DOCSLIB.ORG

Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani at a Glance, 1957–2001

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani at a Glance, 1957–2001 k o No. 1 • January 2011 o l Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani: t A Biography u O By Ali Alfoneh This is the first in a series of Middle Eastern Outlooks about Qassem Suleimani. n r Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani was appointed chief of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards e Corps (IRGC) sometime between September 10, 1997, and March 21, 1998, during the rise of the Taliban in t Afghanistan. Suleimani’s appointment was no accident. He was chosen in part because he is a native of a mountain- ous village in Kerman, which is both geographically and culturally closer to Afghanistan than Qom, Suleimani’s s commonly believed place of birth. Suleimani also had extensive battlefield experience in the civil war in Kurdish a regions of Iran during the immediate aftermath of the revolution, was a seasoned commander in the war against Iraq from 1980 to 1988, and fought against drug cartels near the Iran/Afghanistan border from 1988 until he E was appointed Quds Force chief. This Outlook provides biographical background on Suleimani that shows why he was chosen as IRGC Quds Force chief in the first place. e l “You should know that I . control the policy have complained publicly about the interference d for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and by the Quds Force in Iraqi political affairs.5 Afghanistan,”1 wrote Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani also appears on both the United d Suleimani in a message to General David i Petraeus, commanding general of the Multi- National Force–Iraq, in spring 2008. Suleimani, Key points in this Outlook: M chief of the Quds Force of the IRGC, which was • Little information is available in English- established in 1979 and tasked with exporting language sources on Brigadier General the Islamic revolution beyond Iran’s borders,2 was Qassem Suleimani. not bragging; according to leaked US Department of State diplomatic cables, the US embassy in • By piecing together Persian-language Baghdad considers Suleimani “the point man sources, we can begin to understand Suleimani’s life and why he was directing the formulation and implementation of appointed Quds Force chief of the the [Islamic Republic of Iran Government’s] Iraq Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. policy, with authority second only to Supreme Leader [Ali] Khamenei.”3 The Quds Force that he • As the Iran/Iraq war generation is dominat- leads has been “organizing, training, funding, and ing the politics, military, economy, and equipping Iraqis to fight against Coalition and even spiritual life of the Islamic Republic, US policy analysts should pay greater atten- Iraqi Security Forces,” along with Lebanon’s tion to the Persian-language material from 4 Hezbollah. Since March 2004, Iraqi authorities the 1980s and other sources discussing the Ali Alfoneh ([email protected]) is a resident fellow formative phase of this generation. at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2- Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani at a Glance, 1957–2001 1977–78 Political radicalization 1979 Enrolled in Kerman branch of the IRGC Involved in suppression of separatists 1997/1998 in Iranian Kurdistan Appointed IRGC Quds Force chief 1970–75 Construction worker in Kerman Province 1997/1998–2001 1957 1980–88 Led the Iranian effort against the Born in Rabord village in Forty-First Tharallah division chief, Taliban regime in Afghanistan Kerman Province active in the war against Iraq 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1964–70 Attended primary 1975–79 I988–97/98 school in Rabord Kerman Water Led the fight against drug cartels Organization contractor and smugglers in southeastern Iran from his headquarters in Kerman Nations Security Council’s6 and the US Department living from the pilgrimage industry.10 In contrast, of State’s7 lists of individuals sanctioned for their the mountain village of Rabord in remote Kerman— involvement in proliferation activities and support closer to the Afghan border—has a tribal structure,11 for terrorism. which would have prepared Suleimani for operating in Despite Suleimani’s central role, open-source materials tribal societies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. in English provide no information about his life before the This unique knowledge and experience is likely one of 1950 invasion of Afghanistan. For that matter, neither do the the main reasons why Suleimani was appointed Quds majority of online Persian sources, some of which are Force chief. primarily comprised of translations of English-language The open-source material provides no detailed infor- material. The lack of knowledge about Suleimani’s past mation about Suleimani’s parents or immediate family constitutes a formidable challenge when trying to analyze members, but his name identifies him as part of the his actions in the present. However, a careful analysis of Suleimani tribe, which migrated to Kerman from Fars the Persian-language open-source material on the Iran/ Province in the eighteenth century.12 In a rare auto- Iraq War (1980–88) produced by the Tehran-based IRGC biographic note, Suleimani writes that his father was a Center for Research and Study of the War, Iran’s preemi- peasant and that the family owed nine thousand rial to nent institution for the study of the Iran/Iraq War, along the government sometime around 1970.13 This indicates with select Persian-language sources available online, that Suleimani’s relatives were landless peasants who provides interesting insights into Suleimani’s life. initially benefitted from the Shah’s land-reform program of 1962—which divided the agricultural land of the Early Life landed aristocracy among the peasants—but that the Suleimani tribe became impoverished because of poor According to the US Department of State, Suleimani execution of the program. was born in the city of Qom on March 11, 1957.8 According to Suleimani, in 1970 he and Ahmad Persian-language sources contest this claim, identifying Suleimani, a close relative killed in the war with Iraq the village of Rabord in Kerman Province in south- in 1984,14 traveled to Kerman City and worked as con- eastern Iran as Suleimani’s place of birth9—which has struction workers to help repay their fathers’ debt.15 significant implications for understanding Suleimani. This shows that Suleimani left Rabord at age thirteen, Qom’s population is centered around religion, including as soon as he had finished the mandatory five years of theologians and seminary students from all over the primary school. In 1975, Suleimani started working as world, along with pilgrims and those who make their a contractor for the Kerman Water Organization.16 - 3- Kerman-based blogger Majid Malek confirms this infor- because of his superior performance he was quickly mation, noting that Suleimani worked there “either as a appointed as an instructor.26 Suleimani does not provide technician or a workman.”17 A third source states that any details about the length of the military training he Suleimani worked as a construction worker,18 which received, but, according to Asghar Mohammad- may refer to his work before joining the Kerman Water Hosseini, a fellow IRGC veteran from Kerman, the Organization or the fact that he probably had not had any military training entailed only a forty-five-day course.27 education beyond five years of primary school. Expedition to Mahabad “You should know that I . control the Suleimani soon needed both his knowledge of tribal policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, societies and his military training, as he was deployed to Mahabad in the province of West Azerbaijan to suppress Gaza, and Afghanistan,” wrote Brigadier the Kurdish separatist uprising in the aftermath of the 28 General Qassem Suleimani. revolution. Suleimani shares no information about the Mahabad expedition, but, according to fellow IRGC member Mohammad-Hosseini, a “company-size irregular According to Suleimani, he began his revolutionary contingent” from Kerman was dispatched to Mahabad activities in 1976 “through the late Martyr [Hojjat and tasked with “administering and protecting the al-Eslam Reza] Kamyab” (assassinated by the Mojahedin-e city.”29 The regime in Tehran preferred to send non- Khalq Organization on July 29, 1981)19 but continued Kurdish troops, who were free of local bonds of loyalty his work at the Kerman Water Organization.20 Kamyab and allegiance, to suppress the rebellion of Kurdish was a firebrand preacher from Gonabad who was active separatists30 and the bloody ethnic clashes between in Kerman during the month of Ramadan in the years Azeris and Kurds.31 1977 and 1978.21 But there is a conflict between the year Mohammad-Hosseini’s account does not mention of Kamyab’s visit to Kerman and Suleimani’s recollections. Suleimani by name, which may indicate that there were If Suleimani was radicalized “through” Kamyab, Suleimani several expeditions from Kerman to Mahabad. Suleimani could not have started his revolutionary activities before and his supporters may also prefer to obscure his role in Kamyab’s arrival to Kerman in 1977. Remarkably, Mahabad. The Islamic Republic generally considers the Suleimani does not mention any pre-revolutionary very existence of separatist movements and ethnic connections with the main clerical revolutionary figures clashes in Iran as a source of embarrassment, let alone from Kerman Province such as Ali-Akbar Hashemi Raf- the central government’s use of non-Kurdish ethnic sanjani, Mohammad-Ali Movahedi Kermani, or Yahya groups to suppress them. Secretly, however, a record of Jafari. This suggests that Suleimani’s
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
    The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Middle East After the Iraq War
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War Frederic Wehrey Dalia Dassa Kaye Jessica Watkins Jeffrey Martini Robert A.
    [Show full text]
  • International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War
    Mercer Law Review Volume 43 Number 2 Lead Articles I - The Legal Article 1 Implications of a Nation at War 3-1992 International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War Francis A. Boyle Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr Part of the International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Boyle, Francis A. (1992) "International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran- Iraq War," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 43 : No. 2 , Article 1. Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol43/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LEAD ARTICLES International Crisis and Neutrality: United States Foreign Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War by Francis A. Boyle* Prescript This Article was written in 1986 and submitted to the University of New Orleans Symposium on Neutrality. The Article reflects the author's analysis regarding the United States military intervensionism into the Middle East with a special focus on the Persian Gulf region. The author analyzes the United States' policies to divide-and-conquer the Arab oil * Professor of International Law, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, Illi- nois. University of Chicago (A.B., 1971); Harvard Law School (J.D., magna cum laude, 1976); Harvard University (A.M., 1978 and Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • DEPARTMENT of the TREASURY Office Of
    This document is scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 11/17/2017 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2017-24947, and on FDsys.gov DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Office of Foreign Assets Control Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions AGENCY: Office of Foreign Assets Control, Treasury. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing the names of 41 persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and whose entries on OFAC’s Specially Designated National and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) have been amended accordingly. All property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these persons are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. DATES: See Supplementary Information section. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: OFAC: Associate Director for Global Targeting, tel.: 202-622-2420; Assistant Director for Sanctions Compliance & Evaluation, tel.: 202-622-2490; Assistant Director for Licensing, tel.: 202-622-2480; or the Department of the Treasury’s Office of the General Counsel: Office of the Chief Counsel (Foreign Assets Control), tel.: 202-622-2410. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Electronic Availability The SDN List and additional information concerning OFAC sanctions programs are available on OFAC's Web site (www.treas.gov/ofac). Notice of OFAC Actions On June 6, 2003, OFAC issued the GTSR (68 FR 34196, June 6, 2003) to implement E.O. 13224. OFAC has amended the GTSR on several occasions. On August 2, 2017, the President signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Public Law 115-44, Aug.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth and Reality of Iraq's Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi (Popular
    Policy Paper The Myth and Reality of Iraq’s al-Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces): A Way Forward Author: Hassan Abbas Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Amman Office September 2017 Amman, Jordan Published in 2017 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Tel. +962 6 5008335 Fax: +962 6 5696478 Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Facebook: www.facebook.com/FESAmmanOffice Not for sale. © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or the institution he is affiliated with. II Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 Who constitutes the Hashd? What are their organizational structures, motivations and operational capabilities? Who sponsors and funds the Hashd? .............................. 4 How do Sunnis (and other groups) view the Hashd? Why are Iraq’s neighbours so concerned about the role of the Hashd? .................................................................. 9 Can the Hashd be fully integrated into Iraq’s official security forces? ................... 11 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Soore Mehr Publishing Co
    Soore Mehr Publishing Co. Visit us Hall5.0/B132 16-20 Oct 2019 Soore Mehr Publishing Co. is one of the Best and huge Publishing group in Iran, and established 1998, we selected 7 years as the best Publisher in Iran and get the prize with cultural ministry Of Iran. we published about 10000 title books up to now, and we publish about 300 new title( 1st edition) every year, we have fiction, Non-fiction, Poem, War story and Memory for Adults. In addition we have a special Department for Children›s and Young Adults that name is «Mehrak Publication», and we have about 1000 books for children›s and young Adult it›s included Poem, Story, comic story, poem story. we register Mehrak publication Brand last year. Mehrak Puplication Children's Department www.mehrak.ir Title: The Twenty-three Ones Author: Ahmad Yousefzadeh Subject: Non-Fiction (Memory) Year of Publishing: 2017 / 58th Edition No. of Pages: 408/Paperback Size: 14 × 21 ISBN: 9786001755842 Awards: The book was honored by the supreme leader of Iran. about book The age of Ahmad (the author of the book) is sixteen. His name, after military training, is finally listed on the list of expeditions to the warfront. He participates in Operation Baytol-Moghaddass . But after a while, he has taken as a prisoner of war. There, during his captivity in the Iraqi POW camp, he is called a «minor child» due to his young age and his small body. He is being taken to the city of Basra along with 150 other prisoners of the war.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Tribalism and Sectarianism in Defining the Iraqi National Identity
    The Role of Tribalism and Sectarianism in Defining the Iraqi National Identity The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Abdallat, Saleh Ayman. 2020. The Role of Tribalism and Sectarianism in Defining the Iraqi National Identity. Master's thesis, Harvard Extension School. Citable link https://nrs.harvard.edu/URN-3:HUL.INSTREPOS:37365053 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The Role of Tribalism and Sectarianism in Defining the Iraqi National Identity Saleh Ayman Abdallat A Thesis in the Field of Middle Eastern Studies for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies Harvard University May 2020 Copyright 2020 Saleh Ayman Abdallat Abstract In this thesis, I examine the roots that aggravated the Iraqi national identity to devolve into sectarianism. The thesis covers 603 years of historical events that coincided during the time the Ottoman ruled Mesopotamia, until the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. The thesis is divided into four chapters, in which I address the factors that aggravated to deteriorate the Iraqi national unity. The historical events include the Ottoman-Persian rivalry that lasted for more than three centuries, and the outcomes that precipitated the Iraqi national identity to devolve into sectarianism. Furthermore, the thesis covers the modern history of Iraq during the period that Britain invaded Iraq and appointed the Hashemite to act on their behalf.
    [Show full text]
  • How Iran Would Apply Its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in the F
    Occasional Paper Series Obsolete Weapons, Unconventional Tactics, and Martyrdom Zeal: How Iran Would Apply its Asymmetric Naval Warfare Doctrine in a Future Conflict By Jahangir Arasli GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES No. 10 April 2007 ISSN 1863-6039 The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is a leading trans- atlantic defense educational and security studies institution. It is bilaterally sup- ported by the U.S. and German governments and dedicated to the creation of a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships; promoting active, peaceful engagement; and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eura- sia. The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series seeks to further the legacy of the Center’s namesake, General George C. Marshall, by disseminating scholarly essays that contribute to his ideal of ensuring that Europe and Eurasia are de- mocratic, free, undivided, and at peace. Papers selected for this series are meant to identify, discuss, and influence current defense related security issues. The Marshall Center Occasional Paper Series focus is on comparative and interdisci- plinary topics, including international security and democratic defense manage- ment, civil-military relations, strategy formulation, terrorism studies, defense planning, arms control, peacekeeping, crisis management, regional and coop- erative security. The Marshall Center Occasional Papers are written by Marshall Center faculty and staff, Marshall Center alumni, or by individual, invited con- tributors, and are disseminated online and in a paper version. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the George C.
    [Show full text]
  • RADICALIZATION DURING the ROUHANI YEARS Iran’S Political Shifts and Their Implications Contents
    ANALYSIS Political momentum in Iran now lies with the radicals. In the wake of U.S. sanctions, PEACE AND SECURITY President Hassan Rouhani’s policy of moderation has failed to produce promised RADICALIZATION economic growth. DURING THE Political shifts in Iran have up- ended the usual dynamics of inter-factional competition to not only affirm the radicals’ ROUHANI YEARS positions, but to also radical- ize the more moderate forces themselves. The hard-liners Iran’s Political Shifts and Their Implications remain a heterogenous group, with intense disputes over ideology and power. David Jalilvand and Achim Vogt (eds.) March 2021 Tehran’s nuclear and regional policies look set to become even more assertive while Iran’s progress in economic diversification renders con- cessions on its part less attractive. PEACE AND SECURITY RADICALIZATION DURING THE ROUHANI YEARS Iran’s Political Shifts and their Implications Contents Introduction 2 1 THE END OF MODERATION? SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RADICALISM UNDER HASSAN ROUHANI 4 Azadeh Zamirirad 2 RADICAL IRAN: GENERATIONAL CHANGES AND OUTLOOKS 9 Narges Bajoghli 3 IRAN’S HEZBOLLAH: A RADICAL AND DECISIVE POLITICAL CURRENT 15 Walter Posch 4 THE FUTURE OF IRAN’S NUCLEAR POLICY AND APPROACH TO THE JCPOA 23 Dina Esfandiary 5 A RADICAL IRAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE LEVANT 29 Hamidreza Azizi 6 IRAN’S RESISTANCE ECONOMY: AMBITIONS AND REALITY 36 David Jalilvand About the Authors 48 1 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – RADICALIZATION DURING THE ROUHANI YEARS Introduction At the start of 2021, the political momentum in Iranian stitutions.1 In February 2020, hard-liners constituted the domestic and foreign affairs lies squarely with the radicals.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Taliban
    Iran and the Taliban by Erfan Fard BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,147, September 6, 2021 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to overthrow the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks. Iran opposed the US presence, as it strove (and continues to strive) for regional hegemony. Despite its distaste for the Sunni Taliban, Tehran constantly undermined US efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by collaborating with the extremist group. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland in 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda. US policy was to conduct a full-scale war to neutralize jihadism and Islamic terrorism, not just in Afghanistan but around the globe. This was a new paradigm in the security order of the Middle East. As the Taliban in Afghanistan rose in terms of power and visibility, it became a serious concern of the Iranian Quds Force (QF). It dealt with the challenge by using non-conventional military methods and directing revolutionary activities on Afghan soil from Tajikistan and areas controlled by the Northern Alliance. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) strengthened its forces along the Afghan border, and the former commander of the IRGC-QF, Qassem Soleimani, spent most of his time on that border. Iran’s geopolitical situation played a crucial role in the war against al-Qaeda terrorism immediately following 2001 in two important respects: by helping to remove the Taliban and by blocking infiltration routes of al-Qaeda forces. By providing intelligence and security information to the Americans as well as supporting the Northern Alliance, Iran played a vital role in overthrowing the Taliban.
    [Show full text]
  • TAKING BACK the NEIGHBORHOOD the IRGC Provincial Guard’S Mission to Re-Islamize Iran
    THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n JUNE 2020 n PN81 Saeid Golkar TAKING BACK THE NEIGHBORHOOD The IRGC Provincial Guard’s Mission to Re-Islamize Iran During 2019, the Islamic Republic of Iran erupted in nearly simultaneous public protests in cities across the country. Thousands of citizens stopped traffic along major highways, marched, and shouted complaints about the gasoline price hike that had ostensibly sparked the demonstrations in the first place. They also aired their broader complaints against the leadership. Indeed, more than forty years after the country’s Islamic Revolution, the Iranian regime has become more repressive than ever, with an apparatus that attempts to reach into every facet of life and society. The protests, for their part, were brutally quelled through force. This was a familiar experience for Iranians seeking to express their displeasure. Scholars and journalists have produced a growing body of literature on political repression in Iran and the regime’s oppressive tools, including the police and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in general.1 © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. SAEID GOLKAR But these studies focus mainly on the IRGC’s 1979, to protect itself against a possible coup by military and security role and its five official divisions: Iran’s conventional army, the Artesh. At the beginning the IRGC Ground Forces (IRGC-GF), Aerospace of the Iran-Iraq War, in September 1980, the IRGC Force (IRGC-ASF), Navy (IRGCN), Qods Force was rapidly expanded to include ten departments. It (IRGC-QF),2 and Basij organization.3 Only a handful incorporated the National Mobilization (Basij-e Melli), of studies cover the IRGC’s role in political suppression which was created independently several months and maintaining state control, leaving a gap in the earlier, on April 30, 1980.
    [Show full text]
  • What General Soleimani's Death Means for the Middle East
    What General Soleimani’s Death Means for the Middle East ALINA V. GUERRA n January 3, 2020, General Qasem Soleimani – commander of the Quds Force, a powerful branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – was assassinated in a OUS drone strike.1 Prior to his assassination, Soleimani’s significance as a military leader and prominent figure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was largely underappreciated in the West. In this article, I first review Soleimani’s background and achievements to draw ‘lessons learned’ from his career and then I assess the implications of his assassination for Iran, the future of the Middle East, and US strategic interests in the region. Who was Qasem Soleimani? Qasem Soleimani was one of Iran’s leading military officers and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s top military advisor. Born and raised in a village in the Kerman Province near Afghanistan and Pakistan, Soleimani from a young age showed interest in the Arab world. Soleimani entered the IRGC after the 1979 revolution, becoming a new recruit trainer following graduation from basic training.2 During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Soleimani’s unfaltering leadership earned him a fast track to the top of the IRGC. He became the commander of the Quds Force by 1997. Though Khamenei generally set term limits of ten years for top military and political positions, General Soleimani kept his military command for over twenty years until his death. As Khamenei’s right-hand military man, Soleimani was nearly indispensable in loyally propping up Iran’s theocratic regime and in attacking Iran’s enemies.3 In a 2018 speech, at a memorial service for Imad Mughniyeh – the former deputy leader of Lebanese Hezbollah who was assassinated by a CIA car bomb in 2008 – a fiery Soleimani warned that the “enemy knows that punishment for Imad’s blood is not firing a missile or a tit-for-tat assassination.
    [Show full text]