TrueCrypt - Introduction

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Introduction Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration This documentation is not guaranteed to be error-free and is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Encryption Algorithms For more information, see Disclaimers. AES Serpent Introduction Twofish Cascades TrueCrypt is software for establishing and maintaining an on-the-fly-encrypted volume (data storage device). On-the-fly encryption means that data is automatically encrypted right before it is saved and Hash Algorithms decrypted right after it is loaded, without any user intervention. No data stored on an encrypted volume RIPEMD-160 can be read (decrypted) without using the correct password/keyfile(s) or correct encryption keys. Entire file SHA-512 system is encrypted (e.g., file names, folder names, contents of every file, free space, meta data, etc). Whirlpool Files can be copied to and from a mounted TrueCrypt volume just like they are copied to/from any normal Technical Details disk (for example, by simple drag-and-drop operations). Files are automatically being decrypted on the fly Notation (in memory/RAM) while they are being read or copied from an encrypted TrueCrypt volume. Similarly, files that are being written or copied to the TrueCrypt volume are automatically being encrypted on the fly Encryption Scheme (right before they are written to the disk) in RAM. Note that this does not mean that the whole file that is Modes of Operation to be encrypted/decrypted must be stored in RAM before it can be encrypted/decrypted. There are no extra Header Key Derivation memory (RAM) requirements for TrueCrypt. For an illustration of how this is accomplished, see the following paragraph. Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Let's suppose that there is an .avi video file stored on a TrueCrypt volume (therefore, the video file is Volume Format Spec. entirely encrypted). The user provides the correct password (and/or keyfile) and mounts (opens) the TrueCrypt volume. When the user double clicks the icon of the video file, the operating system launches the Standards Compliance application associated with the file type – typically a media player. The media player then begins loading a Source Code small initial portion of the video file from the TrueCrypt-encrypted volume to RAM (memory) in order to play it. While the portion is being loaded, TrueCrypt is automatically decrypting it (in RAM). The decrypted TrueCrypt Volume portion of the video (stored in RAM) is then played by the media player. While this portion is being played, Creating New Volumes the media player begins loading another small portion of the video file from the TrueCrypt-encrypted Favorite Volumes volume to RAM (memory) and the process repeats. This process is called on-the-fly encryption/decryption and it works for all file types (not only for video files). System Favorite Volumes

Main Program Window Note that TrueCrypt never saves any decrypted data to a disk – it only stores them temporarily in RAM Program Menu (memory). Even when the volume is mounted, data stored in the volume is still encrypted. When you Mounting Volumes restart Windows or turn off your computer, the volume will be dismounted and files stored in it will be inaccessible (and encrypted). Even when power supply is suddenly interrupted (without proper system shut Supported Systems down), files stored in the volume are inaccessible (and encrypted). To make them accessible again, you Portable Mode have to mount the volume (and provide the correct password and/or keyfile). Keyfiles For a quick start guide, please see the chapter Beginner's Tutorial. Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/[6/16/2013 4:52:16 PM] TrueCrypt - Tutorial 1/5

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Beginner's Tutorial > Part 1 Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Beginner's Tutorial Encryption Algorithms AES How to Create and Use a TrueCrypt Container Serpent Twofish This chapter contains step-by-step instructions on how to create, mount, and use a TrueCrypt volume. We strongly recommend that you also read the other sections of this manual, as they contain important Cascades information. Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 Step 1: SHA-512 Whirlpool If you have not done so, download and install TrueCrypt. Then launch TrueCrypt by double-clicking the file Technical Details TrueCrypt.exe or by clicking the TrueCrypt shortcut in your Windows Start menu. Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Step 2: Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/tutorial[6/16/2013 4:52:19 PM] TrueCrypt - System Encryption

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

System Encryption Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration System Encryption Encryption Algorithms AES TrueCrypt can on-the-fly encrypt a system partition or entire system drive, i.e. a partition or drive where Windows is installed and from which it boots. Serpent Twofish System encryption provides the highest level of security and privacy, because all files, including any Cascades temporary files that Windows and applications create on the system partition (typically, without your Hash Algorithms knowledge or consent), hibernation files, swap files, etc., are always permanently encrypted (even when power supply is suddenly interrupted). Windows also records large amounts of potentially sensitive data, RIPEMD-160 such as the names and locations of files you open, applications you run, etc. All such log files and registry SHA-512 entries are always permanently encrypted too. Whirlpool Technical Details System encryption involves pre-boot authentication, which means that anyone who wants to gain access and use the encrypted system, read and write files stored on the system drive, etc., will need to enter the Notation correct password each time before Windows boots (starts). Pre-boot authentication is handled by the Encryption Scheme TrueCrypt Boot Loader, which resides in the first track of the boot drive and on the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Note that TrueCrypt can encrypt an existing unencrypted system partition/drive in-place while the operating system is running (while the system is being encrypted, you can use your computer as usual without any Random Number Gen. restrictions). Likewise, a TrueCrypt-encrypted system partition/drive can be decrypted in-place while the Keyfiles operating system is running. You can interrupt the process of encryption or decryption anytime, leave the partition/drive partially unencrypted, restart or shut down the computer, and then resume the process, Volume Format Spec. which will continue from the point it was stopped. Standards Compliance Source Code To encrypt a system partition or entire system drive, select System > Encrypt System Partition/Drive and TrueCrypt Volume then follow the instructions in the wizard. To decrypt a system partition/drive, select System > Permanently Decrypt System Partition/Drive. Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes The mode of operation used for system encryption is XTS (see the section Modes of Operation). For further System Favorite Volumes technical details of system encryption, see the section Encryption Scheme in the chapter Technical Details. Main Program Window Program Menu Note: By default, Windows 7 and later boot from a special small partition. The partition contains files that are required to boot the system. Windows allows only applications that have administrator privileges to Mounting Volumes write to the partition (when the system is running). TrueCrypt encrypts the partition only if you choose to Supported Systems encrypt the whole system drive (as opposed to choosing to encrypt only the partition where Windows is Portable Mode installed). Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/system-encryption[6/16/2013 4:52:20 PM] TrueCrypt - Systems Supported for System Encryption

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

System Encryption > Supported Systems Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Operating Systems Supported for System Encryption Encryption Algorithms AES TrueCrypt can currently encrypt the following operating systems: Serpent Twofish Windows 7 (32-bit and 64-bit) Cascades Hash Algorithms Windows Vista (SP1 or later) RIPEMD-160 Windows Vista x64 (64-bit) Edition (SP1 or later) SHA-512 Whirlpool Windows XP

Technical Details Windows XP x64 (64-bit) Edition Notation Windows Server 2008 R2 (64-bit) Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Windows Server 2008 Header Key Derivation Windows Server 2008 x64 (64-bit) Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Windows Server 2003 Volume Format Spec. Windows Server 2003 x64 (64-bit) Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Note: The following operating systems (among others) are not supported: Windows RT, Windows 2003 IA-64, Windows 2008 IA-64, Windows XP IA-64, and the Embedded/Tablet versions of Windows. Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes See also: Supported Operating Systems System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Next Section >> Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/sys-encryption-supported-os[6/16/2013 4:52:21 PM] TrueCrypt - Hidden OS

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

System Encryption > Hidden Operating System Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Hidden Operating System Encryption Algorithms AES It may happen that you are forced by somebody to decrypt the operating system. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to do so (for example, due to extortion). TrueCrypt allows you to Serpent create a hidden operating system whose existence should be impossible to prove (provided that certain Twofish guidelines are followed). Thus, you will not have to decrypt or reveal the password for the hidden operating Cascades system. For more information, see the section Hidden Operating System in the chapter Plausible Deniability. Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160

SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Next Section >> Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-os[6/16/2013 4:52:22 PM] TrueCrypt - Rescue Disk

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

System Encryption > TrueCrypt Rescue Disk Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration TrueCrypt Rescue Disk Encryption Algorithms AES During the process of preparing the encryption of a system partition/drive, TrueCrypt requires that you create a so-called TrueCrypt Rescue Disk (CD/DVD), which serves the following purposes: Serpent Twofish If the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen does not appear after you start your computer (or if Windows Cascades does not boot), the TrueCrypt Boot Loader may be damaged. The TrueCrypt Rescue Disk allows Hash Algorithms you restore it and thus to regain access to your encrypted system and data (however, note that you will still have to enter the correct password then). In the Rescue Disk screen, select Repair Options RIPEMD-160 > Restore TrueCrypt Boot Loader. Then press 'Y' to confirm the action, remove the Rescue Disk SHA-512 from your CD/DVD drive and restart your computer. Whirlpool If the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is frequently damaged (for example, by inappropriately designed Technical Details activation software) or if you do not want the TrueCrypt boot loader to reside on the hard Notation drive (for example, if you want to use an alternative boot loader/manager for other operating systems), you can boot directly from the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk (as it contains the TrueCrypt boot Encryption Scheme loader too) without restoring the boot loader to the hard drive. Just insert your Rescue Disk into Modes of Operation your CD/DVD drive and then enter your password in the Rescue Disk screen. Header Key Derivation If you repeatedly enter the correct password but TrueCrypt says that the password is incorrect, it is Random Number Gen. possible that the master key or other critical data are damaged. The TrueCrypt Rescue Disk Keyfiles allows you to restore them and thus to regain access to your encrypted system and data (however, Volume Format Spec. note that you will still have to enter the correct password then). In the Rescue Disk screen, select Repair Options > Restore key data. Then enter your password, press 'Y' to confirm the action, Standards Compliance remove the Rescue Disk from your CD/DVD drive, and restart your computer. Source Code Note: This feature cannot be used to restore the header of a hidden volume within which a hidden TrueCrypt Volume operating system resides. To restore such a volume header, click Select Device, select the partition Creating New Volumes behind the decoy system partition, click OK, select Tools > Restore Volume Header and then follow Favorite Volumes the instructions.

System Favorite Volumes WARNING: By restoring key data using a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, you also restore the password that Main Program Window was valid when the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk was created. Therefore, whenever you change the password, you should destroy your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk and create a new one (select System -> Program Menu Create Rescue Disk). Otherwise, if an attacker knows your old password (for example, captured by a Mounting Volumes keystroke logger) and if he then finds your old TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, he could use it to restore the Supported Systems key data (the master key encrypted with the old password) and thus decrypt your system partition/drive Portable Mode Keyfiles If Windows is damaged and cannot start, the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk allows you to permanently Tokens & Smart Cards decrypt the partition/drive before Windows starts. In the Rescue Disk screen, select Repair Options > Permanently decrypt system partition/drive. Enter the correct password and wait until decryption Language Packs is complete. Then you can e.g. boot your MS Windows setup CD/DVD to repair your Windows Hot Keys installation. Note that this feature cannot be used to decrypt a hidden volume within which a hidden

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/rescue-disk[6/16/2013 4:52:23 PM] TrueCrypt - Plausible Deniability

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Plausible Deniability Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Plausible Deniability Encryption Algorithms AES In case an adversary forces you to reveal your password, TrueCrypt provides and supports two kinds of plausible deniability: Serpent Twofish 1. Hidden volumes (see the section Hidden Volume) and hidden operating systems (see the section Cascades Hidden Operating System). Hash Algorithms 2. Until decrypted, a TrueCrypt partition/device appears to consist of nothing more than random data RIPEMD-160 (it does not contain any kind of "signature"). Therefore, it should be impossible to prove that a SHA-512 partition or a device is a TrueCrypt volume or that it has been encrypted (provided that the security Whirlpool requirements and precautions listed in the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions are followed). A possible plausible explanation for the existence of a partition/device containing solely Technical Details random data is that you have wiped (securely erased) the content of the partition/device using one Notation of the tools that erase data by overwriting it with random data (in fact, TrueCrypt can be used to securely erase a partition/device too, by creating an empty encrypted partition/device-hosted Encryption Scheme volume within it). However, you need to prevent data leaks (see the section Data Leaks) and also Modes of Operation note that, for system encryption, the first drive track contains the (unencrypted) TrueCrypt Boot Header Key Derivation Loader, which can be easily identified as such (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption). When using system encryption, plausible deniability can be achieved by creating a Random Number Gen. hidden operating system (see the section Hidden Operating System). Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Although file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes (containers) do not contain any kind of "signature" either (until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of random data), they cannot provide this kind of Standards Compliance plausible deniability, because there is practically no plausible explanation for the existence of a file Source Code containing solely random data. However, plausible deniability can still be achieved with a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume (container) by creating a hidden volume within it (see above). TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Notes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window When formatting a hard disk partition as a TrueCrypt volume (or encrypting a partition in place), the partition table (including the partition type) is never modified (no TrueCrypt "signature" or "ID" Program Menu is written to the partition table). Mounting Volumes Supported Systems There are methods to find files or devices containing random data (such as TrueCrypt volumes). Note, however, that this should not affect plausible deniability in any way. The adversary still should Portable Mode not be able to prove that the partition/device is a TrueCrypt volume or that the file, partition, or Keyfiles device, contains a hidden TrueCrypt volume (provided that you follow the security requirements and precautions listed in the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions and in the subsection Tokens & Smart Cards Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes). Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/plausible-deniability[6/16/2013 4:52:24 PM] TrueCrypt - Hidden Volume

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Plausible Deniability > Hidden Volume Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Hidden Volume Encryption Algorithms AES It may happen that you are forced by somebody to reveal the password to an encrypted volume. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to reveal the password (for example, due to extortion). Using a Serpent so-called hidden volume allows you to solve such situations without revealing the password to your Twofish volume. Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards The layout of a standard TrueCrypt volume before and after a hidden volume was created within it. Language Packs Hot Keys The p inciple is that a T eC pt ol me is c eated ithin anothe T eC pt ol me ( ithin the f ee space

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume[6/16/2013 4:52:25 PM] TrueCrypt - Protection of Hidden Volumes

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Plausible Deniability > Hidden Volume > Protection of Hidden Volumes Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Protection of Hidden Volumes Against Damage Encryption Algorithms AES If you mount a TrueCrypt volume within which there is a hidden volume, you may read data stored on the (outer) volume without any risk. However, if you (or the operating system) need to save data to the outer Serpent volume, there is a risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (overwritten). To prevent this, you should Twofish protect the hidden volume in a way described in this section. Cascades Hash Algorithms When mounting an outer volume, type in its password and before clicking OK, click Mount Options: RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code In the Mount Options dialog window, enable the option 'Protect hidden volume against damage caused by writing to outer volume '. In the 'Password to hidden volume' input field, type the password for the hidden TrueCrypt Volume volume. Click OK and, in the main password entry dialog, click OK. Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume-protection[6/16/2013 4:52:26 PM] TrueCrypt - Hidden Volume Precautions

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Plausible Deniability > Hidden Volume > Security Requirements for Hidden Volumes Search Introduction Beginner's Tutorial Disclaimers System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >> Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes Encryption Algorithms

AES If you use a hidden TrueCrypt volume, you must follow the security requirements and precautions listed Serpent below in this section. Disclaimer: This section is not guaranteed to contain a list of all security issues and attacks that might adversely affect or limit the ability of TrueCrypt to secure data stored in a hidden Twofish TrueCrypt volume and the ability to provide plausible deniability. Cascades Hash Algorithms If an adversary has access to a (dismounted) TrueCrypt volume at several points over time, he may RIPEMD-160 be able to determine which sectors of the volume are changing. If you change the contents of a hidden volume (e.g., create/copy new files to the hidden volume or modify/delete/rename/move SHA-512 files stored on the hidden volume, etc.), the contents of sectors (ciphertext) in the hidden volume Whirlpool area will change. After being given the password to the outer volume, the adversary might demand Technical Details an explanation why these sectors changed. Your failure to provide a plausible explanation might indicate the existence of a hidden volume within the outer volume. Notation Encryption Scheme Note that issues similar to the one described above may also arise, for example, in the following cases: Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation The file system in which you store a file-hosted TrueCrypt container has been defragmented Random Number Gen. and a copy of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) remains in the free space on the Keyfiles host volume (in the defragmented file system). To prevent this, do one of the following: Volume Format Spec. Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. Standards Compliance Securely erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after Source Code defragmenting. TrueCrypt Volume Do not defragment file systems in which you store TrueCrypt volumes. Creating New Volumes A file-hosted TrueCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS). A copy Favorite Volumes of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain on the host volume. To prevent System Favorite Volumes this, do one the following: Main Program Window Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. Program Menu Store the container in a non-journaling file system (for example, FAT32). Mounting Volumes Supported Systems A TrueCrypt volume resides on a device/filesystem that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism Portable Mode (e.g. a flash-memory SSD or USB flash drive). A copy of (a fragment of) the TrueCrypt volume may remain on the device. Therefore, do not store hidden volumes on such Keyfiles devices/filesystems. For more information on wear-leveling, see the section Wear-Leveling in Tokens & Smart Cards the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions. Language Packs A TrueCrypt volume resides on a device/filesystem that saves data (or on a device/filesystem Hot Keys that is controlled or monitored by a system/device that saves data) (e.g. the value of a timer

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume-precautions[6/16/2013 4:52:27 PM] TrueCrypt - Hidden Operating System

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Introduction Plausible Deniability > Hidden Operating System Search Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Disclaimers Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Plausible Deniability Please consider making a donation. Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Parallelization Donate Now >> Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms Hidden Operating System AES

Serpent If your system partition or system drive is encrypted using TrueCrypt, you need to enter your pre-boot Twofish authentication password in the TrueCrypt Boot Loader screen after you turn on or restart your computer. It may happen that you are forced by somebody to decrypt the operating system or to reveal the pre-boot Cascades authentication password. There are many situations where you cannot refuse to do so (for example, due to Hash Algorithms extortion). TrueCrypt allows you to create a hidden operating system whose existence should be impossible RIPEMD-160 to prove (provided that certain guidelines are followed — see below). Thus, you will not have to decrypt or reveal the password for the hidden operating system. SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Before you continue reading this section, make sure you have read the section Hidden Volume and that you understand what a hidden TrueCrypt volume is. Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. A hidden operating system is a system (for example, Windows 7 or Windows XP) that is installed in a hidden TrueCrypt volume. It should be impossible to prove that a hidden TrueCrypt volume exists Keyfiles (provided that certain guidelines are followed; for more information, see the section Hidden Volume) and, Volume Format Spec. therefore, it should be impossible to prove that a hidden operating system exists. Standards Compliance However, in order to boot a system encrypted by TrueCrypt, an unencrypted copy of the TrueCrypt Boot Source Code Loader has to be stored on the system drive or on a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Hence, the mere presence of TrueCrypt Volume the TrueCrypt Boot Loader can indicate that there is a system encrypted by TrueCrypt on the computer. Creating New Volumes Therefore, to provide a plausible explanation for the presence of the TrueCrypt Boot Loader, the TrueCrypt helps you create a second encrypted operating system, so-called decoy operating system, during the Favorite Volumes process of creation of a hidden operating system. A decoy operating system must not contain any sensitive System Favorite Volumes files. Its existence is not secret (it is not installed in a hidden volume). The password for the decoy Main Program Window operating system can be safely revealed to anyone forcing you to disclose your pre-boot authentication password.* Program Menu

Mounting Volumes You should use the decoy operating system as frequently as you use your computer. Ideally, you should Supported Systems use it for all activities that do not involve sensitive data. Otherwise, plausible deniability of the hidden operating system might be adversely affected (if you revealed the password for the decoy operating system Portable Mode to an adversary, he could find out that the system is not used very often, which might indicate the Keyfiles existence of a hidden operating system on your computer). Note that you can save data to the decoy Tokens & Smart Cards system partition anytime without any risk that the hidden volume will get damaged (because the decoy system is not installed in the outer volume — see below). Language Packs Hot Keys There will be two pre-boot authentication passwords — one for the hidden system and the other for the Security Model decoy system. If you want to start the hidden system, you simply enter the password for the hidden

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-operating-system[6/16/2013 4:52:29 PM] TrueCrypt - Parallelization

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Beginner's Tutorial Parallelization Search System Encryption Supported Systems Disclaimers Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Please consider making a donation. Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Parallelization Pipelining Donate Now >> Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Parallelization Serpent

Twofish When your computer has a multi-core processor (or multiple processors), TrueCrypt uses all of the cores Cascades (or processors) in parallel for encryption and decryption. For example, when TrueCrypt is to decrypt a chunk of data, it first splits the chunk into several smaller pieces. The number of the pieces is equal to the Hash Algorithms number of the cores (or processors). Then, all of the pieces are decrypted in parallel (piece 1 is decrypted RIPEMD-160 by thread 1, piece 2 is decrypted by thread 2, etc). The same method is used for encryption. SHA-512 Whirlpool So if your computer has, for example, a quad-core processor, then encryption and decryption are four times faster than on a single-core processor with equivalent specifications (likewise, they are twice faster Technical Details on dual-core processors, etc). Notation Encryption Scheme Increase in encryption/decryption speed is directly proportional to the number of cores and/or processors. Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Note: Processors with the Hyper-Threading technology provide multiple logical cores per one physical core (or multiple logical processors per one physical processor). When Hyper Threading is enabled in the Random Number Gen. computer firmware (e.g. BIOS) settings, TrueCrypt creates one thread for each logical core/processor. For Keyfiles example, on a 6-core processor that provides two logical cores per one physical core, TrueCrypt uses 12 Volume Format Spec. threads. Standards Compliance

Source Code When your computer has a multi-core processor/CPU (or multiple processors/CPUs), header key derivation TrueCrypt Volume is parallelized too. As a result, mounting of a volume is several times faster on a multi-core processor (or Creating New Volumes multi-processor computer) than on a single-core processor (or a single-processor computer) with equivalent specifications. Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Note: Parallelization was introduced in TrueCrypt 6.0. Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode See also: Pipelining, Hardware Acceleration Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/parallelization[6/16/2013 4:52:30 PM] TrueCrypt - Pipelining

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact System Encryption Pipelining Search Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Disclaimers Rescue Disk Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Please consider making a donation. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Donate Now >> Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Pipelining Twofish

Cascades When encrypting or decrypting data, TrueCrypt uses so-called pipelining (asynchronous processing). While Hash Algorithms an application is loading a portion of a file from a TrueCrypt-encrypted volume/drive, TrueCrypt is automatically decrypting it (in RAM). Thanks to pipelining, the application does not have wait for any RIPEMD-160 portion of the file to be decrypted and it can start loading other portions of the file right away. The same SHA-512 applies to encryption when writing data to an encrypted volume/drive. Whirlpool Technical Details Pipelining allows data to be read from and written to an encrypted drive as fast as if the drive was not encrypted (the same applies to file-hosted and partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes).* Notation Encryption Scheme Note: Pipelining was introduced in TrueCrypt 5.0 and it is implemented only in the Windows versions of Modes of Operation TrueCrypt. Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen.

Keyfiles * Some solid-state drives compress data internally, which appears to increase the actual read/write speed when the Volume Format Spec. data is compressible (for example, text files). However, encrypted data cannot be compressed (as it appears to consist solely of random "noise" without any compressible patterns). This may have various implications. For Standards Compliance example, benchmarking software that reads or writes compressible data (such as sequences of zeroes) will report Source Code lower speeds on encrypted volumes than on unencrypted volumes (to avoid this, use benchmarking software that reads/writes random or other kinds of uncompressible data). TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes See also: Parallelization, Hardware Acceleration System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/pipelining[6/16/2013 4:52:31 PM] TrueCrypt - Hardware Acceleration

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Supported Systems Hardware Acceleration Search Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Disclaimers Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Please consider making a donation. Hidden Operating System Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms Donate Now >> AES Serpent Twofish Hardware Acceleration Cascades

Hash Algorithms Some processors (CPUs) support hardware-accelerated AES encryption,* which is typically 4-8 times faster RIPEMD-160 than encryption performed by the purely software implementation on the same processors. SHA-512 Whirlpool By default, TrueCrypt uses hardware-accelerated AES on computers that have a processor where the Intel AES-NI instructions are available. Specifically, TrueCrypt uses the AES-NI instructions that perform so- Technical Details called AES rounds (i.e. the main portions of the AES algorithm).** TrueCrypt does not use any of the AES- Notation NI instructions that perform key generation. Encryption Scheme Note: By default, TrueCrypt uses hardware-accelerated AES also when an encrypted Windows system is Modes of Operation booting or resuming from hibernation (provided that the processor supports the Intel AES-NI instructions). Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. To find out whether TrueCrypt can use hardware-accelerated AES on your computer, select Settings > Keyfiles Performance and check the field labeled 'Processor (CPU) in this computer supports hardware acceleration for AES'. Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance To find out whether a processor you want to purchase supports the Intel AES-NI instructions (also called Source Code "AES New Instructions"), which TrueCrypt uses for hardware-accelerated AES, please check the TrueCrypt Volume documentation for the processor or contact the vendor/manufacturer. Alternatively, peruse this official list of Intel processors that support the AES-NI instructions or use the official AMD website to find such AMD Creating New Volumes processors. However, note that some Intel processors, which the Intel website lists as AES-NI-supporting, Favorite Volumes actually support the AES-NI instructions only with a Processor Configuration update (for example, i7- System Favorite Volumes 2630/2635QM, i7-2670/2675QM, i5-2430/2435M, i5-2410/2415M). In such cases, you should contact the manufacturer of the motherboard/computer for a BIOS update that includes the latest Processor Main Program Window Configuration update for the processor. Program Menu Mounting Volumes If you want to disable hardware acceleration of AES (e.g. because you want TrueCrypt to use only a fully open-source implementation of AES), you can do so by selecting Settings > Performance and disabling the Supported Systems option 'Accelerate AES encryption/decryption by using the AES instructions of the processor'. Note that Portable Mode when this setting is changed, the operating system needs to be restarted to ensure that all TrueCrypt Keyfiles components internally perform the requested change of mode. Also note that when you create a TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, the state of this option is written to the Rescue Disk and used whenever you boot from it Tokens & Smart Cards (affecting the pre-boot and initial boot phase). To create a new TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, select System > Language Packs Create Rescue Disk. Hot Keys Security Model Note: Support for hardware acceleration was introduced in TrueCrypt 7.0. Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File * I thi h t th d ' ti ' l f t d ti

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hardware-acceleration[6/16/2013 4:52:32 PM] TrueCrypt - Encryption Algorithms

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Hidden Operating System Encryption Algorithms Search Rescue Disk Plausible Deniability Disclaimers Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Please consider making a donation. Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Donate Now >> Serpent Twofish Cascades Encryption Algorithms Hash Algorithms

RIPEMD-160 TrueCrypt volumes can be encrypted using the following algorithms: SHA-512 Whirlpool Key Size Block Size Mode of Technical Details Algorithm Designer(s) (Bits) (Bits) Operation Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation AES J. Daemen, V. Rijmen 256 128 XTS Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Serpent R. Anderson, E. Biham, L. Knudsen 256 128 XTS Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance B. Schneier, J. Kelsey, D. Whiting, Twofish 256 128 XTS Source Code D. Wagner, C. Hall, N. Ferguson TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes AES-Twofish 256; 256 128 XTS Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes AES-Twofish-Serpent 256; 256; 256 128 XTS Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Serpent-AES 256; 256 128 XTS Supported Systems Portable Mode Serpent-Twofish-AES 256; 256; 256 128 XTS Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards

Language Packs Twofish-Serpent 256; 256 128 XTS Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements For information about XTS mode, please see the section Modes of Operation. Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/encryption-algorithms[6/16/2013 4:52:33 PM] TrueCrypt - AES

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Rescue Disk Encryption Algorithms > AES Search Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Disclaimers Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Parallelization Please consider making a donation. Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Donate Now >> Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms AES RIPEMD-160

SHA-512 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithm (Rijndael, Whirlpool designed by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, published in 1998) that may be used by US federal departments and agencies to cryptographically protect sensitive information [3]. TrueCrypt uses AES with Technical Details 14 rounds and a 256-bit key (i.e., AES-256, published in 2001) operating in XTS mode (see the section Notation Modes of Operation). Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation In June 2003, after the NSA (US National Security Agency) conducted a review and analysis of AES, the U.S. CNSS (Committee on National Security Systems) announced in [1] that the design and strength of Header Key Derivation AES-256 (and AES-192) are sufficient to protect classified information up to the Top Secret level. This is Random Number Gen. applicable to all U.S. Government Departments or Agencies that are considering the acquisition or use of Keyfiles products incorporating the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to satisfy Information Assurance requirements associated with the protection of national security systems and/or national security Volume Format Spec. information [1]. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Next Section >> System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/aes[6/16/2013 4:52:34 PM] TrueCrypt - Serpent

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Plausible Deniability Encryption Algorithms > Serpent Search Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Disclaimers Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Parallelization Pipelining Please consider making a donation. Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Twofish Donate Now >> Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 Serpent SHA-512

Whirlpool Designed by Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, and Lars Knudsen; published in 1998. It uses a 256-bit key, 128-bit Technical Details block, and operates in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Serpent was one of the AES finalists. It was not selected as the proposed AES algorithm even though it appeared to have a higher Notation security margin than the winning Rijndael [4]. More concretely, Serpent appeared to have a high security Encryption Scheme margin, while Rijndael appeared to have only an adequate security margin [4]. Rijndael has also received Modes of Operation some criticism suggesting that its mathematical structure might lead to attacks in the future [4]. Header Key Derivation In [5], the Twofish team presents a table of safety factors for the AES finalists. Safety factor is defined as: Random Number Gen. number of rounds of the full cipher divided by the largest number of rounds that has been broken. Hence, a Keyfiles broken cipher has the lowest safety factor 1. Serpent had the highest safety factor of the AES finalists: 3.56 Volume Format Spec. (for all supported key sizes). Rijndael-256 had a safety factor of 1.56. Standards Compliance In spite of these facts, Rijndael was considered an appropriate selection for the AES for its combination of Source Code security, performance, efficiency, implementability, and flexibility [4]. At the last AES Candidate Conference, TrueCrypt Volume Rijndael got 86 votes, Serpent got 59 votes, Twofish 31 got votes, RC6 got 23 votes, and MARS got 13 Creating New Volumes votes [18, 19].* Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window * These are positive votes. If negative votes are subtracted from the positive votes, the following results are obtained: Rijndael: 76 votes, Serpent: 52 votes, Twofish: 10 votes, RC6: -14 votes, MARS: -70 votes [19]. Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Next Section >> Portable Mode Keyfiles Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/serpent[6/16/2013 4:52:35 PM] TrueCrypt - Twofish

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Hidden Volume Encryption Algorithms > Twofish Search Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Disclaimers Hidden Operating System Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Please consider making a donation. Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Twofish Cascades Donate Now >> Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Twofish Whirlpool

Technical Details Designed by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey, Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson; Notation published in 1998. It uses a 256-bit key and 128-bit block and operates in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Twofish was one of the AES finalists. This cipher uses key-dependent S-boxes. Encryption Scheme Twofish may be viewed as a collection of 2128 different cryptosystems, where 128 bits derived from a 256- Modes of Operation bit key control the selection of the cryptosystem [4]. In [13], the Twofish team asserts that key-dependent Header Key Derivation S-boxes constitute a form of security margin against unknown attacks [4]. Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Next Section >> Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/twofish[6/16/2013 4:52:36 PM] TrueCrypt - Cascades

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Protection of Hidden Vol. Encryption Algorithms > Cascades Search Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Disclaimers Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms Please consider making a donation. AES Serpent Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms Donate Now >> RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool AES-Twofish Technical Details

Notation Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128- Encryption Scheme bit block is first encrypted with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note Modes of Operation that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see Header Header Key Derivation Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers. Random Number Gen. Keyfiles AES-Twofish-Serpent Volume Format Spec. Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128- Standards Compliance bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS Source Code mode, and finally with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All TrueCrypt Volume encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). Creating New Volumes See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers. Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Serpent-AES Main Program Window Program Menu Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128- bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS Mounting Volumes mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note Supported Systems that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the Portable Mode section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers. Keyfiles

Tokens & Smart Cards Serpent-Twofish-AES Language Packs Hot Keys Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128- Security Model bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode, and finally with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. Security Requirements All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though Data Leaks they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers. Paging File Hibernation File Twofish-Serpent Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128- Physical Security bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent Malware (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/cascades[6/16/2013 4:52:37 PM] TrueCrypt - Hash Algorithms

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Security Requirements Hash Algorithms Search Hidden Operating System Parallelization Disclaimers Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Please consider making a donation. Serpent Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 Donate Now >> SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Hash Algorithms Notation

Encryption Scheme In the Volume Creation Wizard, in the password change dialog window, and in the Keyfile Generator dialog Modes of Operation window, you can select a hash algorithm. A user-selected hash algorithm is used by the TrueCrypt Random Number Generator as a pseudorandom "mixing" function, and by the header key derivation function (HMAC Header Key Derivation based on a hash function, as specified in PKCS #5 v2.0) as a pseudorandom function. When creating a new Random Number Gen. volume, the Random Number Generator generates the master key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt. Keyfiles For more information, please see the section Random Number Generator and section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count. Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance TrueCrypt currently supports the following hash algorithms: Source Code TrueCrypt Volume RIPEMD-160 Creating New Volumes SHA-512 Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Whirlpool Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Next Section >> Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hash-algorithms[6/16/2013 4:52:38 PM] TrueCrypt - RIPEMD-160

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Hidden Operating System Hash Algorithms > RIPEMD-160 Search Parallelization Pipelining Disclaimers Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Please consider making a donation. Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Donate Now >> Whirlpool Technical Details Notation RIPEMD-160 Encryption Scheme

Modes of Operation RIPEMD-160, published in 1996, is a hash algorithm designed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Header Key Derivation Bart Preneel in an open academic community. The size of the output of RIPEMD-160 is 160 bits. RIPEMD- 160 is a strengthened version of the RIPEMD hash algorithm that was developed in the framework of the Random Number Gen. European Union's project RIPE (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation), 1988-1992. RIPEMD-160 was adopted Keyfiles by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the IEC in the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Volume Format Spec. international standard [21]. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Next Section >> Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/ripemd-160[6/16/2013 4:52:39 PM] TrueCrypt - SHA-512

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Parallelization Hash Algorithms > SHA-512 Search Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Disclaimers Encryption Algorithms AES Serpent Twofish Please consider making a donation. Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Donate Now >> Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme SHA-512 Modes of Operation

Header Key Derivation SHA-512 is a hash algorithm designed by the NSA and published by NIST in FIPS PUB 180-2 [14] in 2002 Random Number Gen. (the first draft was published in 2001). The size of the output of this algorithm is 512 bits. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code Next Section >> TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/sha-512[6/16/2013 4:52:40 PM] TrueCrypt - Whirlpool

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Pipelining Hash Algorithms > Whirlpool Search Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms Disclaimers AES Serpent Twofish Cascades Please consider making a donation. Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Donate Now >> Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Whirlpool Header Key Derivation

Random Number Gen. The Whirlpool hash algorithm was designed by Vincent Rijmen (co-designer of the AES encryption Keyfiles algorithm) and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. The size of the output of this algorithm is 512 bits. The first version of Whirlpool, now called Whirlpool-0, was published in November 2000. The second version, now called Volume Format Spec. Whirlpool-T, was selected for the NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption) Standards Compliance portfolio of cryptographic primitives (a project organized by the European Union, similar to the AES Source Code competition). TrueCrypt uses the third (final) version of Whirlpool, which was adopted by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the IEC in the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 international standard TrueCrypt Volume [21]. Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu See also: Encryption Algorithms, Technical Details Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/whirlpool[6/16/2013 4:52:41 PM] TrueCrypt - Technical Details

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Hardware Acceleration Technical Details Search Encryption Algorithms AES Disclaimers Serpent Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms Please consider making a donation. RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Donate Now >> Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Technical Details Random Number Gen.

Keyfiles Notation Volume Format Spec. Encryption Scheme Standards Compliance Source Code Modes of Operation TrueCrypt Volume Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Random Number Generator System Favorite Volumes Keyfiles Main Program Window Program Menu TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification Mounting Volumes Compliance with Standards and Specifications Supported Systems Portable Mode Source Code Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Next Section >> Data Leaks Paging File Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/technical-details[6/16/2013 4:52:50 PM] TrueCrypt - Technical Details Notation

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Encryption Algorithms Technical Details > Notation Search AES Serpent Disclaimers Twofish Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 Please consider making a donation. SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Donate Now >> Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Notation Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance C Cipher text block Source Code DK() Decryption algorithm using encryption/decryption key K TrueCrypt Volume

Creating New Volumes EK() Encryption algorithm using encryption/decryption key K Favorite Volumes H() Hash function System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window i Block index for n-bit blocks; n is context-dependent Program Menu K Cryptographic key Mounting Volumes Supported Systems P Plaintext block Portable Mode ^ Bitwise exclusive-OR operation (XOR) Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Modulo 2n addition, where n is the bit size of the left-most operand and of the resultant value Language Packs (e.g., if the left operand is a 1-bit value, and the right operand is a 2-bit value, then: 1 0 = 1; 1 1 = 0; 1 2 = 1; 1 3 = 0; 0 0 = 0; 0 1 = 1; 0 2 = 0; 0 3 = 1) Hot Keys Security Model Modular multiplication of two polynomials over the binary field GF(2), modulo x128+x7+x2+x+1 Security Requirements (GF stands for Galois Field)

Data Leaks || Concatenation Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Next Section >> Physical Security Malware Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/technical-details-notation[6/16/2013 4:52:52 PM] TrueCrypt - Encryption Scheme

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact AES Technical Details > Encryption Scheme Search Serpent Twofish Disclaimers Cascades Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Please consider making a donation. Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Donate Now >> Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Encryption Scheme Volume Format Spec.

Standards Compliance When mounting a TrueCrypt volume (assume there are no cached passwords/keyfiles) or when performing Source Code pre-boot authentication, the following steps are performed: TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes 1. The first 512 bytes of the volume (i.e., the standard volume header) are read into RAM, out of which the first 64 bytes are the salt (see TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification). For system encryption Favorite Volumes (see the chapter System Encryption), the last 512 bytes of the first logical drive track are read into System Favorite Volumes RAM (the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is stored in the first track of the system drive and/or on the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk). Main Program Window Program Menu 2. Bytes 65536–66047 of the volume are read into RAM (see the section TrueCrypt Volume Format Mounting Volumes Specification). For system encryption, bytes 65536–66047 of the first partition located behind the active partition* are read into RAM (see the section Hidden Operating System). If there is a hidden Supported Systems volume within this volume (or within the partition behind the active partition), we have read its Portable Mode header at this point; otherwise, we have just read random data (whether or not there is a hidden volume within it has to be determined by attempting to decrypt this data; for more information see Keyfiles the section Hidden Volume). Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs 3. Now TrueCrypt attempts to decrypt the standard volume header read in (1). All data used and generated in the course of the process of decryption are kept in RAM (TrueCrypt never saves them Hot Keys to disk). The following parameters are unknown** and have to be determined through the process Security Model of trial and error (i.e., by testing all possible combinations of the following): Security Requirements Data Leaks a. PRF used by the header key derivation function (as specified in PKCS #5 v2.0; see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count), which can be one of the following: Paging File Hibernation File HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-RIPEMD-160, HMAC-Whirlpool. Memory Dump Files A password entered by the user (to which one or more keyfiles may have been applied – see Unencrypted Data in RAM the section Keyfiles) and the salt read in (1) are passed to the header key derivation Physical Security function, which produces a sequence of values (see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count) from which the header encryption key and secondary header key (XTS Malware mode) are formed. (These keys are used to decrypt the volume header.) Multi-User Environment b. Encryption algorithm: AES-256, Serpent, Twofish, AES-Serpent, AES-Twofish-Serpent, etc. Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles c. Mode of operation: XTS, LRW (deprecated/legacy), CBC (deprecated/legacy) Password/Keyfile Change d. Key size(s) Trim Operation Wear-Leveling 4. Decryption is considered successful if the first 4 bytes of the decrypted data contain the ASCII string Reallocated Sectors "TRUE", and if the CRC-32 checksum of the last 256 bytes of the decrypted data (volume header)

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/encryption-scheme[6/16/2013 4:52:53 PM] TrueCrypt - Modes of Operation

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Serpent Technical Details > Modes of Operation Search Twofish Cascades Disclaimers Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Please consider making a donation. Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Donate Now >> Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Modes of Operation Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume The mode of operation used by TrueCrypt for encrypted partitions, drives, and virtual volumes is XTS. Creating New Volumes XTS mode is in fact XEX mode [12], which was designed by Phillip Rogaway in 2003, with a minor Favorite Volumes modification (XEX mode uses a single key for two different purposes, whereas XTS mode uses two System Favorite Volumes independent keys).

Main Program Window In 2010, XTS mode was approved by NIST for protecting the confidentiality of data on storage devices Program Menu [24]. In 2007, it was also approved by the IEEE for cryptographic protection of data on block-oriented Mounting Volumes storage devices (IEEE 1619). Supported Systems Portable Mode

Keyfiles Description of XTS mode: Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs i i Ci = EK1(Pi ^ (EK2(n) a )) ^ (EK2(n) a ) Hot Keys

Security Model Where: Security Requirements Data Leaks denotes multiplication of two polynomials over the binary field GF(2) modulo x128+x7+x2+x+1 Paging File K1 is the encryption key (256-bit for each supported cipher; i.e, AES, Serpent, and Twofish) Hibernation File Memory Dump Files K2 is the secondary key (256-bit for each supported cipher; i.e, AES, Serpent, and Twofish) Unencrypted Data in RAM i is the cipher block index within a data unit; for the first cipher block within a data unit, i = 0 Physical Security Malware n is the data unit index within the scope of K1; for the first data unit, n = 0 Multi-User Environment a is a primitive element of Galois Field (2128) that corresponds to polynomial x (i.e., 2) Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Note: The remaining symbols are defined in the section Notation. Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation The size of each data unit is always 512 bytes (regardless of the sector size). Wear-Leveling

Reallocated Sectors For further information pertaining to XTS mode, see e.g. [12] and [24]. Defragmenting

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/modes-of-operation[6/16/2013 4:52:54 PM] TrueCrypt - Header Key Derivation

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Twofish Technical Details > Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count Search Cascades Hash Algorithms Disclaimers RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Please consider making a donation. Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Donate Now >> Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count Source Code

TrueCrypt Volume Header key is used to encrypt and decrypt the encrypted area of the TrueCrypt volume header (for system Creating New Volumes encryption, of the keydata area), which contains the master key and other data (see the sections Encryption Scheme and TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification). In volumes created by TrueCrypt 5.0 or Favorite Volumes later (and for system encryption), the area is encrypted in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). System Favorite Volumes The method that TrueCrypt uses to generate the header key and the secondary header key (XTS mode) is Main Program Window PBKDF2, specified in PKCS #5 v2.0; see [7]. Program Menu 512 Mounting Volumes 512-bit salt is used, which means there are 2 keys for each password. This significantly decreases vulnerability to 'off-line' dictionary/'rainbow table' attacks (pre-computing all the keys for a dictionary of Supported Systems passwords is very difficult when a salt is used) [7]. The salt consists of random values generated by the Portable Mode TrueCrypt random number generator during the volume creation process. The header key derivation function is based on HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-RIPEMD-160, or HMAC-Whirlpool (see [8, 9, 20, 22]) – the user Keyfiles selects which. The length of the derived key does not depend on the size of the output of the underlying Tokens & Smart Cards hash function. For example, a header key for the AES-256 cipher is always 256 bits long even if HMAC- Language Packs RIPEMD-160 is used (in XTS mode, an additional 256-bit secondary header key is used; hence, two 256-bit keys are used for AES-256 in total). For more information, refer to [7]. 1000 iterations (or 2000 iterations Hot Keys when HMAC-RIPEMD-160 is used as the underlying hash function) of the key derivation function have to be Security Model performed to derive a header key, which increases the time necessary to perform an exhaustive search for Security Requirements passwords (i.e., brute force attack) [7]. Data Leaks Header keys used by ciphers in a cascade are mutually independent, even though they are derived from a Paging File single password (to which keyfiles may have been applied). For example, for the AES-Twofish-Serpent Hibernation File cascade, the header key derivation function is instructed to derive a 768-bit encryption key from a given password (and, for XTS mode, in addition, a 768-bit secondary header key from the given password). The Memory Dump Files generated 768-bit header key is then split into three 256-bit keys (for XTS mode, the secondary header Unencrypted Data in RAM key is split into three 256-bit keys too, so the cascade actually uses six 256-bit keys in total), out of which Physical Security the first key is used by Serpent, the second key is used by Twofish, and the third by AES (in addition, for XTS mode, the first secondary key is used by Serpent, the second secondary key is used by Twofish, and Malware the third secondary key by AES). Hence, even when an adversary has one of the keys, he cannot use it to Multi-User Environment derive the other keys, as there is no feasible method to determine the password from which the key was Authenticity and Integrity derived (except for brute force attack mounted on a weak password). New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Next Section >> Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Journaling File Systems

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/header-key-derivation[6/16/2013 4:52:55 PM] TrueCrypt - RNG

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Cascades Technical Details > Random Number Generator Search Hash Algorithms RIPEMD-160 Disclaimers SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Please consider making a donation. Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Donate Now >> Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code Random Number Generator TrueCrypt Volume

Creating New Volumes The random number generator (RNG) is used to generate the master encryption key, the secondary key Favorite Volumes (XTS mode), salt, and keyfiles. It creates a pool of random values in RAM (memory). The pool, which is 320 bytes long, is filled with data from the following sources: System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Mouse movements Program Menu Mounting Volumes Keystrokes Supported Systems Mac OS X and Linux: Values generated by the built-in RNG (both /dev/random and /dev/urandom) Portable Mode Keyfiles MS Windows: Windows CryptoAPI (collected regularly at 500-ms interval)

Tokens & Smart Cards MS Windows: Network interface statistics (NETAPI32) Language Packs MS Windows: Various Win32 handles, time variables, and counters (collected regularly at 500-ms Hot Keys interval) Security Model Security Requirements Before a value obtained from any of the above-mentioned sources is written to the pool, it is divided into Data Leaks individual bytes (e.g., a 32-bit number is divided into four bytes). These bytes are then individually written 8 Paging File to the pool with the modulo 2 addition operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at the position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written, the pool cursor position is advanced by one byte. When Hibernation File the cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is set to the beginning of the pool. After every 16th Memory Dump Files byte written to the pool, the pool mixing function is applied to the entire pool (see below). Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Pool Mixing Function Malware

Multi-User Environment The purpose of this function is to perform diffusion [2]. Diffusion spreads the influence of individual "raw" Authenticity and Integrity input bits over as much of the pool state as possible, which also hides statistical relationships. After every 16th byte written to the pool, this function is automatically applied to the entire pool. New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Description of the pool mixing function: Trim Operation

Wear-Leveling 1. Let R be the randomness pool. Reallocated Sectors 2. Let H be the hash function selected by the user (SHA-512, RIPEMD-160, or Whirlpool). Defragmenting Journaling File Systems 3. l = byte size of the output of the hash function H (i.e., if H is RIPEMD-160, then l = 20; if H is Volume Clones SHA-512, l = 64)

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/random-number-generator[6/16/2013 4:52:56 PM] TrueCrypt - Technical Details - Keyfiles

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Hash Algorithms Technical Details > Keyfiles Search RIPEMD-160 SHA-512 Disclaimers Whirlpool Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Please consider making a donation. Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Donate Now >> Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Keyfiles Creating New Volumes

Favorite Volumes TrueCrypt keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password. The user can use any kind of file as System Favorite Volumes a TrueCrypt keyfile. The user can also generate a keyfile using the built-in keyfile generator, which utilizes the TrueCrypt RNG to generate a file with random content (for more information, see the section Random Main Program Window Number Generator). Program Menu Mounting Volumes The maximum size of a keyfile is not limited; however, only its first 1,048,576 bytes (1 MB) are processed Supported Systems (all remaining bytes are ignored due to performance issues connected with processing extremely large files). The user can supply one or more keyfiles (the number of keyfiles is not limited). Portable Mode Keyfiles Keyfiles can be stored on PKCS-11-compliant [23] security tokens and smart cards protected by multiple Tokens & Smart Cards PIN codes (which can be entered either using a hardware PIN pad or via the TrueCrypt GUI). Language Packs Hot Keys Keyfiles are processed and applied to a password using the following method: Security Model 1. Let P be a TrueCrypt volume password supplied by user (may be empty) Security Requirements 2. Let KP be the keyfile pool Data Leaks 3. Let kpl be the size of the keyfile pool KP, in bytes (64, i.e., 512 bits); Paging File kpl must be a multiple of the output size of a hash function H 4. Let pl be the length of the password P, in bytes (in the current version: 0 < pl < 64) Hibernation File 5. if kpl > pl, append (kpl – pl) zero bytes to the password P (thus pl = kpl) Memory Dump Files 6. Fill the keyfile pool KP with kpl zero bytes. Unencrypted Data in RAM 7. For each keyfile perform the following steps: Physical Security a. Set the position of the keyfile pool cursor to the beginning of the pool Malware b. Initialize the hash function H Multi-User Environment c. Load all bytes of the keyfile one by one, and for each loaded byte perform the following steps: Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles i. Hash the loaded byte using the hash function H without initializing the hash, to obtain Password/Keyfile Change an intermediate hash (state) M. Do not finalize the hash (the state is retained for next Trim Operation round). ii. Divide the state M into individual bytes. Wear-Leveling For example, if the hash output size is 4 bytes, (T0 || T1 || T2 || T3) = M Reallocated Sectors iii. Write these bytes (obtained in step 7.c.ii) individually to the keyfile pool with the Defragmenting modulo 28 addition operation (not by replacing the old values in the pool) at the Journaling File Systems position of the pool cursor. After a byte is written, the pool cursor position is advanced by one byte. When the cursor reaches the end of the pool, its position is set to the Volume Clones beginning of the pool. Additional Requirements

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/keyfiles-technical-details[6/16/2013 4:52:57 PM] TrueCrypt - Volume Format Specification

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact RIPEMD-160 Technical Details > TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification Search SHA-512 Whirlpool Disclaimers Technical Details Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Please consider making a donation. Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Donate Now >> Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification Favorite Volumes

System Favorite Volumes Note that this specification applies to volumes created by TrueCrypt 7.0 or later. The format of file-hosted Main Program Window volumes is identical to the format of partition/device-hosted volumes (however, the "volume header", or key data, for a system partition/drive is stored in the last 512 bytes of the first logical drive track). Program Menu TrueCrypt volumes have no "signature" or ID strings. Until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of Mounting Volumes random data. Supported Systems Portable Mode Free space on each TrueCrypt volume is filled with random data when the volume is created.* The random data is generated as follows: Right before TrueCrypt volume formatting begins, a temporary encryption key Keyfiles and a temporary secondary key (XTS mode) are generated by the random number generator (see the Tokens & Smart Cards section Random Number Generator). The encryption algorithm that the user selected is initialised with the Language Packs temporary keys. The encryption algorithm is then used to encrypt plaintext blocks consisting of zeroes. The encryption algorithm operates in XTS mode (see the section Hidden Volume). The resulting ciphertext Hot Keys blocks are used to fill (overwrite) the free space on the volume. The temporary keys are stored in RAM and Security Model are erased after formatting finishes. Security Requirements Data Leaks TrueCrypt Volume Format Specification: Paging File Hibernation File Offset Size Encryption Description Memory Dump Files (bytes) (bytes) Status† Unencrypted Data in RAM

Physical Security 0 64 Unencrypted§ Salt Malware 64 4 Encrypted ASCII string "TRUE" Multi-User Environment

Authenticity and Integrity 68 2 Encrypted Volume header format version (5) New Passwords & Keyfiles 70 2 Encrypted Minimum program version required to open the volume Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation 72 4 Encrypted CRC-32 checksum of the (decrypted) bytes 256-511

Wear-Leveling 76 16 Encrypted Reserved (must contain zeroes) Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting 92 8 Encrypted Size of hidden volume (set to zero in non-hidden volumes)

Journaling File Systems 100 8 Encrypted Size of volume Volume Clones Additional Requirements 108 8 Encrypted Byte offset of the start of the master key scope

Command Line Usage 116 8 Encrypted Size of the encrypted area within the master key scope

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/volume-format-specification[6/16/2013 4:52:58 PM] TrueCrypt - Compliance with Standards

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact SHA-512 Technical Details > Compliance with Standards and Specifications Search Whirlpool Technical Details Disclaimers Notation Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Please consider making a donation. Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code Donate Now >> TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Compliance with Standards and Specifications System Favorite Volumes

Main Program Window To our best knowledge, TrueCrypt complies with the following standards, specifications, and Program Menu recommendations: Mounting Volumes Supported Systems ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 [21] Portable Mode FIPS 197 [3] Keyfiles FIPS 198 [22] Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs FIPS 180-2 [14] Hot Keys NIST SP 800-3E [24] Security Model Security Requirements PKCS #5 v2.0 [7] Data Leaks PKCS #11 v2.20 [23] Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files The correctness of the implementations of the encryption algorithms can be verified using test vectors (select Tools > Test Vectors) or by examining the source code of TrueCrypt. Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment

Authenticity and Integrity Next Section >> New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/compliance-with-standards[6/16/2013 4:52:59 PM] TrueCrypt - Source Code

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Whirlpool Technical Details > Source Code Search Technical Details Notation Disclaimers Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Please consider making a donation. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Donate Now >> Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Source Code Main Program Window

Program Menu TrueCrypt is open-source and free software. The complete source code of TrueCrypt (written in C, C++, Mounting Volumes and assembly) is freely available for peer review at: Supported Systems http://www.truecrypt.org/ Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards

Language Packs Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/source-code[6/16/2013 4:53:00 PM] TrueCrypt - TrueCrypt Volume

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Technical Details TrueCrypt Volume Search Notation Encryption Scheme Disclaimers Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Please consider making a donation. Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Donate Now >> Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window TrueCrypt Volume Program Menu

Mounting Volumes There are two types of TrueCrypt volumes: Supported Systems Portable Mode File-hosted (container) Keyfiles Partition/device-hosted Tokens & Smart Cards Note: In addition to creating the above types of virtual volumes, TrueCrypt can encrypt a physical Language Packs partition/drive where Windows is installed (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption). Hot Keys Security Model A TrueCrypt file-hosted volume is a normal file, which can reside on any type of storage device. It contains Security Requirements (hosts) a completely independent encrypted virtual disk device. Data Leaks A TrueCrypt partition is a hard disk partition encrypted using TrueCrypt. You can also encrypt entire hard Paging File disks, USB hard disks, USB memory sticks, and other types of storage devices. Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Next Section >> Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/truecrypt-volume[6/16/2013 4:53:01 PM] TrueCrypt - Creating a New TrueCrypt Volume

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Notation TrueCrypt Volume > Creating a New TrueCrypt Volume Search Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation Disclaimers Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Please consider making a donation. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Donate Now >> System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Creating a New TrueCrypt Volume Mounting Volumes

Supported Systems To create a new TrueCrypt file-hosted volume or to encrypt a partition/device (requires administrator Portable Mode privileges), click on 'Create Volume' in the main program window. TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard should appear. As soon as the Wizard appears, it starts collecting data that will be used in generating the Keyfiles master key, secondary key (XTS mode), and salt, for the new volume. The collected data, which should be Tokens & Smart Cards as random as possible, include your mouse movements, key presses, and other values obtained from the Language Packs system (for more information, please see the section Random Number Generator). The Wizard provides help and information necessary to successfully create a new TrueCrypt volume. However, several items Hot Keys deserve further explanation: Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Hash Algorithm Paging File Allows you to select which hash algorithm TrueCrypt will use. The selected hash algorithm is used by the Hibernation File random number generator (as a pseudorandom mixing function), which generates the master key, Memory Dump Files secondary key (XTS mode), and salt (for more information, please see the section Random Number Unencrypted Data in RAM Generator). It is also used in deriving the new volume header key and secondary header key (see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). Physical Security

Malware For information about the implemented hash algorithms, see the chapter Hash Algorithms. Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity Note that the output of a hash function is never used directly as an encryption key. For more information, New Passwords & Keyfiles please refer to the chapter Technical Details. Password/Keyfile Change

Trim Operation Encryption Algorithm Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors This allows you to select the encryption algorithm with which your new volume will be encrypted. Note that Defragmenting the encryption algorithm cannot be changed after the volume is created. For more information, please see the chapter Encryption Algorithms. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Quick Format Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely If unchecked, each sector of the new volume will be formatted. This means that the new volume will be entirely filled with random data. Quick format is much faster but may be less secure because until the Miscellaneous whole volume has been filled with files, it may be possible to tell how much data it contains (if the space Use Without Admin Rights was not filled with random data beforehand). If you are not sure whether to enable or disable Quick Format, we recommend that you leave this option unchecked. Note that Quick Format can only be enabled Sharing over Network when encrypting partitions/devices.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/creating-new-volume[6/16/2013 4:53:02 PM] TrueCrypt - Favorite Volumes

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Encryption Scheme TrueCrypt Volume > Favorite Volumes Search Modes of Operation Header Key Derivation Disclaimers Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Please consider making a donation. Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Donate Now >> Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Favorite Volumes Supported Systems

Portable Mode Favorite volumes are useful, for example, in any the following cases: Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards You have a volume that always needs to be mounted to a particular drive letter. Language Packs You have a volume that needs to be automatically mounted when its host device gets Hot Keys connected to the computer (for example, a container located on a USB flash drive or external Security Model USB hard drive). Security Requirements You have a volume that needs to be automatically mounted when you log on to the operating Data Leaks system. Paging File You have a volume that always needs to be mounted as read-only or removable medium. Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM To configure a TrueCrypt volume as a favorite volume, follow these steps: Physical Security Malware 1. Mount the volume (to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time). 2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main TrueCrypt window and select 'Add to Multi-User Environment Favorites'. Authenticity and Integrity 3. The Favorite Volumes Organizer window should appear now. In this window, you can set various options for the volume (see below). New Passwords & Keyfiles 4. Click OK. Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Favorite volumes can be mounted in several ways: To mount all favorite volumes, select Favorites > Mount Favorite Volumes or press the 'Mount Favorite Volumes' hot key (Settings > Hot Keys). To mount Reallocated Sectors only one of the favorite volumes, select it from the list contained in the Favorites menu. When you do so, Defragmenting you are asked for its password (and/or keyfiles) (unless it is cached) and if it is correct, the volume is Journaling File Systems mounted. If it is already mounted, an Explorer window is opened for it. Volume Clones

Additional Requirements Selected or all favorite volumes can be mounted automatically whenever you log on to Windows. Command Line Usage To set this up, follow these steps: Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous 1. Mount the volume you want to have mounted automatically when you log on (mount it to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time). Use Without Admin Rights 2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main TrueCrypt window and select 'Add to Sharing over Network Favorites'. 3. The Favorites Organizer window should appear now. In this window, enable the option 'Mount Background Task selected volume upon logon' and click OK

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/favorites[6/16/2013 4:53:03 PM] TrueCrypt - System Favorite Volumes

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Modes of Operation TrueCrypt Volume > System Favorite Volumes Search Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Disclaimers Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code Please consider making a donation. TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Donate Now >> Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems System Favorite Volumes Portable Mode

Keyfiles System favorites are useful, for example, in the following cases: Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs You have volumes that need to be mounted before system and application services start and Hot Keys before users start logging on. Security Model There are network-shared folders located on TrueCrypt volumes. If you configure these volumes as Security Requirements system favorites, you will ensure that the network shares will be automatically restored by the operating system each time it is restarted. Data Leaks Paging File You need each such volume to be mounted as the same drive letter each time the operating Hibernation File system starts. Memory Dump Files

Unencrypted Data in RAM Note that, unlike the regular (non-system) favorites, system favorite volumes use the pre-boot Physical Security authentication password and, therefore, require your system partition/drive to be encrypted (also note it Malware is not required to enable caching of the pre-boot authentication password). Multi-User Environment

Authenticity and Integrity System favorite volumes can be configured to be available within TrueCrypt only to users with New Passwords & Keyfiles administrator privileges (select Settings > 'System Favorite Volumes' > 'Allow only administrators to view and dismount system favorite volumes in TrueCrypt'). This option should be enabled on servers to Password/Keyfile Change ensure that system favorite volumes cannot be dismounted by users without administrator privileges. On Trim Operation non-server systems, this option can be used to prevent normal TrueCrypt volume actions (such as Wear-Leveling 'Dismount All', auto-dismount, etc.) from affecting system favorite volumes. In addition, when TrueCrypt is run without administrator privileges (the default on Windows Vista and later), system favorite volumes will Reallocated Sectors not be displayed in the drive letter list in the main TrueCrypt application window. Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones To configure a TrueCrypt volume as a system favorite volume, follow these steps: Additional Requirements 1. Mount the volume (to the drive letter to which you want it to be mounted every time). Command Line Usage 2. Right-click the mounted volume in the drive list in the main TrueCrypt window and select 'Add to Backing Up Securely System Favorites'. Miscellaneous 3. The System Favorites Organizer window should appear now. In this window, enable the option 'Mount system favorite volumes when Windows starts' and click OK. Use Without Admin Rights

Sharing over Network The order in which system favorite volumes are displayed in the System Favorites Organizer window Background Task (Favorites > 'Organize System Favorite Volumes') is the order in which the volumes are mounted. You can use the Move Up and Move Down buttons to change the order of the volumes. Removable Medium Vol.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/system-favorites[6/16/2013 4:53:05 PM] TrueCrypt - Main Program Window

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Header Key Derivation Main Program Window Search Random Number Gen. Keyfiles Disclaimers Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Please consider making a donation. Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Donate Now >> Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Main Program Window Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Select File Hot Keys Security Model Allows you to select a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume. After you select it, you can perform various operations on it (e.g., mount it by clicking 'Mount'). It is also possible to select a volume by dragging its icon to the Security Requirements 'TrueCrypt.exe' icon (TrueCrypt will be automatically launched then) or to the main program window. Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Select Device Memory Dump Files Allows you to select a TrueCrypt partition or a storage device (such as a USB memory stick). After it is Unencrypted Data in RAM selected, you can perform various operations with it (e.g., mount it by clicking 'Mount'). Physical Security Malware Note: There is a more comfortable way of mounting TrueCrypt partitions/devices – see the section Auto- Mount Devices below for more information. Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Mount Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation After you click 'Mount', TrueCrypt will try to mount the selected volume using cached passwords (if there are any) and if none of them works, it prompts you for a password. If you enter the correct password Wear-Leveling (and/or provide correct keyfiles), the volume will be mounted. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Important: Note that when you exit the TrueCrypt application, the TrueCrypt driver continues working and Journaling File Systems no TrueCrypt volume is dismounted. Volume Clones Additional Requirements Auto-Mount Devices Command Line Usage This function allows you to mount TrueCrypt partitions/devices without having to select them manually (by Backing Up Securely clicking 'Select Device'). TrueCrypt scans headers of all available partitions/devices on your system (except Miscellaneous DVD drives and similar devices) one by one and tries to mount each of them as a TrueCrypt volume. Note that a TrueCrypt partition/device cannot be identified, nor the cipher it has been encrypted with. Therefore, Use Without Admin Rights the program cannot directly "find" TrueCrypt partitions. Instead, it has to try mounting each (even Sharing over Network unencrypted) partition/device using all encryption algorithms and all cached passwords (if there are any). Background Task Therefore, be prepared that this process may take a long time on slow computers. Removable Medium Vol. If the password you enter is wrong, mounting is attempted using cached passwords (if there are any). If TrueCrypt System Files you enter an empty password and if Use keyfiles is unchecked, only the cached passwords will be used

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/main-program-window[6/16/2013 4:53:06 PM] TrueCrypt - Program Menu

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Random Number Gen. Main Program Window > Program Menu Search Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Disclaimers Standards Compliance Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Please consider making a donation. Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Donate Now >> Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Program Menu Tokens & Smart Cards

Language Packs Note: To save space, only the menu items that are not self-explanatory are described in this Hot Keys documentation. Security Model Security Requirements Volumes -> Auto-Mount All Device-Hosted Volumes Data Leaks

Paging File See the section Auto-Mount Devices in the chapter Main Program Window. Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Volumes -> Dismount All Mounted Volumes Physical Security See the section Dismount All in the chapter Main Program Window. Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity Volumes -> Set Header Key Derivation Algorithm New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change This function allows you to re-encrypt a volume header with a header key derived using a different PRF function (for example, instead of HMAC-RIPEMD-160 you could use HMAC-SHA-512). Note that the volume Trim Operation header contains the master encryption key with which the volume is encrypted. Therefore, the data stored Wear-Leveling on the volume will not be lost after you use this function. For more information, see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Note: When TrueCrypt re-encrypts a volume header, the original volume header is first overwritten 256 Journaling File Systems times with random data to prevent adversaries from using techniques such as magnetic force microscopy or magnetic force scanning tunneling microscopy [17] to recover the overwritten header (however, see also Volume Clones the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions). Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Volumes -> Change Volume Password Miscellaneous Allows changing the password of the currently selected TrueCrypt volume (no matter whether the volume is Use Without Admin Rights hidden or standard). Only the header key and the secondary header key (XTS mode) are changed – the Sharing over Network master key remains unchanged. This function re-encrypts the volume header using a header encryption Background Task key derived from a new password. Note that the volume header contains the master encryption key with which the volume is encrypted. Therefore, the data stored on the volume will not be lost after you use this Removable Medium Vol. function (password change will only take a few seconds). TrueCrypt System Files To change a TrueCrypt volume password, click on Select File or Select Device, then select the volume, and Removing Encryption from the Volumes menu select Change Volume Password.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/program-menu[6/16/2013 4:53:09 PM] TrueCrypt - Mounting

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Keyfiles Main Program Window > Mounting TrueCrypt Volumes Search Volume Format Spec. Standards Compliance Disclaimers Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Please consider making a donation. System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Donate Now >> Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Mounting TrueCrypt Volumes Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model If you have not done so yet, please read the sections 'Mount' and 'Auto-Mount Devices' in the chapter Main Program Window. Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Cache Password in Driver Memory Hibernation File Memory Dump Files This option can be set in the password entry dialog so that it will apply only to that particular mount attempt. It can also be set as default in the Preferences. For more information, please see the subsection Unencrypted Data in RAM Settings -> Preferences, item Cache passwords in driver memory in the section Program Menu. Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Mount Options Authenticity and Integrity Mount options affect the parameters of the volume being mounted. The Mount Options dialog can be New Passwords & Keyfiles opened by clicking on the Mount Options button in the password entry dialog. When a correct password is Password/Keyfile Change cached, volumes are automatically mounted after you click Mount. If you need to change mount options Trim Operation for a volume being mounted using a cached password, hold down the Control (Ctrl) key while clicking Mount or a favorite volume in the Favorites menu, or select Mount with Options from the Volumes menu. Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Default mount options can be configured in the main program preferences (Settings -> Preferences). Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Mount volume as read-only Volume Clones Additional Requirements When checked, it will not be possible to write any data to the mounted volume. Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Mount volume as removable medium Miscellaneous See section Volume Mounted as Removable Medium. Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Use backup header embedded in volume if available Background Task All volumes created by TrueCrypt 6.0 or later contain an embedded backup header (located at the end of Removable Medium Vol. the volume). If you check this option, TrueCrypt will attempt to mount the volume using the backup TrueCrypt System Files header. Note that if the volume header is damaged, you do not have to use this option to mount the volume. Instead, you can repair the header by selecting Tools > Restore Volume Header. Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Mount partition using system encryption without pre-boot authentication

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/mounting-truecrypt-volumes[6/16/2013 4:53:10 PM] TrueCrypt - Supported Operating Systems

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Volume Format Spec. Supported Operating Systems Search Standards Compliance Source Code Disclaimers TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Please consider making a donation. Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Donate Now >> Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Supported Operating Systems Hot Keys

Security Model TrueCrypt currently supports the following operating systems: Security Requirements Data Leaks Windows 7 (32-bit and 64-bit) Paging File Windows Vista (32-bit and 64-bit) Windows XP (32-bit and 64-bit) Hibernation File Windows Server 2008 R2 (64-bit) Memory Dump Files Windows Server 2008 (32-bit and 64-bit) Windows Server 2003 (32-bit and 64-bit) Unencrypted Data in RAM Windows 2000 SP4 Physical Security Malware Mac OS X 10.8 Mountain Lion (32-bit and 64-bit) Mac OS X 10.7 Lion (32-bit and 64-bit) Multi-User Environment Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard (32-bit) Authenticity and Integrity Mac OS X 10.5 Leopard Mac OS X 10.4 Tiger New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Linux (32-bit and 64-bit versions, kernel 2.6 or compatible) Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Note: The following operating systems (among others) are not supported: Windows RT, Windows 2003 IA-64, Reallocated Sectors Windows 2008 IA-64, Windows XP IA-64, and the Embedded/Tablet versions of Windows. Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage See also: Operating Systems Supported for System Encryption Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/supported-operating-systems[6/16/2013 4:53:11 PM] TrueCrypt Portable / Portable TrueCrypt

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Standards Compliance Portable Mode Search Source Code TrueCrypt Volume Disclaimers Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Please consider making a donation. Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Donate Now >> Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Portable Mode Security Model

Security Requirements TrueCrypt can run in so-called portable mode, which means that it does not have to be installed on the Data Leaks operating system under which it is run. However, there are two things to keep in mind: Paging File Hibernation File You need administrator privileges in order to be able to run TrueCrypt in portable mode (for the reasons, see the chapter Using TrueCrypt Without Administrator Privileges). Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Note: No matter what kind of software you use, as regards personal privacy in most cases, it is not secure to work with sensitive data under systems where you do not have administrator Malware privileges, as the administrator can easily capture and copy your sensitive data, including Multi-User Environment passwords and keys. Authenticity and Integrity

New Passwords & Keyfiles After examining the registry file, it may be possible to tell that TrueCrypt was run (and that a Password/Keyfile Change TrueCrypt volume was mounted) on a Windows system even if it had been run in portable mode. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Note: If that is a problem, see this question in the FAQ for a possible solution. Reallocated Sectors

Defragmenting There are two ways to run TrueCrypt in portable mode: Journaling File Systems Volume Clones After you extract files from the TrueCrypt self-extracting package, you can directly run Additional Requirements TrueCrypt.exe.

Command Line Usage Note: To extract files from the TrueCrypt self-extracting package, run it, and then select Extract (instead of Backing Up Securely Install) on the second page of the TrueCrypt Setup wizard.

Miscellaneous You can use the Traveler Disk Setup facility to prepare a special traveler disk and launch TrueCrypt Use Without Admin Rights from there. Sharing over Network Background Task The second option has several advantages, which are described in the following sections in this chapter. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Note: When running in portable mode, the TrueCrypt driver is unloaded when it is no longer needed (e.g., when all instances of the main application and/or of the Volume Creation Wizard are closed and no TrueCrypt volumes are Removing Encryption mounted). However, if you force dismount on a TrueCrypt volume when TrueCrypt runs in portable mode, or mount Uninstalling TrueCrypt a writable NTFS-formatted volume on Windows Vista or later, the TrueCrypt driver may not be unloaded when you exit TrueCrypt (it will be unloaded only when you shut down or restart the system). This prevents various problems Digital Signatures caused by a bug in Windows (for instance, it would be impossible to start TrueCrypt again as long as there are Troubleshooting applications using the dismounted volume).

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/truecrypt-portable[6/16/2013 4:53:12 PM] TrueCrypt - Keyfiles

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Source Code Keyfiles Search TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Disclaimers Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Please consider making a donation. Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Donate Now >> Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Keyfiles Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Keyfile is a file whose content is combined with a password (for information on the method used to combine a keyfile with password, see the section Keyfiles in the chapter Technical Details). Until the correct Hibernation File keyfile is provided, no volume that uses the keyfile can be mounted. Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM You do not have to use keyfiles. However, using keyfiles has some advantages: Physical Security Malware May improve protection against brute force attacks (significant particularly if the volume password is not very strong). Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity Allows the use of security tokens and smart cards (see below). New Passwords & Keyfiles Allows multiple users to mount a single volume using different user passwords or PINs. Just give Password/Keyfile Change each user a security token or smart card containing the same TrueCrypt keyfile and let them choose Trim Operation their personal password or PIN that will protect their security token or smart card. Wear-Leveling Allows managing multi-user shared access (all keyfile holders must present their keyfiles before a Reallocated Sectors volume can be mounted). Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Any kind of file (for example, .txt, .exe, mp3**, .avi) can be used as a TrueCrypt keyfile (however, we recommend that you prefer compressed files, such as .mp3, .jpg, .zip, etc). Volume Clones Additional Requirements Note that TrueCrypt never modifies the keyfile contents. You can select more than one keyfile; the order Command Line Usage does not matter. You can also let TrueCrypt generate a file with random content and use it as a keyfile. To do so, select Tools > Keyfile Generator. Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Note: Keyfiles are currently not supported for system encryption. Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network WARNING: If password caching is enabled, the password cache also contains the processed Background Task contents of keyfiles used to successfully mount a volume. Then it is possible to remount the volume even if the keyfile is not available/accessible. To prevent this, click 'Wipe Cache' or disable Removable Medium Vol. password caching (for more information, please see the subsection 'Settings -> Preferences', item 'Cache TrueCrypt System Files passwords in driver memory' in the section Program Menu). Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt See also the section Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles in the chapter Security Requirements and Precautions. Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Keyfiles Dialog Window

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/keyfiles[6/16/2013 4:53:13 PM] TrueCrypt - Security Tokens & Smart Cards

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact TrueCrypt Volume Security Tokens & Smart Cards Search Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes Disclaimers System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Please consider making a donation. Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Donate Now >> Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Security Tokens & Smart Cards Data Leaks

Paging File TrueCrypt supports security (or cryptographic) tokens and smart cards that can be accessed using the Hibernation File PKCS #11 (2.0 or later) protocol [23]. For more information, please see the section Security Tokens and Smart Cards in the chapter Keyfiles. Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/tokens-and-smart-cards[6/16/2013 4:53:15 PM] TrueCrypt - Language Packs

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Creating New Volumes Language Packs Search Favorite Volumes System Favorite Volumes Disclaimers Main Program Window Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Please consider making a donation. Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Donate Now >> Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Language Packs Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Language packs contain third-party translations of the TrueCrypt user interface texts. Some language packs also contain translated TrueCrypt User Guide. Note that language packs are currently supported only by the Unencrypted Data in RAM Windows version of TrueCrypt. Physical Security Malware Installation Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity To install a language pack, follow these steps: New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change 1. Download a language pack from: http://www.truecrypt.org/localizations 2. Extract the language pack to the folder to which you installed TrueCrypt, i.e. the folder in which the Trim Operation file 'TrueCrypt.exe' resides; for example, 'C:\Program Files\TrueCrypt'. Wear-Leveling 3. Run TrueCrypt. 4. Select Settings -> Language, then select your language and click OK. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting To revert to English, select Settings -> Language. Then select English and click OK. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements

Command Line Usage Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/language-packs[6/16/2013 4:53:16 PM] TrueCrypt - Hot Keys

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Favorite Volumes Hot Keys Search System Favorite Volumes Main Program Window Disclaimers Program Menu Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Please consider making a donation. Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Donate Now >> Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hot Keys Hibernation File

Memory Dump Files To set system-wide TrueCrypt hot keys, click Settings -> Hot Keys. Note that hot keys work only when Unencrypted Data in RAM TrueCrypt or the TrueCrypt Background Task is running. Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity See also: Main Program Window New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hotkeys[6/16/2013 4:53:17 PM] TrueCrypt - Security Model

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact System Favorite Volumes Security Model Search Main Program Window Program Menu Disclaimers Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Please consider making a donation. Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Donate Now >> Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Security Model Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Note to security researchers: If you intend to report a security issue or publish an attack on TrueCrypt, please make sure it does not disregard the security model of TrueCrypt described below. If Multi-User Environment it does, the attack (or security issue report) will be considered invalid/bogus. Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change TrueCrypt is a computer software program whose primary purposes are to: Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Secure data by encrypting it before it is written to a disk. Reallocated Sectors Decrypt encrypted data after it is read from the disk. Defragmenting Journaling File Systems TrueCrypt does not: Volume Clones Additional Requirements Encrypt or secure any portion of RAM (the main memory of a computer). Command Line Usage Secure any data on a computer* if an attacker has administrator privileges** under an operating Backing Up Securely system installed on the computer. Secure any data on a computer if the computer contains any malware (e.g. a virus, Trojan horse, Miscellaneous spyware) or any other piece of software (including TrueCrypt or an operating system component) Use Without Admin Rights that has been altered, created, or can be controlled, by an attacker. Sharing over Network Secure any data on a computer if an attacker has physical access to the computer before or while TrueCrypt is running on it. Background Task Secure any data on a computer if an attacker has physical access to the computer between the time Removable Medium Vol. when TrueCrypt is shut down and the time when the entire contents of all volatile memory modules connected to the computer (including memory modules in peripheral devices) have been TrueCrypt System Files permanently and irreversibly erased/lost. Removing Encryption Secure any data on a computer if an attacker can remotely intercept emanations from the computer Uninstalling TrueCrypt hardware (e.g. the monitor or cables) while TrueCrypt is running on it (or otherwise remotely monitor the hardware and its use, directly or indirectly, while TrueCrypt is running on it). Digital Signatures Secure any data stored in a TrueCrypt volume*** if an attacker without administrator privileges can Troubleshooting access the contents of the mounted volume (e.g. if file/folder/volume permissions do not prevent Incompatibilities such an attacker from accessing it). Preserve/verify the integrity or authenticity of encrypted or decrypted data. Issues and Limitations Prevent traffic analysis when encrypted data is transmitted over a network. License Prevent an attacker from determining in which sectors of the volume the content changed (and when and how many times) if he or she can observe the volume (dismounted or mounted) before Future Development and after data is written to it, or if the storage medium/device allows the attacker to determine Acknowledgements such information (for example, the volume resides on a device that saves metadata that can be

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/security-model[6/16/2013 4:53:49 PM] TrueCrypt - Security Requirements and Precautions

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Main Program Window Security Requirements and Precautions Search Program Menu Mounting Volumes Disclaimers Supported Systems Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Please consider making a donation. Language Packs Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Donate Now >> Paging File Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Security Requirements and Precautions Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware IMPORTANT: If you want to use TrueCrypt, you must follow the security requirements and security Multi-User Environment precautions listed in this chapter. Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles The sections in this chapter specify security requirements for using TrueCrypt and give information about Password/Keyfile Change things that adversely affect or limit the ability of TrueCrypt to secure data and to provide plausible Trim Operation deniability. Disclaimer: This chapter is not guaranteed to contain a list of all security issues and attacks that might adversely affect or limit the ability of TrueCrypt to secure data and to provide plausible deniability. Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Data Leaks Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Paging File Volume Clones Hibernation File Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Memory Dump Files Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Unencrypted Data in RAM

Use Without Admin Rights Physical Security Sharing over Network Background Task Malware Removable Medium Vol. Multi-User Environment TrueCrypt System Files Authenticity and Integrity Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles Digital Signatures Changing Passwords and Keyfiles Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Trim Operation Issues and Limitations Wear-Leveling License Future Development Reallocated Sectors

Acknowledgements Defragmenting Version History li il S

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/security-requirements-and-precautions[6/16/2013 4:53:51 PM] TrueCrypt - Security Precautions - Data Leaks

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Program Menu Security Requirements and Precautions > Data Leaks Search Mounting Volumes Supported Systems Disclaimers Portable Mode Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Please consider making a donation. Hot Keys Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Donate Now >> Hibernation File Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Data Leaks Physical Security

Malware When a TrueCrypt volume is mounted, the operating system and third-party applications may write to Multi-User Environment unencrypted volumes (typically, to the unencrypted system volume) unencrypted information about the data stored in the TrueCrypt volume (e.g. filenames and locations of recently accessed files, databases Authenticity and Integrity created by file indexing tools, etc.), or the data itself in an unencrypted form (temporary files, etc.), or New Passwords & Keyfiles unencrypted information about the filesystem residing in the TrueCrypt volume. Note that Windows Password/Keyfile Change automatically records large amounts of potentially sensitive data, such as the names and locations of files you open, applications you run, etc. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling In order to prevent data leaks, you must follow these steps (alternative steps may exist): Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting If you do not need plausible deniability: Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to do so, see the chapter System Encryption) and ensure that only encrypted or read-only filesystems are mounted during Additional Requirements each session in which you work with sensitive data. Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely or, Miscellaneous If you cannot do the above, download or create a "live CD" version of your operating system Use Without Admin Rights (i.e. a "live" system entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD) that ensures that any data written to the system volume is written to a RAM disk. When you need to work with Sharing over Network sensitive data, boot such a live CD/DVD and ensure that only encrypted and/or read-only Background Task filesystems are mounted during the session. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files If you need plausible deniability: Removing Encryption Create a hidden operating system. TrueCrypt will provide automatic data leak protection. For Uninstalling TrueCrypt more information, see the section Hidden Operating System. Digital Signatures Troubleshooting or, Incompatibilities If you cannot do the above, download or create a "live CD" version of your operating system Issues and Limitations (i.e. a "live" system entirely stored on and booted from a CD/DVD) that ensures that any data written to the system volume is written to a RAM disk. When you need to work with License sensitive data, boot such a live CD/DVD. If you use hidden volumes, follow the security Future Development requirements and precautions listed in the subsection Security Requirements and Precautions Acknowledgements Pertaining to Hidden Volumes. If you do not use hidden volumes, ensure that only non- system partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes and/or read-only filesystems are mounted during Version History the session. References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/data-leaks[6/16/2013 4:53:51 PM] TrueCrypt - Paging File

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Data Leaks > Paging File Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Paging File Malware Multi-User Environment Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted Authenticity and Integrity (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if all paging files are located on one or more of the partitions within the key scope of system encryption, for example, on the partition where New Passwords & Keyfiles Windows is installed (for more information, see the fourth paragraph in this subsection). Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Paging files, also called swap files, are used by Windows to hold parts of programs and data files that do Wear-Leveling not fit in memory. This means that sensitive data, which you believe are only stored in RAM, can actually be written unencrypted to a hard drive by Windows without you knowing. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Note that TrueCrypt cannot prevent the contents of sensitive files that are opened in RAM from being saved Journaling File Systems unencrypted to a paging file (note that when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor, then the content of the file is stored unencrypted in RAM). Volume Clones

Additional Requirements To prevent the issues described above, encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to Command Line Usage do so, see the chapter System Encryption) and make sure that all paging files are located on one or more of the partitions within the key scope of system encryption (for example, on the partition where Windows is Backing Up Securely installed). Note that the last condition is typically met on Windows XP by default. However, Windows Vista Miscellaneous and later versions of Windows are configured by default to create paging files on any suitable volume. Use Without Admin Rights Therefore, before, you start using TrueCrypt, you must follow these steps: Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on the desktop or in the Start Menu, and then select Properties > (on Windows Vista Sharing over Network or later: > Advanced System Settings >) Advanced tab > section Performance > Settings > Advanced tab Background Task > section Virtual memory > Change. On Windows Vista or later, disable 'Automatically manage paging file Removable Medium Vol. size for all drives'. Then make sure that the list of volumes available for paging file creation contains only volumes within the intended key scope of system encryption (for example, the volume where Windows is TrueCrypt System Files installed). To disable paging file creation on a particular volume, select it, then select 'No paging file' and Removing Encryption click Set. When done, click OK and restart the computer. Uninstalling TrueCrypt Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (for more information, see the Digital Signatures section Hidden Operating System). Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Next Section >> Version History References Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/paging-file[6/16/2013 4:53:52 PM] TrueCrypt - Hibernation File

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Data Leaks > Hibernation File Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Hibernation File Malware Multi-User Environment Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted* Authenticity and Integrity (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if the hibernation file is located on any of the partitions within the key scope of system encryption (which it typically is, by default), for example, on New Passwords & Keyfiles the partition where Windows is installed. When the computer hibernates, data are encrypted on the fly Password/Keyfile Change before they are written to the hibernation file. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling When a computer hibernates (or enters a power-saving mode), the content of its system memory is written to a so-called hibernation file on the hard drive. You can configure TrueCrypt (Settings > Preferences > Reallocated Sectors Dismount all when: Entering power saving mode) to automatically dismount all mounted TrueCrypt Defragmenting volumes, erase their master keys stored in RAM, and cached passwords (stored in RAM), if there are any, Journaling File Systems before the computer hibernates (or enters a power-saving mode). However, keep in mind, that if you do not use system encryption (see the chapter System Encryption), TrueCrypt still cannot reliably prevent the Volume Clones contents of sensitive files opened in RAM from being saved unencrypted to a hibernation file. Note that Additional Requirements when you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor, then the content of the file is stored unencrypted in RAM (and it may remain unencrypted in RAM until the computer is turned off). Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Note that when Windows enters Sleep mode, it may be actually configured to enter so-called Hybrid Sleep Miscellaneous mode, which involves hibernation. Also note that the operating system may be configured to hibernate or Use Without Admin Rights enter the Hybrid Sleep mode when you click or select "Shut down" (for more information, please see the documentation for your operating system). Sharing over Network Background Task To prevent the issues described above, encrypt the system partition/drive (for information on how to Removable Medium Vol. do so, see the chapter System Encryption) and make sure that the hibernation file is located on one of the TrueCrypt System Files partitions within the key scope of system encryption (which it typically is, by default), for example, on the partition where Windows is installed. When the computer hibernates, any data will be encrypted on the fly Removing Encryption before being written to the hibernation file. Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Note: You may also want to consider creating a hidden operating system (for more information, see the Troubleshooting section Hidden Operating System). Incompatibilities Alternatively, if you cannot use system encryption, disable or prevent hibernation on your computer at Issues and Limitations least for each session during which you work with any sensitive data and during which you mount a License TrueCrypt volume. Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References * Disclaimer: As Windows XP and Windows 2003 do not provide any API for encryption of hibernation files, TrueCrypt has to modify undocumented components of Windows XP/2003 in order to allow users to encrypt hibernation files. Therefore, TrueCrypt cannot guarantee that Windows XP/2003 hibernation files will always be

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hibernation-file[6/16/2013 4:53:54 PM] TrueCrypt - Memory Dump Files

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Data Leaks > Memory Dump Files Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Memory Dump Files Malware Multi-User Environment Note: The issue described below does not affect you if the system partition or system drive is encrypted Authenticity and Integrity (for more information, see the chapter System Encryption) and if the system is configured to write memory dump files to the system drive (which it typically is, by default). New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Most operating systems, including Windows, can be configured to write debugging information and contents Trim Operation of the system memory to so-called memory dump files (also called crash dump files) when an error occurs Wear-Leveling (system crash, "blue screen," bug check). Therefore, memory dump files may contain sensitive data. TrueCrypt cannot prevent cached passwords, encryption keys, and the contents of sensitive files opened in Reallocated Sectors RAM from being saved unencrypted to memory dump files. Note that when you open a file stored on a Defragmenting TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor, then the content of the file is stored unencrypted in RAM Journaling File Systems (and it may remain unencrypted in RAM until the computer is turned off). Also note that when a TrueCrypt volume is mounted, its master key is stored unencrypted in RAM. Therefore, you must disable memory Volume Clones dump file generation on your computer at least for each session during which you work with any sensitive Additional Requirements data and during which you mount a TrueCrypt volume. To do so in Windows XP or later, right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on the desktop or in the Start Menu, and then select Properties > (on Command Line Usage Windows Vista or later: > Advanced System Settings >) Advanced tab > section Startup and Recovery > Backing Up Securely Settings > section Write debugging information > select (none) > OK. Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Note for users of Windows XP/2003: As Windows XP and Windows 2003 do not provide any API for encryption of memory dump files, if the system partition/drive is encrypted by TrueCrypt and your Sharing over Network Windows XP system is configured to write memory dump files to the system drive, the TrueCrypt driver Background Task automatically prevents Windows from writing any data to memory dump files. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Next Section >> Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/memory-dump-files[6/16/2013 4:53:55 PM] TrueCrypt - Unencrypted Data in RAM

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Unencrypted Data in RAM Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Unencrypted Data in RAM Malware Multi-User Environment It is important to note that TrueCrypt is disk encryption software, which encrypts only disks, not RAM Authenticity and Integrity (memory). New Passwords & Keyfiles Keep in mind that most programs do not clear the memory area (buffers) in which they store unencrypted Password/Keyfile Change (portions of) files they load from a TrueCrypt volume. This means that after you exit such a program, Trim Operation unencrypted data it worked with may remain in memory (RAM) until the computer is turned off (and, Wear-Leveling according to some researchers, even for some time after the power is turned off*). Also note that if you open a file stored on a TrueCrypt volume, for example, in a text editor and then force dismount on the Reallocated Sectors TrueCrypt volume, then the file will remain unencrypted in the area of memory (RAM) used by (allocated Defragmenting to) the text editor. This applies to forced auto-dismount too. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Inherently, unencrypted master keys have to be stored in RAM too. When a non-system TrueCrypt volume is dismounted, TrueCrypt erases its master keys (stored in RAM). When the computer is cleanly restarted Additional Requirements (or cleanly shut down), all non-system TrueCrypt volumes are automatically dismounted and, thus, all Command Line Usage master keys stored in RAM are erased by the TrueCrypt driver (except master keys for system partitions/drives — see below). However, when power supply is abruptly interrupted, when the computer is Backing Up Securely reset (not cleanly restarted), or when the system crashes, TrueCrypt naturally stops running and Miscellaneous therefore cannot erase any keys or any other sensitive data. Furthermore, as Microsoft does not provide Use Without Admin Rights any appropriate API for handling hibernation and shutdown, master keys used for system encryption cannot be reliably (and are not) erased from RAM when the computer hibernates, is shut down or Sharing over Network restarted.** Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files To summarize, TrueCrypt cannot and does not ensure that RAM contains no sensitive data (e.g. Removing Encryption passwords, master keys, or decrypted data). Therefore, after each session in which you work with a Uninstalling TrueCrypt TrueCrypt volume or in which an encrypted operating system is running, you must shut down (or, if Digital Signatures the hibernation file is encrypted, hibernate) the computer and then leave it powered off for at least several minutes (the longer, the better) before turning it on again. This is required to clear the RAM. Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations

License * Allegedly, for 1.5-35 seconds under normal operating temperatures (26-44 °C) and up to several hours when the Future Development memory modules are cooled (when the computer is running) to very low temperatures (e.g. -50 °C). New types of memory modules allegedly exhibit a much shorter decay time (e.g. 1.5-2.5 seconds) than older types (as of 2008). Acknowledgements ** Before a key can be erased from RAM, the corresponding TrueCrypt volume must be dismounted. For non-system Version History volumes, this does not cause any problems. However, as Microsoft currently does not provide any appropriate API for handling the final phase of the system shutdown process, paging files located on encrypted system volumes that References are dismounted during the system shutdown process may still contain valid swapped-out memory pages (including portions of Windows system files). This could cause 'blue screen' errors. Therefore, to prevent 'blue screen' errors, T C t d t di t t d t l d tl t l th t k f th

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/unencrypted-data-in-ram[6/16/2013 4:53:56 PM] TrueCrypt - Physical Security

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Physical Security Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Physical Security Malware Multi-User Environment If an attacker can physically access the computer hardware and you use it after the attacker has physically Authenticity and Integrity accessed it, then TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer.* This is because the attacker may modify the hardware or attach a malicious hardware component to it (such as a hardware New Passwords & Keyfiles keystroke logger) that will capture the password or encryption key (e.g. when you mount a TrueCrypt Password/Keyfile Change volume) or otherwise compromise the security of the computer. Therefore, you must not use TrueCrypt on Trim Operation a computer that an attacker has physically accessed. Furthermore, you must ensure that TrueCrypt (including its device driver) is not running when the attacker physically accesses the computer. Additional Wear-Leveling information pertaining to hardware attacks where the attacker has direct physical access is contained in the Reallocated Sectors section Unencrypted Data in RAM. Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Furthermore, even if the attacker cannot physically access the computer hardware directly, he or she may be able to breach the physical security of the computer by remotely intercepting and analyzing emanations Volume Clones from the computer hardware (including the monitor and cables). For example, intercepted emanations from Additional Requirements the cable connecting the keyboard with the computer can reveal passwords you type. It is beyond the scope of this document to list all of the kinds of such attacks (sometimes called TEMPEST attacks) and all Command Line Usage known ways to prevent them (such as shielding or radio jamming). It is your responsibility to prevent such Backing Up Securely attacks. If you do not, TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer. Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task * In this section (Physical Security), the phrase "data on the computer" means data on internal and external storage devices/media (including removable devices and network drives) connected to the computer. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Next Section >> Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/physical-security[6/16/2013 4:53:57 PM] TrueCrypt - Malware

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Malware Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Malware Malware Multi-User Environment The term 'malware' refers collectively to all types of malicious software, such as computer viruses, Trojan Authenticity and Integrity horses, spyware, or generally any piece of software (including TrueCrypt or an operating system component) that has been altered, prepared, or can be controlled, by an attacker. Some kinds of malware New Passwords & Keyfiles are designed e.g. to log keystrokes, including typed passwords (such captured passwords are then either Password/Keyfile Change sent to the attacker over the Internet or saved to an unencrypted local drive from which the attacker might Trim Operation be able to read it later, when he or she gains physical access to the computer). If you use TrueCrypt on a computer infected with any kind of malware, TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the Wear-Leveling computer.* Therefore, you must not use TrueCrypt on such a computer. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting It is important to note that TrueCrypt is encryption software, not anti-malware software. It is your Journaling File Systems responsibility to prevent malware from running on the computer. If you do not, TrueCrypt may become unable to secure data on the computer. Volume Clones

Additional Requirements There are many rules that you should follow to help prevent malware from running on your computer. Command Line Usage Among the most important rules are the following: Keep your operating system, Internet browser, and other critical software, up-to-date. In Windows XP or later, turn on DEP for all programs.** Do not open Backing Up Securely suspicious email attachments, especially executable files, even if they appear to have been sent by your Miscellaneous relatives or friends (their computers may be infected with malware sending malicious emails from their Use Without Admin Rights computers/accounts without their knowledge). Do not follow suspicious links contained in emails or on websites (even if the email/website appears to be harmless or trustworthy). Do not visit any suspicious Sharing over Network websites. Do not download or install any suspicious software. Consider using good, trustworthy, anti- Background Task malware software. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt * In this section (Malware), the phrase "data on the computer" means data on internal and external storage devices/media (including removable devices and network drives) connected to the computer. Digital Signatures ** DEP stands for Data Execution Prevention. For more information about DEP, please visit Troubleshooting http://support.microsoft.com/kb/875352, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700810.aspx, and http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows7/What-is-Data-Execution-Prevention. Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Next Section >> Version History References Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/malware[6/16/2013 4:53:58 PM] TrueCrypt - Multi-User Environment

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Multi-User Environment Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Multi-User Environment Malware Multi-User Environment Keep in mind, that the content of a mounted TrueCrypt volume is visible (accessible) to all logged on users. Authenticity and Integrity NTFS file/folder permissions can be set to prevent this, unless the volume is mounted as removable medium under a desktop edition of Windows Vista or later (sectors of a volume mounted as removable New Passwords & Keyfiles medium may be accessible at the volume level to users without administrator privileges, regardless of Password/Keyfile Change whether it is accessible to them at the file-system level). Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Moreover, on Windows, the password cache is shared by all logged on users. Reallocated Sectors Also note that switching users in Windows XP or later (Fast User Switching functionality) does not dismount Defragmenting a successfully mounted TrueCrypt volume (unlike system restart, which dismounts all mounted TrueCrypt Journaling File Systems volumes). Volume Clones Additional Requirements On Windows 2000, the container file permissions are ignored when a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume is to be mounted. On all supported versions of Windows, users without administrator privileges can mount any Command Line Usage partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume (provided that they supply the correct password and/or keyfiles). Backing Up Securely A user without administrator privileges can dismount only volumes that he or she mounted. However, this Miscellaneous does not apply to system favorite volumes unless you enable the option (disabled by default) Settings > 'System Favorite Volumes' > 'Allow only administrators to view and dismount system favorite volumes in Use Without Admin Rights TrueCrypt'. Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Next Section >> Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/multi-user-environment[6/16/2013 4:53:59 PM] TrueCrypt - Authenticity and Integrity

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Authenticity and Integrity Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Authenticity and Integrity Malware Multi-User Environment TrueCrypt uses encryption to preserve the confidentiality of data it encrypts. TrueCrypt neither preserves Authenticity and Integrity nor verifies the integrity or authenticity of data it encrypts or decrypts. Hence, if you allow an adversary to modify data encrypted by TrueCrypt, he can set the value of any 16-byte block of the data to a random New Passwords & Keyfiles value or to a previous value, which he was able to obtain in the past. Note that the adversary cannot Password/Keyfile Change choose the value that you will obtain when TrueCrypt decrypts the modified block — the value will be Trim Operation random — unless the attacker restores an older version of the encrypted block, which he was able to obtain in the past. It is your responsibility to verify the integrity and authenticity of data encrypted or decrypted Wear-Leveling by TrueCrypt (for example, by using appropriate third-party software). Reallocated Sectors See also: Physical Security, Security Model Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones

Additional Requirements Next Section >> Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/authenticity-and-integrity[6/16/2013 4:54:00 PM] TrueCrypt - Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Choosing Passwords and Keyfiles Malware Multi-User Environment It is very important that you choose a good password. You must avoid choosing one that contains only a Authenticity and Integrity single word that can be found in a dictionary (or a combination of such words). It must not contain any names, dates of birth, account numbers, or any other items that could be easy to guess. A good password New Passwords & Keyfiles is a random combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters, such as @ ^ = Password/Keyfile Change $ * + etc. We strongly recommend choosing a password consisting of more than 20 characters (the longer, Trim Operation the better). Short passwords are easy to crack using brute-force techniques.

Wear-Leveling To make brute-force attacks on a keyfile infeasible, the size of the keyfile must be at least 30 bytes. If a Reallocated Sectors volume uses multiple keyfiles, then at least one of the keyfiles must be 30 bytes in size or larger. Note that the 30-byte limit assumes a large amount of entropy in the keyfile. If the first 1024 kilobytes of a file Defragmenting contain only a small amount of entropy, it must not be used as a keyfile (regardless of the file size). If you Journaling File Systems are not sure what entropy means, we recommend that you let TrueCrypt generate a file with random Volume Clones content and that you use it as a keyfile (select Tools -> Keyfile Generator).

Additional Requirements When creating a volume, encrypting a system partition/drive, or changing passwords/keyfiles, you must not Command Line Usage allow any third party to choose or modify the password/keyfile(s) before/while the volume is created or the Backing Up Securely password/keyfiles(s) changed. For example, you must not use any password generators (whether website applications or locally run programs) where you are not sure that they are high-quality and uncontrolled by Miscellaneous an attacker, and keyfiles must not be files that you download from the internet or that are accessible to Use Without Admin Rights other users of the computer (whether they are administrators or not). Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Next Section >> Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/choosing-passwords-and-keyfiles[6/16/2013 4:54:02 PM] TrueCrypt - Changing Passwords and Keyfiles

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Changing Passwords and Keyfiles Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Changing Passwords and Keyfiles Malware Multi-User Environment Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) Authenticity and Integrity contains the master key (not to be confused with the password) with which the volume is encrypted. If an adversary is allowed to make a copy of your volume before you change the volume password and/or New Passwords & Keyfiles keyfile(s), he may be able to use his copy or fragment (the old header) of the TrueCrypt volume to mount Password/Keyfile Change your volume using a compromised password and/or compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount Trim Operation the volume before you changed the volume password and/or keyfile(s).

Wear-Leveling If you are not sure whether an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and whether he has Reallocated Sectors a copy of your volume when you need to change its password and/or keyfiles, it is strongly recommended that you create a new TrueCrypt volume and move files from the old volume to the new volume (the new Defragmenting volume will have a different master key). Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Also note that if an adversary knows your password (or has your keyfiles) and has access to your volume, he may be able to retrieve and keep its master key. If he does, he may be able to decrypt your volume Additional Requirements even after you change its password and/or keyfile(s) (because the master key does not change when you Command Line Usage change the volume password and/or keyfiles). In such a case, create a new TrueCrypt volume and move all Backing Up Securely files from the old volume to this new one. Miscellaneous The following sections of this chapter contain additional information pertaining to possible security issues Use Without Admin Rights connected with changing passwords and/or keyfiles: Sharing over Network Background Task Wear-Leveling Removable Medium Vol. Journaling File Systems Defragmenting TrueCrypt System Files Reallocated Sectors Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Next Section >> Issues and Limitations License Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/changing-passwords-and-keyfiles[6/16/2013 4:54:03 PM] TrueCrypt - Trim Operation (SSD Command)

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Trim Operation Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Trim Operation Malware Multi-User Environment Some storage devices (e.g., some solid-state drives, including USB flash drives) use so-called 'trim' Authenticity and Integrity operation to mark drive sectors as free e.g. when a file is deleted. Consequently, such sectors may contain unencrypted zeroes or other undefined data (unencrypted) even if they are located within a part of the New Passwords & Keyfiles drive that is encrypted by TrueCrypt. TrueCrypt does not block the trim operation on partitions that are Password/Keyfile Change within the key scope of system encryption (unless a hidden operating system is running) and under Linux Trim Operation on all volumes that use the Linux native kernel cryptographic services. In those cases, the adversary will be able to tell which sectors contain free space (and may be able to use this information for further Wear-Leveling analysis and attacks) and plausible deniability may be negatively affected. If you want to avoid those Reallocated Sectors issues, do not use system encryption on drives that use the trim operation and, under Linux, either configure TrueCrypt not to use the Linux native kernel cryptographic services or make sure TrueCrypt Defragmenting volumes are not located on drives that use the trim operation. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones To find out whether a device uses the trim operation, please refer to documentation supplied with the Additional Requirements device or contact the vendor/manufacturer. Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights

Sharing over Network Next Section >> Background Task Removable Medium Vol. Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/trim-operation[6/16/2013 4:54:04 PM] TrueCrypt - Wear-Leveling

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Wear-Leveling Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Wear-Leveling Malware Multi-User Environment Some storage devices (e.g., some solid-state drives, including USB flash drives) and some file systems Authenticity and Integrity utilize so-called wear-leveling mechanisms to extend the lifetime of the storage device or medium. These mechanisms ensure that even if an application repeatedly writes data to the same logical sector, the data is New Passwords & Keyfiles distributed evenly across the medium (logical sectors are remapped to different physical sectors). Password/Keyfile Change Therefore, multiple "versions" of a single sector may be available to an attacker. This may have various Trim Operation security implications. For instance, when you change a volume password/keyfile(s), the volume header is, under normal conditions, overwritten with a re-encrypted version of the header. However, when the Wear-Leveling volume resides on a device that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism, TrueCrypt cannot ensure that the older Reallocated Sectors header is really overwritten. If an adversary found the old volume header (which was to be overwritten) on the device, he could use it to mount the volume using an old compromised password (and/or using Defragmenting compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re- Journaling File Systems encrypted). Due to security reasons, we recommend that TrueCrypt volumes are not created/stored on Volume Clones devices (or in file systems) that utilize a wear-leveling mechanism (and that TrueCrypt is not used to encrypt any portions of such devices or filesystems). Additional Requirements Command Line Usage If you decide not to follow this recommendation and you intend to use in-place encryption on a drive that Backing Up Securely utilizes wear-leveling mechanisms, make sure the partition/drive does not contain any sensitive data before Miscellaneous you fully encrypt it (TrueCrypt cannot reliably perform secure in-place encryption of existing data on such a drive; however, after the partition/drive has been fully encrypted, any new data that will be saved to it will Use Without Admin Rights be reliably encrypted on the fly). That includes the following precautions: Before you run TrueCrypt to set Sharing over Network up pre-boot authentication, disable the paging files and restart the operating system (you can enable the paging files after the system partition/drive has been fully encrypted). Hibernation must be prevented Background Task during the period between the moment when you start TrueCrypt to set up pre-boot authentication and the Removable Medium Vol. moment when the system partition/drive has been fully encrypted. However, note that even if you follow TrueCrypt System Files those steps, it is not guaranteed that you will prevent data leaks and that sensitive data on the device will be securely encrypted. For more information, see the sections Data Leaks, Paging File, Hibernation File, Removing Encryption and Memory Dump Files. Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures If you need plausible deniability, you must not use TrueCrypt to encrypt any part of (or create encrypted Troubleshooting containers on) a device (or file system) that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism. Incompatibilities To find out whether a device utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism, please refer to documentation supplied Issues and Limitations with the device or contact the vendor/manufacturer. License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References Next Section >>

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/wear-leveling[6/16/2013 4:54:05 PM] TrueCrypt - Reallocated Sectors

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Reallocated Sectors Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Reallocated Sectors Malware Multi-User Environment Some storage devices, such as hard drives, internally reallocate/remap bad sectors. Whenever the device Authenticity and Integrity detects a sector to which data cannot be written, it marks the sector as bad and remaps it to a sector in a hidden reserved area on the drive. Any subsequent read/write operations from/to the bad sector are New Passwords & Keyfiles redirected to the sector in the reserved area. This means that any existing data in the bad sector remains Password/Keyfile Change on the drive and it cannot be erased (overwritten with other data). This may have various security Trim Operation implications. For instance, data that is to be encrypted in place may remain unencrypted in the bad sector. Likewise, data to be erased (for example, during the process of creation of a hidden operating system) may Wear-Leveling remain in the bad sector. Plausible deniability may be adversely affected whenever a sector is reallocated. Reallocated Sectors Additional examples of possible security implications are listed in the section Wear-Leveling. Please note that this list is not exhaustive (these are just examples). Also note that TrueCrypt cannot prevent any Defragmenting security issues related to or caused by reallocated sectors. To find out the number of reallocated sectors on Journaling File Systems a hard drive, you can use e.g. a third-party software tool for reading so-called S.M.A.R.T. data. Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Next Section >> Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/reallocated-sectors[6/16/2013 4:54:06 PM] TrueCrypt - Defragmenting

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Defragmenting Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Defragmenting Malware Multi-User Environment When you (or the operating system) defragment the file system in which a file-hosted TrueCrypt container Authenticity and Integrity is stored, a copy of the TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system). This may have various security implications. For example, if you New Passwords & Keyfiles change the volume password/keyfile(s) afterwards, and an adversary finds the old copy or fragment (the Password/Keyfile Change old header) of the TrueCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the volume using an old compromised Trim Operation password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were necessary to mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). To prevent this and other possible security issues (such as those mentioned in Wear-Leveling the section Volume Clones), do one of the following: Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. Journaling File Systems Securely erase free space on the host volume (in the defragmented file system) after defragmenting. Volume Clones Do not defragment file systems in which you store TrueCrypt volumes. Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Next Section >> Sharing over Network Background Task Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/defragmenting[6/16/2013 4:54:07 PM] TrueCrypt - Journaling File Systems

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Journaling File Systems Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Journaling File Systems Malware Multi-User Environment When a file-hosted TrueCrypt container is stored in a journaling file system (such as NTFS), a copy of the Authenticity and Integrity TrueCrypt container (or of its fragment) may remain in the free space on the host volume. This may have various security implications. For example, if you change the volume password/keyfile(s) and an adversary New Passwords & Keyfiles finds the old copy or fragment (the old header) of the TrueCrypt volume, he might use it to mount the Password/Keyfile Change volume using an old compromised password (and/or using compromised keyfiles that were necessary to Trim Operation mount the volume before the volume header was re-encrypted). Some journaling file systems also internally record file access times and other potentially sensitive information. If you need plausible Wear-Leveling deniability, you must not store file-hosted TrueCrypt containers in journaling file systems. To prevent Reallocated Sectors possible security issues related to journaling file systems, do one the following: Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Use a partition/device-hosted TrueCrypt volume instead of file-hosted. Store the container in a non-journaling file system (for example, FAT32). Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Next Section >> Use Without Admin Rights

Sharing over Network Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/journaling-file-systems[6/16/2013 4:54:08 PM] TrueCrypt - Volume Clones

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Volume Clones Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Volume Clones Malware Multi-User Environment Never create a new TrueCrypt volume by cloning an existing TrueCrypt volume. Always use the TrueCrypt Authenticity and Integrity Volume Creation Wizard to create a new TrueCrypt volume. If you clone a volume and then start using both this volume and its clone in a way that both eventually contain different data, then you might aid New Passwords & Keyfiles cryptanalysis (both volumes will share a single key set). Also note that plausible deniability is impossible in Password/Keyfile Change such cases. See also the chapter How to Back Up Securely. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Next Section >> Volume Clones Additional Requirements Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/volume-clones[6/16/2013 4:54:09 PM] TrueCrypt - Additional Security Requirements

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Security Requirements and Precautions > Additional Requirements and Precautions Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Additional Security Requirements and Precautions Malware Multi-User Environment In addition to the requirements and precautions described in this chapter (Security Requirements and Authenticity and Integrity Precautions), you must follow and keep in mind the security requirements, precautions, and limitations listed in the following chapters and sections: New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change How to Back Up Securely Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Limitations

Reallocated Sectors Security Model Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Security Requirements and Precautions Pertaining to Hidden Volumes Volume Clones Plausible Deniability Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task See also: Digital Signatures Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/additional-security-requirements[6/16/2013 4:54:10 PM] TrueCrypt - Command Line Usage

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Command Line Usage Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Command Line Usage Malware Multi-User Environment Note that this section applies to the Windows version of TrueCrypt. For information on command line usage Authenticity and Integrity applying to the Linux and Mac OS X versions, please run: truecrypt –h New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation /help or /? Display command line help. Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors or Path to a TrueCrypt volume to mount (do not use when dismounting). For a file- Defragmenting /volume /v hosted volume, the path must include the filename. To mount a partition/device- Journaling File Systems hosted volume, use, for example, /v \Device\Harddisk1\Partition3 (to Volume Clones determine the path to a partition/device, run TrueCrypt and click Select Device). You can also mount a partition or dynamic volume using its volume name (for Additional Requirements example, /v \\?\Volume{5cceb196-48bf-46ab-ad00-70965512253a}\). To Command Line Usage determine the volume name use e.g. mountvol.exe. Also note that device paths Backing Up Securely are case-sensitive. Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network /letter or /l Driver letter to mount the volume as. When /l is omitted and when /a is used, the first free drive letter is used. Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files /explore or /e Open an Explorer window after a volume has been mounted. Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures /beep or /b Beep after a volume has been successfully mounted or dismounted. Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations /auto or /a If no parameter is specified, automatically mount the volume. If devices is License specified as the parameter (e.g., /a devices), auto-mount all currently accessible device/partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes. If is specified Future Development favorites as the parameter, auto-mount favorite volumes designated as "mount upon Acknowledgements logon". Note that /auto is implicit if /quit and /volume are specified. If you Version History need to prevent the application window from appearing, use /quit. References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/command-line-usage[6/16/2013 4:54:11 PM] TrueCrypt - How to Back Up Securely

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes How to Back Up Securely Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security How to Back Up Securely Malware Multi-User Environment Due to hardware or software errors/malfunctions, files stored on a TrueCrypt volume may become Authenticity and Integrity corrupted. Therefore, we strongly recommend that you backup all your important files regularly (this, of course, applies to any important data, not just to encrypted data stored on TrueCrypt volumes). New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Non-System Volumes Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors To back up a non-system TrueCrypt volume securely, it is recommended to follow these steps: Defragmenting 1. Create a new TrueCrypt volume using the TrueCrypt Volume Creation Wizard (do not enable the Journaling File Systems Quick Format option or the Dynamic option). It will be your backup volume so its size should match Volume Clones (or be greater than) the size of your main volume. Additional Requirements If the main volume is a hidden TrueCrypt volume, the backup volume must be a hidden TrueCrypt Command Line Usage volume too. Before you create the hidden backup volume, you must create a new host (outer) Backing Up Securely volume for it without enabling the Quick Format option. In addition, especially if the backup volume Miscellaneous is file-hosted, the hidden backup volume should occupy only a very small portion of the container and the outer volume should be almost completely filled with files (otherwise, the plausible Use Without Admin Rights deniability of the hidden volume might be adversely affected). Sharing over Network 2. Mount the newly created backup volume. Background Task Removable Medium Vol. 3. Mount the main volume. TrueCrypt System Files 4. Copy all files from the mounted main volume directly to the mounted backup volume. Removing Encryption

Uninstalling TrueCrypt IMPORTANT: If you store the backup volume in any location that an adversary can repeatedly Digital Signatures access (for example, on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit box), you should repeat all of the Troubleshooting above steps (including the step 1) each time you want to back up the volume (see below). Incompatibilities If you follow the above steps, you will help prevent adversaries from finding out: Issues and Limitations

License Which sectors of the volumes are changing (because you always follow step 1). This is particularly Future Development important, for example, if you store the backup volume on a device kept in a bank's safe deposit Acknowledgements box (or in any other location that an adversary can repeatedly access) and the volume contains a hidden volume (for more information, see the subsection Security Requirements and Precautions Version History Pertaining to Hidden Volumes in the chapter Plausible Deniability). References That one of the volumes is a backup of the other.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/how-to-back-up-securely[6/16/2013 4:54:12 PM] TrueCrypt - Miscellaneous

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Miscellaneous Malware Multi-User Environment Using TrueCrypt Without Administrator Privileges Authenticity and Integrity Sharing over Network New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change TrueCrypt Background Task Trim Operation Volume Mounted as Removable Medium Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors TrueCrypt System Files & Application Data Defragmenting How to Remove Encryption Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Uninstalling TrueCrypt

Additional Requirements Digital Signatures Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/miscellaneous[6/16/2013 4:54:13 PM] TrueCrypt - Non-Admin Users

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > Using TrueCrypt without Administrator Privileges Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Using TrueCrypt Without Administrator Privileges Malware Multi-User Environment In Windows, a user who does not have administrator privileges can use TrueCrypt, but only after a system Authenticity and Integrity administrator installs TrueCrypt on the system. The reason for that is that TrueCrypt needs a device driver to provide transparent on-the-fly encryption/decryption, and users without administrator privileges cannot New Passwords & Keyfiles install/start device drivers in Windows. Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation After a system administrator installs TrueCrypt on the system, users without administrator privileges will be able to run TrueCrypt, mount/dismount any type of TrueCrypt volume, load/save data from/to it, and Wear-Leveling create file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes on the system. However, users without administrator privileges Reallocated Sectors cannot encrypt/format partitions, cannot create NTFS volumes, cannot install/uninstall TrueCrypt, cannot change passwords/keyfiles for TrueCrypt partitions/devices, cannot backup/restore headers of TrueCrypt Defragmenting partitions/devices, and they cannot run TrueCrypt in portable mode. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Warning: No matter what kind of software you use, as regards personal privacy in most cases, it is Command Line Usage not secure to work with sensitive data under systems where you do not have administrator privileges, as the administrator can easily capture and copy your sensitive data, including passwords and keys. Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/non-admin-users[6/16/2013 4:54:40 PM] TrueCrypt - Sharing over Network

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > Sharing over Network Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Sharing over Network Malware Multi-User Environment If there is a need to access a single TrueCrypt volume simultaneously from multiple operating systems, Authenticity and Integrity there are two options: New Passwords & Keyfiles 1. A TrueCrypt volume is mounted only on a single computer (for example, on a server) and only the Password/Keyfile Change content of the mounted TrueCrypt volume (i.e., the file system within the TrueCrypt volume) is Trim Operation shared over a network. Users on other computers or systems will not mount the volume (it is Wear-Leveling already mounted on the server).

Reallocated Sectors Advantages: All users can write data to the TrueCrypt volume. The shared volume may be both Defragmenting file-hosted and partition/device-hosted. Journaling File Systems Disadvantage: Data sent over the network will not be encrypted. However, it is still possible to Volume Clones encrypt it using e.g. SSL, TLS, VPN, or other technologies. Additional Requirements Remarks: Note that, when you restart the system, the network share will be automatically restored Command Line Usage only if the volume is a system favorite volume or an encrypted system partition/drive (for Backing Up Securely information on how to configure a volume as a system favorite volume, see the chapter System Miscellaneous Favorite Volumes).

Use Without Admin Rights 2. A dismounted TrueCrypt file container is stored on a single computer (for example, on a server). Sharing over Network This encrypted file is shared over a network. Users on other computers or systems will locally mount the shared file. Thus, the volume will be mounted simultaneously under multiple operating systems. Background Task Removable Medium Vol. Advantage: Data sent over the network will be encrypted (however, it is still recommended to TrueCrypt System Files encrypt it using e.g. SSL, TLS, VPN, or other appropriate technologies to make traffic analysis more difficult and to preserve the integrity of the data). Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Disadvantages: The shared volume may be only file-hosted (not partition/device-hosted). The Digital Signatures volume must be mounted in read-only mode under each of the systems (see the section Mount Options for information on how to mount a volume in read-only mode). Note that this requirement Troubleshooting applies to unencrypted volumes too. One of the reasons is, for example, the fact that data read from Incompatibilities a conventional file system under one OS while the file system is being modified by another OS might be inconsistent (which could result in data corruption). Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements

Version History See also: Using TrueCrypt without Administrator Privileges References

Legal Notices www truecrypt org

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/sharing-over-network[6/16/2013 4:54:41 PM] TrueCrypt - Background Task

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > TrueCrypt Background Task Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security TrueCrypt Background Task Malware Multi-User Environment When the main TrueCrypt window is closed, the TrueCrypt Background Task takes care of the following Authenticity and Integrity tasks/functions: New Passwords & Keyfiles 1) Hot keys Password/Keyfile Change 2) Auto-dismount (e.g., upon logoff, inadvertent host device removal, time-out, etc.) Trim Operation 3) Auto-mount of favorite volumes Wear-Leveling 4) Notifications (e.g., when damage to hidden volume is prevented) 5) Tray icon Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting WARNING: If neither the TrueCrypt Background Task nor TrueCrypt is running, the above-mentioned Journaling File Systems tasks/functions are disabled. Volume Clones Additional Requirements The TrueCrypt Background Task is actually the TrueCrypt.exe application, which continues running in the background after you close the main TrueCrypt window. Whether it is running or not can be determined by Command Line Usage looking at the system tray area. If you can see the TrueCrypt icon there, then the TrueCrypt Background Backing Up Securely Task is running. You can click the icon to open the main TrueCrypt window. Right-click on the icon opens a Miscellaneous popup menu with various TrueCrypt-related functions. Use Without Admin Rights You can shut down the Background Task at any time by right-clicking the TrueCrypt tray icon and selecting Sharing over Network Exit. If you need to disable the TrueCrypt Background Task completely and permanently, select Settings -> Background Task Preferences and uncheck the option Enabled in the TrueCrypt Background Task area of the Preferences dialog window. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures See also: Main Program Window Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/background-task[6/16/2013 4:54:42 PM] TrueCrypt - Volume Mounted as Removable Medium

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > Volume Mounted as Removable Medium Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Volume Mounted as Removable Medium Malware Multi-User Environment This section applies to TrueCrypt volumes mounted when one of the following options is enabled (as Authenticity and Integrity applicable): New Passwords & Keyfiles Tools > Preferences > Mount volumes as removable media Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Mount Options > Mount volume as removable medium Wear-Leveling Favorites > Organize Favorite Volumes > Mount selected volume as removable medium Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Favorites > Organize System Favorite Volumes > Mount selected volume as removable medium Journaling File Systems Volume Clones TrueCrypt Volumes that are mounted as removable media have the following advantages and Additional Requirements disadvantages: Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Windows is prevented from automatically creating the 'Recycled' and/or the 'System Volume Miscellaneous Information' folders on TrueCrypt volumes (in Windows, these folders are used by the Recycle Bin and System Restore features). Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Windows may use caching methods and write delays that are normally used for removable media (for example, USB flash drives). This might slightly decrease the performance but at the same Background Task increase the likelihood that it will be possible to dismount the volume quickly without having to Removable Medium Vol. force the dismount. TrueCrypt System Files The operating system may tend to keep the number of handles it opens to such a volume to a Removing Encryption minimum. Hence, volumes mounted as removable media might require fewer forced dismounts than Uninstalling TrueCrypt other volumes. Digital Signatures Under Windows Vista and earlier, the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') list does not show the amount Troubleshooting of free space on volumes mounted as removable (note that this is a Windows limitation, not a bug Incompatibilities in TrueCrypt).

Issues and Limitations Under desktop editions of Windows Vista or later, sectors of a volume mounted as removable License medium may be accessible to all users (including users without administrator privileges; see section Future Development Multi-User Environment). Acknowledgements The operating system may use a different file indexing policy (used e.g. for instant search) for Version History volumes mounted as removable media. References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/volume-mounted-as-removable-medium[6/16/2013 4:54:43 PM] TrueCrypt - System Files

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > TrueCrypt System Files & Application Data Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security TrueCrypt System Files & Application Data Malware Multi-User Environment Note: %windir% is the main Windows installation path (e.g., C:\WINDOWS) Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change TrueCrypt Driver Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors %windir%\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\truecrypt.sys Defragmenting Note: This file is not present when TrueCrypt is run in portable mode. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones

Additional Requirements Command Line Usage TrueCrypt Settings, Application Data, and Other System Files Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights WARNING: Note that TrueCrypt does not encrypt any of the files listed in this section (unless it encrypts the system partition/drive). Sharing over Network Background Task The following files are saved in the folder %APPDATA%\TrueCrypt\. In portable mode, these files are saved Removable Medium Vol. to the folder from which you run the file TrueCrypt.exe (i.e., the folder in which TrueCrypt.exe resides): TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Configuration.xml (the main configuration file). Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures System Encryption.xml (temporary configuration file used during the initial process of in-place Troubleshooting encryption/decryption of the system partition/drive). Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations Default Keyfiles.xml Note: This file may be absent if the corresponding TrueCrypt feature is not used. License

Future Development Favorite Volumes.xml Acknowledgements Note: This file may be absent if the corresponding TrueCrypt feature is not used. Version History (the list of last twenty files/devices attempted to be mounted as TrueCrypt volumes or References History.xml attempted to be used as hosts for TrueCrypt volumes; this feature can be disabled – for more information, see the subsection Never Save History in the chapter Main Program Window).

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/truecrypt-system-files[6/16/2013 4:54:44 PM] TrueCrypt - Removing Encryption

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > How to Remove Encryption Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security How to Remove Encryption Malware Multi-User Environment Please note that TrueCrypt can in-place decrypt only system partitions and system drives (select Authenticity and Integrity System > Permanently Decrypt System Partition/Drive). If you need to remove encryption (e.g., if you no longer need encryption) from a non-system volume, please follow these steps: New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change 1. Mount your TrueCrypt volume. Trim Operation 2. Move all files from the TrueCrypt volume to any location outside the TrueCrypt volume (note that Wear-Leveling the files will be decrypted on the fly). 3. Dismount the TrueCrypt volume. Reallocated Sectors 4. If the TrueCrypt volume is file-hosted, delete it (the container) just like you delete any other Defragmenting file. Journaling File Systems If the volume is partition-hosted (applies also to USB flash drives), in addition to the steps Volume Clones 1-3, do the following: Additional Requirements Command Line Usage a. Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your desktop, or in the Start Menu, and select Manage. The 'Computer Management' window should appear. Backing Up Securely b. In the Computer Management window, from the list on the left, select 'Disk Management' Miscellaneous (within the Storage sub-tree). Use Without Admin Rights c. Right-click the partition you want to decrypt and select 'Change Drive Letter and Paths'. d. The 'Change Drive Letter and Paths' window should appear. If no drive letter is displayed in Sharing over Network the window, click Add. Otherwise, click Cancel. Background Task If you clicked Add, then in the 'Add Drive Letter or Path' (which should have appeared), select a drive letter you want to assign to the partition and click OK. Removable Medium Vol. e. In the Computer Management window, right-click the partition you want to decrypt again and TrueCrypt System Files select Format. The Format window should appear. Removing Encryption f. In the Format window, click OK. After the partition is formatted, it will no longer be required to mount it with TrueCrypt to be able to save or load files to/from the partition. Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures If the volume is device-hosted (i.e., there are no partitions on the device, and the device is Troubleshooting entirely encrypted), in addition to the steps 1-3, do the following: Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations a. Right-click the 'Computer' (or 'My Computer') icon on your desktop, or in the Start Menu, and select Manage. The 'Computer Management' window should appear. License b. In the Computer Management window, from the list on the left, select 'Disk Management' Future Development (within the Storage sub-tree). c. The 'Initialize Disk' window should appear. Use it to initialize the disk. Acknowledgements d. In the 'Computer Management' window, right-click the area representing the storage space of Version History the encrypted device and select 'New Partition' or 'New Simple Volume'. References e. WARNING: Before you continue, make sure you have selected the correct device, as all files stored on it will be lost. The 'New Partition Wizard' or 'New Simple Volume Wizard' window should appear now; follow its instructions to create a new partition on the device. After the

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/removing-encryption[6/16/2013 4:54:45 PM] TrueCrypt - Uninstalling TrueCrypt

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > Uninstalling TrueCrypt Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Uninstalling TrueCrypt Malware Multi-User Environment To uninstall TrueCrypt on Windows XP, select Start menu > Settings > Control Panel > Add or Remove Authenticity and Integrity Programs > TrueCrypt > Change/Remove. New Passwords & Keyfiles To uninstall TrueCrypt on Windows Vista or later, select Start menu > Computer > Uninstall or change a Password/Keyfile Change program > TrueCrypt > Uninstall. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling No TrueCrypt volume will be removed when you uninstall TrueCrypt. You will be able to mount your Reallocated Sectors TrueCrypt volume(s) again after you install TrueCrypt or when you run it in portable mode. Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements See also: How to Remove Encryption Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/uninstalling-truecrypt[6/16/2013 4:54:47 PM] TrueCrypt - Digital Signatures

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Miscellaneous > Digital Signatures Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Digital Signatures Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity Why Verify Digital Signatures New Passwords & Keyfiles It might happen that a TrueCrypt installation package you download from our server was created or Password/Keyfile Change modified by an attacker. For example, the attacker could exploit a vulnerability in the server software we Trim Operation use and alter the installation packages stored on the server, or he/she could alter any of the files en route Wear-Leveling to you. Reallocated Sectors Therefore, you should always verify the integrity and authenticity of each TrueCrypt distribution package Defragmenting you download or otherwise obtain from any source. In other words, you should always make sure that the Journaling File Systems file was created by us and it was not altered by an attacker. One way to do so is to verify so-called digital signature(s) of the file. Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Types of Digital Signatures We Use Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous We currently use two types of digital signatures: Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network PGP signatures (available for all binary and source code packages for all supported systems). X.509 signatures (available for binary packages for Windows). Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Advantages of X.509 Signatures Uninstalling TrueCrypt X.509 signatures have the following advantages, in comparison to PGP signatures: Digital Signatures Troubleshooting It is much easier to verify that the key that signed the file is really ours, not attacker's (provided Incompatibilities that you trust the certification authority). You do not have to download or install any extra software to verify an X.509 signature (see below). Issues and Limitations You do not have to download and import our public key (it is embedded in the signed file). License You do not have to download any separate signature file (the signature is embedded in the signed Future Development file). Acknowledgements Version History References Advantages of PGP Signatures

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/digital-signatures[6/16/2013 4:54:48 PM] TrueCrypt - Troubleshooting

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Troubleshooting Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Troubleshooting Malware Multi-User Environment This section presents possible solutions to common problems that you may run into when using TrueCrypt. Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Note: If your problem is not listed here, it might be listed in one of the following sections: Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Incompatibilities Wear-Leveling Known Issues & Limitations Reallocated Sectors Frequently Asked Questions Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Make sure you use the latest stable version of TrueCrypt. If the problem is caused by a bug in an old version of TrueCrypt, it may have already been fixed. Note: Select Help > About to find out which Backing Up Securely version you use. Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. Problem: TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Writing/reading to/from volume is very slow even though, according to the benchmark, the speed of the Uninstalling TrueCrypt cipher that I'm using is higher than the speed of the hard drive. Digital Signatures Probable Cause: Troubleshooting Incompatibilities This is probably caused by an interfering application. Issues and Limitations

License Possible Solution: Future Development Acknowledgements First, make sure that your TrueCrypt container does not have a file extension that is reserved for Version History executable files (for example, .exe, .sys, or .dll). If it does, Windows and antivirus software may interfere with the container and adversely affect the performance of the volume. References

Second, disable or uninstall any application that might be interfering, which usually is antivirus software or

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/troubleshooting[6/16/2013 4:54:49 PM] TrueCrypt - Incompatibilities

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Incompatibilities Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Incompatibilities Malware Multi-User Environment Activation of Adobe Photoshop® and Other Products Using FLEXnet Publisher® / SafeCast Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Note: The issue described below does not affect you if you use TrueCrypt 5.1 or later and a non-cascade encryption algorithm (i.e., AES, Serpent, or Twofish).* The issue also does not affect you if you do not use Password/Keyfile Change system encryption (pre-boot authentication). Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Acresso FLEXnet Publisher activation software, formerly Macrovision SafeCast, (used for activation of third- Reallocated Sectors party software, such as Adobe Photoshop) writes data to the first drive track. If this happens when your system partition/drive is encrypted by TrueCrypt, a portion of the TrueCrypt Boot Loader will be damaged Defragmenting and you will not be able to start Windows. In that case, please use your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk to regain Journaling File Systems access to your system. There are two ways to do so: Volume Clones Additional Requirements 1. You may keep the third-party software activated but you will need to boot your system from the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk CD/DVD every time. Just insert your Rescue Disk into your CD/DVD drive Command Line Usage and then enter your password in the Rescue Disk screen. Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous 2. If you do not want to boot your system from the TrueCrypt Rescue Disk CD/DVD every time, you can restore the TrueCrypt Boot Loader on the system drive. To do so, in the Rescue Disk screen, Use Without Admin Rights select Repair Options > Restore TrueCrypt Boot Loader. However, note that this will deactivate the Sharing over Network third-party software. Background Task For information on how to use your TrueCrypt Rescue Disk, please see the chapter TrueCrypt Rescue Disk. Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Possible permanent solution: Upgrade to TrueCrypt 5.1 or later, decrypt the system partition/drive, and Removing Encryption then re-encrypt it using a non-cascade encryption algorithm (i.e., AES, Serpent, or Twofish).* Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Please note that this not a bug in TrueCrypt (the issue is caused by inappropriate design of the third-party activation software). Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License * The reason is that the TrueCrypt Boot Loader is smaller than the one used for cascades of ciphers and, therefore, there is enough space in the first drive track for a backup of the TrueCrypt Boot Loader. Hence, whenever the Future Development TrueCrypt Boot Loader is damaged, its backup copy is run automatically instead. Acknowledgements Version History References See also: Known Issues & Limitations, Troubleshooting

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/incompatibilities[6/16/2013 4:54:50 PM] TrueCrypt - Known Issues & Limitations

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Known Issues & Limitations Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Known Issues & Limitations Malware

Multi-User Environment Last Updated February 7, 2012 Authenticity and Integrity New Passwords & Keyfiles Known Issues Password/Keyfile Change (There are currently no confirmed issues.) Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Limitations Defragmenting Journaling File Systems [Note: This limitation does not apply to users of Windows Vista and later versions of Windows.] On Volume Clones Windows XP/2003, TrueCrypt does not support encrypting an entire system drive that contains extended (logical) partitions. You can encrypt an entire system drive provided that it contains only Additional Requirements primary partitions. Extended (logical) partitions must not be created on any system drive that is Command Line Usage partially or fully encrypted (only primary partitions may be created on it). Note: If you need to Backing Up Securely encrypt an entire drive containing extended partitions, you can encrypt the system partition and, in addition, create partition-hosted TrueCrypt volumes within any non-system partitions on the drive. Miscellaneous Alternatively, you may want to consider upgrading to Windows Vista or a later version of Windows. Use Without Admin Rights TrueCrypt currently does not support encrypting a system drive that has been converted to a Sharing over Network dynamic disk. Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt volume passwords must consist only of printable ASCII characters. Other characters in passwords are not supported and may cause various problems (e.g., inability to mount a volume). TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption To work around a Windows XP issue, the TrueCrypt boot loader is always automatically configured for the version of the operating system under which it is installed. When the version of the system Uninstalling TrueCrypt changes (for example, the TrueCrypt boot loader is installed when Windows Vista is running but it is Digital Signatures later used to boot Windows XP) you may encounter various known and unknown issues (for Troubleshooting example, on some notebooks, Windows XP may fail to display the log-on screen). Note that this affects multi-boot configurations, TrueCrypt Rescue Disks, and decoy/hidden operating systems Incompatibilities (therefore, if the hidden system is e.g. Windows XP, the decoy system should be Windows XP too). Issues and Limitations License The ability to mount a partition that is within the key scope of system encryption without pre-boot authentication (for example, a partition located on the encrypted system drive of another operating Future Development system that is not running), which can be done e.g. by selecting System > Mount Without Pre-Boot Acknowledgements Authentication, is limited to primary partitions (extended/logical partitions cannot be mounted this way). Version History References Due to a Windows 2000 issue, TrueCrypt does not support the Windows Mount Manager under Windows 2000. Therefore, some Windows 2000 built-in tools, such as Disk Defragmenter, do not work on TrueCrypt volumes Furthermore it is not possible to use the Mount Manager services

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/issues-and-limitations[6/16/2013 4:54:51 PM] TrueCrypt - License

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes License Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security License Malware Multi-User Environment The text of the license under which TrueCrypt is distributed is contained in the file License.txt that is Authenticity and Integrity included in the TrueCrypt binary and source code distribution packages, and is also available at: New Passwords & Keyfiles http://www.truecrypt.org/legal/license Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting See also: Acknowledgements Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/license[6/16/2013 4:54:52 PM] TrueCrypt - Future Development

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Future Development Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Future Development Malware Multi-User Environment For the list of features that are planned for a future release, please refer to: Authenticity and Integrity http://www.truecrypt.org/future New Passwords & Keyfiles Password/Keyfile Change Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Backing Up Securely Miscellaneous Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network Background Task Removable Medium Vol. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/future-development[6/16/2013 4:54:53 PM] TrueCrypt - Acknowledgements

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes Acknowledgements Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security Acknowledgements Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity We would like to thank the following people: New Passwords & Keyfiles Paul Le Roux for making his E4M source code available. TrueCrypt 1.0 was derived from E4M and some Password/Keyfile Change parts of the E4M source code are still incorporated in the latest version of the TrueCrypt source code. Trim Operation Wear-Leveling Dr. Brian Gladman, who wrote the excellent AES, Twofish, and SHA-512 routines. Reallocated Sectors Defragmenting Peter Gutmann for his paper on random numbers, and for creating his cryptlib, which was the source of parts of the random number generator source code. Journaling File Systems Volume Clones Wei Dai, who wrote the Serpent and RIPEMD-160 routines. Additional Requirements Command Line Usage Mark Adler et al., who wrote the Inflate routine. Backing Up Securely The designers of the encryption algorithms, hash algorithms, and the mode of operation: Miscellaneous Horst Feistel, Don Coppersmith, Walt Tuchmann, Lars Knudsen, Ross Anderson, Eli Biham, Bruce Schneier, Use Without Admin Rights David Wagner, John Kelsey, Niels Ferguson, Doug Whiting, Chris Hall, Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen, Sharing over Network Carlisle Adams, Stafford Tavares, Phillip Rogaway, Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel, Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. Background Task Removable Medium Vol. All the others who have made this project possible, all who have morally supported us, and all who sent us TrueCrypt System Files bug reports or suggestions for improvements. Removing Encryption

Uninstalling TrueCrypt Thank you very much. Digital Signatures Troubleshooting Incompatibilities Issues and Limitations Legal Notices www.truecrypt.org License Future Development Acknowledgements Version History References

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/acknowledgements[6/16/2013 4:54:53 PM] TrueCrypt - Version History

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact

Version History > Part 1 Search Introduction Disclaimers Beginner's Tutorial System Encryption Supported Systems Hidden Operating System Rescue Disk Please consider making a donation. Plausible Deniability Hidden Volume Protection of Hidden Vol. Security Requirements Hidden Operating System Donate Now >>

Parallelization Pipelining Hardware Acceleration Encryption Algorithms AES 7.1a Serpent Twofish February 7, 2012 Cascades Improvements and bug fixes: Hash Algorithms

RIPEMD-160 Minor improvements and bug fixes (Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux) SHA-512 Whirlpool Technical Details 7.1 Notation September 1, 2011 Encryption Scheme Modes of Operation New features: Header Key Derivation Random Number Gen. Full compatibility with 64-bit and 32-bit Mac OS X 10.7 Lion Keyfiles Volume Format Spec. Improvements and bug fixes: Standards Compliance Source Code Minor improvements and bug fixes (Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux) TrueCrypt Volume Creating New Volumes Favorite Volumes 7.0a System Favorite Volumes September 6, 2010 Main Program Window Program Menu Improvements: Mounting Volumes

Supported Systems Workaround for a bug in some custom (non-Microsoft) drivers for storage device controllers that Portable Mode caused a system crash when initiating hibernation on TrueCrypt-encrypted operating systems. (Windows 7/Vista/2008/2008R2) Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Other minor improvements (Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux) Language Packs Hot Keys

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/version-history[6/16/2013 4:54:55 PM] TrueCrypt - References

Home Documentation FAQ Downloads News Future History Screenshots Statistics Forum Contact Mounting Volumes References Search Supported Systems Portable Mode Disclaimers Keyfiles Tokens & Smart Cards Language Packs Hot Keys Please consider making a donation. Security Model Security Requirements Data Leaks Paging File Hibernation File Donate Now >>

Memory Dump Files Unencrypted Data in RAM Physical Security References Malware Multi-User Environment Authenticity and Integrity [1] U.S. Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), National Policy on the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National Security Systems and National Security Information, New Passwords & Keyfiles CNSS Policy No. 15, Fact Sheet No. 1, June 2003, available at Password/Keyfile Change http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/CNSS15FS.pdf. Trim Operation

Wear-Leveling [2] C. E. Shannon, Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, Bell System Technical Journal, v. 28, n. Reallocated Sectors 4, 1949 Defragmenting Journaling File Systems [3] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Volume Clones 197, November 26, 2001, available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf. Additional Requirements Command Line Usage [4] J. Nechvatal, E. Barker, L. Bassham, W. Burr, M. Dworkin, J. Foti, E. Roback, NIST, Report on the Backing Up Securely Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), October 2, 2000, Journal of Research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Vol. 106, No. 3, May-June 2001, available at Miscellaneous http://nvl.nist.gov/pub/nistpubs/jres/106/3/j63nec.pdf. Use Without Admin Rights Sharing over Network [5] B. Schneier, J. Kelsey, D. Whiting, D. Wagner, C. Hall, N. Ferguson, T. Kohno, M. Stay, The Twofish Background Task Team's Final Comments on AES Selection, May 15, 2000, available at Removable Medium Vol. http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/round2/comments/20000515-bschneier.pdf. TrueCrypt System Files Removing Encryption [6] Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World, Springer, 2003 Uninstalling TrueCrypt Digital Signatures Troubleshooting [7] RSA Laboratories, PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-Based Cryptography Standard, RSA Data Security, Inc. Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), March 25, 1999, available at Incompatibilities ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-5v2/pkcs5v2-0.pdf. Issues and Limitations License [8] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, R. Canetti, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, RFC 2104, Future Development February 1997, available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt. Acknowledgements Version History [9] M. Nystrom, RSA Security, Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- References SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512, RFC 4231, December 2005, available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4231.txt.

http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/references[6/16/2013 4:54:56 PM]