conclude its consideration of all guidelines within its current mandate, discussions had continued at the current session of the Committee on a number of draft guidelines for which consensus had not been reached. That progress was reflected in conference room paper A/AC.105/2018/CRP.21.55 The Committee encouraged States and international intergovernmental organizations to consider implementing guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities on a voluntary basis and to share their experiences with implementation under the Subcommittee’s agenda item on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. The Committee noted that the Working Group had discussed various options for continuing work related to the topic of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, including extending the current Working Group by one year with a mandate to carry out specific tasks and creating a new working group on safety and transparency in space activities. However, at the 2017–2018 session, the Working Group was not able to reach a consensus on the details of any proposal.
Implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) Status of implementation On 28 December, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) (1540 Committee) submitted to the Council its review of the resolution’s implementation for 2018.56 The 1540 Committee, chaired by Sacha Sergio Llorentty Solíz (Bolivia (Plurinational State of)), continued to facilitate and monitor implementation of the resolution by States with administrative and substantive support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The review addressed all aspects of the Committee’s work, which had been facilitated throughout the year by its four working groups on the
53 Ibid., para. 133. 54 A/AC.105/1167, annex III, para. 6. 55 A/73/20, paras. 194–208. 56 S/2018/1178.
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following areas: monitoring and national implementation, assistance, cooperation with international organizations, and transparency and media outreach.
Monitoring and national implementation The 1540 Committee continued to compile and examine information on the resolution’s implementation by States. In 2018, this effort included reformatting data on implementation measures by various countries. The Committee also continued to encourage the submission of implementation reports in line with Security Council resolution 2325 (2016), in which the Council had called upon all States that had not yet done so to submit a first report without delay. In 2018, three States57 submitted their first reports to the Committee, bringing to 182 the number of Governments that had provided them. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council encouraged States to also provide additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including on their laws, regulations and effective practices. Eight States58 reported such material in 2018. The Security Council also called, in resolution 2325 (2016), for States to develop, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). Three States59 provided such plans to the Committee in 2018, bringing to 32 the number of States that had done so since 2007. The Council further encouraged States in resolution 2325 (2016) to inform the Committee of points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004). Such individuals could facilitate internal coordination of implementation efforts, collaboration between States and contact with the Committee. Five States60 named points of contact in 2018, bringing to 106 the number of States that had done so. Through its seventeenth programme of work,61 the Committee aimed to expand the network of those points of contact while continuing to train them at the regional level. In that regard, the Committee collaborated with the African Union to organize a training course for francophone African countries from 14 to 17 August in Addis Ababa. It also held a course in Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation, from 4 to 7 September with support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
57 Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste and Comoros. 58 Argentina, Australia, Burundi, Cambodia, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia and Malaysia. 59 Serbia, Turkmenistan and Uruguay. 60 Bahrain, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste and Kuwait. 61 S/2018/340.
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Also in its programme of work, the Committee recognized the need to promote the sharing of experience, including through peer reviews, to evaluate and reinforce effective implementation practices and lessons learned. In 2018, two peer-review processes62 were conducted with the support of the Committee and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. On 7 and 8 November, the Plurinational State of Bolivia hosted a regional conference on resolution 1540 (2004) for States in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Conference in La Paz allowed an exchange of views and effective practices for preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons to non-State actors, with emphasis on handling related materials.
Assistance In 2018, nine States63 submitted new requests for assistance to the 1540 Committee, a threefold increase over the prior year. Additionally, several States and international organizations64 submitted letters indicating their readiness to consider assistance requests by States and identifying areas in which they could provide support in that regard. The Committee relayed the offers of assistance to the requesting States for their potential action in direct coordination with providers.
Cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations Throughout 2018, the Committee further enhanced its collaboration with relevant international, regional and subregional organizations. In that regard, the Committee and its Group of Experts continued to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The activities of the committees in that area included conducting three joint country visits65 during the year and a joint briefing to the Security Council on 3 October.66 Meanwhile, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa continued to support States of the region in strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In an initiative to help Mali draft its national report, the Centre collaborated with 1540
62 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supported by Belarus, Chile and Colombia. 63 Bahrain, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Madagascar, Mali, Peru and Republic of Guinea. 64 World Customs Organization, World Health Organization, INTERPOL, the World Organization for Animal Health, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and Nuclear Suppliers Group. 65 Armenia, Georgia and Zimbabwe. 66 S/PV.8364.
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Committee experts to facilitate a series of presentations in October that focused on effective implementation by all stakeholders. Also in October, the Centre discussed the resolution at a workshop in Djibouti for member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.67 Additionally, the Centre took part in a round table in Equatorial Guinea in December to support national authorities in understanding the implementation responsibilities of various stakeholders. Throughout the year, the Centre also informed Member States about available implementation assistance mechanisms and encouraged their utilization. Separate efforts to strengthen the resolution’s implementation took place with support from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. In January, the Centre held a national round table in Ashgabat to conclude a programme on the regional implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in Central Asia and Mongolia. The programme—convened jointly by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe—supported the development of national implementation action plans submitted to the 1540 Committee by four States: Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Also in January, Timor-Leste submitted its first national implementation report following a national round-table meeting that the Centre had organized in the country the prior year. Additionally, the Centre provided substantive support for a programme on countering maritime terrorism and the financing for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in South Asian States in the framework of resolution 1540 (2004), organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Maritime Organization. Likewise, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to assist five States68 in implementing resolution 1540 (2004). Its support in that regard included technical assistance in adopting national control lists and licensing regimes intended to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, through national and regional discussions held in Suriname and Guyana with the participation of 1540 Committee experts, the Centre helped provide support to the two States in drafting voluntary national implementation action plans. Separately, the Centre undertook national workshops on explosive chemical precursors in a collaborative partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States.
67 The presentation addressed, inter alia, complementarity in the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and the Biological Weapons Convention. 68 Dominican Republic, Peru, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
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Transparency and outreach The Chair, members and experts of the 1540 Committee participated in 32 outreach events in 2018,69 supporting greater cooperation and awareness among States, parliamentarians, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and civil society—including academia and industry—regarding the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) and related implementation measures. In addition, the Committee directly engaged with and provided information to industry actors regarding their national legal obligations at two events in 2018. India hosted the first of those regional industry outreach conferences70 in April with support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs and in cooperation with Germany. The Republic of Korea held the second regional industry outreach conference71 in September.
69 S/2018/1178, enclosure. 70 The conference title was “Securing Global Supply Chains Through Government-Industry Partnerships towards Effective Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540”. 71 The conference title was “2nd UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Industrial Outreach Conference for the Asia-Pacific Region”.
207 chapter Disarmament VI machinery Vladimir Drobnjak (centre), Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations, chairs the meeting of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Secretary-General António Guterres (left) and Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (right), participated in the meeting in June 2018.
UN Photo/Mark Garten C h a p t e r V I
Disarmament machinery
Disarmament and arms control are complex projects comprising many small steps. Each one affects the whole. Each gas attack, each nuclear test, takes us into greater danger. We cannot contemplate further erosion of the global framework for disarmament. Indeed, we must reverse it urgently.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Developments and trends, 2018
The organs of the United Nations disarmament machinery took some notable steps towards advancing substantive items on their agendas, with the most noteworthy developments in the areas of emerging weapon technologies. The deterioration of the international security environment had a significant impact on the General Assembly, which was compelled to pursue a record number of votes on draft resolutions. While the Assembly was able to initiate several new processes, each was contentious and ultimately adopted by majority vote. In that connection, the Assembly took its first steps towards taking forward multilateral deliberations on cybersecurity, following the failure of a group of governmental experts in 2017 to agree on a substantive outcome on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.2 With consensus on a single approach beyond reach, the Assembly ultimately approved two new processes. Other disarmament bodies also engaged in several notable activities. In April, the United Nations Disarmament Commission commenced its first year of deliberations on practical recommendations for the implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space. Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament adopted a decision to establish subsidiary bodies with deliberative mandates under each agenda item covering its four core issues—nuclear disarmament, fissile material, prevention of an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances—as well as a subsidiary body on its three remaining agenda items. Separately, the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group concluded its work with the adoption of a substantive report. In that document, the Group presented a menu of potential treaty elements
1 Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 26 February 2018. 2 A/72/327.
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intended to facilitate future negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Two other governmental expert groups also commenced their work in 2018, respectively addressing the topics of nuclear disarmament verification and further effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its sixty-ninth and seventieth sessions in 2018, addressing two substantive agenda items: (a) strategic priorities for the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation and (b) current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament. Expressing full and unreserved support for the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament following its release, the Board stressed that it was incumbent on all stakeholders to actively promote the Agenda. The Board also made a series of recommendations to raise awareness of the Agenda and its call to action among Member States, the expert community, civil society and the broader public.
First Committee of the General Assembly
The First Committee held its seventy-third session from 8 October to 8 November. The session was particularly acrimonious, reflecting the deterioration of the international security environment and increasing strains on frameworks for arms control and non-proliferation. The Committee heard statements from 135 delegations during its general debate and 354 interventions during its thematic discussions. Under the leadership of its Chair, Ion Jinga (Romania), the Committee devoted a total of 8 meetings to its general debate, 13 to its thematic debate and 5 for action on all draft resolutions and decisions. Divisions among Member States were particularly evident in the frequency of votes, which was far higher than in recent years. Of the 68 draft resolutions and decisions adopted by the Committee, 39 were by vote. It held 89 votes on separate paragraphs and on texts as a whole. The tension between the Russian Federation and the United States was a major and defining dynamic of the session. In a procedural vote, the Committee ultimately decided not to accept for consideration a draft resolution authored by the Russian Federation on the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty). Other major areas of division included the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and advancement of norms of responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Many Member States expressed support for the preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan
212 Disarmament machinery of Action relating to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Member States also welcomed the dramatic easing of tensions and convening of historic summits on the Korean Peninsula, which many hoped would lead to comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. Member States broadly welcomed the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. Positive references to the Agenda were reflected in at least 110 statements delivered by nearly 60 States, regional and subregional groups—including the Arab Group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries and the European Union—and by civil society. The 2018 “Exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and other high-level officials on the current state of affairs in the field of disarmament and arms control” departed from its traditional composition in order to facilitate discussion on the evolving strategic context surrounding disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, including, inter alia, the Secretary-General’s initiative to issue his Agenda for Disarmament.3 Member States that took the floor during the exchange all expressed support for the Agenda and its implementation. References to the Agenda were ultimately included and retained in six resolutions adopted by the Committee.4 In those resolutions, the General Assembly variously noted, took into account, expressed appreciation or welcomed the Agenda, its launch and the Secretary-General’s initiative. Although separate votes were requested on each paragraph referring to the Agenda owing to that document’s reference to the findings of the fourth report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations, voting on those paragraphs otherwise reflected prevailing vote patterns on their parent resolutions. For the single one of those resolutions adopted historically without a vote, “Disarmament and non-proliferation education” (73/59), the Committee retained the reference “expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his disarmament agenda” by a vote of 166 in favour and none opposed, with 4 abstentions.
3 The panellists included representatives from the Peacebuilding Support Office and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Executive Director of the High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and, by a decision taken by the Committee by a vote, the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. 4 These were the following resolutions: “The Arms Trade Treaty” (73/36), “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions” (73/54), “Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World” (73/57), “Disarmament and non- proliferation education” (73/59), “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons” (73/64) and “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” (73/70).
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Despite noted divisions and often intense exchanges, the working methods of the First Committee allowed it to initiate several new processes. The Committee adopted a decision to request the Secretary-General to convene on an annual basis a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. The Committee also adopted two resolutions under its agenda item on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, the first 73/27( )5 establishing an open-ended working group to meet in 2019 and 2020 and the second (73/266)6 establishing a new group of governmental experts to meet from 2019 to 2021. As in previous years, the thematic debate addressed seven clusters: nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, outer space (disarmament aspects), conventional weapons, other disarmament measures and international security, regional disarmament and security, and disarmament machinery. Representatives of civil society from various organizations, international networks and coalitions again delivered presentations to the First Committee in an informal session, with their interventions largely divided according to specific types of weapon systems or emerging issues. During its thematic debate on the disarmament machinery, the Committee repeated its past practice of convening a panel discussion with the President of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Chair of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and the Director of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. On 5 December, the General Assembly adopted 66 draft resolutions and decisions received from the First Committee, excluding 2 draft resolutions pending reviews of their budgetary implications.7 Voting patterns remained largely the same as in the First Committee.
Nuclear weapons Tensions between the Russian Federation and the United States dominated the proceedings on nuclear weapons, even as much of the Committee’s formal action continued to focus largely on so-called traditional resolutions. On 20 October, President Donald Trump of the United States publicly stated that his Government would withdraw from the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. On 24 October, the Russian Federation circulated the text of a new proposed draft resolution entitled “Preservation of and compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty”.8 At
5 The resolution entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” was adopted on 5 December 2018. 6 The resolution entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security” was adopted on 22 December 2018. 7 General Assembly resolution 73/266 and decision 73/546 were adopted on 22 December 2018. 8 A/73/L.70.
214 Disarmament machinery the plenary on 25 October, the United States raised a point of order to oppose acceptance of the draft for consideration, citing the expiration of the deadline on 18 October for the submission of all draft resolutions and decisions. Acting on that point of order, the Committee voted to uphold a ruling of the Chair to allow more time for consultations on whether to accept the resolution for consideration after the previously decided deadline. On 26 October, the Committee resumed its debate on the matter and ultimately decided to reject consideration of the draft resolution by a vote of 31 to 55, with 54 abstentions. Several States spoke before the vote in favour of accepting the resolution for consideration, including China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. Delegations from Australia, France, Finland, Israel and the United Kingdom spoke in opposition, and Argentina, Belarus and El Salvador also delivered explanations of their votes. A number of States called separately for an extension of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). Additionally, certain States expressed concern that one party had undermined the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, under which the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States pledged to, inter alia, refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine in exchange for that country’s agreement to implement its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol not to retain any nuclear weapons by December 2001. Egypt, on behalf of the Arab Group, introduced a draft decision9 entrusting the Secretary-General to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to which, inter alia, all States of the Middle East would be invited. Other invitees included the three sponsors10 of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the two other nuclear-weapon States. The conference was to be convened annually, beginning in 2019, until its elaboration of a legally binding treaty establishing the zone. Furthermore, all decisions emanating from the conference would be taken by consensus by the States of the region. In submitting the draft, the Arab Group cited the decades-long stalemate in implementing the 1995 resolution and the blockage of efforts to initiate negotiations outside of the United Nations. The Committee adopted the draft decision by a vote of 103 to 3, with 71 abstentions. Israel and the United States vowed not to attend, and the two countries also voted against the resolution “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” (73/28), traditionally adopted by consensus, which the Committee adopted by a vote of 174 to 2, with 5 abstentions.
9 A/C.1/73/L.22/Rev.1, adopted by the General Assembly as decision 73/546. 10 Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
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The contentious debates over the Middle East and the future of bilateral arms control between the Russian Federation and the United States overshadowed continued differences over both the overall approach for nuclear disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Many States expressed support for the Treaty and called for its early entry into force. Meanwhile, the nuclear-weapon States delivered a joint statement in which they expressed opposition to the Treaty and advocated a gradual approach for nuclear disarmament. Despite those differences, many States reaffirmed the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and called for efforts to ensure the success of the 2020 Review Conference. States also continued to support long-standing objectives, such as the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. States additionally called for progress in emerging areas, including nuclear disarmament verification. Many States voiced their support for the preservation and implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and concerns were expressed over the decision of the United States to suspend its participation.11 Some States that expressed support for the Plan of Action also expressed concern over the ballistic-missile activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Other weapons of mass destruction As in the previous two sessions of the First Committee, discussions during the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction focused largely on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. Member States remained divided on that matter. A number of States welcomed the adoption of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 by the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and called for its full implementation.12 Other States strongly criticized the decision, and some regretted its adoption by vote. Meanwhile, France delivered a joint statement13 on behalf of 39 members14 of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of
11 The International Atomic Energy Agency had affirmed that it had continued to monitor and verify the implementation of the nuclear-related commitments undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran under the Plan of Action. For more information, see chapter 1. 12 The decision, entitled “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use”, called on the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to, inter alia, put in place arrangements to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. For more information, see chapter 2. 13 International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, “Joint statement by the Participating States”, New York, 24 October 2018. 14 For the current list of participants of the Partnership, which comprised 38 States and the European Union at the time of the statement’s delivery, see the website of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons.
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Chemical Weapons. The members of the Partnership recalled their ministerial declarations of 23 January and 18 May, and they expressed support for efforts of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The statement also indicated that the members of the Partnership would meet at the expert level in Paris on 8 and 9 November to develop common approaches to support the implementation of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was living up to its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention and recalled the destruction of its chemical-weapon stockpiles and production sites. It denied the use of chemical weapons by its armed forces. Many States also condemned the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, Malaysia and the United Kingdom, including by State and non-State actors. There was no consensus for a third consecutive year on the resolution entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (73/45), in which the General Assembly strongly condemned, inter alia, the use of chemical weapons attributed to the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. For the first time, the Assembly also condemned use of chemical weapons inthe United Kingdom and since 2012 in Iraq. The Committee adopted the draft resolution by a vote of 148 to 7, with 23 abstentions. With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, many States welcomed the agreement by States parties on an intersessional programme for the period 2018–2021. A number of States expressed concern over the financial situation of the Convention and called for parties that were in arrears to promptly settle any outstanding balances.
Outer space During the thematic debate on the disarmament aspects of outer space, delegations expressed increasing concern over current developments in outer space, including behaviour with unclear intentions, the development and deployment of terrestrially based missiles with anti-satellite capabilities, and research into possible co-orbital anti-satellite and space-to-ground weapons. In one consequence of those developments, the United States broke consensus on and voted against, together with Israel, the annual resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities 73/72( ). Many States continued to call for a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space, and a number of States supported negotiations on the basis of the draft treaty presented to the Conference on Disarmament by China and the Russian Federation. Other States expressed reservations over
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the draft text and expressed a preference to focus in the immediate term on the implementation and further elaboration of transparency and confidence- building measures, including development of norms of responsible behaviour. States continued to promote other interim political measures, including declarations on the non-first placement of weapons in outer space. A number of States welcomed the decision of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to take up an item for its 2018–2020 cycle on recommendations for the implementation of transparency and confidence- building measures in outer space activities with the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space. (For more information, see the separate section on the Disarmament Commission in this chapter.) Many also welcomed progress made within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, although it was regretted that the work could not be completed. A number of States expressed support for the convening in 2019 of a third joint meeting of the First and Fourth Committees. Many States welcomed the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 72/250. A number of States particularly welcomed the constructive progress made by the Group at its first session in August. As an interim measure pending the negotiation of a legally binding instrument on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space, the Russian Federation had led an effort since 2014 to encourage States to undertake a political commitment on the non-first placement of weapons in outer space. As at October 2018, 19 States15 had made political statements towards that end.
Conventional weapons On conventional arms issues, States welcomed the unanimous adoption of the final report of the Third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, notwithstanding its decision to retain by vote paragraphs that referred to ammunition and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Committee consequently held separate votes on paragraphs that referred to the outcome of the Review Conference. Many States expressed support for the new funding facility, named the Saving Lives Entity, proposed in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament to be established within the Peacebuilding Fund for the pursuit of country-level approaches to addressing small arms.
15 Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tajikistan, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam.
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Separately, the issue of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas gained greater prominence in the discussions on conventional weapons. Many States welcomed the priority afforded to that issue by the Secretary-General, including in his Agenda for Disarmament and his call for States to develop measures designed to address the humanitarian impacts. Ireland, on behalf of 50 States, delivered a joint statement in which they expressed grave concern over the humanitarian harm caused by such use, including the long-term impacts. They expressed an intent to continue supporting civil society in addressing those challenges and to remain seized of efforts to address the issue, both through the achievement of a possible future political declaration and through support for other initiatives, such as regional conferences. As an increasing number of States emphasized the relevance of disarmament to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, that focus continued to be primarily reflected in resolutions centred on efforts to curb illicit flows in small arms and light weapons. A number of States explicitly welcomed the approach reflected in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, which mapped out practical areas where specific disarmament measures would benefit the achievement of specific goals and targets of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Committee continued to adopt by vote the annual resolutions supporting various recent humanitarian disarmament and arms-regulation treaties, including the Arms Trade Treaty (73/36), the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (73/61) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (73/54). Signaling the widespread acceptance of the norms contained in the latter two conventions, States not party to those agreements continued to express support for the overall objectives and cited their particular security situations as the reasons preventing their accession.
Emerging technologies and other issues Cybersecurity The Committee’s deliberations on cyber issues remained divisive even as it ultimately decided on various future steps to move past the inability of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security to adopt a consensus report. The Russian Federation and the United States ultimately introduced separate proposals on new processes after they were unable to agree on a single approach. The Committee adopted the draft resolution introduced by the Russian Federation on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” by a vote of 109 to 45, with 16 abstentions. Through that resolution, the General Assembly established an open-ended working group, to convene beginning in 2019 with
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a focus on, inter alia, developing rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States; possible establishment of institutional dialogue; promoting common understandings on existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and on how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies; and confidence-building measures and capacity-building. The Committee also adopted the draft resolution introduced by the United States entitled “Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security” by a vote of 139 to 11, with 18 abstentions. Through the resolution, the General Assembly established a group of governmental experts, to meet between 2019 and 2021, to continue to study—with a view to promoting common understandings and effective implementation—possible cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security, including norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour of States, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, as well as how international law applies to the use of information and communications technologies by States.
Lethal autonomous weapon systems Many States welcomed the outcome of the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, convened within the framework of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, including its adoption of 11 possible guiding principles. States continued to promote different approaches on that issue. Many States expressed support for a new legally binding instrument, with a number of States specifically calling for a prohibition of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Other States expressed support for a political declaration. There were also calls for States to undertake reviews of new weapons in accordance with the requirements of article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Gender and disarmament The First Committee continued to lag with respect to the full and equal participation of women, with less than 27 per cent of statements (122 out of 453) delivered by women. There was, however, a significant increase in interest in addressing gender-related issues; six resolutions incorporated language on gender for the first time, bringing the total to 15 during the session. In seven resolutions, the General Assembly recognized the gendered impact of weapons and the role of arms control in combating gender-based violence, including three resolutions in which it did so for the first time.
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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research France introduced and subsequently withdrew, owing to the opposition of one State, a draft decision in support of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. A group of 57 States expressed support for the withdrawn text, welcomed its appreciation of the Institute’s work and strongly supported the proposed sustainable and stable funding structure and operating model outlined in the report of the Secretary-General.16 Those States looked forward to working towards achieving the recommended increase in support from the regular budget.
United Nations Disarmament Commission
The United Nations Disarmament Commission commenced a new three-year cycle in 2018. The General Assembly First Committee had not agreed during the prior year on new agenda items for the period 2018–2020, following the conclusion of the Commission’s 2015–2017 cycle and its successful completion of work under the agenda item “Practical confidence- building measures in the field of conventional weapons”. Before the organizational meeting for the 2018 session, the Chair- designate, Gillian Bird (Australia), convened informational consultations to discuss the agenda. There continued to be support for Working Group I to continue deliberations on its long-standing agenda item on nuclear weapons. There was also overwhelming support for the introduction of a new item on outer space, based on a proposal jointly tabled by China, the Russian Federation and the United States,17 despite various views on its precise wording. Delegations also discussed various possible items on conventional weapons that the Commission could discuss in an informal meeting—the format in which it had taken up a proposed item on outer space in 2017— and address as a second substantive item in a future session. There was no consensus on any of the discussed options, however, and no delegation subsequently tabled a formal proposal. At its organizational session on 21 February, the Commission adopted the provisional agenda for its 2018 session. It further decided that its agenda for the 2018 substantive session, which included the two above-mentioned items, should serve for the period 2018–2020. At the beginning of its substantive session on 2 April, the Commission adopted the provisional agenda, entrusted Working Group I with the agenda item entitled “Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear
16 A/73/256. 17 A/CN.10/2016/WP.1.
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disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” and entrusted Working Group II with the agenda item entitled “In accordance with the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities (A/68/189), preparation of recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space”. The Commission elected Diedre Mills (Jamaica) as Chair of Working Group I and Jeroen Cooreman (Belgium) as Chair of Working Group II. On 2 and 3 April, the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items over the course of three plenary meetings, where 52 delegations delivered statements.18 Highlights from the discussion are presented in the following sections.
Nuclear weapons During the general debate, delegations primarily reiterated their general positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as summarized in this section. With respect to the focus of work in the current cycle, Australia advocated for a focused approach on discrete topics. A number of delegations proposed a focus on risk reduction, and it was also suggested that there could be a focus on transparency, irreversibility and verification. The United States proposed a new approach, entitled “creating conditions for nuclear disarmament”, and stated that that approach would also be introduced within the review cycle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Many Member States expressed deep disappointment that the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had failed to adopt a final document, and they expressed hope that the 2020 Review Conference would reach a successful outcome. States also reiterated arguments for and against the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The African Group underscored that agreement’s compatibility with article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while South Africa called the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
18 For the full statements, see A/CN.10/PV.369–371. Representatives of the following countries delivered statements: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda (on behalf of the Caribbean Community), Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Honduras, India, Indonesia (on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries), Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria (also on behalf of the Group of African States), Pakistan, Peru, Philippines (also on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia (on behalf of the Group of Arab States), Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).
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Weapons a “critical step” in the evolution of the international disarmament regime. Others, meanwhile, reiterated the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention. The Non-Aligned Movement recalled General Assembly resolution 68/32 of 5 December 2013 and its most recent iteration, resolution 72/251 of 24 December 2017, entitled “Follow-up to the 2013 High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament”. In that context, it called for a concrete road map for nuclear disarmament. The African Group separately described that resolution as an integral part of the overall objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Many States referred to the crucial role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement and other States called for implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Additionally, many States expressed hope for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Several States voiced optimism that discussions in the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group, and its informal consultative meeting, would provide an impetus to break the stagnation at the Conference on Disarmament. A large number of States welcomed recent diplomatic developments related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Many also continued, however, to condemn the nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A number of States emphasized that the policy of maximum pressure should continue until the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea took concrete steps towards denuclearization. Many States expressed support for the continued implementation by all participants of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, while a few criticized the ballistic-missile activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Working Group I held 10 meetings from 4 to 19 April, including several rounds of discussions on the basis of a compilation of proposals submitted by delegations. On 12 April, the Chair circulated a non-paper that the Working Group discussed at its meetings on 17 and 19 April. On the basis of those discussions and proposals by delegations, the Chair circulated a revised non-paper on 19 April, and the Working Group adopted a consensus report on its work the same day.
Outer space During the general debate, States emphasized that outer space was the common heritage of humankind and that its exclusively peaceful nature
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should be safeguarded. States also called for adherence to existing space law and obligations. Concern was expressed over the development of certain new technologies, including anti-satellite capabilities and satellites capable of interacting with other satellites, and many States expressed concern in particular over acts that could result in the generation of multiple and long-lasting space debris. States considered that transparency and confidence-building measures on outer space activities could build mutual trust and reduce misunderstanding. It was also argued that non-binding, but verifiable, transparency and confidence- building measures would be the most likely to gain wide acceptance and adherence. Although several States supported the recommendations contained in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts,19 many States emphasized that such recommended measures did not substitute legally binding measures. The Republic of Korea and Singapore welcomed the preparation of a non-paper on that topic by the Secretariat. The United Kingdom pointed out that many of the draft guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space, which were under consideration within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, had characteristics of transparency and confidence-building measures and that other guidelines could form the technical basis for the implementation of such measures. A number of delegations emphasized the need to avoid duplication of the work being done within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Many States continued to call for negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They considered that the establishment of a subsidiary body on that item within the Conference and the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space were positive developments in that regard. In that connection, many States referred to the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, introduced in the Conference on Disarmament by China and the Russian Federation, as a good basis for negotiations. A number of States also supported the initiative for political declarations on the non-first placement of weapons in outer space as an interim measure. Other States called for the elaboration of norms of responsible behaviour in outer space. Working Group II held 10 meetings, from 3 to 18 April. Its deliberations were informed by conference-room papers provided by Australia, the Russian Federation and the Group of Arab States;20 the non-paper by the Secretariat; and briefings by Victor Vasiliev, Chair of the Group of Governmental Experts
19 A/68/189. 20 A/CN.10/2018/WG.II/CRP.1-3.
224 Disarmament machinery on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities; Peter Martinez, Chair of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; and Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota, Chair of the subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Director of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs introduced the report of the Secretary-General on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.21 At its seventh meeting, the Chair presented a paper,22 under his own responsibility and without prejudice to the position of any delegations, making recommendations on the proposed structure of the eventual recommendations of the Working Group, as well as a summary of the Group’s discussions. The Working Group engaged in substantive exchanges of views on those papers, which were subsequently revised, but it was unable to agree to the Chair’s paper forming the basis of its work for the remainder of the current cycle. The Working Group agreed instead to continue discussion of the paper in 2019. The Working Group adopted a consensus report on its work23 at its tenth meeting, on 18 April.
Conference on Disarmament
In a message to the first 2018 plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 23 January, Izumi Nakamitsu, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said she was deeply troubled by signs that nuclear disarmament commitments were no longer valued, that active consideration was being given to increasing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines and that programmes continued to be pursued for upgrading, enhancing and extending existing nuclear arsenals while consensus over the right approach for nuclear disarmament remained fractured. The High Representative also stressed the Secretary-General’s commitment to the Conference on Disarmament and his belief in the need to give new momentum to global disarmament efforts. She further affirmed their belief that many aspects of the traditional disarmament agenda could be re-energized by being clearly linked to, and positioned centrally within, contemporary priorities.24 The Conference continued its 1434th plenary meeting by adopting the agenda25 for its 2018 session, which began under the presidency of Ravinatha
21 A/72/65. 22 A/CN.10/2018/WG.II/CRP.4. 23 A/CN.10/2018/WG.II/CRP.5. 24 Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs,remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 23 January 2018. 25 CD/2116.
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Aryasinha (Sri Lanka). Also under his leadership, the Conference adopted a decision26 on 16 February to establish five subsidiary bodies on all agenda items with the following mandates: • To reach an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference on Disarmament by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future • Deepening technical discussions and broadening areas of agreement, including through the participation, in accordance with the rules of procedure, of relevant experts • Consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations. On 27 March, under the presidency of Sabrina Dallafior (Switzerland), the Conference appointed coordinators for the subsidiary bodies and adopted a timetable for their meetings throughout the year.27 The Conference further decided that it would adopt the reports of those groups by consensus28 and that Subsidiary Body 5 would also consider emerging and other issues relevant to substantive work of the Conference.29 Addressing the Conference at the start of its high-level segment on 26 February, the President of the General Assembly, Miroslav Lajčák, stressed that people all over the world needed the Conference on Disarmament and cautioned against the risk of it being sidelined. He also recalled the broader picture of disarmament as an essential part of peace, its linkages with the Sustainable Development Goals and its relationship with human rights, stressing that the work of the Conference on Disarmament cut across the United Nations’ three pillars and had an impact on almost every aspect of the United Nations’ work around the world.30 On the same day, the Secretary-General also addressed the Conference on Disarmament and welcomed the decision to take forward substantive work.31 Noting the work ahead to translate that into the resumption of negotiations, he stressed that disarmament and arms control were top priorities for him and central to the system of international security agreed upon in the United Nations Charter. The Secretary-General called for further disarmament and arms control measures as a sound basis for peace and he noted that the Conference on Disarmament was a critical forum for progress. Encouraging the international community to urgently rebuild a common
26 CD/2119. 27 CD/2126. 28 The Conference adopted final reports by four of the five subsidiary bodies at its 1470th plenary meeting on 5 September 2018. Subsidiary Body 4, which considered negative security assurances, could not reach consensus on a report. 29 CD/2119. 30 Miroslav Lajčák, President of the General Assembly, statement at the high-level segment of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 26 February 2018. 31 Secretary-General remarks to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 26 February 2018.
226 Disarmament machinery vision for disarmament and arms control, he announced that he was preparing a new initiative aimed at giving greater impetus and direction to the global disarmament agenda and restoring the role of disarmament as an integral component of the United Nations’ work to maintain international peace and security. The Secretary-General concluded by calling for a new vision for disarmament to address today’s priorities: preventing conflict, upholding humanitarian principles, promoting sustainable development and dealing with future threats. The Conference also heard remarks during its high-level segment from Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.32 Describing the decision of the Conference to establish subsidiary bodies as encouraging, he stressed the importance of trust and confidence to achieving a successful outcome of the 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Executive Secretary also stressed the need to preserve the integrity of existing institutions and instruments and to build trust in and around them, including through maintaining and securing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its entire chain of responsibilities, of which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s entry into force was an integral part. Later in the year, the Conference held formal and informal discussions about the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament33 on 7 and 14 August on the initiative of the fifth President of the Conference, Walid Doudech (Tunisia).34 Following the discussions, the fifth President presented a draft decision to establish an informal working group to discuss issues raised in the Agenda that were pertinent to the mandate of the Conference.35 As consensus seemed out of reach, the President decided not to take action on that draft decision.
Nuclear disarmament The member States of the Conference on Disarmament addressed nuclear disarmament principally within Subsidiary Bodies 1 and 2. The Conference appointed Hasan Kleib (Indonesia) as the Coordinator of Subsidiary Body 1, which held meetings on 25 and 26 June, on 31 July and on 2, 3 and 9 August. It appointed Robbert Jan Gabriëlse (Netherlands) as Coordinator for Subsidiary Body 2, whose meetings took place on 15 and 16 May, from 27 to 29 June and on 7 August. The discussions on nuclear disarmament by those bodies were reflected in their final reports.36
32 Address during the high-level segment, Geneva, 26 February 2018. 33 António Guterres, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.IX.6). 34 CD/PV.1464 and 1465. 35 CD/PV.1465. 36 CD/2138 and CD/2139.
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In its first session, Subsidiary Body 1 focused on deepening technical discussions on the current state of play on issues related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. John Borrie and John King, respectively Chief of Research and Research Fellow of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, made a presentation in that area, which was followed by an interactive discussion. The Body’s four subsequent sessions focused on (a) reaching an understanding on the areas of commonalities in the Conference by taking into consideration all relevant views and proposals past, present and future and (b) considering effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiations. The Subsidiary Body devoted its final two sessions to discussion and consideration of its report. The discussions of Subsidiary Body 1 reflected differences among delegations over the ways and means to fulfil their shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. Those divergent views and positions prevented adoption of the Coordinator’s draft report, which the Body instead included as an annex to its adopted report.37 All member States recognized that further work was required to promote convergence among their various positions and to narrow gaps on issues relevant to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In light of the recognized usefulness of the Subsidiary Body’s deliberations, delegations agreed to continue discussions on the matter during the Conference’s 2019 session. Within Subsidiary Body 2, delegations discussed, inter alia, policy options related to reducing nuclear-weapon risks. In an exchange on that issue that followed a presentation by Sico van der Meer, Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, some delegations expressed the view that further discussions on the security environment and how to improve it might contribute to nuclear risk reduction. While some saw a need to narrow the scope of possible measures for nuclear risk reduction, others emphasized the importance of better defining risks by category and then identifying tools to address those risks. Delegations mentioned policy options that included training for nuclear weapons–related emergencies, increasing transparency, improving communications, de-targeting, increasing the security of launching systems, de-alerting, increasing decision time, raising the threshold for use including statements on “no first use” of nuclear weapons, eliminating certain types and limiting numbers and locations. Some member States also referenced nuclear disarmament as a policy option, with some asserting that the only way to eliminate all risk from nuclear weapons was by achieving their complete elimination. Certain delegations raised the question of how to approach nuclear deterrence in the context of nuclear risk reduction. Some participants argued that nuclear deterrence was obsolete and ran contrary to obligations and
37 CD/2138.
228 Disarmament machinery commitments to achieve nuclear disarmament. There were also delegations that mentioned the importance of strategic stability or balance, including in relation to general and complete disarmament. Additionally, some States mentioned the importance of multilateralizing the issue of nuclear risk reduction and discussing risks associated with new technologies. Delegations agreed that further discussion was welcome in the Conference on Disarmament on all matters related to preventing nuclear war, including those that encompassed nuclear risk reduction.
Fissile material The member States of the Conference addressed the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices principally within Subsidiary Body 2. The Body’s discussions were reflected in its final report38 and benefited from a briefing by Pavel Podvig, Programme Lead at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, on activities relevant to a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. During the discussions, delegations expressed the view that a treaty in that area should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable while practically contributing to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. They also stated that it should be effective, practical and flexible to allow for future developments. In addition, delegations noted that such a treaty remained particularly valuable both as an effective measure relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and as a means to build trust and confidence among States. Delegations gave detailed consideration to issues concerning definitions, scope and verification in a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and they considered institutional arrangements to facilitate effective implementation of such an eventual agreement. They extensively addressed the role of transparency and confidence-building measures as a valuable tool to prepare for negotiations, during negotiations and as part of a legally binding instrument. Identifying examples, delegations referred to voluntary offer agreements, moratoriums on fissile-material production for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, irreversible dismantling of fissile-material facilities, unilateral declarations and other forms of information-sharing. Throughout the discussions of technical and more general aspects of the ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, delegations emphasized the value of further work on the issue.
38 CD/2139.
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Prevention of an arms race in outer space The Conference on Disarmament addressed the prevention of an arms race in outer space primarily within Subsidiary Body 3, for which it appointed Guilherme de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil) as Coordinator. The Body held meetings on 23 and 25 May, from 5 to 7 June and on 24 August, and discussions on the topic were reflected in its final report.39 During the discussions, many States noted the need for the Conference’s work in that area to be guided by the objectives of maintaining a safe, secure, stable and sustainable outer space and of preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict. Following a discussion on the existing normative and institutional framework, delegations addressed possible threats to peace and security, such as the weaponization of outer space, the pursuit and use of anti-satellite capabilities and other threats, such as the use of electronic warfare, the possibility of using satellite-servicing spacecraft to move or damage space objects and the possibility of using deliberate collision as a means of damaging or destroying a space object. In the earlier discussion of existing norms and institutions, there was strong emphasis on the Outer Space Treaty as the centrepiece of the legal regime governing the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Delegations also mentioned the important role of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as the mandated United Nations norm-creating body for the peaceful uses of outer space. References were made to the Disarmament Commission’s work on the implementation of non-legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and to the General Assembly’s role in that regard. In addition, several delegations referred to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities, whose report was adopted by consensus by the Assembly in July 2013, as well as to the ongoing work of the Group of Governmental Experts established by resolution 72/250 of 24 December 2017 to “consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space”. Delegations also discussed the role and sufficiency of the existing normative and regulatory frameworks, definitions of items or objects to be controlled and behaviour to be regulated, and the closely connected issue of what constitutes a peaceful use of outer space. The applicability of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defence, risk reduction and transparency, and confidence-building measures were also addressed.
39 CD/2140.
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Negative security assurances The Conference on Disarmament appointed Michael Biontino (Germany) as the Coordinator of Subsidiary Body 4, the primary forum in which member States addressed negative security assurances, or “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”. The body’s meetings took place on 17 and 18 May, from 19 to 21 June and on 23 August. Discussions on that matter reflected the various priorities of the international community. States focused mainly on general considerations about negative security assurances, including their possible impacts on the non-proliferation regime, nuclear disarmament and global and regional security; general and specific obligations arising from them; their possible role as confidence-building measures; their scope and linked conditionalities;40 and issues concerning reciprocity, transparency and verification. Participants also pursued an in-depth discussion about the effectiveness of existing negative security assurances and their legally binding impact. Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties were generally perceived to be effective if respective protocols with applicable provisions were signed by all relevant States. Delegations also discussed the feasibility and relevance of a stand-alone, comprehensive, legally binding instrument on negative security assurances and the possibility of integrating existing and new measures of that nature into other legal instruments and frameworks. The deliberations benefited from the participation and expert input of John Borrie, senior fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research; Paul Ingram, Executive Director of the British American Security Information Council; Marc Finaud, senior researcher at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; and Lukasz Kulesa, head of the Warsaw branch of the European Leadership Network. Delegations could not reach consensus on language for the Body’s report owing to disagreements on whether the Conference on Disarmament or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provided the more suitable context for negotiating new and universal negative security assurances.
Other agenda items The Conference on Disarmament used Subsidiary Body 5 to address new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons, comprehensive programme of disarmament, transparency in armament, and emerging and other issues relevant to the Conference’s substantive work. Yury Ambrazevich (Belarus) was appointed as Coordinator for the Subsidiary Body, which held meetings on 17 and 18 May,
40 Delegations addressed related reservations and exceptions, particularly with regard to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
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from 19 to 21 June and on 23 August. Its deliberations were reflected in the Body’s final report.41 During the meetings of Subsidiary Body 5, delegations thoroughly discussed developments in science and technology, issues related to information and communications technology and cybersecurity, the weaponization of artificial intelligence and the risk of non-State actors obtaining weapons of mass destruction. They also discussed general and complete disarmament and matters of transparency.
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held its sixty-ninth session in Geneva from 23 to 26 January and its seventieth session in New York from 27 to 29 June, dealing with the following substantive agenda items: (a) strategic priorities for the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation and (b) current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament. In July, the Secretary-General submitted a report42 to the General Assembly summarizing the Board’s deliberations and recommendations. The Board’s discussions helped inform the development of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, complementing input from Member States, academia and non-governmental organizations. The Advisory Board expressed full and unreserved support for the Agenda for Disarmament following its release in May, welcoming the clear and strategic path that it set out for addressing current challenges and defending gains made in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Praising the Agenda’s balanced and comprehensive nature, the Board stressed that it was incumbent on all stakeholders to actively promote it and urged all Member States to take ownership of it. The Board also stressed the need for greater outreach to raise awareness of the Agenda and its call to action among Member States, the expert community, civil society and the broader public. To further those aims, the Board recommended the following: • The Secretary-General and his senior staff are encouraged to reach out to Member States through their respective permanent missions and engage with their capitals, including their ministries of defence, foreign affairs and finance and other relevant national institutions • Heads of State and Government should be encouraged to refer to the Agenda in their remarks to the General Assembly
41 CD/2141. 42 A/73/259.
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• The Chair of the Board should bring the Agenda to the attention of the President of the General Assembly and the Chair of the First Committee and encourage them to ensure that it receives adequate consideration • Opportunities for the Secretary-General to set out the Agenda in various regions across the world should be utilized • A “friends of disarmament” network could be created as a possible means to advance the implementation of the Agenda • Opinion pieces supportive of one or more parts of the Agenda could be published under the authorship of one or more members of the Board or a group of mobilizers or champions • The Agenda should be emphasized in the introduction to and in section six of the Secretary-General’s annual report on the work of the Organization, which is mandated by Article 98 of the Charter of the United Nations • A mapping exercise should be undertaken to determine the potential role of each United Nations entity in advancing certain parts of the Agenda, such as the role of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in engaging women and girls in the work of the Agenda • Tailored messages should be developed that explain the unique benefits to particular Member States of effective actions across the main areas of the Agenda. Through the implementation of the Agenda, its added value for Member States should be demonstrated over time, thereby strengthening their support for it. Discussions relevant to the Agenda’s strategic and conventional weapons pillars were encompassed in their entirety within the Board’s first substantive agenda item, addressing strategic priorities for the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation. With regard to “Disarmament to save humanity”, concerning weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons, the Board strongly welcomed the Agenda’s emphasis on dialogue and actions to reduce the risk of any use of nuclear weapons; affirmed the need to halt any use of chemical weapons by ensuring accountability and ending impunity; and highlighted that preventing the emergence and potential deployment of new and destabilizing strategic weapons, including in outer space, remained vital for the preservation of international stability. In its deliberations on “Disarmament that saves lives”, the Board welcomed the Secretary-General’s assessment that international approaches to regulate arms needed to be brought in line with the magnitude of the problems to which they contribute and also integrated into broader work for prevention and sustainable development. It agreed on a need for, inter alia, support of country-level action to end the illicit trade in small arms and their
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ammunition, enhanced implementation of measures to ensure the security and physical protection of excessive and poorly maintained stockpiles, and new cooperation and dialogue to reduce military spending and build confidence among States. Discussions relevant to the third pillar of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, “Disarmament for future generations”, fell within the scope of the Board’s second substantive agenda item, concerning current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament. In its deliberations, the Board noted that new technologies in the area of weapons posed challenges to existing legal, humanitarian and ethical norms, non-proliferation, international stability and peace and security. It also determined that, in the face of the growing automation of weaponry, new measures were necessary to ensure that humans always maintained control over the use of force. According to the Board, a culture of accountability and adherence to norms, rules and principles had to be fostered to ensure responsible behaviour in cyberspace. It also noted that additional steps needed to be taken to encourage responsible innovation by industry, engineers and scientists. The fourth pillar of the Agenda for Disarmament, “Strengthening partnerships for disarmament”, also received consideration from the Advisory Board in its discussions regarding strategic priorities for the Secretary- General on disarmament and non-proliferation. The Board recognized that disarmament initiatives had been most successful when they involved effective partnerships between Governments, the expert community, the private sector and civil society, and its members saw a need for the existing multilateral disarmament institutions to be reinvigorated and better utilized, both through increased political will and by improving the coordination and integration of expertise into their work. The Board called for more education and training opportunities that would empower women and young people to be a force for change and disarmament. In addition, the Board found that experts and representatives of industry and civil society had to be included and integrated more effectively into United Nations efforts for disarmament. As the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Advisory Board welcomed and endorsed the new Director’s vision for the Institute to be a responsive provider of knowledge, information, dialogue and policy advice to Member States, the disarmament expert community and United Nations entities. In particular, the Board welcomed the emphasis that the Institute was placing on contributing to the implementation of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. The Board approved the report of the Director on the activities of the Institute for the period from January 2017 to May 2018 and the proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2018 and 2019, and it considered the report of the independent third- party assessment, which outlined a sustainable and stable funding structure
234 Disarmament machinery and operating model, as required to achieve the mandate and objectives of the Institute. Additionally, the Board took note of the professional and comprehensive nature of the assessment and endorsed its overall findings. In its view, the assessment confirmed the Board’s long-standing position on the importance of ensuring that the Institute had adequate operating capacity and resources to carry out its mandate in a sustainable, impartial and inclusive manner.
High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group
In 2018, the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group concluded its work. At its second and final two-week meeting, held from 28 May to 8 June, the Group agreed to a final report that the Secretary- General later transmitted to the General Assembly43 and the Conference on Disarmament44 pursuant to resolution 71/259 of 23 December 2016. The meeting was preceded by a second open-ended informal consultative meeting, which the Chair had organized on 15 and 16 February in New York in accordance with resolution 71/259. Statements and presentations were made by, inter alia, Algeria, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland and the United States. Participants also heard presentations from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and from three non-governmental organizations: the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, the International Panel on Fissile Materials and the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. The Chair’s summary45 of the meeting was later issued. In its final report, the Group presented a menu of potential treaty elements for reference by future negotiators of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The report contained four subsections covering such a treaty’s scope, definitions, verification, and legal and institutional arrangements. In addition, it addressed treaty elements such as a preamble, as well as transparency and confidence- building measures. For each subsection, the report provided a list of possible treaty elements and some of the considerations that negotiators might wish to take into account. Lists of options contained in the document reflected the Group’s attempt to capture the full range of views on a future treaty. The Group recommended, inter alia, that the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty begin without delay in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. It also advised
43 A/73/159. 44 CD/2152. 45 A/AC.288/PG/4.
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that further consideration be given to what measures might facilitate the commencement of negotiations and enhance confidence. The Preparatory Group agreed that its report should be read in conjunction with the 2015 report46 of the Group of Governmental Experts on possible aspects that could contribute to, but not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It further agreed that both documents should be taken into account by future negotiators in their deliberations.
Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament
By its resolution 71/67 of 5 December 2016, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the development and strengthening of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures and on the importance of such measures in achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, and to report back to the Assembly at its seventy-second session.47 By the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts of up to 25 participants on the basis of equitable geographical distribution to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, taking into account the aforementioned report, which would meet in Geneva in 2018 and 2019 for three sessions of five days each. Following an invitation by the Secretary-General for 25 States48 to nominate participants, the Group of Governmental Experts held its first and second sessions from 14 to 18 May and from 12 to 16 November in Geneva, with Knut Langeland (Norway) serving as Chair. In preparation for the first meeting of the Group, Norway organized an informal meeting from 24 to 26 January at the Wilton Park conference centre in West Sussex, United Kingdom, where the experts discussed verification in multilateral nuclear disarmament. A report49 was later issued on the meeting’s work.
46 A/70/81. 47 A/72/304. 48 Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 49 Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom and Wilton Report: Park,“ Verification in multilateral nuclear disarmament—Preparing for the UN Group of Governmental Experts”, March 2018.
236 chapter Information and VII outreach Participants at the event “Peace and Disarmament Education Discussions: Creating Safe Spaces for Youth”, held in Kathmandu on 17 August 2018. C h a p t e r V I I
Information and outreach
We cannot create a safer world for all through uncoordinated action. Disarmament works best when we work together: governments, experts, civil society and individuals.
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations1
Developments and trends, 2018
The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs continued, through its Disarmament Information Programme, to provide Member States, the diplomatic community, non-governmental organizations and the public at large with unbiased, up-to-date and relevant information on multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control activities. In keeping with the objective of promoting the environmental sustainability of the United Nations, the Office reinforced its efforts to issue more of its outreach materials online, reducing the need for printed copies. In one highlight of 2018, the Secretary-General issued his Agenda for Disarmament, Securing Our Common Future, containing 40 actions that the United Nations system would undertake in support of the efforts and initiatives of Member States. Focusing on three priorities—weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons and emerging weapon technologies—the Agenda was a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, set of practical measures placing disarmament and non-proliferation at the centre of the work of the United Nations. An internally developed media plan maximized public attention to the Agenda through a robust social media campaign, a dedicated website, multi-stakeholder consultations, a live broadcast of the Secretary- General’s 24 May launch speech, extensive outreach to journalists and other awareness-raising and education activities. Meanwhile, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, advocated for robust disarmament and arms control actions in seven disarmament-related opinion pieces that she contributed throughout the year to influential newspapers and policy blogs. In one of these articles, published in Teen Vogue, the High Representative made the case to a younger audience for pursuing gender parity in international disarmament and arms
1 Remarks at the University of Geneva on the launch of the Agenda for Disarmament, Geneva, 24 May 2018.
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control negotiations. In a second op-ed published by Time magazine, she called for curbs on excessive military spending to strengthen support for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Later in the year, three Latin American news outlets carried a piece in which the High Representative pressed for action to prevent armed violence against women and girls. The Office’s own publications continued to be a mainstay activity of the Disarmament Information Programme, notably with the issuance of the forty-second annual edition of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. Mandated by the General Assembly since 1976, the flagship publication of the Office for Disarmament Affairs was made available to permanent missions in two instalments: Part I, on disarmament resolutions and decisions of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, was released at the plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission; and Part II, summarizing disarmament-related developments, was issued during the general debate of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly First Committee. In the Office’s Occasional Paper for 2018, The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web, the role of the dark web in facilitating trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives was examined. In the monograph, the author summarized the main findings and implications of the first empirical investigation into the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web, shedding light on characteristics of dark web–facilitated arms transfers and revealing weapons traded, market prices and common transit routes. The Office also issued several ad hoc publications throughout the year. Those included a booklet entitled Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context, developed in response to the greater need for arms control activities in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes—including weapons and ammunition management activities carried out locally as part of community violence reduction projects. The Office also released a booklet entitled “How Weapons Control Fosters Development”, which explained how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development placed disarmament, arms regulation and peace and security squarely within the scope of development policies. Another publication, Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council, grouped past actions by the Security Council on weapons and ammunition management and suggested further options for Council members to consider to accurately and comprehensively reflect state-of-the-art practices in relevant draft decisions. The Office also issued a new edition of the series Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions for the period 2017–2018. That report showcased concrete results of partnerships between the Office for
240 Information and outreach
Disarmament Affairs and donors, and it highlighted the vital role ofsuch support in attaining important disarmament goals. The Office’s websites continued to be a vital resource for reaching out to delegates, civil society stakeholders and the general public, and, in 2018, they remained critical to accomplishing the goals of the Disarmament Information Programme. With more than half a million unique visitors in 2018, the Office’s main website (www.un.org/disarmament) served as a connecting point for staff members, Member States, non-governmental organizations, research institutes and interested individuals. Additionally, a new dedicated microsite provided easy access to online versions of the Agenda for Disarmament and its “implementation action plan”, information on how the Agenda promotes the Sustainable Development Goals, details on the Agenda’s “champions” and “supporters”, and a variety of downloadable outreach materials. Entities of the United Nations system joined Member States, regional organizations and civil society groups to mark 29 August as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. The General Assembly commemorated the International Day at a high-level plenary meeting, where the need for a complete ban on nuclear testing was highlighted in statements by the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Honorary Ambassador for the independent ATOM2 Project. The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to support the General Assembly’s annual 26 September commemoration of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which Member States established in 2013 to call for the urgent commencement of negotiations to prohibit the possession, development, production, acquisition and testing of nuclear weapons. A high-level plenary meeting took place at United Nations Headquarters to mark the International Day, with statements delivered by the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General, delegates of 52 Member States, two permanent observers and two representatives of civil society. With regard to disarmament and non-proliferation education, the Office continued to implement and promote activities promulgated in the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations study on this issue. Its related work included training activities specifically geared towards young disarmament advocates; the continuation of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament; and training courses by the Vienna Office of the Office for Disarmament Affairs that blended online and in-person learning on issues related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.
2 ATOM stands for “Abolish Testing: Our Mission”.
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Disarmament Information Programme Print and e-publications The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook continued to serve as the flagship publication of the Office. Part I of the 2017 edition was distributed in 2018 to permanent missions at the plenary meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, while the circulation of Part II to delegations was timed to coincide with the general debate of the General Assembly First Committee. The Office also issued the latest versions of the Yearbook in PDF and e-book formats and announced their publication on Twitter and in the “Spotlight” section of its website. In 2018, the Office published one title under its Occasional Papers series: The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web: A Study (No. 32), examining the role of the dark web in facilitating trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives. This lesser known part of the web gained increased public attention following recent terrorist attacks and other criminal activities worldwide. Using the dark web, criminals and others could procure or sell a wide range of weapons and associated products through encrypted marketplaces and vendor shops. In line with outcomes of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which acknowledged the importance of considering challenges and opportunities arising from new forms of illicit trafficking, the Occasional Paper contained summaries of the main findings and implications of the first empirical investigation into the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web. Through that study, the author shed light on characteristics of dark web–facilitated arms transfers, revealing weapons traded, market prices and common transit routes. In addition, the discussion in the Occasional Paper on implications of the growing trade for law enforcement agencies and policymakers highlighted the key role that firearms control measures continued to play in the presence of new forms of trafficking. In May, the Secretary-General announced his Agenda for Disarmament, entitled Securing Our Common Future, which was published by the Office and released simultaneously with the announcement. The Secretary-General outlined in the document a set of practical measures across the entire range of disarmament issues, including weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms and future weapon technologies. Through the Agenda, he sought to generate fresh perspectives and to explore areas where serious dialogue was required to bring disarmament back to the heart of common efforts for peace and security. The Office also produced several serial and ad hoc publications throughout the year, including a booklet entitled Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and
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Reintegration Context: A Handbook for United Nations DDR Practitioners. Jointly authored by the Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and published in January, the handbook built on good practices and innovative approaches developed in the field while taking into consideration the most recent international arms regulation standards. Developed in response to the greater need for arms control activities in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes—including weapons and ammunition management activities carried out locally as part of community violence reduction projects—the handbook equipped practitioners with practical resources for designing effective operations for weapons and ammunition management that could be implemented across the peace continuum. In July, the Office released a pamphlet entitled “How Weapons Control Fosters Development”, explaining how the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development placed disarmament, arms regulation, peace and security squarely within the scope of development policies. In this regard, the 2030 Agenda’s target to significantly reduce illicit arms flows was strongly emphasized in the pamphlet. The deep relevance of disarmament and arms regulation to reaching other Sustainable Development Goals—including those on gender equality, safe and sustainable cities and quality education—was also outlined in an infographic (see next page). In October, the Office for Disarmament Affairs published a booklet entitled Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council. In that publication, related past actions of the Security Council on weapons and ammunition management and suggested further options were grouped to provide a resource for Council members seeking to accurately and comprehensively reflect state-of-the-art practices in relevant draft decisions. The Aide-Memoire was also aimed at supporting the Secretary-General’s 2015 recommendation3 for the Council to consistently consider the arms situation when addressing both geographic and thematic issues on its agenda. The Office developed the publication with input and commentary from United Nations system partners, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Also in October, the Office issued the 2017–2018 edition ofProgrammes Financed from Voluntary Contributions, a report showcasing the concrete results of partnerships between the Office and its donors and the essential role of such support in attaining important disarmament goals. The publication included summaries of the following extrabudgetary activities: • Promoting arms and ammunition controls in changing conflict settings • Securing ammunition and saving lives
3 See S/2015/289.
243 At a Glance: Disarmament and Arms Regulation in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Armed violence is among the leading causes of premature death, and it victimizes even more people by spreading injuries, disability, psychological distress and disease. Disarmament and arms control reduce the impact of conflict on human health.
Limiting the proliferation and uncontrolled circulation of weapons in communities contributes to safe and non-violent learning environments 16.1 Disarmament and for all. arms regulation contribute to reducing deaths Disarmament education contributes to education from armed violence by on peace and non-violence, conflict resolution, sustainable development, gender equality, prohibiting and restricting economic justice, human rights and tolerance of the use of certain types cultural diversity. of weapons and by establishing effective Men and women are affected differently by the controls of arms and proliferation and use of weapons. Young men ammunition. are overwhelmingly responsible for the misuse of small arms. While men make up most direct 16.4 Effective disarmament casualties, women are more frequently victims of and arms regulation gender-based violence that small arms facilitate. Regulating arms and ammunition can reduce reduce illicit arms flows, violence against women and girls in both public which can otherwise and private spheres. instigate, fuel and prolong armed conflict, terrorism Empowering women and ensuring their equal and crime. and meaningful participation in disarmament and arms control decision-making processes can lead to more inclusive, effective and sustainable 16.6 Participation in policy outcomes. military transparency and confidence-building Excessive military spending harms economic measures, such as growth and can produce undesirable social reporting on military and political consequences. Reducing military spending and on arms budgets can reduce the negative effects of this imports and exports, spending on economic and social development. promote accountability of Stemming the proliferation and easy availability national institutions and of arms can counter the recruitment and use can foster cross-border of child soldiers. Opportunities to build decent dialogue and trust- livelihoods can attract young men away from building. armed groups or gangs.
Adequate arms regulation helps prevent illicit transfers of weapons in support of human trafficking, modern slavery or forced labour.
244 At a Glance: Disarmament and Arms Regulation in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION Measures for disarmament can reduce military AND ARMS CONTROL PLAY A VITAL expenditures and redirect public resources/ ROLE IN PREVENTING CONFLICT, AND spending towards social and economic initiatives that can contribute to greater equality. IN FORGING AND SUSTAINING PEACE.
16.8 The active Effective ammunition management mitigates engagement of all the risk of storage depots accidentally exploding in populated areas. These explosions, when States, especially they occur, are humanitarian disasters that lead developing countries, to death, injury, economic loss, displacement in multilateral and destruction of infrastructure and private disarmament property. discussions leads to Arms control measures increase urban safety and more effective and security by curbing the uncontrolled proliferation sustainable policy and misuse of small arms, particularly for gang- outcomes. related violence.
16.a Strengthening the institutional Contamination from capacities of States to remnants of war and better control arms the testing and use of and ammunition and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons have to engage in military disastrous environmental confidence-building consequences. measures help prevent Disarmament and arms conflict, violence, regulation reduce the terrorism and crime. impact of weapons on the environment.
Mobilizing sufficient resources in support of disarmament and arms regulation is critical to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Increased availability of high-quality, timely, disaggregated and reliable arms-related data can inform discussions about the relationship between disarmament, development, peace and security, leading to better decisions and policies.
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• Supporting the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons by boosting preparations for the third Review Conference • Investing in arms control and supporting development • Supporting Security Council work on weapons and ammunition management • Strengthening the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological and Weapons • Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery to non-State actors • Facilitating inclusive participation by States in possible future treaty negotiations on fissile material • Strengthening the ban against biological weapons • E-learning about the peaceful use of information and communications technology • Supporting the activities of the Office’s regional centres and its Vienna Office. Meanwhile, the Office continued throughout the year to produce the “UNODA Update”, an online chronicle of events and activities of the Office and of various disarmament forums. In 2018, the Office published 47 articles for the Update that it collated in a quarterly mode. Also in 2018, the Office for Disarmament Affairs updated and expanded its series of two-page fact sheets on various disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and related issues, providing readers with relevant, up-to-date information about those topics in a clear, easy-to-read format. The Office continued its biannual updates of 36 fact sheets in areas such as weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms, the disarmament machinery and regional disarmament, and the Office introduced two new fact sheets focused respectively on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and on autonomous weapons systems. For more information on, and links for online access to, the Office’s 2018 publications, including those of its regional centres, see annex I to this chapter.
Websites The websites of the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to bea vital resource for reaching out to delegates, civil society stakeholders and the general public. In 2018, they remained vital in accomplishing the goals of the Disarmament Information Programme. With more half a million unique visitors in 2018, the Office’s main website (www.un.org/disarmament) served as a connecting point for staff
246 Information and outreach members, Member States, non-governmental organizations, research institutes and interested individuals. Designed to meet the demands of current technologies and fit multiple screen sizes, including tablets and mobile devices, it provided the latest information, updates, speeches, remarks and news in the area of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The Office continued its efforts to provide as much content as possible in the six official languages of the United Nations. A new microsite4 highlighting the Secretary-General’s Agenda on the Disarmament went online immediately before the Agenda’s launch on 24 May, and it was featured on the Office’s main website for the remainder of the year. Initially, the microsite offered easy access to information in all official United Nations languages about the Secretary-General’s rollout of the Disarmament Agenda at the University of Geneva. Later additions to the microsite included French and English editions of the Agenda in PDF and e-book formats, as well as related videos and printable outreach materials. On 4 October, the microsite was updated with an implementation plan detailing how various entities in and beyond the United Nations system would carry out each of the Agenda’s 40 actions. Each action had its own page showing a summary of that action’s main objectives, a description of specific steps and activities being carried out, and other relevant information. The updated website provided a dynamic platform for monitoring and tracking the status of various steps and activities, as well as making future additions. The status of various activities would be updated on a regular basis,5 including with links to specific outputs. In lieu of the submission of any formal reports, notifications of major updates were to be disseminated through the Office’s social media account and its website.
Databases In 2018, the Office maintained the following public databases: • General Assembly Resolutions and Decisions, which hosted information about every disarmament-related resolution the Assembly had adopted since its fifty-second session • Disarmament Treaties,6 which housed information on disarmament- related treaties, including a list of their States parties and signatories
4 “Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament”. 5 Activities for which no action had yet been taken were marked “not yet initiated”. Activities for which planning had commenced were marked “in development”. Activities currently being carried out were marked “in progress”. Activities that were in progress without a discrete completion date were marked “ongoing”. Successfully concluded activities were marked “completed”. 6 Since 1978, the United Nations has published the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements, presenting data on signatories, parties of relevant agreements and the texts of the agreements themselves.
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• Documents Library database, a specialized archive of United Nations disarmament-related documents • Military Expenditures Database, which catalogued the national reports received from Member States • The Global Reported Arms Trade—the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which presented data provided by Member States in an interactive information platform.
International days International Day against Nuclear Tests The International Day against Nuclear Tests7 on 29 August was commemorated at the United Nations in Vienna and New York, as well as in Astana. At the ceremony in Kazakhstan during the “2018 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Group of Eminent Persons–Youth International Conference”, with the theme “Remembering the past, looking into the future”, Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, adopted a joint declaration.8 In Vienna, the Preparatory Commission, together with the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan, organized an exhibit and commemorative event for members of the diplomatic community, international organizations and civil society. In addition, the Preparatory Commission and the non-governmental organization Peace and Cooperation launched the Global Scholar Art Campaign, themed “For a Safer World—Join Forces with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization”. At United Nations Headquarters in New York, a high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly took place on 6 September to commemorate and promote the International Day. The opening ceremony included remarks by the Secretary-General and by the President of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia), as well as speeches by the Preparatory Commission’s Executive Secretary and Karipbek Kuyukov, Honorary Ambassador for the ATOM Project.
7 Through resolution 64/35 of 2 December 2009, introduced at the initiative of Kazakhstan, the General Assembly declared 29 August the International Day against Nuclear Tests to commemorate the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site on 29 August 1991, to raise awareness on the effects of nuclear-weapon test explosions and to strengthen the international norm against all nuclear tests as a valuable step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. 8 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, “Joint Statement by H.E. Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization”, Astana, 29 August 2018.
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In his opening remarks9 to the plenary, the Secretary-General highlighted the inextricable connection between ending nuclear testing and the elimination of nuclear weapons and referred to the catastrophic impact of nuclear testing on the environment, human health, food security and economic development. The Secretary-General reiterated his appeal for the remaining eight States whose ratifications were required for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force to commit to sign the Treaty and complete their ratification processes. The President of the General Assembly welcomed the near-universal moratoriums on nuclear tests and called on States to ratify the Treaty. He referred to the positive steps taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the suspension of nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic-missile launches and the closure of a nuclear test site, and expressed hope to see more tangible action.10 In his statement to the plenary meeting, the Executive Secretary referred to the Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and underscored the effectiveness of the Treaty’s verification regime in detecting nuclear test explosions that violated the Treaty. He welcomed educational initiatives to promote awareness and understanding about the threats of nuclear weapons and highlighted the importance of tools such as the Treaty to combat those threats.11 Afterwards, the ATOM Project Honorary Ambassador shared his experience as a victim of nuclear-weapon testing and stressed the need to join efforts to achieve a complete ban on nuclear testing.12 At the high-level plenary meeting, statements13 were delivered from 22 States and the African Group, the Eastern European States, the Arab Group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union and the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons The 2018 International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons was observed on 26 September at a high-level plenary meeting convened by the President of the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador). The International Day was established
9 Secretary-General, remarks at General Assembly observance of the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 6 September 2018. 10 Miroslav Lajčák, President of the General Assembly at its seventy-second session, statement at the high-level meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 6 September 2018. 11 Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, statement at the high-level meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 6 September 2018. 12 Karipbek Kuyukov, ATOM Project Honorary Ambassador, statement at the high-level meeting to commemorate and promote the International Day against Nuclear Tests, New York, 6 September 2018. 13 A/72/PV.112.
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in 2013 as an initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement14 following the first high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. The initiative also calls for immediately commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, as well as for enhancing public awareness and education about the threat of nuclear weapons and the necessity of their total elimination. In her opening remarks,15 the President of the General Assembly stated that “the very survival of humanity requires resolute agreement forbidding the use of nuclear weapons”. The Secretary-General, in his statement,16 said the only sure way to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons was to eliminate the weapons themselves. He recalled that, in his Agenda for Disarmament, he urged “the resumption of sincere, substantive and results- oriented dialogue towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as the implementation of existing commitments”. In closing, he pledged his “total commitment” to working towards ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The commemorative event included statements from 55 Member States,17 as well as the Holy See and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Representatives of the World Future Council and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons18 also delivered remarks.
Media In 2018, the Office launched a comprehensive media strategy aimed at (a) promoting the disarmament goals of the United Nations by emphasizing
14 The Non-Aligned Movement advanced the initiative through General Assembly resolutions 68/32 of 5 December 2013, 69/58 of 2 December 2014, 70/34 of 7 December 2015, 71/71 of 5 December 2016, 72/251 of 24 December 2017 and 73/40 of 5 December 2018. 15 María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, President of the General Assembly at its seventy- third session, statement at the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2018. 16 Secretary-General, statement at the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2018. 17 Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (the Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar (on behalf of the African Group), Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman (on behalf of the Arab League), Pakistan, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement). For their statements, see United Nations (PaperSmart), “International Day for Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”, 26 September 2018. 18 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, statement at the high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 26 September 2018.
250 Information and outreach their relevance to specific audiences and (b) highlighting actions that Member States and the public could take to address related concerns in a manner consistent with these goals. It also implemented a separate media plan in connection with the release of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, Securing Our Common Future. Its engagement with news organizations in that regard included the publication of six opinion articles by the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs in influential newspapers and policy blogs. The High Representative used those pieces to respectively advocate for, inter alia, the following: • Gender parity in international disarmament and arms control negotiations19 • Curbs on excessive military spending with a view to strengthening support for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development20 • Steps to maximize the benefits of emerging artificial intelligence technologies while mitigating and preventing the dangers21 • Partnerships and collaborations that broadly advance the Sustainable Development Goals by promoting long-term peace and security through effective disarmament and arms control22 • Action to prevent armed violence against women and girls23 • Closer cooperation between policymakers and technical experts to diminish risks from technological change without stifling innovation.24 In another article prepared jointly by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the authors advocated for actions at the local, national, regional and international levels to rein in threats from uncontrolled small arms.25
19 “International Women’s Day 2018: The Women Who Have Shaped Policies on Nuclear Weapons”, Teen Vogue, 8 March 2018. 20 “Global Military Spending Has Doubled but the World Is No Safer”, Time, 25 April 2018. 21 “Making Sure Artificial intelligence is Harnessed forGood ”, XPRIZE Foundation, 18 April 2018. 22 “Advancing Disarmament within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, UN Chronicle, vol. LV, no. 2 (August 2018). 23 “Salvemos la vida de las mujeres en AL: un cambio de mentalidad”, Diario La Estrella de Panama, 22 November 2018. The Spanish-language article was later published in Excelsior (Mexico) and Diario Libre (Dominican Republic). For the English translation, see Izumi Nakamitsu, “Changing mindsets can save women’s lives in Latin America”, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 22 November 2018. 24 “Responsible Innovation for a New Era in Science and Technology”, UN Chronicle, vol. LV, nos. 3 and 4 (December 2018). 25 Izumi Nakamitsu and Jean-Pierre Lacroix, “Building Peace in Societies Affected by Small Arms”, Inter Press Service, 24 July 2018.
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Meanwhile, the High Representative and senior staff of the Office took part in interviews with several international television, radio and print outlets, including Altreconomia, the Asahi Shimbun, BS-TBS, the Cape Breton Spectator, Fujin no Tomo, Jiji Press, Kyodo News, the Mainichi Shimbun, NewsPicks, NHK, Nikkei, Reuters, Richesse, Sankei News and Le Temps. Additionally, the High Representative took part in three media briefings: on 19 June in New York, on the sidelines of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons;26 on 5 August in Japan, on the occasion of the annual Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony; and on 19 September in Singapore, during Singapore International Cyber Week. Questions during those press encounters focused on topics raised in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament and recent news developments in those areas. Content from the engagements was made available in the “Spotlight” section of the Office’s website.
Agenda for Disarmament promotional campaign In advance of the launch of the Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament on 24 May, the Office developed and oversaw implementation of a detailed media plan aimed at maximizing public attention to the Agenda through related awareness-raising and education activities. Overall management of the plan was carried out by the Office’s Information and Outreach Branch in cooperation with substantive branches, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and relevant divisions of the Department of Public Information. The effort began with a robust social media campaign aimed at initiating online discussions about the Agenda. In February and March, the Office highlighted multi-stakeholder consultations on its development in Twitter posts that used the hashtags #SG2018DisarmamentAgenda, #SecuringOurCommonFuture and #DisarmamentThatSavesLives. On 17 May, the Secretary-General announced the Agenda’s upcoming launch in a video statement27 published in the “Spotlight” and “Announcements” sections of the Office’s website and on Twitter, including through the accounts of the High Representative and the Office’s regional centres. An accompanying media advisory provided information on the planned participation of the Secretary- General and the High Representative in a launch event on 24 May at the University of Geneva, and details of their upcoming travel were highlighted at noon media briefings in New York and Geneva.
26 United Nations, “Third Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons - Press Conference (19 June 2018)”, video. 27 United Nations, “António Guterres (UN)—Message Before Launching the Disarmament Agenda”, video, 17 May 2018.
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On 24 May, the Office and the Department of Public Information publicized a live broadcast28 and a highlight video29 of the Secretary-General’s launch speech with their respective social media accounts, including the main United Nations social media feeds for New York and Geneva. Building on a series of teaser messages posted to Twitter in the immediate lead-up to his address, the offices amplified his statement throughout the day by circulating social media video clips and “quote cards” drawing from his remarks, as well as a follow-on discussion with students and faculty of the University of Geneva. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General subsequently published a written version of the speech that the Office made available on its website. After concluding his remarks, the Secretary-General took questions from journalists.30 The Office, which had organized his encounter with local and international media, monitored news coverage of the Agenda both beforehand and afterwards to help respond to related questions. The Office also maintained contact with prominent news organizations with a view to arranging interviews, including one-on-one exchanges with the High Representative. Immediately before the launch event, the Office unveiled a newly developed microsite providing a central source of information about the Agenda. Its resources included the following: • Downloadable versions of the document and of the Secretary-General’s launch speech • A brief “explainer video” on the Agenda • Printable postcards, pamphlets and posters containing introductory details about the Agenda and its four pillars • A media kit for journalists, with background information and contact details for substantive spokespersons • Contact details for the United Nations Media Accreditation and Liaison Unit, which provided information regarding event-related inquiries, such as requests for live coverage.
Disarmament and non-proliferation education
By operative paragraph 2 of its 2016 resolution on disarmament and non-proliferation education (71/57), the General Assembly requested the
28 United Nations, “António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) An Agenda for Disarmament - Securing our Common Future”, video, 24 May 2018. 29 United Nations, “Disarmament: Securing Humanity’s Future”, video, 24 May 2018. 30 United Nations, “António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) on An Agenda for Disarmament—Media Stakeout (24 May 2018)”, video, 24 May 2018.
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Secretary-General to prepare his biennial report31 reviewing (a) the results of the implementation of the 34 recommendations contained in the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education32 and (b) possible new opportunities for promoting such education. The Secretary- General submitted the report to the General Assembly’s seventy-third session, including information submitted by five Member States,33 seven international and regional organizations34 and 34 non-governmental organizations and academic institutions.35 Meanwhile, the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued in 2018to build upon its work to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, focusing on further implementation of the recommendations contained in the 2002 United Nations study on the matter.
Disarmament education website—a resource for learning A number of new elements were added to the content of the disarmament education website in 2018. In addition to highlighting the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education and the full text of all contributions,36 the website drew attention to an award-winning historical novel about a young girl who lived with her family in Hiroshima, Japan, during the last year of the Second World War. Entitled The Last Cherry Blossom,37 the fictional account of author Kathleen Burkinshaw centred on the life of her mother, who as a 12-year-old child witnessed the horror of the world’s first atomic bomb. In the novel, Burkinshaw also explored the culture, mindset and daily life of Hiroshima in the days before the atomic bombing—subjects that had rarely before received thorough consideration in English-language fiction. In a new addition to its collection of work by students around the world, the disarmament education website featured a second project38 undertaken by Nagasaki Higashi High School students on the impact of the atomic bombings as seen through the eyes of their survivors (hibakusha). The project also included thought-provoking points and messages for discussion by teachers and their students.
31 A/73/119. 32 A/57/124. 33 Cuba, El Salvador, Japan, Madagascar and Mexico. 34 For the list of non-governmental organizations, see the contents of the report. 35 International Atomic Energy Agency, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 36 “Contributions to the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education received by the Office for Disarmament Affairs”. 37 New York, Sky Pony Press, 2016. 38 Students of the Nagasaki Higashi High School, “From Nagasaki to the World 2”.
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Training activities The Office for Disarmament Affairs continued offering opportunities through the United Nations Associate Expert Programme for young university graduates to build professional experience. In addition, the Office trained more than 25 graduate students in New York, Geneva and Vienna through the United Nations 2018 internship programme. On 6 November, 27 public high school teachers from across New York City were trained at a day-long workshop at United Nations Headquarters entitled “Nuclear Weapons Today: From Hiroshima to Nagasaki to the Ban Treaty”. The aim of the workshop was to discuss how educators could engage effectively with their students on topics related to nuclear weapons and disarmament. The professional development workshop was the seventh of its kind. Since 2012, civil society advocates had partnered with the Office to host the annual event on the date of the United States election, when public school teachers in New York City received time to participate in continuing education activities.
Commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki On 9 August, the Secretary-General attended the seventy-third Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremony to pay tribute to the victims of the 1945 atomic bombing of Nagasaki. In his remarks,39 he underscored his commitment to making Nagasaki the last place on earth to suffer nuclear devastation. The Secretary-General also met in Nagasaki with representatives of the atomic bomb survivors (hibakusha), telling journalists afterwards that a world free of nuclear weapons should be a central objective of humankind.40 On 6 August, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, participated in the seventy-third Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony and delivered a message from the Secretary-General. In his message,41 the Secretary-General paid tribute to the citizens of Hiroshima and to those who perished both in the initial blast of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima and in the ensuing weeks, months and years. While expressing his sincere gratitude to the hibakusha and the people of Hiroshima for their dedication to educating the world about the threat of nuclear weapons, the Secretary-General called upon world leaders to return to dialogue and diplomacy, to a common path towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and a safer and more secure world for all. He reiterated his firm commitment
39 António Guterres, remarks at the Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Ceremony, Nagasaki, 9 August 2018. 40 António Guterres, press conference at Nagasaki Peace Memorial Hall, Nagasaki, 9 August 2018. 41 António Guterres, message at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Service, Hiroshima, 6 August 2018.
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to working with the hibakusha, citizens of Hiroshima and all peoples of the world to realize the common vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Earlier in the year, on 31 May, Japan and the Office for Disarmament Affairs co-organized a screening at United Nations Headquarters of the documentary film Paper Lanterns, featuring Shigeaki Mori, a hibakusha from Hiroshima who devoted his life to investigating the fates of 12 United States prisoners of war killed in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing. Speaking at the screening, Mori reminded attendees that 200,000 people had died in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and he appealed to individuals to use their talents “for peace not bombs”. The High Representative for Disarmament Affairs noted that the number of atomic bombing survivors was in rapid decline, and she stressed the need to remember their stories. The event was attended by more than 200 people, including the families of the prisoners of war and the film’s director and producers.
Disarmament fellowships
In 2018, diplomats and other officials from 25 Member States42 participated in the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, an initiative established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session43 in 1978 and implemented by the Office for Disarmament Affairs. By providing specialized training to that annual class of Disarmament Fellows, the Programme continued to support greater expertise in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues, as well as a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the field of multilateral disarmament and international security. As at the end of the year, the Office for Disarmament Affairs had provided training through the Programme to 1,008 officials from 169 States, many of whom had come to hold important disarmament-related positions in their Governments. The Programme enabled former Fellows to participate more effectively in regional and global disarmament efforts and, by creating an informal world-spanning network, helped them work cooperatively and constructively in pursuit of disarmament and non-proliferation goals. The 2018 Fellowship Programme took place in three segments that comprised various theoretical activities and practical exercises, including
42 Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Botswana, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iceland, Jamaica, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Libya, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Portugal, Senegal, United States, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zimbabwe. 43 See paragraph 108 of the Final Document (General Assembly resolution S-10/2): “In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament”.
256 Information and outreach lectures and round-table debates on current disarmament topics with senior diplomats and representatives from international, civil society and academic organizations; ambassadorial-level panel discussions on nuclear disarmament; a simulated session of the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems; and a table-top exercise on “point of entry” procedures used in on-site inspections by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Fellows also visited field locations that included a destruction facility for conventional weapons, a nuclear reactor and multiple laboratories engaging in disarmament- related work. The initial segment of the Fellowship Programme, which began in Geneva on 20 August, exposed the Fellows to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and of various treaty regimes, in particular the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.44 In addition, the Fellows received background information on weapon systems and their effects and on the applicable law, in particular international humanitarian law; participated in two exercises on applying weapons law; and were briefed on the work of civil society in the field of disarmament and arms control and the activities of the Geneva Centres.45 That segment also included a “Swiss day study visit” to Bern and Spiez organized by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland. During the second segment of the programme, the Fellows participated in study visits to several international organizations, structures or arrangements related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. In Vienna, those included the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, as well as the secretariats of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of export control regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In The Hague, Netherlands, the Fellows visited the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. The Fellows also participated in country-specific study visits to China, Germany, Japan and the Republic of Korea at the invitation of their Governments. Additionally, in the first trip of its kind under the Programme, the Fellows saw the European Union institutions in Brussels in a visit organized by the Union’s Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, pursuant to European Union Council decision 2018/299/CFSP.
44 For the text and adherence status of these treaties, see the Disarmament Treaties Database. 45 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
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The third segment of the Programme took place in October at United Nations Headquarters in New York, where the Fellows followed the work of the General Assembly First Committee and developments on key issues related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. In parallel, the group also prepared and discussed research papers on various disarmament and arms control topics. After completing the Programme at United Nations Headquarters on 26 October, the 2018 Fellows were awarded certificates of participation by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.
Vienna Office of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
The Vienna Office further strengthened its engagement with Vienna- based organizations in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, in part through support for various outreach and capacity-building activities for young professionals. The efforts of the Office included partnering with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to implement the Scholarship for Peace and Security for 2018, a capacity-building and training programme for young professionals in the organization’s region. This initiative provided scholarships for 70 early-career professionals, with 60 of the awards reserved for women and 10 for men. The programme consisted of two components: (a) a segment providing young professional women with eight weeks of online study and one week of in-person training; and (b) eight weeks of separate online training open to female and male participants. These training courses not only increased the substantive knowledge and skills of participants on issues related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but also contributed to the creation of a network of young professionals, particularly women, from the wider area of the organization active in relevant fields. The Scholarship was the fifth training programme in a series that, as at the end of the year, had successfully educated a total of 229 women and 10 men from 111 countries.46 In light of the programme’s success in 2018, the Vienna Office and the organization jointly decided to repeat it in 2019. All courses for the scholarship effort took place under the Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education Partnership, an initiative with 30 partners representing international and regional organizations, media, civil society and academia. The Partnership’s aims included developing curriculums on disarmament and non-proliferation to promote new educational networks and outreach activities while also fostering women’s participation in the disarmament field.
46 The majority of participants were nationals of States participating in the Women Scholarship for Peace initiative of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. For more information about the programme, see “Women Scholarship for Peace: Global South”.
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The Vienna Office also continued to host the Disarmament Education Dashboard, an online platform that provides access to training materials and resources developed in cooperation with organizations active in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues and in cross-cutting matters such as gender and development. With the aim of expanding the number and quality of related education opportunities, including through courses tailored to audience demands, the Dashboard had become an essential tool for training participants, partners, donors and a growing number of organizations. In 2018, the Vienna Office cooperated with branches of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other partners to continuously update the Dashboard’s educational “modules” while expanding and improving upon its thematic and methodological offerings. In addition, the Vienna Office continuously improved the platform to enhance its accessibility and increase its potential to provide positive learning experiences. In particular, the Office oversaw a revamp of the Dashboard to host self-paced short courses on disarmament and non-proliferation issues for the general public. Meanwhile, the Vienna Office continued to initiate and take part in a range of separate outreach activities in cooperation with other Vienna- based initiatives and organizations. On 25 September, for example, the Office participated in a commemorative event for the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, helping to raise awareness of the grave risks to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear arms. The Vienna Office also conducted regular briefings for groups of high school and university students on the mandate and activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Vienna Office developed, with European Union funding, a comprehensive online course on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) for relevant officials and other experts. The training platform was to bemade available on the Disarmament Education Dashboard.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
In 2018, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research continued to produce policy-relevant research and analysis, build capacity on traditional and emerging issues and deliver tools to assist Member States in implementing their disarmament commitments. Acting in its capacity as an autonomous institute within the United Nations, it offered research and policy support to Member States, United Nations bodies, international and regional organizations and other stakeholders. The Institute’s contribution to disarmament and arms control was underscored in the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, which highlighted the advisory services and the studies the Institute had undertaken at the request of the General Assembly. In his Agenda, the Secretary-General also identified the Institute as a source
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of knowledge and practical support for action in specific disarmament areas, including nuclear-weapon risk reduction; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; the examination of hypersonic missile technologies; and the development of standards for the transfer, holding and use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles. Under new leadership in 2018, the Institute established a three-year strategic research agenda focused on four areas: weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons; conventional arms; security and technology; and gender and disarmament. The Institute’s Board of Trustees approved the research plan in June. The Institute accomplished the following during the year: • Carried out research across four key disarmament areas, implementing over 20 projects on topics such as nuclear disarmament verification, space security, weapons and ammunition management, cybersecurity and gender and disarmament • Facilitated dialogue between and among disarmament stakeholders through 56 conferences, workshops and events, ranging from an expert seminar on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons to a table-top exercise concerning use of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles to a Geneva dialogue series on the Secretary-General’s Disarmament Agenda • Offered advisory services to intergovernmental processes and forums, including as a consultant to two groups of governmental experts—one on further effective measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the other on nuclear disarmament verification—and as a source of substantive support for the five subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament • Issued 23 publications on subjects as varied as the changing role of conventional arms control in preventing and managing violent conflicts, nuclear disarmament verification, the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies and gender issues related to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.47 The following subsections contain highlights from the 2018 activities of the Institute’s four research programmes, all of which supported the Secretary- General’s Agenda for Disarmament. A full account of the Institute’s activities and its proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2018 were included in the Secretary-General’s annual report48 to the General Assembly on the Institute’s work. Detailed information about all of the Institute’s research and activities was made available on its website (www.unidir.org).
47 For a list of the Institute’s publications, including links for online access, see annex II. 48 A/73/284.
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Weapons of mass destruction and other strategic weapons The Institute continued its work on nuclear disarmament verification, a ban on production of fissile materials for weapons and other explosive devices, new approaches to nuclear security and nuclear disarmament, and security issues associated with hypersonic weapons. In the area of nuclear disarmament verification, the Institute advocated a new approach focused on verifying the absence of nuclear weapons. It also supported the work of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and of two new subsidiary bodies of the Conference on Disarmament that focused, respectively, on new types of weapons of mass destruction and on banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Institute undertook a study that explored security issues associated with long-range delivery systems, such as hypersonic weapons. Additionally, it supported the work of Member States on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, providing technical expertise to United Nations processes that included a new group of governmental experts on further practical measures for the prevention of such an arms race.
Conventional arms The Institute’s conventional arms programme focused on three areas: supporting national and regional frameworks for weapons and ammunition management, integrating conventional arms control into preventive strategies and actions, and promoting progress on the implementation of multilateral instruments and guidelines. The Institute’s work under the programme included supporting States in designing and developing national frameworks for weapons and ammunition management in cooperation with regional organizations, such as the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States. In 2018, the Institute helped establish baselines of national frameworks in three West African States, and it produced a road map document to operationalize ammunition management in low-capacity and conflict-affected environments. Through related research and reporting, the Institute considered the changing role of arms control in preventing and managing conflicts, and it suggested options to strengthen the implementation of United Nations arms embargoes. The Institute’s conventional arms programme also facilitated dialogue, among States, United Nations system entities and specialized organizations, on the following subjects: ammunition management, tracing of small arms and light weapons, and the roles and contributions of industry and private sector actors towards mitigating the risk of diversion in arms transfers. Those activities supported the active engagement of States in various multilateral instruments, including the Arms Trade Treaty and the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
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Security and technology Established to help practitioners and multilateral disarmament processes respond effectively to security challenges from technological innovation, the Institute’s Security and Technology Programme pursued three objectives in 2018: supporting norm development and implementation, increasing understanding of digital destabilization, and helping modernize the “arms control toolbox”. The Programme focused on three priority areas of technological innovation: cyber stability, artificial intelligence and the weaponization of increasingly autonomous technologies, and the security dimensions of innovations in science and technology. Within each area, the Institute sought to (a) build knowledge and awareness of the international security implications and risks of specific technological innovations and (b) convene stakeholders to explore ideas and develop new thinking on ways to address them. In support of these aims, the Institute convened six multi-stakeholder expert workshops: three in Geneva, one in New York, one in Washington, D.C., and one in Singapore. Meanwhile, the Institute’s annual Cyber Stability Conference for 2018, the largest since its inception, gave participants an opportunity to preview the forthcoming Cyber Policy Portal.49
Gender and disarmament In 2018, the Institute established a new gender and disarmament programme in support of calls by the Secretary-General for “the full and equal participation of women in all decision-making processes related to disarmament and international security”. That effort was intended to provide insight and reporting on gender-responsive approaches to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament while also formulating resource tools to support disarmament stakeholders in translating gender awareness into practical actions. Another new initiative, the International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group, was launched in 2018 with ambassadors of Canada, Ireland and Namibia and the Director of the Institute as its co-chairs. Through the new Group, the Institute helped to organize a series of side events and to produce a “Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack”,50 with practical ideas to support diplomats in applying a gender lens to their work.
49 The Cyber Policy Portal, launched by the Institute in 2019, served as an interactive, “at a glance” reference tool for policymakers and experts. Through a single site, users could access concise yet comprehensive cybersecurity policy profiles of all 193 Member States, as well as regional and international organizations and multilateral frameworks. 50 International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group, Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack for Multilateral Practitioners (Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2019).
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Annex I United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs publications and other information materials in 2018
‒‒ Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (Sales No. E.18.IX.6) (also available in French and in e-book format) ‒‒ United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 42 (Parts I and II): 2017 (Sales Nos. E.18.IX.5 and E.18.IX.7) (also available in e-book format) ‒‒ The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web: A Study, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs Occasional Papers, No. 32, October 2018 (Sales No. E.19.IX.1) ‒‒ Advocacy by Non-governmental Organizations to Strengthen the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Civil Society and Disarmament, 2018 (Sales No. E.19.IX.2) ‒‒ Programmes Financed from Voluntary Contributions: 2017-2018 ‒‒ Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context: A Handbook for United Nations DDR Practitioners (also available in French) ‒‒ Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council ‒‒ How Weapons Control Fosters Development ‒‒ UNODA Update (online news updates): First Quarter, Second Quarter, Third Quarter and Fourth Quarter ‒‒ Fact sheets on disarmament issues
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa ‒‒ UNREC Focus (newsletter): No. 31 (January 2018), No. 32 (June 2018) and No. 33 (October 2018) ‒‒ Fact sheet, July 2018
Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean ‒‒ Ammunition Control Practices in Latin America and the Caribbean
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific ‒‒ Newsletter: No. 13 (February 2018), No. 14 (June 2018) and No. 15 (October 2018); special edition—10th anniversary of the Regional Centre’s operations (August 2018)
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Annex II United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research publications in 2018
‒‒ Algorithmic Bias and the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: A Primer ‒‒ An Update on “Outer Space Security” and A Brief History of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) ‒‒ Applying Conventional Arms Control in the Context of United Nations Arms Embargoes ‒‒ Armed UAVs in Conflict Escalation andInter -State Crisis ‒‒ Change in the Air: Disruptive Developments in Armed UAV Technology ‒‒ Evidence of Absence: Verifying the Removal of Nuclear Weapons ‒‒ Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security 2017, Hiroshima Report, 2018 Edition ‒‒ Preventing and Mitigating ICT-Related Conflict: Cyber Stability Conference 2018 Summary Report ‒‒ Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in North East Asia ‒‒ Reporting on Conventional Arms Trade: Synthesis Handbook (also available in French) ‒‒ Resuming Dialogue on Moving Nuclear Disarmament Forward: An Immediate Challenge ‒‒ Space Security: The Next Chapter—UNIDR Space Security Conference 2018: Conference Report, 7–8 May 2018 ‒‒ Space Security and Strategic Stability ‒‒ Synergies in Reporting under Multilateral Conventional Arms Treaties and Instruments: Meeting Summary, Geneva, Switzerland, 6 December 2017 (also available in French) ‒‒ Summary Report: Tabletop Exercise on Armed UAVs ‒‒ The Changing Role of Conventional Arms Control in Preventing and Managing Violent Conflicts ‒‒ The International Tracing Instrument: Examining Options to Support Operationalization (also available in French) ‒‒ The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Artificial Intelligence—A Primer for CCW Delegates ‒‒ Towards ASAT Test Guidelines ‒‒ Weapons of Choice? The Expanding Development, Transfer and Use of Armed UAVs
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Annex III Events held on the margins of the 2018 session of the First Committee
9 October Disarmament to Save Humanity: Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs) 15 October Securing Our Common Future: Promoting Gender-Responsive Disarmament and Security (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Permanent Missions of Ireland and Namibia) Screening of the film Where the Wind Blew (organized by the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan and the Office for Disarmament Affairs) 16 October Nuclear Risk Reduction: Where to Go from Here (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Office for Disarmament Affairs) 18 October Consolidating and Enhancing Cooperation among Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones (organized by the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan and the Office for Disarmament Affairs) Evidence of Absence: Verifying Removal of Nuclear Weapons (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) 19 October Nuclear Security and Disarmament: Securing Excess and Disarmament Fissile Materials (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Permanent Mission of Canada) 22 October Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons: An Expert Seminar to Examine Options to Effectively Implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 2370 (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Permanent Missions of Australia, Germany and Egypt, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate) Addressing the International Security Implications of Science and Technology: Innovations and Combinations (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Office for Disarmament Affairs)
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24 October The Expanding Use of Armed Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles and the Need for International Standards (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Permanent Missions of Germany and the Netherlands, PAX and the Stimson Center) 25 October Examining the Role of Conventional Arms Control in Preventing Conflicts and Building Peace (organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the International Peace Institute)
266 appendix Status of multilateral arms regulation and I disarmament agreements Photo: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, April 2018 A p p e n d i x I
Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
The most up-to-date information on disarmament treaties, including their status of adherence, are available at the website of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/ The data contained in this appendix has been provided by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements. Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the United Nations Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported. The treaties are presented below by depositary.
Secretary-General of the United Nations Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Arms Trade Treaty Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Convention on Cluster Munitions Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
African Union African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)
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Canada and Hungary Treaty on Open Skies
France Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol)
Kyrgyzstan Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
Mexico Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)
Netherlands Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions
Pacific Islands Forum South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)
Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty)
Thailand Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)
United States Antarctic Treaty
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Actions reported for the period 1 January to 31 December 2018
The following list shows actions, if any, during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements, as reported by the depositaries. The order in which the agreements are listed is according to the date of signature or opening for signature. A new State party is listed below based on the date of deposit with the respective depositary of a State’s instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. However, please refer to the footnotes to ascertain whether that State actually becomes a State party at a later date, as some treaties only enter into force for a State after a specified period of time from the date of deposit. If a State expressed its consent to be bound by a means other than ratification, the date of deposit is further noted as follows: (a) = accession, (A) = acceptance, (AA) = approval, (P) = consent to be bound and (s) = succession.a In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The following notation indicates where the reported action was completed: (M) = Moscow, (L) = London and (W) = Washington. Certain treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (Bangkok Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Rarotonga Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty on a Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) have associated protocols concerning security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States and some also have protocols for States outside the zone of application, but which have some territory within the zone. They are at different stages with regard to signature, ratification and entry into force. For the status of adherence of these protocols, see the table in chapter 4 on page 132.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol) Signed at Geneva: 17 June 1925 Entered into force: 8 February 1928 Depositary: France New parties: Armenia —13 March (a) State of Palestine —19 January (a) Total number of parties: 142
Antarctic Treaty Signed at Washington: 1 December 1959 Entered into force: 23 June 1961 Depositary: United States New parties: None Total number of parties: 53
a A glossary of terms relating to treaty actions is available from http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml (accessed 20 June 2018).
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Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) Signed by the original partiesb in Moscow: 5 August 1963 Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 8 August 1963 Entered into force: 10 October 1963 Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W) New parties: None Total number of parties: 125
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 27 January 1967 Entered into force: 10 October 1967 Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W) New parties: Armenia —28 March (a) (M) Total number of parties: 108
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) Opened for signature at Mexico City: 14 February 1967 Entered into force: for each Government individually Depositary: Mexico New parties: None Total number of parties: 33 Amendment to article 7c New parties: None Total number of parties: 24 Amendment to article 25d New parties: None Total number of parties: 24
Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20e New parties: None Total number of parties: 28
b The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. c Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990. d Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991. e Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.
272 Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 1 July 1968 Entered into force: 5 March 1970 Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W) New parties: None Total number of parties: 191
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Sea-bed Treaty) Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 11 February 1971 Entered into force: 18 May 1972 Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W) New parties: None Total number of parties: 94
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington: 10 April 1972 Entered into force: 26 March 1975 Depositary: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom (L) and United States (W) New parties: Central African Republic —25 September (W) Niue —14 June (a) (W) State of Palestine —9 January (a) (M) (L) Total number of parties: 182
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Opened for signature at Geneva: 18 May 1977 Entered into force: 5 October 1978 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties: None Total number of parties: 78
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Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Opened for signature at New York: 18 December 1979 Entered into force: 11 July 1984 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:f Armenia —19 January (a) Total number of parties: 18
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects Opened for signature at New York: 10 April 1981 Entered into force: 2 December 1983 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:g None Total number of parties: 125 Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entered into force on 18 May 2004) New parties: None Total number of parties: 86 Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998) New parties: Mauritius —2 November (P) Total number of parties: 105 Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998) New parties: None Total number of parties: 108 Protocol V (entered into force on 12 November 2006) New parties: Mauritius —2 November (P) Total number of parties: 95
f Article 19, paragraph 4, states: “For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument.” g Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state: “2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. “3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention.”
274 Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) Opened for signature at Rarotonga: 6 August 1985 Entered into force: 11 December 1986 Depositary: Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum New parties: None Total number of parties: 13
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Signed at Paris: 19 November 1990 Entered into force: 9 November 1992 Depositary: Netherlands New parties: None Total number of parties: 30 Agreement on Adaptation Adopted and signed at Istanbul: 19 November 1999 Not yet in forceh New signatories: None Total number of signatories: 30 New parties: None Total number of parties: 3
Treaty on Open Skies Signed at Helsinki: 24 March 1992 Entered into force: 1 January 2002 Depositary: Canada and Hungary New parties: None Total number of parties: 34
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Signed at Paris: 13 January 1993 Entered into force: 29 April 1997 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:i State of Palestine —17 May (a) Total number of parties: 193
h Article 31, paragraph 3, states: “This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form.” i Article XXI, paragraph 2, states: “For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.”
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Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon–Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) Signed at Bangkok: 15 December 1995 Entered into force: 27 March 1997 Depositary: Thailand New parties: None Total number of parties: 10
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) Signed at Cairo: 11 April 1996 Entered into force: 15 July 2009 Depositary: Secretary-General of the African Union New parties: None Total number of parties: 40
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Opened for signature at New York: 24 September 1996 Not yet in forcej Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New signatories: Tuvalu —25 September Total number of signatories: 184 New parties: Thailand —25 September Total number of parties: 167
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention) Opened for signature at Ottawa: 3 December 1997 Entered into force: 1 March 1999 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:k None Total number of parties: 164
j Article XIV, paragraph 1, states: “This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex II to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.” k Article 17, paragraph 2, states: “For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”
276 Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials Opened for signature at Washington, DC: 14 November 1997 Entered into force: 1 July 1998 Depositary: Organization of American States New parties:l None Total number of parties: 31
Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions Opened for signature at Guatemala City: 7 June 1999 Entered into force: 21 November 2002 Depositary: Organization of American States New parties: None Total number of parties: 17
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism Opened for signature at New York: 14 September 2005 Entered into force: 7 July 2007 Depositary: Secretary General of the United Nations New parties:m Guatemala —26 September Total number of parties: 114
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia Opened for signature at Semipalatinsk: 8 September 2006 Entered into force: 21 March 2009 Depositary: Kyrgyzstan New parties: None Total number of parties: 5
l Article XXV states: “This Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30th day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification.” m Article 25, paragraph 2 states: “For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”
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Convention on Cluster Munitions Opened for signature at Oslo: 3 December 2008 Entered into force: 1 August 2010 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:n —Gambia 11 December —Namibia 31 August —Sri Lanka 1 March (a) Total number of parties: 105
Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (Kinshasa Convention) Opened for signature at Brazzaville: 19 November 2010 Entered into force: 8 March 2017 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:o None Total number of parties: 7
Arms Trade Treaty Opened for signature at New York: 3 June 2013 Entered into force: 24 December 2014 Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New parties:p Cameroon —18 June Chile —18 May Brazil —14 August Guinea-Bissau —22 October Mozambique —14 December Suriname —19 October Total number of parties: 100
n Article 17, paragraph 2, states: “For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” o Article 36, paragraph 2, states: “For each State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of that instrument.” p Article 22, paragraph 2, states: “For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”
278 Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Opened for signature at New York: 7 July 2017 Not yet in forceq Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations New signatories: Angola —27 September Antigua and Barbuda —26 September Benin —26 September Bolivia (Plurinational State of) —16 April Brunei Darussalam —26 September Colombia —3 August Dominican Republic —7 June Guinea-Bissau —26 September Kazakhstan —2 March Myanmar —26 September Saint Lucia —27 September Seychelles —26 September Timor-Leste —26 September Total number of signatories: 69 New parties: Cook Islands —4 September (a) Austria —8 May Costa Rica —5 July Cuba —30 January Gambia —26 September Mexico —16 January New Zealand —31 July Nicaragua —19 July Palau —3 May Samoa —26 September San Marino —26 September State of Palestine —22 March Uruguay —25 July Vanuatu —26 September Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) —27 March Viet Nam —17 May Total number of parties: 19
q Article 15, paragraph 1, states: “This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.”
279 appendix Disarmament resolutions and decisions II listed by chapter A general view of voting results during the General Assembly meeting when voting on resolutions related to general and complete disarmament took place, on 5 December 2018.
UN Photo/Loey Felipe A p p e n d i x I I
Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter
At its seventy-third session, the General Assembly adopted 63 resolutions and five decisions related to disarmament. In this appendix, highlights of those texts and explanations of vote by Member States during the First Committee session are presented, with the information organized by chapter topic.1 The accompanying boxes contain key data and cross references to Part I of the Yearbook, which can be consulted for the complete texts, the full lists of sponsors and the votes of States.2
Chapter I. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 73/29. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
The General Assembly recommended that Submitted by: Pakistan (19 Oct.) further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for a common approach or common formula and GA vote: 125-0-58 (5 Dec.) that the various alternative approaches, particularly 1st Cttee vote: 122-0-65 (1 Nov.) those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 14–18. be further explored. It also recommended that the Conference actively continue intensive negotiations to reach agreement and conclude effective international agreements on security assurances, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective. First Committee. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, China expressed reservations that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism.
1 See A/C.1/73/PV.26–31 for the full text of the statements. 2 The following are abbreviations used in the boxes: o.p. = operative paragraph; p.p. = preambular paragraph. The order of the numbers for the voting statistics indicates votes in favour, votes against and abstentions, respectively.
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73/40. Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament The General Assembly called for the urgent Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf commencement of negotiations in the Conference of the States Members of the United on Disarmament on effective nuclear disarmament Nations that are members of the measures to achieve the total elimination of Movement of Non-Aligned Countries nuclear weapons, including, in particular, on a (8 Oct.) comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons. It decided to convene, in New York on a date GA vote: 143-27-14; 129-19-23, p.p. 12 (5 Dec.) to be decided later, a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament to 1st Cttee vote: 143-27-14; review the progress made in that regard. 129-20-22, p.p. 12 (1 Nov.) First Committee. Before it abstained from See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 57–62. voting on the draft resolution, Canada said that it was concerned that the draft resolution did not fully encompass the proposals discussed at the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament in 2013. It expressed support for a high-level multilateral conference on nuclear disarmament that was inclusive from its very inception, planned in consultation with all Member States of the United Nations and on which there was agreement on its objectives and agenda. After it voted in favour of the draft resolution, Switzerland said that its explanation of vote on the draft resolution when it was submitted in 2017 remained valid (see A/C.1/72/PV.27). After voting against the draft, the following delivered statements: • The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, pointed out that the only reference to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in the draft resolution was to the Treaty’s article VI, which they believed to be insufficient, incidental and unbalanced. Furthermore, they reiterated their strong opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was mentioned in the draft resolution. • The Netherlands, speaking also on behalf of Albania, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, expressed their belief that the central role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its review cycle was not acknowledged in the draft resolution. They stressed that the Treaty was the foundation of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. After it abstained from voting, Bulgaria, speaking also on behalf of Greece, Iceland, Norway, Portugal and Spain, explained that another high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament was parallel to and likely to distract focus from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Referring to the reference to the Treaty in the preamble to the draft resolution, it noted that the emphasis was on only one of the pillars. In its view, nuclear disarmament was directly linked to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and Treaty obligations should therefore not be approached selectively.
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73/47. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons The General Assembly stressed that it is in Submitted by: Austria (11 Oct.) the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any GA vote: 142-15-26 (5 Dec.) circumstances, and that the only way to guarantee 1st Cttee vote: 143-15-26 (1 Nov.) that nuclear weapons are never used again would be See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 92–95. their total elimination. Furthermore, the Assembly stressed that the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation could not be adequately addressed and that awareness of those consequences must underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament. The Assembly called upon all States to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to exert all efforts to totally eliminate the threat of those weapons. First Committee. Before it voted against the draft resolution, the United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, said that creating and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons could not be isolated from international security concerns. They stressed that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was clearly at odds with and risked undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They urged all States to commit to the continued success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to ensure compliance, promote universalization, ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation and respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges. Before it abstained from voting, Pakistan expressed the need for a non-divisive approach that united all in the common endeavour towards nuclear disarmament, based on the cardinal principle of attaining equal and undiminished security for all States, as enshrined in the consensus. After they voted in favour of the draft resolution, the following explained their positions: • India stated that its participation in the meetings in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was premised on the shared concerns about the serious threat to the survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons. • Japan said that its support for the draft resolution was motivated by the same logic it employed in 2017. After it abstained from voting, China pointed out that overemphasizing humanitarian issues while ignoring other important factors associated with nuclear disarmament would not help produce any tangible results from the nuclear disarmament process; rather, it would serve only to jeopardize the outcome and results that had already been achieved.
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73/48. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
The General Assembly welcomed the adoption Submitted by: Austria (11 Oct.) of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017 and welcomed that already 69 States GA vote: 126-41-16 (5 Dec.) had signed the Treaty and 19 States had ratified or 1st Cttee vote: 122-41-16 (1 Nov.) acceded to it as at 17 October 2018. It called upon all See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 96–98. States that had not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date. First Committee. Before it voted in favour of the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran explained that the Treaty should be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Before they voted against the draft resolution, the following took the floor: • The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of the United States and France, said that the Treaty was clearly at odds with and risked undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They urged all States to commit to the continued success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to ensure compliance, promote universalization, ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation and respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges. • Pakistan asserted that, at each stage of the disarmament process, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces, to be achieved only as a cooperative and universally agreed undertaking, through a consensus-based process involving all relevant stakeholders. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in its view, did not fulfil those essential conditions. After voting against the draft resolution, the following delivered statements: • India explained that it did not participate in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; therefore, it could not be a party to the Treaty and should not be bound by the obligations that might arise from it. • China expressed the view that the Treaty had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism. • Japan stated that it was essential that all States work together and take united action based on a clear understanding of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, as well as on an objective assessment of the reality of the international security environment. • Israel emphasized that the Treaty did not create, develop or indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject or content of the Treaty. Moreover, in Israel’s view, the Treaty did not reflect legal norms that applied to States not party to the Treaty and did not in any way alter the existing rights or obligations of those States. After abstaining from voting, the following explained their votes:
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• Argentina stated that it was still assessing the text of the Treaty and, because it had not yet signed the instrument, it could not support the call for signature and ratification, as mentioned in the draft resolution. • Singapore pointed out that it actively participated in the negotiations on the Treaty in good faith and with a constructive spirit. It expressed regret that its concerns were not fully taken on board when the Treaty was adopted. • Switzerland noted that it continued to have questions regarding some of the Treaty’s provisions, including their impact on the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. • Sweden said that an independent inquiry tasked with analysing the consequences of a possible Swedish accession was ongoing.
73/49. The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation The General Assembly underscored the Submitted by: Sweden (11 Oct.) importance of further advancing, at both the regional and the international levels, the universalization GA vote: 171-1-12 (5 Dec.) of the Code and invited all States that had not 1st Cttee vote: 171-1-12 (1 Nov.) yet subscribed to the Code, in particular those See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 99–102. possessing space-launch-vehicle and ballistic- missile capabilities and those developing corresponding national programmes, to do so, bearing in mind the right to use space for peaceful purposes. It also encouraged the exploration of further ways and means to deal effectively with the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, to take the measures necessary to avoid contributing to such delivery systems and to continue to deepen the relationship between the Code and the United Nations. First Committee. Before abstaining from voting, Egypt stated that the Code focused on the issue of ballistic missiles while ignoring more advanced means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as cruise missiles. Furthermore, the draft resolution continued to include language that it believed had the potential to restrict the rights of States to the peaceful uses of outer space. After voting in favour, Brazil acknowledged the fact that 139 States had already subscribed to the Code as a practical step for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Having voted against the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran said that the Code was not and could not be considered an internationally negotiated text. After abstaining from the vote, Algeria expressed its belief that the Code was unbalanced and selective, as it did not cover all forms of missiles. It added that some of the Code’s provisions could also be construed as restricting the legitimate right of States to the use of outer space, contrary to the country’s position on the matter.
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73/50. Nuclear disarmament
The General Assembly urged the Conference Submitted by: Myanmar (15 Oct.) on Disarmament to commence as early as possible its substantive work during its 2019 session, on the GA vote: 125-40-18; 116-38-15, basis of a comprehensive and balanced programme p.p. 32; 167-2-6, o.p. 16 (5 Dec.) of work that took into consideration all the real 1st Cttee vote: 120-41-21; and existing priorities in the field of disarmament 117-37-19, p.p. 32; 168-2-8, o.p. 16 and arms control, including the immediate (1 Nov.) commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 103–113. nuclear weapons convention. It also called for the early entry into force, universalization and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a contribution to nuclear disarmament, while welcoming the latest signatory to the Treaty, Tuvalu, and its latest ratification, by Thailand, on 25 September 2018. First Committee. The following States that voted in favour of the draft resolution took the floor: • Qatar, speaking on behalf of the Group of Arab States, conveyed their commitment to nuclear-disarmament efforts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. • Brazil maintained that, as a non-party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it could not subscribe to the implementation of the action plans and decisions of its Review Conferences. • The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea expressed reservations about the calls for adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating that it did not subscribe to the decisions of Treaty’s Review Conferences. It reiterated that it was not a party to the Treaty. Having voted against the draft resolution, China argued that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism. After abstaining from the vote, India explained that it was constrained to abstaining because of certain references in the draft resolution to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
73/56. Reducing nuclear danger
The General Assembly called for a review of Submitted by: India (16 Oct.) nuclear doctrines and for immediate and urgent steps GA vote: 126-49-11 (5 Dec.) to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons. The Assembly requested the 1st Cttee vote: 127-49-10 (1 Nov.) Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 136–138. initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to continue encouraging Member States to consider the convening of an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.
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First Committee. France stated after its vote against the draft that it rejected references to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
73/57. Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear- Weapon-Free-World
The General Assembly requested the Secretary- Submitted by: Kazakhstan (11 Oct.) General to seek the views of Member States on the efforts they had made and measures they had taken GA vote: 138-21-26; 128-20-25, p.p. 7; 136-3-35, p.p. 9 (5 Dec.) with respect to the implementation of the Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear- 1st Cttee vote: 135-21-27; Weapon-Free World, and it also requested the 126-21-26, p.p. 7; 137-3-36, p.p. 9 Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its (1 Nov.) seventy-sixth session a report on the implementation See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 139–143. of the Declaration. First Committee. The Syrian Arab Republic voted in favour of the draft resolution and explained that it had abstained in the voting on preambular paragraph 9, which referred to the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, and thereby contained baseless allegations directed at the country. After voting against the draft resolution, the United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, reiterated that that an incremental, progressive approach was the only practical option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament while upholding global strategic security and stability. They believed that the declaration referred to in the draft resolution did not contribute to that goal. Having abstained from voting on the draft resolution, the following explained their positions: • China argued that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism. • New Zealand said that its explanation of vote during the Assembly’s seventieth session of the General Assembly, during the first adoption of the resolution and of its annexed declaration, was still valid.
73/60. Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems
The General Assembly called for practical and Submitted by: New Zealand (11 Oct.) concrete steps to be taken, unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to decrease the operational GA vote: 175-5-5; 164-2-7, p.p. 8 readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to (5 Dec.) ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from 1st Cttee vote: 173-4-7; 166-2-10, high-alert status, and looked forward to the issue of p.p. 8 (1 Nov.) the lowering of the operational readiness of nuclear See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 150–153. weapons systems being addressed further during the current review cycle. First Committee. After they voted against the draft resolution, the United Kingdom, also speaking on behalf of France and the United States, restated that the operational readiness of their nuclear-weapon systems was maintained at a level
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consonant with their national security requirements and their obligations to their allies, within the larger context of the current global strategic situation.
73/62. United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons The General Assembly called upon all Submitted by: Japan (17 Oct.) States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation of GA vote: 162-4-23; 167-3-10, p.p. 19; Treaty to comply with their obligations under the 168-2-6, p.p. 20; 150-5-21, o.p. 2; Treaty and to implement, with due consideration to 147-8-22, o.p. 3; 175-3-2, o.p. 5; developments in global security, steps agreed to in 162-3-10, o.p. 7; 152-1-26, o.p. 10; the Final Documents of the Treaty’s 1995 Review 148-2-27, o.p. 12; 170-3-4, o.p. 13; and Extension Conference of and its 2000 and 2010 159-2-20, o.p. 18; 174-1-5, o.p. 20; Review Conferences. The Assembly called upon all 173-2-4, o.p. 21; 172-0-8, o.p. 31 States to make utmost efforts to ease international (5 Dec.) tension, strengthen trust between States and improve 1st Cttee vote: 160-4-24; 164-3-12, the international security environment, with a view to p.p. 19; 170-2-7, p.p. 20; 145-5-23, facilitating further nuclear reductions, placing special o.p. 2; 139-8-29, o.p. 3; 173-3-5, emphasis on, inter alia, continued implementation of o.p. 5; 165-4-11, o.p. 7; 152-1-23, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction o.p. 10; 147-2-26, o.p. 12; 170-3-6, and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New o.p. 13; 158-2-19, o.p. 18; 172-2-5, START), continuing dialogues between the Russian o.p. 20; 172-2-5, o.p. 21; 170-0-9, Federation and the United States on reductions in o.p. 31 (1 Nov.) their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and efforts See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 158–179. by all States possessing nuclear weapons to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. The Assembly also urged all States concerned to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of such fissile material, pending the entry into force of the treaty. First Committee. The Philippines, speaking before voting in favour of the draft resolution, reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and acknowledged the importance and legitimacy of the historic Treaty. Before voting against the draft resolution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea emphasized that the draft resolution contained several paragraphs related to it that distorted the spirit and essence of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Singapore joint statement. Japan, in its view, had no moral standing with which to put forward such a draft resolution, let alone interfere in the issue of the Korean Peninsula. The following, which intended to abstain from voting, spoke before the Committee: • Austria stated that the resolution risked undermining the fundamental role played by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. • The United States asserted that the draft resolution was a step back from the baseline set in 2017 in some important ways, including for returning to language that dated from a different time and security environment.
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• Brazil noted the failure in the draft resolution to mention the adoption in 2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and expressed concern about the language that established conditions for nuclear disarmament and improvements in regional and global security. • New Zealand said that the draft resolution redrafted important outcomes and undertakings in the context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and had unacceptably weak language on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. After they voted in favour of the draft resolution, the following took the floor: • Switzerland raised concern over language in the draft resolution that weakened provisions adopted at review conferences of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would have preferred a draft resolution that urged the eight annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty without delay, as iterations of the resolution did before 2017. • Malaysia noted that, in operative paragraph 2, the fragmented nature of the nuclear-weapon States’ unequivocal undertaking was not accurately represented, which risked undermining their prior commitment to nuclear disarmament. • El Salvador expressed the belief that seeking to alter language agreed upon by consensus in disarmament forums went against nuclear disarmament and jeopardized the integrity of fundamental instruments in the field. China voted against the draft and pointed out that the moratorium on production was not clearly defined in the draft resolution, had no clear scope and wasvery difficult to verify. Having abstained from the vote, the following States delivered statements: • India reiterated that it would not join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. It abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 21 because the question of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons did not arise in the draft resolution. • Pakistan rejected the call on Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and expressed concern that the draft resolution sought only to address the non-proliferation aspect of fissile materials. • Egypt noted with concern the implications in the draft resolution that nuclear disarmament was a responsibility equally shared by non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States and that nuclear disarmament by nuclear- weapon States had global security preconditions, while non-nuclear-weapon States were called upon to undertake further obligations and commitments regardless of those same global security conditions. • Venezuela expressed its belief that the text diluted the commitments made by nuclear-weapon States concerning their obligation to pursue the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, with a view to achieving a world free of such military systems. • Mexico stressed that States also had an obligation to comply with international commitments without preconditions.
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• France said that it rejected language linking humanitarian consequences of nuclear-weapon use and nuclear disarmament, disagreeing that such an approach promoted nuclear-disarmament efforts. It also pointed out the absence of consensus on concepts such as unintended nuclear detonations. • Liechtenstein considered the formulation of operative paragraph 2 to still fall short of previous provisions that reaffirmed the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear- weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were committed. • Algeria was of the view that the draft’s weak language on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty did not reflect the previously agreed principles and commitments, a reversal of commitments made in past review conferences. • Ecuador expressed concern that the altered paragraphs of the previous year were retained, weakening the text and diminishing its ambition to seek the goal laid out in the title. It hoped that the following year’s draft resolution would encompass all aspects of and progress made in the area of nuclear disarmament, including the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. • The Republic of Korea argued that certain phrasing in the draft resolution relating to atomic bomb survivors could have been made more appropriate by fully taking into account all survivors, regardless of nationality. • Costa Rica expressed concern about long-term obligations and commitments on disarmament being dependent on global security conditions. It believed that the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could not go unnoticed and must be recognized as a fundamental instrument and a complementary part of the disarmament machinery.
73/64. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons The General Assembly noted continued efforts Submitted by: Malaysia (29 Oct.) towards realizing nuclear disarmament, including through the Secretary-General’s Agenda for GA vote: 138-32-17; 138-2-31, p.p. 9; Disarmament. The Assembly underlined once again 118-35-20, p.p. 17; 121-35-18, o.p. 2 the unanimous conclusion of the International Court (5 Dec.) of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue 1st Cttee vote: 131-31-19; 137-1-35, in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations p.p. 9; 118-34-23, p.p. 17; 120-34-22, leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects o.p. 2 (1 Nov.) under strict and effective international control. It See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 185–191. called once again upon all States to immediately engage in multilateral negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, including under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. First Committee. The following States voted in favour of the draft resolution and spoke afterwards:
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• China explained that it had voted against operative paragraph 2 owing to its view that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism. • Switzerland referred to its statement the previous year (see A/C.1/72/PV.27). After they abstained from voting, the following States took the floor: • India expressed disappointment at the dropping of references to the early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention based on modern nuclear weapons conventions. • Japan said that its position on the draft resolution in 2017 was still valid.
73/65. Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
The General Assembly welcomed the adoption Submitted by: Canada (18 Oct.) by consensus of the report of the High-level Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Expert Preparatory GA vote: 182-1-5 (5 Dec.) Group, (A/73/159) urged Member States to give 1st Cttee vote: 180-1-5 (1 Nov.) due consideration to the report and called upon the See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 192–196. Conference on Disarmament to fully examine the report and consider further action as appropriate. It also urged the Conference on Disarmament to carry out further expert work to elaborate on all relevant aspects of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to assess resource implications. The Assembly called upon future negotiators of such a treaty to take into account the work of the Expert Preparatory Group in conjunction with the work of the Group of Governmental Experts mandated in resolution 67/53 as appropriate, in their deliberations. First Committee. France, speaking also on behalf of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, took the floor for a general statement and said that they believed that the substantive work conducted to date in various forums was a sound basis for ongoing efforts on the issue and, in that regard, the five countries intended to support the draft resolution. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran stressed that an instrument on the issue should oblige all States without exception to completely end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as to declare and destroy all their stockpiles of such material, within a specified time frame in an irreversible and transparent manner, under strict international verification. Egypt, intending to abstain from voting, pointed out the avoidance in the draft of explicit references that would ensure that a future treaty would be negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament and that it would be non-discriminatory or verifiable. It reiterated that it would not accept a discriminatory treaty that did not include existing stockpiles. Having voted against the draft, Pakistan stated that a treaty banning the future production of fissile material would simply freeze the status quo to the strategic advantage of a select few. The following States abstained and explained their positions:
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• Israel reiterated its position that the notion of a treaty on the issue should be part of a new regional security architecture agreed upon by consensus, a prerequisite that was far from being fulfilled. • The Syrian Arab Republic asserted that the draft resolution should mention fissile material stockpiles and that a disarmament conference was the only correct forum within which to negotiate a treaty on fissile materials.
73/68. Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world The General Assembly called upon all States Submitted by: South Africa (18 Oct.) to acknowledge the catastrophic humanitarian consequences and risks posed by a nuclear-weapon GA vote: 136-36-14; 122-29-18, detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or p.p. 11 (5 Dec.) design, and it acknowledged the ethical imperatives 1st Cttee vote: 130-34-18; for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of 121-29-22, p.p. 11 (1 Nov.) achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 213–218. world, which was a “global public good of the highest order”, serving both national and collective security interests. The Assembly stressed that all States, with the support of all relevant stakeholders, shared an ethical responsibility to act with urgency and determination to take the effective measures, including legally binding measures, necessary to eliminate and prohibit all nuclear weapons, given their catastrophic humanitarian consequences and associated risks. First Committee. Before it voted against the draft resolution, the United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, said that creating and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons could not take place in isolation from international security concerns. They urged all States to commit to the continued success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to ensure compliance, promote universalization, ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation and respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges. Pakistan, intending to abstain from voting, expressed the need for a non-divisive approach towards nuclear disarmament based on the cardinal principle of attaining equal and undiminished security for all States. After the vote, the following States that abstained took the floor: • India stated that questions on the immorality of nuclear weapons had to be balanced by the sovereign responsibility of States to protect their people in a nuclearized global order assembled on the pillars of nuclear deterrence. • China said that overemphasizing humanitarian issues while ignoring other important factors associated with nuclear disarmament would not help to produce any tangible results from the nuclear disarmament process; rather, it would serve only to jeopardize the outcome and results that had already been achieved. • Japan said its position in 2017 on the draft resolution was still valid.
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73/70. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments
The General Assembly urged the co-sponsors Submitted by: South Africa (18 Oct.) of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early GA vote: 139-32-17; 139-1-33, p.p. 4; establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear 122-35-17, p.p. 12; 132-2-41, o.p. 13; weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. 162-4-8, o.p. 15; 122-36-15, o.p. 24 The Assembly noted with encouragement the (5 Dec.) dialogue and discussions held with the Democratic 1st Cttee vote: 134-31-18; 134-1-36, Peoples’ Republic of Korea and urged the country p.p. 4; 120-35-18, p.p. 12; 131-2-41, to fulfil its commitments. The States parties to the o.p. 13; 160-5-9, o.p. 15; 122-35-17, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were also urged to o.p. 24 (1 Nov.) move forward with urgency in implementing their See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 227–240. article VI obligations. The Assembly, furthermore, encouraged States parties to the Treaty to improve the measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. First Committee. Intending to abstain from voting, Canada said that, over the years, the draft resolution had moved increasingly further away from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After it voted in favour, Qatar noted that the draft resolution continued to welcome the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which it strongly opposed. Having voted against the draft resolution, the following States explained their positions: • The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, reiterated their opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. • India could not accept the call, contained in the draft, to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. • China argued that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons had eroded the authority of the existing multilateral disarmament negotiation mechanism. The following States abstained from voting and took the floor: • Pakistan expressed dismay at the call upon Pakistan in the draft to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State. • The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea considered unacceptable elements in the draft, such as the call for the country to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement.
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73/74. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons The General Assembly reiterated its request Submitted by: India (16 Oct.) to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an GA vote: 124-50-13 (5 Dec.) international convention prohibiting the use or threat 1st Cttee vote: 120-50-15 (1 Nov.) of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 253–255. and it requested the Conference to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations. First Committee. After they voted in favour, the following States spoke: • Pakistan stressed that the right of each State to security should be kept in mind at each stage of the disarmament process and that the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. • Ecuador expressed support for efforts aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons through the universalization of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. France voted against the draft resolution and stated that it rejected any interpretation of draft texts that indicates a link with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Having abstained from the vote, Thailand argued that, considering the risk of inadvertent or unauthorized detonation of nuclear weapons, the Conference on Disarmament must be more inclusive and democratic. It disagreed with the exclusion of a reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which it believed could be an effective approach to disarmament.
73/86. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty The General Assembly condemned in the Submitted by: Australia (12 Oct.) strongest terms the six nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since GA vote: 183-1-4; 167-0-11, p.p. 4; 2006 in violation of relevant Security Council 172-0-7, p.p. 7 (5 Dec.) resolutions and urged full compliance with the 1st Cttee vote: 181-1-4; 169-0-13, obligations under those resolutions, including that p.p. 4; 170-0-9, p.p. 7 (1 Nov.) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abandon See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 305–310. its nuclear weapons programme and not conduct any further nuclear tests. The Assembly noted with encouragement the statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea concerning a moratorium on nuclear tests and efforts towards the dismantlement of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site; reaffirmed its support for the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner; and welcomed all efforts and dialogue to that end, including the recent inter-Korean summits and the summit between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the Assembly urged all States that had not yet signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.
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First Committee. Intending to vote in favour, the following States spoke before the action on the draft resolution: • Egypt expressed its concern about the fourth preambular paragraph of the resolution, which referred to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016). • Pakistan reiterated its support for the objectives and purposes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although it would abstain in the voting on the seventh preambular paragraph. • The Islamic Republic of Iran noted with concern that nuclear-weapon States were modernizing and upgrading their nuclear-weapons systems by using new technologies and expressed regret that, in the draft, nuclear-weapon States were not called upon to refrain from such measures. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which intended to vote against the draft, affirmed its position on discontinuing nuclear tests while stating that it could not support a draft resolution that explicitly condemned its past such tests. After voting in favour, the following States took the floor: • Brazil expressed reservations over the references in the draft to Security Council resolution 2310 (2016) and the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty issued in September. • The Russian Federation pointed out that the United States had not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and had decided to bolster its nuclear infrastructure, which could lead to an early testing of nuclear weapons. • Israel stated that it was unable to support the language contained in the draft resolution. • Ecuador expressed regret that the draft resolution continued to reference Security Council resolution 2310 (2016). Having abstained from voting, the Syrian Arab Republic noted that the text of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty did not explicitly refer to the illegitimacy of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It added that the text did not include the fact that nuclear-weapon States needed to commit to eliminating their nuclear arsenals within a reasonable time frame.
73/513. Missiles (decision)
The General Assembly decided to include in Submitted by: Islamic Republic of the provisional agenda of its seventy-fifth session the Iran (6 Oct.) item entitled “Missiles”. GA vote: 174-2-7 (5 Dec.) First Committee. Before the voting, the United 1st Cttee vote: 166-2-9 (1 Nov.) States, which would vote against the draft, said that it considered hypocritical the attempt of the Islamic See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 324–325. Republic of Iran to assert leadership regarding the issue of preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Israel voted against the draft resolution, considering it inconceivable that the draft was sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran, which it said had violated
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the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and several Security Council resolutions and arms-control instruments on missile proliferation.
73/514. Nuclear disarmament verification (decision) The General Assembly, noting that the group Submitted by: Norway (15 Oct.) of governmental experts on nuclear disarmament verification had commenced its work, decided to GA vote: 181-0-2 (5 Dec.) include in the provisional agenda of its seventy- 1st Cttee vote: 177-0-3 (1 Nov.) fourth session, under the item entitled “General See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 326–327. and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.
Chapter II. Biological and chemical weapons 73/43. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol
The General Assembly called upon those Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf States that continued to maintain reservations to the of the States Members of the United Geneva Protocol to withdraw them and requested the Nations that are members of the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly Movement of Non-Aligned Countries at its seventy-fifth session an implementation report (8 Oct.) on the resolution. GA vote: 181-0-2 (5 Dec.) First Committee. After voting in favour of 1st Cttee vote: 178-0-2 (5 Nov.) the draft resolution, Belarus said that it considered important the measures provided for in the draft See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 70–71. resolution and would like to understand the reasons why two States continued to request a vote on the draft.
73/45. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
The General Assembly condemned in the Submitted by: Poland (9 Oct.) strongest possible terms that chemical weapons had since 2012 been used in Iraq, Malaysia, the GA vote: 152-7-22; 134-7-25, p.p. 4; Syrian Arab Republic and the United Kingdom and 122-13-26, o.p. 2; 122-13-30, o.p. 3; 112-18-35, o.p. 4; 110-15-38, o.p. 16 demanded that the perpetrators immediately desist (5 Dec.) from any further use of chemical weapons. The Assembly further expressed grave concern that, 1st Cttee vote: 148-7-23; 128-7-30, despite the verified destruction of all 27 chemical p.p. 4; 120-14-32, o.p. 2; 123-13-33, weapons production facilities declared by the o.p. 3; 113-19-34, o.p. 4; 112-15-39, Syrian Arab Republic, the Technical Secretariat of o.p. 16 (5 Nov.) the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 76–87. Weapons could not fully verify that the Syrian Arab Republic had submitted a declaration that could be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, with Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, or with the conclusion of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3—of the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention—that the
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Syrian Arab Republic failed to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. The Assembly underscored the importance of such full verification. First Committee. Intending to vote in favour of the draft resolution, the following States delivered statements before action on the draft: • Brazil expressed reservations regarding the language on decision C-SS-4/ DEC.3 of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which it believed did not contribute to galvanizing support for the draft resolution. • France said that the historic decision taken at The Hague on 27 June did not change the mandate of the OPCW or the Chemical Weapons Convention. It considered reasonable that, after verifying the use of chemical weapons, the OPCW should be able to attribute responsibility for such use. The following States against the draft resolution spoke before the voting: • The Syrian Arab Republic stated that the use of chemical weapons was immoral and unacceptable. It stressed that, as a member State of the OPCW, it was committed to implementing the provisions of the Executive Council, had met its obligations before the deadlines set and cooperated in OPCW investigations. It criticized the working methods of the OPCW–United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, calling its reports unprofessional and unscientific, and argued that the accusations against the country were fabricated. In its view, the draft resolution was politicized, with an unacceptable focus on the Syrian Arab Republic. • The Russian Federation expressed its belief that the draft resolution would undermine the OPCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention and would lead to the development of mechanisms controlled only by the West. • The Islamic Republic of Iran said that the draft aligned with specific political views of only one group of States parties, thereby polarizing the OPCW and attempting to shape its Technical Secretariat into a political organ rather than a technical implementation body. It believed that issues of a technical nature should be exclusively considered within the International Atomic Energy Agency. Before abstaining from voting, the following States took the floor: • Egypt explained that it could no longer support the draft resolution as its main supporters refrained from backing efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It said those countries argued that the region’s security conditions were not conducive to the establishment of such a zone, implying that the possession of nuclear weapons was legitimate until the security conditions changed. • Algeria expressed the view that focusing on a specific case in the draft resolution created an imbalance. It also disagreed with the inclusion in the draft both of issues contrary to the provisions of the Convention and of technical issues that should have been discussed in the OPCW forum. • Cuba said that it was not up to the General Assembly to validate the work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, about which several delegations
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had expressed legitimate concerns that should be addressed. It rejected the selective, biased and politically motivated approaches employed in implementing the Convention. • The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela noted that the selective manner in which the sponsors of the draft resolution addressed the issue was at variance with the main objective of the text: to promote and consolidate support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. The following States voted in favour of the resolution and explained their positions: • Indonesia expressed reservations regarding cases highlighted in the text that were based on incomplete findings or reports. It believed that the OPCW, as the only intergovernmental organization with the technical capability to conduct technical research or issue reports on the technical side of the chemical weapons issue, should not have been politicized. In its view, the resolution should address the issue of the responsibility of the only remaining possessor States in a more adequate manner. • Singapore condemned the use of chemical weapons, which it considered a grave violation of international law. It said that any proposal by the Director- General on the provision of technical expertise to States parties to identify perpetrators, organizers, sponsors and those otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons should involve inclusive and comprehensive consultations with States parties. • India stated that it was against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone and under any circumstances, and that the perpetrators of such abhorrent acts must be held accountable. • Malaysia pointed out that the special session of the Conference was not the appropriate venue for States parties to decide on matters that would affect the scope of the OPCW’s work and of the Convention. It reiterated the need to protect the OPCW from extraneous influences in the conduct of its work. • Viet Nam explained that it attached importance to complying with the obligations and mechanisms under the Chemical Weapons Convention. • The United States, speaking also on behalf of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, stressed that the draft resolution highlighted the grave concerns about chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic, Malaysia, Iraq and the United Kingdom. In their view, the draft resolution rightly recognized their collective view that such horrific acts were reprehensible and must end and that the perpetrators involved must be held accountable. • Japan expressed the view that in order to prevent the use of chemical weapons, perpetrators, including non-State actors, should be identified and held accountable. It said that, as a first step, a permanent international mechanism to identify perpetrators should be established.
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After voting against the draft resolution, China noted that, without full consultations, a vote had been forced in order to address a major issue surrounding the purposes and objectives of the Convention. It believed that the draft resolution should be resubmitted to the First Committee after being presented by the Chair of the OPCW Executive Council and adopted by consensus. Having abstained from voting, Kazakhstan, stated that it could not support the decision of the fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, especially in terms of creating an attribution mechanism.
73/87. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
The General Assembly noted with appreciation Submitted by: Hungary (23 Oct.) that the 2017 meeting of States parties to the Convention had been able to reach consensus on GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) matters concerning the intersessional programme, 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.) the purpose of the programme and the structure of See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 311-314. annual meetings. However, the Assembly noted with concern the financial situation of the Convention on account of, inter alia, systemic issues with the current funding arrangements and arrears in payment of assessed contributions. It requested the Chair of the 2018 meeting of States parties to prepare an information paper for review by States parties on measures to address financial predictability and sustainability. It called upon States parties to consider ways of addressing those serious issues as a matter of urgency. First Committee. In a general statement, India expressed satisfaction that the meeting of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention had successfully adopted by consensus an intersessional programme for 2018 to 2020. It looked forward to further constructive engagement until the ninth Review Conference in 2021. It reiterated its commitment to improving the effectiveness of the Convention and to strengthening implementation. In that regard, it highlighted the importance of ensuring both the stability and predictability of the Convention’s financial resources.
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Chapter III. Conventional weapons 73/36. The Arms Trade Treaty The General Assembly stressed the vital Submitted by: Latvia (29 Oct.) importance of the full and effective implementation of and compliance with all provisions of the Treaty GA vote: 151-0-29; 158-0-16, p.p. 8; by States parties and urged the States parties 138-0-33, o.p. 4; 134-2-35, o.p. 9 to meet their obligations under the Treaty. The (5 Dec.) Assembly encouraged further steps to enable States 1st Cttee vote: 151-0-30; 153-0-18, to increasingly prevent and tackle diversion of p.p. 8; 138-0-35, o.p. 4; 136-2-35, conventional arms and ammunition to unauthorized o.p. 9 (6 Nov.) end uses and end users. It also encouraged States See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 40–47. parties and signatory States to ensure the full and equal participation of women and men in pursuing the object and purpose of the Treaty and its implementation. The Assembly invited civil society, industry and relevant international organizations, in particular those that were underrepresented in Arms Trade Treaty processes, to engage further with States parties with the aim of ensuring the effective implementation and universalization of the Treaty. First Committee. Before it voted in favour of the draft, Israel stated that it did not consider the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons to be the right venue for considering the issue of ammunition. It therefore could not support language that welcomed the outcome document of the Programme’s third Review Conference. Before they abstained from voting, the following States explained their positions: • Egypt pointed out that the desire of some States to manipulate and politicize the legitimate arms trade had led to several shortcomings and loopholes in the Arms Trade Treaty, especially the lack of necessary definitions and clear criteria, making the implementation of the Treaty selective and subjective and allowing exporting States to abuse its provisions. In its view, the Treaty also completely ignored the prohibition of the intentional State-sponsored supply of weapons to unauthorized end users, including terrorists and illegal armed groups. • Armenia shared concerns that the Treaty may lead to political speculation related to the exercise of the sovereign right to self-defence, as well as hinder the legitimate access to relevant technologies. • In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Treaty was an instrument in which the political and commercial interests of certain arms-exporting countries had a higher priority than the observance of the fundamentals of international law. It considered the call upon non-parties to accede to the Treaty was unacceptable because the Treaty was not adopted by consensus. It added that it could not accept so-called synergies between the Programme of Action and the Treaty. • Cuba believed that the Arms Trade Treaty could not be effective if it did not prohibit arms transfers to unauthorized non-State actors, who were the main sources of illicit weapons trafficking. It rejected the creation of artificial
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synergies among legal instruments of different membership and scope and completely different categories of weapons. • The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela viewed the Arms Trade Treaty as imbalanced, both in nature and scope; therefore, it was susceptible to political manipulation and had inconsistencies that affected its universalization. Brazil voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole but abstained from the voting on operative paragraph 4, owing to the reference made to “synergies” between the Treaty and the Programme of Action. It believed that the use of the term was inadequate in light of, among other factors, the differences between the two instruments in nature and scope. The following States abstained from voting and delivered statements afterwards: • Indonesia said that it shared the spirit of the Treaty to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons but considered many elements in the Treaty to be unclear. • India explained that it continued to keep the Treaty under review from the perspective of a defence, security and foreign policy interest. • The United States, being opposed to the inclusion of language on ammunition in the final outcome document of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, rejected the language in the draft resolution that characterized the outcome of the Review Conference as a success when consensus on two paragraphs on a highly controversial issue had clearly not been achieved. • The Syrian Arab Republic stated that the most dangerous part of the Treaty was that some States, which repeatedly called for its adoption, provided terrorist groups with arms and ammunition.
73/51. Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms
The General Assembly encouraged Member Submitted by: Argentina (15 Oct.) States to establish or continue dialogues on confidence-building measures in the field of GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) conventional arms. Furthermore, the Assembly 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (6 Nov.) welcomed the adoption by the Disarmament See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 114–116. Commission in April 2017 of recommendations on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. It also noted that, in those recommendations, Member States were encouraged to exchange information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons at the bilateral, subregional, regional and international levels and to draw lessons learned from other mechanisms.
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73/52. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them
The General Assembly recalled the report Submitted by: Mali, on behalf of the of the third Review Conference of the Programme States Members of the United Nations of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. It that are members of the Economic encouraged the international community to support Community of West African States the implementation of the Economic Community of (15 Oct.) West African States Convention on Small Arms and GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. The Assembly also encouraged countries 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (6 Nov.) in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion to facilitate the See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 117–120. effective functioning of national commissions to combat the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and, in that regard, invited the international community to lend its support wherever possible.
73/53. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures
The General Assembly welcomed the ongoing Submitted by: Germany (15 Oct.) efforts of United Nations–mandated peacekeeping missions to include practical disarmament measures GA vote: w/o vote; 168-2-7, p.p. 9 aimed at addressing the illicit trafficking in small (5 Dec.) arms and light weapons, with a view to promoting 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote; 162-2-8, and implementing an integrated, comprehensive and p.p. 9 (8 Nov.) effective weapons-management strategy that would See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 121–125. contribute to a sustainable peacebuilding process and, in so doing, strive to achieve the goals set out in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. First Committee. Two States that voted against the ninth preambular paragraph delivered statements: • Before the vote, Israel said that it did not consider the Programme of Action to be the right venue for the issue of ammunition. Therefore, it could not support language that welcomed the outcome document of the third Review Conference. • After the vote, the United States pointed out that adding ammunition within the scope of the Programme of Action put the progress of its implementation at risk.
73/54. Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions
The General Assembly expressed strong Submitted by: Sri Lanka (16 Oct.) concern regarding the number of allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster GA vote: 144-1-38; 153-0-18, p.p. 14 munitions in various parts of the world, related (5 Dec.) civilian casualties and other consequences that 1st Cttee vote: 139-1-39; 152-0-17, impede the achievement of sustainable development. p.p. 14 (6 Nov.) The Assembly called upon States parties and See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 126–131. participating States to address issues arising from outstanding dues, including options to ensure sustainable financing for the meetings
304 Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter and prompt payment of respective shares of the estimated costs. It also decided to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy-fourth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”. First Committee. Egypt took the floor before the action on the draft resolution, during which it abstained from voting. In its view, the Convention lacked an equitable and clear definition of cluster munitions and had deliberately been designed to fit the specific production requirements of some States. After voting in favour of adopting the draft resolution, the delegations below explained their positions: • Singapore noted States’ legitimate security concerns and right of self-defence, pointing out that a blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions might run counter to that notion. • Referring to the language in the draft about the number of accessions to the Convention, Germany said that its vote should not be construed as its recognition of a State of Palestine. The following States abstained from voting and then took the floor: • Argentina stated its view that the Convention’s text was not sufficiently ambitious and that articles 2 and 21 were at odds with the goal of the total prohibition of cluster munitions and the principle of non-discrimination. • Brazil argued that the Convention allowed the use for an indefinite period of cluster munitions equipped with technologically sophisticated mechanisms, present in munitions manufactured by a very few countries. The effectiveness of the Convention was also undermined by the interoperability clause (article 21). • Poland, speaking also on behalf of Estonia, Finland, Greece and Romania, expressed their belief that humanitarian concerns must be balanced with the legitimate security concerns and the military and defence needs of States. They considered the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to be the most competent and effective framework for addressing the cluster munitions issue since it included the main producers, possessors and users, as well as non-users. • The Republic of Korea said that, owing to the unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, it was currently not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. • Pakistan was of the view that the multilateral framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was the most appropriate forum for addressing the cluster munitions issue. It considered cluster munitions to be legitimate weapons with recognized military utility. • Cyprus said that its ratification process for the Convention on Cluster Munitions was still ongoing owing to considerations related to the abnormal security situation on the island. • The United States disagreed that the Convention represented an emerging norm or prohibition in customary international law on the use of cluster
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munitions in armed conflict. It maintained that, when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions provided an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets. • The Islamic Republic of Iran said that it had not been part of the Convention’s negotiations, was not a signatory or a party and did not want to legitimize instruments negotiated outside the United Nations, as such instruments disregard the main security concerns and interests of many States.
73/61. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
The General Assembly requested the Submitted by: Afghanistan (2 Nov.) Secretary-General to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Fourth Review Conference GA vote: 169-0-16 (5 Dec.) of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and 1st Cttee vote: 154-0-17 (8 Nov.) called upon States parties and participating States See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 154–157. to address issues arising from outstanding dues and from recently implemented United Nations financial and accounting practices, and to proceed promptly with the payment of their share of the estimated costs. First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, Libya pointed out that the Convention did not call upon the former colonial powers to pay reparations for the damage caused by the anti-personnel mines that they had placed in other countries’ territories. It expressed the hope that the parties to the Convention would take into account that problem and create a mechanism that could assist affected countries. Egypt, which intended to abstain from voting, argued that the Convention did not establish any legal obligation on States to remove the anti-personnel mines that they had placed on the territory of other States, which made it impossible for many States to meet demining requirements on their own. After the vote, Germany spoke. It clarified that its affirmative vote should not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine. Numbers of accessions to the Convention were mentioned in the draft. The following States abstained and delivered statements afterwards: • Cuba said that, as the recipient of hostility and aggression from a military superpower, it could not renounce the use of mines to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. • The Islamic Republic of Iran noted that the Convention focused mainly on humanitarian concerns and did not take adequate account of the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for the responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territories. • Myanmar stated that relevant stakeholders in the country were studying the instrument, with the aim of signing it in the future. • The Republic of Korea clarified that, owing to the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, it was not currently a party to the Convention.
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73/67. Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices
Recognizing that existing approaches in Submitted by: Afghanistan (18 Oct.) multilateral arms regulation did not fully address the use of improvised explosive devices in conflict GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) and immediate post-conflict environments, 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (6 Nov.) the General Assembly strongly urged States to See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 203–212. promote awareness, vigilance and good practices among parties involved in the supply chain of materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices. The Assembly also urged States to increase attention to prevention and to provide support to reduce the risks posed by such devices in a manner that takes into consideration the different needs of women, girls, boys and men. It encouraged States to share information related to countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices and to continue to hold open, informal consultations, focusing on raising awareness, prevention and coordination within the United Nations system and beyond. First Committee. After the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the following States spoke: • Switzerland said that concerns about the humanitarian consequences of improvised explosive devices or their use did not depend on the status of actors or on their designation, such as whether an armed group was legal or illegal or if a State actor had used an improvised explosive device in an illicit manner. It also noted that all measures adopted to prevent or combat the use of improvised explosive devices must be in line with international law, as highlighted in the draft resolution. • Egypt expressed reservations on the fifteenth preambular paragraph, which, in its view, imposed language that largely undermined the draft’s value and could be interpreted as justifying terrorism and the use of improvised explosive devices by terrorists. • Pakistan stated that the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in particular its amended Protocol II, provided the most appropriate forum for considering the issue of improvised explosive devices. • The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed the view that preventing and combating the use of improvised explosive devices by terrorists and illegal armed groups was the exclusive purpose of the draft resolution. It then considered unacceptable that free access to and trade in equipment and goods for civilian uses be restricted. • Cuba stressed the importance of the scope of the draft resolution remaining limited to the use of such devices by terrorists, illegal armed groups and other unauthorized recipients and that the inherent right of States to legitimate self-defence be underscored. It expressed concern about the restrictions on transfers of dual-use components of improvised explosive devices, without acknowledging the legitimate right of States to have access to those commercial materials. • The Syrian Arab Republic said that it expected the sponsors of the draft resolution to take into account the concerns of countries, in particular because
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the main aim of the text was to prevent the possession and use by terrorists of improvised explosive devices or to stop groups from gaining experience that would help them produce such devices.
73/69. The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects
The General Assembly endorsed the outcome Submitted by: South Africa (18 Oct.) of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in GA vote: w/o vote; 176-2-1, p.p. 7; 2018, and decided to convene a one-week biennial 176-2-0, o.p. 6 (5 Dec.) meeting of States in 2020 to consider key challenges 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote; 173-2-1, and opportunities relating to the implementation p.p. 7; 174-2-1, o.p. 6 (6 Nov.) of the Programme of Action and the International See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 219–226. Tracing Instrument at the national, regional and global levels for the purposes of preventing and combating the diversion and the illicit international transfer of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients, as well as a one-week biennial meeting of States in 2022. First Committee. Before it voted against the draft, Israel stated that it did not consider the Programme of Action to be the right venue for considering the issue of ammunition. It therefore could not support language that welcomed the outcome document of the third Review Conference. After the vote, the following States in favour of the draft resolution spoke: • France recalled that the outcome document of the third Review Conference had been unanimously adopted and that all States represented at the First Committee had voted in favour of it. It said that the same should have been the case for the draft resolution. • The Syrian Arab Republic said that the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action had referred in its outcome document to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which contained only one objective related to arms that was generally worded. Noting that the third Review Conference had referred in its political declaration only to preventing the transfer or trafficking of such arms, it requested that such language be included when referring to preventing the transfer of small arms and light weapons to terrorists and unauthorized recipients. The United States voted against the draft resolution and explained that it opposed the inclusion of language on ammunition in the outcome document of the third Review Conference. As such, it could not accept language in the draft resolution that characterized the outcome of the Review Conference as a success when consensus on two paragraphs on a highly controversial issue was clearly not achieved.
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73/84. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
The General Assembly recalled decisions by Submitted by: United Kingdom the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the (18 Oct.) Convention in 2017, by which the Convention had, among others, called for a 10-day meeting in Geneva GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) in 2018 of the Group of Governmental Experts 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (6 Nov.) on lethal autonomous weapon systems, as well as See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 294–298. for the universalization and full implementation of Protocol III. The Assembly welcomed the adoption by consensus of the financial measures by all High Contracting Parties at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties in 2017 in response to the call to explore options to improve the financial situation and ways to ensure financial stability for the operation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols. It also welcomed the request to keep the measures under review in order to ensure the financial sustainability and the adequate and timely funding of the Convention. The Assembly underlined the vital role of the full and equal participation of women in decision-making and implementation of the Convention.
Chapter IV. Regional disarmament 73/26. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
The General Assembly called upon African Submitted by: Nigeria, on behalf States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of the States Members of the United that had not done so to conclude comprehensive Nations that are members of the Group safeguards agreements with the International of African States (15 Oct.) Atomic Energy Agency as required by the Treaty GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) of Pelindaba and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.) model protocol approved by the Board of Governors See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 1–2. of the Agency on 15 May 1997. First Committee. After the draft resolution was adopted, India conveyed its assurance that it would respect the status of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Spain, which had joined the consensus, said that the Treaty did not contain any provision, obligation, guarantee or safeguard in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that Spain had not already adopted for its entire national territory.
73/28. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East
The General Assembly called upon all Submitted by: Egypt (28 Sep.) countries of the region that had not yet done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to GA vote: 171-2-5 (5 Dec.) place all their nuclear activities under International 1st Cttee vote: 174-2-5 (1 Nov.) Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also requested See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 10–13. the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States and to seek their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to
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the report of the Secretary-General of 10 October 1990 (A/45/435) or other relevant measures in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. First Committee. In a general statement, the European Union, speaking also on behalf of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine, said that progress towards a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems was long overdue. They invited all parties to engage constructively in further efforts and dialogue to seek mutually acceptable solutions that would allow the convening of a meaningful conference on the establishment of such a zone. Before voting against the draft resolution, the United States stated that it could not continue to support the draft resolution while turning a blind eye to non-constructive efforts by the sponsors of the draft resolution and others in the Group of Arab States to advance a separate draft decision. After the vote, the following States, which had voted in favour, took the floor: • Australia said that it maintained its position on the draft resolution because the text had not significantly changed. • Israel clarified that, despite its deep reservations concerning the draft resolution, it voted in favour of the draft resolution for the sake of consensus. • The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was one of the first countries to call for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, when it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. • The Islamic Republic of Iran argued that the breaking of the three-decade consensus on the draft resolution by the United States exemplified the unilateralism, reckless behaviour and decisions of a nuclear-weapon State that had assumed international commitments and responsibility to undertake all necessary measures for a prompt implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. • France stated that it rejected any interpretation of draft texts that indicates a link with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The United Kingdom said that it had abstained from voting because it was clear that the draft resolution no longer had the support of all States of the region.
73/33. Regional disarmament
The General Assembly called upon States to Submitted by: Pakistan (2 Oct.) conclude, wherever possible, agreements for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence- GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) building measures at the regional and subregional 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) levels. The Assembly welcomed the initiatives See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 31–32. towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken at those levels, and it supported and encouraged efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures to ease regional tensions and further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation at the regional and subregional levels.
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73/34. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels The General Assembly recognized the Submitted by: Pakistan (2 Oct.) importance of equitable representation of women in arms control discussions and negotiations. It GA vote: 179-1-3; 128-2-43, o.p. 2 requested the Conference on Disarmament to (5 Dec.) consider the formulation of principles to serve as a 1st Cttee vote: 179-1-2; 127-2-45, framework for regional agreements on conventional o.p. 2 (8 Nov.) arms control and looked forward to the subsequent See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 33–36. report on the subject. It asked the Secretary-General, in the meantime, to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session. First Committee. After India voted against the draft resolution, it took the floor, saying that, in 1993, the United Nations Disarmament Commission by consensus adopted guidelines and recommendations for regional disarmament; therefore, the Conference on Disarmament did not need to formulate principles on the same subject at a time when it had other priorities.
73/35. Confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context
The General Assembly called upon Member Submitted by: Pakistan (2 Oct.) States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the purposes and principles of the GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) Charter of the United Nations. It also called upon 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) Member States to pursue confidence- and security- See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 37–39. building measures through sustained consultations and dialogue and urged States to strictly comply with all bilateral, regional and international agreements, including arms control and disarmament agreements to which they were party. The Assembly encouraged the promotion of bilateral and regional confidence-building measures.
73/44. Mongolia’s international security and nuclear- weapon-free status
The General Assembly welcomed the Submitted by: Mongolia (9 Oct.) declarations of 17 September 2012 by Mongolia and the five nuclear-weapon States on Mongolia’s GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete contribution 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.) to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 72–75. nuclear weapons and the enhancement of confidence and predictability in the region. First Committee. Before the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, the Philippines said that it recognized Mongolia’s landmark decision to announce its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. After the action on the draft resolution, India stated that it would respect Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.
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73/58. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
The General Assembly welcomed the Submitted by: Uzbekistan (11 Oct.) ratification of the Protocol to the Treaty ona Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) four nuclear-weapon States and called for early 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (1 Nov.) completion of the ratification process. It also See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 144–145. welcomed the convening of consultative meetings of States parties to the Treaty on 27 February 2015 in Bishkek.
73/71. Fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, 2020
The General Assembly decided to convene the Submitted by: Brazil, Mongolia fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (18 Oct.) and Mongolia in New York on 24 April 2020, inviting States Members and observer States of the United GA vote: 179-0-5 (5 Dec.) Nations that were States parties or signatories to the 1st Cttee vote: 171-0-6 (8 Nov.) treaties that established nuclear-weapon-free zones See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 241–244. and Mongolia to participate. The Conference would be aimed at promoting coordination and convergence in implementing the treaties and in strengthening the regime of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Assembly urged the States parties and signatories to develop activities of cooperation and coordination. First Committee. Before the vote, Morocco explained that it intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution with the understanding that participation in the fourth Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones was open only to United Nations Member States and observer States. After the vote, the following States that were in favour of the draft resolution delivered statements: • Algeria expressed its belief that the Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, like preceding conferences, should ensure the participation of all stakeholders, signatories and parties to conventions that had established nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as Mongolia, without any exception whatsoever. • Egypt said that the draft resolution clearly recognized the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties. In that connection, it expressed strong disagreement with the counterproductive interpretation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission’s 1999 guidelines expressed by some delegations, which had argued that all concerned States must approve the convening of a conference to negotiate such an agreement. • New Zealand noted that the language in operative paragraph 2 to establish relevant participation rights would have the unfortunate result of precluding two States from taking part in the Conference. • Cuba expressed regret over the removal of language referring to the proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace. Since not all States parties and signatories to the treaties that establish nuclear-
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weapon-free zones to the Conference were invited, it called on the Conference to reach an agreement during its preparatory process, in particular its adoption of the rules of procedure, that was satisfactory for all parties and allowed all States parties and signatories of the aforementioned treaties to participate in the Conference, without exclusion and on equal terms. Having abstained from voting, the United Kingdom took the floor and spoke also on behalf of France and the United States. In their view, it was contradictory to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that would be composed largely of the high seas while claiming, simultaneously, that it would be fully consistent with applicable principles and rules of international law, including the navigational rights and freedoms provided for in the international law of the sea.
73/75. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa The General Assembly noted with appreciation Submitted by: Nigeria, on behalf the tangible achievements of the Regional Centre of the States Members of the United and the impact of the assistance that it provided Nations that are members of the Group to African States to control small arms and light of African States (12 Oct.) weapons through capacity-building for national commissions on small arms and light weapons, GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) defence and security forces, and United Nations 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) peacekeeping mission personnel, as well as the See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 256–259. support that the Centre had provided to States in preventing the diversion of such weapons, in particular to non-State armed groups and terrorist groups.
73/76. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
The Assembly recognized that the Regional Submitted by: Peru, on behalf of the Centre had an important role in the promotion and States Members of the United Nations development of regional and subregional initiatives that are members of the Group of agreed upon by the countries of Latin America Latin American and Caribbean States and the Caribbean in the field of weapons of mass (17 Oct.) destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons, in the relationship between disarmament 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) and development, including the implementation of See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 260–263. the Sustainable Development Goals, in the promotion of the participation of women in that field and in strengthening voluntary confidence- building measures among the countries of the region.
73/77. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific Submitted by: Nepal (15 Oct.) The General Assembly took note of the report of the Secretary-General (A/73/126) and expressed GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) its appreciation to the Regional Centre for its 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) important work in promoting confidence-building See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 264–266. measures through the organization of meetings,
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conferences and workshops in the region, including the sixteenth United Nations– Republic of Korea Joint Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues and the twenty-seventh United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues.
73/78. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
The General Assembly welcomed the adoption Submitted by: Cameroon, Congo by the Standing Advisory Committee of the Kigali (23 Oct.) Declaration on the Reform of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and urged the States GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) members of the Standing Advisory Committee and 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) the international community to provide technical See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 267–275. and financial support to accelerate the reform of the Council. The Assembly encouraged the Economic Community of Central African States and the Economic Community of West African States to work together towards the implementation of the Lomé Declaration on Peace, Security, Stability and the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism.
73/80. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf The General Assembly commended the three of the States Members of the United regional centres for peace and disarmament for their Nations that are members of the sustained support provided to Member States for over Movement of Non-Aligned Countries 30 years in implementing disarmament, arms control (11 Oct.) and non-proliferation activities through seminars and conferences, capacity-building and training, GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) policy and technical expertise, and information and 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) advocacy at the global, regional and national levels. See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 279–281.
73/83. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East The General Assembly stressed that the Submitted by: Egypt, on behalf of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 States Members of the United Nations Review and Extension Conference on the Nuclear that are members of the League of Non-Proliferation Treaty was an essential element Arab States (18 Oct.) of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty had been indefinitely GA vote: 158-6-21; 168-3-4, p.p. 5; 167-3-4, p.p. 6 (5 Dec.) extended without a vote in 1995. It reiterated that the resolution would remain valid until its goals 1st Cttee vote: 158-5-21; 170-4-4, and objectives had been achieved and called for p.p. 5; 171-3-5, p.p. 6 (1 Nov.) immediate steps towards the full implementation of See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 288–293. the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole, Pakistan said that it was not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was therefore not bound by any of its provisions nor to the conclusions or recommendations emanating from its various review conferences; accordingly, it would vote against the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs.
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The United States, which spoke before voting against the draft, explained that pursuing politically motivated resolutions aimed solely at singling out one State in good standing would in no way advance the shared goal of a safer and more secure Middle East. The following States voted in favour of the draft resolution as a whole and explained their positions: • Switzerland expressed its reservations, noting that the draft resolution referred to only one dimension of the nuclear proliferation risk in the region and continued to single out one State. • The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea commented that operative paragraph 16 contained some elements that were unacceptable, such as adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement. • The Syrian Arab Republic pointed out that it was one of the first countries to call for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, on its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. • The Islamic Republic of Iran said that the draft resolution reflected the concern of the solid majority of States that the Israeli regime, as the only non-party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Middle East, represented the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region. The text recognized the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as an important measure to enhance peace and security in the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran fully supported operative paragraphs 5 and 6. Having voted against the draft resolution, Israel noted that the submission of the draft resolution was an unfortunate attempt to divert the First Committee’s attention away from the real proliferation challenges facing the Middle East. After abstaining from the vote, the following States took the floor: • India disagreed with the call to those States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to it and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. It believed that such a call did not reflect current realities. • Australia said that it maintained its position on the two long-standing Middle East draft resolutions (later adopted as resolutions 73/28 and 73/83).
73/85. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region
The General Assembly reaffirmed that security Submitted by: Algeria (15 Oct.) in the Mediterranean was closely linked to that of Europe as well as to international peace and security. It GA vote: 181-0-2; 169-2-3, o.p. 2; 168-2-3, o.p. 5 (5 Dec.) called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally 1st Cttee vote: 171-0-2; 166-2-1, negotiated legal instruments in force related to the o.p. 2; 165-2-2, o.p. 5 (8 Nov.) field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 299–304. Assembly encouraged all States of the region to
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strengthen confidence-building measures by promoting openness and transparency on all military matters by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. First Committee. In a general statement, the European Union underlined that the proposed reference to legal instruments in force did not imply a change to its long-standing position in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It believed that, as long as the Treaty had not entered into force, on-site inspections could not be used. In its view, only the Treaty’s entry into force would verifiably outlaw nuclear-weapon-test and any other nuclear explosions. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution, France stated that it rejected any interpretation of draft texts that indicates a link with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Israel, explaining before the vote that it intended to abstain, noted that no mention was found in the draft about the ongoing actions of the Iranian regime such as the use of chemical weapons and missile proliferation. Regarding operative paragraph 5, Israel believed that joining arms control treaties should not be a sole aim or goal, because those were useless if countries do not abide by them or if they do not actually solve regional issues. The Islamic Republic of Iran explained before the vote that it would not participate in the action of the First Committee and General Assembly on the draft resolution as a whole. In its view, the draft did not factually reflect the realities in the region and the situation in the occupied territories, including the continued crisis in the occupied territories of Palestine. After voting in favour, the following States spoke: • The Syrian Arab Republic expressed the view that those who voted in favour of the draft resolution respected international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. • Algeria reaffirmed the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It said that operative paragraph 5 represented a call on all States of the region to accede to international instruments on disarmament.
73/511. Maintenance of international security — good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (decision)
The General Assembly decided to include in Submitted by: The former Yugoslav the provisional agenda of its seventy-fifth session the Republic of Macedonia (8 Nov.) item entitled “Maintenance of international security — GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe”. 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 321–321.
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73/546. Convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (decision)
The General Assembly decided to entrust to Submitted by: Egypt, on behalf of the the Secretary-General the convening, no later than States Members of the United Nations 2019 for one week at United Nations Headquarters, that are members of the League of of a conference on the establishment of a Middle Arab States (18 Oct.) East zone free of nuclear weapons and other GA vote: 88-4-75 (22 Dec.) weapons of mass destruction, to which all States of the Middle East, the three co-sponsors of the 1st Cttee vote: 103-3-71 (1 Nov.) resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 328–330. Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the light of their responsibility for the implementation of that resolution, the other two nuclear-weapon States and the relevant international organizations should be invited. With the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as its terms of reference, the conference should aim at elaborating a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region. The Assembly also provided that all decisions emanating from the conference should be taken by consensus by the States of the region. First Committee. Before voting in favour, the following States took the floor: • The Russian Federation said that it was prepared to make additional proposals on the issue, which it considered very important. • Pakistan explained that their support stemmed from the fact that the proposal to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had been the subject of numerous General Assembly resolutions and that all parties directly concerned had expressed their support for the concept. • The Philippines stated that it opposed any use of the draft decision as a platform to question or criticize any Middle Eastern State’s sovereign decision to abide or not to abide with the draft decision. Intending to vote against the draft decision, the United States stated that it could not continue to support the draft resolution while turning a blind eye to non-constructive efforts by the sponsors of the draft resolution and others in the Group of Arab States to advance a separate draft decision, which would abandon cooperative consensus-based principles. It stressed that all arrangements and modalities for negotiating such a zone in any region must be mutually agreed upon among all States of the region concerned. It added that the annual United Nations–led process put forward in the draft text would be resource-intensive, operating on an arbitrary timeline and be based on terms and modalities that Arab States knew to be completely unacceptable to Israel. Before abstaining, Canada said that the only conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction worth having was an effective one, based on a legitimate process and requiring that all States in the region be present.
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After the vote, the following States that were in favour of the draft decision explained their positions: • The Russian Federation pointed out that, if the positive appeals of the Arab States were to be disregarded, then the issue would never even come close to being resolved, which would undermine the entire review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. • The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first countries to call for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, when it acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969. It believed that Israel was a threat and danger in the Middle East. • The Islamic Republic of Iran viewed the adoption of the draft decision as a reaffirmation that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Israeli regime posed a serious threat to the security of the Middle East, as well as to the non-proliferation regime. Israel, which had voted against the draft decision, argued that the Arab Group had altered the status quo. It stated that, from now on, it would not cooperate with initiatives on regional arms control. In its view, the Arab Group was interested in creating another platform to single out Israel, “imposing on” rather than “discussing with”, involving third parties rather than direct parties and using an open-ended approach rather than an inclusive approach, After abstaining, the following spoke: • Austria, speaking also on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Norway, the Republic of Moldova, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine, expressed concern over the open-ended proposal’s long-term financial implications and viability. They believed the Action Plan in the outcome document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the most promising basis on which to proceed. • India said that it had been constrained to abstain in the voting as the draft decision did not enjoy the support of all States of the region. • Brazil noted that the draft resolution aimed to create a process that was parallel to the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that its parameters were not based on consensus at all stages of the process. • Argentina stated that the participation of all States involved was a fundamental condition to achieving the broad consultation and consensus necessary. • Switzerland considered having an inclusive process with the participation of all States of the region to be necessary to achieve progress on the issue. It questioned whether the approach chosen in the draft decision could provide for such inclusiveness. It also noted the significant financial resources required to implement such an approach with a highly uncertain outcome. • Australia explained that it had abstained in the voting, as the draft decision did not have consensus support from all States of the region.
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• The United Kingdom pointed out that the draft decision clearly did not have the agreement of all States of the region. It argued that the draft was designed to single out and isolate one particular State. It added that the draft decision made no attempt to address the long-term financial implications and viability of the open-ended proposal. • New Zealand urged all relevant parties to work together to arrive at a feasible and durable approach that offered the real prospect of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction applicable to all States in the region. • Japan believed that, if any conference on the matter was to be held, it was vital to ensure that all States of the Middle East and the three co-conveners of the 1995 resolution participate. It called for reducing the cost related to such a conference by effectively utilizing the existing human and document resources. • Turkey voiced its concern that the process foreseen in the draft decision would not yield an effective outcome.
Chapter V. Emerging, cross-cutting and other issues 73/27. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
The General Assembly welcomed international Submitted by: Russian Federation rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour (8 Nov.) of States (as listed in the resolution) that were GA vote: 119-46-14 (5 Dec.) enshrined in the 2013 and 2015 reports of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 1st Cttee vote: 109-45-16 (8 Nov.) Field of Information and Telecommunications in See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 3–9. the Context of International Security (A/68/98 and A/70/174). The Assembly called upon Member States to promote further the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible strategies to address emerging threats. Furthermore, the Assembly decided to convene, beginning in 2019—with a view to making the United Nations negotiation process on security in the use of information and communications technologies more democratic, inclusive and transparent—an open-ended working group acting on a consensus basis to, inter alia, continue to further develop the above- mentioned rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour and the ways for their implementation. First Committee. In a general statement, Cuba stated that the Russian Federation’s proposal was the only one that adequately addressed the concerns of the international community in the area of cybersecurity and that facilitated multilaterally negotiated consensus-based solutions. It reiterated the need for urgent action agreed within the United Nations to prevent the misuse of the information systems of other countries to attack third countries, given their potential for causing international conflict. Before they voted in favour of the draft resolution, the following States explained their positions:
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• Egypt stated that what had already been achieved by previous Groups of Governmental Experts on the subject should be considered. In its view, the Groups that had been established on cybersecurity since 2004 had already put forward valuable recommendations, and yet efforts towards the codification of such recommendations or towards utilizing them as a basis for binding rules continued to be strongly resisted. • Armenia underlined that it attached high priority to the protection of human rights and freedom of speech in the process of combating the use of information and communications technology for malicious purposes. • Algeria expressed the view that the draft resolution outlined a more appropriate approach to tackle cybersecurity issues through an open-ended working group that would allow all States to take part in negotiations, so that all could express their concerns. • The Syrian Arab Republic appreciated the establishment of an open-ended working group, emphasizing that it was time to discuss the security, development and growth of such a vital topic as part of a transparent process based on consensus. Intending to vote against the draft resolution, the following States spoke before voting: • The United States expressed regret that Russia had chosen to depart from a consensus-driven approach, advancing a draft text that continued to contain a number of unacceptable flaws. The United States said that it could not accept the language on States’ internal affairs, which was not consistent with full respect for freedom of expression and the free flow of information online. Furthermore, it explained that the Russian Federation’s cherry-picking and re-wording of texts from past reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on the subject, included in operative paragraph 1, omitted essential elements of the framework for international cyberstability, which would have negative ramifications. Finally, the United States underlined that the Russian Federation’s departure from consensus threatened to create an unnecessary and potentially counterproductive duplication of work within the United Nations system. • Austria, speaking also on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, explained their reservations about the text, which, in their view, supported the assertion that cyberspace was ungoverned; undermined the universally agreed position that existing international law applied in cyberspace; weakened joint commitments to the agreed norms of responsible State behaviour and allowed those norms to be challenged; and gave undue prominence to the sovereignty of States, which risked online freedoms by increasing the ability of States to control access to and content of domestic Internet use. • Australia stated that the draft resolution included selected and fragmented excerpts from past reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on the issue and that the selective recollection distorted past agreements and undermined their status as consensus documents. Furthermore, it said that it
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welcomed broad participation in discussions, yet argued that it would be very difficult to achieve consensus in an open-ended working group. • Canada, speaking also on behalf of Australia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, explained that it could no longer endorse the draft resolution because the draft presented selected and incomplete excerpts from the past reports of the Group of Governmental Experts, which deliberately distorted their meaning and undermined their status as the consensus-normative basis from which to move forward. It argued that the basic premise for pursing work under the draft resolution was flawed and risked destroying hard-won international consensus. After the following States voted in favour of the draft resolution, they delivered statements: • China drew attention to the necessity to further strengthen the relevant United Nations approach to make it more open and inclusive. • Bangladesh underscored the complementarity between the draft resolutions (later adopted as resolutions 73/27 and 73/266) and pointed out that their follow-up should be mutually reinforcing and coherent. • Singapore stated it had endorsed both draft resolutions because, in its view, both initiatives were meaningful. It asserted that the United Nations, as the only universal multilateral forum, had a fundamental role to play in the development of rules, norms and principles for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Singapore noted that an open-ended working group and a group of governmental experts were not fundamentally incompatible, expressing the hope that both groups would be able to work together in a complementary manner. • India explained that it supported the draft’s general objectives, including the establishment of an open-ended working group. However, it expressed its concerns regarding inconsistencies in the use of terms. • Indonesia said that the creation of groups of governmental experts allowed such experts to have intensive and open dialogue on various contentious points. It also explained that it was a strong proponent of multilateralism and favoured discussing contentious issues in open forums. It therefore viewed the mechanisms recognized in the two draft resolutions to be complementary. • Malaysia expressed its hope that both the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group would complement each other and had therefore supported them both. • The Philippines noted that the deletion of references to the code of conduct of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization had brought the mandate between the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group closer together. It said that the United States and the Russian Federation should make the two groups complementary, avoiding any redundancy as much as possible. • Belarus was of the view that only a multilateral and broad approach to establishing a group would allow responding to security threats in a comprehensive manner.
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Japan, which had voted against the draft resolution, expressed its belief that the approaches put forward in the two draft resolutions (later adopted as resolutions 73/27 and 73/266) should be merged in a constructive and cooperative way at some point in the future. Having abstained from voting, Switzerland said that the references in operative paragraph 1 to international norms, rules and principles for the responsible behaviour of States were taken out of context, selectively chosen and incomplete. It also expressed reservations about an open-ended working group that aimed to enhance the understanding of the norms, rules and principles already agreed upon by previous Groups of Governmental Experts, which could jeopardize the gradual progress that had been achieved in those expert groups.
73/30. Prevention of an arms race in outer space
The General Assembly took note of the Submitted by: Egypt, Sri Lanka decision of the Conference on Disarmament to (25 Sep.) establish for its 2018 session a subsidiary body on GA vote: 178-2-0 (5 Dec.) the prevention of an arms race in outer space and invited the Conference to establish a working group 1st Cttee vote: 181-2-1 (5 Nov.) under its agenda item entitled “Prevention of an arms See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 19–23. race in outer space” as early as possible. First Committee. The following delivered general statements: • Egypt expressed the hope that the proposals related to outer space would be adopted by consensus in future sessions of the First Committee and that negotiations on a legally binding and comprehensive treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space would commence in the near future. • Cuba said that it rejected the weaponization of outer space and expressed the need to strengthen and build upon the current legal regime to prevent an arms race in outer space. • The Russian Federation stressed its commitment to preventing an arms race in outer space. It noted that space was an area for peaceful purposes, not for opposition and conflict. Japan, which had voted in favour of the draft resolution, affirmed its support to preserving the long-term safety, sustainability, security and stability of outer space. It stressed the importance of developing transparency and confidence-building measures for actors in space. The United States voted against the draft resolution and said that it opposed the linkage between proposals for voluntary pragmatic transparency and confidence- building measures and the commencement of negotiations on fundamentally flawed proposals for legally binding space arms control measures.
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73/31. No first placement of weapons in outer space
The General Assembly reiterated that the Submitted by: Russian Federation Conference on Disarmament had the primary role (16 Oct.) in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements on the prevention of an arms race in GA vote: 128-12-40 (5 Dec.) outer space in all its aspects. It urged an early start 1st Cttee vote: 129-12-40 (5 Nov.) of substantive work based on the updated draft treaty See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 24–27. on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects introduced by China and the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament. The Assembly stressed that, while such an agreement had not yet been concluded, other measures could contribute to ensuring that weapons were not placed in outer space. First Committee. The following States delivered general statements: • Egypt stressed that, given the fragility and volatility of the outer space environment, the United Nations should resolve to address the alarming threat to the strategic domain. • Cuba pointed out that an arms race in outer space would pose a serious threat to international peace and security and that the international community should reject it. It supported the urgent adoption of a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. • The Russian Federation stressed its commitment to preventing an arms race in outer space. It noted that space was an area for peaceful purposes, not for opposition and conflict. Mexico spoke before it voted in favour, clarifying that its support for the draft resolution was not an endorsement or an acceptance of an alleged right to place weapons in outer space or to launch them from Earth if another State was the first to do so or in response to an attack. Before voting against the draft resolution, the United States, speaking also on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, expressed their belief that the no-first- placement initiative contained several significant problems: the initiative did not adequately define what constituted a weapon in outer space; the initiative contained no effective verification features to measure a State’s political commitment notto be the first to place weapons in outer space; and the draft’s reference to shapinga “community of shared future for humankind” targeted a domestic political audience that had no place in multilateral documents. In their view, the draft resolution failed to address the near-term threat from other types of anti-satellite weapons. Intending to abstain from voting, Austria delivered a statement on behalf of the European Union, as well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, Republic of Moldova, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. In the statement, they noted that the no-first-placement initiative did not define what a weapon in outer space was. They expressed their concern about and called for prompt action on the continued development of anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including terrestrially based systems. After the vote, the following States in favour of the draft resolution took the floor:
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• India clarified that the no-first-placement of weapons in outer space was only an interim step and not as a substitute for substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space. • The Islamic Republic of Iran said that its explanation of vote from the previous year remained valid. The following States abstained from the vote and delivered statements to explain their positions: • Switzerland expressed regret that the draft resolution did not address concerning issues such as the development, including testing, of ground- based weapon systems and the possible second placement of weapons in outer space. • Speaking also on behalf of the Republic of Korea and Norway, Canada underlined that the draft resolution did not adequately address the issue of what exactly constituted a weapon in outer space. It was not convinced that a no-first-placement pledge would be effectively verifiable and argued that the threat of ground-based weapons that were being developed and tested was not addressed in the draft resolution. • Japan shared the views that the draft resolution did not adequately define what constituted a weapon in outer space, that the no first placement pledge would not be verifiable and that the draft resolution was focused solely on space-based weapons, neglecting the threat of anti-satellite weapons, including those terrestrially based.
73/32. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament
The General Assembly called upon Member Submitted by: India (30 Oct.) States to remain vigilant in understanding new and emerging developments in science and technology GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) that could imperil international security, and it 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) underlined the importance of Member States See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 28–30. engaging with experts from industry, the research community and civil society in addressing that challenge. It encouraged the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to continue its discussions on current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts. The Assembly requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research to convene a one-day focused informal seminar in 2019 on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament to facilitate dialogue on developments in science and technology and their impact. First Committee. Before joining consensus, the United Kingdom took the floor, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States. In the statement, they supported the need to remain closely informed about recent scientific and technological developments and to regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies for peaceful uses in order to address the risk of proliferation by States or non-State actors. After action on the draft resolution, the following States delivered statements:
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• Brazil said that it had hoped for a reference in the draft resolution to the right of States to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use technologies for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international obligations. It explained that it accepted the more balanced, though far from ideal, formulation contained in the fifth preambular paragraph. • Pakistan pointed out that proliferation concerns should not become a pretext for denying dual-use technologies, even in instances where recipient States stood ready to provide non-diversion assurances. It explained that such denial was often based on political grounds, with non-proliferation only a secondary consideration. • The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the draft resolution was acceptable inasmuch as it was in line with its Constitution, laws, regulations and administrative procedures. It also noted that, in regulating transfers of dual-use and high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes, the concerns and interests of all States, in particular their legitimate defence requirements, had to be taken into account, which it believed could be ensured only through an inclusive and transparent process leading to the development of a set of multilaterally negotiated and universally applicable non-discriminatory guidelines. • Egypt associated itself with the explanation of votes delivered by Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, reiterating that proliferation concerns should not become a pretext for denying dual-use technologies.
73/37. Relationship between disarmament and development
The General Assembly reiterated its invitation Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf to Member States to provide the Secretary-General of the States Members of the United with information regarding measures and efforts to Nations that are members of the devote part of the resources made available by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries implementation of disarmament and arms limitation (8 Oct.) agreements to economic and social development, GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries. 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) First Committee. The United Kingdom, See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 48–50. speaking also on behalf of France before joining the consensus, questioned the idea of an automatic link between disarmament and development. They believed that the conditions conducive to effective arms control and disarmament were not necessarily dependent only on development, as seen with the growing military expenditure of some developing countries. After the adoption of the draft resolution without a vote, the United States expressed the view that disarmament and development were two distinct issues. Armenia spoke after action on the draft resolution, drawing the attention of Non-Aligned Movement States members to the fact that the negotiation process for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was taking place within the only internationally agreed and mandated format—namely, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group co-chairmanship, comprising France, the Russian Federation and the United States. Armenia registered its reservation with
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regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution on the relationship between disarmament and development.
73/38. Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium
The General Assembly encouraged Member Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf States in a position to do so to provide assistance to of the States Members of the United States affected by the use of arms and ammunitions Nations that are members of the containing depleted uranium, in particular in Movement of Non-Aligned Countries identifying and managing contaminated sites and (8 Oct.) material. GA vote: 151-4-25 (5 Dec.) First Committee. Belgium, in its speech before 1st Cttee vote: 140-4-26 (8 Nov.) it voted in favour of the draft resolution, expressed its hopes that the draft resolution would contribute to See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 51–54. a better understanding, at the international level, of the possible effects of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium so that an agreement could be reached on the issue. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following took the floor: • The Netherlands stressed that different studies on depleted uranium of the past 20 years had strong contrasting results. • Speaking also on behalf of Sweden, Switzerland noted that their explanation of vote in 2016 (see A/C.1/71/PV.25) remained valid. Having voted against the draft resolution, the United Kingdom, also speaking on behalf of France and the United States, said that the environmental and long-term health effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions had been thoroughly investigated by various organizations, and that none had documented long-term environmental or health effects attributable to use of those munitions.
73/39. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control
The General Assembly called upon States to Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral of the States Members of the United measures to contribute to ensuring the application Nations that are members of the of scientific and technological progress within the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries framework of international security, disarmament (8 Oct.) and other related spheres without detriment to GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development. It invited all 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) Member States to communicate to the Secretary- See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 55–56. General the measures they had adopted and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly’s seventy-fourth session. First Committee. Before the draft was adopted by consensus, the United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France, rejected the notion of a direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.
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After the action on the draft resolution, the United States also rejected the existence of a direct connection between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.
73/41. Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation
The General Assembly reaffirmed Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf multilateralism as the core principle in disarmament of the States Members of the United and non-proliferation negotiations and called once Nations that are members of the again upon all Member States to renew and fulfil Movement of Non-Aligned Countries their individual and collective commitments to (8 Oct.) multilateral cooperation as an important means of GA vote: 128-4-52 (5 Dec.) pursuing and achieving their common disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. It requested the 1st Cttee vote: 121-4-51 (8 Nov.) Secretary-General to seek the views of Member See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 63–66. States on the issue and to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session. First Committee. In a general statement, France stated that it rejected any interpretation of draft texts that indicates a link with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
73/46. Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control
The General Assembly reaffirmed the Submitted by: Trinidad and Tobago Sustainable Development Goals relevant to the (9 Oct.) promotion of women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and acknowledged that the success GA vote: w/o vote; 149-0-23, p.p. 10 (5 Dec.) of efforts to achieve sustainable development and disarmament depended on the full and effective 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote; 149-0-23, inclusion of women in all aspects of those efforts. p.p. 10 (8 Nov.) It also recognized the important role played by See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 88–91. civil society organizations in promoting the role of women in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. First Committee. Before the vote, Egypt explained that, given its reservations about the Arms Trade Treaty, it would abstain in the voting on the tenth preambular paragraph. After the adoption of the draft resolution, as a whole, by consensus, the following States took the floor: • The United States underscored that the 2030 Agenda was non-binding and did not create or affect rights or obligations under international law; nor did it create any new financial commitments. • The Islamic Republic of Iran wished to put on record that it accepted the draft resolution inasmuch as it was in line with its Constitution, laws, regulations and administrative procedures.
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73/55. Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
The General Assembly called upon Member Submitted by: India (16 Oct.) States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) destruction and their means of delivery. It appealed 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.) to all Member States to consider early accession to See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 132–135. and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and encouraged States parties to the Convention to review its implementation.
73/63. Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities The General Assembly welcomed efforts to Submitted by: Australia, Republic of implement the Programme of Action on Small Arms Korea (17 Oct.) and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, including the holding of mandated GA vote: 185-1-2; 157-0-19, p.p. 9 meetings to review their implementation and the (5 Dec.) submission by Member States of national reports. It 1st Cttee vote: 177-1-2; 149-0-20, also welcomed the technical guidance and capacity- p.p. 9 (6 Nov.) building assistance provided by the International See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 180–184. Atomic Energy Agency to enhance nuclear security globally. First Committee. Before voting in favour of the draft resolution as a whole and abstaining on the ninth preambular paragraph, Cuba expressed its reservations regarding the ninth preambular paragraph and pointed out that the reference to the Arms Trade Treaty, which had not been adopted by consensus, should be omitted. It also welcomed the changes made to the fifteenth preambular paragraph, which recognized the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security. Egypt, speaking before it abstained on the ninth preambular paragraph and on the draft resolution as a whole, explained that it had reservations regarding the Arms Trade Treaty. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, India explained that it had abstained in the voting on the ninth preambular paragraph because of the reference to the Arms Trade Treaty, to which India was not a party. Indonesia, which had abstained from voting on the draft resolution as a whole and on the ninth preambular paragraph, said that many elements contained in the Arms Trade Treaty still needed to be further clarified.
73/66. Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources Submitted by: France, Germany The General Assembly urged all States to (18 Oct.) work towards following the guidance contained in GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) the non-legally binding International Atomic Energy Agency Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (5 Nov.) of Radioactive Sources, including the supplementary See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 197–202.
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Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, and encouraged Member States to notify the Director-General of the Agency of their intention to do so. The Assembly decided to convene a joint half-day panel discussion of the Assembly’s First and Fourth Committees to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability. First Committee. Before action on the draft resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran said that it had encouraged the sponsors of the draft resolution to avoid including technical matters in the draft that should be exclusively considered within the International Atomic Energy Agency.
73/72. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities
With a view to promoting the practical Submitted by: China, Russian implementation of transparency and confidence- Federation (30 Oct.) building measures, the General Assembly encouraged Member States to hold regular GA vote: 180-2-1 (5 Dec.) discussions in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 1st Cttee vote: 176-2-2 (5 Nov.) of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 245–249. the Conference on Disarmament on the prospects for their implementation. It called upon Member States and the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system to support the implementation of the full range of conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities. First Committee. Several general statements were delivered: • Egypt stressed that, given the fragility and volatility of the outer space environment, the United Nations should resolve to address the alarming threat to the strategic domain. • Cuba said that it rejected the weaponization of outer space and expressed the need to strengthen and build upon the current legal regime to prevent an arms race in outer space. • The Russian Federation stressed its commitment to preventing an arms race in outer space. It noted that space was an area for peaceful purposes, not for opposition and conflict. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following States took the floor: • Japan affirmed its support to preserving the long-term safety, sustainability, security and stability of outer space. It stressed the importance of developing transparency and confidence-building measures for actors in space. • The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirmed its explanation of vote expressed the previous year, which remained valid. The United States voted against the draft resolution but expressed its long-standing support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities, including those contained in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the issue. It called for all space-faring nations to begin
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the practical implementation of the 21 guidelines, endorsed by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
73/266. Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security
The General Assembly called upon Member Submitted by: United States (18 Oct.) States to be guided in their use of information and communications technologies by the 2010, 2013 and GA vote: 138-12-16 (22 Dec.) 2015 reports of the Group of Governmental Experts 1st Cttee vote: 139-11-18 (8 Nov.) on Developments in the Field of Information and See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 315–320. Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and to support the implementation of cooperative measures identified in those reports. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be established in 2019, proceeding from the assessments and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned reports, to continue to study, with a view to promoting common understandings and effective implementation, possible cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security. First Committee. Intending to vote in favour of the draft resolution, the following States explained their positions beforehand: • The United States clarified that its proposal was built on the success of the productive process of convening a Group of Governmental Experts on the subject, sought to advance those negotiations and made significant steps towards a more inclusive process. • Armenia underscored the significance of enhanced coordination and cooperation among States in addressing the misuse of information and communications technology. • Australia believed that the draft resolution was effective in broadening consultation and inviting more people to participate in such consultations. Before voting against the draft resolution, the following States took the floor: • Egypt stated that the whole endeavour of the draft resolution was counterproductive. It highlighted its concern regarding the resource- intensive requirements of establishing a sixth group of governmental experts on cybersecurity, which, in its view, would most probably face another failure to adopt recommendations, owing to the continued divergence of views on fundamental issues. • The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the draft sought to maintain the status quo and business as usual, resulting in the continued lack of international norms governing cybersecurity and of any inclusive multilateral mechanism within the United Nations for the consideration and elaboration of international norms on information security. • Cuba argued that the group of experts proposed by the draft resolution would duplicate the work of the four previous groups and the open-ended working group proposed in the Russian Federation’s draft resolution.
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Additionally, it explained that the proposed group of experts would severely affect the United Nations regular budget. • The Russian Federation considered that the draft resolution proposed taking a step back, within a very restrictive negotiation format. • The Syrian Arab Republic shared the view that the main objective of the draft resolution was to preserve the status quo and to limit any opportunities for reaching international recommendations. Algeria, speaking before it abstained in the voting, expressed the belief that creating two different mechanisms, under the same circumstances, and at the same time, to address the same issue was counterproductive and undermined current efforts to seek appropriate solutions for the challenges related to cyberspace risks, including cyberattacks. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, the following States explained their positions: • Switzerland said that a new consensus-based group of experts would help States in implementing previously adopted recommendations and would identify new areas of agreement. Furthermore, it welcomed the recognition in the text that engaging the private sector, academia and civil society organizations was beneficial to international cooperation. It also underscored the importance of ensuring coherence among the processes established by the two draft resolutions (later adopted as resolutions 73/27 and 73/266) on cyberspace issues and to avoid any contradiction and fragmentation between them. • Bangladesh favoured both draft resolutions on cyberspace issues, given that it saw useful provisions and elements in both of them. It asserted that there was complementarity between the two draft resolutions and their follow-up should be mutually reinforcing and coherent. • Japan considered the draft resolution well balanced, noting that the process would build on the development and the achievements of the past Groups of Governmental Experts on the subject while, in addition, using a comprehensive outreach to gain outside perspectives. At the same time, Japan recommended that the two approaches should be merged in a constructive and cooperative way at some point in the future. • Singapore stated it had endorsed both draft resolutions on cyberspace issues because, in its view, both initiatives were meaningful. It asserted that the United Nations, as the only universal multilateral forum, had a fundamental role to play in the development of rules, norms and principles for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Singapore noted that an open-ended working group and a group of governmental experts were not fundamentally incompatible, expressing the hope that both groups would be able to work together in a complementary manner. • Indonesia said that the creation of groups of governmental experts allowed such experts to have intensive and open dialogue on various contentious points. It also explained that it was a strong proponent of multilateralism and
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favoured discussing contentious issues in open forums. It therefore viewed the mechanisms recognized in the two draft resolutions to be complementary. • Malaysia expressed its hope that both the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group would complement each other and had therefore supported them both. • The Philippines noted that the deletion of references to the code of conduct of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization had brought the mandate between the group of governmental experts and the open-ended working group closer together. It said that the United States and the Russian Federation should make the two groups complementary, avoiding any redundancy as much as possible. The following States voted against the draft resolution and then delivered statements: • Venezuela expressed its belief that the draft’s restrictive approach would lead to maintaining the status quo. It also objected to the limited format for discussion. • China stressed the necessity of further strengthening the relevant United Nations approach to make it more open and inclusive. Having abstained from voting, Belarus expressed the view that only a multilateral and broad approach to establishing a group would allow security threats to be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
73/512. Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (decision)
The General Assembly, recalling its Submitted by: China, Russian resolution 72/250 of 24 December 2017 and other Federation (16 Oct.) resolutions on this matter, decided: (a) to welcome the commencement of the work of the United GA vote: 128-3-48 (5 Dec.) Nations Group of Governmental Experts tasked 1st Cttee vote: 127-3-49 (5 Nov.) with considering and making recommendations See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 322–323. on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space; (b) to welcome the discussions in subsidiary body 3 of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (c) to include in the provisional agenda of its seventy- fourth session, under the item entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, the sub-item entitled “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”. First Committee. The following States delivered general statements: • Egypt stressed that, given the fragility and volatility of the outer space environment, the United Nations should resolve to address the alarming threat to the strategic domain. • Cuba expressed support for the draft resolution, stating that an arms race in outer space would pose a serious threat to international peace and security and that the international community should reject it.
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• The Russian Federation stressed its commitment to preventing an arms race in outer space. It noted that space was an area for peaceful purposes, not for opposition and conflict. Before voting against the draft resolution, the United States delivered a statement, disagreeing with the intention of the draft’s authors to suggest that the Russian and Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects should serve as the foundation for the review of the Groups of Government Experts. The United States considered that the draft treaty would not effectively prohibit the development of threats to outer space systems, including terrestrially based and orbital anti-satellite weapons. Furthermore, it pointed out that the draft treaty failed to address the challenge of creating an effective verification regime. After voting in favour of the draft resolution, Switzerland said that it was a positive sign that space-faring nations were participating in the process. The United States voted against the draft resolution but expressed its long-standing support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities, including those contained in the 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the issue. It called for all space-faring nations to begin the practical implementation of the 21 guidelines, endorsed by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. Having abstained from voting on the draft resolution, Japan stressed that a number of issues needed to be carefully examined. However, it welcomed the discussion in Subsidiary Body 3 of the Conference on Disarmament.
Chapter VI. Disarmament machinery 73/42. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament The General Assembly recalled the adoption Submitted by: Indonesia, on behalf by consensus of the recommendations on the of the States Members of the United objectives and agenda of the fourth special session Nations that are members of the of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament Movement of Non-Aligned Countries by the Open-ended Working Group on the fourth (8 Oct.) special session of the General Assembly devoted GA vote: 178-0-4 (5 Dec.) to disarmament, which had met in 2016 and 2017. The Assembly also recalled the Group’s report and 1st Cttee vote: 174-0-3 (8 Nov.) the substantive recommendations contained therein See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 67–69. (A/AC.268/2017/2) and reiterated its appreciation to the participants of the Open-ended Working Group for their constructive contribution to its work.
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73/81. Report of the Conference on Disarmament
The General Assembly takes note with Submitted by: Turkey (16 Oct.) appreciation of the decision of the Conference on Disarmament on the establishment of subsidiary GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) bodies for the 2018 session and welcomed the 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) adoption by the Conference of substantive reports of See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 282–284. four of the subsidiary bodies as a basis for substantive work, including negotiations, at its 2019 session. The Assembly requested the current President of the Conference on Disarmament and successive Presidents to cooperate with the States members of the Conference in the effort to guide the Conference to the early commencement of its substantive work, including negotiations, at its 2019 session.
73/82. Report of the Disarmament Commission
The General Assembly emphasized the need for Submitted by: Australia (15 Oct.) a focused and results-oriented discussion of the items on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) It also recommended that the Disarmament 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) Commission continue its consideration at its See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 285–287. substantive session of 2019 of recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as preparations of recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. The Assembly noted that the Disarmament Commission encouraged the Chairs of its working groups to continue informal consultations during the intersessional period on the agenda item allocated to each of the groups. First Committee. After joining the consensus on the draft resolution, the Syrian Arab Republic said that, during its chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament, the programme of work could not be agreed upon, owing to the politicization by the United States and its allies.
Chapter VII. Information and outreach 73/59. Disarmament and non-proliferation education
The General Assembly expressed its Submitted by: Mexico (11 Oct.) appreciation to the Secretary-General for his Agenda for Disarmament, Securing Our Common Future, and GA vote: w/o vote; 171-0-3, o.p. 3 noted the proposed actions therein to further advance (5 Dec.) disarmament and non-proliferation education. 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote; 166-0-4, o.p. 3 (8 Nov.) See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 146–149.
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73/73. United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services
The General Assembly noted with satisfaction Submitted by: Nigeria (6 Nov.) that the programme had trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its 40 years GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) of existence, many of whom held positions of 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) responsibility in the field of disarmament within their See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 250–252. own Governments. It encouraged Member States to leverage the knowledge of the United Nations disarmament fellows as a useful resource on matters related to disarmament and international security.
73/79. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme
The General Assembly recommended that Submitted by: Mexico (16 Oct.) the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme continue to inform, educate and GA vote: w/o vote (5 Dec.) generate public understanding of the importance 1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (8 Nov.) of multilateral action and support for it, including See also Yearbook, Part I, pp. 276–278. action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms control and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner, and that it focus its efforts to, inter alia, continue the publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, the flagship publication of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, in all official languages, as well as its Occasional Papers, Study Series and other ad hoc information materials in accordance with the current practice.
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Occasional Papers A biannual publication with edited presentations made at international meetings, symposiums, seminars or workshops organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs or its regional centres in Lima, Lomé or Kathmandu. Available at www.un.org/disarmament.
Website—www.un.org/disarmament A comprehensive website on all issues in the purview of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, featuring:
• Searchable database of disarmament resolutions and decisions going back to the fifty-second session (1997) of the General Assembly • United Nations Register of Conventional Arms—unique information exchange on international arms transfers Volume 43 (Part II): 2018 • Text and status of treaties and agreements—database • Dedicated working websites for conferences and meetings • Education resources Volume 42 (Part II): 2018 • and more
ISBN 978-92-1-139172-5
asdf 1909036