OVERTHROWN BY THE PRESS: THE US MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE FALL OF DIEM Author(s): ZI JUN TOONG Source: Australasian Journal of American Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (July 2008), pp. 56-72 Published by: Australia and New Zealand American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41054100 . Accessed: 04/05/2014 17:16

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NORMAN HARPER AWARD COMMENDED

OVERTHROWN BY THE PRESS: THE US MEDIA'S ROLE IN THE FALL OF DIEM

ZI JUNTOONG

ABSTRACT This article examineshow media coverage of the 1963 Buddhist Crisis in South contributedto the Kennedy administration}s decision to supporta coup againstPresident . The article's focus on themedia 's role bringsnew perspectives to this crucial momentin US policyformation - it reveals the media's immenseinfluence on the VietnamWar in its early stages, and showsthe Buddhist Crisis as the turningpoint in the interactionbetween publicpolicy and opinionduring the war. Employingthe use of memoirs, Statedepartment papers and Americannews media, this article sheds light on the complex relationshipsbetween media, public opinion and governmentpolicy.

1963 was theyear that Buddhists in SouthVietnam were given the world's attention.Through demonstrations, protest literature, hunger strikes and self-immolations,Buddhists protested the discrimination that they had been subjectedto since Frenchcolonialism, and then underthe U.S.-backed Catholicgovernment of Ngo Dinh Diem. Set in thecontext of Cold War- era of globalism,these Buddhistsrecognised that the introductionof Americanadvisors - and more importantly,the internationalpress - into SouthVietnam as partof thewar effort against Communism provided them withthe opportunityto publicisetheir subjugation to the worldand give impetusto their movement. Between May and the fall of Diem's governmentin November 1963, each increasinglydramatic Buddhist demonstrationwhich the South Vietnamese Government (GVN) suppressed with mountingbrutality gained internationalsympathy for the Buddhist movementand worldwidecriticism for the authoritarian Diem government. Withthe eyes of the worldon the U.S.-led war againstCommunism, the United States Governmentalso sufferedinternational disapproval for financiallyand militarilysupporting Diem's repressiveregime. Concurrent withthe Americanpublic and Congress,governments all over the world beganto questionthe meansemployed by the Kennedyadministration in theirbattle against Communism. Diem's uncompromisingstance towards Buddhistswas diligentlycaptured in theinternational media as thesituation developed into a full-fledgedpolitical crisis. Furthermore,Diem's unpopularitywas notaided by his sister-in-lawMadame Ngo Dinh Nhu's

This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Sun, 4 May 2014 17:16:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES 57 frequentanti-Buddhist public declarationsto the Americanmedia, all of whichDiem refusedto disavow. Afterseveral failed attempts at nudging Diem towardsconciliatory actions with the Buddhists,the exceedingly negativemedia coverage - and hence,international opinion - of Diem and the BuddhistCrisis played a centralrole in the Washington'sdecision to supporta coupto overthrowthe Diem government.

The controversialoverthrow of Diem has been widelyexplored by several historiansas it is regardedas one of themajor turning points in theVietnam War. There exists a debate surroundingthe reasonswhy the Kennedy administrationarrived at the decisionto supporta coup; some historians argue that it was Diem's overturestoward that guided Washington'ssupport for the coup. My findings,based on an analysisof governmentdocuments and thenews media, however, support the that itwas Diem's disfavourwith international opinion that was key.

Withinthis debate surroundingthe overthrowof Diem, some historians havefocussed on theBuddhist Crisis. Thesehistorians invariably agree that Diem's handlingof the situation was a majorcontribution to his becominga liabilityto theKennedy administration. These analysessuggest that public opinionplayed a role- to be a liabilitywas to be a liabilityin public opinion- butthese discussions often discount the centrality of themedia's role. Historianssuch as PhilipE. Catton,Seth Jacobs and HowardJones, have focussed on the effectof Diem's overthrowon the subsequent involvementof the U.S. in SouthVietnam.1 Other historians - such as Ross A. Fisher,William Conrad Gibbons and FrancisX. Winters- have attemptedto allocateresponsibility within the Kennedyadministration for the ultimatedecision to supporta coup againstDiem.2 HistoriansJohn Pradoand Ellen J. Hammer,on the otherhand, recount how the Buddhist Crisisled to a coup.3 This essay adds significantweight and new detailto the idea thatDiem became a liabilityin the way of publicopinion. My focuson the media's role in the overthrowof Diem also shows thatthe mediawere important shapers of theVietnam War well beforethe 1968 ,which is widelyregarded as a turningpoint in the war because of thepress's role.

The BuddhistCrisis began on 8 , whenthe internationalmedia capturedsnippets of the unprovokedattacks by GVN troopson peaceful Buddhistdemonstrators in Hue.4 The day before,Buddhists had displayed flags on homes and all over Hue in celebrationof the 2,507th birthdayof Buddha. UnderSouth Vietnamese law (Decree 189), onlythe Vietnamesenational flag could be flownin public.5This law,however, was rarelyenforced, as exemplifiedby the Catholics'display of a plethoraof papal flags,a week priorto the BuddhistCrisis, in celebrationof the

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anniversaryof Diem's brotherNgo Dinh Thuc as archbishop.6Thus on Buddha's birthday,police attemptsto enforceDecree 189 were metwith resistance.The police thentook to tearingdown the religiousflags. The followingday, the infuriated Buddhists gathered at theradio station in Hue, wheretheir leader Thich Tri Quang was refusedpermission to broadcasthis speechof protestagainst the GVN's explicitsuppression of thefreedom of religionand favouritismof Catholics.7When exhortations of theProvince Chieffailed to dispersethe crowd, GVN troopsfired guns and threwat least fifteengrenades into the peaceful demonstration, killing 9 people.8

Diem's reactionto the bloodshedof 8 May essentiallyset thetone of his conciliatoryefforts towards Buddhists throughout the crisis. In theclimate of the Cold War, he convenientlyplaced the blame of the incidenton Communists,insisting that a VietCong agenthad throwna grenadeinto the crowd,and that GVN troopsonly firedinto the crowd to protectthe demonstrators.This argument,however, only served to discreditthe GVN and irritatethe Buddhists as it was widelydisbelieved - eye-witnessessaw the GVN troopsinitiate attacks on the crowd withoutany provocation.9 Washingtonimmediately recognised the inflammatorypotential of the Buddhistaltercation and in anticipationof 'some internationalreaction to [the]incident', they urged Diem to take appropriatemeasures to reconcile withthe Buddhists.10 Instead of makingthe immediate efforts to rectifythe situation,however, Diem onlymet with Buddhist leaders on 15 May, thus allowingthem time to consolidatetheir grievances.

The flag disputewas quicklytransforming into a politicalcrisis. The Buddhistscreated a five-pointmanifesto which establishedthe political aimsof the protests that followed, and beseeched the Diem governmentto:

1. allow thedisplay of the ; 2. grantBuddhists equal rightsto thoseof Catholics; 3. stopthe arrests and terrorisation of Buddhistfollowers; 4. allow Buddhiststhe freedom to preachand observetheir religion; 5. providecompensation for the people killedon 8 May, and punish thoseresponsible for the "murders".11

Duringthe GVN-Buddhist meeting, Diem maintainedan unyieldingstance towardsthe Buddhists. He assertedthat there was no religiouspersecution in ,and any injusticesthat Buddhistsfaced should be directedto local authorities.12While Diem did promisefinancial aid - amountingto a meagre 500,000 piasters(US$7,000) - to the victims' families,he emphasisedthat the GVN wouldbear no responsibilityfor the eventsof the 8*,13 Expectedly,this meeting barely appeased the demands of the Buddhists.Diem's casual treatmentof religiousdiscrimination was

This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Sun, 4 May 2014 17:16:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES 59 badly received by Buddhists,who resortedto mass meetingsand demonstrations,hunger strikes and the widespreadcirculation of protest literaturethroughout Vietnam.14 The Buddhistshad thenbecome a group thatwas considereda politicalopposition.15

Duringthese early days of the Buddhist Crisis, the American public and the Kennedyadministration took little note of Vietnam. The Americanmedia was saturatedwith images of thecivil rightsbattle then at home. Kennedy was, thus,devoted to dealingwith protests against his own government.16 Nonetheless,from the beginningof the BuddhistCrisis, the Buddhists displayeda clear intentionof courtingthe Westernpress; they carried bannersin both Vietnameseand English,and selectedone of the few English-speakingmonks as theirspokesperson so as to allow theirmessages to be accessibleto an internationalaudience.17 At thisearly stage in the Crisis,while their media efficacy is doubtful,these banners were clearly an attemptto send the messagesof the Buddhistprotest into livingrooms aroundthe world. These effortscertainly assisted the snowballingof the BuddhistCrisis into an internationalspectacle.

As Juneapproached, the Buddhist Crisis was spinningout of control.Diem was employingincreasingly brutal force to suppressprotests against his government,which were spreading throughout South Vietnam. On 2 and 3 June,GVN troopsbroke up Buddhistdemonstrations in Quang Tri City and Hue using tear gas, which caused respiratorydifficulties and skin to blister.18On the3rd alone, it was reportedthat 67 youthswere hospitalised and 3 weredead as a resultof this.19The followingday witnessednearly 200 youthshunger-striking at Tu Dam to protestthe government's brutalityand discrimination.20William Trueheart,the U.S. chargé de affairesin Vietnam,insisted that Diem make generousconcessions to the Buddhiststo ease tensions.It frustratedthe Kennedy administration that

Inept governmenthandling has permitteda localized incidentin Hue to grow into a potentialpolitical crisis. UnlessDiem is able to reach a quick reconciliationwith theBuddhists, the issue could have seriousrepercussions on governmentalstability.

Again,nudged by pressurefrom Washington, Diem negotiatedwith the Buddhistleaders on 5 June.This time he managedto compromiseon more ofthe Buddhists' demands, and makea radioannouncement of theterms of compromise.22

Justas thecrisis appeared to be nearingan end,Diem's effortsat bringing abouta settlementwas compoundedby MadameNhu, who sabotagedthe

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GVN's attemptsat makingconcessions to theBuddhists with anti-Buddhist publicstatements. The day afterthe compromise,,through herWomen's Solidarity Movement (WSM), issueda resolutionto thepress thatcountered the government'spolicy of reconciliation.23It castigated Buddhistdemonstrators as anti-nationalists'exploited and controlledby communism'.24Trueheart insisted that Diem 'disavow it' as theresolution was highlydamaging to the truce agreement.25 More importantly, Trueheartwas concernedthat

[Madame Nhu's] statementwill damage Americanpublic and Congressionalsupport for GVN. U.S. Government cannotbe expectedcontinue aid and assist GVN at heavy cost in men and material unless this policy [is] fully supportedby American citizens26

This,eventually, became the reason the Kennedy administration decided to supporta coup to overthrowDiem. Diem,however, said thatMadame Nhu was freeto expressher opinions.27 With this, Diem set a precedentthat emboldenedMadame Nhu later to make public statementsdirectly to Westernmedia, only to assurean internationalaudience that GVN was a crueldictatorship.

Whilemajor newspapers followed the worseningsituation in Vietnam,it was not until11 June1963 thatthe BuddhistCrisis took centrestage in world news. The weekly-releasedTime magazine's coverage of the Buddhistaffair is indicativeof this (see Figure1). In fact,articles about the crisiswere published only in thethird week of June,the week immediately followingthe event that would cement international focus on theGVN and compelan internationalaudience to questionU.S. involvementin Vietnam.

Figure1. Time(magazine)

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On the morningof 11 June1963, a seventy-threeyear old monkThich Quang Due sat downat the intersectionof Saigon's majorboulevards, and withan audienceof some350 fellowdemonstrators and curiouspassers-by, Quang Due consignedhimself to death by fire.28 In the background, bannersin Englishand Vietnameseread 'A Buddhistpriest burns himself forour fiverequests'.29 This scene was capturedby the only two U.S. reporterswho had not disregardedthe tip froma Buddhistspokesperson that"something important" would happenthat day.30 New York Times reporterDavid Halberstammost articulatelydescribes the sight he witnessed,'As he burnedhe nevermoved a muscle,never uttered a sound, his outwardcomposure in sharpcontrast to the wailing people around him.'31

Even people who were not presentat the scene were moved by Halberstam'sreport and themonk's selfless sacrifice. , a reporterfor the Associated Press, was also presentand retainedsufficient composureto keep takingpictures. As his photographsmade the front pages of newspaperseverywhere, critics of the Diem government multiplied.Kennedy later commented that 'no newspicture in historyhas generatedso muchemotion around the world as thatone'.32 Quang Due's sacrificeturned public opinion against the Diem regime;even ,one of thefew supporters of Diem in theSaigon presscorps, was compelledto assumeDiem' s guilt:

Whatwas PresidentNgo Dinh Diem doingto cause these Buddhiststo choose such a horrible death as self- immolation?...The fact that[this question]presumed a priorithe guilt of Diem botheredme notat all... it was my presumptiontoo.33

The mediaefficacy of self-immolationsis undeniable. Quang Due's suicide successfullycalled attention to thedesperate situation of Buddhistsin South Vietnam,whose protestsappealed to the mostcherished American value: freedomof religion.34

If theself-immolation of Quang Due failedto capturethe attentionof theinternational public, the CBS interviewwith Madame Nhu certainlydid. Of QuangDue's ultimatesacrifice, she callouslyremarked, 'What have the Buddhistleaders done? ...They have barbecuedone of theirmonks whom theyhave intoxicated...'35Diem, expectedly, refused to denounceMadame Nhu's statement.36At thispoint, even Americans inclined to givethe Diem regimethe benefit of the doubt were appalled by this trivialisation of Quang Due's sacrificeand Diem's refusalto denounceit.37 As Jacobsobserved,

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Madame Nhu...wasthe president's sister-in-law, she lived in thepalace, and she helda seat in theNational Assembly. It was naturalto assume,in theabsence of a presidential disavowal,that she spokefor thegovernment.38

Americans,the foremost defenders of 'freedom',could not support a regime thatappeared overtly and proudlyauthoritarian. By theend of themonth, Americanpublic opinion was almostunanimously against the Diem regime, and worse,it opposed U.S. supportof the Diem regime. This was most clear in a full-pageadvertisement in the New YorkTimes on 27 June,in which12 Americanclergymen opposed the U.S. involvementin Vietnam; theywrote:

We protest: 1. Our country'smilitary aid to those who denied him religious freedom... 2. The loss of Americanlives and billionsof dollars to bolstera regimeuniversally regarded as undemocratic,and unstable. unjust, "39 3. Thefiction that this is 'fightingfor freedom. (myitalics)

Thisview was reiteratedin Timemagazine, which argued that 'The weekly deathand injuryof Americansoldiers and the expenditureof morethan $1,000,000a day forVietnam justify much greater pressure for... reforms by presidentNgo Dinh Diem.'40Americans refused to believe thattheir generositytowards South Vietnamdid not amountto any leveragein negotiationswith Diem. They were also beginningto believethat Diem was incapableof rallyingthe popular support that was neededfor the war againstCommunism. Afterall, almost all the news dispatchesout of Saigon estimatedthat Buddhists constituted 70, even 80 to 90, percentof the Vietnamesepopulation.41 The lack of faithin the Diem regimewas encouragedby the Americanmedia, such as the New YorkTimes which speculatedthat 'the crisis is worthabout 15 majorbattlefield victories to the Communists.'42 Time magazine, as well, explained that 'Buddhist discontentcould cause passive resistanceto governmentprograms in the ruralprovinces where political unity is thekey to victoryin thewar against the CommunistViet Cong.'43Reporter Halberstam even wentas faras to conclude that 'the United States backed the wrong man...'44 These opinionsput forth by reporters influenced public opinion significantly.

The accuracyof these media assertions,however, have been disputed, whichonly serves to provethe effectiveness and influenceof themedia on public opinion. As clarifiedin General Victor Krulak's (U.S. Marine Corps)report,

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Thereligious aspect of the issue has a narrowerbase than public reportsmight suggest. ..There is a tendencyto classifyall non-Christiansas Buddhists.In fact, many are simpleancestor worshippers in theChinese tradition, while othermajor religions are also representedin thecountry- includingConfucianists, Taoists and Moslems.45

This was confirmedby a major studyof Buddhismin Vietnam,which concludedthat only 30 percentof South Vietnamesewere practising Buddhists.46The mythof the gravityof the BuddhistCrisis was also a pointof contention;a CIA investigationin June1963 concludedthat there hadbeen 'no formalsuppression of religious freedom in SouthVietnam, but the governmenthas successfullycurbed the politicalinfluence of some religiousgroups, particularly the minority sects.'47 The war effortwas also reportedto be successful,even withthe onslaughtof the BuddhistCrisis, withKrulak's report asserting: 'Military operations are moreeffective; rural economicprogress is manifest;US/Vietnamese coordination is heartening; and the morale of US militaryforces is classic...'48 These reports significantlydiffered from those in theU.S. media,and mediaassertions of Buddhistrepression and Diem's widespreadunpopularity proved heavily to influencepublic opinion. A New YorkTimes editorial on 17 June,for example,is indicativeof this. The editorialreflects the writer's impression thatBuddhists constituted that majority in Vietnam,and hintsat theneed to overthrowDiem:

// is time that Mr. Diem realised that he cannot discriminateagainst a majorityof the people of South Vietnamand win his war againstthe Communists.If he cannotgenuinely represent a majoritythen he is not the manto be President.49(My underline)

It is obviousthat the Buddhist Crisis had, rightly or wrongly,captured the attentionof Americans.

As public opinion swung against the Diem government,Washington intensifiedits pressureon Diem to placatethe Buddhists. The Kennedy administrationwas beginningto recognisethe precariousposition of the GVN abroadand withinVietnam. It was estimatedthat a largepercentage of themilitary were Buddhists, and thispercentage within the military had the potentialto rise up and overthrowthe governmentit was expectedto protect.50The BuddhistCrisis was also gaininginternational attention, as illustratedby CambodianPrince Norodom Sihanouk and CeylonesePrime MinisterSirimavo Bandaranaike, who wroteletters to Kennedy,expressing theirconcern for the 'sufferingof Buddhistsin South Viet-nam'and

This content downloaded from 149.171.67.164 on Sun, 4 May 2014 17:16:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 64 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNALOF AMERICAN STUDIES imploredWashington 'to intercedewith the full force of your moral prestigeand thatof yourcountry'.51 Understanding that they were now innatelyassociated with the BuddhistCrisis, Washingtononce again threatenedto publiclydisassociate itself 'from [the] whole affair'.52 While threatsof disassociationhad beenmade before, the self-immolation marked the breakingpoint of the Kennedyadministration's patience with Diem' s obstinacy.Specifically, Rusk warned, 'If Diem does nottake prompt and effectivesteps to re-establishBuddhist confidence in himwe will have to re-examineour entire relationship with his regime.'53 With this, Washington gave Diem anotherchance to rectifythe situation that, in theiropinion, had gotout of hand unnecessarily.

Negotiations,however, failed once more,giving rise to more Buddhist demonstrationsand self-immolations.Initially, Diem reopenednegotiations withthe Buddhist leaders, and on the 16th,a JointCommuniqué was issued, settingout the terms of agreementbut allocating no responsibilityfor the 8 May incident.54Yet, riotingbroke out in Saigon thenext day, and police once again suppressedit withbrutal force, killing one demonstratorand injuringseveral.55 The BuddhistCrisis continued to plummet,and by early August, three more Buddhists- in their teens and twenties- burnt themselvesto death,and a younggirl tried unsuccessfully to cutoff her arm 'as a humbleoffering to Buddhawhile our religionis in danger',all of whichwere reported in the U.S. media.56

At thisstage, the BuddhistCrisis was alreadyaccumulating a barrageof criticismtowards Diem' s government,only to be furthercomplicated by MadameNhu once again. MadameNhu had takento writingletters to the Americanmedia, rousing the passions of theAmerican public. To theNew YorkTimes, she declared,'I wouldbeat such provocateurs 10 timesmore if theywore monks' robes... and... I wouldclap handsat seeinganother monk barbecueshow, for one cannotbe responsiblefor the madness of others.'57 These statementsreignited the American public's call fortheir government to cease supportof the Diem regime.As an editorialarticulates,

//is preciselybecause this countryis allied withSouth Vietnamin the latter's anti-Communiststruggle that we condemnMrs. Nhu's callous and self-defeatingdesire to apply the scourge to those who legitimatelyprotest injusticesin Saigon.5*

Americansdid notwant to be, in anyway, accountable for the subjugation ofthe Buddhists in SouthVietnam.

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Already strugglingto deal with the proliferationof public opinion condemningthe Diem regimeand Diem's disregardfor the Kennedy administration'sadvice, the attacks on pagodasall over SouthVietnam on 21 Augustfinally exhausted the patience of Washington.Diem explained his actionsby assertingthat the Buddhistpagodas were infiltratedby the Viet Cong and that they were using the pagodas as places to stash weapons.59 In all, nearly2000 pagodas were raided,more than 1400 Buddhistsarrested, and severalhundred killed.60 Diem thenannounced that thecountry was undermartial law, and orderedthe troops to shoot-to-kill - anyone- includingboth Americansand Vietnamese 'found in the streetsduring the curfewwho refusedto haltor fled'.61 Completepress censorshipwas imposedas well, thuseffectively cut offcommunications betweenSaigon and Washington.62The New YorkTimes drew particular attentionto this,with an emboldenedcaption on thefront-page stating: 'The followingdispatch was transmittedfrom Saigon beforecensorship was imposedby the Vietnameseregime.'63 Time magazine also reportedthat 'telephoneservice in the homes and offices of all U.S. militaryand embassy personnelwas cutoff.' (my italics)64This clearlysignalled to theU.S. that theywere now directly affected by Diem's actions.

The internationalmedia was also becomingmore vocal, resonatingthe Americanmedia's criticism of Washington'sinactions for nearly two years, 'althoughthe Saigon regimewas becomingincreasingly incapable of arousingthe war-wearypopulation to greaterefforts.'65 Washington's concernfor internationalcondemnation is indicatedin a government memorandumdevoted to reportingthe widespreadcondemnation of U.S. supportof the Diem regimein the variousnewspapers around the world. Reportedly,Burma's English language Guardian called on theU.S. to give theregime an ultimatum;North Korea described South Vietnam's events as a resultof 'ruthlesssuppression of thepeople by theU.S. imperialistsand theirstooges.'66 The Timesof India, London Times, The Scotsman and Die Welt(Hamburg), all called on Washingtonto letthe Diem regimefall, and to 'establishcontact with the non-communistopposition.'67 The Ceylon Observer,most articulately accused the U.S. of being 'committed,to the cynicalview thatit mattersnot whom it hiresto engagethe enemyin the outlyingmarshes if they will helpto keepFortress America safe.'68 Others, suchas thePhilippine and Cambodiangovernments, hoped that other Asian nationswould join themin breakingdiplomatic relations with Saigon; and eventhe Catholic Awanire d'Italia of Bolognesaid thatbetween the Diem Governmentand the Buddhistsit would have to declare flatlyfor the Buddhists.69International criticism had notonly denounced the GVN, but Washingtonas well, thus placing the Kennedy administrationunder tremendouspressure.

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In face of the huge domesticand internationalopposition to the U.S. involvementin Vietnam,the Kennedyadministration began to discussthe engineeringof a coup to overthrowDiem. In a governmenttelegram (27 August 1963), the then newly appointedambassador to Saigon, Henry CabotLodge, explained Washington's decision to supporta coup:

No long rangeforeign policy could be carriedout by the U.S. Governmentwithout the supportof Congress and public opinion[and the]public opinionin the U.S. was much distressedby the treatmentof the Buddhistsand statementsmade in connectiontherewith. These have greatlycomplicated the job of theExecutive branch of the U.S. Governmentin aidingVietnam™

While therewere debatesand disagreementsbetween the pro-Diemand anti-Diemfactions within the Kennedyadministration, it was the pagoda raids of 21 Augustthat gave impetusto the anti-Diemfaction in their endeavourto overthrowDiem. This was guidedby Lodge, a Republican whowas clearlyopposed to theUS supportof the Diem regime;by Lodge had managedto secure approvalfrom Washington 'not to thwart'a coup.71Nonetheless, after the pagoda raidson 21 August,it was quicklyrecognised that Diem was an obstructionto theU.S. government's widergoal of combatingCommunism, and as such,he had to be removed. The Kennedyadministration first publicly denounced the pagoda raids, and statedthat Diem had breacheda vow to see throughreconciliation with the Buddhists.72 On the 24 August, 3 days after the pagoda raids, Undersecretaryof State George Ball instructedLodge to urge Diem to adopt 'dramaticactions' to redressthe situation,and 'If, in spiteof all of yourefforts, Diem remainsobdurate and refuses,then we mustface the possibilitythat Diem himselfcannot be preserved'12"(My italics)Along withthis statement was also the instructionthat the Vietnam country team shouldbegin to 'urgentlyexamine all possiblealternative leadership and makedetailed plans as to howwe mightbring about Diem's replacement.'74 This instructionsubsequently led to the downfallof the Diem regimein November.

The storyof Buddhistsubjugation played well againsta backgroundof Cold Warrhetoric and therise of civilrights; the Buddhists were perceived by theanti-Communist Western world as 'fightingfor freedom'. Diem's refusalto grantBuddhists equal rightsthat Catholics enjoyed only served to worsenthe crisis with each increasinglydramatic Buddhist demonstration. At thepeak of thecrisis with the onslaught of self-immolations,Buddhists beganactively to engagethe Western press, and the sheer media- worthiness of each sacrificeproved irresistible to the news media aroundthe world.

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Whetheror not media reportsof the BuddhistCrisis were accurate,they significantlyinfluenced public opinion, and thusthreatened Congressional supportfor the U.S. war againstCommunism. In this way, the media influencedthe Kennedy administration'sdecision to supporta coup overthrowingDiem.

ENDNOTES

1 Cattonhas arguedthat Diem' s overthrowcemented U.S. commitmentto SouthVietnam, as 4thepolitical turmoil [resulting from Diem' s overthrow]derailed the war effort, thus paving theway for the ill-fated Américanisation of theconflict.' Extending this argument, Howard Jones- as thetitle of his book suggests - examineshow Diem's overthrow,together with - Kennedy'sassassination, prolonged the . PhilipE. Catton,Diem 's Final Failure:Prelude to America's War in Vietnam,University of Kansas, Kansas, 2002, p. 205; SethJacobs, Cold WarMandarin: Ngo DinhDiem and theorigins of America's war in Vietnam,1950-1963, Rowman & Littlefield,Lanham, Md., 2006,pp. 185-189;Howard Jones,Death of a Generation:How theAssassinations of Diem & JFK Prolongedthe War, OUP, New York,2003. 2 Fisherhas arguedthat 4Diem had a largecontingent of admirers as well as criticswithin the Kennedyadministration, making the American role in hisoverthrow an episodeover which, as RobertKennedy later put it, 4the government split two." Ross A. Fisher,The Kennedy Administrationand the Overthrow of Ngo DinhDiem: WhatHappened, Why Did It Happen, and Was It a Good Idea?', in Ross A. Fisher,John Norton Moore and RobertF. Turner (eds.), To OpposeAny Foe: TheLegacy of U.S. Interventionin Vietnam,Carolina Academic Press,Durham, North Carolina, 2006, p. 4; WilliamConrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and theVietnam War: Executive and LegislativeRoles and Relationships,Part II: 1961-1964 PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton, NJ., 1986; FrancisX. Winters,The Yearof the Hare: Americain Vietnam,January 25, 1963-February15, 1964,University of Georgia Press, Athensand London,1997. 3 JohnPrados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995); Ellen J.Hammer, A Death in November:America in Vietnam,1963 (New York:E.P. Dutton, 1987); HowardJones, Death ofa Generation:How theAssassinations of Diem & JFK Prolongedthe War, OUP, New York,2003. 4 1963was theopportune year in which Buddhists decided to beginactively pressuring the governmentfor their religious freedom. Buddhist subjugation had begunduring French colonialrule in thenineteenth century with the open favouritism of CatholicVietnamese; consequentlythis ensured a disproportionateconcentration of educationalattainment and wealthto thisfavoured religious group. Nonetheless, Vietnamese blossomed between1956 and 1962,with membership of Buddhistassociations increasing dramatically. By 1962,the General Association of Buddhists,which represented only six of South Vietnam'ssixteen sects, claimed to havesome 3000 monks,600 nuns,and 3 millionlay members, including 70,000 to 90,000in youthgroups. Thus by 1963 Buddhists cameto constitutea sizeable proportion of the Vietnamese population. Nonetheless, the dissolutionof colonial rule in the1950s did notaccompany the dissolution of the French- imposedanti-Buddhist laws, such as Decree 10,which was centralto theBuddhist Crisis. It was theheight of what Topmiller labels 'theRenaissance of Vietnamese Buddhism' that - Buddhistsunleashed their simmering rage against state discrimination. Prados, The Hidden Historyof the Vietnam War, pp. 89-90. 5 FRUSofthe UnitedStates, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced fromhttp://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September 2007 [hereafterFRUS'

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6 Ibid; RobertJ. Topmiller, The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movementin South Vietnam,1964-1966, University Press of Kentucky,Kentucky, 2002, p.2. 7 JohnHelble, 'Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to theDepartment of State'(9 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume 111, Vietnam, January-August 1963, sourced from httD://www.state.eov/r/Da/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm.accessed 4 September2007. 8 Two ofthe dead werechildren. - Ibid. 9 The discreditingof the GVN was exemplifiedin thefailure of a government-sponsored meeting- to condemnthe 'Viet Cong terroristact eveningMay 8' - to drawan audience. Comparatively,a meeting organised by Buddhist leaders at Tu Dam Pagoda in Hue on May 10 drewa crowdof fiveto six thousandBuddhists. - JohnHelble, Telegram From the Consulateat Hue to theDepartment of State'(2a.m., 10 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963, VolumeHI, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; FrederickNolting, 'Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(18 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.eov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm. accessed 4 Sentemher2007 10 JohnHelble, Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to theDepartment of State'(3p.m., 10 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; Dean Rusk,Telegram From the Department of Stateto theEmbassy in Vietnam'(9 May 1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 11 The Buddhistsalso urgedDiem to repeala French-imposedlaw, Decree 10,which labelled Buddhismas an "association"rather than a religion,and thus, Buddhists were required to obtainofficial permission to conductany public activities. Blatantly discriminatory, Decree 10 also providedthat 4a specialstatus shall be prescribed...for Catholic and Protestant missions'.'Manifesto of VietnameseBuddhist Clergy and Faithful'(10 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963. 12 In responseto themanifesto, Diem statedthat both Catholics and Buddhistswere guilty of the'disorderly use' ofreligious flags, and the national flag must be givensupremacy. WilliamTrueheart, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(30 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume Hi, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; Nolting,Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(18 May 1963). 13 Nolting,Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(18 May 1963); Jacobs,Cold WarMandarin, p. 144. 14 Nolting,Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(18 May 1963). 15 WilliamTrueheart, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State' (31 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 16 WhenNational Security Council staffer Michael V. Forrestalbrought him a reporton the Buddhistdemonstrations in Hue, Kennedyactually asked, 'Who arethese people?' JohnF. Kennedycited in SethJacobs, Cold WarMandarin: Ngo DinhDiem and theorigins of America'swar in Vietnam,1950-1963, Rowman & Littlefield,Lanham. Md.. 2006. p. 144. On 10 May,for example, banners hoisted by a crowdof five to six thousandBuddhists at Tu Dam Pagodaread in English:'kill us,ready to sacrificeblood, Buddhists and Catholics equal. Cancel DecreeNumber 10, request stop of arrests and kidnapping;a Buddhistflag will nevergo down'. Helble,Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to theDepartment of State' (3p.m.,10 May 1963).

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18 WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(3 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(4 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from httD://www.state.eov/r/Da/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm,accessed 4 September2007. 19 JohnHelble, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(2p.m., 3 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 20 Trueheart,'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(4 ). 21 'CurrentIntelligence Memorandum Prepared in theOffice of Current Intelligence, Central IntelligenceAgency' (3 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963,sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 22 WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State' (lp.m, 6 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced fromhtto://www.state.eov/r/Da/ho/frus/kennedyif/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September 2007. 23 WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam(Trueheart) to the Departmentof State(Hilsman)' (la.m, 9 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from accessed4 September2007. 24http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, 'Resolutionissued by the Central Committee of the Women's Solidarity Movement of Vietnam'cited in 'Telegramfrom the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(8 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from httD://www.state.eov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 25 Trueheart,'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam(Trueheart) to theDepartment of State (Hilsman)'(la.m, 9 June1963). 26 Dean Rusk,'Telegram from the Department of Stateto theEmbassy in Vietnam' (12.55p.m,8 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 27 Trueheart,'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam(Trueheart) to theDepartment of State (Hilsman)'(la.m, 9 June1963). 28 ,The Making of a Quagmire(New York:Random House), p. 21 1; Jacobs,Cold WarMandarin, pp. 147-149. 29 WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State' (noon,11 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January -August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 30Jacobs, Cold WarMandarin, p. 147. 31Halberstam. The Making of a Ouasmire*p. 21 1. 32 JohnF. Kennedyquoted by Henry Cabot Lodge, 'Oral historyinterview with Henry Cabot Lodge,August 4, 1965',FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 33Marguerite Hiegins, Our VietnamNightmare, Harper and Row,New York,1965, pp.2-3. 34 GeorgeBall, 'Telegramfrom the Department of Stateto theEmbassy in Vietnam' (8.52p.m.,1 July1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume IV, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iv/8202.htm, accessed4 September2007; Topmiller,The Lotus Unleashed, 3. 35 MadameNgo DinhNhu, 'Madame Nhu's Responseto ThichQuang Due' (video),sourced fromhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d_PWM9gWR5E, accessed 13 September2007.

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36 Diem evenendorsed it on a radioaddress, proposing that 'a numberof people got intoxicatedand caused an undeserveddeath that made me verysorry.' Ngo DinhDiem, quotedby David Halberstam,'Diem Asks Peace in ReligionCrisis', New YorkTimes, 12 July1963, p. 3; "Trialby Fire", Time, 21 June1963, sourced from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874895,00.html,accessed9 October 2007. 37 EvenHiggins conceded that the "barbecue" statement was "barbaric",and articulatedthe thoughtsof Americans exposed to MadameNhu's insensitivity: Anyonecapable of so insensitiveand callousa remarksurely qualified as the villainessin a scenarioof torture, persecution, and worse. Higgins,Our VietnamNightmare, dp. 59-60. 38Jacobs. Cold WarMandarin, p. 149. 39 Theseconcerns were not unfounded. In theiradvertisement, the clergymen substantiated theirconcerns by quoting Senator Mansfield's report of his visitto SouthVietnam earlier thatyear. Mansfieldhad written: All of thecurrent difficulties existed in 1955,along with hope and energyto meet them.But it is 7years later and $2 billionof U.S. aid later. Yet,substantially the same difficultiesremain if, indeed, they have not been compounded... (italics in advertisement) 'We, Too, Protest'(Full-page advertisement). New YorkTimes. 27 June1963. d. 21. 40 Max Frankel,"Vietnam's 'Untidv' War". New YorkTimes. 3 Julv1963. d. 8. David Halberstam,'Religious Dispute Stirs South Vietnam: Buddhist Struggle Poses MajorThreat to Diem Rule and theWar Effort Against the Vietcong', New YorkTimes, 16 June1963, IV, p. 6; HomerBigart, 'War AgainstReds DominatedNews', New YorkTimes, 22 August1963, p. 3; Higgins,Our VietnamNightmare, p. 4; Jacobs,Cold WarMandarin, p. 185. 42 Halberstam,'Religious Dispute Stirs South Vietnam', New YorkTimes. 43 "Trialby Fire", Time, 21 June1963, sourced from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874895,00.html,accessed9 October 2007. 44 Halberstam,'Religious Dispute Stirs South Vietnam', New YorkTimes. 45 AmbassadorFrederick Nolting also observedon a tripto thecountryside with Diem, i was... impressed...by the vast difference between what is actuallyhappening in thiscountry and thereflection of it in theoutside world.' The CIA memorandumread: 'The vastmajority of SouthVietnam's population of 14 millionis nominallyBuddhist, even a small ' thoughonly proportionhave been considered active practitioners. . . 'Reportby the Joint Chiefs of Staffs SpecialAssistant for Counterinsurgency and SpecialActivities (Krulak)' (1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume HI, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; 'CurrentIntelligence Memorandum Prepared in theOffice of CurrentIntelligence, Central IntelligenceAgency' (3 June1963); FrederickNolting, 'Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(4p.m., 17 May 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyif/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 46 Thisstudy was completedin 1965,and also affirmedthat the remaining 70 percentof the populationconsisted mostly of ancestor worshippers and a minorityof Catholics.Dodd, 'Speechto theUnited States Senate and InformationIntroduced Into the Record with the Speech' (23 February1965), cited in To OpposeAny Foe: TheLegacy of U.S. Interventionin Vietnam. 47 A UnitedNations fact-finding team also concludedthat Diem had notoppressed the Buddhistsat all, andthat the allegations of systematicrepression of Buddhistswere unsubstantiated'hearsay'. 'CurrentIntelligence Memorandum Prepared in theOffice of

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CurrentIntelligence, Central Intelligence Agency' (3 June1963); Fisher,"The Kennedy Administrationand the Overthrow of Ngo DinhDiem...", p. 24. 48 'Reportby the Joint Chiefs of Staffs SpecialAssistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities(Krulak)' (1963). 4 'Diem andthe Buddhists' (editorial), New YorkTimes, 17 June1963, p. 24. FollowingQuang Due's self-immolation,the Kennedy administration had received informationthat Buddhist Lieutenant Colonel Do Khac Mai (SouthVietnamese Air Force) and othersenior officials 'could notunderstand why Americans stood by and lostgolden opportunityto rectifysituation in Vietnam,by which he clearlymeant overthrow of government."- Halberstam, 'Religious Dispute Stirs South Vietnam', New YorkTimes', Bigart,'War AgainstReds DominatedNews', New YorkTimes', Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare,p. 4; WilliamTrueheart, 'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto the Departmentof State'(5p.m., 11 June'963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume 111, Vietnam, January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. NorodomSihanouk, 'Telegram from Prince Sihanouk to PresidentKennedy' (14 June 1963),FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume 111, Vietnam, January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007. 52 Trueheart,'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(5p.m., 1 1 June1963); Dean Rusk,'Telegram from the Department of Stateto theEmbassy in Vietnam' (11.03p.m.,11 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 53Ibid. 54 The failureof the Communiqué discredited the Buddhist leaders in favourof moderateand passiveresistance, thus transferring the Buddhist leadership to militantBuddhists who were moreconcerned with overthrowing the Diem governmentthan reforming it. ,'Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State'(4p.m., 16 June1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; Jacobs,Cold WarMandarin, 1 50. 55 'The Overthrowof Ngo DinhDiem', ThePentagon Papers, Volume2, Graveled. (Boston: BeaconPress, 1971), sourced from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/pent6.htm,accessed 16 October 2006. 56 'SuicideSeries', Time, 23 August1963, sourced from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,875098,00.htmlaccess 9 October 2007; Jacobs,Cold WarMandarin, 152. 57 MadameNgo DinhNhu, 'Mrs. Ngo DefendsStand' (editorial), New YorkTimes, 14 August1963,32. 58'Vietnam's War and the Buddhists' (editorial), New YorkTimes, 14 August1963, 32. 59 'Departmentof StateDaily StaffSummary' (21 August1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume III, Vietnam,January-August 1963, sourced from http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm,accessed4 September 2007; Fisher,'The KennedyAdministration and the Overthrow of Ngo DinhDiem...', p. 32. 60 'Departmentof State Daily StaffSummary' (21 August1963); Jacobs,Cold War Mandarin,p. 153. 61 'Textof Decree by Diem', New YorkTimes, 22 August1963, p. 2; David Halberstam, 'Diem OrdersMartial law; MorePagodas are Raided',New YorkTimes, 22 August1963, p.l; UnitedPress International, 'Shoot-to-Kill Order Issued', New YorkTimes, 22 August 1963,p. 2.

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62 David Halberstam,'Vietnamese Put Under Army Law', New YorkTimes, 22 August1963, p. 2; UnitedPress International, 'Shoot-to-Kill Order Issued', New YorkTimes. 63 Halberstam,'Diem OrdersMartial law', New YorkTimes. 64 The Crackdown',Time, 30 August1963, sourced from httD://www.time.com/time/maeazine/article/0.917 L940704.00.html. access 9 October2007. Bigart,'War Against Reds DominatedNews', New YorkTimes. EdwardR. Murrow,'Memorandum from the Director of the United States Information Agency(Murrow) to thePresident' (28 August1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume ill, Vietnam,January- August 1963, sourced from httD://www.state.eov/r/Da/ho/frus/kennedvif/iii/8163.htm.accessed4 September 2007. 67Ibid. 68Ibid. 69Ibid. 70 HenryCabot Lodge, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnamto theDepartment of State' (5p.m.,27 August1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume 111, Vietnam, January-August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 71 Telegramfrom the Embassy in Vietnamby Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to the Departmentof State'(5 October1963). 72 'U.S. DenouncedVietnam For Drive On Buddhists;Charges Breach of Vow', New York Times,22 August1963, p. 1. 73 GeorgeBall, Telegramfrom the Department of Stateto theEmbassy in Vietnam' (9.36p.m.,24 August1963), FRUS, 1961-1963,Volume 111, Vietnam, January-August 1963, sourcedfrom http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/iii/8163.htm, accessed4 September2007. 74Ibid.

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