DEVELOPING SUSTAINABILITY: AN EVALUATION OF REFORESTATION PROJECTS IN TRIBAL

by

Katherine Elaine Beavis

B.A. Trent University 1993

RESEARCH PROECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT in the School of Resouxce and Environmental Management Report No. 222

O Katherine Elaine Beavis 1998

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

April1998

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thése ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de ceUe-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This research examines the link between the distribution of power in political and economic systems or institutions, and the potentid for sustainability. A working hypothesis on the relationship between structure and sustainability posits that linear structures act as barriers to sustainability. The nature of these barriers is examined in the context of the Western mode1 of political economy. Hierarchy, large scale, and the lack of feedback loops are described as structural barriers to sustainability.

A framework for sustainability indicators is developed based on the structural batTiers to sustainability. These indicators are deveioped as an evaluative tool for policies and programs of na& resource-based decision-making institutions. hdicators of hierarchy include economic, political, gender and species equity. Indicators of scale include distance to decision-makers and scope of huma.impact of decisions. Indicators of feedback loops include the use of indïgenous knowledge and accountability. The fiamework is applied to a case study to assess the validity of the proposed barriers to sustainability, the effectiveness of the indicators fiamework and the sustainability of the projects.

Jhabua District, a predominantly tribal area in Madhya Pradesh, India, provides the case study for this research. Three watershed restoration projects involving reforestation are examined fiom the perspectives of local people who describe the relationship between implementation strategies and project success. The dynamics of this relationship are compared to the indicators framework and framed as barriers or aids to sustainability.

It was found that hierarchically organized or linear structures of power act as bders to sustainability while communally organized or systems-oriented structures act as aids. Key dynamics include equity, participation, social hfktructure and mutual relations. General recornrnendations are identified for structural refom of reforestation policies and projects in India. iii "In a global economy designedfor the interests and neeh of international corporations andf;nunce, ami sectors thai serve them most of the species become superjluour. They will be cast uside iffheinstitutiomZ stmctures ofpower mdprivilege fwrction withoutpopulm chullenge or control" Noam Chomsky

Environment, Society and Economics îs a polite wuy of swing ecologv.poverty andpower. Jim Harding

I would like to thank several people and organizations for their varied support throught this research. Thanks to:

Dr. Michael M'Gonigle, for his support in guiding this research

t Dr. Robert Anderson, the principal investigator of the CIDA-SM Partnership project, -Lillooet academic exchange

the Canadian International Development Agency, Shastri Indo- Canadian Institute and Simon Fraser University for their generous financial support

a the people of Jhabua, who not only tolerated my presence but welcomed me as their own, and especially to Josi and the Pareekhs

my family and Eends for their encouragement and support Table of Contents

Title pee 1 Approvai page 11 a.. a.. Abstract 11 1 Quotation and Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v List of Maps, Figures and Tables vii

PART 1: STRUCTURE

1. Sustainable Development and Power i) Introduction ii) Purpose, Objectives and Context iii) Method and OrgWon

2. The Requirements for Susbinability i) What is Sustainabiiy? ii) The Requirements for Sustainability iii) Social Requirements for Sustamability

3. Understanding the Struc.iral Barriers to Sustainability i) The Ethical Basis of Western Social Systems ii) The Politid Economy of Ecology iii) Deconstmctiug a Power Paradigm 1. Hierarchy 2. Scale 3. Lack of Feedback Loops

4. Indicators of Snstainabüity i) Purpose and Context ii) Uses and Problems iii) Purpose of the Framework iv) The Indicators Framework 1. Hierarchy 2. Scale 3. Lack of Feedback Loops v) Conclusion

PART II: FUNCTION

S. Jhabua District, Madhya Pradesh: Social and Environmental Crisis i) Location, Geography, Climate, and Natural Resources ii) The People of Jhabua: Economy, Culture and Poiitics iii) Current State of the Economy and Environment

6. Reforestation in Jhabua District i) Method ii) A History of Reforestation Strategies in Jhabua District iii) Current Sustainable Development Projects in Jhabua 1. Rajiv Ghandi Mission on Watershed Development 2. MP Forest Department's Jomt Forest Management (FM)Program 3. NCHSE's Integrated Wastelands Development Project (IWDP) 4. KRIBHCO's Indo-British Rainfed Fanning Project (KRBP) Table of Contents - continued

7. From the People: Barriers to Sustainabiiity i) Hieratchy 1. Basic Needs 2. ChangingNeeds 3. Inequitable distn'buiion of ezonornic benefits 4. Lack of locai input in decision-rnaking 5. Exclusion of women 6. Resistance as a response to oppression, exploitation and aiienation 7. Loss of traditionai decision-mahg institutions

8. From tbe People: Barriers and Aids to Sustainabitity ii) Community 8 Mutual Relations: Group Responsibility andor Ownership 9. Trust 10. Selfdetemination . iii) Scale 1 1. Distance to timber markets 12- Distance to projet3 funding sources 13- Distance to decision-makers 14. Scale and time fiame iv) Feedback Loops 15. Valuing expertldevaluing traditional knowledge 16. Access to infoxmaîion

9. Discussion: Sustaiuabii of Reforestation Projects in Jhabna General Observations Hierarchy Community Scaie Feedback Loops

10. Discussion and Conciasions: Structure, Power and SustainaKiIity Hierarchy and Community Large Scale Versus Srnail Scale Feedback Loops Jndicators Limitations Conclusions Further Research

Appendix A. Grounds for Environmental Ethics

Appendix B. Final Question Set

Appendix C. Participatory Planning Process (KRIBP)

Appendix D. Critena and Indieators for Group Performance (KRIBP) List of Mnps, Figures and Tables

Figure 1. CorreIation between environmental impacts and incorne ber capita)

Map 1. Map of Jhabua District

Table 1. Cornparison of the indicators hmework to the case study dynamics

Table 2. Project sustainability potenîial

vii Part 1: Structure

1. SustainabIe Development and Power

i) Introduction Concem about the state of the environment in the late twentieth century has compelled us to wonder about the effectiveness of our social institutions. Despite the fact that we, among other species, are dependent on the Earth's natural resources to suMve, our decisions related to natural resource use often have negative impacts that threaten ecological, social and economic sustainability. That society has developed such destructive decision-making systems is a probiem that has been taken up by international political institutions like the United Nations, with works like Our Common Future (WCED, 1987) and Our Global Nei~hbourhood(CGG, 1995) proferring general solutions. These solutions, however, are based on incrernental environmental reforms to the world's political and economic institutions. This paper suggests that structural reformation, not inmemental reform, is necessary to alter the impact of humans on the environment. This is an investigation into the significance of power for sustainability, and the potential for building a sustainable society within the structural confkies of the late twentieth- century global political economy.

ose. Objectives and Context The purpose of this paper is to determine whether or not there is a link between the distribution of power ic political and economic systems or institutions, and the potential for sustainability. My working hypothesis is that linear systems, or systems based on the unidirectional flow and concentration of power, act as barriers to sustainability. The Western model of political economyl, which is replicated worldwide, can be characterized as linear. Capitalism is a simple example of the unsustainability of linear systems; it requires infinite growth in a finite world. From a systems point of view, natural systems are non-linear in ternis

l~heWestern model of politicaI economy is Ioosely defmed here as democratic political institutions coupled with market-based econornies. of power and, barring large disturbances, are sustainable in the sense of being self-reliant and self-regulating . The objectives of this paper are thus twofold: first, to investigate how institutions based on the rnodel of Western political economy are linear in terms of their con@uration of power; and second, to investigate how this configuration or structure inhibits sustainability through a case study. In short, this paper explores the significance of structure for the sustainable functioning of natural resource decision-making institutions.

iii) Method and Ornanization

Part One of this paper deals with the theoretical background for the case study. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on establishing a working definition of sustainability, denved fiom an overview of a variety of disciplines, including ecological economics, ecofeminism, political ecology and economy, comrnunity economic development, sustainable development and indicators of sustainability. Chapter 3 moves into a structural analysis or deconstruction of Western political and economic systems or institutions. Part of this decomction is a cornparison of social and natural systems, to elucidate how structure may facilitate or block sustainability. Chapter 4 develops a hmework for sustainability indicators based on the structural barriers to sustainability . Part Two of this paper is dedicated to a case study of reforestation projects in Jhabua, Madhya Pradesha, a tribal district in The case study applies the indicators framework to a situation in which ecological cnsis limits human and economic developrnent. The objectives of the case study are to assess the validity of the proposed barriers to sustainability, the effectiveness of the indicators fiamework, and the sustainability of the projects. The method for the case study is described in more detail in chapter 6. 2. The Requirements for Sustainability

i) What is Sustainability? There are many definitions of sustainable development and sustainability (e-g., WCED,

1987). They tend to be similar in that they dl refer to the interface of economy, ecology and so~iety.~They differ depending on the interests and ideologies of the defining groups. Two main econornic proponents of sustainable development are those who talk about "sustainable

growih" versus those who talk about "sustainable developrnent": This distinction is unequivocally dealt with by ecological economist, Herman Daly:

"(G)rowth refer(s) to expansion in the scale of the physical dimensions of the economic system, while "development" refer(s) to qualitative change (improvement or degradation)... By this definition the earth is not growing, but it is developing... Any physical subsystem of a finite and nongowing earth must itself also eventually become nongowing... It is [therefore] development that can have the attribute of sustainability, not growth (Daly, 199 1,249).

The vdue of the Brundtland definition of sustainable development is that it has allowed "considerable consensus to evolve in suppoa of the main idea that it is both moralIy and economically wrong to treat the world as a business in liquidation" (Daly, 1991,248). Despite this advantage, however, 1have fomd that the ambiguity surrounding the texm has also been a disadvantage as it leads those in search of solutions in circles, talking past one another. The concept of sustainabilitycan be summarized for the purpose of this paper as the healthy and long-tem CO-existenceor symbiosis of humam and their natuml environment.3 It means that, given that we live in a world of fînite resources, humans mut learn to live in a mutually beneficial or neutrai relationship with non-human nature, rather than its current destructive relationship, for the long-term viability of life on Earth. This definition contains two main precepts: first, that sustainability recognizes an ecological imperative for sunival in the

'~ccordin~to the preeminent proponents of sustainable development, the concept involves three elernenîs: economy, ecology and society. For example, the IUCN/WWF/LMEP's fmt elaborated on the term in the early 1980's as a need to baiance ecological, economic and social realities for the greater good. The Brundtland Commission's Our Common Future defmed sustainable development in 1987 as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromisin;. the ability of future generations to rneet their own needs". 3~uthor'sdefinition. basic, physical sense; and second, that a mutually beneficiai human-nahue relatiomhip is important for the "good life". In other words, sustainability recognizes a social imperative in the importance of environmental values for the pumit and achievement of happiness. Economics, or the means for both sumival and the good life, nuis through these two precepts to fom a third: that whereas economics defines a primary human-nature relationship, this relationship must be mutually beneficial or neutral for sustainability.

ii) The Reauirements for Sustainability While a full elaboration of the conceptual development of sustainability is beyond the scope of this paper, 1 would nevertheless like to suxnrnarize some of the key themes fiom the literature in support of my definition and the following structural analysis. Bnefly, sustainability involves the maintenance of ecological integrity, Le., ecosystem health and biological diversity, in conjunction with the equitable satisfaction of human and community needs, Le., the fair distribution of control over and use of natural resources (e.g., Gardner and Roseland, 1989). To date, there has been considerable inquiry into the ecological and economic requirements for sustainability. The ecological requirernents cmbe summarized as "the conservation and prudent management of natural resources... (and) the preservation of biodiversity and maintenance of biological integrity" (Hossain, 1995,15). Economic requirements have emeged through the sub-discipline of economics, a leading field in denning and forwarding concepts related to sustainable development. Academic inqujr into the social requirements for sustainability, on the other hand, has been theoretically underdeveloped and segregated in a variety of "grassrootstl-oriented disciplines, e.g., comrnURity economic development This may suggest resistance to academic inquiry that may lead to changes in the power status quo, as well as our tendency to value quantitative over qualitative solutions. On the other hand, it also suggests that local economies are the stuff of sustainability, since this has been the popular context of disc~ssion.~mis paper therefore seeks to marry local wisdorn with academic discourse to broaden our understanding of the social requirements for sustainability.

------4~ustainabilityand community are mought to be complementary according to community economic development literature. For example, Marcia NoWck's Eio Place Like Home: Building Sustainable Communitie~talks about "sustainable community devetopment" in categorical tems. 4 Studies in ecological economics have lead to the concepts of weak and strong sustainability. Based on an understanding of "natural capital" as "stocks that yield flows of

naturd resources and seMces without which there can be no production" @aly, 1991,250),

strong sustainability is about maintaining natural capital so that we can be as well off after consumption as we were before.' In contrast, weak sustainability is about maintaining rotal capital intact, based on the assumption that nahiral capital and man-made capital are substitutable. This assumption is wrong, however, as these two types of capital are clearly complements, not substitutes. "Otherwise, we could build the same wooden house with, Say, half the lumber and twice as many saws and carpenters" (Daly, 1991,252). Natural capital could not be substituted for in maintainhg man-made capital, for example, to repair the saws, nor can man- made capital substitute for the ecosystem functions performed by natural capital. The inherent uncertainty and potential irrevesibility of change in complex systems also demands a precautionary approach. These concepts are usefid in deterrnining requirements for sustainability as they identify an ecological bottom line to our economic activities. Despite the ecological bottom line, the cornmodification of nature is an essential part of the fiinctioning of Western political economy. Weak sustainability has thus kenthe chosen path of decision-malsers (IISD, 1997). These two interpretations of SuSfainability (weak and stroag) express the traditional, expansionist or linear paradigm or world view, on the one hand, and the new, ecological or systems paradigm on the other, that are competing for public support today. For example, the Council of Canadians' protests against the Multihteral Agreement on Investment demonstrates this conflict of world views, as do debates around the North Arnerican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Despite the fact that the leaders of the three signatory countries are also signatories to various international declarations, agendas, protocols and conventions that commit them to sustainable development, NAFTA puts economic growth ahead of sustainability by risking iower environmental standards (Makuch and Sinclair, 1993). It is justified as sustainable development because it will ensure the necessary "sustainable economic growth" required to pay for the costs of conservation.

This is drawn hmJ.R. Hicks' definition of income which "equals maximum austc~inubkconsurnption" (Daly, 1991,248). 5 So if strong sustainability is necessary, why isnftit happening? Surely, social change takes tirne, but we could be facilitating this change by redesigning our political and economic institutions so that they are compatible rather than in conflict with sustainability. Rather than trying to overlay environmental refoms onto a seemingly unsustainable structure, as exemplified in the environmental side-agreement to NAFTA, we could be engaging in structural refomation for sustainability. This refoxmation may, however, involve a redistribution of power, and may therefore be resisted by those interested in maintaining the statu quo.

iii) Social Re~uirementsfor Susiainability The transition to sustainability cannot occur through technical means alone - it will require political will. Certainly, making more energy-efficient consumer goods and imposing tougher environmental regulations on indusûy are necessary measures, but they are not sufficient There is more to the requirements for sustainability than the ecological bottom line; sustainability also implies social change. Specifically related to power, three main areas of social change for sustainability are apparent in the spheres of ethics, equity aml community. Environmental ethics is a broad subject that will be examined in more detail in chapter 3. For the purpose of this paper, the significant aspect of ethics is its role in IegitimiPng social institutions. The World Bank has stated that "political legitimacy and public consensus (a)re a prerequisite to sustainable development" (Okoth-Ogendo, 1995, 107). This draws on the concept of the social contract for legitimiPng govemrnent:

(G)ovemance is about how society builds and sustains structures and institutions for the management of its &airs - social, economic and political ... (these) structures and institutions must reflect values and noms that have gained legitimacy in society (Okoth-Ogendo, 1995, 108).

For example, market economies have been justified as being in the public interest through Adam Smith's theones of the invisible hand and the trickle down effect. Today, however, the legitimacy of our institutions is faltering. There is increasing evidence and public recognition that they primarily serve those in power, rather than the greater public good (both nationally and intemationally).6 While there are both practical and ethical sides to these arguments, the point konsider, for exarnple, the public protests in Vancouver, B.C., around the 1997 APEC Economic Leader's Meeting. here is that institutions that are perceived to be unethical lose legitimacy in the public's eyes and therefore cannot be sustained, Another central issue of social change and sustainabiiity is equity, both intergenerational and intrageneratiod, or a modicum of fair "access to environmental resources both within the present generaîion as well as for niture generations"(Boer, 1995,115). Again, this argument has practical and ethical components; 1will focus here on the practicai issues. According to the Club of Rome, "(a) sustainable society... must be a society of social justice because great disparities of wealth or privilege will breed destructive disharmony" (Council of the Club of Rome, 199 1,49). Economic equity is therefore nquired to minimize conflict. At the 1972 Stockholm Conference, Indira Ghdiasked, "are not poverty and need the patestpoiiuters?". People stntggLing to survive ohdeplete ami degrade the resources avdable to them out of necessity. For many of India's poor, "securityis measured in terms of their &y-to-day stmggle for survival, and the . .. masgins of tolerance are dmumhhg f.ststn (Hassan, l992,49). Poverty and resource scarcity also lead to conflict as well as environmental destruction in the absence of economic equity. Mrs. Ghandi may have added that excessive afnuence and consumption are also sources of poilution (see Figure 1). Independent of any ethical argument, "the importance of the equity criterion Bs] a matter of straight planetary survival" (Ashok Khosla, quoted in Gardner and Roseland, 1989,29).

Per Capita incorne Pcr Yeu Correlation of environmenta2 impact and Mcome (per capiîa), bused on compumfiive comumption rates (PMSK. 1993) Equity refers not only to some degree of distributivejustice in the sphere of ecommics but also to the distribution of political or decision-making power. ïhat political equity is required for sustainability may not be obvious at first glance, but consider how political and economic decisions, especially related to natural resource use, are ofien closely related. In fact, one mi& Say that many decisions are political by vheof the fact that they are also economic. For example, consider the decision by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans not to reduce cod-fishing quotas off the coast ofNewfoundland in the mid-19801s, contrary to its own scientists' advice. This was both a political and economic decision. Public access to decision- making processes, or public participation, is a requirement for sustainability for a variety of reasons, rnany of which will be explored in more detail in chapter 3. In brief, "the participation and direct involvement of local people of the civil society is critical for effective resource management" (Wabunoha, 1995,230). Part of the rationale for this staternent is that "participation encourages people to have a voice in activities aEecting their livelihood, enabling them to protect their interests and promote their own well-king" (Taylor, 1995,205). Again, this is a practical argument:

The case for involving local people in natural resource management and sustainable development planning is a pragmatic one: local people are more familiar with a given area than are outsiders; they have a broader contexhial understanding of the environment; and local participation in sustainable development ensures self-interest without which efforts will likely fail Perkes, 1995, 138).

Implicit in the above discussion about participation is the acknowledgement that society is not made up of individuals living in isolation but of groups of people. Perhaps the least understood requirement for sustainability is "community", a tem which describes particular charactenstics of groups of people. CommUNty has been defmed as "a group of people who know each other personally and who plan together over time for their long-term common betterment" (Boothroyd, 1993,230). Community is important for sustainability in that it is an element of the "good life", uicorporating nich values as solidarity, reciprocity, fratemity, mutuality, interdependence, sharing, caring and responsibility.' The connection between

'~hesevalues have been compiled from a variety of disciplines including feminist political thoughî, communitarianism, bioregionaiism, cornrnunity economic developmenf and post-modemism. 8 cornmunis, and susîainability is complex; it lies in the thin seam that knits together people's own self-interest with the public interest (which includes a healthy natural environment). A deeper understanding of this Iink may be the key to solving the power/sustainability dilemma. 3. Understanding the Structural Bamers to Sustainability

So far, 1 have introduced the differences in interpretation of the tems sustainable development and sustainability, and how the changes required to achieve sustainability include not only technological change in te- of resource efficiency but also social change in tems of the distribution of political and economic power. The next few pages are devoted to laying the groundwork for a deconstruction of Western political economic institutions for na- resource decision-making through a summary of some their underlying philosophies or ethics.

i) The Ethical Basis of Western Social Svstem~ Anthropocentrism is the starting premise or meta-ethic of Western social systems and institutions. Anthropocentrism is generally associated with the traditional (linear, mechanistic) paradigm or world-view that arose during the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. It has its roots in the Graeco-Christian belief that God "created dl things for man's sake" (John Calvin, in Passrnore, 1974,13). The conception of man8 as the master of nature came about only after a long struggle with the organicist view of nature as sacred. Organicism was based on the belief that God created nature and that any attempt by man to manipulate or change it would be hubrlr, or "an attempt... to set himself up as a god ...[th at] would undoubtedly bring calamities about his head" (Passmore, 1974,13). Francis Bacon worked against the organicist view because it was an obstacle to science, the pursuit of which he considered necessary to restore the biblically-pted dominion of man over nature (Passmore, 1974). Science over the centuries eventually established a hierarchy of reductionism and objectivity over holism and subjectivity that has had negative repercussions for sustainability (Capra, 1982). Rene Descartes furthered anthropocentn'sm during the Renaissance by introducing Cartesian dualism and the mechanistic approach to the world. Descartes' famous maxim "1 think, therefore I exist" led to the separation of humans from nature by suggesting that the mind and the body are ultimately separate. It also created an understanding of the world in tems of dualities, where one is valued over the other, thus negating holism. His analysis of living organisms as

'1 use the word "man" in this section because these ideas have historically male foundations. 10 mechanisms, reducible to their parts, is the foundation of reductionist science. While Descartes' "clarity of thought" was extremely valuable to the advancement of science, it is recognized today as having severe limitations in terms of sustainability (Capra, l982,62). Adam Smith's work on markets also had a formative impact on Western thinking, in particular through the concept of capital creation that fueled the expansionist element of the traditional paradigm. These qualities - reductionism, objectivity, mechanism, dualism and expansionism - characterize the linearity or linear thinking of the old paradi-. A new paradigm for sustainability, in contrast, would offer perspectives on individual/community, objectivity/subjectivity, humadnature, etc., that overcome dichotomous thinking and form a new non-linear, neo-organic, continuous or systems-oriented paradigm upon which a sustainable society can be based (Capra, 1982)? According to Carolyn Merchant, three distinct ethics exist in Western society: egocentric, homocentric and ecocentric (Merchant, l992,6l). These ethics represent values ranging fiom least sustainable (egocentric) to most sustainable (ecocentric). The egocentric ethic is consistent with the traditional paradigm. It is based on an understanding of humans as autonomous individuals, as in classical liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism. In egocentric ethics, the emphasis on the self (man)serves to devalue the other (womanhature). The traditional paradigm is sometimes referred to as the dominator paradigm and, according to ecofeminists, is considered the source of the socially oppressive and ecologically destructive activities of humans (Eider, 1987,28). The homocentric ethic is a mix of old and new paradigm values. It is based on an understanding of humans as the building blocks of society and reflects utilitarian and stewardship values. Although human needs are given priority in the homocentric ethic, consideration is still accorded to non-human nature, The third ethic is the ecocentric ethic, which is based on an understanding of humans as only one element of a unherse in which everything has intrinsic

'~ewparadigm values are supported at rhe cutting edge in a wide variety of disciplines ranging hmquantum physics and Far Eastern theology to Iandscape ecotogy and business management. value. This ethic has similarities to Aldo Leopolds "land ethic" and to bi~re~ionalism.'~The - .. ecocentric ethic enlarges the boundaries of the moral communify to include al1 living and non- living things, suggesting that moral weight ought to be given to non-human considerations in

decision-making. This recasts the status of humans on Earth fiom rulers to members of a biospheric community. Appendix A co~rtainsa summary of these three broad categories of environmental ethics and their associated historical figures. Egocentrism forms the ethical bais of the Western paradip. While it is impossible to be completely non-anthropocentnc, as it is impossible to be completely objective, our values,

1 decisions and social systems should nevertheless dernonstrate a more ecocentric understanding of our position relative to the non-human worId for the sake of sustainabiIity. As John Dryzek points out:

The pursuit of all... values is predicated upon the avoidance of ecological catastrophe. Hence the preservation and promotion of the integrity of the ecological and material underpinning of socieq - ecological rationality - should take priority over cornpethg fomof reason in collective choices with an impact upon that inte& (Dryzek, 1987,58-59). Structural reformation for sustainability thus involves understanding human life as

dtimately dependent on the natural environment, and adapting our values and institutions to reflect that understanding.

ii) The Political Economy of Eco10 In the discourse of political economy, Michael M'Gonigle has characterized old paradigm, linear structures as "centre" c~nfi~ouration~of power, in contrast to new paradigm, systems-oriented or "territorial" confi,prations of power (M'Gonigle, 1994). The next few pages are devoted to explaining centre and temtory as theoretical tools that set the problem of developing sustainability in a structural context.

The rïse of centre and decline of temtory is an histoncal process that has been coined "development-as-enclosuret1in The Ecologist. The term "enclosuret' is derived from the enclosure or privatization of common ,gazhg land in 15th-century Britain (Coleman, 1994,86).

'O~iore~ionalistvalues have been described as: "region, community, conservation, stability, self-suficiency, cooperation, decentralization, complementarity, diversity, symbiosis, evolution, and division" (Kirkpatrick Sale, in Alexander, 1990,164). It describes the shift of control over na- resources from the local community to ever-larger and more distant bureaucracies. Development through enclosure occmed domestically at fim (in Western Europe), and then expanded to other nations îhrough colonization. Contrary to the popular notion that capitalism engendered fieedom in the West, development-asenclosure suggests that: "The modem nation state has been built only by stripping power and conbol fiom comrnons regimes and creating structures of govemance from which the great mass of humanity (particularly women) are excluded" (The Ecologist, 1992, 13 1). Centre thus refers to the result of half a millenium of development-as-enclosure: the concentration of political and economic power w;,thin centraiized locations and small groups of people who ensure that local natural and human resources are working, often at their own expense, in the interest of the few." This pattern is repeated at both macro and micro levels. For example, enclosure at the local level doesn't stop or reverse itself with the withdrawal of colonial govemments; rather, local elites often take advantage of political instability and changes in traditional resource management regimes to step into the withdrawing powers' shoes, essentially perpetuating centre dynamics (The Ecologist, 1992,138). Thus whether it is at the local, regional, national or international levels, the subjugation of temtory to centre is the mot of unsustainable social systems structure. Centre and temtoq aren't necessarily spatial concepts; they represent the dialectic of hierarchical versus communal controI. Geographically, centre dynamics have been observed as the flow of "staples" ~omrural to urban settlements (Inais, 1933). Politically, centre has been observed as hierarchies of decision-making authority that alienate and dehumanize the masses, concentrating power in corporate offices and state bureaucracies and breeding dependency . (Chilcote, 1984). Economically, the same dynarnic has been observed in the global flow of resources from penphery to core (Wallerstein, 1975). Karl Marx identified centre dynamics in the alienation of labour, where the value of a product created by labour is appropnated by the owners of the means of production in a unidirectional transfer and concentration of power.

"This suggestion, that the many work at their own expense in the interest of the few, is a reversal of the post- mercantilist assurnption that economic growth was no longer a zero-sum game because of the market creation of capital. Rather, it suggests that the creation of capital depends on land and labour as the source of its value. The relationship between centre and territory is therefore exploitative. 13 Centrekemtory dynamics bave also kentaken up in regional plhgin ternis of temtory and fûnction (Friedmann and Weaver, 1979). The influence of centre can also be witnessed culturally, for example, where indigenou knowledge is adopted for its technical value by "experts" who monopolize commercial benefits (Ziff and Rao, 1997). These dynamics al1 describe a SMin power, politically and econornically; that is, a shift in control over and use of natuml resources from local people to global markets, from sustainable use to overconsumption. nie nse of centre and decline of tenitory has seen the improvement in material standards of living of those associated with centre, and the decline of economic security, culture, community, and environmental health, for those associated with temtory. Centre and temtory are in constant dialectical tension. Histoncally, one has nsen and the other fallen but neither cm cornpletely extinguish the other. Territory is self-reliant; centre is not. Centre draws energy and materials out of local envkonments and communities, "appropriating" carrying capacity fiom one region to another, and at the global scale fiom less developed to more developed counûïes (Wackemagel et al, 1993). In this way, centre is

There are positive and negative aspects to both centre and temtory. While some would argue that centre has mitigated some of the negative aspects of territory (e-g., intolerance to minorities), it has affected the positive aspects as well (e.g., decline of cultural diversity and cooperative traditions). Similarly, positive aspects of centre such as irnproved health care and higher material standards of living have been coupled with negative aspects, such as homelessness and dnig abuse. Perhaps a balance of the two is necessary for sustainability. Centre, however, has Myovertaken temtory. In addition, centre is self-perpetuating and reinforcing: "Grow or perish, that is the law of capital" (Gorz, 1980,22). Change is therefore risky, as global markets are unforgivuig. Hence we hdourselves in a powerlsustainability dilernrna:

There is now a conscious attempt by corporate and other mainstream interests to 'capture' the debate on environment and development and to frame it in ternis that will rninimize changes to the status quo (The Ecologist, 1992,164). The traditional alternatives of govemance, sihiated on the left-nght spectnim of political ideology, dl perceive structure in centreninear tems and as such do not offer any sustainable options (Paehlke, 1989). Given the limited options, it is not surprising that weak sustahability has been the chosen path of world leaders in the pursuit of sustainab1e development

iii) Deconstnictino a Power Patadim The Western political economic system is limited in tenns of its ability to effectively

respond to ecological problems (Dryzek, 1987). The next few pages are devoted to showing how the systems' structure relates to its functional shortcomings in tenns of sustainability. While I would not go as far as the Chicago School in drawing direct analogies between social systems and ecosystems, I would suggest that there is a certain harmony of design between these systems that would facilitate sustainability rather than promote destruction as the main characteristic of

the humanhature interface. l2 This is tnie insofar as all systems show some parallel attributes, and insofar as we understand human systems to be subsets of larger planetary systems and therefore subject to the same basic forces inherent in them. l3 Having reflected on the history and nature of the hear configuration of power in social systems, and having considered the proliferation of weak SuSfainability in institutions like NAFTA (Makuch and Sinclair, 1993), certain structural characteristics of Western political economy consistently appear as barriers to sustainability. They are hiemrchy, scale, and feedback loops. While each one of these characteristics invokes the others, that is, they overlap and interrelate, each also stands on its own as a distinct b-tnicturai attribute demanding refom of its own kind for sustainability. The next few pages are devoted to understanding the basis of these characteristics in the Western political economic system and how they act as baniers to sustainability .

I%he 'Chicago School' of urban sociology analyzed cities and social institutions using ecological metaphors (see, for example, Hawley, A.H., Human Ecoloov: a Theo-/ ofCornmuni? Structure. RonaId Press: New York, 1950). 13 See, for exarnple, Curtis, Richard K. Evolution or Extinction: the Choice Before Us, Pergarnon Press: Toronto, 1982; or Boulding, Kenneth E. Ecodyamics: a New Theorv of Societal Evolution, Sage Publications: Beverley Hills, CA, 1978, for an explanation of systems theory and how it reIates systems in the natural and sociaI sciences. 1. Hierarchv a) Domination and subordination Hierarchy by definition is "a ding body of clergy organized hto orders or ranks each subordhate to the one above it", or "a graded or ranked senes", (Webster's, 1991,569). The linguistic roots of the word lies in the ancient Greek hieros, or sacred, and mkhiu, or de,i.e., the goveniment of the church (Capra, 1982,282). The salient feature for the purpose of this paper lies in the dynarnic of domination and subordination that hierarchy establishes.

(W)e may reserve the ten "hierarchy" for those fairly rigid systems of domination and control in which orders are transmitted from the top down. The traditional symbol for these structures has been the pyrarnid (Capra, 1982,282). It isn't stratification or organization itself, i.e., the division of labour or the allocation of roles, that makes hierarchy inherently unsustainable. Rather, hierarchy is the institutional manifestation of the "dominator" paradigm (Eisler, 1987,2 8). The four basic oppressions that have been identined with political/economic systems are: "rulers over people, men over women, possessors over non possessors, and humans over nature" (Milbrath, 1989,49). These basic forms of oppression limit the possibility of equitable social relationships, thereby limiting sustainability. Exploitation follows fiom oppression: "The more power that accrues to certain members within a social organization, especially undelegated power, the greater the temptation to abuse that powerf' (Curtis, 1982,19 1). Exploitation leads to unsustainability through the devaluing, abuse and degradation of women (socially) and nature (ecologically) by men, as well as through dependency of the poor on the rich. Dependency will be explored in more detail later. As suggested above, hierarchy is an expression of bad systems design or linearïty in Western political economy. It is usefd to visualize hierarchy as a power dynamic in which power flows unidirectionaliy fiorn the dominated to the dominator, with the concentration of power at the endpoint. This is in contrast to the observed tendency of natuml systems to circulate power, that is, to process their energy in cycles (Curtis, 1982,239).

Most living systems exhibit multileveled patterns of organization characterîzed by many intricate and nonlinear pathways dong which signals 16 of information and transaction propagate between al1 levels, ascending as well as descending... As a real tree takes its nourïshrnent through both its roots and its laves, so the power in a systems tree flows in both diiections, with neither end dominahg the other and dl levels interacting in interdependent harmony to support the functioning of the whoie (Capra, 1982,282). Lùiearity in Western political economy coincides with the traditional view of power as something that can be owned, like rights, or property, and that is exercised one over another in a zero-sum game (Fraser and Lacey, 1993). This power is oppressive and unsustainable: "Somehow, men believe they must keep conquering - be it natureywomea, or other men" (Milbrath, l989,5O). The linear conception of power cm be contrasted to the idea of power as a relationship in which the "effectiveness of (its) exercise... by the 'sender' depends on the degree to which the 'receivers' consent to the relation" (Boucher, 1992,47). The alternative to linear or "domination power" (the distribution of power in centre-oriented structures), is "power-with" or

"actualization power" (the distribution of power in temtory). l4 Actualization power in the context of developrnent means the empowement of local people for selfdetermination; for sustainability this is applicable especidly to natural resource decision-making. The sustainability of actualization power is demonstrated in the many examples of common property management regimes that worked for centuries pnor to enclosure (Elerkes, 1989). Ecofeminsm has made sipïficant contributions to theories of power. In the context of sustainability, ecofeminists link hierarchy, or patriarchy more specifically, and the pardel degradation of women and nature. In support of their hypotheses, ecofeminists have found models of non-patnarchal organization in early Neolithic societies, e.g., the Anatolian site of Catal Huyuk, and the ancient civilkation of Crete (Eisler, 1987,28). Contrary to expectation, non-patnarchd societies were not necessarily "rnatriarchal" (Le., ruled by women):

(1)n contrast to the still prevailing view of power as the power syrnbolized by the Blade - the power to take away or to dominate - a very different view of power seems to have been the non in these Neolithic Goddess-worshipping societies..,

I4starhawk distingukhes berween power-over, power-with, and power-fiom-within (see Boucher, 1992,47), and Eisler recognizes the same power dynamic (domination vs. actualizaîion power) (Eisler, 1987). The view of power symbolized by the Chalice ...does not fit into the conventional dominator paradigm of social organization. However ... it does fit the other alternative for human organïzation: a partnership society in which neither half of humanity is ranked over the other and divenity is not equated with inferiority or supenority (Eider, 1987,28). Ecofeminists are thus proponents of the social redistribution of power in favour of a "partnership

ethic" which would treat men and women "as equals in personal, household, and political relations and humans as equal partners with (rather than controlled-by or dominant-over) nonhuman nature" (Merchant, 1992,59). The exploitation of women and nature for the benefit of centre is one of the most convincing modem theones linking hierarchy and unsustainability (Bookchin, 1991). b) Competition versus cooperation Hierarchies are cornpetitive rather than cooperative; however, both are necessary for sustainability. Competition is a dekitive feaîure of modem markets and democracies and is often justified in social systems because of its existence in natural systems. However, as Milbraîh points out, cooperation occurs in natural systems as well:

Competition in which the strong wins has been given a good deal more press than cooperation. But certain superficially weak organisms have survived in the long run by being part of collectives, while the so-called strong ones, never leaming the kick of cooperation, have been dumped ont0 the scrap heap of evolutionary extinction (Margdis and Sagan, quoted in Milbrath, 1989,147).

EmphasiPng or valuing competitiveness alone has negative ecological impacts, e.g., markets externalize the environmental costs of production. The experience of the former Soviet Union suggests that centrai planning also has negative ecological impacts due to hefficiency in resource allocation. Central planning, however, is not cooperative as such but an attempt by the state to eliminate markets; it is, in fact, a manifestation of hierarchy. A case can therefore be made for balancing cornpetition and cooperation in political economic systems (Milbrath, 1989, 148), for example, through participatory government and regulated markets. c) Dualism and nature Dualism is an "eithed~r'~(rather than a "both/and") mentality that is expressed in reductionist values like competition over cooperation. Reductionism is therefore isolationist rather than holistic. Dualist and reductionist logic contradicts ecological rationality:

Detailed study of ecosystems over the past decades has shown quite clearly that most relationships between living organisms are essentially cooperative ones, characterized by coexistence and interdependence, and symbiotic in various degrees. Although there is competition, it usudly takes place within a wider context of cooperation, so that the larger system is kept in balance. Even predator-prey relationships that are destructive for the immediate prey are generdly beneficient for both species.

This insight is in sharp contrast to the vïêws of the Social Darwhists, who saw Iife exclusively in tmsof cornpetition, struggle and destruction. Their view of nature has helped create a philosophy that legitimates exploitation and the disastrous impact of our technology on the naturd environment But such a view has no scientific justification, because it fails to perceive the integrative and cooperative prïuciples that are essential aspects of the ways in which living systems organize themeives at all levels (Cap- 1982,279). Machines are linear and work through cause-and-effect; natural systems are circulating and work through feedback loops. Hierarchy, with its emphasis on competition and domination, is

structured much more like a hear machine than a holistic system. d) Aienation and dependency Political alienation occurs when a citizen becomes estranged from their role as a participating member of the Modem liberal democracies, though fouoded on the principle of citizen de, often have governments so large and removed fiom individual citizens that they have difficulty providing either a tdyrepresentative democracy or a fomfor citizen participation in political life (particularly in North America). A reflection on the state of the North Amencan polity and its future prospects brought Charles Taylor to recall de Tocqueville's description of "soft despotism":

It will not be a tyrmy of terror and oppression as in the old days. The govemment will be mild and paternalistic. It may even keep democmtic

15See, for exarnple, Buchanan, Allen E. "Assessing the Cornmunitarian Critique of Liberalism", Ethics, 99, July 1989, 852-882; or Taylor, Charles, "Cross Purposes: the Liberal-Cornmunitarian Debate", in Liberalism and the Moral Lifc, Nancy L. Rosenblum, Ed., Harvard UP: Cambridge, 1989, for a discussion of the importance of political participation for realizing the "good life". fom, with penodic elections. But in fact, everything will be nin by an "immense tutelary power", over which people will have little control ... Once participation declines, once the lateral associations that were its vehicles wither away, the individual citizen is left alone in the face of the vast bureaucratic state and feelç, correcîly, powerless. This demotivates the citizen even mer,and the vicious cycle of sofi despotism is joined.

Perhaps something like this alienation fiom the public sphere and consequent loss of political control is happening in ouhighly centralized and bureaucratic political world (Taylor, 199 1,9- 10). Economic alienation occurs in industrialized societies in the Max& sense, where the productive nature of humans is alienated through the "soul-destroying work" of wage labour (Schumacher, 1973,30). Taylor claims that this alienation is more or less voluntary in modem societies: "the compromise of affluent society must be seen to represent a tacit acquiescence...in subordinate relations of labour on the part of the mass of workers" (Taylor, 198). Some claim that the alienation fiom political power is justified by the supposed increase in economic power (Rodewald, 1985,237). Not everyone would concur, however, that consumerism replaces participation in the polity, as the concept of voting with one's dollar is obviously biased in favour of the rich. Certainly it cannot replace the need for some degree of selfdetermination, which is both a recognized element of the "good life" and an accepted p~cipleof sustainability. Subsistence economies illustrate the connection between political and economic alienation and sustainability more directly. In this case 1 am referRng to alienation fiom control over and use of natural resources. If local people don't derive economic benefit fiom their local resources, and if they have no political power to manage them, then there is no incentive for conservation. Thus alienation contributes to unsustainability in hvo ways. First, feelings of political or economic powerlessness and insecunty can lead to increased crime, conflict, political instability, etc.; and second, as power is removed fiom comrnunities, what were once locally managed common property resources become easily abused "open access" resources.16 Powerlessness leads to complacency, which itself permits abuse of the system. It dso leads to dependency, the ultimate in economic and political disempowexment. Dependent communities are the least sustainable, as they are unable to support themselves without inputs

16The Ecologist made the distinction that Garreît Hardin overlooked between the comrnons, which is managed cornmunally, and an open access resource, which is subject to Hardin's "tragedy of the commons", 20 fiom the centre. Their local environrnents are ofien degraded due to the anarchical nature of open access resources. They may even lack simple group decision-making skills afier

generations of central control. Sustainability thus has the potential to liberate, as it raises a "challenge... to conventional notions of hierarchyt'in terms of alternative structures of power (Bookchin, 1991,25). e) Self-determination and identification of self with nature Sustainability requires the empowerment of individuals, or a sense of self-determination, and an understanding of one's relationship to nature (based on mutual respect). Self- determination is an important factor for the "good Iife" according to cornmunitarian and liberal politicai thought:

(qhe atrophy of citizen power negates an important dimension of our dignity as fiee agents, and hence poses a potential long-term thxeat to the legitimacy [i.e., sustainability] of a modern society (Taylor, 224). Self-determination is also consistently identified as a key principle of sustainability:

('I')he successful pursuit of sustainable development depends upon interdependent principles aimed at meeting human needs, maint;iining ecologicd integrity, attaining social delfaennination, and establishing social equity.

Omportant elements of social self-cietennination include citizen participation in decision-making, human-sale communities, participatory govemance, decentralized management, grassroots activism and cultural integrity (emphasis mine - Gardner and Roseland, 1989,38-39).

According to cornmunitarian and feminist thought, a person's self-identification is the product of their "constitutive associations", that is, the aggregation of theK experiences and associations that partially constitute the "self '. People's constitutive associations with nature have lead to the development of the "land ethic" which, according to Aldo Leopold, describes a feeling of kinship with nature. The self in liberal (Western) society is, on the other hand, an atornistic concept.17 The "autonomous individual" of liberal theory establishes a rift between humans and nature reminiscent of the rift precipitated by Cartesian dualism. We therefore

for example, the works of Michael Walter, Michael Sandel Alistair MacIntyre or Charles Taylor for a discussion of liberal vs. cornmunitarian conceptions of the self understand nature as fundamentally separate from our selves despite our constitutive associations. We also understand nature as unrelated to our pursuit of the "good life", except as a means to an end This denial of our constitutive associations with nature (the importance of nature to our own self-identity) results in ecological destruction in much the same way that the neglect of our communal associations with each other leads to the destruction of community. It follows that if we identify ourselves with nature, and require a degree of self- detemination for the "good life", then we also need a degree of participation in decision-making about what happens to nature as extensions of ourselves for the "good life". A final word on the link between self-determination and sustainabiliîy:

As one nses up the hierarchy, wielding ever more power, one is increasingly removed fkom the direct experience and understanding of the social and ecological dynamics of a particular locale (Coleman, 1994,65). In other words, those most appropriately informecl, socially and ecologically, for making decisions or "being empowered" around local natural resource use are local people. ierarchy is therefore an ineffective structural design for sustainable naturai resource decision-making.

2. Scale The tendency to increasing scale is one of the main structural barriers to sustainability of Western political economic systems (Helleiner, 1995,9). The growth of political and economic institutions represents the rise of centre over temtory, for example, in the rise of the nation-state and transnational corporations since the Industrial Revohtion, or the globalbation of economies and cultures through Bretton Woods institutions since the end of the Second World War. Growth in scale is linked to hierarchy:

(AIS local ways of knowing and doing are devalued or appropriated, and as vernacular forrns of govemance are eroded, so state and professional bodies are able to insert themselves within the commons, taking over areas of life that were previously under the control of individuals, households and the community (The Ecologist, 1992,153). Leopold Kohr was one of the first to postulate a link between the scale of institutions and sustainability. Twenty years before the Club of Rome, Kohr was talking about the social limits to growth. He suggested that the nation-state was simply too big to be a genuine community in two main respects. First, it would be difficuit for citizens to check the concentration of power in the goveming bodies of large political communities, and second, the "mas nature" of society threatened to dehumanize social and political life (Helleiner, 1995,j). Kohr argued that smaller political communities such as those of the pre-industriai age would be more peaceful and "self- regulating" - a sentiment echoed by bioregionalists today:

To make peace with nature, society mut emulate nature, at least in certain respects. It mut become more self-regulating at the community level- leaming to live in balance with regional ecosystems- rather than relying on govemment to impose "order" fiom above (Alexander, 1992,44). Other "green" thinken have expressed concem about the concentration of economic power in large-scale markets. The small-scale markets prornoted by Adam Smith for the greater Benthamite good have radically different power dynamics than the large-scde pst-industrial markets of the late twentieth cenhiry (Helleiner, 1995,9). Unlike smdl markets, large markets tend to concentrate power in the fo'im of oligopolistic corporations:

Not only rnight these corporations use their market power in ways that ovenvhelm the goals of individuals and srnalier businesses, but also their presence may prevent large-scale markets fiom operating in a stabIe, self- regdating way (Helleiner, 1995,9). The same disequilibh is mirrored in the exploitative relationships between nch and poor countries. Polanyi questioned the possibility that large-scale, socidy disembedded markets could contribute to the constmction of a sustainable social order, pre-empting later arguments raised by green and cornmunitarian thinkers that "unrestrained capitalism breaks down important traditional forms of community" (Polanyi, 1944; Buchanan, 1989,861). The importance for sustainability of cornmunitanan values suchas membership and participation in the polisr (citizenship), rnutuality, reciprocity and fkatemity (solidarity) also imply the need for small or human scale in the organization of social institutions. These values are necessary for the "good life".18 The absence of cornmunitarian values in modern liberal societies, and especially in North Amerka, has resulted variously in social dislocation, the current "crisis of legitimacy" of Western democracy (Taylor, 186) and other "phenornena ranging

%ee, for example, the works of Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Alisîair Maclntyre. 23 fiom mass murders in America to the demise of the British welfare state" (Sypnowich, 1993, 486). Benjamin Barber claims that social çtrife is the redt of too littie democracy. He calls for a participatory mode of govemance, which he calls "strong democracy", that "resolves conflict... through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation" (Barber, 1984). As stated previously, being involved in public processes, or participahg in decision-making processes that affect one's community, is an important expression of an individual's fieedom and therefore an important element of the "good life" (Thigpen and Downing, 1987,65 1). This sentiment is shared by many cornmunitarians; fiee societies are cornposed of citizens who identify with the polis as expressions of themselves, thus "my bond to these people passes through our participation in a common political entityn (Taylor, 1989, 166). Strong democracy is therefore a requirement of sustainability, but may only be achievable at a small or human scale. Bioregionalism broadens the notion of idenmg with one's community to include an

identification with nature or the commons (referred to above as a "constitutive association"). Bioregionalists also cal1 for the decentralization of politics and economics for the sake of ecologicd rationality: "the size of our cornmtmities and the nature of our technology mut be informed by an appreciation of natural processes" (Alexander, 1990, 169). Finally, they echo both communitarianism and native spirituality in their emphasis on the importance of a "sense of place" to the development and maintenance of community (Booth and Jacobs, IWO):

(B)ecoming native to a place through becoming aware of the particular ecologicd relationships that operate within and around it.. .involves becoming fully dive in and with a place. It involves applying for membership in a biotic community and ceasing to be its exploiter (Berg and Dasmann, quoted in Alexander, 199O7l62-I63). Thus need for a sense of belonging to both a group and a place tie human cornmunities to their habitats. The sustainability of scale can also be considered in terms of material and energy efficiencies, or the lack thereof. Economies-of-scale, via large corporate and govemment bureaucracies, can breed megaprojects and mass production that are material andor energy inefficient and destructive to the environment; in other words, they can actually lead to diseconornies of scale (Lovins and Lovins, 1982,353). The closure of small fanns in the U.S. at the tum of the century, for example, was once considered a natural outcome of the greater efficiency and competitiveness of economies-of-scale but in fact was the result of policies that favoured large over small fannen. This reveals a distinctly political side to this supposedly neutral economic argument:

The victory of large-scale and ngidly defined work orgktionin both industry and agriculture was the result, not of any clear advantage in technologicd efficiency, but mther of deliberate state policy to subsidize large industry and suppress small-scde producen. These policies were somethnes the result of class alliances, sometunes the by-product of military policy. Without them, large-scale, ngid modes of production might not have triumphed (Kymlicka, 1994,268). l9 Large scale has therefore been actively prornoted by the centre. Large scale bureaucraties can also hinder sustainability through inadequate communication First, the simple geographical distance between decision-makers and locale can result in important information gaps or losses of local knowledge that might othenvise have idonned the decision-making process. Second, distance can exacerbate problems of accountability. Taylor has described bureaucmcies as "distant" and "insensitive" (Taylor, 208), implying that they are both inflexible and unresponsive to local concems. A cornparison of local and centralized water management schemes in Thailand found that the local regirne consisted of cooperative, collective management and a balance of power, the result of which was a simple, independent system that was easy to enforce. On the other hand, the centralized bureaucratie regime was devoid of local knowledge or control, was unresponsive and inflexible to local concems and clirnatic conditions, and was not accountable to the people (The Ecologist, 1992,

152- 153). Under this regime, "a semblance of order is only achieved through authontarian de" (Ibid.). The solution put forth by both cornmunitarians and bioregionalists in response to the problems of both scale and hierarchy is decentralkation:

If Our response to the increase of overload and alienation is not to be that of abandoning participatory politics and compensating for this with more

19see also The Eeologi* Whose Common Future, 145; or Daly and Cobb, For the Common Good, 271. 25 effective methods of judîcial redress and single-issue campaigning - if our aim is to defend participation - then the only viable policy seems to include some devolution of power (Taylor, 221). However, decentralization in itself does not guarantee either democracy or an ecological society:

Ot should be pointed out that decentralizing and democratizing power relationships will not automatically "solve" the ecological crisis. There is nothing inherent in the democratizing process that guarantees conflicting interem will be harmonized, that humans will consider the needs of other species, or that they will be willing to sacrifice present "perks" for long- term sustainability (Alexander, 1992,44). Instead, we need to change BPfh values a institutions, not simply one or the other. Therefore, "decentraüsrn, a face-to-face participatory democracy [i-e., one which is "scaled to human dimensions"], and a localist emphasis on community values should be viewed as dl of one piece" (Bookchin, 1992,61).

3. Lack of Feedback Loo~s Feedback loops occur naturally in living systems; they are part of the circulatory nature of systems that dowthem to correct for disturbance (Caprq 1982,272). "In al1 living systems, ranging fiom the simplest ce11 to the most complex human society, the integnty of the organism is maintained through homeostatic feedback mechanisms" (Curtis, 1982,79-80). Feedback loops are the intemal response mechanism that allows systems to be flexible, adapt to change, and maintain stability. Without them, living systems (like local communities) lose their capacity for autonomous self-organization,or sustainability. Milbrath has accurately called Iinear systems "maladaptive" as they do not naturally exhibit feedback loops (Milbrath, l989,lS 1). Industrial pollution provides an example of missing feedback loops in linear systems. Markets do not account for pollution, an environmental cost of production. This cost is extemalized rather than feeding back into the system of production. The lack of negative feedback in particular is a major cause of the environmental malaise of linear societies:

(N)egative feedback is the presence of deviation-counteractuig input within a system ... On an environment of cornplexity and uncertainty, one cannot completely understand - let done plan - that environment... As a substiîute for perfect inderstanding ...any intelligent choice mechanisms will be so stmctured as to respond to signals mek,1987,47). In other wordç, we Iive in a complex world that we don7 completeIy understand, so we are beîter off if our social systems contain negative feedback ("deviation-counteractingtt)capabilities. Forcing feedback into linear systems may prove to be more difficult and less effective than reforming systems to accommodate feedback. Accountability can decrease due to the size, complexity andlor procedural nature of political and econornic institutions. Decision-makers are unaccountable where they are inaccessible and insensitive to Idconcem; this is ofien due to their distance fiom local

Centralized govemment, centralized education, and single-interest control over British Columbia's forests have, over the, removed responsibility for the local forest from the local communities which depend upon them. Decisions which shape the destiny of local forests ...are usdymade far (away), often by corporate interests in Vancouver and, with increasing ffequency, as far away as Japan.

In these instances, responsibility is much more like1y to mean responsibility to a balance sheet rather than to a forest and a cornmunity of people (Hmond, 1992,100-101). The lack of political accountab'dity in this example has been replaced by a market-driven feedback loop: accountability to a frmi's shareholders. No such mechanisms exist in the political realm for the protection of humans or the environment (except for occasional elections). Milbrath recommends a self-styled feedback loop to solve this particular problem (Milbrath, 1989, 143). He claims that since ownenhip is only "loosely related" to control, and since control is what matters in ternis of sustainability, then public control (rather than ownership) shodd be ernphasized to ensure "ecosystem viability'?' Of course, this argument makes the assumption that public control is equitable and local. Scale, hierarchy and the lack of feedback loops are al1 barriers to sustainability insofar as they exacerbate information gaps. For example, indigenous knowledge is not applied in most

20~aulEkins, in The Living Econcrny a New Economia in the Making Routledge: New York, 1986, 171, makes a simitar argument when he cals forpublic ownership of land but prniote ownership of the benefits or irnprovements derived therefiom. centralized resource management regimes. Small-scale systexns couid better accommodate indigenous howledge as decision-makers would be more accessible, especially to those without techologically-advanced means of communication. Also, hierarchies of knowledge subjugate local knowledge to that of scientifically-based expert knowledge. Hierarchy thus inhibits a feedback loop, as issues onginating locally could otherwise be addressed by expert knowledge, which may then in hun improve local qudity of life. Hiemrchy and feedback loops intersect again in the tension between representative and participatory democracy. Representative democracy has corne under fire for being insufticiently participatory. Many question whether one election every two-to-four years presents sufficient op port uni^ for participation in decisions that affect our daily Iives:

Where democracy in its classicd form meant quite literally deby the dernos, by the plebes, by the people themselves, it now often seems to mean little more than elite desanctioned (through the device of representation) by the people. Competing elites vie for the support ofa public, whose popular sovereignty is reduced to the pathetic right to participate in choosing the tyrant who dlde it varber, 1984,37). The feedback function of the popular election is limited. This is Merexacerbated by large constituencies and the principte of party loyalty in Canada hificial feedback loops like indicators are increasingly being looked to as a means of harnessing feedback in Western political economic systems. Perhaps a more useful exercise would be to consider how these systems could be restructured to Facilitate feedback and sustainability. In the next chapter, we will move to a discussion of sustainability indicators that would perhaps assist in this structural refomation. 4. Indicators of Sustainabiiity

i) Purpose and Context There has been an increasing fascination with indicators of SuSfainability in recent years as efforts have been made to monitor change:

(W)e don't need new indicators of the glaring global trends in poverty, health, natural resources, poilution, and population to tell us that the nature of economic development... is little more "sustainable" than in years past In light of these trends, meaningfd use of the concept of sustainabdity... implies ciramatic and immediate refom of economic processes and the public institutions that regulate them ...

At the local level, a growing group of local government officials and volunteer leaders have been making a first, earnest attempt at applying this more rigorous use of the concept. The credibility of these eEoa... in the face of organized critics of refom depends upon both the articulation of a viable method and the indication of concrete positive dts (Brugmann, 1997,2).

Indicators cm be used to Somas well as to jepolitical and economic decisions by monitoring and reporting on systemic change. Such reporting is especially effective when related to specific goals or targets identified as part of planning processes (Brugmann, 1997,ll).

Indicators of sustainability can be used to meet a variety of objectives, inchidhg monitoring, perfomance measmement, accountability, and education. Due to the methodological complexities imlved, however, no single "best" approach has been found for developing and applying them.

The following pages are devoted to a bnef look at the history of indicators use, followed by the development of an indicators fiamework. The purpose of the hework is to evaluate the potential sustainability of projects, programs and policies based on the preceding structural analysis of political and ecanomic systems.

ii) Uses and ProbIem Econornic, social and environmental indicators have evolved over the last century as scientific means were sought to measure change and influence policy. In nineteenth century Britain, Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree estabfished the poverty line, a social indicator or meanue of poverty (Beck, 1994,3). Economic indicators proceeded to dominate policy and planning in the twentieth centliry through the Gross National Product (GNP), a measure of economic progress that has been used since the development of systems of national accounting (UNSNA) at the end of World War II. Much of the demand for indicators refom stems fiom the application of GNP as a meanne of people's general well-king. GNP, the "total per capita money income" of a country's citizens, and GDP,the "total moneydenominated, domestically- produced goods and services" of a country, are purely economic indicaton (Henderson, 1991, 148). By excluding information like the value of women's work, the informa1 economy, and leisure tirne, and by counting social costs Iike naturai disasters and environmentai accidents as benefits, GNP and GDP do not adequately measure general well-being (WarUig, 1990). As mentioned above, methodological intricacies have plagued the consistent application of indicators. The scieniSc approach used for collecting statistically signincant data has been critickd for being 'lüerarchical, non-participatory and exclusive, and an approach which reduces those being measured to numbersythus dehumanishg them" (Beck, 1994,3). Indicators are normative; they reflect the values of those who choose them:

One of the fundamental difficulties with respect to the use of social indicators... is their normative signincance. When certain data or derived measures are selected as... indicators on the basis of their perceived normative significance, the shedacceptance of certain values is assumed (Yeh, 1986,226).

Choosing indicators +hou& public processes has thus been a si@cant part of developing indicators of sustainability. This can lead to problems in itself, however, as the inherent complexity and variety, depending on their fûnction, of indicators cm lead to trade-offs between social participation and scientific validity (Brugmann, 1997,5). Finally, the different varieties of indicators, such as indexes and composite indicators, each have their own methodological advantages and disadvantages. One of the foremost methodological debates in the social indicators literature is that of quantitative versus qualitative indicaton. This debate catalyzed the social indicators movement of the 1970's and 1980's that was concemed with "people-centred development". It paralleled the rise of alternative feminist research methods that eschewed statistical methods for more participatory and qualitative methods (Beck, 1994,3). The distinction between quantitative (traditional) and qualitative (participatory) indicators hablurred, bowever, as qualitative indicators can be quantined through coding methods to facilitate analysis. Many development agencies now use a combination of traditional and participatory methods in îheir evaluation processes. The normative nature of indicators would suggest that the ment movement to develop indicators of sustainability shows a significant commitment to social change. Given the "diverse views on how we need to change in order to achieve sustainability", it is not surprishg that as many diverse approaches and sets ofindicaton have been esiablished (BCRTEE, 1993,8). The importance of monitoring is thus magnified by the fact that there is neither consensus on where we're going, nor on how to get there. Practical applications of SuSfainability indicators to date have been combinations of social, environmental and economic indicators, for example, the Jacksonville (Florida) Quality

Indicators for Progress, the Sustainable Seattle Indicators of Sustainable Community, and the Oregon BenchmarkS. Some agencies have advocated a more complex linlcing of these three spheres, but this integration has been in theory only. For example, the British Columbia Round

Table on the Environment and the Economy has suggested a sustainability reporting system that accounts for information gathering, analysis of govemance, communication and zction, while the National Round Table on Environment and the Economy has suggested a hework that includes indicators of ecosystem health and integrity, human-ecosystem interactions, human well-being, and an overall synthesis of the three. One of the obvious difficulties with sustainability indicators is knowing what to maure, as "state-of-sustainability"reporting can easily become "state-of-everythûigI1reporting. While "state of' or "status" indicators are usefbl for assessing sustainability, monitoring trends, educating the public and rneasuring performance, they may nevertheless have shortcomings. First, they can not assess the potential for sustainability but are useful only after implementation has taken place. They are therefore reactive rather than proactive. Second, they cm not explain why changes occur, but can only describe it after it happens. They are therefore 31 descriptive rather than evduative in the sense of determining cause and effect Finally, they may neglect the fuadamental issue of power dtogether. Status indicators are therefore necessary, but not smcient for providing meanin@ and timely assessrnents of the sustainability.

iii) Pui._oose of the Framework The following Mework is an attempt to develop more proactive, "actionnindicaton that address the core issue of power directly. The goal of these indicators is to identifj and explain the dynamics behind the structural baniers to sustainability of institutions and their resulting decisions in the fom of projects, programs and policies. This can be done before or as these decisions are taken and implemented, in order to imrnediately assess their potential sustainability. Action indicators would be usefbl in the developmental stage of projects as structural guidelines, before implementation as a screen for potentially uosustainable structures, and after implementation as an evaiuative tool to highlight the areas where structural change can make a difference. If our goal is to expose barriers to sustainabfiity, then these indicators could be described as indicators of uwtainabiliiy. Raising a critiquing without providing solutions may be considered a negative approach. Since we know what Lm't working, however, and only vaguely know what will (in p~ciple),1 would suggest that this is an adnptive rather than a negative approach. As W. Jay Reedy, a polifical philosopher, pointed out, "announcing sound principles without showing what prevents their redization..will not lead to the recognition and removal of that obstruction" (Reedy, 1995,72). The following fkimework is intended to guide the development of more specinc indicators at the local level. In the absence of a public process to develop these indicators, which would be beyond the scope of this paper, the hework approach permits flexibility so that they may be adapted to the local context and values. In addition to the structural criteria, the selection of indicators will be guided by the following general cntena for good indicators. They should be:

locdy based; relevant to politicaUeconomic systems; reflective of stakeholder concems; both objective (quantitative, technical) and subjective (qualitative, percephial); responsive or sensitive to change; based on available data; easy to understand; compmble; and useful for driving change?'

iv) The lndicators Framework What is an indicator of hierarchy in political and economic structures? Mat is an indicator of unsustainably large scale, or a lack of feedback loops? Specific indicators are established here for a case study of reforestation projects in India

1. Hierarchv In the context of developing sustainab'ity, an indicator of hierarchy will expose the inequitable concentration of decision-making power in political economic systems. Stratification of power does not necessarily imply hierarchy; organhtion and the division of tasks is an important part of getting work done. Decisions rnay be made by one person or a select group without public consultation, but this does not mean that power must be concentrated at these points. Checks can exist to counter such concentration. Where decision-making ocws that affects people or commuities, these people and communities must have reciprocal power to question an& through the proper channels, overhm these decisions. This way, people cm decide which types of decisions should be put to public debate, for example, and which types should be left in the han& of administrators. Power is therefore shared through transparent and accountable decision-making, making this a compound solution to both hierarchy and the lack of feedback 100~s.~~ The indicators of hierarchy are based on the four main oppressions stated in chapter 3, that is, men and wornen, commmity and bureaucracy, possessos and n~n-~ossessors,~~and

'lThese criteria have been partially derived from Peat Mmick Stevenson & Kellogg, "Sustainability Indiaitors Methodology", a report prepared for the Fraser Basin Management Board, Vancouver, B.C., June, 1993, 50; and the Alberta Round Table general critena for sustainabiliîy indicators in BCRTEE, From Ideas to Action, 49. %e municipality of Rossland, B.C., has moved to a system that provides oppominities for the people to fonvard bylaws or force bylaws forwarded by council to referenda, followinp a clear procedure of petition. ïhus far this s stem has proven to be successfil. 'The real diflerence between democracy and oligarchy is poverly and wealth. The rich are few and the poor are many ... Where the poor rule, that is a democracy" (Aristotle, quoted in Coleman, Daniel A., Eco ety3 Rutgers UP: New Jersey, 1994, 61). humans and nature. For these indicators to be responsive to change, it mut be clearly stated that more hierarchy is less sustainable: that is, the more concentration or centralization of power in a system, the less sustainable the system. However, we need not aspire to egalitarianism, an ided that does not occur in reality (like a climax forest). The concept of a specbum of hierarchy allows for flexibility in choosing the place on the spectnim that best fits the specific cultural context as well as the dynamic nature of the univer~e.~~ Examples of indicators of hierarchy in the context of reforestation projects in India are as follows: Men and women: gender equity can be measured qualitatively through detennining the substantive participation of women in decision-making related to the project at hand, as compared to that of men. It could be measured quantitatively through, for example, the number of women occupying elected office, or by cornparhg male to female income levels. In the context of the case study, however, income levels would be less useful as women do not ofken participate independently in the formal economy. Communi~and bureaucracy: political equity can be measured qualitatively by determining the substantive participation of local people in decision-making relative to that of govemment officiais. Possessors and non-possessors: econornic equity could be measured quantitatively by

identifjhg the main beneficiaries of the project and matching this to incorne differentials. For example, if the poor benefit fiom the project at least as much as the rich, then the project codd be considered equitable fiom the perspective of this indicator. Humaos and nature: species equity could be measured qualitatively by detemiining the extent to which ecocentric values are considered in decisionmaking through assessing project goals. For example, ecocentric values would be expressed in the inclusion of substantive project goals such as species diversity, soi1 conservation, habitat preservation, etc. A distinction should be made, however, between the expression of these values as non-substantive project principles and their inclusion as substantive project goals.

24~eeBotkin, Daniel B., Discordant Harmonies: a New Ecologv for the Twenty-First Centu?, Oxford UP: New York, 1990, for a fil1 treatment of the concept of the dynamic universe. 34 2. &aIe In the context of power relationships, an indicator of scale will express the size or magnitude of political and economic systems or institutions where decisions taken in one place (and by one group of people) have an impact on another place (and another group of people). In oiher words, our concem with measuring scde is not only to measure the physical size of the system, but also to account for the distribution of decision-making power within that system. This nuance is clarîfied by an examination of the key concepts of centralization and decentralization. Centdization and decentralization describe not only large and small scde in the physical sense but also the locus or concentration of decision-making power. A centralized system is a system in which power is concentrated at the centre, while a decentralized system is a system in which power is distributed (more evenly) among its constituent parts (which, in the case of political and economic systems, may be regions, municipalities or people). Scde is relevant to sustainability both in terms of the physical space encompassed by the exercise of power as well as the distribution of power within that space; our indicator of scale shouid thus reflect this linkage. Two simple indicators of scale cmtherefore be fkned as: a) Distance between a decision and its final impact; and b) Number of people afEected by the decision, where as either grows in magnitude, a subsequent drop can be expected in sustainability. These two quantitative indicators should be combined for the following reasons: the distance indicator alone may fail in systems (e-g., northem Canada) which are small in tems of population, but large in terms of geobgapk(Jcal size, or in small areas with large populations, neither of which can be considered "large scale" (scale is relative but "Iarge scale" inplies global proportions). Thus in our consideration of scale, we need to be concemed with both geoDgaphicalas well as population size.

3. J,ack of Feedback Loops Feedback loops are natual charactenstics of circulating systems. To expose their absence in linear systems as a bamier to sustainability is equivalent to identifiing infoxmation channels that would improve decision-making but that do not exia or are not functional. The more, and the more effective, feedback loops that exist, the more sustainable a system will be. This presents a methodologicai problem - how does one identify or assess something that isn't there? We will therefore need to take a somewhat different approach with this indicator. Having identified some types of feedback loops in the previous section, we can test for these in much the same way that ecologists test for indicator species to assess the health of an ecosystem. Two useful types of feedback loop indicators are:

a) Indigenous knowledge: the use of indigenous knowledge could be rneasuied qualitatively by determining the extent of its use in, for example, the technical aspects of reforestation in India Indigenous knowledge is not only an important preliminary feedback between bureaucrats and local people at the plhgstages of a project, but it also establishes communication links for further feedback (e-g., monitoring) down the road. b) Accountability: accountability to the public cmbe tracked by following the response path of cornplaints regarding decisions. In the case of reforestation in India, if a

complaint amse regarding a decision to plant a certain species of tree, for example, one could track that complaint to detemine whether or not it reached the decision-maker and was acted upon.

v) Conclusion

This concludes Part One, the analysis of structure in political and economic systems and its relevance to sustainability. Part Two focuses on a case study of reforestation or "sustainable development" projects in a tribal region of central India. The objectives of the case study are to assess the validity of the proposed barries to sustainability, the effectiveness of the indicators framework, and the sustainability of the projects. part TI: Function

5. Jhabua District, Madhya Pradesh: Social and Environmental Crisis

i) Location. Geop~hv.Cl imate. and Natural Resources Jhabua District, in western Madhya Pradesh (MI'), borders Rajasthan to the north, to the west, and Maharashtra to the south (Map 1). It is a region of foothills, lying on a spur of the Vindhyan range and abutting the westemrnost reaches of the Malwa Plateau. The Nannada river valley drains the district to the south, as does the Mahi to the north. Tributaries of these two major rivers flow through the distnct, although their levels fluctuate drastically with the seasons and they dry up altogether in places. There are no Iakes in the district, though 'stop- dams' account for the proliferation of human-made 'nalas' or ponds (sometimes of significant size). Altitude in the district ranges fkom 3 17 - 714 m, and its area totals 6,757 km& The capital of MP, Bhopal, takes 6-7 hom to reach by train? The Indian capital, New Delhi, takes 9-10 hours to reach by train and is the same distance iiom Jhabua as Bombay. Urban Indians therefore perceive of the region as "the interior", and express honor that one might want to visit there. Admhistratively, the relationship between the district and the state in Mais comparable to that of the federal and provincial govemments in Canada, though with a great deal less policy autonomy. In the words of one bureaucrat, "policy is decided by the central govemment and implemented by the states", at the district level? Jhabua is descsbed as "wide and open with rolling plains of grazing lands altemating with fields of black-cotton soil" (NCHSE, 1993, 15). It was not always this way - a popular expression states that "there was thick forest*', full of lions - but now you yïll not even find a rabbit". The climate is semi-arid, with average temperatures ranging fiom l OOC in January (der)to 400C in May (sumrner). The other seasons are monsoon, fiom June to September, where the district expenences most of its rainfall in heavy bursts, and the post-monsoon growing

bout 600 km, the actual distance is less significant a measure than its accessibility to local people. That is, 600 km doesn't seem terribly far if one has a car and a telephone, but it might as well be on another planet if one doesn't. 26This is especially mie with respect to forest management. ARempts have been made recently to radically decentnIize the management of other resources through "Panchayati Raj" or the rule of villase counciIs. As it is a very new effort its success remains to be seen. 27"...so thick that we couldn't even see the sun at mid-day", according to one village elder. Jhabwr District in relation to Madhya Pradesh and India season fiom mid-October to mid-December. Rainfall is highly variable in Jhabua Variability in timing (the onset and retreat of rnonsoon) and distribution (continuity of monsoon) of raidail makes this area very Milnerable to drought. Average muai rainfall in the di& ranges fiom 762 mm to 962 mm; however, it can Vary up to 36% fiom one year to the next. Overall, average

mual rainfall has showa decreasing trend over the last 20 yeais (NCHSE, 1993,3 8). Jhabua's population is 86% tribal or adi~asi;~the main tribes being Bhil, Bhilda and Patelia (JDSO,199 l)? Jhabua's adivasis live mainly in villages composed of a number of 'falias', kinship groupings of two or three houses each, situated on hilltops and adjacent to their fields. Their livelihood is gained increasingly through subsistence agriculture and supplemented by wage labour. For a variety of reasons includiag rapid population growth, environmental decline in the form of soil erosion and desertincation, and the decreasing distance to urban centres, about half of the tribal population outmigrates seasonally in search of work. Non- adivasis (Hindus, Muslims and Jains) live in towns, where light industry and services are concentrated. Produce and livestock are brought in fiom the surrounding village farms for the weekly 'haat' or market &y. Natural resources in Jhabua District include everything that people use to gain their livelihood and are not confined to commercial resources. Agriculture is central to the household economy, therefore, soil and water are of prirnary importance. Soils in the district tend to be deep dong river banks and valleys, and shallow on slopes. Medium black soils make up about 30% of the district (lowlands) and are considered suitable for agriculture. Red soils, which make up 60% of the dist&, occur on uplands and slopes, are thin, do not form well-drained groups and have very low fertility. Any available land is quickly converted to agiculture, however, due to the high population density in the district.30 Jhabua receives most of its water from rainfall, so the peoples' livelihood is very much dependent on the generosity of the monsoon rains. Ground water supplies are in higher demand

28~divasimeans "original inhabitant"; however, there are similar political connotations to these terms as there are in Canada for the terms "native" and "Indian", so 1 will altemate between the two (tribal and adivasi). 2g~habua'stribes are fiom the same linguistic group (Bhili), but there are important caste (clan) and religious differences that distinguish them. 30~elativeto the rest of India, Jhabds huuman population density is low. Relative to the earrying capacity of the land, however, it is hi$. 39 recently due to the relatively new practice of irrigation; there has been a parallel demease in groundwater levels. Fish are raised in nalas for human comumption, while clean drinking water is a perpehial problem, especially in the villages (NCHSE, 1993, 12-26). Cornmercially valuable minera1 deposits including marble, limestone, soapstone and asbestos have been identified in the district, but not exploited (Goverment of MP, 1974). Before the forests were enclosed and largely destroyed, the adivasis of Jhabua suMved through a combined economy of shifting cultivation and hunting and gaîhenng (Anderson and Huber, 3 1). The forest ('jungle' in Hindi) provided at least half of their basic needs in the growing season, and the bulk of their needs in the lean rnonsoon season, including fuel, fodder, building materials, fit, honey, gums, bark, roots, liquor, tendu leaves (tobacco), wildlife, and most importantly, water in the fom of soi1 moisture and cooler temperatures.)' The importance of the forest to the tribal economy was noted as late as 1974, when Jhabua was descnbed as

"thinly populated by Bhil and Bhilala tribes, whose livelihood is mostly forest produce with agiculture restricted to smd areas around the villages (Govemment of MP, 1974)~~ The following information was compikd fiom the last available Forest Department working plan (1 964-65) (NCHSE, 1993,153- 166). nie forests were composed of mainly dry teak (Tectona grandis) with some mixed sa1 (Boswellia serrata) and anjan (Hardwickia binata), and classified as a combination of tropical dry and tropical moist deciduous forests. Edaphic types were described as Boswellia, Hardwickia, Butea and Lateritic forests. Tropical moist deciduous forests are, "closed high forests, generally 25-30 m in height, and the dominant species being mostly deciduous. nie dominants contain a few evergreen in the lower stoW... The typical bamboo. ..grow as understory " (NCHSE,1 993,154). Ground cover was mainly evergreen shrubs and grasses, and forest fxes favoured the regeneration of teak and grasses. Tropical dry deciduous forests contained more or less the same species, though far fewer of them, with a less dense canopy and no evergreens. Average height of this cancpy was 13-20 m. Degraded scrub

3i~eninterviewed, villageen spoke of their belief that the trees atû-act clouds and bring min; in faci, since deforestation has become increasingly widespread, so has annual rainfall declined @CHSE, 1993,38). 3%his would have been a fairly anachronirtie statement at the the, as the occupational transition from the forest to the field had been long established by 1974. 40 and savannah fore- were also documented in 1964. The mineral inventory in 1974 gauged forest cover at approximately 33%. Today, land under Forest Department jurisdction ("forest land") covers 25% of the total land area of the district, or 169,499 ha33 (Map 2 - p. 160). The designation of forest land is mdyfor legal purposes as much of it is barely vegetated. In 1993, with the aid of remote sensing the forest land in the district was analyzed as follows: a) Dense forest (>0.4 crown cover) 19.6% b) Open forest (c0.4 crown cover) 16.5% c) Degraded forest (tree vegetation sparse but root stock preserved) 22.5% d) Scmb forest 2% e) Blank forest (bald and bmen land) 372% f) Plantation in forest land 2.2% Thus dense forest is limited today to only 5% of total land area, and is concentrated in the southern part of the district . ii) The People of Jhabua: Economv. Culture and Politlç~. The Bhils are the largest of the tribes of Jhabua, followed in nmbers by Bhilalas (a mixed caste of Rajputs and Bhils) and Patelias. The intimate relationship that formerly existed between the adivasis of Jhabua and the forest (and the dering of the people upon its loss) was captured by the famous explorer and author, Vamer Elwin:

To a vast number of the tribal people the forest is their well-loved home, their livelihood, their very existence. It gives them food,... material to build their homes and to practise their arts, ...( and) keeps them wam with its fuel and cool with its gratefid shade... Ot is striking to see how in many of the myths and legends the deep sense of identity with the forest is emphasized (Elwin, l963,5 1). The process of enclosure began with the arrival of the , who were descended fiom Rajputs from Jodhpur, Rajasthan. They were granted part of what is now hbuaDistrict during the mid-fourteenth century deof the mogul emperor, Jehangir. In order to take control of the State (Jhabua District is composed of 5 former "pnncely states" - Jhabua, Alirajpur, , Kathiwada, and Jobat), Kesho Das Rathor had to defeat Jtiabbu Naik, the "fieebooter" or bandit

33~herehas been a runninp dispute between the Forest Deparmient and Revenue Lands Department regardhg land allocation, Le., the Forest Department claims that their lands total 25%of the district whereas the Lands records show the figure at doser to 17%. I am using Forest Department figures (NCHSE, 1993, 1 16). 41 of the Labana race who had de facto power in the region at the tirne and after whorn the district is now named. In the early days of feudal de,"the land and forest in which the tribals had customary though unwrittzn rights, were lefi to be managed without interference fiom Hindu overlordships" (Anderson and Huber, 34). NevertheIess, al1 of the forest was in "khalsa",meaning that it was the sovereign property of the (WHSE, 1993,160). As its commercial value increased, so were tribal rights to its products restricted. Concessions were granted - generously at first, then less and less so as time passed. This had a significant impact on the adivasis:

[After the middle of the 19th century], people fiom outside began to move into the forest and conditions began to change. The gradual extension of the authoriv of the Govenunent and the ... desire of the forest officiais to exercise ever closer control over the use of forest produas deeply dishirbed the entire tribal economy and introduced a psychological conflict (Elwin, I963,5 1). With British contact both the population and the economy expanded rapidly into previously isolated areas. Adivasis were forced out of the forest to meet the British demand for teak, and into shifting cdtivation to meet their basic need~?~The colonial administration in Calcutta, which had moved fiom a policy of non-interference, to gaining some conirol over the princely states via commercial contracts and treaties in the mid-nineteenth century, to a policy of full annexation by the 18501s7 perceived shifting cultivation as a threat to its potential revenue fiom forests. It responded by implementing a series of Iegislative and policy tools to enclose the forest that incrementally restncted the use nghts of the tribal people.

Briefly, the Forest Act of 1865 declared aIl forests on state (Crown) land as state property, and created the Forest Department. The Indian Forest Act of 1878 began the practice of classiQing forests as reserved, protected or village forest, with parallel restrictions on the collection of produce. The Forest Policy of 1894 reiterated the government's intent to administer the forest "for the public benefit", which required "the regulation of. ..[use rights] in the forest area which may have previously been enjoyed by the inhabitants of its immediate

34~histransition was for security purposes and not just to secure the sovemmenttseconomic interest Mbals, who knew the forest well, would hide in i~ attack and loot vehicles transporthg goods out of the district and return to the forest to hide (pers-comm., 1995). 42 neighbourhood" (NCHSE, 1987, 1). It Merclassified the forests, ostensibly for consemation, but in the patnarchal marner of the times:

The nrst object to be aimed at is to preserve the wood and gras fiom destruction; for user [use rightsf must not be exercised so as to annihilate its subject, and the people must be protected against their own improvidence (NCHSE,1 987,4). This lead to the demarcation of Forest Reserves and the appointment of Forest Offices, ranges and guards.

Adivasis' rights and access to forest products were thus increasingly restricted. At the tum of the cenhiry, concessions in Jhabua included the right to collect non-timber forest products

(NTFPs, e.g., gras, honey, gums) for domestic use, although products collected for export were charged duties thereon? Grazing fees were assessed by the number of ploughs a fmerkept, while in othes a "commutation fee" was assessed per plough for the collection of al1 forest products and graPng fees were exempted? No fees were charged on headloads of fielwood or fodder (Jhabua State Gazette, 1908; Ibid., 1941). Many of these concessions still exist today in "protected" (as distinguised fiom "reserved") forests.

Permits were required for the commercial harveshg and transport of timber, whereas adivasis were granted timber for domestic use through a convention called "nistar", (WHSE, 1993,162). In Kathiwada State, for example, each household was provided with 20 teak and 40 bamboo annuaily, a generous amount (pen.comm., 1995). In 1995 the nistar concession still existed, though it had been pared down so that one could only obtain the poorest quality of wood, and only in the case of emergency (e.g., home fire). It was expected to be phased out altogether in 1996. The Indian Forest Act of 1927 served to consolidate the previous Acts and policies and is still in force today. It abolished use rights in resemed forests (classified as such because they require preservation on physical or climatic gromds or because they contain large tracts of

3s~tshould be noted here that restrictions to forest products varied hmone to the nexc therefore the examples given are not universally applicable. 36~hecommutation fee or tax created a disincentive for people to take up agriculture and encouraged them to "steaI1' their livelihood fkom the forest This could be a coniributing factor to the widespread occurrence of thefi in the culture of Jhabua's adivasis. In an interview conducted in November 1995, a forest officer spoke of the villagers' tendency to refuse seedlings offered fiee fiom the Forest Department, even though they would steal seedlings. When asked about this, the villasers explained tbat the stolen seedlings grow better than fiee ones. commercially valuable timber) and left it to the discretion of the States to establish desfor protected forests (classified as such because they do not contain much valuable timber, or are pasture or wasteland). Today, most of the forest land (-80%) in Jhabua District is classified as reserved and is therefore completely off-Iimits (NCHSE,1993,153). Adivasis are not only prohibited fiom collecting forest products fiom these areas but are charged for trespassing if they even approach the~n.~~As an example of the impact that this has had on the functioning of local econornies, one of the most important inputs in the household economy of tribals is grass, or fodder for domestic animais. Where livestock used to graze fieely in the forest, gras is now collected fiom reserved forests and sold to local people for cash. Independence (1 947) saw an increase in the rate of deforestation as political and economic instability lead to panic cutîing by the muafidan (former feudal lords). In addition, the socialist movement at the time promoted the transfer of land ownership to cultivators under the Land Revenue Act of 1952. A local socialist leader, Marna Baleshwar Dayal, instigated tribals to massive deforestation in order to bring the land under cultivation and thereby attain ownership rights under the slogan, "Tree and land is ours!" @ers.comm., 1995). A number of other post-Independence events may have aggravated deforestation in Jhabua District. First, in 1956 the smaller state of (of which Jhabua was a part) was annexed into greater Madhya Pradesh, now the largest state in India This was particularly siyificant at the time since states then held the constitutional head of power for forest policy and could unilaterally amend the Forest Act. This changed in 1976 when forests were added to the concurrent list of the Constitution of India, formally bringing forests under central control? Finally ,the new National Forest Policy of 198 8 is quite progressive in ternis of promoting decentralization, and it puts conservation ahead of revenue generation as a management objective. Nevertheless, its interpretation is left to the discretion of state forest deparûnents, andt

37~was totd repeatedly of abuses perpeüated by Forest Depariment oficials. For example, oficials wouid beat people and confiscate the meager fiiniishing in their huts, claiming that the wood must have been stolen from the forest and was therefore govemment property. Another cornmon cornplaint was to be beaten for venturing too close to reserved forest land while carrying an axe. 38~oincidentally,people consistently stated approximately 20 years ago (1975) as the tirne when forabegan to noticeably disappear. 44 it is in conflict with the relevant legislation. It has therefore failed to bring about change, and India's forests continue to decline. ïhe rapid destniction of Jhabua's forests is commonly blamed on population growth and

illiteracy, but a cursory historical analysis points to another dynamic - that of political and econornic centralizati~n.)~The changes to the household economy brought about by the enclosure of forests has forced adivasis to earn cash in order to buy the various products that the forest used to provide them for fiee, such as medicine, a varied diet, fuel and fodder. They have therefore had a hand in illegal felling, to use or sel1 firewood, or to increase their agricultural land holdings. In economic terms this is a smdl proportion of the return that black market contractors gain fkom the illegd teak trade. Population growth cm aîso be blamed on the transition to an agricultural econorny (which demands larger families), the perception of relative poverty40and the attendant changes in perceptions of basic needs. These will be discussed in more detail later as they also contribute to failed sustainable development efforts.

iii) Current State of the Economy and Environment In essence, things are bad in Jhabua and getting worse. From the centrd perspective, literacy is among the lowest in the country, with only 14% literacy among tribal men and 3% among tribal women. Poverty is Iikewise rampant, with average annual incomes for marginal and srnall fmers4l being only 4-1 0,000 Rs. ($160-400 Cdn.) (NCHSE, 1993,247). Over half of tribal households outmigrate to cities after the growing season in search of wage labour, where they saerfrom appalling living conditions. From the local perspective, despite a 10-year moratorium on felling, the forest continues to disappear, leading to rising temperatures and worst of dl, decreased rainfall The alienation of tribals ftom econornic decision-making and the imposition of central structures of govemance (Western-style democracy) have dissolved traditional structures involving a "Thadvi" or

39~would often think to myself, "These people have been illiterate for thousands of yean - what eke has changed to affect the forests?". 400ne elder spoke of the wealth and convenience of villaje life today as compared to his youth @e described his "kaccha"or mud house as a "big building"), whiie the younger generation considers themselves poor relative to media images of urban life, as expressed in their desire for a "pukka" or cernent house. 41~arginaland maIl fmenmake up 75% of landholdings, with 2 ha or less. 97% of Jhabuds population count their main occupation as a,ai;iculture. headrnan, and decision-making processes based on "mutual understanding". Comption is now a comrnon feature of dl levels of g~~e-e*t.4' On a positive note, the recent reservation of 3% of al1 elected positions for women is promising, although the status of women and die landless is still very low. This reservation is based on the new Panchayti Raj reforms for local govement. While flawed, this constitutional change offers promise for local empowement and is worthy of much greater attention. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to consider it in detail. The lack of power fhat defines daily reality for adivasis in Jhabua is reflected in their coping strategies: ouûnigration, crime, alcoholism indebtedness, population growth and cultural assimilation. People outmigrate, go into debt or steal because they can not meet their basic needs with the resources that they have. They drink and corntviolent crimes - Jhabua district hm the highest homicide rate in Asio - perhaps in response to povew and powerlessness. While it has withstood colonization extremely well, the tribal culture is nevertheless threatened by the prevailing opinion, even among themselves, that they are a "backwards"people. The future is looking dim in Jhabua Wlethere are inspiring stories of individuals who, upon witnessing successful rehabilitation projects, plant trees around their fields or grow grass on their less productive land, these options are only available to larger landowners." May villagers expressed hesitation at planting trees because they are diaid of being harassed by Forest Deparbnent officials (NCHSE,no date, 8). Findly, whiie agroforestry and social forestry have been encouraged for years by the Indian government (for the most part unsuccessfully), in the end even the grandest roadside trees and the lushest field borders do not replace the need for accessible, nadforests. The last large stand of trees in Jhabua is in Kathiwada, where poor transportation links and a moderate climate has prolonged its life. It is under immense pressure today, and 1 would estimate that it will disappear within the next 10- 15 years unless action is taken to reverse the trend.

42 1 am not an expert on the traditional structures of govemance of the , nor am 1 impiying that local structures of govemance were ideal in tems of fieedom and justice. It is commonly held that traditional structures of governance have disappeared; however, people still recollect the existence of checks and balances on power and decision-making through processes of "mutual understanding" or consensus- This is supported by the existence of this mode of decision-making within the family today (pers. comm., 1995). a and is so scarce in the district haî fmeaare nluctant to plant fhit mes around their fields despite their benefits because they take up too much space. They prefer to pIant Eucalyptus or barnboo that have a higher return for their investment given the scarcity of wood and easier maintenance involved. 46 In sum, the district is suf5ering an acute ecological cnsis that has mots in social (economic, political and cultural) factors. The decrease in average annual rainf'all poses the most immediate threat to the people as it affects their ability to provide food for themselves. 6. Reforestaîion in Jhabua District

i) Metbod The methodology for the case study was a qualitative research method that combined feminist and ethnographie approaches. Archival research, field observation and secondary data supplemented the data from semi-structured inte~ews.Some additional secondary research was also required pnor to the case study for perspectives on politicai ecology, community development and forest management in the Indian context. I conducted semi-structured inte~ewswith members of representative groups fiom my codtyof interest, that is, forest stakeholders. The method allowed respondents to identi6 salient issues according to their own judgement and allowed me to probe these issues, thus providing further value to the research while ensuring mutual respect and collaboration. 1set the broad context for the discussion and used my question set mauily to refocus the discussion where necessary. Tnis method is different fkom conventional or positivist approaches as it does not seek to remove the researcher's bias, but accepts that this bias exists and will info~nany analysis. 1consider my biases to be exhibited in Part One of this paper. Limitations of this research are reviewed in detail in Chapter 10. This method proved to be particularly valuable in the context of this research due to the highiy political nature of the subject and the necessity for probing people who answered questions indirectly. A more technically rigorous method may well have been rejected. In many instances, people were hesitant when they realized that 1 intended to record their answers on paper. I found that this type of research was most valuable for gaining insight into underlying dynamics that explain observed phenornena These dynamics are perhaps better understood through listening to people tell their own stones, rather than being confined within the parameters of surveys and questionnaires. Before setting out for the field, I drafted a rough set of open-ended questions to. guide my research in Jlabua District. Upon my amval in September, 1995, I sou& out members of the reforestation community, or stakeholders in the forests. They included state Forest Department officials (mainly non-adivasi), elected leaders (aàivasi), villagers (adivasi), development workers (NGO staff and Christian missionaries - non-adivasi), and townspeople (mainly non-adivasi). Dirt roads and nails were rough, and my main mode of transportation consisted of a 70cc scooter for myself and rny translater, so we focused our efforts on projects within 30 km of Jhabua tom. On occasion, however, 1 ventufed farther, to the forested areas around Kathi* These forays offered a view into the past, a place where enough forest remains to play a part in the village economy . The primary research stage involved 66 semi-structured interviews which 1 conducted during the months of September to December, 1995. Of those interviewed, 14 were governent officids, 13 were elected leaders, 16 were viIIagers, 14 were development workers, and 9 were townspeople. In total, 59 males and 7 females were interviewed. The gender imbalance was the result of many factors, including: the necessity to follow established protocol when making contact with villagers; the lack of time'that village women have for anything other than domestic and agricultural work; and the added difficulty of translation with women who were uneducated and spoke no Hindi. Very few translators were available who spoke English, Hindi and Bhili. In addition, social mores made it difficult for male translators to travel with me or interview females who were not directly related to hun. The interview questions evolved with my fafniliarization of the local context and the nature of the projects under study. A final question set was developed to address the original research question and respond to the hypothetical indicators hework (Appendùc B). These questions focused specifically on people's perceptions of the causes and effects of deforestation in the district, the degree of participation involved in the reforestation projects at hand, and people's definition and criteria for success of these projects. I asked people about success and not sustainability on the advice of my translater. Mer lengthy discussions about the meaning of sustainability, she suggested that the two terms were sufnciently sirnilar after translation, but that the term success would be more easily understood. The reforestation projects studied could al1 be considered "sustainable development" initiatives as their objectives included both natural resource conservation and development for the benefit of the local people. Interview responses were translated fiom Bhili and Hindi to English on site, and recorded in wnting due to people9 aversion to recording devices. 1 coded the responses according to theme, project, and stakeholder group. This was done manually becaw the volume of manually-recorded data (Ihad no access to cornputers in Jhabua) was quite large (more than 300 pages), and the value of digitizing al1 of this data was questionable given the superficial level of analysis that most sofniare programs were capable of at the tune. I felt that a ncher analysis would be possible through a manual interpretation of the data 1 therefore re-read the data several times and identified themes through colour coding and notation. I sought to identify themes relevant to the indicators hework as weil as those occ~gspontaneously. I transferred the data that conelated to the main themes onto index cards, in essence creating a manuai database. The cards recorded quotations, themes, subthemes, project and stakeholder group, so that they could be organized in a variety of ways. The main lens of analysis could be considered to be the themes, some of which correspond to the hypothetical indicators, and some of which do not. In order to identiQ any major trends or patterns in responses according to stakeholder group, 1 organized the data into matrices according to themes, with subthemes along the y-axis, stakeholder groups along the x-axis, and different symbols representing positive and negative responses for each project. As part of my secondary data collection, I compiled and reviewed as much official documentation as possible about the specific reforestation projects under shidy. The next few pages summarize this information, beginning with a brief synopsis of the history of reforestation in Jhabua Distnct in order to set the context. Chapters 7 and 8 descnbe the results of the data analysis; and Chaptea 9 and 10 contain discussions of the results and the general conclusions.

ii) A Historv of Reforestation Stratecies in Jhabua District As noted in Part 1, forestry in India is under central control. Nurseries and plantations are operated by the MP State Forest Department. Plantations on forest lands are either under the Forest Developrnent Corporation (FDC) or the Divisional Forest Office (DFO). The former is a branch of the Forest Department whose objective is to "remove useless forest [that is, forests of low commercial value] and supplement with commercial forest" @ers.comm., 1995). The DFO is the regional headquarters for the Forest Depariment whose "rehabilitation" projects are concerned mainly with "green-up" or the restoration of the landscape. Centrally-sponsored social forestry projects such as "Fuelwood and Fodder" plmtations and "Panch Wan" (village forest projects), are undertaken rnainly on non-forest lands, that is, land under the jurisdiction of the Revenue Department or reveriue land." Social forests, in India is described as "forest activity on non-forest lands to form a beer zone around protected forest" (pen.comm., 1995). The purpose of social forestry is to reduce people's dependence on natural forests, which are largely classified as reserved by the Forest Department and managed for the purpose of central revenue generation Since the late 1980'~~however, social forestry projects have also been undertaken on some degraded farest lands, that is, land under the jurisdiction of the Forest Deparîment. Agroforestry, a type of social forestry, is administered through the Agriculture Department and the District Rural Development Authonty (DRDA). Agroforestry projects have resulted in tree planting on some agricultural land in Jhabua, but faxmers are generally reluctant to participate in such projects, having experienced bureaucratie mismanagement in the past45 Regular reforestation began as officia1 govemment policy in the 196O's, but most plantations in Jhabua District have failed. Green-up tends to look promishg in the fust three to five years, while a guard is retained, but after this time the young trees are destroyed by people or animals. Whether on forest Iand or revenue land, plantations are destroyed by cutting and grazing. Dynamics to explain this phenomenon are discussed in later chapters.

iii) Current Sustainable Development Proiects in Jhabua The projects subject to this study al1 began witbin the last five yean and were operating in the area around Jhabua tom. They emphasized naturai resource conservation and economic development for the benefit of local residents (though not exclusively so), and they dl had a reforestation cornponent. 1 chose to focus on the Joint Forest Management ("JFM") project being

There is litîle private land in the Western sense - lands are owned by the Revenue Department, thou$ use ri&& are with the person who has "patta", a traditional form of Iease. 1 may refer to these leased lands as private lands. 4STheNational Wastelands Developrnent Project for Rain-fed Areas (NWDPRA) was such a project. Aid was granted to fmers willing to plant trees on their lands with no compensation demanded; a few years later oficials began to demand compensation and the plantations were destroyed. implemented by the DFO in the Kalidevi area, the Integrated Wastelands Development Project ("IWDP") implemented by the National Centre for Human Settlements and the Environment's (WHSE) in the Piplipata arq and the Indo-British Rallifed Famiing Project ("KRIBP") implemented by the Krishak Bharati Cooperative Limited (KRIBHCO) in the Meghnagar area. While these projects began under different auspices and with different implementation strategies, at the time of study they were al1 being afTected by a new fûndiig urnbrella called the Rajiv Ghandi Mission on Watershed Development ("RGM") through the national Ministry for Rural Development 1 will present the RGM guidelines first because they are considered to be at the "cutting edge" of sustainable development techniques, that is, through holistic watershed development. Of significimce to this study is that JFM is effectively replacing RGM on forest lands within RGM watersheds. This may have an effect on the SzlStainability of RGM projects

due to different styles of implementation on different areas of the same watershed. Finally, IWDP has received a five-year extension through RGM, and KRTBP was in the process of

determinhg whether or not to accept RGM fiinding at the time of research. It is therefore useful to keep the RGM's rigorous implementation guidelines in mind as a foil when assessing the other three.

1. Raiiv Ghandi Mission on Watershed Developrnent RGM is a five-year umbrella program that dovetails a number of centrally-sponsored schemes with the general objective of "land and water resource management for sustainable production" (GOI,1994,l). Technically, RGM is intended to adopt and upgrade low-cost local technologies for soi1 and water consemation for "sustainable watershed development". Administratively, it is intended to overcome pst failures based on hadequate participation by local communities. The guidelines state that "success is achieved through GovemmenttsNAts (Voluntary Agencies) participation in the peoples' proames rather than the other way around" (GOI,1994,2). Both govemment agencies and NGO1scan apply to the national Ministry of Rural Development for RGM funding. These agencies become the PIA or Project Implementing Agency and are required to follow quite specific implementation guidelines aimed at assuring local control over project decision-making. In Jhabua, each project is taken up on 5,000 ha areas (maximum),which is usually broken down into ten 500 ha mini-watersheds each. The Forest Department is PIA for 8 out of 15 RGM projects happening in Jhabua District as of 1994. NGOs are PIA for 3 and the other 5 are with various other govemment departrnents. Broad objectives of RGM are: il to promote the economic development of the village community through: the "optimum utilization of the watershed's nadresources ... that will rnitigate ...drought and prevent further ecological degradation"; and employrnent generation and development. ii) to "encourage restoration of ecological balance in the village" through: "sustained community action for the operation and maintenance of assets ";and "simple, easy and afiordabe technological solutions and institutional arrangements" that make use of local knowledge and available materials. iii) to improve the economic and social condition of the disadvantaged such as the assetless and women through more equitable distribution of benefits and greater access to income- generating opportudies (GOI, 1994,5-6). Success criteria of RGM involve meeting the goals specified in plans developed at the watershed level, though a fairly specific hework for incikators exists in the guidelines, e-g., "80% of the watershed area is covered with treatment of development activities", etc. Under the guidelines, the PIA forms a multidisciplinary Watershed Developrnent Team (WDT) of experts. The panchayat (or in the case of more than one village, the villages) form a Watershed Association that monitors activities, settles disputes, approves expenditures and nominates mernbers of the Watershed Cornmittee. The Watershed Cornmittee carries out the day-to-day activities of the projecf and consists of villagers fiom the user groups (based around specific activities), and self-help groups @ased around savings) that are formed as part of the project, panchayat members and one member of the WDT. A Secretary is also appoinred to facilitate the activities of the various groups. Funds for the projects are broken down so that 80% goes to watershed development (e.g., soil and water conservation measures, water harvesting structures, replanting etc.), 5% to community organisation (e-g.,organising user groups and self-help groups, conducting

Participatory Rural Appraisds, exposure visits, literacy prograrns, etc.), 5% for training (e.g., in technical aspects of soil and water conservation, horticulture, etc.), and 10% for administrative 53 overhead. An important and mandatory aspect of the pruject is that the community must contribute to the Watenhed Development Funci, either in cash or in kind. This fund is intended to be used for post-project maintenance, and there is no miaimm contribution. The central goverrunent is otherwise providing the full cost of project activities.

2. &IF Forest Department's Joint Forest Management (JFM Promm~ JFM is a centrai government directive (fiom the Ministry of Environment and Forests in New Delhi) that is being implemented at the state level under a govenunent order ("GO") through the MP State Forest Department. Its purpose is to fom forest protection cornminees ("gram s&cha/wan samitis") in villages adjacent to forest land in order to stem "illegal cutting and encroachments by some organised gangs" (SPWD, 47). In essence, the GO describes the need for participation of local people in protecting the furest. It sets an incentive for people to participate will be in the fom of a share of the forest produce: 20% of timberhationalized NTFPs or net income therefiom in forest areas; 30% of timberhationalized NTFPs or net income therefiom in degraded forests; and 100% of the yield denved fiom silviculhiral activity, i.e., thinning, and non-nationalized NTFPS.~~ The implementaîion of JFM is the responsibility of the Divisional Forest Officer (DFO). He selects the forest area to be protected by villages that express interest in the JFM program. He or his represenbtive convenes a meeting and a Forest Protection Cornmittee is formed if 50% of the adult population of the village passes the proposal. One member fiom each household is nominated to the cornmittee (samiti). The Executive is formed in the same meeting and is composed of one member fiom each group of 10 families, the panchayat, and the Forest Ranger who is ex-officio Secretary. The DFO approves the membership of the samiti and its Executive, and the Ranger convenes monthly meetings. The Forest Department therefore has a considerable amount of power in the fûnctioning of the sarniti. In forested areas, the wan sarniti (forest cornrnittee) is responsible for protecting any plantation or forest. They rnust noti@ the relevant forest officers in the case of a crime being committed (e.g., cutting, graring, encroachment, theft of produce) and give their full cooperation

46 Nationalized forest produce includes, for example, tendu leaves, Le., tobacco (NTFP), and teak (timber). Formerly aIi tree species except bamboo were nationalized. 54 to the forest officen in checking illegal activity and making mests. They are also responsible for cooperating with the Forest Department in cbscientificmanagement, tree felling etc." (SPWD, 1993,82). The DFO has the nght to bar any member fiom the samiti if they are found guiity of committuig an offense. The DFO is also responsible for reviewing and approving the work of the samiti (no framework for evaluation is given). He can cancel individual memberships or dissolve the samiti aitogether if they fail to protect the are$ although appeal is possible throua the Conservator of Forests (the head officiai at the next level up fiom the District level). The

DFO also has the right to calculate the value of forest produce in forested areas and determine its distribution among samiu members. Again, key powers are therefore delegated to government officids. In degraded forest areas, the surakcha samiti (protection cornmittee) is formed the sarne way, but there are othenvise dserences in administrative roles and responsibilities. The DFO conducts a socio-economic survey of the village and prepares a five-year management plan that details the development of the axa, the annual quantity and distribution of produce and grazhg facilities to be made available. The plan is then put to the Executive for "suggestions" and the samiti for approval. The DFO takes care of any amendments and can consequently accept or reject the plan. The Executive carries out the management plan ''under the guidance of the Forest Department" (SPWD,1993,84). The DFO has the right to suspend execution of the plan if "in the opinion of the DFO it is found that hds... are not being properly utiliser (SPWD, 1993, 85). The Forest Department provides training necessary for the execution of the plan. Other notable differences in the case of degraded forests: the samiti is responsible for detemiining how the produce will be distributed among its members; and, the Executive has the nght to "take appropriate action agaùist those who are found guilty" of committing an offensee4' It should be reiterated here that JFM has been "dovetaifed" with RGM wherever forest lands are concurrent with a watershed." Funding for RGM has recently been approved in many watersheds where the Forest Department has already taken up soi1 and water conservation works

47 In fact, one cornmittee member told me that they "had to beat one man who let hir wife lop a tree for fuelwood" ers.com., 1995). '' Forest lands tend to be concentrateci on the hilis that make up watershed bighlands, where the valley bottom tend to be cultivated (patta). through other reforestation programs, thereby circumventing RGM's rigorous participatory implementation guidelines. According to the DFO, JFM replaces the participation component of RGM on forest lands. I focused on the JFMRGM projects in the Kalidevi and Bawa. Piplia watersheds. The area taken up in Kalidevi was 135 ha of forest land and 116 ha of Revenue land (private and common) as of December, 1995. More land will be worked as RGM is fully implemented. nie population of the watershed is approximately 300 households (three villages) or 1,800 people and the total area of the watershed is approximately 1,000 hectares. While there was no mention of community fimds in the GO, the people that 1 spoke with in Kalidevi stated that a collection of funds had been taken up by the FD fiom each household to retain a guard. ~lsoof note: the DFO stated that samiti members are given priority wen the Forest Department hires plantation labourers; and villages with samitis are given preference for other development funding (often the only source of cash income for local tribal people). There were no statistics available for the Bawar Piplia area.

C) 3. NCHSE's Tnte~tedWastelands Development Prqiect (IWI)P) NCHSE is a fairly large and well-known NGO,with several field ofices (including Jhabua) and a head office in Bhopal. The Chahan, UN. Buch, is a former IFS (Indian Forest Service) employee. NCHSE undertook a rather extensive research project about Jhabua before starting the IWDP project under Dr. H.K.Jaui, a former UNDP ernployee, ecologist and pioneer of watershed development. Consequently, the same IWDP project has won a UNEPRJNDP award for soi1 and water consewation.

The IWDP is a central initiative that targets state goveniments and NGOs for implementation. As the name suggests, IWDPJsgoal is to integrate land management and wastelands development based on viIlage/watershed plans to promote optimal land use for ecological and socio-economic needs (GOI,1990,36). A priority of the project is to encourage public participation through mechanisms for people's involvement and the equitable and sustainable sharing of project benefits. Project objectives include: i) the conservation of ecologically fragile watersheds through protection, reforestation, pasture development, soi1 and water conservation, etc.;

ii) technology extemion for problem areas, e.g., saline/alkaline soils, ravines, arid and desert areas, etc.; and,

iii) regeneration of degraded forest through nahual regeneration and plantation, with a focus on diversiîy and indigenous species as well as on providing forest products to local comrnunities. The IWDP in Jhabua began in 1991 in a group of villages that I will refer to as the Piplipata area. These villages are part of a 1,270 ha watershed with a total human population of 1,7 16 (NCHSE,1 99 1'6). Afforestation and pasture development was taken up on 4 17 ha of Revenue land (common and p~vate).49A multi-disciplinary cornmittee made up of NCSHE staff and district govemment officials was fomed to guide the implementation of the project, although a memo states that this cornmittee was not vev active (thus rnost work was conducted

by NCHSE staff). The project was initially targeted for Piplipata but had to begin elsewhere as the local people initially resisted the project As Dr. Jain descnbes it, the headman of Piplipata virtually chased him out of the village! He was mistaken for a govemment official and expenenced fkst- hand the hostile relatiomhip between govemment officials and adivasis. It was only after promising to build a "stop-dam" that the people of Kalapan offered Dr. Jain twenty hectares of "bare rock" for pasture development. Upon witnessing the grass harvested fiom project lands in Kalapan, the people of Piplipata approached Dr. Jain to take up similar work in their village. Thus the people had to witness success with their own eyes before they would ûust anyone to begin development work in their area. According to the proposal, people's cooperation was solicited through meetings held to "explain to them the objective of the project and its benefits" (WHSE, 1991,lO). Once the people were "convinced" and had "given their consent to participate", the project could be implemented. This was accomplished through a plan that was based on a detailed land survey (to

49 The NCHSE staff people that 1 spoke to claimed that one of the project's main limitations wu the restriction on the kinds of land that could be worked, Le., Revenue lands. Thus, forest Imds were off limits and private holdings were probiernatic as the viIIagers had to be convinced to allow the project to take place. These restrictions were not mentioned in the guidelines. formulate a treatment plan for degraded lands), a socio-econornic survey (to assess social and economic indicators and develop a strategy to include the people in watershed management), and a resource inventory (for the formulation of "need-based" development). The plan idenaed economic development activities (e.g., irrigation) that could bz integrated into watershed development. it also outlïned a monito~gsystem based on largely quantitative targets (as required by the fimding agency, the National Wastelands Development Program in New Delhi). Species selection for planting was also included in the proposal. A public awareness program '20 motivate the people in understanding the importance of florestation, etc." was intended to encourage people to form cormnittees to manage and protect community laisafter the agency pulled out of the villages. While pnvate lands are adequately protected, the long-term security of common lands remains an issue. Mer 1995, Eundlng for the guard would be depleted, yet no ÜIfr;istnicture for management and protection had been developed at the fime of study. These conmittees were also intended to determine the distribution of project benefits "der the supe~sionand guidance of the IWD Cornmittee" (NCHSE, lWl,l4). At the time of study, grasses fiom common lands were equally distnbuted among households, but no autonomous committees had been formed. It should be noted here that as of 1996, IWDP in the Piplipata area was entering a second 5-year phase under RGM hding and implementation guidelines.

. . 4. E(RIBHCO's Indo-Bntish Ra infed Farming Proieçt (KRIBP)

This project is an independent effort initiated by KRIBCHO, India's national fertilizer CO- operative, a branch of the central Ministry of CO-operatives,with support fiorn the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA). Its goal is to prioritize problem-solving and identifi oppomuiities for innovation (e.g., improved crop varieties, soi1 and water conservation, agroforestry) through the active involvement of local farming communities and a jointly developed understanding of the &ditional fdngsystem (KRIBCHO,1992). Priority is given to meeting the needs of women and the poor and involving them in decision-making. Since the sustainability of the project depends on the continued involvement of the community, the project aims to generate a capacity for this by training community members and developing local 58 institutions to better enable poor fmers to manage resources. There is dso an emphasis on

developing community capability for obtaining senices fiom governent and, in the long nin,

enabling the cornrnunity-based provision of seMces (e.0.. credit, inputs, etc.). A special program management unit was set up in Dahod, Gujarat (approximately 2 hours drive fiom Jhabua tom) to headquarter the project. The unit is cornposed of a Project Manager, a team of social and natural science specialists and teams of Community Organizers who live and work in pain (one male, one femde) within each village cluster. The special management unit has "functional autonomy" for al1 decision-making conceming the project (perscomm. 1995). The project encompasses nine village clusters of five or six villages each. Each cluster is situated no more than 70 km fiom Dahod. One of these clusters is in'the Meghnagar area of Jhabua District, where 1 conducted research. The broad objectives of the project include:

0 a replicable, participatory, poverty and gender approach to farming systems development; ii) the use of long-term links between villages and govement/other institutions to meet their development needs; iii) stable and sustainable increases in fmproduction; and, iv) the establishment of village-based institutions to sustain the process of participatory development (KRTBCHO, 1992). The project is designed to be bottom-up, with communities intimately involved in planning and implernentation. A process approach has been taken, so blue prints are avoided and targets are secondary (Appendix C). Monitoring is undertaken mainly through the use of qualitative, process-oriented indicators (Appendix D). The mode of implernentation is adaptive and oriented around rapport or relationship building, both between agency staff and communities, and within communities. Tt is also intended to promote colIective rather than individual benefit, to build awareness and training for sustainability, and to find low cost production technoIogies (KRIBCHO,1992). Implementation of the project is through: participatory planning with communities

(PRAS,priontisation of options, annual work plan development); the development of small, "natural" groups based on kinship or other already-existing ties to manage key activities and 59 promote local institutions and equity; and the identification and training of volunteers (one male and one female) for each activity that has been prioritized and planned through the groups. An important elernent of KRIBP is the required contribution of villagers to project inputs. Most projects receive a maximum of 50% funding fiom KRIBCHO; the rest has to be raised within the village. For this reason, small activities precede larger ones as natural groups Save money, see retunis on small loans and make plans for projects that are achievable given their resources. At the time of study, KRIBCHO had been awarded a contract to conduct RGM work; however, funding was dependent on KRIBCHO's taking up a whole watershed as defined by the RGM guidelines (5,000 ha). Community Organizers felt that in the time fiame given by RGM (four years), to work such a large area would require a compromise of their participatory planning process; they eventually decided to decline the fûnding offer @es.comrn., 1997). 7. From the People: Barriers to Sustainability

1spoke to many people about Jhabua's disapwng fore-, and why efforts to Save them have failed thus fat. Specifically, I asked about the causes of deforestation, the decision-making structure of local sustainable development projects, and the potential for success of these projects. This chapter surnmarizes peoples' responses. in order to convey their expenences in their own words as much as possible, direct quotes are used wherever space allows. Speakers are not identified due to c~~dentialityrequirements. InteMew responses are organized in chapters 7 and 8 according to themes and subthemes that can be characterized as barriers or aids ro sustainability. Where relevant, the themes are also related to the indicators framework fiom chapter 4, that is, in ternis of structural attributes of hierarchy, scale and feedback loops. The subthemes are in descending order of importance, as determined by the.fiequency of their identification by respondents. The main themes are in no particular order due to the overlapping nature of many of the subthemes and the concurrent difficulty in isolating the identification fiequencies of the main themes. Where relevant, I have presented general observations about deforestation fint and then focused on comments about the three specific projects at hand.

i) Hierarchv Hierarchy, a strucural attnbute that formed part of the indicators Çamework, considered eq- in natural resource decision-making in tems of gender equity (women and men), political equity (community/bureaucracy), economic equity @ossessors/non-possessors), and species equity (humandnature). The subthemes below related most closely to this attribute.

1. Basic Needs The requirement to meet basic physical needs, particularly food (hit and wildlife), water

(for drinking and crops), and shelter (for shade or moderation of climate), was considered one of the main barriers to sustainability in tems of deforestation, and subsequently for the potential success of reforestation projects. It was considered a barrier to sustainability by dl stakeholder groups, especially NGO workers, govemment oficids and villagers. Forests historically had provided Jhabua's adivasis with many of their basic needs. As forests were incrementally enclosed, agriculture and govemment assistance substituted for the traditional economy, but never succeeded in filling the basic needs gap. Natural resource scarcity and explosive population growth since Independence exacerbated the basic needs crisis of the tribal people in Jhabua. A townsperson prophesied that "destruction of the forests carmot be stopped because adivasis are poorl'. It was common for adivasis to cut trees illegally for fuelwood which they either useddomestically or sold at local markets. In the remnant Kathiwada forest to the south of the district, villagers said, "we can't live without the jungle". They claimed to take only what they needed for subsistence and blamed the few landless adivasis, the poorest among them, for clearcutting for the black market. These people received wages and sometimes land for their role in illegal felling, but the sale of timber was left to merchants who could transport the teak to Gujarati auctions. "The nch exploit the forest, and adivasis are fools at the han& ofthe rich". JFWRGM Governent officials and NGO workers noted that the desperate basic needs situation meant that people would only work for the Forest Deparhnent if they denved irnmediate benefits, such as wages, fiom the work. IWDP Agency staff stated that, relative to their interest in development projects, "people need to think of filling their stomachs first". This need for immediate benefits was part of the villagers' motivation in demanding that the agency build a stop-dam or well to secure their cooperation for restoration work. NGO workers saw seasonal migration as an example of basic needs taking pnonty over resource conservation. Desertification in the barren areas around Jhabua town had shortened the growing season, so the land was only capable of producing one crop per year (rather than two). Villagers would typically borrow money to survive in dry, lean years, necessitating seasonal outmigration for wage labour to pay back crediton and supplement the subsistence economy.

This ~utmi~mtionwas inevitably detrimentai to project work as only the young and elderly remained behind, leaving few who could effectively ,wd plantations against grazing animals. 62 Agency staff agreed that people wouldn't maintain projects if economic benefits were not sufficient. They therefore v*ed their activities to include short-tenn economic benefits and emphasized awareness-raising about the indirect benefits of nahiral resource development In order to maximize benefits, villagers chose to raise fittrees and Eucalyptus horticulturally, and planted cmarina (an ecologically-suitable exotic which produces fodder and timber) and Neem (an indigenous medicinal plant) for pashire development and soi1 and water conservation.

2. Changn~Needs According to an NGO worker, tribal society did not traditionally display significant inequity between households in tems of material wealth. He described differences in wealth as having been ultimately dependent on annuai rainfall, so that in a dry year everyone was at the same level, regardless of the amount of land they owned. An example of economic equity in tribal society was the cooperative tradition of "hal;nar'. This convention brought members of a community together to help each other, for example in building a new house when one was destroyed by fire, or in helping a neighbour to harvest their crops. These seMces were voluntarily given, with the understanding that they would be reciprocated in the. Villagers and NGO workers noted that, with increases in matenal wedth, cooperative traditions were declining, and people's "basic needs" increasing. Some targeted Independence as the beginning of this change, others blamed contact with mainStream Hindu society. Changging needs were descnbed as a barrier to sustainability as people were cutting the forest in order to improve their material standard of living. Although they had traditionally survived with less, their perception of their situation relative to others (townspeople, media images) had declined and their minimum basic needs were therefore rising. A govemment official noted:

Economic sec* cornes fiom the equal distribution of resources. Once peoples' status is raised, their basic requirements are raised. They aspire to have what others have. Villagers used the example of mud vessels. Everyone formerly had rnud vessels but as stainless steel became the nom, mud was no longer good enough. People had to sel1 wood in order to buy stainless steel vessels. 63 The dynamic of chmgging needs was especially evident upon cornparison of the views of an elder and his grandson. The elder felt th@ compared to his youth, villagers were now vey rich. For example, before, they never had enough grain to store, and now everyone could store

four or five containers. Before, they had to waik all day to get their produce to market; now they

had buses. Before, they used to live in small huts; now they lived in these big buildings (gesîuring to a typical village house made of "kaccha", or mud and dung). The grandson, in contrat, stated that adivasis were very poor, as they were illiterate and couldn't get governent jobs. ïhey had no trucks to take their produce to market, and they lived in kaccha instead of pukka houes (pukka or cernent houses were the nom in town). There were other changes, too. Migrating season wasn't simply a necessity; nch fmers would send their sons out to emextra money. It was also becoming standard for at least one child per family to go to school, as their parents wanted them to have better opportunities. Education, however, was also considered a contributhg factor to the changing tribal lifestyle and the decline of traditional culture. In sum, the basic needs crisis was considered a major barrier to sustainability. Economic need, combined with rapid population growth, increasing land scarcity and desertification, was the primary sdabilityissue in Jhabua. The basic needs crisis is an issue of economic equity and is related to carrying capacity. Responses to this dynarnic included seasonal outmigration, crime (Jhabua has the highest homicide rate in Asia) and alcoholism The basic needs cnsis, dong with rapid population growth, could be interpreted as symptomatic of the larger issue of the impact of power structure on sustainability, rather than direct causes of unsustainability.

3. Jneauitable distribution of economic benefits The inequitable distribution of economic benefits fiom local forests was described as a barrier to sustainability by dl stakeholder groups. Adivasis could not legally obtain economic benefits fiom resemed foresl. In fact, a 10-year moratorium on felling was established in 1985. Neverîheless, it was common knowledge that politicians, govemment officials and black market timber merchants collaborated to profit fiom the district's remaining teak and other commercially valuable non-timber forest products, such as tobacco. When asked about the govemrnent's recent efforts to preserve forests for local people, an elder expressed cynicism: "Adivasis woulddt cut fntit trees, because they use them for themselves. So why doesn't the govemment plant fit trees?". JFWRGM Commlmiîy leaders, govemment officials and NGO workers agreed that benefits would not be equitably distributed fiom the JFMRGM project. FMguidelines did require that one representative fiom each household be on the samiti and that benefits be equally distributed. In reality, however, samiti members were rnainly fmers who had fields adjacent to the forest. These fmers participated (in part) to ensure the security of their fields, as there was significant cornpetition for land and even the Forest Department wisuspected as a potential encroacher. Those who did not participate in the project were excluded f?om its economic benefits (such as gras). This was considered problematic for the project's sustainability, especially given the expenence of the Rupakheda samiti. Rupakheda was a neighbouring communîty that had established a JFM-like conmittee and plantation as part of a smaller, voluntary program approximately 5 years prior to this study. The success of this program had influenced the expansion of the JFM concept. The plantation under the Rupakheda sarniti's care was quite successful in its fust five years, and villagers who had originally refused to cooperate with the project were interested in taking part given its success. Samiti members, however, felt thaf since they had taken the onginal risk in becoming involved in the project, others did not deserve to benefit fiom their efforts. Factions were thus forming within the community, and codict increasing, for example, in the fom of protest felling at ni& m Direct benefits fiom IWDP were not equally distributed among villagers. Project beneficiaries were mainly the larger landholders who could risk giving some of their marginal land over for pamire development Forest land was not eligible for development under the project guidelines, and many villagers were reluctant to participate due to a general mistrust of development projects. nius almost one-third of the land developed under IWDP was pnvate land, or land held in "pana". Cornrnunity leaders, NGO workers and villagers dl considered this 65 a drawback of the project as those most in need of development benefits would not receive them. Direct benefits from common lands were evenly distributed; however, protection of common lands was such an issue as to almost nullify these benefits as aids to sustainability. To date the project had funding for a guard, but this fund would soon be depleted and no new local institutions had been formed to manage the cornmons. Lower productivity on cornmon lands and the loss of traditional management institutions contributed to this failure. There were some indirect benefits fiom IWDP worth mentioning, including: motivation for others to take up planting on their own; and a moderated climate for those living near the rehabilitated areas in the form of more rainfall and cooler temperatures KRlBP

ViIlagers and NGO workers noted that the KRIBP project was Merent fiom other govemment projects, as the former "only benefit the village headmann,while KRIBP would benefit all those who participated. Development of the poor was one of the KRIBP's objectives, so activities were designed to have collective benefits where possible. Group members allocated project work and benefits among themselves. The problem of cooperation existed in KRIBP as in IWDP and JFM, where those mistnistfiil of the project did not participate and therefore did not benefit. In contrast to JFM, however, new participants were welcome to join or fom natural groups at any stage of the project. KRIBP tned to ensure development of the whole community by encouraging jankars (group members who volunteered to coordinate activities) to rotate their posts so that everyone, including the poorest members of the village, wodd have an opportunity to receive training and develop skills. There was, however, some resistance by villagers to allowing those of lower status to occupy positions as jankars. Finally, KRIBP, like IWDP, could not undertake development of forest land regardless of its condition, thereby perpetuating the inequity of access to forest land. In sum, the inequitable distribution of economic benefits fiom forest lands contributed to a spectnun of deforestation activities at the hands of adivasis, fiom a generd lack of conservation to ouûight illegal felling. Contributing factors included obtaining basic needs fkom the forest, political resistance, and the perception that that which belongs to govemrnent, belongs to no one 66 (the two latter factors will be taken up again later). These dynamics repeated themselves within projects, explaining in part the failure of government forest plantations and the reluctance of people to participate in government projects (except in retum for wages). Inequitable distribution of project benefits was a potential source of conflict within JFM villages, but renewed access to the forest resource generally through JFM was an important step toward greater equity between villa~ersand the Forest Department. IWDP had distribution problems due to the narrow scope of its activities, although indirect environmental benefits were broadly available. KRIBP's distribution problems lay mainly in the hesitation of some people to participate in the project, but unlike JFM its membership was open and unlike both IFM and IWDP, its activities were flexible enough to accommodate a broader cross-section of villagers.

4. mg

Lack of local input in decision-making was considered by al1 stakeholders to be a barrier to sustainability. In terms of general deforestation, adivasis and non-adivasis alike agreed that panchayats (village councils) would manage the forest better than the Forest Department. "Give the forests to adivasis. Panchayats will protect their own forests". The need for a recognized authority was emphasized, however: "They will kiH each other for it (the forest), so it is betier to keep a guard". Participation was heralded as a key element of siiccess for projects by al1 stakeholder groups. This opinion was supported in policy (e.g., the National Forest Policy, 1988), as well as in al1 project guidelines. There was, however, no consensus about what the word "participation" means in terms of implementation. Interpretations ranged across the spectnim, fkom participation as mere physical labour, to actually setting project priorities. An NGO worker lamented the lack of local input in govemment projects with the following sktement: "Govemment schemes are schemes of air-conditioned rooms - no one cornes here to ask anyone what is their wish". JFMGM

Decision-makimg authority for this project was largely in the hands of the Forest Department. Real participation of samiti members was limited to: conducting volunteer patrols in assigned areas of forest, doing physical wage labour for watershed restoration, and contributing to project details when consulted, such as species selection and graPng sites. Most decision-making power lay with the Forest Officers, who called and chaired meetings, had veto power over membership, and determined project sites and activities, among other things. NGO workers considered JFM insufficiently participatory in terms of decision-making. As one NGO worker stated: "The bottom-up approach is rhetoric, then they (officials) sit down and tell the people what to do". Senior Forest Department officids, on the other hand, felt that the level of participation in the project was a significant improvement over past efforts. Some villagen (including some samiti members) felt that the lack of participation by dl households in the project would lead to its failme. There seemed to be some misunderstanding about who held ultimate authority to make decisions about both harvesting and distribution of economic benefits fiom timber. The guidelines clearly stated that the Forest Department is responsible for these decisions, but many villagers and some local leaders expressed contradictory views: "Only we will decide when to cut". This misunderstanding codd prove to be problematic given the fiagile working relationship betweer. adivasis and Forest Department officials. A final point worth mentionkg was that many villagers and samiti members showed extrerne discornfort and reluctance to merquestions related to the project's decision-making structure, or comment on its potential for success, in the presence of Forest Department officids. In most cases, when posed in mixed Company the villagers deferred to officials to answer questions, and officials insisted on being present at these interviews.

IWDP . Local input was solicited in decision-making around the IWDP, but the balance of power lay with the central fimding agency. Villagers made decisions on issues like the location of project work (common and private land) and species selection. Major decisions, such as specific project activities, were decided in advance by the hding agency, as funds were conditional on the achievement of resuIts based on established targets.

NGO workers and villagers felt that the project was more participatory than standard govemment projects, but they admitted that it would have been more successful had it been more 68 participatory in terms of agenda-setîing. NGO workers blamed the centrai agency's target requirements for limiting cornrnunity participation. NCHSE staff were looking toward the second phase of the project (funded through RGM) to expand local participation in decision- making. KRIBP Decision-making in the KRIBP project was largely in the han& of project participants. 'Watural" groups, i.e., groups based on kinship or existing ties, were encouraged by cornmunity organizers (agency staff) to meet and contribute regularly to a small revolving loan fund. A11 decision-making for the fund, such as interest rates and eligibility, were detennined by the group. This responsibility-helpedgroup members to develop the decision-making skills and personal commitment to the group, or "nomsand des", necessary to begin more complex development activities, like raising horticultural plants. When mal1 projects were successfid, larger projects could be undertaken, such as irrigation systems and watershed restoration work Group participation in decision-making was therefore considered an important part of the process or an aid to sustainability. The role of community organizers was mainly one of process facilitation. They encouraged villagers to form groups and assisted them through group processes for problern identification, strategic planning and conflict resolution. Commurity organizers also contributed technical assistance and provided training for new activities. Occasionally, experts were called in fiom Dahod to solve more complex technical problems. It should be noted here that, while the groups had a good deal of autonomy to identify their own development objectives, project guidelines were slightly restrictive in the sense that there were broadly defmed types of activities to which the project would contribute matching fûnds. In addition, KRIBP staff would occassiondly try to influence a groups' decisions based on their equity agenda and technicd expertise. For example, the villagers wanted to plant commercially-valuable Eucalyptus trees for its short-term benefits rather than the fit and fodder species preferred by KRIBP staff for their longer-term, more collective benefits. The end result was a compromise, with a certain number of fiuit and fodder species planted for every Eucalyptus. 69 In sum, lack of Iocal input or participation in decision-making was conceived as a banier to sustainability. FMwas the least participato~yproject in terms of agenda-setting. This may lead to confiict between villagers and the Forest Department in the future. IWDP was more participatory but was limited by its narrowly-defined quantitative performance targets. KRIBP was the most participatory, with villagers making al1 major decisions (within the project's mandate) and staff acting as facilitators to ensure equity in decision-making. The balance of power was obvious during inte~ews;in contrast to the JFM interviews where villagers hesitated to speak in front of Forest Department officiais, people within the KRIBP groups encouraged each other to speak and community organizers deferred questions to the villagers.

5. Exclusion of worneq It was generally agreed by al1 stakeholders that women suf5er most for lack of access to forest products, as they are solely responsible for obtaining fodder (for domestic animais) and fuel (for cookhg). The forests are af5ected in tum by women's economic activities that have ecological impacts. Where wood is scarce, women must cut live trees to obtain fuel for cooking, rather than collecting dead wood off the forest floor as in the past The productive capacity of soils is also diminished when women are forced to use crop residue and dung for fuel, rather than ploughing these wastes back into the earth.

As the primary users of non-timber forest products, wornen were important stakeholders in the forest resource. In Jhabua district, however, women did not typically participate in activities outside the household, as evidenced by the female literacy rate of only 3%. Women therefore did not participate in development decision-making to the same extent as men. Their exclusion fiom decision-making related to forest activities was considered a barrier to sustainability . Recent amenciments to the Pcznchayti Raj Act, part of India's constitution, were beginning to give women considerably more access to power than in the past Part of the Act stipulated that

30% of Sarpanches' (chief councillors) seats were to be resewed for women in local elections. Some of the Sarpanches who were interviewed were women, and these women were consequently more active in forest-related development work than their peers. People felt, however, that it would take some time for women to become accustomed to their new power. Many stated that women holding elected office typically deferred decision-making to their

Community leaders, villagers and NGO workers agreed that women were largely excluded fkom JFM samitis and that this wouid have negative repercussions for the success of the project. Govemment oEcials pointed out that separate samitis had been organized for women by the Forest Depariment, but these were savings groups that were not connected to the FM program. Men were encouraged to consdt their wives regarding species selection, but other needs (such as access) were not necessady considered, as consultation was optional. The exclusion of women fiom samitis caused conflict between villagers and the Forest

Department. Forest Department guards (who were still retained despite their overlapping role with the samitis) said that they had chased away female villagers who were trying to cut wood. One elder woman said:

Sometimes women give men abuse because the samiti keeps them fiorn taking even a stick of firewood. Women would like to steal the wood, to cut trees, and not just take dead wood (fiom the forest floor).

In this paaicular village, a samiti member had been beaten for perrnîtting bis Meto cut firewood. WDP Women were marginalized at the outset of IWDP, although directed efforts were eventually made to include them. Women were not intentionally excluded; rather, the project's structure wkftsensitive to their needs and they were excluded as a matter of course. For example, meetings were scheduled during periods when women were busy doing domestic work. Another obstacle was a local tradition whereby adivasi women could not be seen by strange men.

As agency staff were exclusively male at the outset of the project, women's ability to participate was limited. An emphasis on women in development became popular during the project and measures were taken to facilitate women's participation in IWDP. The agency began to target women directly for awareness-raising. According to agency staff, women already "know everything" about protecting the environment. They were therefore considered allies in securing the suppon of their sometimes uncooperative husbands. Village men were asked to bring their wives to meetings, and female field stafYwere hired According to NGO workers, at the time of research, more women were "coming to meetings and speaking out". Their participation was not, however, fully secured; a group of young women who were employed at the nursery said that neither they nor their mothers regularly attended meetings. KRIBP Development of women was a prionty for KRIBP; their inclusion was therefore explicitly worked into the project's structure. Beginning with agency staff, men and wornen were given equal statu in the project. Maldfemale teams were assigned as community organizers in each cluster of villages. These comunity organizers facfitated the formation of men's and women's groups to undertake similar basic activities (saving money). The activities that each group eventually chose rzflected the group's gender in temis of the division of labour. For example, men conducted irrigation projects and planted Eucalyptus trees, as their main interest was cash crops. Women, ou the other hanci, established horticultural plant nurseries and planted fittrees, as their main interest was in providing a varied diet for their fdy. In addition, women needed to undeaake activities that could be integrated into theY existing domestic work; raising hoaicultural plants was therefore appropriate as nurseries could be established close to home. One male and one female jankar (volunteer coordinators) were assigned to each activity despite the gender of its originating group, for the sake of information sharing and to harmonize objectives. The structure was not perfect, however; for example, no woman jarikar could be found to participate in the water and soi1 conservation activities as the theconmitment conflicted with domestic duties. In sum, the exclusion of women from decision-making around forest use was conceived as a barrier to sustainability. The new provisions of Punchayati Raj may ameliorate the situation, but only indirectly as access to and management of forest lands is still controlled by the Forest Department and to a lesser extent, male-dominated JFM cornmittees. Of the three projects, JFM in particular was gender-blind. The Forest Department did target women's 72 development in a program for establishing swings groups, but this was entirely disconnected fiom JFM. Women were probably not intentionally excluded, but could not participate due to

the program's design; for example, only one mernber per household was allowed on the cornmittee and this person would hast certainly be male. To a certain extent, the exclusion of women reflects the Forest Department's inability to transfer real decision-making power to the cornmittees, much less to recognize and act on women's needs for empowennent. Similar design problems found women excluded from IWDP. Agency staffhad recognized and were working at rectieing this problem through design changes. They were particularly optimistic about the potential for the RGM guidelines to accommodate women's needs. KRIBP, on the other hand, had designed women's participation into every &pect of the project. This was a significant clifference, as it ensured much broader cooperation with and cornmitment to the project.

6. Resistance as a reszionse to o~~ression.em- loitation and alienatioq Adivasis have historically resisted the oppression, exploitation and alienation that they have suf5ered at the hands of new settIers. This resistance was itself described as a barrier to sustainability. The relationship that Jhabua's adivasis traditiody had with the forest pub their resistance to change in context. Varrier Elwin observed the strong sense of tribal ownership over the forest in the 1960's:

From times immemorial, until comparatively recently, the tribal people enjoyed fieedom to use the forest and hunt its animals and this has given them a conviction, which remallis even today deep in their hearts, that the forest belongs to them (Elwin, 1963,52-53).

The politically-motivated felling of trees has been an expression of adivasi resistance for centuries across central India. In Jhabua district, the Bhils thernselves revolted against state intervention in the forest in 1846 (Kotharï and Parajuli, 1993,229). More recently, the socialist slogan "Tree and land is ours!" galvanised the adivasis of Jhabua to clear large areas of land immediately following Independence in 1947.

Oppression was descnbed by villagers as human rights abuses at the hands of Forest Department officials, including assault, thefi of property, bnbery, and rape. Stories of police brutality against adivasis were cornmon in the local newspapers. Villagers opedy accused the Forest Department of encroaching their fields and stealing their land. These allegations were supported by Vanier Elwin, who stated that adivasis were routinely exploited at the han& of forest officers and contracton, and that even barren and agricultural lands had been annexed under Forest Department control (Elwin, 1963,531. Exploitation was described by al1 stakeholder groups (except govemrnent officials) as mainly economic exploitation at the han& of former hgs, timber contractors and local merchants. Black market timber contractors would pay adivasis minimal wages for illegal felling, and then scape-goat them in public. Local merchants would cheat adivasis in the market, taking advantage of their illiteracy and lack of sophistication by giving them poor terms of trade. Money-lenders demanded extortionary rates, forcing adivasis to outmigrate to the cities for wage labour. One villager summarized the peoples' response: "We cut the forest because the townspeople dont give us a fair pnce for our honey". Illegal felling waj therefore rnotivated both by economic need and a sense of retnbution for past injustices. A politician fiom another district told me a story of his personal experience with adivasi resistance. He had obtained permission to conduct an experiment in his constituency, whereby management responsibility for a barren hillock would be divided among villagers with adjacent fields (fiom the edge of their field to the height of land). After only three years, the kees had reached 10m in height One day, a villager was going to cut one of the trees on his part of the hillock to make a new plough for himself, but was stopped by a forest guard. The next morning, the entire hillock was bare. Resistance was discussed in the context of deforestation in general and was not directly related to the projects studied. One NGO worker did suggest that the JFMlRGM project bordered on exploitation as samiti members received pnority for jobs, and villages with samitis received pnority for other development funding. These incentives to cooperate with FMcould not be refused by the adivasis: "People won't reject the idea of IFM because they want wages and development ftlndst'. 7. J.oss of traditional decision-rn- institutions The loss of traditionai decision-making institutions, and their piecemeal replacement with foreign structures of govemance, was considered a bmier to sustainability. Traditionally, local govemment was participatory in nature:

Before, each household wouid send a representative to panchayat meetings to decide on suggestions by mutual understanding. Now ody the Sarpanch decides everything. The mode1 of parliamentary democracy did not effectively transfer to the local level in tribal India; transparency, accountability and civics were lost. Thus where local govemments had decisionmaking powers, comption and abuse was common. For example, Sarpanches would ofien take kick-backs for pemiteing projects in their villages. Where local govemments had lost powers to higher levels of govemment, as with forest management, corruption had even greater impacts. For example, politicians, bureaucrats and timber merchants were known to collaborate in the black market, yet villagers had little recourse for holding people accountable. Townspeople, NGO workers and community leaders al1 noted that corruption threatens project success. Funds were typically skimmed 15% for every mgof the administrative ladder, resulting in poor quality work One townsperson noted: "Planting schemes are 100% bogus. The budgets are pocketed and adivasis are blarned for raiding (and destroying them)". JFWRGM According to the guidelines, JFM was intended to establish new local institutions for protecting the forest. These new institutions did not, however, emphasize a decision-making role for the cornmittees, which were lead instead by the Forest Department. In contrat, the RGM guidelines focused on building much-needed decision-making capachy among villagers. As one NGO worker noted: "This is a very new experience for people - they are not sure how to digest decision-making". JFM was therefore an insufficient replacement for the RGM participation guidelines on forest lands within RGM watersheds. IWDP&KRrEP Villagers and NGO workers noted that both IWDP and KRIBP helped to build local decision-making capability, although KRIBP did more so. Villagers were especially positive, referring to their decision-making capability in temis of a new-found sense of independence. KRIBP especially focused on the development of autonomous decision-making groups. Self-help groups were descnbed as "natural groups that have developed some noms and des". They would discuss issues and corne to one conclusion through "mutual understanding". Where there were disputes, they would try to "make everyone understand". if dissent persisted, the issue was left. Villagers emphasized that it was important to "sit in a group and make everyone understand", as well as to review past decisions.

In sum, the loss of traditional decision-making institutions was considered a barrier to sustauiability due to the concurrent loss of group decision-making sMswithin the community. Newer institutions, like the Forest Department, were perceived as ineffective due to their inaccessibility and lack of accotmtability, legitimacy andlor respect. New institutions mut therefore be accessible and accountable to the people, and have both decision-making authority ' and capacity. This transfer of power and related skills was accomplished least in JFM, somewhat in IWDP, and fully in KRTBP. 8. From the People: Barriers and Aids to Susbiinabiüty

The previous chapter outlined people's opinions about the significance of hierarchy to project success. In general, people were les confident that hierarchically-structured projects would be successful. The next chapter begins with people's opinions about what they thought would make projects successful. The significance of scale and feedback loops conclude the chapter.

ii) Cornmunity People consistently referred to aspects of community as aids to sustainability. Community was not identified in the indicators heworkas an explicit structural attribute of sustainable systems, but was included as a manifestation of equity. The following subthemes or dynamics suggest that community may have structural qualities associated with sustainability. While interrelated with the other structural attributes, they hevertheless contribute uniquely to this discussion and are therefore outlined separately.

8. Mutual Relations: Group Responsibility andor Own AU stakeholder groups, and especially villagers and NGO worken, felt that peoples' mutual relations lead to feelings of collective ownership and responsibility that aided sustainability. For example, an elder stated that:

The forest guard should be fiom the village because he knows the jungle and knows the people; they will help him because they are al1 related. Decision-makers who were distant or only posted for short periods of time had never developed this sense of responsibility, resulting in various problems for sustainability such as lack of . initiative, motivation, loyalty and accountability to the community. It was this sense of collective responsibility that NGO workers were emphasizing when they discussed the difference between and importance of community development over individual development. JFM

According to Forest Department officiais, IFM was intended to "give responsibility to the people, give them a feeling of ownership; then hurt to the forest hurts them". Villagers, however, claimed that they never discussed JFM among themselves outside of govemment-led meetings. As one NGO worker stated, "with FM,people dont feel ownership for the forest because they aren't starting dialogue with each other as they would if they felt that it was important". The lack of cornmitment to the project was also apparent in that many committees were not undertaking regular patrols, and Forest Depariment guards were dlthe main protectors of the forest As one samiti member said, "the samiti can be broken". rnDP Agency staff recognized the need for villagers to feel a sense of ownership for the project and therefore suggested lower wages for project work. "People must contribute, labour or money, then they know it is their duty to protect". The villagers therefore accepted 20 rupees per

day for their labour, rather than the government rate of 30 mpees. They were told, however, that

the purpose of lower wages was to dethe work last longer. Villagers claimed that they had accepted the wage because in cornparison, work for the Forest Department was harder, and they wouldn't gain the same non-cash benefits fiom working for the Forest Deparûnent. People would therefore feel that they had a nght to the non-cash benefits, such as grasses and fuelwood, as they had been eamed, and would therefore be more inclined to protect them. In terms of the importance of interpersonal relationships, one agency worker stated that:

While adivasis need to understand their rights (to project benefits), they must also understand the (importance of) developrnent of the community. Meeting with each other is very necessary. Villagers stated that IWDP was successful because "NCHSEcame to the village and got the people to take care". They also stated that:

NCHSE people work with the villagers, they are not like forest offices. They work shoulder to shoulder with us so we know they are helping us. It desus think that this wil go on for ever and ever. Thus mutual relations among villagers as well as between villagers and agency staff were regarded as important factors in the sustainability of the project. KRIBP Community organizers spent the first year of the project living with the villagers and building rapport. While dtimately fiom "out", cornmunity organXzers worked on establishing 78 mutual relations with villagers before encomging them to take up any development work. KRIBP also took advantage of existing relationships by forming working cornmittees or "natural" groups around existing or kinship ties. Che NGû worker stated that "relationship building and cooperation among the people, a sense of pride and responsibility are al1 necessq" for sustainable development Meetings were important for leaming how to work together, that is, to strengthen mutual relations: "If everyone saves, and follows the nom(des) of the group. then they al1 have a right (to benefit fiom the project)". On the other hand, "if someone is not a member, they won't

benefit. People need to spare the the for meetings". A member of the women's group said:

Results are one thing but the important thing is that people are aware, that they are organized. Before, people who didn't understand created problems, and we approached problems in a haphazard way. Now we are on a common platform. In contrast, villagers felt that govemment projects didn't work because "officers only want to meet targets, they don't care for the people". In terms of ownership, 1 asked a women's group about what they thought of the "KRIBCHO"project (KRIBCHO being the implementing agency). 1 was corrected: "We work on matching contrlbutions", a member of the group stated, "so it is our projeci, not KRIBCHOfs". In sum, rnutual relations were considered an aid to sustainability as they instill within individuals a sense of respomibility to the group, thereby increasing each person's accountability to that group. Since community decision-making is a group affair, good interpersonal relationships facilitate decision-making. The sense of ownership that an individual feels for the object of their work is a related type of relationship that promotes project success. The importance of meetings and dialogue was emphasized as an important element of building good mutual relations. In JFM, mutual relations between the Forest Department and vilIagers were weak, and among villagers they were strained as factions rdlied for and against the project (this varied fiom one village to the next). Ownership for the forest was a vestige of adivasi culture and codd therefore be considered a given, although this could also lead to conflict in the future as the

Forest Deparbment was holding on to decision-making power. In IWDP, mutual relations between agency staff and most villagers were growing, although some villagers still refused to participate. While some individuals felt ownership for the project, this had not filtered through to the community as a whole due to different understandings of the nature of the in-kind contributions and the minimal relationship-building around the project In KTUBP, mutual relations between agency staff and vülagers were sufficient, and among most viUagers were more highly developed in tenns of group decision-making skills than IWDP. Ownenhip was high

because of rnatching contributions. Finally, only in KRlBP did villagers taik about the importance of developing a common vision, which 1would consider a benchmark of community development.

9. Trust Lack of trust was considered a banier to sustainability, and especially that which existed

between villagers and the Forest Department This was considered a problem by govemment officials, villagers and NGO workers alike. The relationship between adivasis and the Forest Department could best be descrïbed as adversarial. Viagers had little faith in govemment promises to improve their lives and therefore had no faith in govemment programs. They described a govemment track record of failed projects, lack of follow-through and bmeaucratic about-faces that had bred a significant level of cynicism among the people. Historically, adivasis had respected the Raja, but at the time of study they were "againstthe goverment because it is too cormpt". This lack of trust permeated dl discussions of the fate of the forest. Villagers even feared that the Forest Department wodd steal their land if it had trees on if and were therefore more willing to destroy the forest than dlow the governent to claim it. JFMRGM Lack of trust was behind the villag-rs' reluctance to cooperate with reforestaton projects. Govemment officials said they had to "give them incentive, provoke them" into cooperating. One of these incentives was the promise of increased development funding to villages with JFM cornmittees. Forest Department ofticials considered JFM as their attempt to form a "relationship" with the people. The DFO said: "People used to be scared of the Forest Department, but now they look at us as fkiends". Villagers were more cautiously optirnistic. At a large govemment-organized rally for JFM, people cornplained that the speakers "dgo on, tahgnonsense. At every meeting they Say the same thing". NGO workers concurred: "NO one has fa& due to the govemmentlsrecord of empty promises". They also aclmowledged that villagerj would sometimes agree to host a project primarily to secure employment They would therefore have no expectaîion, personal cornmitment or vested interest in the project either failing or succeeding. WDP NGO workers noted that since people had "cornpletely lost faith in government", anyone aîiempting to do development work had to start with rapport-building to gain the villagen' confidence: ''For success, you must build confidence". 'Ihe NCHSE had to give the viiiagers of Piplipata fiee grass just to get the Sarpmch to discuss the project, and then build a stopdam to Nly secure their cooperation. Those who were convinced of the agency's sincerïty spoke tu others to gain their confidence, but they said it was a long time before their "fear went away". Their fear had been such that villagen said they used to throw away fke seedlings fiom the Forest Department rather than plant them and have their land annexed into forest lad. XRlBP The commimity organizers had trouble at fïrst being accepted by the villagem. ïheir objective in their nrst year, when they lived and worked with the vülagers, was to build rapport and encourage the formation of natural groups. Only after they had achieved a certain level of rapport, and when nomand deswere established within the groups, could development activïties begin. Developing trust in this region was particularly challenging as villagers had participated in an earlier project where the implementing agency had attempted to recover its inputs after seeing some success. The villagers therefore said that their confidence was only gained through "regdar meetings and dialogue". In sum, lack of trust was considered a bderto sustainability, because people who donlt trust will not cooperate with development projects. Trust is also an element of muhial relations. A trust relationship is necessary for people to cooperate in working together to develop sustainability. In JFM, there was little û-ust between the implementing agency and the villagers, and consequently Iittle corrrmitment by villagers to the success of the project. In IWDP, the 81 implementing agency had worked to develop tmst by showing signs of good faith in the fom of "start-up" projects and demonstrations of their ability to follow through with their goal of pasture development. In KRIBP, agency members also worked to develop trust, but through dialogue and by taking fime to let mutuai relatians develop naturally. . . 10. Sel f-determination Community leaders, villagen and NGO workers suggested that (a degree of) self- determination was a necessary pre-condition for sustainability. It could be described as an aid to sustainability in the same sense that its opposite, dependency, was considered a barrier. The political slogan "Tree and land is ours! ",a nationalist movement, had incurred vast clear-cuttirig at the time of Independence. This nationdism still held currency in adivasis' consciousness at the time of research. Self-detennination is related to ownership in temis of both commUDity and scaie. JFrnGM One objective of RGM was comrnunity organization in order to "give people the capacity to make decisions and keep work going after the Forest Department is gone", that is, to be self- detemüning. JFM did not appear to be facütating this -ex of decision-making skilis. Some villagers who had refused to contribute their land to JFh4RGM were doing soi1 conservation work and replanting on their own. They said that they preferred to plant their own way, without following directions fkom govemment officiais. WDP NGO workers noted that people become dependent unless they have a degree of self- determination. They said: "people have become lazy because of govemment handouts, and are mainly interested in quick economic benefits". They felt that this was an obstacle to project success. KRIBP A female co~xllxluni~organizer stated that:

Only the headman was involved before (in project decision-making). Every person has the nght to express th& ideas, and these should be respected by the community. In other words, people have the right to make their own decisions, to be selfdetermining. In sum, self-detemination in tenns of a capacity for group decision-making?an absence of oppression and dependency, and a degree of economic autonomy were ail considered important for project success. JFM did not emphasize group decision-making or empowerment, but did encourage economic autonomy. IWDP also encoumged economic autonomy, as weU as empowerment and independence, although group decision-making was neglected. KRIBP focused on group decision-making around economic autonomy, and empowerment and independence were a by-product of these.

iii) Scale The following themes relate to scale as a structural attribute. ïhe indiators hework considered scale in terms of: i) the distance between a decision and its nnal impact; and, ii) the number of people affecteci by a decision.

11. ver* markets The high demand for timber outside of Jhabua was considered a barrier to sustainability. According to adivasis, they were responsible only for a small percentage of illegal felling - enough to meet their basic needs. Non-adivasis, however, held that tribds were almost entirely to blame for illegal felling. When probed, most people agreed that adivasis took part in large scale illegal felling only as labourers for black market hbermerchants? who paid them wages and tumed sizeable profits at private teak markets in Gujarat. People noted with surprishg consistency and accuracy that the rate of deforestation picked up significantly 15-20 years ago (in the early 1970's). This was approximately the same time that the forest industry was nationalized and private contracting banned. The ensuing govemment monopoly on te& and other nationalized forest products set the stage for a highly profitable black market. Heavily restricted interstate trade and a significant discrepancy in prices between the forested district of Jhabua and its industria1i;ring neighbour, Gujarat, reinforced these conditions. In fact, local people would go to Gujarati markets to buy Jhabua-grown teak, as only poor quality lumber was available at the local govemment timber depot The black market compounded the problem of accelerated deforestation in Jhabua district by encouraging smugglers to use destructive harvesting methods. Working at night, the smugglers were known to "cut down a whole tree jus for the (tobacco) leaves".

Distance to timber markets was discwed in the context of deforestation in general and was not directly related to the projects studied.

12. Distance to project fundin~sources Distance to funding was related to project success in two ways: fht, corruption linked to large scale was considered a barrier; and second, local contributions to project funding was considered an aid. As mentioned above, project funding went through so many levels of administrative graft due to the size of the bureaucracy that little was left for implementation; nevertheless, project staffwere still bound by central targets, and poor quality projects ofien resulted. Stop-dams that didn't fûnction and barren plantations were testimony to this problem in Jhabua. In con- where viilagers themselves contributed to project fiinding (in cash or in kind), greater conmitment was demonstrated through their voluntay participation and positive attitude about the project's potential for success. JFWRGM Corruption was not directly mentioned as a problem in FM, although village leaders were encouraged to form committees on the bais that participahg villages would be eligible for a greater share of development funding, and subsequently for more jobs. The large rnajority of JFM committees interviewed were not yet undertaking their voluntary patrols (an in-kind contribution) to protect the forest; uniformed guards were still being retained by the Forest Department One codtteethat was actively patrolling did demonstrate greater cornmitment to the project's success, dthough their relationship with the Forest Department and their neighbouring committees was poor. Forest Department par& therefore still regularly visited this watershed. The Forest Department's attempts to collect funds fiom the villagers (a cash contribution), ostensibly for the project, were met with disbelief and refusais. Comption was discussed as a problem in temis of other projects, but not in reference to IWDP. Distance to funding sources was considered significant mainiy in terms of accessibility to decision-makers and inflexibility of project targets; these will be taken up in the next section. Specifically in ternis of funding, distance was an access issue in the sense that NGOs needed to have a contact within the central agency for their applications for funding to be considered. According to NGO workers, in-kind contributions ffom villagers in the form of lower- than-minimum wages for project work were an important element of IWDP's success. The RGM extension to the project would ensure even greater success as it emphasized activities that would help the villagers "tum (fun&) into sore", meaning that small-scaIe economic activities (and not simply pasture development) were a central part of the extension project. Success was therefore linked to ending people's dependency on the agency as their employer through a variety of development activities. KltlBP In KRIBP, corruption was not discussed as an issue. NGO workers and villagers did, however, emphasize the matchhg contributions of al1 project costs as an important element of the project's success. KRIBP would donate 50% of start-up costs to smd scale activities and provide technical assistance where required. The natural groups would contribute the rest of the funds through their group savings. KRIBP also worked on hamessing small scale development principles such as the multiplier effect and economic incentives. For example, those who provided seMces to group activities, like the woman who tended the nursery or the man who tended the irrigation pump, were compensated with a small salary (the amount was decided by the group). Emphasis was not on the generation of cash income for these individuals, however, but on supporting activities that were affordable to the villagers and that contributed to the subsistence economy. Thus only low cost, small scale energy and capital projects were considered by the groups, as inputs and maintenance were provided in part by the villagers themselves. As one of the KRIBP staff members said, "We want technology that is 'adaptable' to the culture, not technology that can be 'adopted' by the culture1'. 85 In surn, large bureaucraties and administrative grafS or scale and corruption, were not discussed in reference to any of the projects under study but as a popular explanation of why previous projects had failed. On the other hand, local economic activity and in particular local contributions to project inputs were considered an important element of project success dl amund. There was considerably less success in obtaining these inputs in the JFM villages.

13. Distance to decision-maken

Large distances to decision-makers was considered a banier to sustainability by most stakeholder groups, and especially by comrnunity leaders. Villagers, on the other hand, did not emphasize it. Projects that involved inaccessible, remote decision-makers saered fiom poor decisions due to lack of communication or miscommunication, tirne lags, incongnious agendas, insufncient monitoring capability, etc. Similarly, centralization and big bureaucracy had exacerbated the problem of deforestation:

MF is too big; it should be divided into four. We need different govemment for difierent geography and different language; this is better. When this was Madhya Bharat, officials were fiom inside and staff was sd;now with MP officids come fkom out and staff is big, officials corne for short periods, only to make money. Al1 should be from inside and not be transfened, then they would be held responsible. People generally agreed that distance rnakes decision-makers inaccessible and effective communication difficult. They consistently stated that they would be better off if they only had to go as far as Jhabua town to talk to decision-makers, because "we can reach there", and it wouldn't require as much "courage" to go. Even where decision-makers were posted near by, if they came fiom "out"50, problems such as lack of accountability and initiative, motivation, loyalty and responsibility arose. These are related to both thefiames (below) and community.

Distance to decision-makers was discussed in the context of deforestation in general, but not in the context of JFM.

50~f werentt from Jhabua, you were fiom "out", regardles wheîher you came from Deihi, Canada or the United Arab Emirates. Some starus was accorded to others fiom MP. Agency staff saw the ngid targets set by the central firnding agency as a limitation to die success of the project. Distance to decision-makers was an issue as their inaccessibiiity meant that project goals remaiwd inflexible and incapable of adapting to the specific needs of the locale. KRIBP The headquarten at Dahod for KRIBP was "functionally autonomous"; decision-making for the project was therefore unrelated to the source of funding. It was in fact quite accessible to villagers as it was only a day-trip by bus, although some would wak. In addition, targets were flexible, with emphasis on procedural rather than quantitative results. Project staff and villagen themselves therefore had greater autonomy to decide development goals as long as they followed the established guidelines for process. According to community organizers, KRlBP was able to address the unique problems of the area because of its bottom-up, small scale structure. It did not attempt to bring "tailor-made solutions" fiom outside to solve local problems; instead, project decisions were made locally. Occasionally, technical advice would be sought from KRIBP headquarters. Important decisions in terms of agenda-setting were thus made by the nahiral groups, within a broad heworkset by the funding agency. In su,large distances to decision-makers was considered a baxrier to project success because of accessibility, in terms of mahgthe right decisions, and accountability, in terms of guaranteed results and/or retribution. In IWDP, large distances were symbolized by the unresponsiveness of decision-makers through inflexible targets. This problem was avoided altogether in KRIBP. The fact that it wasn't discussed in FMis significant in the sense that the question of who in fact was making decisions in JFM was a taboo subject.

14. Scale and time he Time frame was an issue of scale that was not anticipated by the indicators hework.

Short time frames were considered a banier to sustainability, while long time &unes were considered an aid. Govemment officials, townspeople and community leaders felt that short terms of office for government officials were detrimental to both the success of reforestation projects and forest conservation in general. Short terms meant that govemment officials did not see projects

through to completion and therefore did not get credit for their work: "Why should anyone take interest? Officers are transferred in 2 or 3 months". Corruption and short postings combied to make Jhabua especially vulnerable. It was common knowledge that, to be promoted, ambitious civil servants had to pay large sums of graft. They then had to make back their investment in less than 3 years, the maximum term for senior officials. The payment for a senior position in the

Forest Department was said to be quite large (1 laldi or 100,000 rupees) due to the profitmaking potential of Jhabua's black market. NGO workers and villagers generally agreed that projects with longer times heshad greater potential for success. Short tirne heswere a problem within the Forest Department: "The Forest Department has no long-term projects". This made planning difficult and accountability next to impossible. For example, plantations were only malntained for a few rnonths, "then they are forgotten". Funding for guards to watch plantations was supposed to last five years, but these fûnds quickly disappeared. An elder told a story of senior officials coming fkom Bhopal to inspect the plantations, ody to hdthat the range officer had planted sticks in the field to make it look like something was growing. JFMRGM The importance of time fiames was reflected in the DFO's statement that new samitis in the district were working better than old ones because the depariment was now waiting 4-5 months to see proof of their cornmitment before approving them. In the. area under study, though, the plantation was observed by NGO workers to be a "half-hearted effort", because it was done quickly in order to have something to show in tenns of meeting targets by the end of the fiscal year. One villager who had been hired to guard his village's JFM plantation confirmed that he had not been paid in three months. He was concemed that he would not be able to fiord to guard the land much longer without payment, and wamed that without his services, the plantation would fail. 88 WDP Agency staff felt that the project wouldn't be fully nistainable for 8-1 0 years. It would take this long to "get understanding", or cooperation, hmthe whole village. It would also take this long for the forest to re-establish itself. nie project was therefore described as a "process that is still evoIvingn. RGM fimding was extending the project fiom 3 years to 8. This longer time hewas considered necessary as the project could therefore integrate more in-depth local participation. People thought that this and the long-tem maintenance plan required by RGM wodd help the

project to be more sustainable. The "lengthy process of organizing the community" was seen as the biggest'improvement that RGM would bring to IWDP. NGO workers stated that it would take one year to develop their action plans alone, through a participatory process, and that they would not push targets but "let the project develop nahnally". KRIBP Natural groups in KRIBP had to save money for a minimum of nine months and see retums on smail loans before they could plan for any development activities. One villager said, "slowly people carne for meetings, foxmed groups, and had exposures and trainings". As the process in KRIBP was primary, development work was not nished. In the other projects under study, dediate benefits from the project (e.g., grass, a stop dam) was considered a must in order to secure the villagers' cooperation. In the KRIBP project, however, the villagers demonstrated greater patience:

It will take time to get good production fiom the plantation - thc papaya and guava have corne up in 2 years, so we are optimistic that we will get more benefits.

In sum, short time Meswere considered a banier to sustainable forest management due to short postings for officiais and the accompanying lack of accountability that they face. This was exacerbated by corruption and the fact that forests take 3-5 years to re-establish themselves in Jhabua's semi-arid climate. Projects involving reforestation therefore needed a minimum time f-e to protect new plantations and develop new institutions for protection over the long term. Long time hmes were subsequently considered an aid to sustainability or project success, as participatory processes take tirne. New institutions for resource management therefore need time to establish working relationships, understanding, skills, and "noms and rules" to be effective.

JFM was in a sense ahead of the game as it had an infinite theMe. On the other hmd, planning around FM was short tem, as the Forest Department did not seriously engage in long term project planning due to prior failures. These opposing sceaarios presented an advantage and a disadvantage to JFM consecutively, in tems of project success. IWDP stood to benefit greatly from its RGM extension due to the longer tirne fi-ame. It would be able to integrate its pasture development with the participatory processes and institutions necessary to sustain them. KRIBP had the shortest time fi-arne with only 4-5 years, but it had emphasized participation fiom the beginning. Villagers were therefore more patieat and confident that economic benefits would follow, although a longer time frame would be an advantage in this regard.

iv) Feedback Loops The following themes relate to feedback loops. The indicators Wework considered feedback loops in tems of: i) the use of indigenou lmowledge in sustainable development decision-making; and, ii) the level of accomtability in nahiral resource decision-making to local people. The subthernes below were those that related most closely to this attn'bute.

15. Valuiqg expertldevaluinp traditional knowled~e There were mixed opinions about the significance of expert and traditional knowledge respectively for project success. NGO workers felt that expert knowledge, especially the preference for "green revolution" species, could be a barrier to sustainability. A primary example was the planting of Eucalyptus, an exotic tree favoured for its rapid growth and commercially valuable timber. Eucalyptus was promoted by the central government through Forest Department plantations, and deregdation. Deregulation contrïbuted to its value for adivasis as it codd legally be cut and sold without a permit. Nonetheless, Eucalyptus was not ecologically suitable for Jhabua's semi-arid climate. The proliferation of Eucalyptus was considered a factor in lowering the water table and increasing the rate of desertification in mabua. Another negative consequence of favouring high-yield exotic species was the neglect and potential extirpation of slower-growing, more ecologically suitable local species such as horse gram, the result of which would be a loss of biodiversity. Community leaders, govemmenr officials and villagers, on the other hand, preferred exotics for their ability to establish quickly and provide more Mmediate and diverse economic benefits to the people. Water and soil conservation techniques were a mix of expert and traditional knowledge and were considered an improvement to traditional techniques. Villagers felt that their traditional planting methods were sup&or to those brought by outsiders. JFWRGM Govemment officials stated that indigenous knowledge was considered in project decision-making, with the caveat that it be "scientifically justifiable". This included some soil conservation techniques (field bunds), the use of local building matenais, selection of graPng sites and some local species for pasture development. Othenvise, soil and water conservation methods were based on standard engineering techniques taught at the national Indian Forest

Service training institute in Dehra Dun, north of New Delhi. Exotic, hi&-yield primary successional species' were preferred, as they offered quick benefits to villagers in the fom of grass. A particular species of grass, detrofa, was chosen because it had added commercial value frorn oilseeds. IWDP Community leaders, villagers and NGO workers al1 agreed that indigenous knowledge contributed to the success of their project, althouph expert knowledge played an important part as well. Indigenous knowledge included planting times, and choice of plant species. A local species of fhit tree (mango) was planted, as was an exotic tree species, acacia catechu While villagers would have preferred Eucalyptus, agency workers convinced them that acacia was better for the soil, and that it offered al1 the same advantages of Eucalyptus. Exotic, high-yield primary successional species' were planted in order to re-establish a hospitable microclimate for pasture development as quickly as possible. This gras was appreciated by villagers who depended on the annual gras harvest to provide fodder in the dry season. There was a difference of opinion between NGO workers and villagers regarding the origin of soil and water conservation methods. Based on the traditional use of field bunds, 91 agency staffrefemed to the methods as "al1 traditional knowledge", while villagers pointed out that trenchuig and check dams were new to them. Villagers and community leaders claimed that "whatever we plant is successful". They credited their success to traditional howledge of appropriate planting times and methods, and proper maintenance, in con- to the project plantations. One villager commented that the agency had "ody taught us that we need to plant, not how to plant", rneaning that they had more faith in their own methods. XRIBP NGO workers did not veto the villagers' choice of Eucalyptus trees for pastine development, but they did require that a number of acacia be planted for eveq Eucalyptus on common land. Exotic primary successional and indigenous horticultural species were selected by the natural groups based on a selection of both exotic and indigenous species provided by staff experts. Soi1 and water consentation techniques were similar to those used in other projects, though they were modified by the villagers accordùig to their specific needs. One villager stated,

"KRIBCHO taught us at fkst, but now we know wàat to do". In sum, a distinction must be made between local and traditional howledge, as expert knowledge is sometimes assimilated by local people. Many people felt that devaluing iraditional knowledge was a banier to project success. Many people also felt, however, that where expert and traditional knowledge were given equal consideration, projects would be more successfûl. Of the projects, al1 three accommodated indigenous knowledge to a greater or less degree regarding species selection, grazing sites and planting methods. The main difference was that in JFM and IWDP, expert knowledge took precedence in the event of contradictory information, whereas efforts were made to understand and accommodate indigenous knowledge andlor preferences in the KRTBP project.

16. Access to informatioq Access to information was considered an aid to sustainability by dl stakeholder groups. High illiteracy rates among tribals in Jhabua meant that they couldn't read project descriptions or authorizations. They therefore tended to mistrust those fiom "outn until they had witnessed success "with their own eyes". Villagers' willingness to cooperate with deveiopment projects thus revolved around their haWig wimessed successful projects or having some other information that would give them confidence in the implementing agency. Lack of access to information about policies that benefit adivasis was a related barrier to sustainability. This dynamic was rooted in illiteracy and limited communications technology. Altematively, the Forest Department's lack of awareness or information about adivasis' culture and concerns was also considered a barrier to sustainability. JFWRGM A standard RGM strategy for gaining people's cooperation, especially when they complained that project benefits were too long-tem, was to send them to a village that was profiting fiom watershed-based development. This experience consistently convinced villagers to cooperate with proj ects. WDP As rnentioned in chapter 6, the people of Piplipata chased NCHSE workers out of the village when they were fint approached with the project proposal. Upon witnessing their neighbour's success, however, they pumied NCHSE to start work in their own village. As one staff member put it:

For sustainability, we need one side raising awareness, and beside is implementation; one side is looking, the other is understanding. If people see gras, they will care for grass, if they see forest, they will think 'this is for us', and they will care for it. Likewise, when the project swed only the Sarpanch (council chair) gave" his land to be worked, and only upon witnessing his success did others follow suit. KrnP One of the project's objectives of developing natural groups was to link them with govemment programs, improve communication and facilitate access to information. One way of facilitating access to information was to take groups on "exposure visits". These visits were essentially field trips to other villages, where group rnembers could witness small-scale development works and learn about them fiom the villagers. The villagers spoke of not having 93 known the importance of soi1 and water conservation until they were "exposed" to other villages and it was explained to them how and why the work had been done. "We didn't cooperate at first, but came to understand after the exposures".

In SUI, access to information was considered an important element of project success. People need to know about progms and policies designed for their benefit in order to take advantage of them. They need to know what their rights are in order to exercise them. They also need to know about an organization's tmck record in order to trust them. FMused exposure visits as an information tool in a limited way - maidy to overcome peoples' lack of trust, and ody in villages that were particdarly resistant to the program. The IWDP project in Piplipata never would have happened had it not been for the incidental exposure of the villagers to the neighbouring project KRIBP used expoues regularly as a communications, educational, and trust-building tool. 9. Discussion: SustainabiLity of Reforestation Projects in Jhabua

The purpose of this paper was to determine whether or not there is a link between the distribution of power in political and economic systems or ,institutions, and the potential for sustainability. This discussion reflects on the results of the case study in the context of the indicators framework developed in Chapter 4, which was developed to test the hypothesis that linear structures of power act as baniers to sustainability. Because a number of projects were studied, this discussion is not exhaustive in terms of the relevance of the hework to each, but rather draws examples fiom them to support the major findings. These findings are highlighted in italics throughout the discussion and are elaborated in the next chapter. General recommendations for structural, institutional change are included.

General Observations The indicaton fiamework developed in Chapter 4 was composed of structural attributes of hierarchy, scale, and feedback loops. These attributes were thought to mate barriers to sustainability. The results of the case study demonstrate that, in the opinion of many of those inte~ewed,these attributes generally do hinder the potential for sustainability in tenns of project success. They also suggest that their absence improves the potential for sustainabiiity or project success. The specific indicators or dynamics related to the amibutes, as well as the attributes themselves, showed both similarities and diflerences to the hework. These dynamics were described as either baniers or aids to sustainability, depending on the presence or absence of the athibute. For example, the greater the distance between a project's activity and its decision-makers, the less confident people were of its potential for.success. The interreiated nature of the dynamics was also supported by the case study. The following discussion examines the similarities and differences between the framework and the case study results, considers their significance for sustainability, and presents general recomrnendations for structural change to improve the potential sustainability of institutional prognms and policies. The following table relates the indicators heworkwith the results fiom the case study. Becaw the dynarnics are interrelated, theK presentation in the following discussion does not necessarily follow the same order as the table.

Table 1. Cornpaison of the case study dynarnics and the indicators fiamework

1 1. Basic needs crisis possessors/non-possessors(economic equity)

2. Changing needs possessors/non-possessors (economic equity)

3. Inequitable distribution of economic benefits ~ossessors/non- os ses sors (economic eauitv)

4. Lack of local input in decision-making comrnuni~/bureaucracy(political equity)

5. Exclusion of women womenfmen (gender equity)

( 6. Resistance as a response to oppression, community/bureaucracy@oIitical equity) and exploitation and alienation possessors/non-possessors(economic equity)

1 7. Loss of traditional decisionmaking institutions cornmunity/bureaucracy(political equiw)

humanhanire (species equity) Collutuu~ihrIndicatom:

8. Mutual relations: group responsibility ancilor ~ ownership ' 9. Trust

10. Self-determination

Distance to timber markets Distance beîween decision and final impact

12. Distance to project funding sources

13. Distance to decision-makers

14. Time fiames

NA Number of people afYected by decision Feedback Loop Dynamîcx Feedback bopIndicaiors

15. Valuing expert/ devaluing local knowledge

16. Access to information

1 see 4, 7,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 1 Accountabi Iitv Hierarchv The basic needs cnsis deserves primary consideration in this discussion, as it and population growth were considered the main causes of resource and environmental degradation in Jhabua. In the context of power, however, population growth, resource scarcity and the crisis in meeting basic needs can be seen as symptoms rather than causes, despite the fact that they now

senously aggravate the problem. The cause cmbe traced to economic inequity. As people stniggle for survivd, they are tempted to make decisions for their short-tem benefit at the expense of their long-tenn well-being, and are less likely or able to give either time or resources (land) to efforts that only promise benefits over the long lem, if at dl. Poverty, in addition, is relative. As standards of material wealth and consumption have changed, so have peoples' needs changed. The implication of peoples' "basic" needs changing, as they make contact with other cultures, is that environmental health will be at greater risk as dernands expand beyond the minimum for Survival. People are not satisfied with the mirhum when they witness others with so much more. In Ghandi's words, however, "there is enough in the world for people's need, but not for people's greed. It is therefore imperative that development be redeflned as more than just material growth, and that the negative consequences of growth in terms of community and environmental health be openly acknowledged and accounted for in development planning. It is likewise imperative that community, via mutual relations, collective goals and a sense of public responsibility, be engaged for the sake of environmentai protection. Othenvise, demands for the global redistribution of wealth will undoubtedly lead to conflict and Merenvironmental destruction. This highlights the importance of both economic andpolitical equity for sustainability. Economic inequity topped the list of peoples' concems for causes of forest destruction. Adivasis' rights to the forest were progressively restricted until they were gradually phased out in most areas. Benefits were concentrated among timber merchants, politicians and govemment officials through the illegal teak trade and the siphoning of reforestation hds,whereas costs were dispersed among local people and the environment Resource benefits thus shifted over time fiom territory to centre. Not only did this create a disincentive to conserve forests on the part of adivasis, the effect of which was compounded by cornpetition for scarce agricultural land, but an underlying sense of injustice persisted. Many tribal people did not accept the govemment's authority to control the forest resource, especially given the govemment's own lack of ability to steward the land. Forest laws, which served mainly to resîrict the allocation of resource benefits to the centre, despite recent conservation-onented policies, were therefore ignored and in some cases, covertly flouted as a form of political protest Resistance to economic and cultural dienation from the forest was therefore a conîributing factor in the failure of forest conservation and restoration efforts. The result is that forests and reforestation projects are under extreme pressure by a number of groups, including adivasis, and to compound the problem, the traditional economic and socio-cultural ties that may otherwise have inspired adivasis to protect the forest have been weakened.

Economic inequity contributed to the lack of trust or faith that adivasis felt in regard to reforestation projects. Lack of trust was a key dynamic related to community that proved an obstacle to al1 projects. For example, it was problematic that JFM was being Unplernented by the Forest Department, as people consequently lacked faith that they would receive benefits fiom if and therefore showed a lack of co~tmentand effort to make it work. All of the projects, however, did show greater potential for success once people were actually receiving benefits and trusted that those benefits would continue. On a smaller scale, inequity in the distribution of project benefits within comrnunities was problematic as it had the potential to create factions and codict within codties,which sometimes lead to destruction of plantations. Finally, there was a tendency for ncher members of a community to monopolize project benefits, thereby defeating equity and community development objectives. Political inequity manifested itself in two ways: fht, through hadequate input into

decision-making for policies and projects, and second, through the loss of traditional decision- making institutions (especially related to forest management). Adivasis were completely excluded fiom forest-related decision-making except through projects such as FM.The critical issue here is the absence of responsibility or ownership that follows fkom excluding people fiom decision-making. The importance of creating a sense of ownership is well understood in development circles; where participation in decision-making is minimal, people show little 98 cornmitment to projects This understanding was demonstrated by the inclusion ofparticipution as an explicit requirement of each project Interpretations of participation, however, were vastly different fkom one project to the next To their credit, each project solicited some decisions fiom community members, but these were ofien superficial fiom the perspective of broad developrnent priorities or objectives. Participation in decision-rnaking was not a major objective of JFM, but local knowledge and

preferences were consulted in ternis of species selection and grazùig sites. Participation was an objective in IWDP, but was restricted due to quantitative targets established by the central

fimding agency. Participation was not only an objective of KRIBP but its main mode of operation. People showed levels of cornmitment to each project consistent with the level of decision-making permitted, fiom site-specific details to broad development objectives. This holds significance for susrainability in temof what consists of meaningful participation for

conservation policies and restoration projects. It also helps to define the role of Mplementing agencies in decision-making in te- of the balance of power between centre and temtory.

Local conventions and traditions related to forest management have fden into disuse as the centre has assumed decision-making authority for the forest. This has had a number of negative impacts both for social and ecological sustainability. The loss of traditional knowledge means that tribal peoples' knowledge of the local ecology, such as locations of productive sites, weather pattern, and species, is nut applied in forest management. Sirnilarly, the replacement of traditional institutions by foreign systems of governance has not been entirely effective, in part because foreign systems have little cultuml significance and therefore limited legitimacy for adivasis. A result of this change in govemmce has been the loss of personal and political accountability and the nse of corruption among decision-makers. In addition, it has led to increased inequity and environmental destruction as individuals abuse the vaccuum of authority for their own gain. Most importantly, it has meant the loss of social intastructure# or the decision-making capacity necessary for people to organize collectively, to communicate and problem-solve, and ultimately to take responsibility for their own development - to be self- detennining. Political and economic inequities have contributed to the weakening of tribal culture by decreasing ties between the people and the forest, increasing dependency of temtory on centre, and increasing rates of crime, dcoholism and outmigration. These social ills are in tum obstacles to reversing the destructive spiral of povem and ecological destruction once engaged. Gender inequity was recognized as a barrier to sustainability, as demonstrated by the multitude of projects targeted specifically toward women's development and the acknowledgement of women's direct interaction with the forest. Nevertheless, women were stiII excluded from conservation and restoration projects compared to men due to traditional gender divisions of labour and communication. The exception to this was in the KRIBP project, which was designed to account for women's needs and which held gender equity as a project objective. Inequity between humans and nature was not identified as a concem as such. AU of the project guidelines included conservation and restoration of degraded areas as substantive project goals. Ego- or homocentric values were not outwardly blamed for the poor state of the fore-, although many blamed a "lack of awareness" on the part of adivasis for conservation. This may be explained by a difference in prionties, or misunderstandings about why adivasis cut trees. It is udikely that adivasis harbour egocentric values as their liveiihoods are so closely tied to the health of the land. Species inequity and ecocentric values were not, therefore, issues as such, since the fate of the people was understood to be dependent on the fate of the environment.

Recommendations:

amend or repeal the National Forest Act of 1927 and replace with legislation that more closely reflects the conservationist and decentralist orientation of the National Forest Policy of 1988 and the Panchayati Raj constitutional amendments

engage NGOs rather than government departments to implement reforestation projects, and clearly define their role as facilitators, not decison-makers

redefine the role of government departments as sources of technical expertise to seMce the needs of comrnunities

minimize inflexible, quantitative targets that derive from central funding agencies

clearly define participation asfull participation for al1 project decision-making, from agenda- setting to implementation integrate traditional culture and decision-making methods into new institutions

consider women's needs when designing implementation strategies to ensure their full participation

Community Community was an unanticipated structural athibute (in the sense that it was originally a subset of hierarchy) that arose from the data analysis. Comrnmity was referred to in the first

chapters of this paper on social requirements for sustainability. At the time that the hework was developed, 1was confounded by the task of conceiving community as a structural attribute. The case study helped to define that structural attnbute as mutual relations. Mutual relations within social systems were considered an aid to sustainability. The dynaniics relevant to mutual relations and sustainability within the context of power were described as feelings of collective responsibility andor ownership, trust, and self-detemiination. A common objective of the projects was communi~,rather than individual, development. Commuity development requires motivated individuals who have the capacity to work collectively. While it was considered a given that people would protect their own land, private ownership was not the only source of conmitment to conservation and restoration. A sense of responsibility to the collective, and an understanding of shared goals, were considered important for motivating people to work for their collective bettement. Collective responsibility and shared goals depend on muhial relations, on the fact that people know each other. Mutual relations were therefore necessary to establish common goals for comrnon property resources, and to work collectively towards them. Many of the respondents emphasized the importance of dialogue, discussion and meetings for the success of their projects. The purpose of dialogue was to give groups of people the opportunity to corne to "mutual understanding" about development priorities, that is, to establish common goals. Relations offen needed to be developed among community members themselves, as well as between villagers and agency staff. For the KRIBP project, "rapport-building" was key to their implementation strategy. Mutual relations are the backbone of community and sustainability in tenns of project success. Consider participation and social infrastructure; these also depend on mutual relations, especially where telecornunications technologies an mdimentary. In addition, short time frames and large scale institutions both mate obstacles to mutual relations. Mutual relations are key to understanding how a communal power structure impacts project success or sustainability. Distnist, as we have seen, was considered a major bamier to sustainability. Besides inequity, distrust was also based on fear, and lack of confidcnce in the motives of govemment. Adivasis had expenenced abuse at the hands of government officials, and witnessed the failure of governent projects. Since govemment departments have traditionally implemented secular development projects in India, adivasis tend to equate development work with the government. Fear is compounded by illiteracy, as written information can neither confirm nor negate an agency's claims to altruism. AI1 three implcmenting agencies had to work to overcome distrust, whether through a show of good faith via entry projects (essentidy giving the community something it wants), by educating villagers through "exposure" visits, or simply by living and working in the commUnrty for a length of tirne. These methods helped to establish trust between villagers and agency staff. Without a trust relatiomhip, villagers remained uncooperative - a fom of resistance against the centre. Self-determination was the final aid to sustainability identified that could be considered a dynamic of community. Any colll~llunitythat is dependent on handouts is clearly unsustainable.

Self-determination was expressed during inte~ewsas a desire to be fiee fiom oppression and dependency, a desire that fuelled resistance to the Forest Department's control over forest lands. While most of the projects included objectives for building the social inf?astx-ucture necessary to be self-determining, that is, to create local institutions for decision-making, only the KRIBP

project had succeeded in doing so thus far. Descriptions by KRIBP wornen about the importance + of self-detennination implied that it requires respectfbl and consultative mutual relations between individuals and decision-makers. Recommendations:

ensure that community members are decision-rnakers, or that they have mutual relations with decision-makers

use development models that emphasize relationship-building and participatory processes, for example, the KRIBP mode1 (Appendix C). when detennining project time fiames, allocate enough time to accommodate the need for trust and relationship-building processes, which will Vary on a case by case basis.

Scale Distance was described as either a barrier or an aid to sustainability, depending on dynamics related to distance to timber markets, fiuiding sources and decision-maken. nese dynamics de-emphasized distance as the critical factor, emphasizing the magnitude of administrative institutions instead For example, the restriction of interstate trade in forest products, based on a nationalized system of forest administration, created the conditions necessary for black markets in forest products like te& and tobacco. Since the products were being taken fiom the forest illegally, harvesting methods were destructive and uncontrollable. The salient dynamic here is therefore not simply distance, but unsustainability as a function of competing economic interests that remain unresolved and uncoatrolled due to the inaccessible and unresponsive nature of large sale bureaucracies-

Distance to funding sources was a barrier to sustainability due to the depletion of fun& fiom centre to territory. Scale therefore facilitates cormptionllack of accountability, perhaps because difficulties exist in detecting and isolating irreguladies in large systems. To state that corruption impedes sustainability is perhaps redundant, but since it underlies this argunent, let it be stated nonetheless. In contrast to distant fûnding sources, local sources of hancial or in-kind contributions were seen as aids to sustainability, as they encouraged feelings of ownership, responsibility and cornmitment previously identified as important for project success. Cash contributions in particular were effective as they formed a tangible bais for social infrastnicture building, and particularly group mobilization, organization and skills development around small savings and loans groups. Small scde economic activity, and in the case of KRIBP, small scale, affordable and culturally appropnate technologies, were used complementanly to reduce dependency on the centre and increase the community's capacity for self-determination. nie impact of large distances between decision-makers and project communities on accountability, comption, responsibility and ownership restates the link between scale and

103 project success or sustainability. Distant decision-rnakers were inaccessible to community members and considered unresponsive or simply ignorant of community development needs. Their decisions were often misguided or ineffective due to this and other problems attributable to scale such as time lags between a decision and its implementation. Again, these problems underscore the lack of accountability (being held responsible for project results) and lack of ownership (being personally impacted by project results) of distant decision-makers as contributing to project failure. The salient dynamic in this case is that where decision-makers are not held accountable or otherwise af5ected by the results of their decisions, no incentive or personal investment exists to ensure that they make the best decisions possible.

A dynamic which was not considered in the original hework was that of scale in relation to timeframes. Short thehunes were seen as a banier to sustainability. For example, short terms of office were blamed for poor decision-making on the part of locally-posted officials. Neither could these officials be held responsible for the long-term results of their decisions, nor would they benefit from good decision-making in terms of being rewarded for the fkuits of their labour. Corruption created a disincentive to long-term planning, as even short-tenn plans were difficult to carry through. Projects suffered as participatory processes were not possible within short time frames. Community development was descnbed as a natural process that must evolve and that cannot be nished. For this reason, the WE!P staff refused to join the large-scale RGM project, as it would have increased the projects human scope without increasing the time fiame available for its completion. The number of people afFected by a decision did not appear to be a concem accordinj to the data. This indicator was intended to complement hierarchy in temof determinhg the distribution of decision-making power in systerns, but was obviously ineffective as an indicator. The relevant dynamics of scale therefore relate to the magnitude of administrative institutions in terms of incentive through accountability and ownership, and time hes. Recommendations:

decentralize decision-making for village forest conservation and restoration projects by giving full control of forest lands to designated committees

ensure that local financial and in-kind contributions are required elements of projects 1O4 harmonize time frames of postings for officiais with long-texm planning objectives

determine the sharing of accountability among decision-makers. Decision-makers should either be held responsible for project results or should be personally impacted by their decisions, or both.

Feedback Loo~s The purpose of examining feedback loops was to determine what kind of impact they (or their absence) have on sustainability, and how they manifest themselves in terms of social power relationships. The indicators hework considered feedback loops in terms of the use of indigenous knowledge in forest management, and bureaucratic accountability for forest decision- making. An additional dynamic from the case study was access to information. The data indicated that feedback loops conûibute to project success or sustainability and suggested that they manifest themselves mainly as inf~mationflows,or communication. Information flows between and among political and economic institutions and resource-based communities have profound implications for natural resource decision-making. The fiee flow of infornation is an equity issue, as "knowledge is power". The scant use of indigenous knowledge in project decision-making was considered a problem in terms of expert knowledge being vaiued at the expense of traditional knowledge. Traditional indigenous knowledge could be visualized as a feedback loop via the institutionalization of local participation in decision-making processes, although a distinction should be made between local and traditional howledge. The devaluation of traditional knowledge was seen to have negative consequences for both cultural and ecologi'cal sustainability in tems of diversity. As iraditional ways (for example of dress or language) fall into disuse in favour of "modem" ways, so are local species perceived as less valuable compared to higher-yield exotics. Local knowledge, however, is not always traditional knowledge. In some instances, expert knowledge was assimilated by local people, thereby necessitating "awareness-raising" if that knowledge proved to be wrong (as in the case of Eucalyptus). Traditional indigenous knowledge was sometimes supported by, or improved upon via integration with, expert knowledge. The key was to neither value nor devalue either indigenous or expert knowledge on the basis of its source, but to consider al1 knowledge equdly valuable until proven otherwise. Access to information was considered an aid to sustainability. As a feedback loop it could be visualized as universal education or fieedom of information legislation. Illiteracy and

"lack of awareness" were ofien cited as causes of deforestation and the failure of restoration efforts. Development workers got past illiteracy (and distnist) by taking villagers to witness successful projects, that is, by providing information visually. These were trust-building as weil as educationai trips. Access to information about govemment poIicies for the bettement of adivasis and about adivasis' legal rights and priviledges were considered important to deveIopment in generd. Such information wouid improve peoples' capacity to parîicipate in decision-making and was, in fact, a project objective of KRIBP. Access to fieedom of information legislation, for example, would improve transparency and accountability. Information flows, both fkom centre to temtory and fiom tenitory to centre, can be seen as equally important. The centre needs to understand local cultural Merences and development priorities for sustaïmb'ïty as much as territory needs to understand the tools avaïiable to them to participate in decision-making. "Awareness-raishg" was a development buzzword that received as many interpretations as "participation". Both of these te= describe the fiee flow of information fkom centre to territory and back, but could easily be misinterpreted either through misunderstanding or a desire to maintain the statu quo. Accountability was impossible to gauge according to the indicaton fimework, that is, by tracing cornplaints related to resource management decisions to determine whether or not they were followed up. Recorded information of any kind was difficdt to obtain fiom officia1 sources, never mind potentially incrimbating information such as this. Accountability did not corne to the fore during the data analysis but was a thread ninning through many of the explanations about what works and what doesn't for project success. It was a major factor underpinning no less than Nne of the other dynamics; therefore, I will not undertake to repeat them al1 here, save to Say that accountability of govemment to the people, and of individuals to their communities, is a critical element of sustainable social systems, without which corruption and abuse ovemde any efforts to conserve or restore resources. Accountability by definition means responsibility or responsiveness - it too is concemed with the fiee flow of information. Recommendations:

ensure that traditional indigenous knowledge is given equitable consideration through local participation in decision-mabg

provide universal access to education and accessible fkeedom of information legislation

include improving access to information, especially information designed for the bettement of adivasis, as part of development projects

improve accounîability through administrative law and access to decision-maken and decision-making processes

emphasize irnproved communications as a project objective (e-g., literacy, technology trans fer) In sum, the potential for success of the three projects studied appear to be on a continuum, with JFM coming up as least sustainable, KRlBP as most sustainable, and IWDP somewhere in between. The following table summarizes each projects potential for sustainability according to the indicators hework. Community dynamics have been added due to their significance for completing the hrtework. hdicators that were found ineffective and dynamics related more closely to deforestation than to projects have been omitted. The rating scheme is based on high, medium and low values as follows:

high is an aid to sustainability medium is either a weak aid (a) or barrier fi) to sustainability low is a barrier to sustainability

Table 2. Proiect sustainability potential 1 Project 1 Rating (h-m-1) Explanation I I I1 I 1 JFM 1 In (a) 1 new access to forest, but not for everyone IWDP m (b) richer fmers benefit more KRIBP h broader objectives, open to latecorners Political equity JFM 1 Forest Department rnakes decisions vIWDP 1 targets limit Iocal input r KRlBP h villagers make decisions , Gender equity JFM 1 few women participate Gender equity (cont.) IWDP 1 In (b) some women participate 1 I KRIBP h women and men participate equally

1 I I Responsibility/ownership 1 "M I 1 minimal cornmitment hmvillages f I I I IWDP 1 in (a) those involved very committed KRIBP h full ownership, good representation

I Trust JFM 1 history and Iack of power transfer

1 lWDP h Ions tenn project, strong ties I 1 1 l KRBP h work closely with vilkgers, power transfer

1 Self-determination JFM 1 little social infiastnicture building IWDP process lacking, some skilb transfer

I KRIBP h social infrastnicture and skills transfer

1 I Scale and funding sources IJFM 1 Ill (a) 1 voluntary patrols (functioning?) 1

IWDP In @) funding linked to targets, lower wages z KRIBP h matching coniriiutions

Scale and decision-makers IFM 1 Iast word in Bhopal or Deihi (1200 km)

I IWDP 1 last word in Bhopd or Delhi (1200 km)

1 KRIBP h last word in Dahod (70 km)

I 1 I Scale and time frames pF'M 1 m (a & b) 1 infinite time frame - no long tem planning IWDP h extensions to project will improve process KRIBP m (a & b) shorter the frame but process-oriented Indigenous Knowledge JFM 1 minimal input solicited

1 IWDP 1 In (a) input solicited within range of tqets t 1 I 1 KRIBP 1 h 1 input integrated, baseline for technology 1 I Accountability JFM 1 decision-makers short-term or distant 1 IWDP h decision-makers known, accessible 1 KRIBP h decision-makers local 10. Discussion and Conclusions: Structure, Power and Sustainability

The Jhabua case study has several implications for our understanding of power and sustainability in terms of the structural analysis presented in Part One. These implications are subject to the limitations of this research, which are outlined at the end of this chapter.

Hiemchv and Community People described dynamics that could be characterized as linear or hierarchical foms of project organization and implementation as the main barriers to sustainability (insofar as sustainability cmbe related to project success). These dynamics of hierarchy, or centre, were contrasted in Jhabua to those of community, or temtory. People described dynamics that could be characterized as systems-oriented or community foms of organization as the main aids to sustainability (insofar as sustainability can be related to project success). The key dynamics relating hierarchy to sustainability were economic andpolitical eguity, specifically meeting basic needs and integrating public participation into natural resource decision-making. The political equity criterion exhibits a transitional link to community in terms of social infasfructure and muhral relations. These are supported stnicturally in turn by srna22 scale administrative institutions and longer timeffarnesyand feedback loops in the fom of infrmationflows and accountability, al1 of which were also identified as aids to sustainability or project success. Bnefly, hierarchy does not support sustainability because it does not support political and economic equity. Community does support sustainability because it supports equity, mutual relations and, subsequently, social infrastructure. Scale is sigaifcant insofar as it aggravates or facilitates the dynamics of hierarchy and community that respectively block or assist sustainability. Feedback loops exist, or not, as a result of systems structure and as mentioned above, aid sustainability or project success. Linear versus systems-oriented structures of powq in hierarchy and cornmunity respectively, are described by the concept of hierarchy as domination power (power over) vs. cornrnunity as actualization power (power with). Community as actualization power describes interdependence or the simultaneous empowennent of individuals and collectives, as opposed to domination power that is oppressive and exclusive. Actualization power is manifested as cooperative relationships leading to community development or self-determination. niis bdof

power was evident in the KRIBP project. Domination power is manifested as competitiveness and relationships characterized by distrust, which block community collaboration and dcvelopment. This was evident in the JFM project

The importance of equitable power relationships to sustainable developrnent was recoa&ed in Jhabua in the general program emphasis on women's development. The desire to

maintain the power statu quo was, however, evident in the state Forest Department's interpretation of women's developrnent in terms of segregated women's projects, rather than efforts to include women in typically male-dominated nahual resource projects. ~n&nada, equitable power relationships are recognized in federal development policies emphasizing "partnerships". Partners share power; they cooperate with each other. Another lesson learned fiom Jbabua was the advantage for project success/sustainability of working fiom a whole systems rather than a reductionist approach with respect to development of land and people. This was demonstrated by the greater success and subsequent program emphasis on watershed development projects like IWDP (based on ecological boundaries) compared to the failure of "patch development" projects (based on jurisdictîonal boundanes). It was also demonstrated by the greater success of projects that had broad community support (e.g., KRIBP) compared to those where cornmunity support was severely fiabmented (e.g., the FMmode1 project in Rupakheda). Finally, I observed that development work that focused on both people and the natural environment (rather than one or the other) would more Iikely be successful in terms of sustainability because it would develop the social infrastructure, economic benefits and ecological conditions necessary for project success/sustainability as described by the stakeholders. Alienation and dependency dso proved to be important for explaining how hierarchy leads to project failure or unsustainability. Alienation from civics was a problem in Jhabua in terms of the disintegration of traditional institutions of governance, a geneml lack of accountability, and corruption. Alienation exacerbated dependency as group decision-making skills, and access to the land and resources, were lost. The result was the engagement of a cycle 110 of poverty and powerlessness, which perpetuates centre over territory, and is reflected in habua's social problems of crime, alcoholim, and outmigration. Hierarchy (and scale in terms of the magnitude of adminimative institutions) therefore serve to erode mutual relations, which 1interpreted as the definitive element of com~ty. Recall the definition of community fiom Chapter 2: "a group of people who know each other personally and who plan together over time for their long-term common bettement". Worhg together means cooperating, and cooperation requires relationships based on trust. Recall also the community values fiom Chapter 2: solidarity, reciprocity, fiatemity, mutuality, interdependence, sharing, caring and responsibility. These are al1 elements of mutual relations. The case study results emphasized mutuality, sharing, caring and responsibility in particular.

This is reflected in the importance placed by respondents on building trust, commitment and

responsibility to one another for project success. 1 would conclude that rebuilding commtmity through mutual relations is therefore key to developing sustainability- Excessive competition (inthe absence of effective regdatory mechanisms) and distrust were thought to preclude cooperation. Both competition and cooperation, however, were

considered natural elements of hedthy systems in Chapter 3. Cooperation was emphasized as a requirement for project success in Jhabua In the KRIBP project, it was demonstrated as primary for building public consensus, without which community planning and development cannot occur. The difficuity of moving from competitive to cooperative relationships was evident in the Forest Department projects. The importance credited to mutual relations parallels references in Chapter 3 to people's constitutive associations with each other, the natural environment, and their work. A constitutive association is a relationship that infoms one's self-identity. Participation in projects may create constitutive associations between projects and peoples' own sense of pride or self-worth (another facet of ownership). This is similar to Marx's conception of productivity and the dienation of labour. Given that project work is ofien environment-based, participation may similady create or improve associations between people and nature. Extrapolating fiom the case shidy results, 1 would suggest that people's participation in community work increases their commitment and responsibility to, or ownership of, development projects because they perceive their work, community and environment (where combined) as partial expressions of themselves.

Developing sustainability means a lot more than economic growth. Sustainability (insofa.as it is related to project success) is linked to individual and collective empowerment, fieedom or self-detemination, and comrnunity. This was reflected in people's resistance to oppression and the importance for people of meaningful participation in decision-making. In Chapter 2, I discussed both community and equity as social requirements for sustainability. As such, institutions of govemance require public legitimacy and therefore must refiect public consensus, values and culture. This was also demonstrated in Jhabua in the program emphasis on public participation, which properly interpreted meant the de facto decentralkation of power. This in tum reinforced the skills or social infrastnrcture necessary for self-determination. Given hurnm' tendency to compete, economic equity was considered necessary to reduce conflict and

ensure ecological integity. Similady, political equity was considered necessary to foster humans' ability to coopemte. Strong sustainability and strong democracy therefore go hand in hand.

MgeScale Versus Small Scale Scde emerged as a secondary issue in the sense that its significance was tied to its effect on the dynamics that described hierarchical and communal structures. The key elements of scale were large versus srnall scale administrative institutions, and tirne hes. Large scale institutions were thought to decrease people's accessibility to decision-makers or participation in decisionmaking, thereby limiting their political and economic power (and supporting hierarchy). Large scale institutions also inhibited the formation and maintenance of mutual relations. Additionally, large scale inhibited the ffee flow of idonnation, which was exacerbated by the rudimentary state of communications technology. Decision-makers were considered unresponsive, unaccountable, and prone to comption. It was suggested in Chapter 3 that large scale can Iead to inefficiencies. This was certainly the case in Jhabua, where much of the development work was inefficient and ineffective, as it either didn't accommodate local conditions and pnonties or wasntt implemented properly due to administrative graft. These elements of large scale were seen to contribute to project failure and to deforestation generdly in reference to the Forest Department, and as such could be interpreted as barriers to sustainability.

Smdl scale, on the other han& was seen as facilitating mutual relations and cooperation, the fiee flow of information, public participation in decision-making, and accountability. 1 observed that small scale also facilitates holism, as the complexity of a systems approach is more manageable on a small scale. While communications technology could overcome some of the problems of large scale, it was not a senous option in Jhabua given its state of technological ' evolution. People also linked thehes to project success or sustainability. Intergenerational equity was the main issue considered in Part One in temof time fiames, but it did not emergs as a priority in Jhabua due to the severely degraded nature of the forests and the concurrent concems for immediate economic survival. Concem for future generations was, however, expressed in areas where there was sorne forest remaining. Time fiames were emphasized in Jhabua more broadly in terms of muhial relations and natural cycles. The evolution or development of mutual relations and skills takes tirne. Tiie hesalso need to be consistent with natural resource life cycles for sustainability. Short time -es were therefore considered barriers to mutual relations and ecological health, and by extension to project success and sustainability.

Feedback Loops Feedback loops, or information flows, were considered important for project success or sustainability. Dynamics of hierarchy and large scale were thought to inhibit feedback loops. Insofar as hierarchy is representative of linear structures, I concluded that linear structures inhïbit feedback loops while systems-oriented structures (community) facilitate them. The irnproved functioning of feedback loops in small scale systems could be explained by the decreased complexity of these systems. The importance of feedback loops for project success or sustainability was demonstrated in Jhabua through increased confidence in projects where public input regarding local conditions and priorities was integrated, for example, through public control of the KRIBP project. Feedback loops were also discussed in tems of the need for accountable public institutions to secure public legitimacy and cooperation in natural resource programs and policies.

Indicato~ The analfical hmework proved to be useful, although the indicators were not useful ar such due to the method of analysis. The qualitative method precluded the indicators fiom meeting many of the cntena for good indicators outlined in Chapter 4. First, the indicators were al1 qualitative or subjective, rather than a combination of objective and subjective. This was due to a lack of available quantitative data, which I had intended to collect through secondary research- The qualitative method could not be said to have used readily available data since data collection was labour intensive and time consuming. The qualitative nature of the results wodd also make it difficult to detect changes in future evaluations. Finally, while general cornparisons could be made to other comunities, the accuracy of these cornparisons would also be Iimited due to the qualitative nature of the redts. In sum, the over-riding limitation of this hework in terms of indicators was the use of a qualitative research method. A quantitative method wodd have been more appropriate for the specifk purpose of indicators as measures of sustainability. On the other hand, the qualitative method used was very appropriate for determining the relevance of the analytid fkmework. The debate around qualitative vs. quantitative indicators is moot, as both objective and subjective data cm be quantified. The salient point is that different methods produce different results in terms of depth of understanding versus technicd rigour. Method should therefore be selected on the basis of the desired format for results, in order to facilitate their application or use. Since this study was primaily concemed with determining the luik (if any) between sustainability and power structures for the general purpose of contributing to our understanding of sustainable development, the chosen rnethod (qualitative) was appropriate. If, on the other hand, its primary purpose was to measure performance, a quantitative method would have been more appropriate. These could therefore be described as evaluative rather than descriptive indicators, or as criteria. Qualitative methods are critical for explaining and enriching our understanding of the dynamics behind any quantitative results. If 1had used a quantitative method, 1 may have determined that 30% of village leaders were women; 1 would not, however, have known that these women often defer to their husbands for decision-making, or why. Given the normative nature of indicators, qualitative analysis is also important for determining the accuracy of indicators to community values. Finally, public processes for the development of indicators of sustainability serve as relationship-building and community visioning tools, with cornmimity development implications beyond performance meanirement

Limitations This study was lirnited by a number of factors. One limitation was in the methodology. 1 chose a qualitative method as I subscribe to the paradigm values hvolved in constmctivist research:

(A)ny gaze is always filtered through the lenses of Ianguage, gender, social class, race and ethnicity. There are no objective obseniations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of the observer and the observed (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994,12).

Nevertheless, I found myself wondering about the "validity" of my conclusions given my biases as a researcher. Positivist criteria for good research include intemal validity, extemal validity . (generalizability), reliability (replicability) and objectivity. According to Guba and Lincoln (1gW), these four cnteria cannot be applied to consûuctivist inquiry. Rather, they suggest the following criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and co~ability. nie credibility of the data, or the accuracy of my interpretation of peoples' responses, could have been improved by going back to the respondents to verify my interpretations. 1 did remto a small number of key respondents to verify that I was interpreting them correctly at the time, but they were not involved in the analysis phase of the study. Involving them would have been impossible given the distance involved. It would also have been difficult to retum to al1 respondents given the time fiame, the large number of groups that presented as forest stakeholders, and rny efforts to obtain representation in tems of age, class and gender within these groups. Greater credibility may therefore have been partially sacrificed for greater representaîion. Transferability is similar to generalizability; are the results applicable to other situations? 1 set out the context of the case study in sufficient detail to allow anyone interested in transfeming my results to other contexts to assess the applicability of that transfer. Given my experience with working with aboriginal people in Canada on sustainability issues, 1 am fairly confident that the dynamics are transferable to similar situations, although this will always be context-dependent. Confinnability is parallel to objectivity in the sense that it is:

concemed with assuring that data, interpretations, and outcornes of inquiries are rooted in contexts and persons apart fiom the evaluator and are not simply figments of the evaluator's paradigm. Unlike the conventional paradigrn, which roots its assurances of objectivity in method...the constnictivist paradigm's assurances of integrity of the findings are rooted in the data themselves. This means that data cm be tracked to their sources, and that the logic used to assemble the interpretations into structurally coherent and corrorborating wholes is both explicit and implicit in the narrative of a case study (Guba and Lincoln, 1994,243).

1have been as clear as possible about the systematic nature and logic used in collecting and organ-g the data, as well as the logic used in developing the hypothesis and extracthg my conclusions. An audit would have helped to determine the study's confirmability, but this was beyond the scope of the project. Dependability is like reliability in texms of ensuring the stability of data. If outside reviewers were to repeat my process, including the logical approach and techniques, I believe that they would collect similar data (although this may not be the case if the evaluator was not like me, Le., female, mid-twenties, white, and middle class). The interpretation of the data, however, is entirely my own. This brings me to two major limitations that go beyond methodological paradigms. 1 asked questions about what worked and what didn't work for project success in terms of systems structure in my effort to detennine the lin.between structure and sustainability. The first limitation is therefore to what degree project success can be equated with sustainability. 1 felt 116 that they were acceptable substitutes at the time given my translater's advice about the difficulty of mslating "sustainability". In addition, people often defined project success in sustainability tems, depending upon their interest in the project Thus success for govemment officiais was re-establisherrt of primary successional species (green-up), for NGO workers it was development of social infiastructure and green-up, and for villagers it was economic autonomy. Finally, al1 of the projects focused on goals that referred to economic, social and ecological development, so if official project goals were met (another criteriun of success), they could also be described as developing sustainability. The second major limitation is the extent to which the conclusions depend on my own interpretation of the data People told me what worked and didn't work for project success, but I categorized this data as hierarchy, scale, feedback loops or community. Given that the questions were derived from the indicators framework, they were queries about the relationship between structure and project success or sustainability. Insofar as these questions were fiamed to ask about specific elements of structure, in a way that the respondents could understand, they assumed the Iinear nature of hierarchy and sought to detennine the link (if any) to project success or sustainability. For some readers, this may have served to obscure the results. 1 believe, however, that the logic behind the heworkis well set out and supported, and that the conclusions that 1 have drawn do not go beyond what is rasonable in light of the data Minor limitations include the absence of a well established ideological framework for sustainable development theory that would have facilitated the analysis immeasurab1y. A more Mly developed discourse on sustainability and power, based on the concepts of centre and temtory, would therefore have been useful. In addition, the study was limited by the politiczl nature of the subject at hand and the subsequent difficulty in getting people to give their true opinions as opposed to publicly acceptable answers. Finally, translation between not two but three languages undoubtedly obscured the results. It was not feasible to record the data on audio tape and have it translated later due to time constraints and a shortage of translators. Within the limitations described above, the case shidy confirmed that a Iink does exist between the structure of power in nadresource-based decision-making institutions and project success or sustainability in Jhabua. The working hypothesis, that Iinear structures (hierarchy, centre) act as barriers to sustainability, was supported by the case study, as was its antithesis, that systems-oriented (community, territory) structures act as aids to sustainability. The key dynamics in support of the hypothesis/antithesis were economic and political equity, social infrastructure, and rnutual relations. Secondary dynamics were smail scale administrative institutions, longer time hes,information flows and accountability. The significance of this research lies in the case study data in terms of supporting evidence for the analytical framework. The analysis is significant for its qualification of this framework. In other words, the shidy contributes to our understanding of the relevance of power structures for the sustainable functioning of natural resource decision-making institutions, subject to the limitations descnbed above. Some of the dynamics specific to the case study were more relevant to explaining poiicy dynamics (deforestation) than proj ect dynarnics (restoration efforts). Al1 of these dynamics, however, contribute to our understanding of the way these barriers and ai& to sustainability interact, and as such can be usefûl for qualitative evaluation by themselves, or as critena for quantitative evaluation in the fom of indicators of sustainability.

Further Research The stnictural nature of the analysis and the concepts of centre and territory were particularly useM in the context of power. While no one cm deny the existence of power and its role in society, it is nevertheless a difficult concept to isolate for the practical purpose of research. More research would therefore be useM on the concepts of centre and temtory, on systems theory and the parallels between physical and social systerns, and on commmity as a unit of analysis in political economy. I would also suggest retuming to Jhabua in a few years to re-evaluate the three projects using both quantitative and qualitative methods. In closing, 1 wodd like to share a thought frorn Helena Norberg-Hodge with whom 1 spoke in Ladakh, prior to my sojoum in fiabua. She said: "Real power is economic autonomy". From the perspective of centrdtemtory, the word "autonomy"means choice. This is the seed for a theory of power on developing sustainability. Appendix A Grounds for Environmental Ethia

5411: Egocon* Sodoty: Hoflmamic SeM-intarsrt Mbb Util- Wb ThornasHobbes JudeChWan ethic J.S. MUI Johnw JohnLodte Armii%erw Jeremy Bentham Wiiliam Dehm Adam SmiVi GmordPlnchot FleiieOubog Thomas MaltJws Peter Slngsr Robin AtWeld Garrett Hacdin Barry- Murray Bookchin Sodalecafemùrists LsftGreeits

1. Matter is composed of atornic parts 1. Everythiismnectedtoeverything 2. The whole is equal to ttie swn of the parts else (law of identity) 2 The whole is greater than the sum of the 3. Knowledge is mtext-indepencient m 4. Change ocarrs by the remangement of 3. Knowledge is oontext-dependent Pm 4. Rieprfmacyofprocessovefparts 5. Dualiof mind and body, matter and spifi 5. The uniîy of humans and nonhuman nature

Source: Merchant, l992,64-65. AppendLx B. Final Question Set

Part 1. Introduction and Demographic Infornation nie participant was informed that the purpose of the research was to leam fiom their expenence about why the forest was disappearing, and what they thought was necessary for reforestation projects to be successful. They were assured that their participation was voluntary, that their responses would be kept strictly confidentid, and thai the information was to be used for a graduate research paper in Canada.

The participant's name, sex, approximate age. stakeholder group and afiliated project (where relevant) were recorded. The location of the interview was also recorded.

How has the forest changed in your memory? Why?

What do projects need to be successful? (ofien asked Iast) What were the objectives of Project X? How is this different fiom (Project Y, earlier projects, other) Which do you think is more likely to be successful? Why? Do you know of any individuals who have had success through their own initiative to obtain minor forest products? How?

How was Project X initiated (how did it start)? Who decided what kind of work was going to take place? 1s that different nom (Project Y, etc.)? How? Who decided where the plantation or rehabiiitated site would be? How? Who decided what would be planted? How? Who decided when the planting would take place? How are your group meetings conducted? (How rnanyhow often? Who chairs? Who makes the agenda?) Who goes to meetings (do women go)? How many people? Why do they come? How are decisions taken at the meetings? How is this different fiom (Project Y, etc.)?

Who will benefit fkom this project? How are benefits distributed? How is this different fiom (Project Y, etc.)? Who benefits least? Does anyone lose?

Where does funding for the project come fiom? How is it managed? How does this affect the project? How is this different fiom (Project Y, etc.)?

How big is the project (budget, land area, people invohed/&ected)? How is this different fiom (Project Y, etc.)?

How were local people's ideas/concems included in the project? How is this different fiom (Project Y, etc.)? 27. How are disagreements resolved between: project staff and villagers, and among villagers? 28. How is this different fkom (Project Y, etc.)? Appendix C. Participatory Planning Process (KRIBP)

1. Cluster / Village Selection

2. Village Entry and Rapport Building

3. Generat Participatory Rural Appraisd

4. Cornmunity Problem Analysis

5. Identification of Development Options

6. Pnoritisation of Options

7. Negotiation of Village Workshop (leading to small scde activities)

Small scale activities seek to: Solve delimited community problems Gather information Involve less fun& Test and decentralise rules and responsibilities

Leu& to: Solution of some community problems Expenences that aid long tem planning Enhanced participation and cooperation Appendk D. Critena and Indicators for Group Perf'ormance VP)

CRITERIA INDICATORS

1. Group Characteristics Size: 15-25 members (or less 8- 10) Social homogeneity: kinship or ~thersocial ties exist absence of dependency relations Group not dorninated by politically/econornically powerfiI households Poorest households in the hamlet included in the group

2. Group identity and structure Every member knows who else is in the group Every member knows the purpose of the group Members represent their households There is continuity in household representatives Al1 members cm give an account of al1 the group's activities AI1 members cm give an account (general) of the group's finances

3. Leadership Leadership roles change annually ResponsibiIities including bank signatories change at least yearly Leaders have been elected by the group A procedure for the selection of leaders based on desired characteristics has been followed (even if only one candidate) 3.5 Leaders facilitate and do not dominate group discussions and decision making 3.6 Leaders represent group interests and uphold group noms

4. Group Functioning 4.1 Group has a set of niles (bylaws) which have been discussed and agreed (rules for meetings etc.) and sanctions for rule breakers 4.2 Regular group meetings take place with 90-100% attendance 4.3 Sanctions (frnes, refusal of credit etc.) are imposed on rule breakers by the group 4.4 The majority of members (x%) contribute to group discussion and decision-making: - unanimous support (fiorn group rnernbers and other household members) is elicited for key decisionsS1 4.5 There is full group participation (x% members) in key activities (e.g., soi1 and watershed conservation planning, PU,"sweeping transects", species selection for nursery raising) 4.6 The following records are maintained and up to date (without CO inputs) - attendance register - minutes book - savings and loan ledgers

5. Independence of KRIBP 5.1 x% meetings regularly take place in the absence of COS 5.2 Records are maintained without CO assistance 5.3 x% decisions are taken independent of CO52

51~~sinitially record who speaks, who is prevented fiom speaking in meetings and how decisions are made. 124 5.4 x group activities (e.g., self help actions) have been initiated independently of the project (at least two per year) ( number and kind) 5.5 Group makes use of planning skills (PRAs, CPA etc.) on its own

6. Resource mobilisation Financial 6.1 Every member makes the minimum savings contribution every week 6.2 Individual savings of X Rs have been accurnulated (Rs 60 after 3 monttis...) 6.3 Savings and income build up a common fund (savings, fmes, donations) 6.4 Site of common fund is X 1Zs at stage Y 6.5 Working capital per member is X Rs at stage Y 6.6 Group raises money to pay for the services of jankars, training costs, etc. Other 6.7 Group mobilises specialist skills or services fiom the govemment 6.8 Group obtains govemment schernes to meet identified needs 6.9 Group receives development schemes fiom outside (but not in response to requests) (i.e., group is a vehicle for other schemes) 6.10 Group members make time available to attend trainings

7. Resource Management 7.1 Wide (equitable) distribution of lems within the group 7.2 Poorer group members have taken loans 7.3 Group has agreed criteria for loan purpose and priority 7.4 Group appraises loan applications on basis of these (e.g., legitimate need) 7.5 Loans are available for a wider range of needs (loan criteria do not restrict access to credit for consumption for poorest) 7.6 ûver time, the ratio lems for productive/consurnption purposes increases 7.7 Group has agreed interest rates for loans for different purposes 7.8 Loans refused with reasons 7.9 Group agrees repayment schedules for different loans 7.10 There is 95% recovery fiom members 7.1 1 Repayment schedules are strictly adhered to 7.12 Loanlrepayrnent records are kept up to date 7.13 Most of the loan iùnd is in circulation 7.14 Group ensures that loans are used for the purpose for which they are taken 7.15 The group has successfully managed at least other productive resource (diesel engine, group forestry, etc.) 7.16 The group has shown ability to negotiate, sel1 or purchase services or products 7.17 Group effectively overseedmanages the work of jankars 7.18 Group has mobilised and used resources for common purposes (.g., watershed funds for bund repairs)

8. Skill acquisition and use 8.1 X% of gr~upmembers have attended y training programmes 8.2 Every member has received some training

52~hereis a clear shifi in CO'S role in meetings fiom initiator- facilitator- observer -absent. Key decisions (e.g., on leadership, finances, sanctions) are taken without CO involvement. 125 8.3 Completed course in functional Iiteracy/numeracy with 80% attendance rates 8.4 x% of group rnemben can read and understand their pass books 8.5 There has been a reduction in the COSinputs in group record keeping 8.6 x% of members are functionally numeratdliterate (e.g., can read their pass books - simple narne writing is not sufficient) 8.7 Specialised training needs are put to use 8.8 Groups have independently used planning skiils employed by COS in the village (PRA, CPA, mapping etc.) to identiS, and soIve at least one common probIern

9. Distribution of benefits 9.1 The needs of poorer members are specifically identified in group activities (e-g., poorer household are given priority in allocating labour benefits in works, contract arrangements in relation to common water or forest resources, are agreed to give benefits to poorestfnon-beneficiaries) 9.2 The group has provided assistance to rnembers in desperate situation

10. Links with externa1 apencies 10.1 Group has taken loans fiom banks (under NABARD re-finance scheme) 10.2 Resources and services have been obtained fiom governrnent/NGO agencies 10.3 Group members have basic knowledge of available schemes, resources, technology centres, etc., and use them 10.4 Necessary technical assistance is obtained fiom outside Bibliography

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