EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN

BY LOYD D. EASTON

Most ofthe attention given to thethought of Joseph Dietzgen has come about throughhis connectionwith the socialistmovement in Europeand theUnited States. At theHague Congressof the Inter- nationalWorkingman's Association Marx introducedDietzgen, ac- cordingto his son's report,with the words: "Here is our philos- opher." ThoughMarx criticized The Natureof Human Brain Work, Dietzgen'sfirst and major book,for certain confusions and repeti- tiousness,he foundit to containmany ideas whichwere excellent and especiallyadmirable for having come from the independentthought of a workingman.'In LudwigFeuerbach Engels credited Dietzgen- somewhatloosely we may concludelater-with the independentdis- coveryof "materialistdialectics." These referenceslinked Dietz- gen'sthought with , but his views became the center of sharp polemicsin the Europeansocialist movement. His followersin Ger- manyand Russia claimedthat he had significantlyenriched Marx- ismwith an explicittheory of knowledgeand a monisticworld view.2 That claimwas challengedby Plekhanov,Mehring, and Leninwho followedup Marx'sreferences to Dietzgen'sconfusions. Lenin argued thatwhere Dietzgen was not confusedas an empiricisthe was a ma- terialistand strictMarxist like himself.3 As a resultof the controversy in EuropeDietzgen's views received widerattention. A numberof writersfound in his theoryof know- ledgea strikinganticipation of the " empiricalmonism " whichwas developedindependently by ErnstMach 4 and influencedphilosophi- cal thinkingin the UnitedStates throughthe " radicalempiricism " of WilliamJames. But Dietzgen'seffort to extendhis theoryof 1 ,Letters to Dr. Kugelmann(New York,1934), 80, 55; Dona Torr, ed. andtrans., Karl Marxand Correspondence: 1846-1895 (London, 1934), 252f. 2See HenrietteRoland-Holst, Joseph Dietzgens Philosophie (Munich, 1910), Ch. III; Ernst Untermann,Die logischeMangel des engerenMarxismus, Georg Plechanowet alii gegenJosef Dietzgen (Munich, 1910); Paul Dauge,"J. Dietzgen und sein KritikerG. Plechanow"in E. Dietzgen,ed., Erkenntnisund Wahrheit (Stuttgart,1908), 409, 414f.,referring to the sympathetictreatment of Dietzgen's viewsby Andrejew,Hellfond, and otherRussian writers. 3See Lenin, and Empirio-Criticism,trans. D. Kvitko (New York, 1927), Chs. II, III, VI; GeorgPlechanow, " JosefDietzgen " in E. Dietzgen,ed., Erkenntnisund Wahrheit,359-93; G. Bammel,"Joseph Dietzgen,"La Revue Marxiste,3 (1 April1929), 313-16. 4See AdolfHepner, Josef Dietzgens Philosophische Lehren (Stuttgart,1916), 16, with referenceto the writingsof Max Adler,Christian Eckert, and others dealingwith Dietzgen's anticipation of Mach's " empiricalmonism "; ViktorThomas, Das Erkenntnisproblem(Stuttgart, 1921), 177-92,criticizing the "idealist ten- dencies" in Mach and Avenariusfrom the pointof viewof Dietzgen's" monism." 77 78 LOYD D. EASTON knowledgeinto the fieldof ethics,his attemptto developa " scien- tific" or " inductive" ethics,has beengenerally neglected. Though it has beenmentioned or summarizedby a fewwriters,5 there has been no close examinationof its historicalroots and affinities.Typical ofthis neglect is the 1923edition of tYberweg's Geschichte der Philos- ophie. It givesparticular attention to Dietzgen'stheory of knowl- edgeas akinto Mach's " empirio-criticism" but dealswith his ethical viewsin a singlemisleading sentence. The neglectof Dietzgen'smoral seems unfortunate. To be sure,his thoughtin thisarea as in otherparts of his philosophy is oftenrough and abrupt,a reflectionof his militantsocialism and lack of universityeducation. But it showsoriginality and insightat a numberof points. In stressingthe relativityof means and ends and therootage of moral values in reflectivelycriticized needs it anti- cipates,as we shall see, some influentialviews developed later and independentlyby John Dewey.

Born in 1828 near Cologne,Germany, Joseph Dietzgen had an elementaryeducation and briefperiods in highschool prior to learn- ingthe trade of his father,a well-to-domaster tanner.6 In thehours of recreationfrom the tanneryhe studiedliterature, economics, and philosophyand learnedto speak French fluently.His study of Frencheconomists, the conditionsof the times,and -accordingto his son's report-"made a class-conscious socialistout ofhim in 1848." The reactionwhich followed the events of 1848 drove him to Americawhere he workedat variousjobs, trampedover a largepart of the country,acquired a commandof English,and cameto knowat firsthand something of America and its people. Amongthose who left Germany at thistime were Friedrich Sorgeand AlbrechtKomp, pioneers of the socialistmovement in the UnitedStates, with whom Dietzgen maintained correspondence and friendshipin subsequentyears. In 1851 he was back at workin his father'stannery. Shortly afterhis marriage to a devoutCatholic-with whom he livedin " rare

5For example,,Ethics and the MaterialistConception of His- tory,trans. J. B. Askew (,1906); AdolfHepner, op. cit., 29-37; Karl Vorliinder,Kant und Marx (Tiubingen,1911), 96ff. BThe mainsources of the biographicaldata in thissection are: EugeneDietz- gen, "Joseph Dietzgen:A Sketchof His Life,"trans. E. Untermannin Joseph Dietzgen,Philosophical Essays (Chicago,1906), 7-33; F. A. Sorge,Briefe und Auszilgeaus Briefenvon Joh.Phil. Becker,Jos. Dietzgen, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marxu. A. an F. A. Sorgeund Andere (Stuttgart, 1921), 196, 216, 226f., et passim; EugeneDietzgen, ed., Josef Dietzgens Simtliche Schriften, 3 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1911), III, 5n, 12n,63, 67ff.,et passim. EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 79 harmony"despite his naturalisticviews-he opened a combined grocerystore and tannery. The successof thisventure led him to establisha branchstore in a nearbyvillage, but he carefullyplanned his workso as to devoteonly a halfa day to businessand the rest to " diligentstudy, from pure thirst of knowledgeand withoutother incentive." To securegreater economic independence he wentto Montgomery, ,in 1859. Therehe establisheda friendshipwith Julius Liv- ingston,another pioneer of the Americansocialist movement, and wrotehis firstessay, " Schwarzoder Weiss," which set forthseveral ideas he was to developlater. One morninghe foundsome of his friends" strungup in frontof their houses " as Northernsympathizers. Withthe outbreakof the CivilWar he returnedto Germany. Dietzgenconducted his father'sbusiness in Uckerathuntil 1864 whenhe was employedby the Russiangovernment to reorganizeits largetannery in St. Petersburg.In a fewyears he increasedits pro- ductivityfivefold, wrote articles on Capitalwhich Marx commended, and completedhis firstand majorbook, The Natureof Human Brain Work, whichset forththe basic featuresof his theoryof knowledge and ethics,a " monist-naturalisttheory of understanding,"to use his son'sdescription. His laterbooks and articlesdeveloped this theory in differentcontexts and explicitly moved toward a world-viewempha- sizingthe organic unity of all things. Afterhis returnfrom St. Petersburgin 1869 Dietzgenoperated a tanneryin Siegburgand continuedhis studies and writing.Though he was arrestedfor speaking in Cologneand ran unsuccessfullyfor a seat in the Reichstag,he was relativelydetached from immediate politicalaffairs. He had little associationwith othermembers of the Social-Democraticparty and littlecontact with regularparty activities.According to Dr. BrunoWille, a frequentvisitor from the Universityof Bonn,Dietzgen " led a ratherlonely, almost hermit- like existence." Afterhis businesshad sufferedin competitionwith larger units 7Das Wesender menchlichenKopfarbeit, dargestellt von einemHandarbeiter. Eine abermaligeKritik der reinenund praktischenVernunft (Hamburg, 1869). This workappears in a translationby W. W. Craikalong with twenty-four letters on (1880-83) and The PositiveOutcome of Philosophy(1887) in a volume entitledThe PositiveOutcome of Philosophy(Chicago, 1906). One of Dietzgen's laterbooks, Excursions of A Socialistinto the Domainsof (1887), and severalarticles are translatedby M. Beer and Th. Rothsteinin JosephDietz- gen,Philosophical Essays, ed. EugeneDietzgen and JosephDietzgen, Jr. (Chicago, 1906). Together,The PositiveOutcome of Philosophyand PhilosophicalEssays containtranslations of almostall of thefirst and secondvolumes of JosefDietzgens SimtlicheSchriften. Several of Dietzgen'sphilosophical essays and manybrief articleson currentissues which appeared in Der Sozialist(New York), 1885-6,and ChicagoerArbeiterzeitung, 1886-8, are not includedin the SdmtlicheSchriften. 80 LOYD D. EASTON

and his meanshad been reducedby needyfriends and relatives,he followedhis son to Americawhere he rentedan old, almostdilapi- datedhouse in Hoboken,New Jersey. " I can be at ease,"he explained to Sorge," in barbariansurroundings, provided my privateeconomy is so arrangedthat I can devotemyself without care to the super- structure."From 1884 to 1886he editedDer Sozialistin New York and thenjoined his familyin Chicago. Afterthe Haymarketbomb explodedand the editorsof the ChicagoerArbeiterzeitung had been arrested,Dietzgen offered his servicesto the Socialist Publishing Society. He becameeditor of three papers and in thatcapacity tried to lessenthe differencesbetween socialists and anarchistsas required by his philosophicalprinciple that thereare no absolutedifferences but onlydifferences of degree. His positionon the anarchistswas opposedto thatof the nationalexecutive committee of the Socialist Labor Party,but he remainedconvinced to the end of his lifethat he had " accomplishedsome good by it." He died in the springof 1888 and was buriedat the side of the anarchistsin the Waldheim Cemeterynear Chicago. II Dietzgen'sethical views were based on a theoryof knowledge whichstrenuously opposed pure speculationor a priorithinking. Pure speculation,Dietzgen held, is the prototypeof wrongthinking becauseit seeksto arriveat truthwithout the help of experienceand rejectsthe evidenceof the senses. Its typicalproduct is metaphysics as foundin thegreat historic systems which agree only in disagreeing. It reinforcesthe dualismof mindand sense,thought and fact,spirit and matter-typicalexpressions of the cleavagebetween a superna- turalorder and thenatural realm of humanexperience. The chiefsupport of the speculative method, Dietzgen held, is the claimthat basic truthsabout the worldare innateand can be pro- duced fromthe depthsof the mindby pure thought. He allowed that somepropositions appear to be innatelytrue and independent of all experience-forexample, that there is alwaysa valleybetween twomountains and thatthe anglesof a triangleequal tworight an- gles. But thesecases of so-calledapodictical knowledge, on exami- nation,turn out to be tautologies(Tautologien).8 Theyhold so long as the names applied to experiencedthings retain their assigned meanings.They require no pure,supernatural mind. " Whereonly

8 The PositiveOutcome of Philosophy,419f. (DietzgensSdmtliche Schriften, II, 349). Dietzgenseems to have developedthis view, which anticipates one aspect of recent"logical empiricism,"from his studyof Kant and Feuerbach,unaware of Leibniz'scontribution along these lines. See EugeneDietzgen, " Dietzgenund Kant " in DietzgenBrevier fur Naturmonisten (Munich, 1915), x; JosephDietz- gen,Philosophical Essays, 143. EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 81 the wet is called water,"said Dietzgen," we don'tneed any special transcendentalfaculty to knowcategorically that water must be wet." In contrastto thespeculative method, the way to genuineknowl- edge,Dietzgen held, lies in theinductive method or a posteriorithink- ingwhich is basedon " someperceptible material, some given object." Genuinethinking, like all activityand work,must have an objector contentwhich is theworld of sense, perceptible phenomena, or matter. This is equally true of thinkingabout thinking. "We perceive (wahrnehmen)thought or mind,"said Dietzgen," just as sensibly as we perceivewalking, pain, and otherfeelings." 9 Whilethought is nottangible (greif bar), it is materialin thesense that it is percep- tible and thus actual, as perceptibleand actual as the intangible scentof a rose or heat of a stove. It does not differfrom tables, light,or soundany morethan these things differ among themselves. All thesethings-thought, the scent of a rose,sound-have a common natureas being" perceptible,material, i.e., actual" (sinnlich,mater- iell,das heisstwirklich). Genuineor a posteriorithinking, however, is not a mutestaring at perceivedfact any more than it is a transcendentalactivity of pure intellect. It is not to be foundin Biichner'smaxim "What I want are facts,"nor in Lange'sresort to an imperceptiblefaculty of cogni- tion. Ratherit is to be found,as Alexandervon Humboldt suggested, in the clarificationof sensuousfacts by discoveringthe generalin particulars,by classifyingand systematizingthe worldof sense.10 Thus genuinethinking assimilates what is commonin themultiplicity of sense-objects.Since this activity truly defines " mind,"one might say that everythingin the worldhas a mentalor unitaryquality. But onlyrelatively so. In relationto the sense-objectsfrom which genuinethought cannot be separatedthe worldis manifold,diverse, a multiplicity.Both perspectivesare necessarybecause genuine thinkingis " dialectical." It mediatesdifferences or distinctionsand sees howthings are alike as wellas different,one as well as many. Dietzgen'stheory of knowledgereflected the influenceof Bacon, Kant, and especiallyFeuerbach. He agreedwith Bacon's emphasis on thepractical control of naturethat comes through generalizations based on sense-particulars.He referred,with approval,to Kant's "limitationof reason by experience" but rejectedthe " supersensible world" as merebelief or faith. His attackson speculativethought 9 The Nature of Human Brain Workin PositiveOutcome of Philosophy,84. Cf. ibid.,85-90 (DietzgensS&mtliche Schriften, I, hlf.Cf. ibid.,12-16). 10Ibid.) 122f.,where Dietzgen quotes at lengthfrom Humboldt's Cosmos. WhileHumboldt was stronglyattracted to the viewsof AugusteComte and was one of the smallbut selectaudience to whichComte first presented his " positive philosophy,"Dietzgen's empiricism, as we shall see, was developedprimarily from LudwigFeuerbach's critique of speculation. 82 LOYD D. EASTON and his view that the contentof genuinethinking is the worldof senseespecially reflected the influence of Feuerbachwhom he greatly admiredand withwhom he corresponded." For a longtime," Dietz- genwrote to Marxin 1867," myobject has beena systematicworld- view; LudwigFeuerbach showed me the way to it."" Dietzgen followedFeuerbach's view that the essenceof thoughtis " univer- sality,"but it mustbe determinedthrough sense-perception if it is to be "real" or "objective." Genuinethought is thus concerned withthe opposite of thought-with sensuous, actual things-and man himselfis a sense-objectinasmuch as he perceiveshimself and others.'2 True philosophy,in contrastto speculativephilosophy, mustidentify itself with natural science. "My philosophy,"Dietz- gen repeatedafter Feuerbach, "'is no philosophy." ThoughDietzgen insisted that the world is a multiplicityin relation to thesense-objects from which genuine thought cannot be separated, he sometimesinconsistently detached thought from sense and relied on a prioriarguments-" the logicalessence of nomenclature" and " the ontologicalargument "-to prove the onenessof all things.13 Withreferences to the " absoluteall-existence " and " absolutelyco- herentreality " he assertedthat the veryexistence of any particular thingdepends on its relationsto everythingelse. But therewas an- othersense in whichhe was a "monist." This becomesmost ap- parentin his effortto reconcileidealism and materialism.The world is one,he asserted,in thatall thingsfall intothe categoryof " per- ceptiblephenomena " or " empiricalmaterial." To be " perceptible, material,i.e., actual,"}as he put it in The Natureof Human Brain Work,is the " commonnature," the one commonelement in theinfi- nite diversityof things. In this respectmind and matter,subject and object,thoughts and thingsare one. In thisrespect there is a " democraticequality of all thingsin nature."14 This side of Dietz-

11 DietzgensSdmtliche Schriften, III, 67. In the same letterDietzgen also mentionshaving learned much from Marx's Critiqueof PoliticalEconomy and his earlierwritings published in Hamburg,apparently articles in the Neue Rheinische Revue, 1850,including " Class Strugglesin France,1848-50." Dietzgenseems to have been unawarethat Marx and Engels had followedFeuerbach's critique of speculationin The Holy Familypublished in 1845. Accordingto Mrs. Eugene Dietzgen,now livingin California,the lettersbetween and JosephDietzgen were lost when Dietzgen moved to theUnited States. 12See LudwigFeuerbach, Kleine Philosophische Schriften (Leipzig, 1950), 152, 154f.,159f.; Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essenceof Christianity,trans. Marian Evans [GeorgeEliot], (London,1893), viiff. 13Dietzgens Sdmtliche Schriften, III, 157; " Letterson Logic" in PositiveOut- comeof Philosophy,284f. 14PhilosophicaEssays, 206. Cf. ibid., 151ff.,219-22, 294-301; Dietzgens SdmtlicheSchriften, III, 161,174, 183f. EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 83 gen's theoryof knowledgeforeshadowed the "empiricalmonism" of Mach and Avenarius. III On the basis of his critiqueof knowledgeDietzgen sought to de- velopa " scientific,"" inductive," or " materialistic" theory of morals. Again he saw speculation,pure reason,or a priorithinking as the greatsource of errorand confusion.In distinguishingbetween good and bad or rightand wrongwe can get no real guidancefrom pure reasonwhich pretends to furnishabsolute rules and standards.What is " rightin general" forall mankindunder all circumstanceswithout exceptionamounts only to such " uninformativeand indefinitegen- eralities" as the assertionthat the wholeis greaterthan any partor that good is preferableto bad. In themselves,Dietzgen held, abso- lute moralrules are a persistentsource of intoleranceas well as a dangerto humanfreedom and progress. They may readily be usedby powerfulindividuals and groupsto foiston otherstheir particular interestand purposesas eternallygood. " Moses,Aristotle, Christ, Luther,Kant and Hegel had a mostbeneficial effect on the course of historyuntil they became saints." 15 Like all genuinethinking, reasoning in the fieldof moralsmust reston given,concrete materials. While sense-perceptible materials are the touchstoneof truthin general,experienced needs and inter- ests are the materialsout of whichreasoning fashions moral truth. Here,again, Dietzgen seems to have leanedon Feuerbach. True and objectivethought, Feuerbach had insisted,must proceedfrom the oppositeof thought-fromperception, passion, desire, and need.', But Dietzgenwent on to develophis ownview as to how,specifically, thoughtdeals with experienced needs and interests.Moral reasoning is nota catalogof wants and needsany more than scientific reasoning is a tabulationof perceivedfacts. On the contrary,moral reasoning worksupon given needs and intereststo distinguishthe general from the particular. This distinction,in turn,marks the differencebe- tweengood needsand bad, trueinterests and assumedinterests, es- sentialwants and accidentalappetites. Moral reasoningarrives at thesedistinctions by determiningwhat is " generallyuseful or appro- priate" (allgemeinZweckmdssig). Justas knowledgein generalhinges on " the definiteformulation of the problem,"on the demarcationof givensense-objects to be

15" The Ethicsof Social Democracy" (1875) in PhilosophicalEssays, 171. Cf. The Nature of Human Brain Workin PositiveOutcome of Philosophy,152f., 159ff. 16Kleine Philosophische Schriften, 68, 166. Cf.Paul Tillich," ExistentialPhilos- ophy,"this Journal, 5(1944), 53f. 84 LOYD D. EASTON explained,so in moralsthe accuratedetermination of whatis useful dependson thedemarcation of the end or objective(Zweck) express- ing theneeds of particularpersons in particularsocial circumstances. No humanaction can be usefulor reasonablein itself. "The end-in- view,"said Dietzgen,"is the measureof the useful." But it must be a definite,delimited end or objective. Then what is usefulor appropriatecan be determinedscientifically or inductively.That actionis mostreasonable which realizes its end " in thewidest, broad- est,most general way." 17 Dietzgenwas awarethat this version of moral reasoning and moral truthcommitted him to the principlethat "the end justifiesthe means" and exposedhis view to reproachescommonly levelled against the Jesuits. So he undertookto rehabilitatethe principlethrough analysisof therelation of meansand ends. It is a majorand commonmistake, he held,to treatthe distinc- tionbetween means and endsas absoluteand fixed. To be sure,any particularaction may be viewedas a meansto someend. But think- ing mustnot stop there. Genuinethinking is dialecticaland takes accountof the diverse relations of things. Any particular action may also be viewedas an end whosemeans are the variousmoments of whichit is composed. Dietzgenexplained the relativityof means and ends as follows:"We eat in orderto live; but in as far as we live whilewe eat, we live in orderto eat. As lifeis to its functions, so theend is relatedto itsmeans. Justas lifeis onlythe sum (Inbe- griff)of all life'sfunctions, so the end is thesum of all its means."18 The relativedistinction between means and endsthus reduces itself to the differencebetween particular and general. Whenactions are viewedas particulars,they are means. When they are viewedin communitywith other actions, they are ends. Froma standpointwhich surveys all humanactions there is only one end-human welfare(menschliche Heil). This, said Dietzgen, is the " end of all ends" in relationto whichall particularends are means. Only thoseends deservethe predicate" good" whichare themselvesmeans to the totalityof ends defininghuman welfare. Neglectof thisrelationship leads to misuseof the principlethat the end justifiesthe means, a misuselargely responsible for its ill repute. The meansof the Jesuits,Dietzgen asserted, are evil becausetheir ends-the extensionand glorificationof the order-woulddeprive us ofother essential ends such as publicand bodilysecurity. Even mur- der and manslaughterachieve some particularends, but they are wrongbecause they frustrate a widertotality of ends. In this re- 17 The Natureof HumanBrain Work in PositiveOutcome of Philosophy, 150f., 159,161, et passim(Dietzgens Samtliche Schriften, I, 64f.,72, 74, et passim). 18 Ibid.,166f. (Dietzgens Simtliche Schriften, I, 77). EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 85

spect,then, "welfare" is a principleof ethical criticism bidding us to evaluateany particular ends as a meansin relationto otherand wider ends. But welfare,the community of all ends,Dietzgen warned, is itself an " abstraction" whoseparticular content is as differentas are the times,nations, and personsseeking it. The determinationof whatis wholesomeand conduciveto humanwelfare requires definite condi- tionsand relations." Whereman seekshis welfarein bourgeoislife, in productionand commerce,in the undisturbedpossession of his privateproperty, he clips his long fingerswith the commandment 'Thou shaltnot steal.' But where,on the otherhand, as amongthe Spartans,war is regardedas the supremegood, and craftinessas a necessaryquality of a good warrior,there roguery is employedas a meansof acquiringcunning, and theftis sanctionedas a meansto the end."'1 In respectto its contentthen, "welfare" is relative to socialand historicalcircumstances. Thus,particular acts of conductare goodinsofar as theyachieve a givenend " in thewidest, broadest, most general way " and insofar as thatend, in turn,furthers the totality of endswhich define human welfare. No actionis in itselfgood or bad, rightor wrong. Truth- telling,chastity, and honestyare virtuesbecause of their wide human consequences.Since endsexpress man's various needs and interests, theirmaximum mutual fulfillnent in givensocial circumstancesis the goal of moralendeavor and the generalstandard of moralvalue. Man's interestsinclude " the spiritualas well as the physical,"the heartas well as the purse. Hence " welfare" takesaccount of " the positiveside of modernidealism." It includesenjoyments " of the eye, the ear, of art and science,in short,of the whole man."20 " Duty," " right,"and " good" are to be definedin relationto this generalstandard. Whethera particularact of conductis reasonable and appropriate,whether it achievesa givenend "in the widest, broadest,most general way," is to be determined,Dietzgen held, by inductive,scientific thinking. This typeof thinkingalso appliesto ends since ends are the sum of theirmeans and themselvesmeans to otherends as impliedin the conceptof " welfare." Thus there is one patternof thinkingwhich applies to all aspectsof morality as well as to all aspectsof nature. Dietzgen'sethical vriews were explicitly related to his philosophy of religion. As mightbe expected,he opposedsupernaturalism in all its forms.He regardedthe dualismbetween God and the world -like thatbetween soul and bodyor thoughtand sense-as a mis- chievousproduct of a priorispeculation. He saw clericalismas its 19Positive Outcome of Philosophy,172f. 201bid.,136, 178. 86 LOYD D. EASTON

typicalsocial manifestationsand relentlesslyattacked it at every opportunity. Thoughman's welfareis actually" the originand foundationof the holy,"it can be understood,Dietzgen maintained, only if we go beyondthe specificallyhuman standpoint. Man's good dependson his relationsto thecosmos as wellas to his fellowmen. Thesewider relations,Dietzgen recognized, are the foundationsof a naturalistic religion.He urgedhis fellowsocial democrats to searchfor the per- fect and sublimenot in some transcendentspirit or supernatural personalitybut in " the communionand intimateconnection of all menand things." Dietzgen'ssearch for the cosmicdimension of humangood finally led him to an explicitdefense of pantheism.In this he was influ- encedby Feuerbachand especiallySpinoza. " God, truth,nature," said Dietzgen," are namesfor the same thing."21 He condemned "frivolousatheism " becauseit leads to idol worshipwhich only the "divineworld-truth " can exterminate.He saw thecosmos as similar to the " infinitebeing " of whomJakob Bohme said: " He is neither lightnor darkness, neither love nor anger,but the eternalOne." Is the " worldgod," the Alpha and Omega, the " absolute world-being" anythingmore than an idea? To proveits inescapablereality Dietz- genresorted to one of themost purely a prioriarguments in the his- toryof westernthought-the ontological argument of Anselmand Descartes. Perhaps the most seriousambiguity in Dietzgen'sthought on ethicslies in the shiftof his viewsbetween The Natureof Human Brain Workand " The Ethicsof Social Democracy." In the former his conclusionsas to rightand wrongwere based on inductiveap- praisalof means and ends. In thelatter they were based on thesup- posedlyverifiable progress of social evolutiontoward mutual aid, cooperation,and thebrotherhood of man.22 Dietzgen was apparently unawareof the differencebetween these two positions. The actual trendof social evolutionmight be inductivelyverified. But to call it " progress" is to makea moraljudgment, and Dietzgennever ex- plainedhow the presenceof a social trendsettles the questionof moralvalue.

21PoSitiVe Outcomeof Philosophy,230. See also ibid.,231f., 284.; Dietzgens SamtlicheSchriften, III, 157,223ff.; " Die Gottlosen,"Der Sozialist,I, 5 (1885), 1. Cf. S. Rawidowicz,Ludwig FeuerbachsPhilosophie. Ursprungund Schicksat (Berlin,1931), 455; CornelieHuygens, "Dietzgens Philosophie," Die Neue Zeit, XXI, 1 (1902), 199ff.,emphasizing the kinshipbetween Dietzgen's views and Spinoza'sEthics. 22PhilosophicalEssays, 155-72. One of Dietzgen'sardent disciples, ,sought to base ethicson "the courseof evolution,"a universalstand- ard whichis "intelligibleto everyone."See his Scienceand Revolution(Chicago, 1905),163ff. EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 87 Theremay be groundsfor discounting the importanceof Dietz- gen'sshift toward evolutionary ethics. " The Ethicsof Social Democ- racy,"it mightbe argued,was simplya popularizeddefense of mutual aid and cooperation.His mainview, it mightbe maintained,is to be foundin the earlierand moreprecise treatment of ethicsin The Na- tureof Human Brain Work. Whateverbe the meritsof this ap- proach,there can be littledoubt that his earlierdiscussion of ethics was fullerand moresystematic.

IV At severalimportant points there is a strikingkinship between Dietzgen'sviews and the ethicaltheory developed by JohnDewey in his laterwritings. First, both men seek empiricalfoundations for ethics. Theyrelate moral value to theconcrete satisfactions of wants and needs in particularsituations. Like Dietzgen,Dewey attacks rationalismin ethicsas a mistakenand sociallydangerous effort to separatevalues from" concreteexperiences of desireand satisfac- tion." He seesthe genuine goods of life as remediesfor the needs and deficienciesof specificsituations.23 Secondly,Dietzgen and Dewey do not identifymoral value with any satisfactionbut onlywith that which can be approvedafter de- liberation,after reflective examination of its conditionsand conse- quences. In Dietzgen'sview, moral reasoning works upon given needs and intereststo distinguishthe generalfrom the particular,essential wantsfrom accidental appetites, good needs from bad. It does this by determiningwhat is " generallyuseful or appropriate,"by seeing whethera particularaction realizes its end in " the fullest,broadest, most generalway." SimilarlyDewey maintainsthat " therehave to be certainconditions fulfilled to transforma satisfactioninto a value." Those conditionsinvolve the use of intelligence,empirical knowledge,and reflectivejudgment. Dewey repeatedlyinsists that onlythose satisfactions may properlybe termedvalues whichjudg- menthas approvedafter examining their relations, conditions, and consequences.24 Thirdly,there is a kinshipbetween the viewsof Dietzgenand Deweyon the relationof meansto ends. For Dietzgen,we saw ear- lier,the distinctionbetween ends and meansis a relativeone, and moralreasoning stops short if it keeps themseparate. Dewey fre- quentlyendorsed this position. His treatmentof the maximthat

23See JohnDewey, The Questfor Certainty (New York,1929), 258ff.,Recon- structionin Philosophy(New York, 1920), 175, 165, 169; Theoryof Valuation (Chicago,1939), 45f. 24 See The Quest for Certainty,264f.; Dewey and Tufts,Ethics, rev. (New York,1932), 201, 228. 88 LOYD D. EASTON

" the end justifiesthe means" involveda pointof view veryclose to Dietzgen's. That maximis misused,according to Dietzgen,when we judge actionin relationto a particularend and fail to see that end as a meansin relationto otherwider ends. Dewey findsthe maximobjectionable insofar as it suggeststhat some arbitrarilyse- lectedfragment of the actual consequences " authorizes means used to obtainit, withoutthe needof foreseeingand weighingother ends as consequencesof the means used." And,with Dietzgen, he further insistedthat endsand consequencesmust themselves " be valuedin turnas meansto furtherconsequences." 25 Fromthis view of thein- terrelationof means and endsit followsthat moral judgments can be tested " scientifically" or " inductively."A particularaction as means is judgedby its inductivelydetermined consequences. And sinceends are inseparablefrom their means and themselvesmay be means to otherends, the same methodapplies to ends. For both Dietzgenand Dewey thereis one patternof thinkingwhich applies to all aspectsof moralityas well as to all aspectsof the physical world. Whilethere is no evidencethat Dewey was influencedby or even acquaintedwith Dietzgen'sthought, the similarityof theirviews wouldseem to be a result,in part,of a commonelement in theirintel- lectualbackground-namely, an Hegelianbent toward holism, toward synthesisand unification.Early in his career,under the influence of G. S. Morris,Dewey was an Hegelianidealist. Hegel's " dissolu- tionof hardand fastdividing walls," his synthesisof subjectand ob- ject,matter and spirit,the divineand human,supplied a demandin Deweyfor unification and left " a permanentdeposit " in histhinking.26 Dietzgenwas influencedby the holisticemphasis in Feuerbachwho had followedHegel earlyin his careerand developedhis ownphilos- ophyfrom a criticalrevision of Hegel'ssynthesis of thoughtand sen- sation.27While Dietzgen's early writings attacked Hegel as thearch- representativeofpure speculation, he laterpraised him for seeing that thereare no "unbridgeablegulfs," no absolutedifferences among things. BothDietzgen and Deweycarried into their the

25J.Dewey, Theory of Valuation,42f. Cf. Questfor Certainty, 279-86. 28 JohnDewey, "From Absolutismto Experimentalism' in G. P. Adamsand W. P. Montague,eds., Contemporary American Philosophy (New York,1930), II, 18-21. See MortonWhite, The Originsof Dewey'sInstrumentalism (New York, 1943), Chs. II and XI. 2 See SidneyHook, From Hegel to Marx (New York,1950), 224, 228-32. In an earlyletter, quoted by Hook,Feuerbach explained his philosophicalmethod as aiming"to achievea continuousunification of the noble with the apparently common,of the distantwith the near-at-hand, of theabstract with the concrete,of the speculativewith the empirical,of philosophywith life." Dietzgen, as we have seen,fully shared this aim. EMPIRICISM AND ETHICS IN DIETZGEN 89 Hegeliananimosity toward dualisms. Hence in ethicsthey opposed and triedto mediatethe separationof reasonand experience,science and moraldeliberation, individual needs and socialconditions, means and ends. From the beginningof his philosophicaldevelopment Dietzgen enthusiasticallyembraced empiricism and heldthat thought must be groundedin perceivedfacts. As we have seen,he derivedthis posi- tion primarilyfrom Feuerbach, reinforced it fromKant, and found it confirmedin Humboldt. Aftersome years in the Hegeliancamp, Deweybecame an empiricistbut in a differentway and underdiffer- ent auspices. Dewey's empiricismwas shaped by the influenceof WilliamJames's Psychology and evolutionarybiology. As a conse- quence,he conceived" experience" in termsof thepurposeful activi- tiesof the humanorganism rather than in termsof givensense-data. The maindifferences between Dietzgen and Deweyin theirtheories of knowledgeand ethicsare traceableto theirdifferent views of ex- perienceand its relationto thought. WhileDewey emphasizedthe dynamic,problem-solving role of thought in theflow of human activ- ity,Dietzgen stressed its generalizing,schematic relationship to par- ticulardata of perception.This differenceis furtherreflected in Dewey'semphasis on " growth11 28 and Dietzgen'sspecial use of " wel- fare" as thecentral concept in ethicaltheory. Thereare somesignificant points of agreementbetween Dietzgen and Deweyin mattersof social philosophy.In attacking" absolute morality"and demandingthat moral rules be reflectivelybased on humanneeds, Dietzgen defended " thefreedom of theindividual " as a requirementof his ethicaltheory. He founda sureground of tolerancein " the consciousnessof therelative validity of ourknowl- edge."29 In Dewey'swritings there is a similaremphasis on freedom and tolerance.Fundamental differences between Dietzgen and Dewey appearin theirrelationship to Marxism. Dietzgenproudly acknowledged that his economicviews came ready-made" fromMarx and frequentlyexpressed an indebtedness to Marx and Engelsfor his interpretationof history.Hence he as- sertedthat history as determinedby economicdevelopment " organi- callycontains " thesolution of the problems it raises. In sucha view of historyhe saw the followingimplications: "We are thusrecon- ciledwith the world as it actuallyis," " Whateveris, ought to be,and

28Reconstructionin Philosophy, 177, 186. See also HumanNature and Conduct (New York,1930), 194f., 210f.; White, op. cit.,112f. 29 The Natureof HumanBrain Workin PositiveOutcome of Philosophy,178, 153f. Cf. JosephRatner, ed., Intelligencein the ModernWorld: JohnDewey's Philosophy(New York,1939), 775-8, 431ff. 90 LOYD D. EASTON oughtnot to be otherwiseuntil it is otherwise."30 But he never squaredthis line of thought with the concept of " ends,"" duty,"and " freedomof the individual" in his moraltheory or his own moral condemnationof capitalistsociety. Relyingon Marx's dialectical treatmentof history,he endorsedthe following contradictions: " We preacheternal peace and stimulatethe class struggle.We wantto abolishall dominationby establishingour own domination." But he neverreconciled this stand withhis view that meansand ends are inseparableand theirrelations are to be determined" inductively." Dewey noted-and othershave developedthe point-that there areimportant affinities between his own views and " democraticsocial- ism." But he firmlyrejected the Marxianview of historyand social causation.81Such a view,he charged,essentially denies "moving powerto humanevaluations " and " throwsout psychologicalas well as moralconsiderations " in assertingagainst "utopian socialism>" and " idealism" thateconomic production is the onlygenuine causal factorin history.Its dialecticalprinciple of negatingnegations is a " simplifiedromanticism " which is incompatiblewith scientific social inquiryand the " interdependenceofmeans and ends." Dietzgen'sthought is noteworthyfor other reasons than its strik- inganticipation of Dewey's ethical theory. As partof the educational effortof one of the mostinfluential movements for social reform in Europe and America,Dietzgen's writings brought to manyworking people some vistas of Europeanphilosophy and indicationsof the widerapplicability of scientificknowledge. His books-along with those of Marx, Kautsky,Jack London,Upton Sinclair,Debs, and Darrow-helpedthe Socialist " locals" in Americato become,as Van WyckBrooks has put it, " cosmopolitancenters of newlearning and light." Dietzgenparticularly encouraged the laboringman to dis- coverand develophis ownintellectual powers. He urgedhis readers to learnto thinkfor themselves and devotethemselves, as Spinoza did,to "theimprovement of theunderstanding." In his ownexample he showedthem the possibilitiesof self-educationand the dignityof learning. Ohio WesleyanUniversity. 30The Natureof HumanBrain Workin PositiveOutcome of Philosophy,165. Cf. PhilosophicalEssays, 174f., 195, 163. 31See especiallyFreedom and Culture(New York,1939), Ch. IV. Cf. Dewey, Individualism,Old and New (New York,1930), 117-20; Ratner,op. cit.,405-16, 449; SidneyHook, ed., John Dewey: Philosopherof Scienceand Freedom,A Sym- posium(New York, 1950), 348f.,370f., and 335-8 whereJim Cork argues,with considerableevidence, that Dewey's interpretation ofMarx neglects primary sources and is inaccurateat severalpoints. Our chiefconcern here, however, is not the accuracyof Dewey's interpretation of Marx but whatit revealsabout his own social philosophyvis-a-vis Dietzgen.