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REFERENDUM: A DEAD LETTER Prospects for Self-Determination in Western Sahara

Gallit Dobner Department of Political Science McGill University, Montreal

March2003

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master' s of Arts

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Canada Freedom is a plant alien to our part of the world. Whenever implanted, it dies ... We used to blame the colonialists, then sorne of us colonized others and the plant of freedom died over and over again. Each time it died a dreamer who inhabited his own world would try to revive it only to perish along with it.. . aIl those who made the effort rode against powerful windmills with wooden swords.

- Jihad al-Khazin TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... i

RÉSUMÉ ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

MAP OF WESTERN SAHARA ...... v

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

A BRIEF HISTORY: From Tribalism to Nationalism ...... 3 Western Sahara and Hs People ...... 3 Spanish Colonization ...... 5 The Liberation Strugg1e Begins ...... 6 Regional Designs ...... 7 The Liberation Struggle Continues ...... 9

THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION: More than a Quarter ofa Century Of Failed Promises ...... 10 Self-Determination as a Univers al Legal Principle ...... 10 The Failed Application of Self-Determination in Western Sahara ...... Il Initial Support ...... , Il The International Court ofJustice...... 13 Moroccan Occupation ...... 15 OA U Involvement...... 16 UN Involvement ...... 17

THE REFERENDUM AS A MOROCCAN PREROGATIVE ...... 19 Morocco' s Stake in Western Sahara...... 19 Regime Legitimacy ...... , 20 Natural Resources ...... 24 Extensive Investment ...... 26 Regional Bargaining Power ...... 27 Morocco's Efforts to Obstruct a Referendum ...... 28 Refusai to Negotiate ...... 28 Stalling the Pro cess ...... 30 Advocatingfor a Political Agreement...... '" 31 Prospects ...... 33 THE REFERENDUM AS A PREJUDICED PROCESS ...... 34 Voter Eligibility ...... 34 Voter Registration ...... 38 Voter Identification ...... , ...... 38 Ceasefire Violations ...... 41 Premature 'Repatriation' ...... 43 UN Personnel...... 45 Moroccan Control over MINURSO Personnel ...... 45 Neutrality ofthe UN in Question ...... 46 Prospects ...... 49

THE REFERENDUM AS AN UNENFORCEABLE INSTRUMENT ...... 50 UN Passivity ...... 50 UN Enforcement in Western Sahara ...... 51 UN Enforcement in East Timor and Namibia ...... 52 Moroccan Alliances: Powerful Friends ...... 53 The United States ...... 53 France ...... 57 Other Instrumental Allies ...... 59 Polisario Alliances: Dwindling Support ...... 61 Aigeria ...... 61 Other Lesser Allies ...... 63 Prospects ...... 65

ALTERNATIVES TO THE REFERENDUM ...... 65 The Status Quo ...... 66 More ofthe Same: The Benefits ...... 66 An Untenable Situation: The Costs ...... 68 A Return to Arms ...... 74 Terrorism ...... 74 Guerrilla Warfare ...... 76 A Political Soluntion ...... 81 A Polisario-Moroccan Compromise ...... 81 Auton()lny ...... 82 AUfonomy: nU! Framework Agreement ...... 82 Er:lens'tve AUfonorny ...... 84 f)artition ...... 86 A UN Imposed Resolution ...... 90 An Algero-Moroccan Pax ...... 92 Algerian-Polisario Relations ...... 92 Algerian-Moroccan Relations ...... 94 Aigerian lnterests ...... 95

IN CONCLUSION ...... 100

REFERENCE LIST ...... 103 ABSTRACT

Western Sahara has been granted the dubious distinction of Africa's last colony. Long a victim of imperial enterprise, the territory was annexed by Morocco in 1975 just as Spain withdrew. Despite international protest affirming the Saharawi people's right to a referendum of self-determination, still the question of Western Sahara lingers, frozen in time. This paper will demonstrate that a referendum no longer offers a way forward for three reasons: it is unlikely a referendum will be held due to Morocco' s unwillingness to cooperate; if a referendum went forward, it is improbable that it would prove free and fair given Moroccan attempts to undermine the process; and if a successful referendum took place, it is unlikely the international community would be prepared to enforce Saharawi sovereignty. As such, alternatives must be sought. An examination of possible scenarios suggests limited autonomy, as a result of an Algero-Moroccan rapprochement, is Western Sahara's most likely trajectory. RÉSUMÉ

Le Sabra Occidental est accordé la distinction douteuse d'être la dernière colonie en Afrique. Victime de longue date de l'entreprise coloniale, le territoire a été annexé par le Maroc en 1975, aussitôt que l'Espagne s'était retirée. Malgré la contestation internationale affirmant le droit du peuple sahraoui à un référendum d'autodétermination, la question du Sabra Occidental persiste, comme si elle était gelée dans l'histoire. Cette exposition démontrera qu'un référendum n'est plus une solution viable pour trois raisons: il est improbable que le référendum soit mis en place car le Maroc refuse de coopérer; si le référendum est mis en place, il est improbable que le processus soit libre et juste à cause des machinations marocaines; et si les résultats d'un référendum étaient favorables à l'indépendance sahraouie, il est improbable qu'ils soient respectés étant donné les intérêts des grandes puissances. Par conséquent, on doit trouver des alternatives. En enquêtant sur des scénarios possibles, une autonomie limitée issue d'un rapprochement algéro-marocain paraît la trajectoire la plus probable pour le Sahra Occidental.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1 have been told that a Master' s thesis is without import. Who reads a Master's level submission? Perhaps there is truth in such cynicism. However, if just one reader's eyes should faH upon these pages, 1 will feel as though 1 have contributed to the discipline's vast store of knowledge in sorne smaH way; 1 will have succeeded in shedding light, albeit faint, upon a conflict almost lost to obscurity. My academic journey will have been vindicated.

1 have many to thank for their invaluable support throughout this journey. Without question, it is first and foremost that 1 pledge my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Rex Brynen. Almost five years ago, 1 attended a lecture given by Dr. Brynen in which he made mention of the Polisario Front; it was this lecture that first stirred my curiosity and prompted my investigation of the Western Sahara. Throughout my undergraduate career, the year 1 spent abroad researching this conflict, and the writing of this paper in Montreal, Dr. Brynen has been a teacher, a mentor, a supporter, and a true inspiration. He has taught me to think criticaHy. He has encouraged me to dream bigger dreams. And he has pried open a world to me of truth and disco very that 1 could never otherwise have imagined. 1 thank him over and over.

Aiso deserving of great thanks is Sophie Demay of Enfants Réfugiés du Monde. Working alongside Sophie in Paris and traveling with her to the Saharawi refugee camps in Aigeria, 1 discovered a humbling pureness and sincerity of heart to which 1 can only aspire. Sophie took a great deal of interest in my research, providing me with many of the sources that figure prominently in these pages.

Having never wrÏtten a paper of this length before, 1 sought a critical yet constructive eye with boundless patience - this eye was my father's, Moshe Dobner. Almost hand in hand, we discovered the Western Sahara together, for he was ne ver more than a few steps behind, ready to discuss an idea, debate a concept,

111 or edit an argument. Also instrumental were Orna Dobner, Peter Loewen, and Tracy McNicoll. 1 thank them for their kind willingness to assist me in tasks massive and mundane.

ln any undertaking of this kind, moral support is essential. 1 thank my mother, Ina Marie Dobner, and my friend, Meghan Cox, for grinning and bearing whatever burden 1 may have placed upon their shoulders over the course of this project.

Finally, 1 have many to thank for the rare opportunity 1 was granted to travel to the Saharawi refugee camps in May 2002. It was this trip that brought my research alive. First, 1 thank the Mc Gill University Department of Political Science for the inestimable opportunities with which it provided me when it granted me a Guy Drummond Fellowship to travel and study in Paris, France. Second, 1 thank Enfants Réfugiés du Monde for we1coming me into their organization and encouraging my travel to Algeria. And finally, 1 thank the Saharawi people for their warm hospitality and kind friendship. In the unlikeliest of places - a barren, desert plane - amidst the blustering sandstorm and the pitiless sun, 1 discovered grace. 1 met a people who confront adversity with humour and hope; a people with enviable strength and flawless determination; a people eager to share the very little they have. Upon the last night of my stay in the camps, a Saharawi gentleman, grasping my hand firmly, implored me: N'oublie jamais le peuple sahraouis. 1 have not and 1 could not. It is for the Saharawi people that 1 write this paper.

IV MAP OF WESTERN SAHARA. *

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Sidali, Ahmed Mohamed. 2001. Globalisation and peoples' right to self-determination: case of Western Sahara. M.A. diss., University of Pretoria, Faculty of Law, Centre of Human Rights. INTRODUCTION

In 1918, as the First World War drew to a close, it was American President Woodrow Wilson who emerged as the world's champion for peace. He caUed upon Europe to lay down its arms and concede to the lasting peace he envisioned in his Fourteen Points: reconciliation based on democracy and self-determination and bolstered by a trans-national institution of governance, the League of Nations. Only six months later, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the leaders of the world's great powers gathered at Versailles to sign Wilson's Treaty. This war was to be, as Wilson put it, the war to end aU wars.

As history would have it, not only would President Wilson's principles fail to prevent another World War, but they would also ironically spur civil and interstate conflict in the decades to follow. For when Wilson, in his fifth point, validated the nation's right to self-determination, he effectively set the law of the jungle - and that of an anarchical state system - upon its head: no longer would brute force win the day; instead, international law was to see to it that the rights of nations large and small were respected. Although noble in its purpose, this principle would prove inherently flawed in its application, for self-determination would be dependent upon the support of the international community - a community of states guided by the principle of realpolitik rather than Wilson's professed idealism.

Fast forward more than fi ft y years from the Treaty of Versailles to the Maghreb in the year 1975: an independent Morocco, led by its domestically besieged King Hassan II, occupies Western Sahara, a desert territory on Africa's Atlantic coast, as Spain, the former colonizing power, withdraws. The Saharawis are forced to flee their homes, seeking refuge in the de sert of southem Algeria. Sympathetic states prote st and international organizations caU for the Kingdom's immediate withdrawal. Yet, after 25 years of illegalannexation, Morocco remains

1 resolute and thousands of Saharawis remain refugees, as the international community clings to a principle it is unwilling to enforce.

At stake, of course, is the right of the people of Western Sahara to self­ determination. First articulated by Wilson, this right was later reiterated by the United Nations in its 1960 Resolution 1514: "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation." (A/RES/1514/XV) Thus, according to UN Resolution 1541, aIl territories that are non-self governing (i.e. colonies), should achieve a full measure of self-government by either emerging as a sovereign state; freely associating with an independent state; or integrating with an independent state. Should astate decide to associate with another state, this decision "" .should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes" i.e. via a referendum (A/RES/15411XV). The people of Western Sahara have exhausted both military and diplomatie channels for almost three decades in an attempt to secure this right to a referendum of self-determination. However, a popular vote, continuously frustrated by Morocco and the international community, evades them still.

Given the rule of international law - that of self-determination - and the current context - that of countless failed bids for self-determination - how viable is a referendum as a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict? While independence, granted vis-à-vis a referendum of self-determination, is the only solution consistent with the UN Charter, such a scenario seems highly improbable for three reasons: first, it is unlikely that a referendum will ever be held due to Morocco' s unwillingness to cooperate and the related complexity of compiling a voter's list; second, if a referendum were to go forward, it is improbable the outcome would prove free and fair in light of Moroccan attempts to undermine the process; and third, should a successful referendum take place, it is unlikely the international

2 community, glven prevailing material and security interests, would enforce Saharawi sovereignty. Thus, the question emerges: what will be the fate of Western Sahara? An exploration of alternative scenarios - the status quo, a return to arms, and a political solution - points to a token autonomy agreement, brokered by Aigeria and Morocco, as the territory's most likely trajectory.

The following analysis will provide a general overview of Saharawi history from tribalism to nationalism - and outline the Saharawis' heretofore unsuccessful bid for a referendum; it will then explore why a referendum of self­ determination is no longer a realistic resolution in light of Moroccan and international constraints; finally, it will examine alternatives to a referendum of self-determination, identifying an autonomy arrangement, and ultimately Moroccan integration of Western Sahara, as the most likely scenario to unfold in the region. The letter of the law, it will be conc1uded, though ideal, is not achievable. It is the luxury of those unwearied by war, the indulgence of those who me et their enemy on even ground. Unfortunately, the Saharawis enjoy neither. It is the inelegant principle of pragmatism, embedded in a framework of realpolitik, rather than Wilson's starry ideal of self-determination that will prevail in Western Sahara.

A BRIEF HISTORY: From Tribalism to Nationalism

Western Sahara and Its People

Western Sahara is a disputed territory in Northwest Africa. Spanning 266,000 square kilometres and situated on the Atlantic coast, it is bound to the north and northeast by Morocco and Aigeria and is bordered to the east by Mauritania. The irony implicit in Western Sahara's dismal geography - stony, wind-swept planes, practically void of oases and averaging only 50 millimetres a year in rainfall - rarely escapes mention: despite its meagre, almost pitiable

3 appearance, this seemingly insignificant stretch of desert lS endowed with an abundance ofnatural riches (Miské 1978, 12).

Nomadic and of mixed descent, the people of Western Sahara are considered a sub-group of the Moors. Their varied ancestry can be traced to the wars; alliances and inter-marriages between Sanhaja Berbers, Bedouin Arabs, and black African slaves. Occupying the extreme western desert and united by their common Arabic dialect, Hassaniya, the Saharawis have remained a distinct people in the region.

Saharawi society was traditionally ordered by loyalty to one oftwenty tribes - the Reguibat, Tekhna, and Ouled Delim the most notable. These tribes and their factions regulated their own affairs through assemblies known as the djemaa. Led by an appointed sheikh, each djemaa established and administered its own body of law, consistent with the Islamic judicial code. At the tribal level, the djemaa was known as the Council of 40 and was called together in times of crisis to organize coordinated action. Tribal and sub-tribal divisions were further compounded by a system of caste. The shorfa tribes or descendents of the prophet Mohammed and the ahel mdafa tribes or people of the gun ruled the hierarchy. Below them were the znaga who had tributary status; the maalemin (craftsmen); and the iggawen (bards). The abid (slaves) and haratin (freed slaves who remain dependant) occupied the lowest rungs of the social order (Hodges 1984).

Dictated by nomadic pastoralism and an inhospitable terrain, Saharawi society was relatively dispersed. Migration occurred in small groups and full tribal gatherings were rare. One of the results of this diffusion was the ghazi or raid. As no single tribe or fraction could build enough wealth or power to rule over the others, no supra-tribal government emerged and law and order remained the unique prerogative of each group. Vying for livestock, the tribes and their fractions participated in an endless spiral of raids and counter-raids that continued well into the 20th century. Despite minor interventions aimed at securing desert routes, and

4 thus controlling the trade of gold and slaves in the region, the powerful sultans of neighbouring Morocco were also unable to institute a system of supra-tribal authority. In fact, it would take Spain, one of the great colonizing powers, fi fty full years to pacify this de sert range.

Spanish Colonization

Spanish colonization of Western Sahara occurred in two stages. The first, spanning the 15th and 16th centuries, was characterized by Spanish-Portuguese rivalry as the two powers, hungry for slaves and colonial loot, landed successive bands of raiding armies on Western Sahara's shores. By the early 16th century, attempts at colonization were met by local resistance in the form of jihad. While both Spain and Portugal eventually lost control of the coast, Spain held onto the Canary Islands and therefore continued to send marauding armies to the territory in search of resources. At the end of the 19th century, fearing a French foothold in the Western Sahara might threaten its interests in the Canaries, Spain joined the scramble for Africa, thus initiating its second phase of colonization. In a series of Franco-Spanish conventions - signed in 1886, 1900, 1904, and 1912 - Spanish Sahara's borders were delineated.

While the Spanish formally controlled the colonies of Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra (collectively referred to as the Spanish Sahara and now commonly known as the Western Sahara) as weIl as a protectorate known as Spanish South Morocco, they were too weak to occupy the territory. Concerned mainly with protecting their fishing interests in the Canaries, Spain was content to establish a limited number of bases along the coast. As a result, the hinterland underwent little development, becoming, instead, a haven for nomad forces resisting French occupation in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. It was not until 1934 when the French, in a coordinated military campaign, pacified the border regions of Western Sahara that the Spanish began to occupy strategie points in the interior.

5 However, seeing no monetary bene fit in its development, Spain continued to neglect its North African possession until the end of the 1950s. In 1958, Spain ceded its protectorate of Spanish South Morocco to a newly independent Morocco and converted the remaining territory (Western Sahara) into a Spanish province. Administrative bodies were forrned and municipal elections, albeit controlled by the Spanish, were held by 1963. While Western Sahara's waters had long been renowned for their rich fishing, it was only in the early 1960s that experts began to speculate as to the worth of possible petroleum and iron ore deposits. More importantly, in 1962, Empresa Nacional Minera deI Sahara (ENMISA) conducted a systematic survey of the territory, concluding that it had an estimated 10 billion tons of phosphate deposits and found proven reserves of 1.7 billion tons at Bou Craa (Hodges 1984, 6). Spain immediately founded a special company, Fosbucraa, to exploit the phosphates and exports began in 1972.

As a result of these developments, Saharawi society underwent rapid modernization in the following two decades. The majority gave up nomadic life and settled in towns, taking up wage employment or opening shops and sending their children to school. According to the 1974 census, by that same year, 55% of Saharawis lived in one of the province's three main towns: El Ayoun, Smara, and Dakhla (forrnerly known as Villa Cisneros) (Hodges 1984, 6). The way had been paved for a nascent sense of nationhood.

The Liberation Struggle Begins

While Saharawi resistance to foreign invasion began in the IS th century with the arrivaI of the Spanish and Portuguese, it was crushed by the French in 1934 and would only re-emerge with the Moroccan liberation movement of the 1950s. Assisted by the Moroccan Arrny of Liberation, the Saharawis took up arms against the French in Aigeria and Mauritania in 1956. In response, the French joined forces with the Spanish and launched Operation Hurricane in 1957 and 1958, successfully subduing the Saharawis once again.

6 Unable to challenge the Spanish militarily throughout the 1960s, the Saharawis founded a modem, urban-based nationalist movement called Harakat Tahir Saguia el- Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab (Liberation Organization of Saguia el­ Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab). The small clandestine movement was led by Mohammed idi Ibrahim Bassiri who, having studied in Morocco, Egypt and Syria, began a Saharawi journal called Al Chihab (the Torch). The principle objectives of the movement were autonomy for Western Sahara; an agreement with the Spanish regarding future independence; and exclusive control over the region' s natural resources. The movement disbanded in 1970 after the Spanish fired on demonstrators in the town of Zemla, killing Il and arresting many hundreds; Bassiri, too, was arrested and never resurfaced. 1

The Zemla massacre represented a turning point for the Saharawis: peaceful prote st was no longer an option. The void left by Bassiri was quickly filled by EI­ Ouali Mustapha Sayed and his contemporaries living abroad in Morocco and Mauritania. Having studied in Rabat, they returned to Western Sahara in the early 1970s to establish links with remnants of Harakat Tahir and solicit foreign support for the Saharawi cause. On May 10, 1973, the Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguis el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) was founded as "the unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi Arab African people can recover their total liberty and foil the manoeuvres of Spanish colonialism" (Hodges 1984, 7). The Polisario began its guerrilla attacks ten days after its formation.

Regional Designs

As the Polisario battled occupying Spanish forces, further threats to Saharawi independence began to emerge within the region with the assertion of

1 Bassiri vanished without a trace following his June 1970 arrest. The Spanish Government later claimed it had deported him to Morocco, but Moroccan authorities deny he ever arrived. Many Saharawis believe he was murdered by his Spanish captors (Hodges 1987, 50).

7 Moroccan and Mauritanian territorial c1aims. At independence, Moroccan Istiqlal Party leader, Allal el-Fassi, c1aimed: " ... so long as the Spanish deserts of the south, the Sahara from Tindouf and Atar and the Aigerian-Moroccan borderlands are not liberated from their trusteeship, our independence will remain incomplete and our first dut y will be to carry on action to liberate the country and to unify it." (Hodges 1984, 7) Thus, adopting el-Fassi's dream of a 'Greater Morocco', King Hassan c1aimed a large portion of the Algerian Sahara, aIl of Western Sahara and Mauritania and a corner ofNorthwest Mali as part of Morocco.

Mauritania, fearing Moroccan control over Western Sahara would threaten its own sovereignty, laid c1aim to the territory as weIl. In a calI to the people of Western Sahara, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah stated: "I cannot help invoking the innumerable ties which unite us .. .I invite our brothers of Spanish Sahara to dream ofthis great economic and spiritual Mauritania." (Hodges 1984, 7)

Thus, when Spain finally agreed to pull out of Western Sahara, it was war rather than independence that ensued. Due mostly to the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon and the consequent fall of the Portuguese colonial empire, compounded by an ailing Franco, Spain agreed to a statute of autonomy that would convert the djemaa into a legislative assembly and announced that a referendum under UN auspices would be held in Western Sahara in 1975. Morocco, determined to block the referendum, warned that it would not accept a Spanish puppet regime in North Africa and brought the matter before the United Nations International Court of Justice (lCJ).

When, in October of 1975, the International Court ruled that the people of Western Sahara had the right to self-determination, the King launched his Green March. Amassing 350,000 volunteers, Hassan marched his people, Koran in hand, across the desert to assert his c1aim over the territory. Determined to avoid military confrontation with Morocco, Spain began to negotiate with the Kingdom. On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritanian signed the Tripartite

8 Agreement (also known as the Madrid Accords) in which Spain agreed to leave the Western Sahara by February 1976 and transfer administrative authority - though not sovereignty - to a joint Moroccan-Mauritanian administration. Most experts agree that the accords also involved secret terrns: in return for its withdrawal, Spain would retain control of the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, guaranteed fishing rights off the Saharan and Moroccan coasts, and a 35% stake in Fosbucraa. Despite a flurry of resolutions, the United Nations proved powerless: Spanish troops were vacated, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces moved in as of November 25, 1975, and up to 40,000 Saharawis, fled to Aigeria2 (Hodges 1984, 10).

The Liberation Struggle Continues

After the Madrid Accords, the majority of Saharawis rallied to support the Polisario. On February 27, 1976, the Provisional Saharawi National Council (composed of members of the former djemaa) proclaimed the independence of Western Sahara, christening the new state the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Both the Polisario and the SADR were led by EI-Ouali until his June 1976 death in a guerrilla raid on Nouakchott. El-Ouali was replaced by current leader, Mohammed Abdelaziz. An estimated 20,000 men joined the Polisario's Saharawi People's Liberation Arrny (SPLA) to fight Morocco and Mauritania. With limited support from Aigeria and Libya, the SPLA first concentrated its forces on Mauritania, defeating it in August 1979. From this point forward, Western Saharan self-determination would become a question of Moroccan fortitude.

2 The Saharawis were first driven from the northeast of the territory; wh en Moroccan forces bombed their makeshift camps, located further south, with napalm and phosphorous, many were forced to seek refuge in southwest Algeria (Seddon 1987,99).

9 THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION: More than a Quarter of a Century of Failed Promises

Since Moroccan occupation, the Saharawi people have claimed the right to self-determination as their primary defence. As the literature attests, international organizations, individual states, jurists - and even Morocco in the past - have recognized this right and called for its application in Western Sahara. An examination of the history of this fundamental principle and its failed enforcement in the territory demonstrates a clear and consistent contradiction of international law. The principle of self-determination, however, has come to be equated with justice and, as such, has a great deal of staying power - even if it has bec orne clear that a referendum of self-determination is no longer a viable option.

Self-Determination as a Univers al Legal Principle

When the concept of 'self-determination' first emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, it was considered a moral and political princip le rather than one of any legal substance. And when President Woodrow Wilson enshrined it in his Fourteen Points after WWI, and when Sir Winston Churchill and President F.D. Roosevelt committed themselves to it in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, they were speaking in terms of North America and Western Europe - self-determination was not a right that extended to the peoples of Africa and Asia. With time, however, self-determination became a governing principle, a legal right under customary internationallaw, which applied to aIl peoples.

In Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, for instance, the UN declares developing "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princip le of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" one of its purposes. Furthermore, it requires members administering terri tories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government to recognize that "the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount". In 1960, the UN General Assembly passed the

10 Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, further defining the right to self-determination as "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation" and requiring non-self-governing territories be granted self­ government. Further reinforcing this commitment, the Assembly passed two human rights covenants in 1966 - the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - recognizing self-determination as a right of aIl parties. In 1971, it passed the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN once again confirming this right.

The Failed Application of Self-Determination in Western Sahara

Initial Support

The UN General Assembly first acknowledged the Saharawis' right to self­ determination in 1965 when it requested Spain immediately take "aU necessary measures for the liberation of. .. the Spanish Sahara from colonial domination" (AiRES/2012072). In 1966, it passed the first of several annual resolutions calling for self-determination via a referendum. In that same year, Spain expressed its support for the resolution and promised to hold a referendum in Western Sahara. However, as Tony Hodges argues, it probably had little intention of keeping its word (Hodges 1987, 45). Hoping to exploit the territory's mineraI wealth, Spain continued to publicly pledge its support for a referendum while working feverishly to hold onto its North African possession.

Meanwhile, both Morocco and Mauritania echoed the Saharawis' caU for independence. In fact, Morocco voiced its support for Saharawi self-determination as early as 1959. As Prince Moulay Hassan declared:

Il C'est la volonté de la population saharienne qui décidera de l'avenir du territoire, toute autre forme de revendication pouvant apparaitre comme un signe d'impérialisme ... la volonté des populations se manifestera tot ou tard, sans que Rabat ait besoin de la solliciter. (Mohsen Finan 1997, 176)

In this spirit, Morocco and Mauritania voted in support of aIl of the UN's pro­ referendum resolutions between 1967 and 1974. In 1970, having met with Spanish officiaIs, King Hassan himself declared:

Instead of going purely and simply [to Spain] to claim the territory of the Sahara, 1 went to request specifically that a popular consultation take place there, assured as 1 was that the first result would be the departure of the non-Africans and that then one would leave it up to the people of the Sahara to choose whether to live under the Moroccan aegis or their own aegis or any other aegis. (Hodges 1987,47)

The actions of Morocco and Mauritania were clearly motivated by the belief that Saharawi leaders would choose to join their respective countries should an exercise of self-determination take place.

Spain' s procrastination prompted the creation of the Polisario and its fierce guerrilla war. Adopting a measured approach, Spain continued its policy of opposition and repression while initiating preparations for eventual disengagement. In 1974, Spain unveiled its estatuto politico in which it converted the djemaa into a legislative assembly, thus devolving limited powers to tribal chiefs. Moreover, it began to prepare a pro-Spanish political party, PUNS, in order to counter the Polisario's influence. However, in the wake of the Carnation Revolution, Spain finally responded to Polisario and international pressure and, in August 1974, announced that a referendum would be held under UN auspices in the following year.

Given a growing sense of nationalism among the Saharawis, as evidenced by the popularity of the Polisario, Morocco responded unfavourably to Spain's planned disengagement. Fearing, for the first time, that an independent Western

12 Sahara would not opt for integration with the Kingdom but would rather seek full independence, the King submitted his own claim to the territory to the ICl; Mauritania did the same.

The International Court of Justice

The Court was faced with two questions: "Was Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one [terra nullus] 7" and, if not, "What were the legal ties of this territory with the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity7" (ICl 1975). The Saharawis, lacking state status, were excluded from the debate and instead represented by Aigeria. Aigeria based its argument for Saharawi statehood on two major legal principles: uti possidetis and self-determination. The former demands that successor states accept international boundaries as delineated by predecessor regimes. This concept is best reflected in the OAU's 1964 Cairo Declaration on Border Disputes, legitimizing national borders inherited from colonial times. The latter, as previously diseussed, argues that a people, separate and existing within defined territorial borders, has the inherent right to determine its own destiny (loffé 1987, 18).

Morocco and Mauritania countered Aigeria 's argument on the basis of territorial sovereignty rooted in pre-existing legal ties to the territory of Western Sahara. Arguing that Spanish eolonization of Western Sahara had disrupted their historie territorial integrity, they pointed to Article VI of UN Resolution 1514 and its ambiguous assertion that where territorial integrity is disrupted, states have the right to reintegrate their former territories: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unit y and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (A/RES/1514IXV).3

3 It is interesting to note that Boughdadi Mohamed, in his 2001 work Le Coriflit Saharien: Une Nouvelle Lecture, interprets Article VI of Resolution 1514 to read, "Si un Etat a été démembré par le colonialisme, il a le droit de recouvrer son intégrité territorial après sa decolonisation" (Mohamed 2001, 233). Thus Mohamed suggests that the United Nations grants states that have been

13 Thus, Morocco' s argument hinged on two factors. First, it brought forward different treaty relations between itself and various European powers as evidence of its sovereignty over the territory. Second, and more importantly, it referred to the internaI nature of the Moroccan state in pre-colonial times as evidence of prior authority in the region. As Boughdadi Mohamed, an officer in Morocco' s Royal Armed Forces and instructor at its École d'État Major, explains, before 1912 (at which point Morocco became a protectorate of France and Spain), the King's sovereignty extended north from the Mediterranean to as far south as the Senegal River, and east to west from the Atlantic to the Timbuktu meridian. His sovereignty was based on the concept of bayâ - an oath of allegiance and fealty:

La bayâ determine une implication matérielle et en même temps spirituelle. C'est une souveraineté autant temporelle que religieuse du monarque sur le peuple et sur le territoire. Elle est précisément la base-même des liens personnels d'allégeance juridiques et spirituals, qui impliquent une responsabilité réciproque entre le peuple et amir el mouminine (le prince de croyants) (Mohamed 2001, 142).

Authority was thus demonstrated by the ability of the Sultan to appoint local officiaIs in the region, collect taxes, and obtain this oath or bayâ from representatives of the communities he sought to control. This concept of authority, Morocco argues, applied even when the Sultan's direct temporal authority was lacking as his spiritual status was still respected (lotTé 1987, 21-24). However, as Mohamed argues, the concept of bayâ is not one well-recognized by international law: "le droit international, bien qu'il ait subi des modifications, reste encore caractérisé par un "européocentrisme" et un ethnocentrisme occidental qui l'éloignent des autres concepts d'ordre régional, national, historique, traditionnel, culturel ou religieux" (Mohamed 2001, 150).

Upon consideration of the Vlews presented by Aigeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, the Court rendered its advisement in October 1975. In response to the dismembered during the colonial period the right to recover their territorial integrity upon decolonization.

14 first question, it found that the Western Sahara was not a terra nullus i.e. it had belonged to a population; in response to the second question, it determined that although sorne legal ties existed in both the Moroccan and Mauritanian cases, these ties were not sufficient to warrant sovereignty over Western Sahara. Specifically, in the case of Morocco' s daim, the Court asserted that oaths of fealty were personal and not indicative of sovereign control since their validity was limited to the pers on of the Sultan; as well, the Court maintained that religious ties did not constitute a basis for sovereignty (loffé 1987, 24). Moreover, only two days before the Court announced its decision, the UN Visiting Mission to the Western Sahara had published a report based on its tour of the region; the indigenous population of Western Sahara, it found, was "categorically for independence and against the territorial daims of Morocco and Mauritania." (Damis 1983, 59) Thus the Court dedared that it found no "le gal ties of such a nature as might affect the ... decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular. .. self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory" (ICl1975).

Moroccan Occupation

As previously noted, the ICl decision gave way to the Green March which, in turn, forced Spain's hand, leading to the 1975 Tripartite Agreement; Moroccan and Mauritanian forces annexed the territory shortly after. The UN's response to Moroccan-Mauritanian occupation was ambiguous. In December 1975, the General Assembly passed Resolution 3458A, calling for a UN-supervised exercise of self-determination. However, it also passed Resolution 3458B taking note of the Tripartite Agreement and calling for consultations to be presided over by a UN observer.

In an attempt to justify his position, King Hassan convened an extra­ ordinary meeting of the djemaa in February 1976. Sixty-five of the 102 members attended and aIl voted to ratify the Tripartite Agreement. However, neither Spain

15 nor the UN recognized this vote. Spain insisted that it had transferred authority and not sovereignty to Morocco, while Secretary General Kurt Waldheim maintained that the vote had not been supervised by the UN. Furthermore, many argued that the vote was invalid as 67 members of the djemaa had met previously and signed the Proclamation of Guelta Zemmour, formally dissolving the body and declaring support for Polisario; this latest vote, they claimed, was the result of Moroccan coerClOn.

OAU Involvement

Despite these claims, foreign occupation of the Western Sahara continued with little response from the international community. The UN continued to pass annual resolutions in support of the Saharawis' right to self-determination via a referendum but took no further action, preferring to defer the matter to the Organization of African Unit y (OAD). Despite its charter, which stresses the "inalienable right of aIl people to control their own destiny", the OAU's role in the dispute was both belated and short-lived (OAD 2002).

Only after Mauritania's President Mokhtar Ould Daddah was overthrown in a 1978 coup (as a result of its war against the Polisario), did the OAU become actively involved in the search for a resolution by creating the Wise Men's Committee. In 1979, the Committee issued a report recommending that a referenduffi be held in Western Sahara; despite Moroccan protestations, the OAU adopted the findings of the report at its 1979 Summit. No action, however, was taken until 1981 when, isolated on the diplomatic front, facing severe military setbacks, and reeling from Mauritania's disengagement from the war, Morocco back peddled once again and agreed, in principle, to the idea of a referendum. The OAU immediately set up an implementation committee to organize a ceasefire and referenduffi.

16 However, Morocco's agreement to a popular plebiscite was probably an effort to buy its military forces more time on the battlefront. In collaboration with the United States, the King had begun construction of a great wall of defence that would encirc1e the 'useful triangle' of Western Sahara - inc1uding El Ayoun, Smara, and Bou-Craa - thus sealing off the northwest corner of the territory and rendering Moroccan forces less vulnerable to attack.4 Despite a series of OAU committee meetings and indirect negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario, the process fell apart in 1982 when the Secretary General of the OAU announced his decision to seat the SADR (as 26 of the organization's 50 member states had formally recognized the SADR). Morocco and 18 member states walked out of a February 1983 summit in protest, throwing the OAU into disarray. No longer able to achieve its obligatory two-thirds quorum, the organization was paralysed until a new summit could finally be convened in June 1983. Isolated within the organization, Morocco withdrew in July 1985, effectively ending OAU involvement in the dispute.

UN Involvement

With the OAU's virtual banishment from the mediation arena, the United Nations took up the lead role in negotiations, building on progress made by the Wisemen and Implementation Committees. In December 1985, the General Assembly broke from its mantra and formally endorsed the OAU's approval of direct negotiations, a ceasefire, an interim administration, and a referendum (A/RES/40/50). Throughout 1985 and 1986, Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar held proximity talks with Polisario and Moroccan representatives (as Morocco refused to recognize the Polisario, let alone negotiate directly with the Front). In November and December of 1987, a joint UN-OAU technical mission

4 Between March 1981 and 1987, with the assistance of the United States and France, Moroccan General Ahmed Dlimi oversaw the six-part construction of a 1125km berm, known as the "Great Wall of the Sahara". Constructed from sandbanks 2-3 yards high, the berm was fortified with minefields, barbed wire, artillery placements, observation posts, underground quarters, electronic ground sensors, and radar equipment. The wall seriously eroded the Polisario's military upper hand, in effect, nullifying the military component of the conflict and creating a situation of stalemate (Harding 1993, Ill; Hodges 1984,12; Mohsen-Finan 1997,65).

17 visited Western Sahara in order to prepare the way for a referendum; and in 1988, De Cuellar proposed a peace plan. 5 In August 1988, both Morocco and the Polisario agreed to the plan. Following the General Assembly's November resolution demanding direct negotiations, the King finally agreed to recelve a Polisario delegation at the beginning of January 1989 (A/RES/43/33). Although the talks were insignificant in terms of content and outcome, the meeting, in itself, was groundbreaking. In June 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 658 approving the peace plan, and in April 1991 it adopted Resolution 690, creating MINURSO (the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). Thus, a ceasefire was proclaimed on September 6 of that year and the peace plan took effect.

The referendum to be held in 1992 was postponed. In fact, the referendum was postponed many times over in the decade that followed. Officially, the principle stumbling block was the compilation of a voters list; the real obstacle, however, was Moroccan intransigency. As will be explained, disagreements over who should have the right to vote led to a suspension of MINURSO and a series of ceasefire violations in the early and mid-90s. With Kofi Annan at the helm of the UN by the end of 1996, former American Secretary of State James Baker was named personal envoy to the Secretary General and negotiations resumed in 1997. Despite a series of meetings culminating in the Houston Accords, a referendum still proved elusive. By January 2000, a voters list of approximately 86,000 had been compiled while the number of Moroccan appeals - to be explained later - stood at 130,000.

5 The plan involved both a ceasefire and referendum: a UN Representative would be assigned to the territory with a 2,000 strong force to monitor the process; Moroccan troops would be reduced from 100,000 to 25,000 before the referendum and would be confined to the barracks during the vote; Polisario forces, estimated at 6,000, would withdraw to their bases; voter eligibility would be determined by a UN team and would be limited to those identified in a 1974 Spanish census and those born in the Western Sahara since; and the referendum would involve two options - independence or integration with Morocco - plus the possibility of a third option involving a large measure of autonomy for Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty (Lawless 2002, 774).

18 Morocco's attempts to frustrate the referendum process have proved successful. F or more than ten years, the King has managed to postpone the seemingly inevitable by insisting Moroccans be allowed to participate in the determination of Western Sahara's future. And thus stands the peace process today: idle. Moroccan forces guard their defensive wall; Saharawi refugees languish in southwest Aigeria; and the Security Council passes occasional resolutions, postponing decisive action again and again.

Given this CUITent context - decades of unanswered calls for self­ determination and a prevailing diplomatie stalemate - what can be said for the prospects of a referendum? It is to this question that we now turn.

THE REFERENDUM AS A MOROCCAN PREROGATIVE

"There will be no referendum for Western Sahara until Morocco permits it," claims Frank Ruddy, former Vice President of the UN Identification Commission in the territory. "Everyone knows it, and it is simply and demonstrably the fact" (Ruddy 2000). Indeed, an examination of Morocco's stake in the territory and the King's consequent efforts to prevent a popular plebiscite from taking place confirms Ruddy's pessimism. Despite its grand designs, the United Nations is little closer to holding a referendum today than it was ten years ago; moreover, the future looks equally grim.

Morocco's Stake in Western Sahara

Although a seemingly inconsequential ribbon of desert, there is more to Western Sahara than a cursory glance might reveal. Indeed, vested in the territory is the Moroccan monarchy's legitimacy and staying power, the potential for great resource wealth, extensive investment, and the Kingdom's bid for regional supremacy.

19 Regime Legitimacy

The legitimacy of Morocco's ruling Alawi dynasty (1635-) is rooted primarily in its claim of descent from the Prophet Muhammad, through the line of Ali (the Fourth Caliph) and the Prophet's daughter, Fatima. Nevertheless, the faU oflraq's King Faisal, Libya's King Idris, and the Shah oflran points to the fragile nature of monarchies in the Middle East. The need to build legitimacy upon strong foundations or el se risk instability and overthrow is a lesson that has not been wasted upon any of Morocco' s kings. Indeed, aU have made their daim over Western Sahara an integral aspect of regime legitimacy. As Ahmed-Baba Miské asserts, "Pour le regime de Rabat, la recuperation du Sahra est devenue une question de vie ou de mort. L'opinion a été conditionnée à y voir une cause nationale" (Miské 1978, 33).

For King Mohammed V, the dislocating effect of colonization had created a need to reconstruct a sense of national unit y, independence and territorial integrity. Thus, he immediately adopted Istiqlal's caU for a greater Morocco, refusing to recognize Mauritania's independence in 1960.

King Hassan II inherited his father's policy., briefly warring with Algeria over borders in 1963. From 1965 onwards, facing increasing domestic pressure due to a deteriorating economy and consequent riots as weIl as two failed army coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, Hassan declared a state of emergency and assumed sweeping powers. The resulting climate of tension led Hassan to conclude that he would have to depoliticize the army, end the violence and repression that had followed the coups, and reinforce the legitimacy gained by his father if he was to maintain his thrown (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 37). The acquisition of Western Sahara provided an ideal focus for Moroccan ultra-nationalism. Thus he launched his campaign in Western Sahara, claiming "We are prepared to pursue the war for centuries if that is necessary, because the Sahara is Moroccan and can only be Moroccan" (Hodges 1984, 14). By defending the Kingdom's 'territorial integrity',

20 the palace was able to unify its national forces and give its distrusted army a new

mISSIOn.

Despite initial claims that Mohammed VI's July 1999 inauguration would usher in increased liberalization and democratization and, therefore, a solution to the Western Sahara dispute, the young king has followed closely in his father's footsteps - particularly in regard to Western Sahara. Mohammed VI began his reign attempting to distance himself from the absolutist nature of Hassan II. As Abdeslam Maghraoui explained, upon ascension to the throne, the new King was faced with two alternatives: either he could invent a new 'ruling bargain', thereby replicating his father's authoritarian rule, or he could spearhead serious political reform in pur suit of a democratic form of political authority. Mohammed VI seems to have opted for the latter "in order to buy himself time and to avoid confronting the powerful religious, military, and administrative establishment before his power base is consolidated" (Maghraoui, 2001). Addressing the people of Morocco in his debut Throne Speech, Mohammed asserted: "We are devoted to the constitutional monarchy, a multi-party system, economic liberalism, regionalization and decentralization, the construction of a state of law, the safeguard of human rights and individual and collective freedoms and the preservation of security and stability for all" (Howe 2000).

Thus, in the first year of his reign, the so-called Moroccan spring, initiated by Hassan II two years earlier, seemed to blossom.6 Most notably, Mohammed sacked infamous iron man Driss Basri, Minister of the Interior, replacing also 44 senior officiaIs in Basri's network (Howe 2000). Soon after, he fired Mohammed Mediouri, Hassan's head of security, as part of his purported fight against corruption. The new King also encouraged the retum of political exiles: Abraham Serfaty, his father's most outspoken critic and the monarchy's longest standing

6 The Moroccan spring was initiated with Hassan's policy of alternance - a royally-mandated shift in govemmental power to the opposition. Hassan named Abderrahmane Youssoufi, leader of the Socialist opposition, Prime Minister.

21 political pnsoner was repatriated; the family of dissident Ben Barka7 was welcomed back from exile in France; and the irreverent comedian Ahmad Sanoussi, who had been banned from television, was rehabilitated (Howe 2000). Mohammed's tour of the neglected regions of northern Morocco and the Rif Mountains seemed to cement his popularity as "the king of the poor" (Ramonet 2000).

However, these measures proved little more than cosmetic and, one year later, Mohammed's search for legitimacy led many to question his commitment to reform. The Spanish right-of-centre daily El Mundo stated: "À la fin de l'année 2000, le monarque marocain règne comme un roi absolu et son régime est tout aussi dictatorial et policier que du temps de Hassan II'' (Tuquoi 2001, 216). Indeed, Ahmed Midaoui, the new Minister of the Interior, was swiftly replaced with a close friend of the King, and Serfaty was co-opted into government. 8 Less than a month after a television appearance in which Mohammed promised to uphold press freedoms, authorities had closed the Kingdom's three leading independent weekly newspapers (The Economist 2000a). In· fact, by June 2000 alone, seven newspapers had been banned (The Economist, 2000b). Perhaps most telling, the King began to address himself in third person, and boulevards, sporting events, academies and mosques soon bore the name of this supposed man of the people (Tuquoi 2001, 230-231). As for Mohammed's 'constitutional monarchy', despite relatively free and fair legislative elections held in September 2002, a constitutional bias favouring the king at the expense of parliamentary autonomy virtually ensures that the Palace, which appoints key ministers and powerfullocal governors, still caUs the shots; Mohammed has made no attempt to reduce his real powers vis-à-vis the country's elected bodies. 9 Why the about-face?

7 Mehdi Ben Barka, a leading opponent of the Moroccan Government, was living in exile in Europe in 1965 when he disappeared un der mysterious circumstances in Paris, France. Many claim he was abducted in a plot masterminded by the CIA and Moroccan officiaIs and later murdered in custody. 8 ft was later revealed that Serfaty had only been allowed to return to Morocco upon condition that he abstain from criticizing Moroccan policy in Western Sahara (Tuquoi 2001,203; 198) 9 By proclaiming the king the "supreme representative of the nation", the Moroccan constitution makes the king, rather than the people, sovereign, thus granting him sweeping political power. The king appoints, and can dismiss at any time, the prime minister and cabinet; he can dissolve the

22 First, rumours had begun to circulate regarding the King's long holidays away from Rabat and his interest in sport at the expense of the Kingdom's daily affairs - thus earning him the nickname "His Majetski" (Tuquoi 200 1, 225). Second, the threat of an officers' coup stilllooms large. As Khadija Mohsen-Finan argues, the dispute over Western Sahara not only allows the King to neutralize party politics, but also occupies the army; a political solution to the conflict - the armed forces' raison d'être for the past twenty years - would humiliate the army and reduce salaries, as those serving in the territory receive double wages for 'hardship' (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 180). Finally, as in many Arab nations, the legitimacy of the Monarchy is threatened by radical Islamists. While local Islamists have eschewed violence and are not known to have links with radicals in neighbouring Aigeria, they are well organized and have made gains in recent years, particularly among alienated youths (Howe 2000). For instance, in March 2000, the government and Islamists staged rival rallies for and against a proposed national action plan to grant women increased rights; a procession of 40,000 government supporters marched in Rabat while more than 100,000 Islamists took to the streets in Casablanca (The Economist 2000c). As former Prime Minister y oussoufi explained, people in the poorest neighbourhoods are turning to the Islamists because the socialists have adopted middle-class values. "We've lost contact with the people," Youssoufi lamented, "the Islamists have seduced our natural electorate and promised them heaven on earth" (Ramonet 2000). In searching for alternatives to an increasingly unacceptable status quo characterized by flagging economies,1O growing poverty gaps and a lack of freedom, Mark

parliament, legislate during recess and before new elections are held, declare a state of emergency without explanation, and revise the constitution by directly submitting proposed amendments to a national referendum; he appoints key positions ranging from judges and magistrates, to directors of public agencies and enterprises, to half of the High Constitutional Council, inc1uding the president. Furthermore, it is a crime for legislators to criticize either the king or his policies. While constitutional reform in 1996 provided for the direct election of the entire lower house, the same amendment gave representatives in the upper house unparalleled legislative powers to check the lower house and censure the govemment. Moreover, a multiplicity of non-elected entities has the right to enact laws and veto inconvenient texts emanating from parliament (Maghraoui 2001). 10 Experts such as Bradford Dillman and Gregory White claim Morocco and Tunisia are exceptions to the general economic malaise prevalent in North Africa and the Middle East (Dillman 2001; White 2001). Indeed, IMF-managed structural adjustment in recent years has, without question, strengthened macro-economic indicators: inflation is down to 2.6% and the budget deficit no longer

23 TessIer asserts, "North Africans and other Arabs are turning to Islamist political movements" (TessIer 1997, 107; Gray 2002). Thus, in a March 2002 televised speech made in occupied Western Sahara, King Mohammed VI asserted "Morocco will not give up one inch of territory from its inalienable and indivisible Sahara" (ARSO 2002).

Natural Resources

Western Sahara is blessed - or perhaps cursed - with an abundance of natural resources. Thus its wealth of phosphates, mineraIs, fish, and, most recently, potential hydrocarbon deposits has been another driving force behind Morocco' s refusaI to relinquish its claim over the territory.

When Hassan II occupied Western Sahara, it was the presence of phosphates that promised the kingdom its greatest payoff. As mentioned earlier, the Bou Craa mine had an estimated 10 billion tons of phosphates. Morocco, the world's large st phosphate exporter, felt threatened by the possibility of a neighbouring competitor and, in annexing the territory, stood to acquire a quasi­ monopoly over the market (Barbier 1982, 353). Indeed, in 1978, Morocco signed an agreement with the USSR termed the 'contract of the century'; Morocco would supply the Soviet Union with up to 10 million tons of phosphates over a period of

thirty years in ex change for oil and credit worth over $20 million Il for the development of a new phosphate mine (Ruf 1987, 82).

Although phosphate prices began to faH in 1976 and dropped again in 1982, Western Sahara boasted a great deal of other lucrative resources. Its desert sands concealed a wealth of minerals such as iron, titanium, precious stones, uranium, and vanadium. As weIl, its fish-filled waters attracted - and continue to attract - exceeds 3%. But as Ignacio Ramonet points out, the social costs of such policies have been exorbitant. Severe unemployment affects 25% of the country's workforce; more than half of the population is iIliterate (a full 70% of women); two-thirds of Moroccans have no access to drinking water, 87% are without electricity, and 93% do not receive medical care (Ramonet 2000). Il AlI dollar values are listed in US dollars.

24 thousands of fishing boats. Polisario delegate to the EU Mohamed Sidati estimates that half of the 1,200 European fishing boats in the Atlantic concentrate their activities along Western Sahara's coast, catching almost 900,000 tons of fish each year (Sidati 2001, 161-162). Ismael Sayeh further estimates that the territory loses a total of close to 2 million tons of fish each year (Sayeh 1998, 52).

However, it is neither phosphates nor fish that have spurred the monarchy as of late. Research carried out by US companies in the 1960s pointed to the existence of oil and natural gas deposits along Western Sahara's coast (Sayeh 1998, 52). Recently, the country's energy needs,12 coupled with Mohammed's failure to 'strike it rich' in his own territory, has led Morocco to grant exploration licences in Western Sahara (US Commercial Service 2002).13 In fall 2001, Morocco issued one-year licences to TotalFinaElf of France and Kerr-McGee of the US as weIl as signing agreements with British company Enterprise Oil (Canales 2002). The Polisario protested the licenses and, to the King' s dismay, the President of the Security Council referred the matter to Hans CorreIl, UN Undersecretary for Legal Affairs. Correll deemed the contracts legal, claiming they did not breach the principle that exploitation of resources in non-self-governing territories must be for the benefit of the people of the territories. However, he asserted that this was only because no benefits had yet accrued. Any further exploration and production activity "in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of the Western Sahara" Correll advised, would be illegal (SI2002/161). While the judgment is se en as a small victory for the Polisario and setback for the King, the overall consequences of potential oil reserves in the territory are clear: Moroccan resolve to cling to its 'southern provinces' has been strengthened

12 Morocco is the second largest net importer of oil in Africa, acquiring roughly 90% of its petroleum through trade 13 At the beginning of 2000, the King granted Shell five marine exploitation licenses in the Moroccan Atlantic and US company Lone Stat Energy three Iicenses for the Talsint region. Lone Star's mistaken projections led Morocco to prematurely c\aim the Kingdom a large crude oil producer and give up the country's interests in the Saudi oil company Dallah Albaraka (Canales 2002).

25 Extensive Investment

In addition to the wealth Morocco hopes to generate by consolidating its claim over Western Sahara, it is important to consider the great wealth the Kingdom has already invested in the territory. Billions of dirham have been spent securing the territory, establishing administrative bodies, building infrastructure, pro vi ding social programs, developing the economy, and encouraging settlement.

By 1984, the cost of securing Western Sahara - including both military expenditures and berm construction - was 40-50% of Morocco's national budget. The construction of the wall alone, between 1982 and 1987, cost the Kingdom $2 million a day (Zoubir 1993, 5). While military expenses have fallen dramatically since the ceasefire, a great deal of funding is still required to pay for the hardship salaries of the many occupying troops.

The cost of establishing government structures has also been burdensome. Upon annexation, Western Sahara was divided into four provinces and a system of administration similar to that of the rest of Morocco was introduced, including state, local, and consultative bodies. Local elections were organized and Saharawis have been allowed to vote in national elections. In 1992, Saharawis were given the right to vote on new Moroccan constitutional reforms (Mohsen-Finan 1997). By instituting Moroccan government structures in the territory, the King hoped to win over Saharawi loyalty while asserting de facto sovereignty.

According to John Damis, civilian expenditures in the four provinces have totalled $2.5 billion between 1976 and 1989 (HRW 1995). Infrastructure projects have included the construction of roads, ports, railways, and administration buildings, as weIl as the development of water and electricity supply. In terms of social services, the King has built housing for the poor; the Hassan II Hospital, a nurse training school, and four dispensaries in El Ayoun alone; and schools and colleges that parallel the Moroccan education system (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 87-88).

26 As Damis argues, "The primary objective of these expenditures was to win the hearts and minds of the resident Saharawi population. Over the longer term, the Moroccan government hopes to recoup its investment from profits from Saharan fisheries and phosphates" (HRW 1995).

In January 1978, the Kingdom launched the $292 million Sahara Development Pro gram aimed at providing for the settlement of indigenous nomads and the creation of a viable economy (Seddon 1987, 123). In an effort to encourage Moroccan settlement, the Kingdom offers salaries that are 25-75% higher than in the rest of the country in addition to tax exemptions. As a result, by 1991 Morocco had managed to attract 100,000 settlers (Durch 1993, 164). El Ayoun has now joined the ranks of Morocco's other major cities with a population of between 160,000 and 200,000 (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 93). Having invested so much, it is hard to see how Morocco would agree to relinquish its daim.

Regional Bargaining Power

Morocco's stake in Western Sahara is also tied to the Kingdom's bid for regional hegemony: Algeria and Morocco have long vied for the position of North African strongman, and the dispute over Western Sahara has proved an integral factor. Moroccan annexation of the territory is related the King's vision of a Grand Maroc - a restoration of the boundaries of the ancient Almoravid Empire of the eleventh and twelfth centuries that historically incorporated parts of Algeria. Moreover, Algeria cannot profit from the extensive natural resources in the territory as it probably would should Western Sahara win its independence. A successful bid for self-determination, however, would turn the tables on Morocco. Independence would be viewed as a victory for Algeria as it has been a long-time supporter of the Polisario. As a small state with a nascent government, Western Sahara would be susceptible to Algerian influence. Simply put, Western Sahara is one of Morocco' s best bargaining chips; its control over the territory virtually guarantees its power in the Maghreb.

27 Morocco's Efforts to Obstruct a Referendum

Given its substantial stake in Western Sahara, Morocco is determined to prevent a popular vote of self-determination that might favour the territory's independence. Indeed, King Hassan only proposed that a referendurn be held at the 18th OAU Summit in June 1981 after 26 of the organization's 50 member states had recognized the SADR and he thus began to fear the territory would gain admission; the King hoped the referendurn would temporarily postpone the issue and therefore buy the Monarchy additional time. In fact, in a nationwide address two days before his pledge to cooperate with an OAU referendum, the King asserted: "We will not renounce a single grain of sand of this Moroccan Sahara for which so many of us have sacrificed [our] blood and which has cost us so much money" (Wenger 1982, 24). WeIl aware that it cannot win a free and fair plebiscite, the Palace has set out to block the very referendum to which it previously agreed by refusing to negotiate with the Polisario, stalling the process, and supporting an alternate resolution to the dispute.

Refusai to Negotiate

One tactic employed by Morocco to obstruct the referendum process has been its unwillingness, throughout the duration of the conflict, to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario. Shortly after accepting the principle of an OAU administered referendum, Hassan asserted: "For me, the parties interested by the Saharan affair remain Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, to the exclusion of the Polisario" (Wenger 1982, 25). Despite OAU and UN resolutions calling on Morocco and Polisario to enter into direct negotiations, the King remained resolute. In fact, despite secret low-Ievel talks in Bamako in 1978, Aigiers in 1983 and Lisbon in 1985, it was not until Morocco and Algeria re-established diplomatie relations in 1988 that the Palace agreed to meet the Polisario secretly that summer in Taëf, Saudi Arabia (Chopra 1996).

28 Following the meeting in Saudi Arabia, UN Secretary General de Cuellar proposed his peace plan - a ceasefire and referendum - to which the two parties agreed in principle. However, the Kingdom's sustained refusaI to meet with the Polisario resulted in the latter's refusaI to lay down its arms. Only after the General Assembly called for direct negotiations in November 1988 did the King finally agree to meet with Abdelaziz for 'discussions' - not 'negotiations' - the following January in Marrakech. And even afterward, the King staunchly denied having met with Saharawi nationalists, claiming: "It is Moroccans who had gone astray that I met in the hope that they would be put back on the right path. N ever were they received as members of so-called Polisario" (Zoubir 1993, 8).

The 1989 discussions gave way to more violence as the King once again refused direct talks. Indeed, it was ultimately the commitment of the Security Council to end the conflict that resulted in the peace plan; in 1991, the General Assembly approved the Secretary General's plan to organize a referendum without direct negotiations between the two parties. From that point forward, almost all talks between Morocco and the Polisario occurred via the Secretary General. As Fatemeh Ziai explains, the lack of coordination between the two parties meant that each time a minor disagreement emerged it escalated into large-scale disputes, thus paralysing the registration process (Ziai 1996, 29).

The early 1990s were punctuated by sorne attempts at direct discussion - albeit as a result of American prompting - but they proved unproductive. For instance, in talks scheduled to take place in July 1993, between senior Polisario officiaIs and a Moroccan delegation headed by Morocco' s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Ahmed Snoussi, Morocco sent its Member of the Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs as Chief of the Delegation instead, with Snoussi acting only as his advisor. Moreover, Moroccan press reports presented the meeting as one between two groups of Saharawis and the issues discussed were reduced to that of a Moroccan invitation to "other Moroccans" to integrate into the Kingdom. In October of that same year, the Polisario refused to

29 meet with the Moroccan delegation in New York when Morocco included Brahim Hakim, a Polisario defector, among its representatives. Again, in January 1994, the Polisario backed out of talks when Morocco sent its Ambassador Snoussi and General Khadiri, head of police intelligence, to meet with the Polisario's Secretary General Abdelaziz - a complete asymmetry of authority signalling the King's lack of serious commitment to effective negotiations (Chopra 1996).

In 1997, the referendum process at a standstill, Morocco joined the Polisario in talks led by Special Envoy James Baker - once again, at the urging of the US. Meetings in London, Lisbon, and Texas culminated in the 1997 Houston Accords, providing new hope for the referendum. Unfortunately, aIl optimism quickly faded as the identification process ground to a halt two years later. As will be discussed shortly, the UN, at present, has given up on direct talks and is now considering abandoning the referendum process altogether.

Stalling the Process

A second tactic employed by Morocco to obstruct the referendum process has been extensive stalling. Morocco has resorted to multiple practices aimed at delaying the referendum indefinitely. In 1991, Morocco insisted it would not allow MINURSO to deploy its forces until the issue of voter eligibility had been settled. When MINURSO began to establish its presence in the territory anyway, Hassan refused to c1ear its supplies through the port city of Agadir. The King blocked the deployment of UN logistics, communications, and medical units until early 1992, rendering it impossible for MINURSO to go about its work. Once supplies were finally made available, Morocco refused to begin voter registration until aH UN flags had been removed from UN buildings (Durch 1993, 167-168; HRW 1995).

Moroccan stalling continued throughout 1994. Between June 15 and August 28, the identification process was halted as Morocco and the Polisario negotiated, via Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, over what to call OAU

30 representatives; Morocco objected to their presence on the identification commission despite having agreed to their participation in 1993. In December, Morocco delayed the process for over a week - at a cost of $100,000 per day - on the question of an adverb used in the schedule proposed by MINURSO. That same month, a Morocco liaison officer with MINURSO bragged, in a bar, that he could unilateraUy decide whether identification would go forward or not; he then proceeded to make a phone caU in front of the bar' s patrons, canceUing the next week' s identification sessions (Ruddy 1995).

The ultimate delay tactic employed by the King, however, has been his resort to appeals. After an extended identification period, resulting in numerous postponements of proposed referendum dates,14 the identification committee finaUy posted its voters list in December 1999; 86,000 would be allowed to vote. Almost immediately, Morocco filed blanket appeals for 79,000 rejected voters - in the words of Secretary General Kofi Annan, virtually an appeal for every voter rejected. If one factors in the outstanding issue of the so-called contested tribes, to be explained later, the total number of appeals stands at over 130,000, "in effect, beginning the identification aIl over again" (Ruddy 2000).

Advocating for a Political Agreement

Most recently, Morocco has endeavoured to block the referendum by backing an alternative resolution to a popular vote - a political agreement. Following the situation of stalemate that developed after Morocco presented its mass appeals, Special Envoy Baker asked the two parties for suggestions for resolving the impasse. Morocco put forward a proposaI termed 'the third way'; it abandoned the principle of a referendum, instead outlining an autonomy plan that would eventually lead to integration. Based on this suggestion, Baker drew up a

14 Referendum dates were set and 1ater cancelled for January 1992, February 1995, November 1995, Oecember 1998, and Oecember 1999.

31 plan - known first as 'the Baker Plan' and later as 'the Framework Agreement' - and submitted it to Aigeria and the Polisario in May 2001.

The agreement consisted of five main points. First, the Saharawis would have exclusive autonomy over local administration, their budget and taxes, internaI security and the maintenance of order, the environment, housing, agriculture, roads etc. Second, Morocco would control external relations, national defence and security, the flag, currency, customs, post and telecommunications. Third, an executive power would be elected by aIl those on MINURSO's December 1999 voters list for a period of four years; a legislature would be chosen by all those currently living in Western Sahara; and a judiciary, consisting of Saharawi judges, would be appointed by Morocco. Fourth, laws andjudiciary decisions made would conform to the Moroccan constitution. And fifth, a referendum on the status of Western Sahara would be organized within five years; al! those having lived in the territory for the year preceding the referendum would be entitled to vote (SI2001l613).

While Baker claimed the plan provided a strong foundation for future negotiations, Aigeria and the Polisario rejected it, considering it a violation of the right to self-determination, and demanded that the peace plan be implemented. Nonetheless, Kofi Annan brought the Framework Agreement before the Security Council in June 2001, arguing it offered, "what may be the last window of opportunity for years to come," and claiming it was "in the interests of the people of Western Sahara as weIl as those of the countries in the region" (SI2001/613). The Security Council disagreed with the Secretary General and called for self­ determination, while requesting that Baker continue negotiations with the two parties (S/RESI1359).

By February 2002, faced with a stalemated situation and forced to foot a steadily rising UN mission bill, Kofi Annan put four alternatives before the Security Council. The Council could (a) resume trying to implement the peace

32 plan, but without requiring the concurrence of both parties before action could be taken; (b) aIlow Baker to revise the draft framework agreement, taking into account the concerns expressed by the parties, and the Council would then present it to the parties as non-negotiable; (c) allow Baker to explore a possible division of the Territory with the parties; or (d) terminate MINURSO, thereby acknowledging that the UN is not going to solve the problem of Western Sahara (S/20021178). In response, the Security Council has since passed three resolutions extending MINURSO's mandate and postponing its final decision (S/RESI1394; S/RESI1406; S/RESI1429). Thus, by rejecting the peace plan after a de cade of refusing to negotiate with the Polisario and attempting to staIl the process, Morocco has successfully stopped the referendum process dead in its tracks.

Prospects

Morocco's refusaI to allow the referendum to go forward is based on the King's belief that a free and fair vote would result in majority support for independence. Given the winner-take-aIl nature of the resolution, the Monarchy has correctly concluded that a vote against integration is equivalent to total defeat. With no mechanisms in place to ensure that the Palace would be able to save face and salvage at least a portion of its extensive investment in the territory, the peace plan is inherently flawed and fuels Morocco's intransigence. As Thompson and Adloff explained at the outset of the conflict:

If the war's outcome is favourable to Rabat, Morocco stands to acquire a quasi­ monopoly of world phosphate exports, the means to develop a flourishing economy, and a primacy position in the Maghreb that would enable King Hassan to play a stronger role intemally and intemationally. On the other hand, there is the risk of a popular uprising or an army coup d'etat that could cost the king his throne and possibly his life, in the event of a military defeat in the de sert, or a concession to the Polisario that might incite hardline Moroccan nationalists into provoking a war with Algeria ... Morocco has the least inclination to compromise. (Thompson & Adloff 1980, 302)

33 While the Polisario has little to lose, the King stands to gamble away a great deal by holding a referendum. And thus, as Ruddy has explained: "Morocco's strategy is quite simply to delay a referendum they know they cannot win until the United Nations throws up its hands in frustration. And sad to say, they are getting away with if' (Ruddy 2000).

THE REFERENDUM AS A PREJUDICED PROCESS

If, in the unlikely event, a referendum of self-determination were to finally take place in Western Sahara, it is improbable that such a plebiscite would be free and fair. More than a decade of Moroccan manoeuvring, in the face of UN impotence, virtually guarantees that results would be coloured by a pro-Moroccan bias. Irregularities and improprieties, ubiquitous in the determination of voter eligibility, the registration and identification processes, the ceasefire, premature 'repatriation' efforts, and even the actions of UN personnel, have tainted the referendum process. As a popular vote would not be a true assessment of Saharawi will, results would be subject to the criticism of the Polisario as well as various concerned individuals and organizations. The very credibility of the UN would be threatened should it allow the outcome of an unjust referendum to determine the fate of Western Sahara.

Voter Eligibility

ln organizing and implementing the referendum, the first question the UN faced was that of voter eligibility. The UN peace plan provided for a 1974 Spanish census (the last such survey to be taken in the region) to form the sole basis of the voters list (S/21360). All those individuals figuring on the census, inc1uding those who had since reached the age of 18 and exc1uding those who had since passed away, would be eligible to cast their vote. Despite his previously expressed agreement, by the summer of 1991, King Hassan was vigorously protesting the

34 census as a means of deterrnining voter eligibility. In June, the King submitted two lists - comprising 75,000 and 45,000 names each - demanding that those listed be given the right to vote (de Froberville 1996, 165).

ln question was the validity of the Spanish census. Indeed, sorne argue that the survey, identifying 73,497 Saharawis living in the territory, could not account for the territory's entire population given its nomadic nature. As de Cuellar asserted:

Le caractère nomade des bédouins et leur structure tribale rendent difficle leur recensement complet et, par consequent, posent le problème délicat de l'identification de la population apte à voter. Le recensement espagnol de 1974 ne peut être donc pris comme base de référence pour un quelconque dénombrement de la population. (Mohamed 2001, 167)

Adding to this uncertainty, Morocco daims, are the many members of Saharawi tribes who settled in neighbouring regions throughout the 1950s as a result of political and economic upheaval. Mohamed asserts that both the drought of 1956- 58 and Operation Hurricane, launched by the French and Spanish in 1957-58, forced the inhabitants of the region to migrate north. Moreover, Morocco's 1958 recovery of its province of Tarfaya from Spain encouraged further migration from the area (Mohamed 2001, 167).

According to the UN mISSIOn visiting the regIOn III 1975, there were probably 3-4,000 Saharawis living in Morocco, 4-5,000 in Mauritania and a small number in Aigeria. At that same time, Morocco put forward a number of between 30-40,000 Saharawis living within its borders, while Mauritania daimed zero refugees (insisting Saharawis were also Mauritanians) and Aigeria claimed 7,000 (de Froberville 1996, 160-162). These numerical differences aside, there is no objective evidence to corroborate Morocco's daim that an additional 120,000 persons should be added to the voters list. Both the UN and the Polisario tried to placate Morocco with various proposaIs to enlarge the voters list, but Morocco

35 proved unyielding. In fact, Morocco's demands further escalated to include everyone over 18 years of age who was a member of a tribal fraction or sub­ fraction of Western Sahara and who could be identified as such by a tribal chief - whether or not they has ever resided in Western Sahara; at the same time, the Kingdom refused to recognize members of Saharawi tribes living in Aigeria and Mauritania (de Froberville 1996, 166).

In May 1992, a group of Spanish generals, including Alonso deI Barrio, the former head of census and population registration in the region, came forward in support of the Saharawi position. They insisted that the population of 170,000 (the number by then being offered by Morocco as Saharawi refugees living in its borders) had never existed. Statistics collected in the Spanish Sahara in 1950, they pointed out, indicated that there were only 33,256 people living in the territory at that time; a 1954 study by Molina Campuzano established a population of 35,000; a 1967 study put the number at 46,558; and in 1972, the population was said to be at 68,697. Given these figures, the generals argued, Morocco's claims were without "scientific or demographic base" and thus "absurd" (de Froberville 1996, 189).

The resolution to this dilemma of voter eligibility came unexpectedly. On December 19, 1991, just days before the accession of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, outgoing Secretary General Péres de Cuellar issued his final report on Western Sahara in which he introduced five new voter criteria, effectively tripling the number of potential voters. 15 Moreover, de Cuellar allowed for oral testimony to establish the se criteria.

De Cuellar's report was widely criticized: the Polisario rejected his terms; Special Representative to the Secretary General Johannes Manz resigned one day

15 Eligible voters would include (1) those counted in the 1974 Spanish census; (2) those living in Western Sahara at the time of the cens us but not counted in the census; (3) direct descendants and ascendants of the two aforementioned categories; (4) those born to a father born in the territory; and (5) those belonging to Saharawi tribes who have lived in the territory for six years consecutively of 12 years intermittently since 1973 (S/23299).

36 later; 16 and even the Security Council refused to accept his recommendations (S/RES/725). Implementation of the peace plan ground to a haIt as negotiators shuttled back and forth between the parties in search of a consensus. FinaIly, in a surprise move in the summer of 1993, the Polisario accepted de CueIlar's controversial criteria. There is a great deal of speculation that Aigeria's constrained and weakened position, as a resuIt of its civil war, dictated the compromise; without a strong aIly, Polisario was in no position to bargain and thus Morocco' s stand prevailed (Pazzanita 1994, 278).

The next hurdle in voter eligibility was the so-called contested tribes. Just as the identification committee completed its work in August 1998, Morocco presented 65,000 additional individuals for identification, claiming they had migrated to southem Morocco in the 1950s to escape Spanish colonial mIe. They belonged to 90 small tribes collectively categorized as H41, H61 and J51/52 by the Spanish census. The Polisario objected, arguing that only 2,000 of these tribes' members were Saharawis and the rest were merely family members who lived in Morocco and had never set foot in the territory. However, in the interest of completing the referendum process, the Polisario compromised once again in May 1999, and identification proceeded. In the end, only 4% ofthese 65,000 individuals were deemed eligible to vote. Emilio Cuevas, author of the original census, protested even this small number, claiming it was an error on the part of the UN to permit their registration (Sayeh 2001, 155). Morocco disagreed, and when it launched its blanket appeals in December 1999, almost aIl of the members of these tribes were submitted for re-identification.

16 While the circumstances surrounding Manz's resignation have been debated by different sources, most point to two underlying factors. First, Manz is said to have protested Morocco's refusaI to cooperate, highlighted by its so-called 'second march'. "Il est clair que les Marocains n'ont pas collaboré comme on pouvait l'espérer," Manz complained in a UN interoffice memorandum to the Secretary General. Second, Manz was disappointed with the meagre resources the UN was devoting to the conflict (Serge 1991). De Cuellar' s report seemed to represent the proverbial straw leading to Manz's resignation.

37 Voter Registration

Once voter eligibility had been established, MINURSO moved forward with the registration of potential voters. The first step in this process should have involved UN officiaIs questioning potential voters to determine whether they were eligible for identification. However, given financial and logistical constraints, MINURSO decided to delegate this crucial task to the parties themselves. Thus, Morocco and the Polisario, each responsible for Western Sahara and Aigeria respectively, would register potential voters and relay this information to MINURSO by October 1994. The problems inherent in this system are evident and, indeed, the process was fraught with inconsistencies.

First, as Frank Ruddy explains, Morocco denied MINURSO permission to buy space in newspapers and on the radio in order to inform people of the registration process. Second, many Saharawis complained that despite filling out applications at the Moroccan-run centres, their names did not appear on identification lists. And third, latecomers could not fill out registration forms at the MINURSO voter centres because access was restricted by Moroccan officiaIs (Ruddy 1995). The result ofthese irregularities is that "there is no way ofknowing who may have been excluded" from the initial registration process (HRW 1995).

Voter Identification

Once registration was completed, the identification of voters began in August 1994 in eight centres across Western Sahara and Southwest Aigeria. Similar to the registration process, the identification process proved problematic in many regards. First, access to the identification centres was controlled completely by Morocco; all potential voters were transported in state vans to and from the centres. Many complained that despite appearing on the registration lists published by the Moroccan government, Moroccan officiaIs refused to put them on the vans so that they might be identified (Ruddy 1995).

38 Second, the actual process of identification was subject to much criticism. Complex in its five-part design, the process was to first see applicants individually interviewed by a two-member UN identification team who would pose questions related to the interviewee' s application and ask for further documented evidence (particularly official documents issued by the Spanish colonial administration). In the second stage, the applicant would be questioned by two leaders of her/his tribal sub-fraction, one from Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara and the other from the refugee camps in Algeria. 17 The tribal leader would confirm, under oath, the identity of the applicant and whether she/he belonged to a valid tribal sub-fraction. Third, the UN identification commissioner would make a decision regarding eligibility based on the application form, the applicant' s responses to questions posed by the commission, the conclusions of both tribal leaders, and any documentary or other convincing evidence. In the fourth stage, this decision would be reviewed by the MINURSO legal review committee. Fifth, as each party would be allowed two observers to attend each identification session, the observers could submit objections to MINURSO, in writing, within 48 hours of the proceedings. MINURSO would then announce the list of eligible voters only once aIl applicants had been identified.

While the design of the system itself was relatively sound, much criticism was levelled against the improper influence wielded by Morocco in the course of the process. For instance, sorne suspected Morocco had intimidated tribal leaders, forcing them to positively identify applicants deemed supporters of the monarchy. One tribal leader from Aigeria described the following identification session in Smara:

They presented 3,000 people and only 107 were in the [1974 Spanish] census. They aIl said they had come to the Westem Sahara in 1991 or 1992. Only about one percent of them had any documents at aIl; the rest had nothing - not even Moroccan papers. They said they had never had any! They aIl said they had left

17 Tribal leaders, or sheikhs, were elected by members of their tribes in 1973 and thus theoreticaIly had no political affiliation with either Morocco or the Polisario.

39 during the Spanish days, but not a single one had any relatives left behind here. None of them knew other people from our subfraction. 1 personally did not recognize a single one of these people. The Moroccan sheikh said he recognized ail ofthem. It was incredible. But later he was embarrassed. He told me privately, he even apologized. He told me that he had to say it because he had pressure. His family lives there [in the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara] and he is scared (HRW 1995).

In other instances, tribal leaders complained Moroccan observers gave signaIs to tribal leaders from Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Sheikh Sveilan Brahim Med Ali Belkheir explained one such instance:

ln one identification, a man being identified kept making errors, contradicting himself. The Moroccan sheikh did not know what to do. He looked at the Moroccan observer who signalled to him not to identify - that he should say he didn't recognize the applicant. This was obvious, because we [the two sheikhs] sit next to each other and the observers sit across from both of us. The same thing happened when 1 was identifying at Boujdour - the Moroccan observer signalled to the sheikh five times in two days (HR W 1995).

And in still other situations, MINURSO staff members complained that Moroccan observers often disrupted the process despite rules against their registering oral objections (HRW 1995).

A third problem with the identification process was its Iack oftransparency. The UN only allowed journalists and NGO representatives into the voter identification centres for a period of 30 minutes. This Iimited opportunity for independent observation was too brief to permit any meaningful assessment. Moreover, all visitors wishing to speak with MINURSO members in Western Sahara and Algeria must, upon Morocco's insistence, obtain clearance from UN headquarters in New York beforehand. As Human Right Watch observed, even those with clearance cannot obtain interviews with MINURSO staff as empIoyees fear losing their job contracts (HRW 1995).

40 A final concern is the intimidation of applicants by Moroccan officiaIs. As Frank Ruddy observed, during the opening session in El Ayoun, Moroccan "journalists", later identified as Moroccan state security personnel by MINURSO's police observers, photographed and videotaped aU Saharawis who came to the centres to be identified. None of this footage ever appeared on television. Once these applicants had been identified, they would receive receipts to present in return for voter's cards upon publication of the Commission's findings. In El Ayoun, Saharawis complained that during their return from the centre, in the same state­ controUed vans, Moroccans confiscated these receipts (HRW 1995, Ruddy 1995). Commenting on these irregularities and improprieties, Ruddy claims that as of August 28, 1994, "MINURSO ceased to be a UN-run operation and became the instrument for Morocco's domination of the identification process" (HRW 1995).

Ceasefire Violations

In accordance with the UN Peace Plan, Canadian General Armand Roy declared a ceasefire on September 6, 1991. This ceasefire aimed to end almost sixteen years of hostilities and thus foster the necessary conditions for a free and fair referendum. Under the terms of the plan 1,695 military and 1,600 civilian personnel were to be deployed. Despite the ambitious nature of these terms, only a fraction of this number was ever actuaUy stationed (Durch 1993, 166). As of September 1993, only 360 military personnel were deployed in the territory. Moreover, a steady decline in personnel throughout the 1990s further handicapped the Mission; by November 1996, MINURSO military forces had been reduced to 230, while civilian police dropped from 91 to 9 and civilian posts from 410 to 170 (Lawless 2002, 776). As of February 2002, 230 military personnel and 25 civilian police officers were aU that was left of the contingency (Arts 8 & 12 of S/20021178). At the same time, Moroccan forces, which were to be reduced to a maximum of 65,000 in total, continue to stand at an estimated 150,000 strong (S/22464; Bontems 2001, 34). Given MINURSO's minute size, relative to that of

41 the Moroccan forces, Moroccan violations of the UN ceasefire became commonplace.

After the creation of MINURSO at the end of April 1991, an informaI ceasefire was proclaimed; both parties were to temporarily hait aIl hostilities until the formaI September ceasefire put a permanent end to the violence (SI21360). However, in August, a Moroccan FI Mirage was shot down by the Polisario during an attack on the Saharawi village of Tifariti. Morocco also attacked the villages of Bir Lahlou and M'heiris later that month. In a second attack on Tifariti, Polisario announced 19 dead and 65 disappeared; the village was destroyed and water points poisoned by Moroccan forces (de Froberville 1996, 140-141).

Morocco's record did not improve once the formaI ceasefire entered into effect. In total, between September 1991 and December 1993, MINURSO attributed 236 out of 258 ceasefire violations to Moroccan forces (de Froberville 1996, 141). According to Jean-Luc Held, a former officer in MINURSO's Swiss medical unit, Moroccan soldiers testified to ceasefire violations; sorne also admitted to moving heavy artillery while other soldiers were charged with distracting UN observers. Held witnessed firsthand the overhead flight of French­ made planes by Moroccan forces (de Meslan 1994). Yet when George Pickart, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Western Sahara in 1992, he found that the UN had failed to respond poiitically to MINURSO's reports of ceasefire violations, thus undermining the Mission's credibility with both parties (Zoubir and Volman 1993,235).

Compounding the atmosphere of insecurity and distrust it created with its persistent contravention of ceasefire obligations, Morocco also engaged in fear tactics among Saharawis living in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Since the September ceasefire, hundreds of Saharawis have been arrested and detained. In January 1992, for instance, Morocco made mass arrests following peaceful demonstrations in Assa, Smara, and El Ayoun (HRW 1995). In June 1995,

42 Morocco arrested eight Saharawi youths for protesting against Moroccan occupation and, after trying them before a military tribunal, sentenced each to 15- 20 years in prison. The sentences were later reduced as a result of international pressure (de Froberville 1996,222).

The logic behind Morocco' s forceful tactics in the territory is clear; if Morocco can create an atmosphere of fear, a free and fair referendum will not be possible. Either MINURSO will be forced to postpone the vote, or, if the vote goes ahead and Moroccan ca1culations prove correct, the Saharawis, fearing the consequences of a pro-independence outcome, will vote for integration.

Premature 'Repatriation'

Another direct violation of the terms of the peace plan that threatens the credibility of a popular vote is the so-called 'second green march'. In an attempt to populate the region with its supporters, Morocco erected 'tent cities' in September and October 1991 on the outskirts of Western Sahara' s main cities. This act was in clear violation of paragraphs 72 and 73 of the peace plan, specifying that people would only be allowed to return to the territory once their eligibility to vote had been established. Moreover, repatriation was to be supervised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (S/22464).

In a September 1991 letter, King Hassan informed the UN Secretary General that 70,000 Saharawis who had not been identified in the 1974 census were living in Morocco and would be unilaterally transferred to the territory without delay:

L'avantage de cette demarche est evident. Nous éviterons la dispersion des Sahraouis à identifier, et nous permettrons ainsi à cette commission de procéder à l'identification in situ, sur les lieux mêmes, où devra se dérouler le referendum d'autodétermination .... Nous sommes certains que vous ne manquerez pas d'apprécier à sa juste valeur la contribution qu'apporte ainsi le Maroc pour assurer

43 la réussite de votre action, tant sur le plan logistique que financier. (de Froberville 1996, 150)

According to Martine de Froberville, the majority of those transferred to Western Sahara were poor Moroccans in possession of Spanish identity documents. Bribed with the promise of free transport, shelter and food, they agreed to relocate to Western Sahara. In the words of former Special Representative Johannes Manz, "le transfert de personnes non-identifiées à l'intérieur du territoire, appelé 'seconde March verte', constitue à mon avis une infraction à l'esprit si ce n'est à la lettre du Plan de paix" (de Froberville 1996, 151-153).

There is no way of knowing exactly how many people are currently living in these tent cities as they are strictly controlled by Moroccan soldiers, police, gendarmes, and secret servicemen, barring the entry of UN personnel. Moreover, inhabitants are not free to leave the settlements. However, it is clear that their populations have grown steadily throughout the past decade. The 'second green march' of September 1991, involving an estimated 25,000 Moroccans, has been followed by a succession of 'marches'. In June 1993, Spanish journalist Ferran Sales of El Pais reported the arrivaI of a third wave of settlers; in June 1995 and February 1996, the Polisario denounced a fourth and fifth march ofmany thousands of Moroccans (de Froberville 1996, 207-208). Despite the illegal nature of this migration, MINURSO has done nothing to prevent it and the Secretary General has failed to report it in his special reports to the Security Council.

By settling Moroccans in Western Sahara, the King is creating what Human Rights Watch terms "facts on the ground" (HRW 1995). It is the King's hope that the UN will be forced to include these settlers in any vote that takes place in the territory. As authors Yahia Zoubir and Daniel Volman argue, "Clearly, King Hassan had agreed to the eventual holding of a UN referendum because he was convinced that either it would never take place or that if it did, Morocco would win

44 it because of the votes of the Moroccans induced to settle in the occupied Western Sahara" (Zoubir and Voiman 1993,230).

UN Personnel

Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the misconduct apparent in the organization of the referendum in the Western Sahara has been the behaviour of UN officiaIs and MINURSO personnel. Either as a result of bias or simply owing to an inability to resist the demands of Moroccan officiaIs, the UN, both in New York and on the ground, has dispIayed an undeniable willingness to placate Moroccan demands. From the lowest to the highest echelons of the UN system, employees and officiaIs alike have proven either unable or unwilling to challenge Morocco's attempts to dominate the referendum process.

Moroccan Control over MINURSO Personnel

Upon its initial deployment in September 1991, MINURSO was one of the UN' s most ambitious peacekeeping operations attempted to date. It was the first mission to be given UN authority to restrain local security forces, to identify and register voters, to conduct a referendum and certify the results, and to supervise the losing side's withdrawai or disarmament (Durch 1993, 151). However, few of these far-reaching responsibilities were ever operationalized. While the peace plan provided for a transition period to commence upon the ceasefire's entry into force, during which MINURSO's full powers were to have effect, the UN decided to postpone this period until the identification process had proceeded further aiong (HRW 1995). As a result, MINURSO was prevented from exercising its responsibilities as envisioned by the plan, and Moroccan muscle reigned supreme. In the words of Jarat Chopra, a Iecturer in international Iaw at Brown University who has toured the region, MINURSO personnel became "virtuai hostages" to Morocco's will (Chopra 1992).

45 Moroccan control over MINURSO personnel has been pervasive. All employees live in three hote1s in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara alongside Moroccan officiaIs; indeed, many MINURSO staff members have expressed their belief that hotel employees are actually members of the Moroccan secret service and have therefore felt constrained in what they can discuss with colleagues (HR W 1995). As Chopra explains, "MINURSO officiaIs drive from their c10sely supervised hotels to their offices and back; checkpoints and Moroccan security personnel prevent, sometimes at gunpoint, any freedom of movement" (Chopra 1992). Even the rooms of personnel are subject to routine searches. Moreover, the confidential nature of the work of UN personnel has been regularly compromised at the identification centres. In addition to mail tampering, officiaIs discovered telephone taps on local and internationallines (Ruddy 1995). A former member of MINURSO told Human Rights Watch, "In [MINURSO] meetings, anytime anyone suggested that there were irregularities in the process, they would immediately be told, 'Hush, hush - the rooms could be tapped. Then people would stop reporting the problem. The message was that you shouldn't talk too much" (HRW 1995). Given this atmosphere of Moroccan control, it has been difficult for MINURSO officiaIs to go about their duties in a free and fair manner.

Neutrality of the UN in Question

The neutrality of UN officiaIs regarding the settlement of the Western Sahara dispute has been called into question on many occasions. The first and most obvious example of partiality is apparent in the actions of former Secretary General Péres de Cuellar. As explained, in his final report to the Security Council, de Cuellar proposed five criteria to broaden voter eligibility despite Morocco's and the Polisario's prior approval of terms of eligibility based on the 1974 census. The Security Council' s refusaI to accept these criteria stands as perhaps the best evidence of their biased nature. Other critics of de Cuellar cite his failure to denounce both Morocco's obstructions to MINURSO's deployment and the illegal 'second march' taking place in the territory. Indeed, referring to Moroccan military

46 violations only as "circonstances peu encourageantes", de Cuellar limited UN observers to 200 and curtailed their mandate, limiting it to surveillance rather than enforcement of the ceasefire. Following his retirement, de Cuellar was reportedly offered a position by the Moroccan holding company Omnium Nord Africain; although he dec1ined, the offer casts further doubt on his neutrality (Cakebread 1998).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali appeared to share the bias of his predecessor. A long time friend and ally of King Hassan since his days as Egyptian Foreign Minister, Boutros-Ghali did not criticize Morocco's continuous violations of the terms of the peace plan either and repeatedly postponed the transition period (Cakebread 1998; de Froberville 1996). Moreover, he actively promoted de Cuellar's five criteria, encouraging Polisario to accept his successor's redefinition of voter eligibility.

Upon Johannes Manz's resignation, Boutros-Ghali gave Morocco a list of ten individuals from which to choose two possible successors; Polisario was then forced to choose between Vernon Walters and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan (de Froberville 1996, 180). The former, an American general, played an active role in convincing Spain to sign the Madrid Accords and was involved in clandestine arms shipments to Morocco under the Carter administration; the latter was a former Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs with strong ties to the Moroccan throne (Zunes 1993, 54-55; de Froberville 1996, 180). Opting for what it considered the lesser of two evils, the Polisario selected Khan. Suspicions of Khan' s bias proved correct. During a November 1993 visit to the region, Khan spent five days in Rabat and toured El Ayoun; however, he spent only three hours at the Identification Commission in Tindouf and, cancelling a meeting with President Abdelaziz, returned to Rabat to celebrate the anniversary of the Green March (de Froberville 1996, 219). As one diplomat note d, "[Khan] is not engaged. He is ne ver in the Western Sahara" (HRW 1995).

47 Boutros-Ghali chose Eric Jensen, a career UN bureaucrat to replace Khan. While Jensen was admittedly more involved than his predecessor, he seemed unable to challenge Morocco's attempts to control the referendum process. "Once 1 asked him why he didn't protest when [Moroccan Minister of the Interior] Basri had arbitrarily prohibited MINURSO from announcing the referendum in the press," Ruddy explains. "Jensen replied: 'He yelled at me. What could 1 do?'''. Interesting to note is that when Ruddy was invited to address the 4th Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 1995, Boutros-Ghali personally intervened to bar Ruddy's appearance and he was subsequently disinvited (Ruddy 1996).

While Kofi Annan's accession has introduced a greater sense of objectivity to the process, Annan is not without his critics. As UN Undersecretary, Annan dismissed Moroccan violations of the peace plan, as documented by MINURSO officiaIs and contract employees, as "not serious" (Ruddy 1996). Moreover, as M'Hamed Khaddad, the Polisario's Coordinator to MINURSO, recently lamented, "unfortunately, the Secretary-General from time to time easily passively adopts or accepts the opinion of the dominant members [of the Security Council], which sometimes is a very bad and unjust policy" (Hennig & Gracia 2002).

Criticism levelled against UN officiaIs also extends to the larger organs of the UN itself. As Human Rights Watch argues, despite numerous reports of Moroccan violations, the Security Council did not investigate the MINURSO operation until June 1995, when it finally sent a fact-finding mission to the region. The mission's report "focused primarily on the slow pace of identification, and only alluded to issues related to the faimess of the referendum". According to one UN diplomat, only political motives and interests can account for the UN' s failure to disc10se facts on the ground to their full extent. "Political considerations that are extraneous to the resolution of the conflict prohibit an impartial and balanced approach. There is a clear tendency in the Council not to antagonize Morocco, which is in a much stronger position [than the Polisario]" (HRW 1995).

48 Prospects

In the opinion of Fatemah Ziai, counsel at Human Rights Watch, "the most important issue now confronting the UN mission is whether the referendum process ... has already been so compromised that it no longer offers a realistic means for resolving the conflict" (Ziai 1996, 38). As a result of all the inconsistencies in determining voter eligibility, registering and identifying potential voters, guarding the ceasefire, 'repatriating refugees', and even guaranteeing the neutrality of UN actors, the referendum has been critically compromised. To be sure, there are optimists; Ziai and Ruddy, for instance, be1ieve that the referendum could be salvaged if the UN were to overhaul the system and effectively recommence the process. If the presence ofMINURSO military and civilian police were expanded such that Moroccan attempts to intimidate workers and potential voters and to control the process were addressed, and if an independent review of the registration and identification processes were carried out such that all results unfairly or improperly obtained were eliminated, the referendum might still stand a chance. The likelihood of such an overhaul, however, is slim. Ten years behind schedule and $400 million over budget, MINURSO is an albatross around the United Nations' neck; the UN is not eager to engage in what might potentially become a repeat of the past ten years of indecision and stalemate. Already in 1993, William Durch of the Henry L. Stimson Centre assessed the UN' s options, conc1uding that, "At this stage, the UN appears to have the choice of engineering sorne sort of compromise ... or terminating the mission, with whatever adverse reactions that may generate. Under the circumstances, the latter option is the better one" (Durch 1993, 171). Given such pessimism, and in view of the compromised nature of the referendum process, it is unlikely the UN will be willing to go forward with a process so riddled with inconsistency.

49 THE REFERNDUM AS AN UNENFORCEABLE INSTRUMENT

Should a referendum of self-determination actually take place in Western Sahara, and should the process prove free and fair, one virtually insurmountable obstacle still remains: enforcement. As Secretary General Kofi Annan indicated in his February 25, 2002 report to the Security Council, if the UN were to go forward with the referendum, not only would it be unable to guarantee a free and fair process, but there also exists "no mechanism to enforce the results of the referendum" (S/20021178). The irony inherent in over a decade of efforts to organize and implement a referendum in the Western Sahara is that nowhere in any document does the United Nations make provisions for the enforcement of the results of the vote. As previously discussed, the Kingdom has too much at stake to relinquish its 'southern provinces' without a fight. Is there a powerful member of the international community willing to confront Morocco and make certain it abides by the provisions of the peace plan? None of the members of the Security Council would be likely to enforce Western Sahara's right to independence if it means souring their relations with Morocco; they, too, have much at stake. A look at the United Nation's track record of enforcement, in the region and beyond, as weIl as a comparison of Morocco's strong and powerful alliances with Polisario's dwindling regional and international support highlight the unlikelihood that a referendum of self-determination provides a way forward for Western Sahara.

UN Passivity

Perhaps one of the most important questions regarding the resolution of the Western Sahara dispute was posed by the Economist: "What would happen .. .if Moroccan troops aped their Indonesian counterparts and, after losing the vote, fought to hang on to the territory? Would any outside power resist them?" (The Economist 2002b) In terms of intervention, the United Nations should be given first consideration; would the Security Council oppose Morocco' s attempts to maintain its presence in Western Sahara? An examination of the UN's actions thus

50 far in the region as well as its track record of enforcement in similar conflicts provides a pessimistic outlook.

UN Enforcement in Western Sahara

UN pas si vit y has been evident since the beginning of the conflict. Indeed, its initial decision to defer to the Organization of African Unit y was the first time the United Nations gave a regional organization authority to settle a question of decolonization (Barbier 1982, 283). As explained, until the OAU's paralysis became evident in the mid-1980s, the UN' s role was basically limited to the General Assembly's annual resolution condemning the Moroccan invasion and expressing support for Saharawi self-determination.

With de Cuellar's draft peace plan in 1988, the UN assumed a more active role in the dispute, but, as explained, faced with Moroccan hostility and manoeuvring, the UN proved powerless to successfully implement the plan. As Secretary General Kofi Annan's former Special Representative Charles Dunbar laments, nine years and $500 million spent and the UN has accomplished only a durable ceasefire and a preliminary voters list of 86,381, with an appeals list of 133,000 more (Dunbar 2000, 523). How to account for this ineffectiveness? Dunbar points to three key factors that have prevented the Security Council from adopting a harder line: divisions among member states; a lack of will to take punitive action against Morocco; and the relatively low $50 million annual cost of keeping the mission in place (Dunbar 2000, 537).18 Indeed, while MINURSO's presence has cost the UN an estimated $5 million a month, the UNT AC and UNPROFOR missions in Cambodia and Yugoslavia had a price tag of $150 million a month each. Moreover, the obscure nature of the conflict, in addition to the

18 Dunbar chaUenged the credibility of MINURSO when he resigned from his post in March 1999. While the UN claimed Dunbar left for personal reasons, Dunbar accused aU engaged ofbeing "more intent on managing a process than fulfilling the UN resolution for a referendum and self­ determination"; Dunbar alleged refugees had been forgotten as negotiators trooped around expensive hotels (The Economist 1999).

51 imbalance in diplomatie clout between Morocco and the Polisario, have reinforced the UN' s unwillingness to adopt a more active role (Ziai 1996, 40).

As the decade drew to a close, the referendum a more distant prospect than ever, Annan's support for self-determination began to wane. For the first time in October 2000, the Secretary General began referring to Morocco as the 'Administering Power in Western Sahara'; according to international law, Morocco is the occupying power and Spain remains the administering power until the people have exercised their right to self-determination (S/2000/1 029; S/2001/148). Then, in May 2001, Special Envoy James Baker presented the Polisario with his draft proposaI for autonomy that would come to be known as the Framework Agreement. The proposaI, which would effectively secure Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, was met with a great deal of criticism: "L'ONU s'incline devant Mohamed", "La bombe Baker", and "The UN's U-turn" newspaper headlines read (Favières 2001; Puazani 2001; The Economist 2001). The Polisario rejected Baker's proposaI, insisting that the UN continue to search for a resolution within the framework of the peace plan. As explained earlier, however, the Security Council continues to consider the merits of the Framework Agreement.

UN Enforcement in East Timor and Namihia

The UN's failure to act decisively and effectively in East Timor and Namibia - two other instances of decolonization - is further evidence of the body's ineffectualness. When lndonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, the Security Council responded with resolutions of condemnation, calling for lndonesia to withdraw immediately. However, due to lndonesia's great power alliances, it was not until lndonesian troops opened fire on scores of Timorese youth at a peaceful demonstration in Dili that the international community, led by Australia, mobilized in defence of the small island nation. A referendum was not held until August 1999 and, even then, the UN proved powerless to stop the massacres that took place as militia forces wreaked havoc on the Timorese people (Nairn 1997).

52 In the case ofNamibia, the General Assembly proclaimed the people's right to self-determination in 1960; in 1966 it revoked South Africa's mandate, announcing it would take direct responsibility for the territory. However, South Africa refused to cooperate and hundreds of Namibians were killed in the fighting that ensued. While the Security Council continued to pass resolutions calling for South Africa's withdrawal, abstentions by Great Britain and France rendered the motions even more ineffectual. Indeed, throughout most of the 1970s, the United States joined the se powers in vetoing mandatory economic sanctions. South Africa's withdrawal was not to corne until the international community finally lent the colony its support. Its economy in shambles and its military weakened by a major defeat in Angola, South Africa agreed to link its pullout from Narnibia to a Cuban retreat in Angola. The referendum was held in 1989. As Laurent Kaela explains: "The independence settlement may be regarded as a triumph of the conciliatory approach," however, this approach only prevailed "because the states which were behind it wielded enormous power and influence in the UN .... These included the US, Britain and France" (Kaela 1996, 141).

As both cases illustrate, the UN' s limited ability to enforce its resolutions is critically constrained by the will of the international community's great powers. Therefore, we now turn to the alliance structures of Morocco and the Polisario.

Moroccan Alliances: Powerful Friends

The United States

American involvement in Western Sahara is best understood in terms of its relationship with Morocco. As Werner Ruf explains, "successive American administrations have unconditionally supported King Hassan's position because of the simplistic and one-dimensional reasoning that he is a reliable partner of the United States and that, therefore, his regime must be 'stabilized'" (Ruf 1987, 83). Indeed, the United States' alliance with Morocco dates back to a 1787 treaty of

53 friendship - the longest unbroken agreement of friendship the US has ever maintained with another state (Zunes 1993, 53). As Stephen Zunes asserts, "Clearly, a special relationship does exist between the two countries where clear strategie interests leads them to build one of the closest relationships the United States has with any Middle Eastern or African Country" (Gupta 1988, 52). Given this history, it is easy to understand why the US has been complicit in Morocco's quarter-century bid to annex Western Sahara and why it would be more than reluctant to force Morocco to relinquish the territory should a popular plebiscite favour independence. An examination of American interests and involvement in the region both during and after the Cold War provides strong evidence of its unconditional support for the King.

In the Cold War era, American involvement in Western Sahara was largely motivated by ideological factors; suspicious of the self-proclaimed socialist Polisario Front,19 the US government worked tirelessly to prop up King Hassan lest leftist powers, already entrenched in Aigeria and Libya, should gain power in the Kingdom. "The United States will not allow another Angola on the East Flank of the Atlantic ocean," Kissinger asserted flatly (Zunes 1993,54). Thus, in 1975, US General Vernon Walters was dispatched to the region to pressure Spain into signing the Madrid Accords. Only months after the accords were signed, the US signed a five-year treaty with Spain. As Moroccan troops invaded Western Sahara in November 1975, a US aircraft carrier was sent to the North African coast in case of a challenge to Morocco' s military forces. On the diplomatie front, the US abstained on UN Resolution 3458-A, renewing the Security Council's calI for self­ determination after the Moroccan-Mauritanian invasion, and instead supported Resolution 3458-B, noting the Madrid Agreement. In the words of former US Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan regarding UN efforts to block the

19 Although socialist, the Polisario was the only major liberation movement in Africa that did not receive direct assistance from the Soviet Union. The USSR always denied a role in the dispute, asserting, "No Moroccan or Western official can provide even the smallest bit of evidence of intervention by the USSR or any other socialist country in the Western Sahara contlict." The Soviets did, however, provide Aigeria and Libya with approximately 90% of their military requirements, therefore it is possible Soviet arms were indirectly channelled to the Polisario (von Hippel 1995, 73).

54 invasion: "The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and 1 carried it forward with no inconsiderable success" (Zunes 1993,55).

Although, the Carter administration initially tied military aid to Morocco' s willingness to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict, it changed gears after the Iranian revolution. Fearing the King would suffer the same fate as the Shah, Carter relaxed restrictions on US arms sales. In October 1979, the US decided to suppl y Morocco with OV-lO Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft and Cobra helicopter gunships. "This decision," an official said, "indicates an increased willingness to sell Morocco arms that are well-suited for anti-guerrilla operations in the southern desert regions" including the Western Sahara (Wenger 1982, 24). The 1960 US-Morocco agreement prohibiting Morocco's use of American arms for non-defensive purposes was promptly forgotten. Whereas Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Morocco were only $3.9 million in 1979, by 1980 they had skyrocketed to $270 million (Saxena 1985, 243).

Aid to Morocco continued to increase under Reagan. When American Ambassador Joseph Reed presented his credentials to Hassan in N ovember 1981, he told the King: "The leadership of the Reagan administration has stated that your country' s concerns are my country' s concerns. The United States will do its best to be helpful in every area of need that may arise. Count on us. We are with you." And indeed they were. In its first budget for Fiscal Year 1983, the Reagan administration increased FMS credits for Morocco from $34 million to $100 million (Wenger 1982, 22). A parade of American officiaIs - CIA agents, Pentagon and State Department staff, senators, and even Vice President Bush - visited Rabat regularly; by 1982, 130 American military advisors were on the ground; $1 million annually was directed to Moroccan military training; and, most significantly, the US assisted the King in his construction of the berm (Zunes 1993, 60).

55 In total, from 1975 to 1990, the United States sold Morocco more than $750 million worth of military assistance through its FMS pro gram , plus an additional $150 million via its Commercial Sales Program; this represents one quarter of the total foreign military assistance Morocco purchased over the fifteen-year period (Volman 1993,151).

In return for its 'friendship', the United States profited handsomely. Morocco willingly played the role of regional gendarme in Africa in 1977 and 1978, sending 1,500 troops to Zaire' s mineral-rich Shaba province to help suppress armed resistance to the Mobutu dictatorship; it served as a conduit for secret negotiations with the Arab world, most notably initiating contact between Begin and Sadat; it acted as a staging point for US covert operations in Southern Africa, providing training for Jonas Savimbi's rightwing UNITA rebel group; and its strategic location on the Straits of Gibraltar granted the US Sixth Fleet open port facilities in the Middle East. Most importantly, America's policy of containment was enforced.

The end of the Cold War signified uncertainty in terms of US-Moroccan relations. Ismail Sayeh has argued American geostrategic interests have been fundamentally altered; the US, he asserts, interested in ending conflicts in Africa in order to take advantage of the African market, will be supportive of Saharawi self­ determination (Sayeh 1998, 122). Similarly, both Ahmed Boukhari, Polisario's representative in New York, and Polisario official Mansur Omar have asserted that US support for Morocco in the past was motivated by Cold War logic; now, they claim, the United States has adopted a more even-handed position (Lamore 2000; Omar 2002).

However, while the collapse of the USSR has negated any ideological rationale for backing Morocco' s occupation of Western Sahara, American support for the monarchy, albeit moderated, remains strong. Morocco proved instrumental during the Gulf War when it dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia. And given the

56 events of September Il th, Morocco's role as a bastion against the rise of Islamic extremism is crucial to America's war against terrorism (Zoubir 2002, 65). Furthermore, with the issue of oil now a significant aspect of the dispute, American interests have been heightened. In September 2001, Morocco granted US oil company Kerr McGee an exploration license for a 110,400 square kilometre area off the coast of the Saharan city of Boujdor (Canales 2002). The ultimate proof of the United States' continued support for Morocco is in the pudding. In April 2002, the US presented the Security Council with a draft resolution favouring the Framework Agreement; it proposed that Baker be given a mandate to prepare the Framework Agreement without seeking the agreement of both parties and present it to the Council which would then present it to both parties as non-negotiable. The proposaI, supported by France, Great Britain, Guinea and Bulgaria, was in clear violation of the terms of the peace plan and, as such, diametrically opposed the will of the Polisario. The resolution did not receive a majority vote in the Security Council and the US was forced to abandon it.

American involvement in the region throughout the 1980s "crippled the efforts of the international community for a peaceful negotiated settlement to the war", thus demonstrating the weight it is capable of bringing to bear upon the dispute (Kamil 1987, 3). Given the United States' history of close relations with Morocco and its continued interest in Moroccan stability, it is unlikely the US will alter its policies and force Morocco to withdraw. In a confidential interview last year, US officiaIs openly acknowledged the legitimacy of Saharawi claims to self­ determination, lamenting, "no matter how unfortunate it is, political realism dictates U.S. policy on the issue" (Zoubir 2002, 80).

France

Traditionally, French involvement in Western Sahara was shaped by its need to preserve friendly relations with both Morocco and Aigeria. Not only did substantial French populations reside in both countries, but there was also the need

57 to secure a steady flow of natural resources as well as to maintain politicalleverage in the region in order maximize French clout in international fora - most notably its permanent seat in the Security Council (von Hippel 1995, 76). However, eager to support Morocco due both to its strategic pro-West orientation and the personal friendship that existed between King Hassan and successive French presidents, France's policy in the region was neutral only in name.

In 1975, loath to see either its Moroccan ally weakened or its Spanish neighbour's fledgling democratic movement threatened by a colonial war, France pressured Spain to sign the Madrid Accords (Naylor 1993, 32). During the fighting that ensued, the Polisario kidnapped six French employees of the Mauritanian mining company SNIM and two French railway technicians. In response, France propped up a steadily weakening Mauritanian army, launching Operation Lamantin in December 1977; French Jaguar aircraft periodically inflicted heavy losses on the Polisario until Mauritania withdrew from the war in mid-1978.

In March 1979, suffering from Aigeria's refusaI to deal with French companies as a result of France's role in the conflict, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Olivier Stirn, announced: "It is the policy of France like that of the European Community to recognize the Saharawi people's right to self­ determination" (Naylor 1993, 34). Indeed, in August 1981, the Quai d'Orsay received a Polisario representative and a Polisario office was opened in Paris. Underlying these diplomatic formalities, however, was a continued pro-Moroccan foreign policy. From 1975-90, France sold Morocco more than $2 billion worth of weaponry and other military equipment - 55% of Morocco's weapons imports. By the 1990s, France was Morocco's number one trading partner and largest source of development assistance (Volman 1993,156 and von Hippell995, 76).

In light of recent events in Aigeria, French involvement in the dispute has grown increasingly pro-Moroccan. Citing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria as its main concern, France has articulated the need to support the

58 monarchy and thus prevent an 'algerianization' of the situation there (Lamore 2000, 32). Moreover, as in the case with the United States, the French company TotalFinaElf has been awarded prospecting rights by the Moroccan government (Canales 2002). Thus, during a visit to Morocco in December 2001, President Jacques Chirac broke with French protocol and referred to Western Sahara as "les provinces du sud du Maroc" (ARSO 2001). When the United States presented its draft resolution to the Security Council the following April, France supported its initiative, stating "the framework-agreement is, for us, the only option which is realistically capable of finding a lasting settlement for the question of Western Sahara" (ARSO 2002).

Given France' s history of cooperation with Morocco and the importance of its current alliance, it is unlikely it would attempt to force the King to relinquish Western Sahara. Indeed, Polisario regards France as the greatest obstacle, aside from Morocco, to Saharawi self-determination (Lamore 2000; Omar 2002; Khaddad 2002). In the words of one Polisario official: "Even our bones in the grave cannot forget the injustices the French have perpetrated against our people" (Personal Interview, 2002).

Other Instrumental Allies

While the United States and France have proved Morocco's most important allies, other significant powers have also supported the King' s bid to annex Western Sahara. Spain, for instance, has played a controversial role in the dispute. Motivated by the desire to appear a responsible colonial power and mindful of the importance of Aigerian petroleum exports to its economy, Spain claimed it had not ceded sovereignty over the territory to Morocco in the Madrid Accords but had simply handed over its administration until self-determination could be exercised. It therefore joined in the international chorus calling for self-determination in the region. However, unwilling to offend Morocco as it wished to maintain both its fishing interests off Morocco's coasts and its presence in the North African

59 enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Spain did not recognize the SADR. Instead, it provided Morocco with frigates, technical assistance, and maintenance and repairs for its Mirage F -1 fighters; it conducted joint exercises with the Kingdom in the Straits of Gibraltar $221million for additional military equipment; and in July 1991, it signed a Treaty of Friendship with the King (von Hippel1995, 78).

For its part, Great Britain has also proved unwilling to oppose Moroccan supremacy in the region. In 1977 and 1978, it provided the Kingdom with thirty 105mm light field guns; these weapons were used during the war and have since been deployed as Morocco' s main weapon along the berm. While Britain has not officially provided Morocco with military assistance after this point, in Oecember 2001, it granted licenses for the guns' refurbishment in violation of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (Denselow 2001). Moreover, shortly after the Moroccan Government signed contracts with the British company Enterprise Oil, Great Britain decided to support the American draft resolution to implement the Framework Agreement (Canales 2002).

Saudi Arabia has provided Morocco with economic and military support, mostly in the form of grants, in order to quell the spread of radical ideas emerging from Libya and Algeria. From 1975 to 1985, it gave Morocco between $500 million and $1 billion per year (Harding 1993, 119). In 1991, it forgave $2.8 billion in Moroccan debt and became the Kingdom's main source of crude oil (von Hippel 1995, 79). It is clearly in the interest of the Saudi monarchy that the Moroccan monarchy remain strong. Other important supporters in the region have included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan (de Froberville 1996; Ruf 1987)

60 Polisario Alliances: Dwindling Support

Compared to Morocco' s grand alliances, the Polisario can boast few friends. With the exception of Aigeria, it has attracted mostly lightweights in the global order who have generally proved fair-weather allies.

Algeria

Aigeria has been a close ally of the Polisario almost since its founding; so close, in fact, that Morocco once insisted the Polisario was nothing more than a group of mercenaries charged with Aigeria' s bidding. As Moroccan Prime Minister Bouabid stated in June 1980, "The problem, at bottom, opposes Morocco to Algeria ... no one else" (Saxena 1981, 106). Although Algeria was only directly involved in combat on behalf of the Polisario once,20 it has provided the liberation front with the majority of its arms and training. Moreover, permitting the Polisario to set up its refugee camps near the southwest town of Tindouf, Aigeria has provided the Saharawis with a great deal of humanitarian aid while allowing the Polisario defacto sovereignty in the area.

The reasoning behind Algeria's support for the Polisario is multifaceted. On an ideological level, its support is consistent with its own revolutionary experience and its claim to Third World leadership as the standard bearer against Western imperialism. In geopolitical terms, Algeria would like to arrest any attempts at Moroccan expansion. Rabat has expressed ownership of the Béchar and Tindouf regions of Aigeria and the Guerre de Sables border war fought with Morocco in 1963 is a not-so-distant memory. A Moroccan takeover would enlarge and strengthen Morocco as a rival to Aigerian pre-eminence in North Africa and encourage its expansionist tendencies (Damis 1983, 36). Finally, the economic dimension is also significant. Large iron ore deposits were discovered in 1952 at

20 Aigeria fought in the Battle of Amgala, southwest of Smara, in January 1976; 200 Aigerians were killed and 106 were taken prisoner by Moroccan forces. Algeria maintained it had not been in Amgala as a fighting force, but rather for humanitarian aid purposes (Barbier 1982, 185).

61 Gara Jebilet, 160 kilometres southeast of Tindouf. The deposits are estimated to contain 3.24 billion tons ofmedium-to-Iow grade ore but, sinee Gara Jebilet is 1600 kilometres from Algeria's Mediterranean coast, mining is not economically feasible. A government study of possible transit routes concluded that a 560- kilometre railway line across the Western Saharan panhandle to the Atlantic coast was its best possible option. (Damis 1983, 35; Barbier 1982, 256). As Mohamed claims, "[1 ' Algérie] cherche depuis 1973 à créer par tous les moyens possibles et imaginables une faible entité qui deviendrait, au bout d'une semaine d'existence, une Wilaya algérienne, réalisant ainsi son rêve non declare: un debouche sur l'Atlantique" (Mohamed 2001, 5). Finally, given its continued support, Aigeria would most probably bene fit from joint exploitation of Western Sahara' s natural resources.

Algeria's long-time support was questioned for the first time at the end of the 1980s. With the 1986 drop in oil priees, Algeria' s petrol-based economy virtually collapsed: per capita income dropped from $2,600 to $1,600; unemployment hit 30%; and social conditions deteriorated rapidly (Hume and Quandt 1999). Searching for a way out of its woes, Aigeria restored diplomatie relations with Morocco in 1988. In February 1989, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) was formed with the intention of boosting economic relations in North Africa. However, while Hassan II believed Aigeria would abandon Western Sahara in favour of a Greater Maghreb, Algeria had pursued the union hoping that the King would enter into talks with the Polisario in order to maintain the momentum of the UMA. Thus, both incorrect in their calculations, the two countries soon began to dispute again and efforts to build the UMA ground to a hait (Mortimer 1993, 182).

Although the Polisario's confidence in Aigeria was restored, Aigeria could no longer serve as a strong ally. With the military's decision to cancel the 1992 legislative elections, crisis rocked the country. One govemment after the next fell; the economy crumbled; and the army lost control as the Islamic Salvation Front

62 (FIS) and Armed Islamic Group (GIA) launched attacks on government officiaIs and civilians. Battling its own war, Aigeria was in no position to support the Polisario in any substantive way. Thus, well aware it could not return to arms without Aigeria's support, the Polisario was forced to make compromises in its dealings with Morocco and the United Nations.

Now, almost ten years later, decreased violence and a successful IMF rescue pro gram bode well for Aigeria. However, still weak, it can do little to support the Polisario. Moreover, rumours have circulated as to Aigeria's position regarding the Framework Agreement. According to Arabies, a pro-Moroccan newspaper, despite Aigerian UN Representative Abdallah Balli's June 2001 letter to the Secretary General denouncing the agreement, President Bouteflika, in a November 2001 visit to Washington, announced he was not against the so-called third way (Zyas 2002). French journalist Jean-Pierre Tuquoi suggests Aigeria may want to abandon its support for the Polisario in an effort to forge doser relations

with the US in the aftermath of September Il th (Tuquoi 2002). Thus, the support of its dosest ally flagging - an ally in any case without strong presence at the United Nations - to whom in the international community can the Polisario turn?

Other Lesser Allies

John Damis' assertion that Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi "has long been an important supporter of the Polisario Front" was untrue at the beginning of the 1980s and remains untrue today (Damis 1983, 108). Although Libya was the Polisario's largest financial and material backer from 1973-1975, once the war began it continued to support the Polisario while simultaneously providing Mauritania with financial assistance. Moreover, despite recognizing the SADR in 1980, upon normalizing diplomatie relations with Morocco in 1981, it suspended aIl arms shipments to the Polisario. Today, in search of security and economic prosperity, Qaddafi's main interest in the dispute is its speedy settlement - in whatever form - so that the development of the UMA may recommence.

63 Libya is not the only country to have abandoned support for the Polisario. Many, in fact, have actually withdrawn their recognition of the SADR in recent years. For instance, of the 76 countries that recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic in 1995, no more than 55 can be counted today. As a result of increased Moroccan activism and decreased Aigerian diplomacy, 21 states, including India, Peru, Nicaragua, the Pacific Islands and a dozen African nations have either cancelled or suspended their diplomatic ties with the SADR (Soudan 2001). While sorne Polisario officiaIs view this as a minor setback, simply demonstrative, they daim, of the fickle nature of developing nations, others have voiced their concern that these withdrawals could upset Saharawi morale, convince other states to follow suit, and potentially stimulate dissent within Polisario's ranks (Sayed 2002; Mouloud 2002). Whether these developments are temporary or indicative of a more permanent phenomenon, the fact remains that the Polisario is presently losing support in the United Nations as a result of Moroccan manoeuvring.

Given the crumbling nature of the Polisario's support structure, upon who can the Saharawis depend? A brief glance at the headlines offers proof of little more than diplomatie support from minor powers: December 2001, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh caUs for the Saharawi people's right to self­ determination; January 2002, SADR President Abdelaziz shakes hands in Cuba; February 2002, the Ethiopian President reaffirms unconditional support for the Saharawi people and the government of St Vincent and the Grenadines decides to recognize the SADR (ARSO 2001-2002). None ofthese states carry much weight in the UN. As long as Morocco curries favour with powerful countries like the US and France - permanent members of the Security Council - the referendum will not be enforced.

64 Prospects

Thus stands the sad reality of the Western Saharan quandary: should Morocco fail to block the referendum and should the referendum prove free and fair, favouring independence, no means of enforcement are in place. Maria Paz Andres Santa Maria, a professor of International Public Law, argues that the absence of such means is common in processes of decolonization and therefore not necessarily an obstacle (Colloque 5 2001, 82). However common, a lack of plans for enforcement, coupled with both Morocco's unwillingness to relinquish its 'southern provinces' and the international community's seeming unwillingness to stand strong against Morocco, bodes poorly for the prospect of independence in Western Sahara. As Claude Bontems explains, "Le droit nécessite une forme de volonté, qui doit aller jusqu'à la violence si l'on souhaite qu'il soit respecté. Sans cette volonté sans cette violence, le droit n'existe pas" (Bontems 2001, 35). Without international resolve, self-determination becomes an unachievable goal.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE REFERENDUM

"We are currently faced with a rather bleak situation with regard to the future of the peace process in Western Sahara," lamented UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in February 2002. "It is highly unlikely that the settlement plan [i.e. a referendum of self-determination] can be implemented in its present form in a way that it will achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution" (S/20021178). After more than a decade of UN-sponsored diplomacy aimed at implementing a popular vote of self-determination, Annan finally concluded what to many was by this time foregone: the referendum was a dead letter. Mutually agreed upon terms for a free and fair vote yi el ding an outcome that could be effectively enforced was an unrealistic expectation and therefore hardly worth pursuing. Wilsonian idealism finally given way, the United Nations began to seriously consider alternatives to a

65 plebiscite in the region. The question in interested circles thus emerged: What does the foreseeable future hold for Western Sahara?

Three possible scenarios can be envisioned: a continuation of the status quo, a return to arms, and a political solution. Each of these alternatives will be explored in an effort to demonstrate the real possibility of a rapprochement between Morocco and Aigeria, resulting in a limited autonomy arrangement in Western Sahara. It seems that realism, rather than international law, will ultimately dictate the conflict' s end.

The Status Quo

Writing about the Western Sahara dispute in 2000, Dunbar was pessimistic: "Odds are for more of the same," he predicted (Dunbar 2000, 542). While there is evidence to suggest that Dunbar is correct in terms of certain Moroccan, Aigerian, and UN interests, there is greater reason to believe that the status quo is no longer tenable. The negative consequences of the stalemate for Morocco and the Polisario, as well as regional and international actors, far outweigh any of its potential benefits. A cost-benefit analysis of the status quo demonstrates this point.

More of the Same: The BenejUs

To be certain, Morocco has a great deal to gain from the status quo. First, as previously explained, the King has taken advantage of the situation of stalemate to create what Human Rights Watch terms "facts on the ground". By way of investment and settlement, Morocco is slowly integrating the territory. Two thirds of El Ayoun' s population of 200,000, for instance, is Moroccan (Khaddad 2002). It is the Kingdom's hope that by the time a resolution is finally reached, the territory will be Moroccanized to the point that any vote of self-determination will favour integration. A second benefit, as Mohsen-Finan argues, is the justification the dispute provides for putting off any real democratic opening. As long as the status

66 quo prevails, party politics in the country remain neutralized, and the King is free to reject the opposition's proposed measures for reform while adopting extended powers. The conflict also allows Mohammed VI to keep his army occupied. As independent Moroccan weekly Tel Quel points out, the King must find "des solutions viables pour gérer une armée pléthorique au Sahara, estimée à 160,000 soldats" (AFP 2002). A political solution might humiliate the army, as the conflict has been its sole raison d'être for more than twenty years. Moreover, soldiers would see their salaries eut in half as they currently receive twice the pay of those stationed outside the region (Mohsen-Finan 1997). Public support and popular legitimacy, as previously discussed, are important factors as weIl; the dispute serves as an ideal symbol for rallying the Kingdom and ensuring national unity.

The United Nations also appears comfortable with the status quo. "Est-ce que la communauté internationale ne réagit que lorsque il y a du sang projeté sur les images et les écrans à travers le monde?" demands Pierre Galand (Galand 2001, 16). Indeed, an absence of overwhelming human rights violations reinforces the stalemate. As Dunbar explains, when in progress, the war did not pro duce much "collateral damage" and, at present, few atrocities are committed (Dunbar 2000, 538-539). To be sure, Morocco's record in the territory is far from good. Abba Salek El Haissen, Secretary General of the Union of Saharawi Jurists, points to a host of violations - extra-judicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, threats and aggression, and a suspension of civil, political and economic rights. He daims 526 Saharawis remain 'disappeared' (El Haissen 2001, 112). For its part, the Polisario continues to detain 1,362 Moroccan prisoners of war (S/2003/59). However, when contrasted with the recent atrocities that have characterized conflicts in countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslavia, and Iraq, these abuses appear more or less banal. And thus "the relatively civilized nature of the Sahara conflict ensures it minimal attention not only at the United Nations but in interested capitals such as Washington" (Dunbar 2000, 540). Quite simply, as Catherine Lalumière points out, the international community has more pressing concerns, such as Afghanistan and the Middle East. And by accepting the

67 situation of stalemate, the UN is able to affirm its sacred principle of self­ determination without directly chaUenging Morocco (Lalumière 2002, 17-18).

Aigeria, despite its overt support for the Polisario, also benefits from the current situation in certain respects. Weakened as a result of more than a decade of domestic violence, Aigeria lacks a great deal of its former clout and therefore poses a less credible threat to Morocco. Hoping to avoid confrontation with its neighbour during its period of recovery, Aigeria views the CUITent stalemate as a kind of stopgap to the Saharawi dilemma that is buying it time to rebuild. Moreover, as long as the dispute continues, it constitutes an invaluable bargaining chip for Aigeria in the diplomatie tug-of-war that characterizes Aigero-Moroccan relations (AFP 2002; Mohsen-Finan 1997).

An Untenable Situation: The Costs

Despite convincing arguments for the status quo, there is greater reason to believe that the current situation has become untenable in recent years and that its continuation is therefore unlikely. First, on a global level, the promise of oil is driving the international community toward a timely resolution. "Ironically for a desert dispute," The Economist argues, "the battle for Western Sahara is now being waged at sea, by way of the multinational firms prospecting for oil off the Atlantic coast" (The Economist 2002a). Recent agreements signed with French giant TotalFinaElf and American and Australian companies Kerr Mc Gee and Fusion (see above), have created a new imperative for a speedy end to the dispute. As explained, the UN' s legal opinion on the question of oil concessions is 'prospecting is legal, exploiting is not'. As long as the Western Sahara dispute goes unresolved, multinational oil companies can look but not touch. Thus Canales asserts, "Oil is on the brink of providing a solution for the Western Sahara crisis that has been affecting Morocco and the [Polisario Front] for over a quarter of a century .... Oil interests are going to achieve what weapons and political negotiations were unable to achieve" (Canales 2002).

68 As for the UN, the organization is growing weary of a dispute that costs it dearly in terms of credibility and funds. Cakebread explains that MINURSO has become a central symbol of UN waste and inefficiency in recent years, constantly criticized by the US Congress (Cakebread 1998). While Dunbar argues that the $50 million annual cost of keeping the mission in place is low and therefore tolerated by the Security Council, its cumulative total - more than $500 million - renders it the ninth costliest operation ever launched by the UN (Dunbar 2000, 537). Moreover, as ofNovember 2002, $52,784,234 in assessed contributions was still unpaid (S/2003/59). Annan's proposed alternatives for imposing a solution on the two parties or withdrawing completely reflect an unwiIlingness to shoulder the dispute much longer.

The ongoing conflict is equally costly at the regional level. Founded in 1989 by Morocco, Aigeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) was originally aimed at developing a mutually beneficial economic arrangement that would shelter its members from the growing Islamist threat in the region and the imminent cohesion of the European Economie Community. Preliminary agreements called for expanded rail links and a single regional airline as weIl as economic reciprocity in industry and agriculture. But, as Zunes asserts, "the irresolution of the Western Sahara conflict has been a brake on more complete and mutually beneficial regional integration" (Zunes 1995). Indeed, the UMA has been aIl but aborted. This failure to forge a coordinated economic front has had serious economic consequences for the region. As Gregory White explains, Morocco and Tunisia have turned toward Europe, deepening their bilateral relations with the EU at the exp en se of cooperation with other countries in the region. 21 This increasing free trade with the EU is expected to expose the Moroccan and Tunisian economies to harsh, new competition. Meanwhile, Algeria grows increasingly isolated, as evidenced by a c10sed border with Morocco since 1994. Thus,

21 fn 1995, Morocco and Tunisia signed bilateral Partnership Accords with the EU, agreeing to phase in free-trade zones over a twelve-year period. The Accords require Morocco and Tunisia to dismantle their tariff and non-tariff barriers to industrial imports from the EU by 2008 and involve phasing out monopolies, subsidies and public enterprises.

69 Mohamed argues that the UMA is the only way to solidify the economy of the Maghreb: "L'UMA ne doit pas être considérée comme un lux. Elle n'est pas un choix non plus. Elle est une nécessité stratégique incontournable qu'exigent le troisième millénaire et ses inconnues" (Mohamed 2001, 205).

Finally, the current stalemate is proving ruinous for both Morocco and the Polisario. It is undeniable that the status quo offers Mohammed VI sorne benefits. Moreover, the current process of Moroccanization in the territory has led sorne to posit that time is the only factor in the Kingdom's inevitable absorption of Western Sahara. However, barring the potential for influential oil interests, an impatient United Nations, and the logic of a Maghreb union to break the stalemate, this time factor will prove increasingly costly for Morocco' s King. In short, the status quo has carried and will continue to carry a heavy economic and social toll on the Kingdom. While the military cost of the dispute has certainly fallen since the early 1980s with the construction of the berm,22 the cost of holding Western Sahara in 1992 was still estimated at $3 million per day, the wall costing Morocco roughly $1,000 per minute (Harding 1993, 105; 131). The total cost of the war is approximated at nearly $1 billion per year (White 2001, 132).

As discussed, one result of excessive military spending has been poverty; according to the World Bank, while poverty fell from 21 to 13 per cent of the population between 1984-1991, levels surged back to 19 per cent in 1998 (Drummond 2002). As Seddon argues, "the degradation of economic and social conditions, amidst glaring social inequalities, has encouraged the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and other radical creeds" (Seddon 1987, 126). The whole of Morocco which is presented as a calm island in contrast to Aigeria could be swept away by a storm," Gilles Perrault asserts, "It is five minutes to midnight in Morocco" (Sheriff 2003). Although it should be argued that it would be an exaggeration to insist that fundamentalism poses the same threat in Morocco as in

22 Fighting in the Jate 1970s and early 1980s absorbed more than 70% of the Kingdom's budget (White 2001, 132).

70 neighbouring Algeria, Islamists have been steadily gammg support. In recent elections, the Islamic party Justice and Development became the third largest party in Parliament.23 Shaikh Yassin's more extreme - and consequently outlawed - Justice and Charity Organization enjoys even greater popular support. As po verty increases, regime support lags and the foothold gained by Islarnic fundamentalists grows further entrenched, thus threatening the very regime legitimacy Mohamed VI is trying desperately to maintain. As a result of Morocco' s declining social situation, de Froberville argues, the King has more to gain from peace negotiations than war or the status quo (de Froberville 1996,254).

The Polisario is also suffering as a result of the status quo. As Tuquoi argues, "Le temps joue contre le Polisario et ses dirigeants" (Tuquoi 2002). The current stalemate has had deleterious consequences for Saharawi identity. As Khaddad explains, the pervasive presence of settlers in Western Sahara - now constituting 70% of the population - is killing the Saharawi language and way of life; drugs and prostitution are of grave concern; and the presence of more than 1 million mines hinders nomadism. In the camps, Saharawi culture has been eroded by twenty-six years of desert life: 40-50% of refugees were born in Tindouf and, of this group, 80% have studied abroad, thus importing to the camps various "pieces of different cultures" (ARSO 2002; Khaddad 2002).

Compounding this problem is a lack of humanitarian assistance. Today, nutritional deficiencÎes are evolving into dire food shortages as many accuse the international community of withholding aid as a pressure tactic (Cembrero 2001). "Il Y a une sorte de négligence de la part du Programme alimentaire mondial," Catherine Lalumière commented upon her return from the camps in November 2002 (ARSO 2002). Such hardship is evident in the words of Babih, a Saharawi refugee:

23 In the September 2002 elections, the Socialist Union narrowly won the largest number of seats - 50 - compared to the 48 and 42 secured by Istiqlal and Justice and Development (PJO) respectively. Perrault argues that the PJD was set to gamer even more seats, but it announced ahead oftime that it would limit its number of candidates so as not to alarm the Palace with an overwhelming victory (Sheriff2003).

71 C'est dur. J'ai participé à beaucoup de combats, et deux de mes frères sont tombés en 'martyrs'; une moitié de ma famille est restée au Sahara et je ne l'ai pas vue depuis vingt ans. Mais voir nos enfants manquer de tout, de legumes, de fruits, de vitamins, c'est plus dur encore" (Decamps 1997).

A diminished sense of identity and dwindling resources are severely eroding the morale of the Saharawi people, resulting in internaI dissension, desertion, and defection. In October 1988, dissent among the Polisario's leadership led to rioting and a spate of arrests.24 Shortly after, a series of high-ranking officiaIs defected to Morocco where they were welcomed by the King and awarded plum govemment positions. Omar Hadrami, one such defector, spoke of the weariness of the camp population:

Sans le HCR ... et quelques organizations humanitaires, il y aurait de graves problèmes. Le Polisario vit dans un de sert où il n'y a pas un seul arbre; tout se fait avec le gaz et il y a souvent pénurie pour la cuisson et pour l'éclairage. La santé piétine, car le principal problème, la sous-alimentation, entraine l'anémie et des enfants chétifs. La populations des caps est formée de nomads qui revent de reprendre le de sert et de retrouver leur paturage, et de citadins qui ne supportent plus de passer leur vie à attendre sous de vieilles tentes" (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 110).

In 1998, Baba Sayed, named Polisario Representative to Canada, asked for asylum in Canada.25 He criticized the Polisario claiming:

24 While a great de al of secrecy surrounds the events of October 1988, most sources concur that certain members of the Polisario's Bureau Politique began to criticize the power Bechir Sayed, brother of El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, was wielding over the Polisario's most powerful organ, its Comité Exécutif. When ten members of the Bureau Politique were arrested at Bechir's behest, camp-wide demonstrations ensued, resulting in, sorne claim, interrogations, tortures, and executions. In the first half of 1989, a succession of four Saharawi govemments-in-exile fell as the Polisario's leadership struggled to establish a consensus among its members. Order was eventually restored after Abdelaziz held a Congress in July 1989, resulting in the elimination of the Comité Exécutif and the creation of a bigger and arguably more democratic Secrétariat National in its stead. lndemnities were paid to those unjustly imprisoned, heads of certain security organs were fired, and a military tribunal was established. Bechir's powers were effectively curtailed (Mohsen-Finan 1997; 107-111; Jarry 1992; Omar 2002; Alien 2002). 25 Baba Sayed is the youngest brother of EI-Ouali Mustapha Sayed.

72 The Front is in an advance state of decomposition. Its mediocre direction, void of a collective political project and corrupted by the exercise of autocratie power, can no longer be considered the legitimate battle of the Saharawi people but is rather a business that generates profits and personal privileges for itself. Saharawis must renounce the Polisario in order to avoid a retum to archaism and tribalism. (Soudan 1998)

More recently, the September 2002 defection of Lahbib Ayoub - cofounder of the Polisario, commander of the SPLA throughout the war, member of the Secrétariat National, and Minister of the Occupied Territories - has dealt a particularly harsh blow to Polisario unity. "C'est loin, le ralliement le plus important que nous ayons obtenu depuis le début du conflit du Sahara," a Moroccan General commented, "Le Polisario a perdu son Giap" (Soudan 2003, 34). Ayoub attributed his decision to defect to a rupture in relations with President Abdelaziz. Accusing the leader of despotism and corruption, Ayoub asserted that the Secrétariat National was nothing more than a rubber stamp body and that questions of finance were handled solely by Abdelaziz. "Abdelaziz se méfie de tout le monde," he claimed. "Il vit entouré d'une garde prétorienne de quarante personnes et ne compte plus que sur ses services de renseignements et sur une gendarmerie à sa devotion" (Soudan 2003, 39).

Ordinary Saharawis - perhaps as many as 5,000 over the past fifteen years - are also leaving (Soudan 2003, 34). As one refugee commented, "Recently, many people have left the camps - l know at least ten or fifteen myself who have left in the last year and that had never happened before - because they had gotten fed up with waiting and wasting their lives living like this in the de sert" (HRW 1995).

Growing dissent and schism threaten the very existence of the Polisario. As J. Bowyer Bell, an expert on armed struggle, explains, "It is not the [centre], the declared enemy, that often concerns the faithful most.. .. It is rather those who would either twist or betray the dream who are the real threat (Bell 1998, 48). The

73 Polisario is painfully aware of the precarious nature of its position and therefore considers the status quo a dangerous alternative.

A Return to Arms

Given the costly nature of the present situation, particularly with respect to the Polisario's position, is a return to armed struggle a plausible alternative? Could the Saharawis, the party with arguably the most to lose from the status quo, reSOrt to violence? As Bontems remarks, "[Les Sahraouis] sont victimes de leur réussite dans l'organisation de leur population en exil.. .. Pour arracher son indépendence contre la Communauté Internationale, mieux vaut transformer sa population en bêtes féroces plutôt qu'en citoyenes conscients, intelligent et éduqués" (Bontems 2001, 34). Certainly the Polisario has threatened a return to arms on many occaSIOns. Sabre-rattling aside, however, the evidence does not support a return to arms.

Terrorism

In any consideration of armed conflict, it is essential to distinguish between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. While the latter refers to a purely military form of conflict (most often utilized by the weak as a tactical recourse against the strong), the former is more difficult to define (Beckett 2001, vii)?6 For the purposes ofthis analysis, Martha Crenshaw's definition is adequate: terrorism as "the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behaviour .... [involving] symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate a political message to watchdog audiences" (Sick 1990, 53). Is it possible that the Polisario, fast losing patience and hope, could resort to terrorism?

26 In a survey of the Iiterature, Alex Schmid identified 109 different definitions for terrorism, concluding the "search for an adequate definition is still on" (Hoffman 1998, 39).

74 While many Saharawi children idolize Osama Bin Laden as a defender of Islam, Saharawi identification with terrorism ends there (Sayed 2002). As Bontems asserts, "Contrairement à d'autres organisations de liberation, le Front Polisario n'a jamais essayé de sensibiliser l'opinion international publique en recourant à des actes de terrorisme. Toutes les operations ont été conduits dans un cadre purement militaire" (Bontems 1984, 178). Why has the Polisario rejected such tactics? First, as Jon Anderson explains, the Polisario has always refrained from terrorism because it has adopted the sober demeanour of a state-in-exile and terrorism is not a state activity (Anderson 1992, 152). Indeed, the Polisario has signed and ratified the OAU's 1999 Convention of Aigiers on the prevention and fight against terrorism.

Secondly, terrorists run the risk of alienating the international community. There is no doubt terrorism can be a powerful weapon. At the 1972 Munich Games, for instance, Black September stunned an audience of 800 million when it killed two Israeli athletes and took eight hostage. After the incident, thousands of Palestinians joined the terrorist organization and, eighteen months later, Yasser Arafat was invited to the UN General Assembly. By the end of the 1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) had established formaI diplomatic relations with 86 countries (Schlagheck 1988, 70; Hoffman 1998, 75). However, as terror expert Walter Lacqueur concedes, such success is rare; terror is noisy, but it hardly ever produces a lasting effect (Lacqueur 1990, 70). lndeed, a 1988-89 RAND Corporation study found that public approval for terrorists was effectively zero; while terror fascinates, it fails to inspire sympathy (Hoffman 1998, 143). Most recently, the events of September Il have altered the international environment such that terrorism is no longer tolerated. Acts of terror in Morocco' s cities or elsewhere wou1d alienate the international donor community; moreover, Aigeria, itself besieged by terror, could not support the Polisario (Dunbar 2000, 543). The United States, of course, would take a dim view of such actions.

75 Guerrilla Watfare

If terrorism is unlikely, what are the prospects for guerrilla warfare? As remarked earlier, the Zemla Massacre represented the turning point in the Saharawi struggle for se1f-determination. From that point forward, the struggle came to be defined by the Hassaniya maxim koul el watan aou shahada - the whole land or martyrdom. At its creation in 1973, the Polisario proclaimed: "Après l'échec de tous les moyens pacifiques utilisés ... le Front Polisario est né comme expression unique des masses, optant pour la violence révolutionaire et la lutte armée" (de Froberville 1996, 36).

Zein Saad divides the Polisario' s war with Morocco into two principal stages. He characterizes the first, 1975-1981, as offensive, explaining that by mid­ January, Morocco (and Mauritania) had occupied the majority of Western Sahara. The Polisario responded by launching two main offensives: El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed from 1976-78; and Houari Boumediènne in 1979 (Saad 1987, 85-86). Though inferior to Morocco in terms of numbers and arms, the Saharawi People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was bolstered by its knowledge of the land, great mobility and morale.27 Adopting guerrilla tactics such as the ambush, the raid, sabotage, and kidnappings, it proved a formidable force. For instance, the SPLA's efforts to sabotage the 97 kilometre conveyor belt used by Morocco to transport phosphates from Bou Craa to El Ayoun had serious economic ramifications; between 1975 and 1977, phosphate production fell from 2.6 million tons to 25,000 tons. Similarly, Spanish ships carrying military support to Morocco were bombed, and foreigners exploiting the territory' s fishing resources were harassed and sometimes kidnapped (Barbier 1982, 215-218). By 1981, the SPLA had successfully defeated Mauritania and liberated 90% of the territory, placing Morocco on the defensive (Saad 1982, 86). Thus began the second stage of the war. Faced with the real possibility of

27 While it primarily resorted to guerrilla tactics, the Polisario's forces were larger, better equipped, and better organized than most guerrilla forces. The SPLA, numbering 20,000 by 1980, was organized into battalions of 350 men and companies of hundreds of men. Armed by Libya and Algeria, it possessed sophisticated weaponry, including tanks (Barbier 1982, 280).

76 defeat, Morocco began construction of the berm. By the time of its completion in 1987, the SPLA' s military advantage, despite intermittent breaches of the fortification, had been whittled away. Facing a military stalemate, it was in August of the following year that the Polisario and Morocco agreed to De Cuellar's proposed plan for peace.

Since the declared ceasefire in 1991, the Polisario, with few exceptions, has refrained from military action. Rallying calls such as heU houndoukia lana el houria (with the gun we take the freedom) and hi elkifahoua sUah nafda sahara hi el arouah (with the struggle and weapon we sacrifice ourselves for the Sahara) have fallen silent as the Saharawi leadership has pursued political means to secure its right to self-determination (Saxena 1981, 76). But after more than a decade of diplomatic manoeuvring, self-determination seems an illusory promise and the Saharawis are losing patience: "Combattre ne me fait pas peur," a 22 year old youth belonging to the SPLA insisted, "Rien n'est pire que la situation actuelle". "De plus en plus," de Froberville asserts, "l'éventualité de la reprise des combats se profile à l'horizon (de Froberville 1996, 240; 6). What credence are analysts to attribute those forecasting a return to arms by the Polisario?

Theoretically, the Polisario stands to gain from a return to arms. Guerrilla warfare would be a méans of drawing attention to the dispute and galvanizing the international community to search for a speedy resolution. Polisario official Abdelkader Taleb Omar insists international NGOs would respect such a decision and maintain their support for the Saharawis (Omar 2002). Secondly, national unit y, as evidenced by recent desertions and defections, is beginning to dwindle. As Barbier points out, war would be a means of rallying Saharawi nationalism and preventing the Saharawis' integration into neighbouring populations (Barbier 1982, 229). "La poursuite du conflit ne peut que renforcer [la] cohésion," Bontems asserts (Bontems 1984, 218). A return to arms would also allow the Polisario to protect sorne of its natural resources, should it target mining companies, oil prospectors, and foreign fishing boats as it has in the past. And war would have

77 tremendous economlC and social costs for Morocco. As Omar explains, the Polisario does not have the conviction that it could win a war against Morocco, but it could inflict serious damage (Omar 2002). The King would be forced to divert more of the country' s funds to its defence budget and reinforce its armed presence in the region. And as de Froberville argues, "Malgré toutes les aides dont il a pu bénéficier, le Maroc en seize ans n'a pu venir à bout des mercenaries du Polisario. La guerre passée a fait des milliers de morts et Hassan II reconnait qu'il n'y a pas une famille marocaine qui ne pleure l'un des siens" (de Froberville 1996,240).

Having said this, it is highly unlikely the Polisario will revert to guerrilla warfare. Danielle Mitterand, a long-time supporter of the Saharawi people, summarized the situation best in N ovember 2001: "Quand on pousse un peuple à l'exaspération, toutes les solutions peuvent être envisagées. Mais ... reprendre les armes serait un suicide" (du Roy 2001). The Polisario's SPLA - now only 2,000 men strong - has no hope of defeating Morocco militarily and little chance of ev en waging a sustained struggle (Soudan 2003, 39). First and foremost, Morocco is far better armed than the Polisario. As Bell asserts, "arms matter more than anything else .... Arms are absolute, the tangible means into the future. As such they play an enormous role, both real and symbolic" (Bell 1998, 138). While sorne Polisario officiaIs claim they have enough weaponry to challenge Morocco, arguing they will increase their stocks each time they win small victories, others have conceded in private that the Polisario does not possess the conventional military capability to inflict serious damage on the King's forces (Omar 2002; Dunbar 2000, 543).28 The facts, however, are clear: Morocco continues to purchase more arms while the Polisario, unable to rely upon its former suppliers, Libya and Aigeria, cannot (Sayed 2002; ARSO 2002).

28 During its war with Morocco, the Polisario claimed 80% of its weapons were captured from the RAF; however, Aigeria and Libya were actually providing a range of relatively sophisticated weaponry from Kalashnikov automatic rifles to SAM 7 missiles (Seddon 1987, 103).

78 Compounding a lack of armaments is the omnipresence of the berm. Ahmed Fal, Commander of the SPLA's Second Military Region, argues that the wall is actually a liability for Morocco:

Vou might say that building [the wall] backfired because it meant that the bulk of the Army had to be maintained right at the very frontline, deep in the desert, at huge expense. lmagine having your whole army distributed along one line 1,500 kilometres long? No one point is any more important than another, so you have to defend the whole equally" (Brazier 1998).

While it is undeniable that the berm requires Morocco maintain a large armed presence in the territory, it must also be conceded that it was upon the berm's construction in the mid-1980s that the military tide turned in Morocco' s favour and a situation of stalemate ensued, ultimately leading to the 1991 ceasefire.

A related problem is that of morale. It would be extremely difficult to take up arms after a long ceasefire (Gooch 1997). As Bell explains, "Morale is almost always tied to the perceived success of the armed struggle. If there is action, a feel of momentum, the oil of enthusiasm lubricates aIl the cogs and gears: money and time are contributed, recruits arrive ... the media is agog, the nation is risen or the people mobilized" (Bell 1998, 142). In the case of the Saharawis, years of occupation and desert exile have eroded the spirit of the people: "Nous avons perdu notre âme," says Mokta, and old Saharawi living in the occupied territories, "Nous n'existons plus. Regardez-moi, je me suis transformé en un homme qui ne bouge pas. Honte sur moi, honte sur la politique, qui a fait de moi un demi-homme" (Ficatier 2000).

A lack of international support is another significant factor. As Ibrahim Abu Lughod argues, "It is imperative for the population engaged in a war of national liberation to have the full material and political support of an external state" (Brynen 1990, 50). As explained, the Polisario has few allies and, by the mid-1980s, could count upon only Aigeria for military support. Given its current

79 situation of internaI turmoil, today Aigeria can offer the Saharawis little more than diplomatic backing. Moreover, should the Polisario resort to violence, it is uncertain whether Aigeria would even continue to offer it sanctuary. As Rex Brynen explains:

... while sanctuary provides important, perhaps indispensable, benefits for an insurgent movement, the granting of sanctuary may involve considerable costs for the sanctuary state and the regime that rules it. This in turn adversely affects insurgent-sanctuary relations - and hence the availability of sanctuary itself (Brynen 1990, 50).

Battling its own civil war, Aigeria would be reticent to risk opening up a western front with Morocco, should the King decide to exact revenge for guerrilla attacks launched from Aigerian soil. The loss of sanctuary would prove detrimental to the Polisario's very survival (loes 1992,6).

A final consideration is the blurred distinction between guerrilla war and terrorism. Should the former be cast as the latter, the Polisario may face sanction by the international community. "If the Sahrawis, out of desperation, break the cease fire and go to war with Morocco, the anti-terrorism measures undertaken by the United States may seal their fate," Wayne Madsen argues:

Ali the State Department has to do is simply declare POLISARIO and the [Saharawi] Arab Democratie Republic terrorist organizations. Their international assets would be frozen, their leaders would be arrested and could be tried by secret U.S. military tribunals and executed, and Big Oil and Morocco would rule the day in Western Sahara" (Madsen 2003).

In a post-September Il world, leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Ariel Sharon are scrambling to win international approval or at least acquiescence for their violent response to uprisings in Chechnya and the Palestinian Territories. Casting these conflicts as 'wars on terror', they have succeeded in gaining the tacit, and often

80 explicit, approval of American and EU officials.29 It is likely Morocco would follow suit and attempt to characterize the SPLA as a terrorist organization should the Polisario take up arms. For aIl these reasons, armed violence - either terrorism or guerrilla warfare - seems a dubious and therefore unlikely alternative to the current stalemate. Instead, the way forward seems to hinge upon a political solution.

A Political Solution

As the status quo grows increasingly intolerable and the likelihood of either a referendum or a return to arms fades into irrelevance, the possibility of a political solution figures more prominently on Western Sahara's horizon. Exactly what shape this solution will take and which parties will be involved in its configuration, however, is subject to debate. Broadly speaking, three alternatives are worthy of examination: a Polisario-Moroccan compromise; a UN imposed solution; and an Aigero-Moroccan pax, leading to a resolution of the dispute. An analysis of each suggests an autonomy agreement, as a result of an Aigero-Moroccan rapprochement, is the most likely scenario to play out in the region.

A Polisario-Moroccan Compromise

One possibility for peace in the region is a mutually agreed upon resolution forged by the Palace and Polisario officiaIs. Such a resolution could take the form of either Saharawi autonomy with the framework of Moroccan sovereignty or a partition of the territory. Although attractive, a lack of convergence in the protagonists' respective preferences renders a political bargain that would prove acceptable to both sides extremely unlikely. An examination of the prospects for

29 Following the events of 9/11, the European Union joined the United States in blacklisting a collection of groups it viewed as terrorist organizations, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas Izzedine al-Qassam. At the end of February 2003, the US bent to Russian pressure and agreed to blacklist three Chechen groups, including Riadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment, and the Islamic International Brigade (among other aliases).

81 autonomy and partition highlights the virtually unbridgeable divide between the two parties' positions.

Autonomy

In general terms, autonomy is understood to refer to "independence of action on the internaI or domestic level...but occasionally power to conclude international agreements concerning cultural or economic matters" (Hannum and Lillich 1980, 860). Such an elastic definition imagines a plurality of arrangements from cultural and religious rights to political sovereignty. Thus, anY discussion of an autonomy agreement in Western Sahara begs a detailed extrapolation of terms. Morocco, for instance, had indicated its willingness to explore an agreement that would grant Western Sahara limited autonomy; the Polisario, rejecting such a proposaI, might be disposed to discussing sorne form of loose association with the Kingdom that would safeguard Saharawi identity and guarantee it extensive autonomy. The problem, therefore, is not necessarily autonomy per se; rather, the problem lies with the extent of autonomy to which each party might be willing to agree. A discussion of the parties' positions demonstrates that it is unlikely Morocco and the Polisario will be able to reach a compromise on the principle of autonomy.

Limited Autonomy: The Framework Agreement

As discussed, after Morocco indicated a willingness to negotiate a measure of autonomy for Western Sahara in 2001, James Baker drew up a plan known as the Framework Agreement, providing for limited Saharawi autonomy within a framework of Moroccan sovereignty. Reactions to Baker's five-point plan were predictable: the King voiced his wiIlingness to discuss the Agreement while the Polisario "categorically rejected the draft framework agreement", c1aiming it paved the way "for a programmed annexation of Western Sahara by the Kingdom of Morocco" (S/2002/41 Annex 1). Seemingly committed to an autonomy agreement,

82 Baker presented the parties with a Revised Framework Agreement in January 2003.

Refusing to make public the details of this plan, Baker said only that he hoped "t~ arrive at an initiative allowing a political settlement of the question of the Sahara" (ARSO 2003). Although official responses to the plan have not yet been issued, initial reactions were telling: Morocco agreed to study it, while the Polisario criticized the plan, stating its title - Peace Planfor Self-determination ofthe People of Western Sahara - was misleading and that it retained the same orientation and objectives as the original Framework-Agreement save a few insignificant amendments. The interests of each party vis-à-vis a limited autonomy agreement are clear.

Since the end of the 1980s, Morocco has been gravitating towards a model of decentralized government, favouring the promotion of regional elites. This strategy, combined with reforms such as a directly elected bicameral parliament and the principle of alternance, means the King is no longer solely responsible for domestic ills: sharing power also means sharing blame. Moreover, decentralization allows the King, at least ostensibly, to respond to internaI and international demands for democratic opening as weIl as potentially regulate two problems - the poor north, which is hostile to central authority, and Western Sahara - by allowing regions to manage their own affairs (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 190). Mohsen-Finan effectively summarizes the Moroccan argument in this final respect:

Depuis quelques mois, le depart d'une partie de contingent de la MINURSO laisse à penser que la tenue d'un referendum parait peu probable; les protagonists semblent s'orienter vers une solution politique. L'arrangement pourrait porter sur l'intégration du Sahara et des Sahraouis au Maroc par le biais du projet marocain de decentralisation. Rabat pourrait ainsi se voir confirmer dans son role de maitre de Sahara, tandis que les Sahraouis de Poliario pourraient continuer à faire valoir leur identité, mais dans un cadre régionale. (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 140)

By agreeing to a token measure of Saharawi autonomy, the King would succeed in maintaining his legitimacy before both the army and the general population;

83 redirecting attention and funds to social and economlC matters, including the forging of the UMA; and fully exploiting Western Sahara's resources. With time, Mohammed could fully integrate the territory.

Recognizing the King's intentions, the Polisario has rejected Baker's overtures for a limited autonomy agreement. As Pazzanita explains, an 'independence-integration' agreement stands no chance of acceptance by the Saharawis because it would leave sovereignty in Morocco's hands and therefore allow the King to define the territory' s status within the Kingdom over time; it would eliminate the international political and legal personality of Western Sahara; and it would effectively prejudge the outcome of any referendum. Thus "any proposaI for. .. autonomy within Morocco of whatever complexion would constitute a distinction without a difference for the Saharawi population, and substantively be no different than complete integration" (Pazzanita 1993, 216). Angel Pérez Gonzâlez further argues that autonomy "is impossible with a regime in which power and sovereignty emanate from the king" (Gonzâlez 2002). Unlike models of autonomy such as Canadian and American federalism, autonomy in Morocco would be granted within the framework of an absolute Monarchy. As Moroccans are currently deprived of many basic civil rights, it is difficult to see how Saharawi rights would be protected if Western Sahara became a de jure province of the Kingdom. Finally, numbers alone are proof that limited autonomy is synonymous with integration: only 60,000 of the 300,000 currently living in the occupied territories are Saharawi, and a total Saharawi population of only 200,000-300,000 would be dwarfed by a Moroccan population of 30 million. Under these circumstances, "autonomy [would] not stand two days" (Khaddad 2002).

Extensive Autonomy

Although an agreement that would confer Western Sahara with extensive autonomy has not yet received serious consideration from the international community, there is sorne indication that the Polisario might be amenable to such a

84 deal. For its part, Morocco would reject any resolution that could diminish its powers considerably in the territory.

If one accepts Polisario rhetoric at face value, the message with respect to an autonomy agreement is dear: "We will never live under the same roof as the Moroccans" (Khaddad 2002). The Polisario, in its official discourse, has asserted that it is unwilling to discuss any resolution operating within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. However, the BBC's David Bamford argues that given the right conditions (i.e. a higher level of political autonomy than so far stated and the promise of a restricted referendum), the Polisario may be willing to accept the previously unthinkable (Bamford 2001). This much was admitted to the author by a senior Polisario official in May 2002 (Personal Interview 2002). Why might the Polisario depart from its stand that an associative agreement in any form would be unacceptable? As explained, dissent in the Saharawi refugee camps, reduced levels of humanitarian assistance, and an acute awareness of Morocco' s growing strength vis-à-vis the Polisario are all factors in the liberation front's calculations. The Polisario cannot remain in the desert forever and, at least for the foreseeable future, time and the majority of the international community are on Morocco's side. Given these circumstances, it is possible that the Polisario would agree to Moroccan sovereignty if such an arrangement provided for an adequate level of autonomy.

Morocco, however, would be unwilling to discuss any agreement that granted Western Sahara extensive autonomy. Pointing to the dangers of internaI political, economic and cultural autonomy for the territory, Mohamed daims that "Certains observateurs, marocains et étrangers, ont noté que la troisième voie n'est autre que l'anti-chambre dans l'attente d'une entité saharienne indépendante" (Mohamed 2001,239). This possibility of eventual secession aside, the King fears that a large measure of independence would not only be frowned upon by the Moroccan army and general public but would also spark serious problems within the Kingdom. First, a large measure of autonomy in Western Sahara could have a

85 demonstration effect in the country, causmg other regions to demand similar freedoms. Second, the Polisario would surely add its voice to growing calls for democratization within the Kingdom. Third, Western Sahara aIready benefits from extensive Moroccan investment - at the expense of other underdeveloped regions in the country. It would no doubt profit from its rich resource base, thereby exacerbating the already present gap between the country's have and have-not regions (Mohsen-Finan 1997, 180). Finally, Saharawi dissent, combined with CUITent Berber hostility, may well lead to extensive domestic violence (Omar 2002). A large measure of independence for the Saharawis would imply too many risks and yield too few rewards for the King to justify such a resolution.

Thus, there is little reason to believe that, left to their own devices, Morocco and the Polisario might strike a mutuallY acceptable agreement for autonomy. Neither limited nor extensive autonomy offers both parties the guarantees they seek.

Partition

Given the difficulties involved in striking a bargain for autonomy, might the two parties negotiate sorne sort of agreement resulting in a division of the territory? To be sure, partition is an attractive alternative for various reasons. As James Baker remarked, a partition plan would "give to each party something of what rit] wants, but not aIl," thus ensuring the dispute does not generate winners and losers (Fisas 2002). The Saharawis would have an independent state; Morocco would gain a partial victory, allowing the King to guard a portion of his investments; the region would be free to foster an integrated Maghreb; the United Nations, credibility intact, would be able to direct its attention elsewhere; and the international community would profit from the territory' s natural resources. However, it must be argued that the prospect of partition raises many questions as weIl. What incentives exist for Morocco to agree to such a compromise? How might the territory be divided? And what guarantees does partition pro vide for

86 future stabiIity in the region? An examination of these issues proves partition an unlikelyalternative.

First and foremost, it is not c1ear whether both parties will agree to a partition plan. Although the Polisario has yet to formulate a definitive position, many officiaIs have indicated that a division of Western Sahara is a real possibility: "We have told Mr. Baker that we in principle are not against negotiating ... modifications or adjustments of the borders" Khaddad has stated (Hennig and Gracia 2002). Polisario officiaIs agree that the Saharawi must make sorne compromises and that most countries have lost parts of their territory throughout history (Sayed 2002; Khaddad 2002; Sidati 2002). Ultimately, as Khaddad asserts, "It is better to have bad justice than total anarchy" (Khaddad 2002).

Backing the Polisario' s position, interested states have expressed their support for such a compromise. AIgeria's Ambassador to the UN has stated that Algiers would be "disposed to examine any proposaI for a political solution which takes full account of the legitimate national interests of the Saharawi people" (ARSO 2002).30 The Spanish daily El Periodico 's Antonio Baquero claims that the US not only supports a partition of the territory but is also behind the plan, calculating that a divided Western Sahara would allow Algeria to transport its oil across the Atlantic (ARSO 2002). Whatever its incentives, the US has not spoken out against the principle of partition. Meanwhile, both Spain and France have reiterated their support for any solution agreed upon by the parties concerned. "We are favourable in any case to pursuing James Baker's consultations with a view to

30 Sorne claim that Algeria is the primary force behind a partition agreement, motivated by its interest in gaining access to the Atlantic and putting pressure on Morocco to make concessions on a Iimited autonomy agreement (Khalaf 2002). Bachir Sayed has argued that while "the word 'partage' stemmed rrom Baker's mouth, the Aigerians did not speak Ioudly their rejection" and therefore media speculated that partition was an Aigerian plan (Sayed 2002). Khaddad insists that the origins of the plan are un important but that the proposai is probably French because it was France that once convinced Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Dada to accept the Madrid Accord and the partition of the territory. "Barely one year ago," Khaddad claims, "French diplomats approached us to speak about such a solution and therefore l don't understand how it can be an exclusively Algerian idea" (Hennig and Gracia 2002).

87 reaching a negotiated solution acceptable to the parties" the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented (ARSO 2002).

The real challenge lies in winning Moroccan support for such a plan. In March 2002, in a televised speech from occupied Western Sahara, King Mohammed expressed his "categorical refusaI of any proposalliable to damage the territorial integrity of Morocco and its sovereignty over its southern provinces, " asserting "Morocco will not give up one inch of territory from its inalienable and indivisible Sahara ....We are sure of our complete sovereignty over every acre of this land" (ARSO 2002). The Financial Times reported that as of March 2002, Morocco had stepped up diplomatie efforts to convince Western governments to reject any partition proposaI the UN might table (Khalaf2002).

Certain analysts argue that Morocco' s official position in not a final one. If pressured by the international community, particularly the United States and France, the King may prove willing to discuss partition. These analysts point to the precedent Morocco set in 1975 when it divided Western Sahara with Mauritania via the Madrid Accords. Moreover, they claim that by taking a seemingly adamant stand against partition, the King may simply be manoeuvring for more favourable terms once division is actually negotiated. This was the opinion of two Spanish journalists with information from the UN, writing for El Periodico and La Razon (ARSO 2002).

While is it possible Morocco may still agree to partition, it is highly unlikely. Morocco has relinquished its claims to parts of Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria in the past in order to concentrate its efforts on regaining Western Sahara. Given the Kingdom's present control over the majority of the territory, as weIl as its bargaining power relative to the Polisario, why should it agree to a resolution that would compromise its interests? Moreover, having sworn before his people that he will guard the territorial integrity of Morocco' s 'southern provinces', as weIl as requiring the army's continued backing, it would be extremely difficult for

88 the King to go back on his word. Therefore, while the Polisario appears willing to talk partition, the King does not.

Should Morocco eventually agree to partition, a second challenge arises - division of the territory. Clive Christie argues that severing territorial ties between two peoples can lead to improved relations. "Good fences," he asserts, "make good neighbours" (Christie 1992, 76-77). Christie may be correct, but the question remains: where do disputing parties put those fences? Perhaps best said by Bechir Sayed: "la terre n'est pas la pomme." Western Sahara cannot simply be divided in two without reference to history, demography, economic viability and strategie interests. It is not the same colour, flavour or shape throughout (Sayed 2002). Without a doubt, the most coveted part of the territory is its northwest corner - that which has been termed the "useful triangle" and comprises the capital city of El Ayoun, the sacred town of Smara, the phosphate-rich Bou Craa mines, and a coastline holding the promise of extensive oil wealth. Also significant, however, is the southern town of Dakhla that boasts the territory's largest port. Further complicating these material and strategie interests, Khaddad explains, is the question of repatriation. Any partition agreement would prove highly political within the Polisario itself, as Saharawis originally from the south would oppose a lateral partition while those from the east would oppose a vertical division (Khaddad 2002). As for Moroccan settlers, would they be granted the right to remain in the territory, potentially outnumbering ethnie Saharawis? And in terms of defensible borders, would a future Saharawi state be a secure and viable entity? The questions are irrefutably many and would undoubtedly complicate, if not confound altogether, attempts to negotiate division.

A third issue worthy of discussion is the principle of partition itself. Does partition guarantee future stability or does it simply prolong conflict? Based on his study of 21 partition agreements, Nicholas Sambanis argues, "evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence" (Sambanis 2000, 473-474). Indeed, examples of territorial division in the cases of

89 Pakistan and India, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Korea, Vietnam, and Cyprus aU illustrate the way in which intra-state wars can translate into interstate wars once a country is divided. Moreover, these cases demonstrate the way in which regional and even international stability may become threatened. From this viewpoint, partition does not promise North Africa stability and therefore would not necessarily pro vide an environment favourable to the creation of a Maghrebi union.

For aU of the foregoing reasons, it appears unlikely that Morocco and the Polisario will be able to reach an agreement that would divide Western Sahara. Partition would deprive King Mohammed VI of the resounding victory he needs to shore up domestic support; it would prove difficult to negotiate; and it would carry with it no guarantee of future stability. Moreover, as T.G. Fraser argues in a discussion of the partition of India and Ireland:

Partition was not conceived in a vacuum. It was agreed to by weary men desperate to see a way out of seemingly intractable bloody struggles. The mental and emotional exhaustion of Collins and Griffith by the end of the treaty negotiations or of the aging Gandhi and Jinnah in the spring of 1947 may only be guessed at, but must form part of any judgement of their actions (Fraser 1984, 196-197).

Morocco and the Polisario have simply not reached a point where the conflict has become so costly that both - particularly Morocco - are willing to pursue significant compromises.

A UN Imposed Resolution

The realization that a compromise between Moroccan and Polisario officiaIs lS unlikely has led the United Nations to con si der an imposed resolution. In February 2002, frustrated with an enduring situation of stalemate, Kofi Annan put four proposaIs before the Security Council. One option was the termination of MINURSO, thereby conceding the UN's failure to regulate the dispute. Not

90 surprisingly, the Council rejected this option. Arman's three alternate proposaIs proved more interesting. First, Arman advanced the possibility of imposing a referendum, requiring the concurrence of neither Morocco nor the Polisario. Second, he suggested the imposition of a revised version of the Framework Agreement, again requiring the agreement of neither party. Third, he proposed Morocco and the Polisario discuss a partition agreement. However, if such an agreement could not be negotiated between the two parties, the Council could impose a partition (S/2002/178). The Security Council has yet to articulate its position regarding these three proposaIs. It has instead postponed its decision four times, most recently setting March 25, 2003 as a tentative deadline (S/RES/1394; S/RES/1406; S/RES/1429; S/RES/1463).

The Council's reluctance to decide between three equally unpalatable proposaIs is understandable. Each would require a generally unified stand among Security Council members with divergent interests. For instance, while the United States, France and Great Britain would most probably support the Framework Agreement, formerly colonized states such as Angola and Cameroon would probably favour a referendum or partition. As Dunbar argues, divisions among member states prevent the Council from taking a harder line in resolving the dispute (Dunbar 2000, 536). This was clearly demonstrated in April 2002 when the United States' draft resolution for an autonomy agreement was rejected by the Council.

More importantly, however, is the question of enforcement. As none of the three proposaIs would prove ideal to both Morocco and the Polisario, and as aU of the proposaIs would effectively sideline Morocco and the Polisario from the decision-making process, each would require the commitment of the international community in terms of enforcement. As Arman has already clearly stated, no means of enforcement are currently in place. And as has been demonstrated in an earlier discussion of the UN' s track record of enforcement in territorial disputes, particularly Western Sahara, the international body cannot be counted upon to

91 ensure the terms of any of the above agreements. Therefore, it must be concluded that Annan's proposaIs hold little hope for a timely resolution of the conflict.

An Algero-Moroccan Pax

Given the virtual impossibility of a referendum, the untenable nature of the status quo, and the improbability of a return to arms, recourse to a political solution emerges as the only plausible alternative. Yet, if the Polisario and Morocco are unable to strike a mutually acceptable bargain, and the UN is unable to impose a resolution upon the parties, what kind of political solution might be foreseen? Aigeria, it must be argued, holds the key. An examination of Aigeria's relations with the Polisario and Morocco, as well as Aigerian interests, highlights the real possibility of an Aigero-Moroccan pax of sorts: a rapprochement between the two Maghrebi powers which would see Aigeria relinquish its support for the Polisario in order to forge closer political, economic and social ties with Morocco. The Polisario, deprived of its only real ally, would be forced to accept whatever bone an Aigero-Moroccan compromise threw its way; and this bone would likely be no more than a limited measure of autonomy, ultimately leading to integration.

Aigerian-Polisario Relations

The first supposition underlying the preceding argument is the Polisario's near complete dependence upon Aigeria .. Only if the liberation front is controlled by or closely bound to Aigeria might an Aigero-Moroccan rapprochement determine the course of the Saharawi struggle. Morocco adopts the former premise, claiming the Polisario is essentially an Aigerian creation and therefore subject to Algeria's whim:

De 1975 à nos jours, tout le monde a compris que ni la RASD ni le POLISARIO n'ont ni le droit et encore moins la liberté d'agir d'eux-mêmes. Ils ne peuvent décider de leur avenir. Ils ne sont que des pions qu'Alger déplace volontairement sur l'échiquier de sa politique nord africaine (Mohamed 2001, 246).

92 It is for this reason that Istiqlal Party President Abdellhaq Tazi caUs for "la négotiation directe avec l'Algérie qui détient les clés de la solution" (Mohamed 2001,6).

Polisario defector Lahbib Ayoub rejects the claim that the Polisario is a mere Aigerian proxy, but he argues that current President Abdelaziz is an Aigerian pawn. Abdelaziz, he says, became Secretary General of the Polisario (and thus President of the SADR) in 1976 at the behest of the Aigerians. Why was EI-Ouali Mustapha Sayed not replaced by one of the Polisario' s other founding fathers, the former General demands, or even his brother Bechir Sayed? "Les Algériens l'avaient choisi et nous ne pouvions rien leur refuser," he admits. "Ils nous donnaient tout, ou presque." Abdelaziz, born in Marrakech, belongs to a minority fraction of the Saharawi Reguibat tribe, the Fokra; this subfraction consisted of nomads living primarily between Béchar and Tindouf in present-day Aigeria. Therefore, he asserts: "Contrairement à nous, qui venons du Sahara occidental, il s'est toujours considéré comme leur homme" (Soudan 2003,37).

While Anderson does not Vlew the Polisario as a mere extension of Aigerian foreign policy, he adopts the broadly accepted position that the Polisario is extremely dependent on external - namely Aigerian - support (Anderson 1992, 131). As explained earlier, the Polisario is completely dependent upon Aigeria for its sanctuary in the Tindouf region. Moreover it has benefited from Aigerian military assistance in the past, and it continues to rely upon Aigeria for humanitarian aid and diplomatie support. This extensive backing necessarily dictates Aigeria's pro minent position as an interested party in the dispute. As Mohamed points out, the UN' s decision to include Aigeria in discussions of Baker' s Framework Agreement is proof that the international community recognizes Aigeria's intimate involvement in the conflict (Mohamed 2001, 235). As Anderson argues, where groups are dependent on outsiders, they can eventually be forced to compromise (Anderson 1992, 131).

93 Algerian-Moroccan Relations

A second element upon which this argument hinges is an Algero-Moroccan rapprochement. After fort Y years of latent hostility, what evidence is there to suggest that Algeria and Morocco are finally moving toward a warmer peace? ln recent yearS, Morocco has demonstrated its goodwill and readiness to cooperate after Algeria was hit by a series of natural disasters. Following an earthquake in Western Algeria in December 1999, Morocco dispatched two aircraft to the troubled region, carrying a large quantity of aid. Morocco's Ambassador to Algeria asserted that the initiative testified to the existence of fraternal relations between the Moroccan and Algerian people (PANA 1999). When northern Algeria was hit by floods in December 200 1, the King again responded by sending material assistance, as weIl as a rescue team (ArabieNews.Com 2001a). King Mohammed VI also telephoned President Bouteflika, expressing his condolences and solidarity. "1 learned with deep sadness and affliction [of] the death of a great number of victims following the torrential rains that hit sisterly Algeria," the King said in a message extended to the Algerian people (ArabieNews. Corn 2001 b). And following torrential storms in eastern Algeria in August 2002, Morocco dispatched three planes, carrying 21 tons of aid. Algerian Minister of Employment Taib Belaiz thanked the Moroccan government "for this act of solidarity," saying "we appreciate [it], and will keep [it] in memory" (Arabie News. Corn 2002).

An anticipated re-openmg of Algerian-Moroccan borders is a second indication that relations between the neighbouring countries are improving. A border c10sure has been in effect since 1994, following a terrorist attack m Morocco,31 and has damaged the economies of both countries. According to a Moroccan official, the borders are expected to re-open within the coming month (Personal Interview 2003).

31 Two Spanish tourists were killed when a small group of Algerian-bom French nationals attacked a luxury hotel in Marrakech. When Morocco imposed entry visas on Aigerians wishing to enter the Kingdom, Aigeria responded by closing its borders.

94 The third and perhaps most important sign that relations are thawing is an increase in communication between high-Ievel Moroccan and Algerian officiaIs. In February 2003, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem met with several Moroccan officiaIs in Rabat. Conveying a message of "brotherhood and friendship" from President Bouteflika, he explained his visit was part of an Aigerian effort to raise bilateral relations with Morocco. Belkhadem held talks with his Moroccan counter part, Mohamed Benaissa, as weIl as Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou and Speaker of the Moroccan Chamber of Advisors, Mustapha Okacha. The latter said the visit was "likely to contribute to warming relations between Morocco and Aigeria". These talks led to speculation that a direct meeting between King Mohammed VI and President Bouteflika is imminent. Belkhadem said he hoped that "such an encounter [would] be held shortly" and that in the meantime "King Mohammed VI and President Bouteflika are carrying on contacts through phone calls and the exchange of messages" (ArabicNews. Com 2003b). Indeed, Libération announced that Bouteflika and Mohammed VI would be meeting "très prochainement" and that, according to an Aigerian diplomat, "la question du Sahara-Occidental y serait abordée si les amis marocains l'évoquent" (Garçon 2003). As a Moroccan official explained, the question of Western Sahara is the single largest outstanding issue between the two states. As such, a summit between the King and Bouteflika will only be held once the matter of Western Sahara is virtually settled. In this way, a summit can be viewed as a gauge of how close the two parties are to reaching an agreement regarding the territory. And given that officiaIs are hinting at the real possibility of such a summit in the near future, it can be assumed that Aigeria and Morocco are close to an agreement (Personal Interview 2003).

Aigerian Interests

Implicit in the argument for an Aigero-Moroccan brokered peace deal is a final assumption that Aigerian interests have changed in recent years such that it now considers a rapprochement with Morocco paramount to its relationship with

95 the Polisario. As Brynen argues, "There exists, within any set of insurgent­ sanctuary relations, considerable potential for divergence between the insurgents' raison de la révolution and the sanctuary's raison d'état" (Brynen 1990, 9). And in the present case, an examination of Aigerian interests demonstrates that while a warm Aigero-Moroccan peace would confound the Polisario's attempts to achieve an independent state, it would provide Aigeria with significant benefits. Such benefits, it is argued, would justify an Aigerian decision to abandon the Polisario in its struggle for independence.

In terms of Aigeria's economic interests, it is widely assumed that Aigeria's first and foremost concern is access to the Atlantic so that it might exploit and export its iron-ore deposits outside of Tindouf. Friendly relations with Morocco, Mohamed daims, would grant Aigeria this access (Mohamed 200 1, 247). However, as Zunes effectively argues, Aigeria has over 1125 kilometres of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea and virtually all of its roads and rail lines for international commerce are directed towards the Mediterranean; Aigeria's iron-ore deposits in Tindouf are its only resource that could logically be routed westward. Moreover, there is no reason why Aigeria could not work out an agreement with Morocco for access to the Atlantic or, alternatively, route its iron-ore through Mauritania and hook up with rail lines at Zouerate. In any case, as Aigeria has its own processing facilities at Oran as well as its own steel production plants, it is hard to understand why Aigeria would want to export raw iron-ore in the first place (Zunes 1995). A more convincing economic argument privileges the UMA. Regional integration is extremely important for Aigeria. As note d, much of Algeria's domestic turmoil over the past decade is attributable to the country's socio-economic conditions. Moreover, as long as efforts to forge a North African union remain stalled, Morocco and Tunisia continue to move closer to Europe and the United States, slowly isolating Aigeria. As Aigeria's Foreign Minister recently asserted: there is "a keenness to boost the Arab Maghreb Union in order to better exploit the potentials of the Maghreban countries" (ArabicNews.Com 2003b). And

96 as the past fifteen years show, no union of any kind is possible without a resolution of the Western Sahara dispute.

Security is a second crucial interest. Aigeria has feared Moroccan expansionism since it fought a border war with the Kingdom in 1963. Morocco far outperformed Aigeria and would have prevailed militarily had an OAU-sponsored agreement not been reached. However, though relations between the two states remained frosty, a treaty was signed in 1972, defining the borders between them. This treaty was ratified by Morocco in 1989, following the peace agreement reached with the Polisario. Thus, the question of Aigeria's borders has now been settled. Moreover, Morocco has long dropped its daim over both Mauritania and parts of Mali, recognizing the two African states. The threat of Moroccan expansion, then, seems an exaggerated one. The real threat to Aigerian security is a domestic one. Although terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists have waned considerably since the mid 1990s, hundreds are still killed each year. A North African Union is considered by many the best way to address the socio­ economic ills that spur such movements. Thus, Aigerian security ultimately lies in doser relations with Morocco.

Foreign - especially American - relations are a third interest. As Maghreb Conjidential argues, if Morocco is Washington's oldest diplomatic ally, the Americans look to Aigeria for business. According to Maghreb Conjidential sources, US investment in the Aigerian oil industry now totals $4.5 billion, while American firms are equally active in banking/finance, services, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and aerospace sectors. US exports to Aigeria surged by over 150% in 2001, and a 40-member Aigeria-US chamber of commerce was established in 2002. Moreover, Aigiers exports over $3 billion in oil and oil products to the US and ettioys a $50 million credit line for the purchase of American grain. In terms of military, Aigeria continues to buy its big-ticket equipment from Russia but enjoys technical assistance from Northrop Grumman for its air defence system and surveillance aircraft (Maghreb Conjidential 2002).

97 Eager to maintain such close economic ties to the US, it is logical to assume that Algeria would be responsive to increasing American pressure to settle the Saharawi question. Following September Il, the United States has made it clear that those states that are not with it, are necessarily against it, and as such will pay a heavy priee. Thus Tuquoi argues that Algeria may abandon the Polisario in order to forge closer relations with the US in the aftermath of September Il (Tuquoi 2002).

A fourth interest is legitimacy, both domestic and international. Having long rallied both its population and much of the non-aligned world in support of the Polisario, lobbying tirelessly for the cause of self-determination based on its reputation as a global leader in the fight for independence, a pact with Morocco threatens Algerian credibility. This may be so, but there is much evidence to suggest that a rapprochement with Morocco, at the expense of the Polisario, would not be as disastrous as once feared. In terms of domestic legitimacy, Zunes claims that "Algeria is tired of supporting the Polisario and popular enthusiasm for the struggle has waned considerably." He points to the October 1988 riots as proof, claiming the Polisario's headquarters in Algiers were attacked, apparently as a result of popular resentment toward the costs of financing the war while the Algerian economy deteriorated (Zunes 1995). The Algerian government, focussed now on its socio-economic agenda rather than its politico-military one, derives little benefit from the longstanding Saharan dispute.

In terms of international legitimacy, the addition of certain face-saving measures to Baker's Framework Agreement would allow Algeria to concede autonomy, and eventually integration, without losing its integrity before the international community. One such measure is Algerian supervision of the transitional autonomy period leading up to a territory-wide referendum on integration. Officially 'monitoring' the process, Algeria would be seen as safeguarding Saharawi interests. A second measure is an extension of the autonomy period from the five years proposed by Baker to six or seven years. The Algerian daily Liberté recently reported that Mohamed Bedjaoui, Chairman of

98 Aigeria' s Constitutional Council, was pushing for such an extension in negotiations with Morocco (Allilat 2003). An extended transition period would provide more time for Saharawi refugees to be re-integrated into the territory as weIl as for the international community to forget Aigeria' s previous efforts to establish an independent state.

A final interest is related to President Bouteflika's des ire to secure a second term in Aigeria' s upcoming 2004 elections. According to Libération, French pre­ eminence in North Africa is becoming increasingly threatened by America' s extensive investments in Aigeria's oil industry as weIl as the free-trade agreement the US is presently negotiating with Morocco. France views its diminished status in the region as impacting its clout in Madrid, Rome, and most of aIl Washington. For this reason, France would like to improve its relations with the Maghreb. Such a task, however, is complicated by the necessity of maintaining good relations with both Aigeria and Morocco - two long-time rivaIs. Thus, in recent months, President Jacques Chirac has channelled his energy into bringing the parties closer, hopeful that an Arab Maghreb Union will provide an opportunity for increased French leverage in the region. In a series of recent meetings - culminating in both a visit by Chirac to Aigiers and Bouteflika to Paris in early 2003 - France has placed pressure on Aigeria to come to sorne sort of agreement with Morocco regarding Western Sahara. President Bouteflika, for his part, has been receptive to Chirac's overtures, as he would like France's support in a 2004 presidential campaign. As Libération argues, "Si Bouteflika ne cache pas son intention de se succéder à lui-même, les 'décideurs' militaries ne semblent pas encore s'être résignés à ce second mandat. Il doit donc les contraindre de ne pas s'y opposer" (Garçon 2003). French support, for instance, in the form of boosted military sales, would help Bouteflika to gamer support for his bid (Allilat 2003).

Given Aigeria's current interests, a rapprochement with Morocco appears likely. As closer relations with Morocco would necessarily entail weaker relations with the Polisario, Aigeria stands poised to sell its long-time friend up the river.

99 Indeed, the writing has been on the wall for sorne time now. In 1994, Algerian Foreign Minister Mohamed Salah Denbri was quoted as saying: "il faudrait choisir une solution politique au problème du Sahara qui déterminerait une entité saharienne dans un ensemble marocain" (Mohammed 2001, 234). As discussed, Bouteflika is said to have dec1ared in 2001 that he was not against an autonomy agreement. And most recently, former Algerian Defence Minister, General Khaled Nezzar, asserted that he opposes the creation of a Saharawi state, arguing his country "does not need a new state at its borders." As Nezzar is se en as an unofficial spokesperson for the country's popular national army, his statement can be considered representative of the military's view (7). Moreover, as the military­ known popularly as Le Pouvoir - is rumoured to be vested with the country' s real decision-making powers, Nezzar's statement is particularly significant.

From this vantage point, an Algero-Moroccan pax, resulting in an autonomy arrangement and ultimately Western Sahara's integration into Morocco, seems extremely likely. No less attentive to the dictates ofrealpolitik than any other state, Algeria recognizes that its relationship with the Polisario is no longer an advantage, but rather a liability.

IN CONCLUSION

"Sometimes people call me an idealist. Well that is the way 1 know 1 am American," President Woodrow Wilson excIaimed, basking in the glory of the Treaty of Versailles. "America .. .1 do not say it in disparagement of any other great people - America is the only idealistic nation in the world" (WWICS 2002). And yet American policy in the Maghreb has proven anything but idealistic. Instead, it has been an overwhelming sense of realism that has dictated US support for Morocco in violation of the Saharawi people' s right to the principle of self­ determination. In the shadow of the Cold War, the United States and others failed to enforce internationallaw in the region. Indeed, aided and abetted by its powerful

100 allies, Morocco was delivered from the threat of Polisario forces. Today, the iron curtain lifted and a ceasefire proclaimed, little has changed. Morocco's attempts to obstruct the referendum process, if not stay the plebiscite altogether, have succeeded virtually unchallenged; a steady stream of weapons and cash continue to flow into Rabat; and sorne of the very super powers that once praised the principle of self-determination at Versailles, now lobby the United Nations for Moroccan sovereignty in occupied Western Sahara. The suggestion of international enforcement, should a referendum favouring Saharawi independence one day proceed, becomes laughable.

As the bells toll for Saharawi self-determination, the question of Western Sahara's future remains. Will today's reality prove interminable? Will the Saharawis take up arms? Or will a political solution ultimately resolve the present impasse? This paper has argued that for the foreseeable future, aIl other routes exhausted, only a political compromise offers the Saharawi people a way forward. This compromise, however, will be forged neither by the Polisario nor the United Nations. Instead, it is suggested that Algeria, driven by its own raison d'état, will shake hands with Morocco on autonomy - and ultimately integration - for Western Sahara. Its revolutionary days behind it, Aigeria is shedding its Third World skin - allegiance to the Polisario and aIl - in an attempt to mend fences with Morocco and join the big boys in Europe and North America. Unfortunately for the Saharawis, there is no room for freedom fighting on Algeria's new socio-economic agenda. Idealist rhetoric in Aigeria proves no more than a façade for the principle of realpolitik that drives states everywhere, even Wilson's America.

Thus, twenty-five years of struggle have purchased the Saharawi people little more than the promise of Moroccan citizenship. And the blame, should we seek to point fingers, falls squarely on the shoulders of the international community. Indeed, Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait stands as a seminal example of the decisive influence the world can yield in the face of injustice should it just harbour the will. Upon James Baker's first visit to Western Sahara in 1997, he

101 encountered a Saharawi protestor, bearing a simple sign: "Iraq, yes - Morocco, no. Why?" it read (Gooch 1997). The answer, had Baker ventured to give it, is realpolitik. Realism, not Wilson's professed idealism, calls the shots in Western Sahara. The sooner the international community acknowledges as much, the sooner peace, stability, and most of alliife might be restored to the region.

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Von Hippel, Karin. 1995. The non-interventionary norm prevails: an analysis of the Western Sahara. The Journal ofModern African Studies 33, 1 (March): 67-81. Journalon-line. Available from http://www.jstor.org

Wenger, Martha. 1982. Reagan stakes Morocco in Sahara Struggle. MERIP Reports 0, 106 (May): 22-26+30. Journalon-line. Available from http://www.jstor.org

US Commercial Service. 2002. [Cited 16 Dec 2002]. Available from http://www. usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-MOROCC02002-CH-5:-0068F335

WWICS (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars). 2002. [Cited 9 April 2002]. Availablefrom http://wwics.si.edu

Ziai, Fatemeh. 1996. UN impasse in the Western Sahara. Middle East Report 0, 199 (Apr-June): 38-41. Journalon-line. Available from http://www.jstor.org

Zoubir, Yahia H. 2002. Aigeria and U.S. interests: containing radical Islamism and promoting democracy. Middle East Policy 9, 1 (March): 64-81. Journalon-line. Available from http://www.mepc.org

Zunes, Stephen. 1995. Aigeria, the Maghreb Union, and the Western Sahara stalemate. Arab Studies Quarterly 17, 7: 23-36. Journalon-line. Available from http://search.epnet.com

Newspapers and Magazines

Cembrero, Ignacio. 2001. Le Front Polisario dans un isolement croissant. Courrier International, July, 20.

. 111 de Meslan, Tristan. 1994. L'ONU discredité (interview with Jean-Luc Held). Témoignage Chrétien, 6 May.

Decamps, Marie-Claude. 1997. La' génération Polisario' témoignage de l' absursdité d'un conflit oublié. Le Monde, 2 May. du Roy, Ivan. 2001. Danièle Mitterrand plaide la cause sahraouie. Témoignage Chrétien, 15 Nov.

Favières, Laure. 2001. L'ONU s'incline devant Mohamed VI. Rouge, 9 July, 6.

Ficatier, Julia. 2000. Les Sahraouis, ces 'fils des nuages' oubliés de tous. La Crois, 14 Dec, 14-15.

Gooch, Adeala. 1997. Baker renews hope of end to bitter exile. The Guardian, 29 April.

Jarry, Irène. 1992. Gajmoula Bent Ebbi: 'les dirigeants du Polisario ont trahi leur peuple' (interview with Gajmoula Bent Ebbi, former President of Saharawi Women's Union, defected to Morocco Nov 1991). Le Figaro, 29 May.

Puazani, Cherif. 2001. La bombe Baker. Jeune Afrique, 9 July, 6-7.

Serge, Marti. 1991. La demission du représentant des Nations Unies illustre les difficultés auxquelles se heurte le plan de paix. Le Monde. 21 Dec.

Soudan, François. 2003. Sahara le retour du guerrier. Jeune Afrique L'Intelligent, 3 Nov, 34-39.

Soudan, François. 2001. Lâchés de toutes parts. Jeune Afrique, 13 Nov, 46-47.

Soudan, François. 1998. Pourquoi je quitte le Polisario. Jeune Afrique. 30 June, 32-33.

The Economist. 2002a. Numbered days: The Saharawis' last-ditch fight for self­ determination. 13 June.

The Economist. 2002b. It's a mirage. 22 Jan, 45-46.

The Economist. 2001. The UN's U-turn. 30 June, 29.

The Economist. 2000a. Shooting the messenger in Morocco. 9 December, 52.

The Economist. 2000b Morocco's voyage from feudal to modern. 10 June, 49-50.

The Economist. 2000c. Islamist revival. 18 March, 44-46.

112 The Economist. 1999. An endless dance in the de sert. 27 March, 50.

Tuquoi, Jean-Pierre. 2002. Le temps joue contre la cause sahraouie. Le Monde, 28 January.

Zyas, Hamid. 2002. Vers un compromis historique. Arabies, January, 18.

Personal Interviews

Alien, Polisario driver. 2002. Personal Interview, 15 May, Rabuni, Aigeria.

Farrah, Said, and Salem, Saharawi youth. 2002. Personal Interview, 10 May, Smara refugee camp, Aigeria.

Khaddad, M'Hamed, Saharawi Coordinator to MINURSO. 2002. Personal Interview, 16 May, Rabuni, Aigeria.

Mohamed Fadel, Mohamed Mouloud, Secretary General ofUJSARIO. 2002. Personal Interview, 14 May, Smara refugee camp.

Moroccan Official. 2003. Personal Interview, March.

Omar, Mansur, Minister of Health. 2002. Personal Interview, 15 May, Rabuni, Aigeria.

Sayed, Bachir Moustafa, Wali of Dakhla. 2002. Personal Interview, 12 May, Dakhla refugee camp, Aigeria.

Sayed, Baba, former Polisario official. 2003. Personal Telephone Interview, Il March, Quebec, Canada.

Sidali, Ahmed Mohamed, Legal Advisor to Saharawi Government and Chief of Coordinating Bureau. 2002. Personal Interview, 15 May, Rabuni, Algeria.

Taleb Omar, Abdelkader, Wali ofSmara. 2002. Personal Interview, 16 May, Smara refugee camp, Aigeria.

UN Documents

United Nations General Assembly Resolutions

A/RESI1514/XV (1960) A/RESI1541IXV (1960) A/RES/20/20n (1965) A/RES/40/50 (1985)

113 A/RES/43/33 (1988)

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

S/RES/658 (1990) S/RES/690 (1991) S/RES/725 (1991) S/RES/1359 (2001) S/RES/1394 (2002) S/RES/1406 (2002) S/RES/1429 (2002) S/RES/1463 (2003)

United Nations Secretary General's Reports

S/21360 (1990) = Peace Plan S/22464 (1991) = Peace Plan S/23299 (1991) S/2000/1 029 (2000) S/2001/148 (2001) S/200 1/613 (2001) S/2002/41 (2002) S/2002/178 (2002) S/2003/59 (2003)

Other

ICJ (International Court of Justice). 1975. Western Sahara advisory opinion. International Court ofJustice Reports, 12. 160ctober.

S/2002/161. Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary- General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security Council.

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