Validation Report

Reference Number: PVR-431 Project Number: 40046-013 Loan Number: 2356 November 2015

Tajikistan: Khatlon Province Flood Risk Management Project

Independent Evaluation Department

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB – Asian Development Bank CES – Committee for Emergency Situations DMF – design and monitoring framework EIRR – economic internal rate of return Hydromet – Agency for Hydrometeorology JFPR – Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction km – kilometer MAEP – Ministry of Agriculture and Environment Protection MLRWR – Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources M&E – monitoring and evaluation O&M – operation and maintenance PCR – project completion report PIO – project implementation office PMO – project management office PSC – project steering committee RRP – report and recommendation of the President

NOTE

In this report, “$” refers to US dollars.

Key Words

adb, asian development bank, flood embankment, flood preparedness plan, flood protection and management, flood risk management, flood risk map, flood warning system, gender action plan, nonphysical measures, physical measures, , validation, water code

The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the preparation of this report. To the knowledge of IED management, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.

In preparing any evaluation report, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, IED does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.

PROJECT BASIC DATA Project Number: 40046-013 PCR Circulation Date: 15 Apr 2015 Loan Number: 2356 PCR Validation Date: Nov 2015 Project Name: Khatlon Province Flood Risk Management Project Country: Tajikistan Approved Actual ($ million) ($ million) Sector: Agriculture, natural Total Project Costs: 28.50 27.37 resources, and rural development ADB Financing: ADF: 22.00 Loan: 22.00 22.28 ($ million) (SDR equivalent, million) 14.40 14.37 Borrower: 6.50 5.09 OCR: 0.00 Beneficiaries: 0.00 0.00 Others: 0.00 0.00 Cofinancier: Total Cofinancing: 0.00 0.00

Approval Date: 5 Oct 2007 Effectiveness Date: 2 Dec 2007 4 Dec 2007

Signing Date: 2 Nov 2007 Closing Date: 30 Jun 2014 15 Aug 2014 Project Officers: Location: From: To: T. Miyazato ADB headquarters Oct 2007 Nov 2007 B. P. Tambunan ADB headquarters Dec 2007 Aug 2008 R. Takaku ADB headquarters Sep 2008 Dec 2010 T. Miyazato ADB headquarters Jan 2011 Mar 2011 B. P. Tambunan ADB headquarters Mar 2011 Jul 2012 R. Takaku ADB headquarters Jul 2012 Aug 2014 Initial Reviewers: E. Lopez-Dee, Peer Reviewer: G. Kilroy, Evaluation Consultant Specialist, IED1 M. J. Dimayuga, Senior Evaluation Officer, IED1 Quality Reviewer: E. Gozali, Principal Director: W. Kolkma, IED1 Evaluation Specialist, IED1 ADB = Asian Development Bank; ADF = Asian Development Fund; IED1 = Independent Evaluation Department, Division 1; IED2 = Independent Evaluation Department, Division 2; OCR = ordinary capital resources; PCR = project completion report.

I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Rationale

1. The Republic of Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in Central Asia.1 It also has a long-standing vulnerability to natural disasters particularly floods due to its terrain and climate. It relied on flood protection facilities that degraded over the years due to insufficient operation and maintenance (O&M). The threat of flooding intensified in recent years as water flows from its upper mountains has increased. Furthermore, continued growth in both population and agricultural production in many flood-prone areas only increased the risks of physical and socioeconomic damage from flooding.2

1 World Bank. 2015. Poverty and Equity Data/Europe and Central Asia. Washington, DC. http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/ECA 2 ADB. 2004. Floods and the Poor: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor to the Negative Impacts of Flood. Water for All, Series # 11. Manila.

2

2. Tajikistan’s most productive agricultural lands lie within the Khatlon province, the most populous yet poorest province of the country with a poverty rate of 54% compared to the national average of 47%.3 The province’s four districts of , Hamadoni, Kulyab, and Vose are the country’s prime areas for cultivating cotton, Tajikistan’s main agricultural export commodity. The four districts account for 32% of the country’s total cotton area. While acknowledged for its socioeconomic growth potential, the province has become increasingly vulnerable to floods when the Pyanj River and its tributaries swell due to runoff water from melting glaciers and snow. A major flood in Hamadoni district occurred in 2005 as the embankment along the Pyanj River failed causing damage estimated at $18 million. Earlier floods in 1998 and 1999 inflicted damage to the agriculture and infrastructure sectors worth $55 million and resulted in the deaths of 32 inhabitants. These catastrophic events caused the government to recognize that a holistic and coordinated approach of structural protection measures and nonstructural measures was needed to be put in place. It also underscored the need to simultaneously strengthen the institutional and legal frameworks and to upgrade the technical capacity of key flood management institutions.

B. Expected Impact

3. The expected impact of the project was a reduction in flood risks in Khatlon province.4 The target indicator reduced flood frequency in the Hamadoni district from 1 in 10 in 2007 to 1 in 100 in 2013.

C. Objective or Expected Outcome

4. The expected outcome was an operational, well-maintained, effective, and sustainable flood management system. The targets were (i) to fully implement the flood management concept through the Amended Water Code by 2013, and (ii) to allocate enough annual budget to operate the equipment for O&M.

D. Outputs

5. The project had four outputs. Output 1 comprised institutional and legal reforms designed to help the government improve relevant laws and regulations that clarify the authority responsible for flood management activities. The targets for this output were (i) to amend the Water Code by 2008; and (ii) to develop institutional capacity at required standards for flood control on the Pyanj River, to be established by March 2008.

6. Output 2 covered improvements in physical infrastructure for flood management to protect the Hamadoni district against 100-year floods. 5 This included the rehabilitation of damaged embankments and the provision of heavy equipment for O&M. The targets for this output were (i) the rehabilitation of 8.3 kilometers (km) of embankment on the Pyanj River, Hamadoni segment by March 2009; and (ii) maintenance equipment for embankment are operating properly. Output 3 consisted of improvements in nonphysical measures such as (i) completed flood risk maps for the districts of Kulyab, Vose, Farkhor, and Hamadoni by December 2010; (ii) approved flood-preparedness plans based on risk maps and other

3 World Bank. 2013. Tajikistan – Re-invigorating Growth in the Khatlon Oblast. Washington, DC. 4 ADB. 2007. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan for the Republic of Tajikistan: Khatlon Province Flood Risk Management Project. Manila. 5 A 100-year flood is defined by the US Geological Survey as a flood that statistically has a 1% chance of occurring in any given year. http://water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood.html 3

information by December 2010; (iii) functioning hydrometeorology network of 10 climate stations and 10 river gauges by 2012; (iv) operational real-time flood forecasting models for Pyanj, Yakhsu, and Kizilsu rivers by 2012; (v) flood warning triggers with a lead time of at least 3 hours based on river levels for each flood risk zone introduced by 2012; (vi) awareness of flood risks and basic response requirements understood by 90% of village leaders by 2008; and (vii) methods and/or approach for cost-effective tributary flood prevention infrastructure repair in Vose and Kulyab prioritized by 2008. Output 4 comprised capacity-building initiatives to support the project management office (PMO) and the project implementation offices (PIOs) meet the targets for the first three planned outputs. No performance targets were prescribed for this last output.

E. Provision of Inputs

7. The total project cost was estimated at $28.5 million. In October 2007, ADB approved a loan of $22.0 million equivalent from its Asian Development Fund (ADF) and the remaining $6.5 was from the borrower. The loan underwent three reallocations: (i) in April 2011—to increase allocations for civil works, vehicles, and equipment to offset additional embankment rehabilitation cost from the additional flood damage; (ii) in May 2012—to increase the budget for road, bridge, and interstate hydrological monitoring system construction; and (iii) in November 2013—to increase the budget for equipment procurement. These followed five modifications in the scope of work. The total project cost of $27.4 million at completion remained within budget. Loan disbursements reached $22.3 million. 6 This accounted for 81.4% of project cost surpassing the 77.2% estimated at appraisal due to changes in dollar to special drawing rights exchange rate. The government’s actual contribution amounted to $5.1 million or less than the envisaged $6.5 million because of the reduced project management expenses.7

8. Project expenditures for improved physical measures and/or civil works were higher than the appraisal estimate while expenditures for policy reforms, nonphysical measures, and capacity building were notably below their respective budgets. Inputs provided for (i) civil works amounted to $18.1 million, which was higher than the $17.3 million original allocation; (ii) vehicles and equipment cost reached $4.2 million, which was lower than appraisal estimate; while (iii) consulting services amounted to $2.8 million or 5.2% higher than the original allocation. A total of 80 person-months of international and 510 person-months of domestic consultancy services were deployed compared to the combined 486 person-months estimated at appraisal.

9. The project feasibility study was supported by a project preparatory technical assistance in 2006.8The final project outputs corresponded to the technical assistance recommendations to develop a holistic and integrated approach to flood risk management.

F. Implementation Arrangements

10. The project organizational structures comprised a project steering committee (PSC), an executing agency, a PMO, and three PIOs. The designated executing agency was the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources (MLRWR). It had the overall task of executing and coordinating the project. The Agency for Hydrometeorology (Hydromet) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment Protection (MAEP) was charged with rehabilitating and

6 This is inclusive of interest during construction. 7 This was net of taxes and duties. 8 ADB. 2006. Technical Assistance to Tajikistan for Khatlon Province Flood Risk Management Project. Manila. 4

modernizing the network of climate stations, and upgrading the hardware and software for flood forecasting. Developing flood risks maps and flood preparedness program, conducting annual flood awareness campaigns and evacuation drills, and improving the accuracy and timeliness of flood warning systems were assigned to the Committee for Emergency Situations (CES). The PSC was formed within the President’s Office to provide policy guidance, staffed with senior representatives from the MLRWR, MAEP, CES, and other relevant ministries. Its secretariat was based in the PMO, an entity of the then ADB-financed Irrigation Rehabilitation Project of the MLRWR (Loan 2124-TAJ) and concurrently tasked to manage the project. Each PIO within the MLRWR, MAEP and CES would handle their respective day-to-day project affairs. The project completion report (PCR) noted that the implementation arrangements as designed were largely followed.9 The MLRWR and MAEP were affected by a reorganization during the last month of the project life.10 The project’s schedule and intended outputs were not adversely affected.

11. The borrower fully complied with 25 of the 26 loan covenants although amending the Water Code was accomplished a year later than scheduled. The borrower partly complied with the proper and timely submission of audited project financial statements. The MLRWR also failed to prepare the 2013 project financial statement. Consultancy services, civil works, and equipment were procured in accordance with established ADB procedures and procurement plan. The PCR considered the overall performance of the consultants, contractors, and suppliers satisfactory.

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND RATINGS

A. Relevance of Design and Formulation

12. The PCR rated the project relevant because it aimed to support the government in developing and implementing a holistic approach to flood management that combined structural and nonstructural interventions. The project supported one of the priorities of the country’s national development strategy.11 Upgrading flood protection in Khatlon province was a critical intervention that would spur other agricultural investments necessary to increase crop yields and agricultural productivity.12

13. As to the design assessment, changes in the project scope were noted, such as additional civil works to respond to the additional flood damage that occurred during project implementation. This showed flexibility of design. However, there were deviations from the original design that indicated issues with the capacity assessment and readiness of institutions at the start of the project, and with other technical assessments. Amending the Water Code was accomplished a year behind schedule. The planned numbers of climate stations and river gauges were reduced and completed with delays. Activities to raise community awareness on flood risks and the feasibility studies on embankments along the Kilsu and Yakhsu rivers were also delayed. Despite these identified design issues, the need for the project’s interventions

9 ADB. 2015. Project Completion Report: Khatlon Province Flood Risk Management Project (Tajikistan). Manila. 10 MLRWR was abolished and its policy and regulatory functions were transferred to the newly created Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. Its infrastructure development and management functions were thereafter assumed by the Agency of Land Reclamation and Irrigation. Hydromet, on the other hand, was transferred to the newly formed Committee on Environmental Protection after the environment protection function of MAEP was removed from it. 11 Republic of Tajikistan. 2007. National Development Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan (2017–2015). Dushanbe. 12 ADB. 2003. Country Strategy and Program (2004–2008): Tajikistan. Manila. 5

were confirmed with the occurrence of flooding during the implementation period, such as the one in 2010.This validation, therefore, assesses the project relevant.

B. Effectiveness in Achieving Project Outcome and Outputs

14. Under Output 1, the Water Code was amended to support the implementation of a flood management system in an integrated and coherent manner. The code helped provide sustained funding for flood management at each concerned agency. From 2009 to 2013, budget allocations for O&M totaled $0.65 million, of which $0.60 million was spent. The state enterprise, Canal , implemented the integrated flood management concept in Hamadoni district by 2013, and commenced O&M work for flood embankment on the Pyanj River following the capacity building of its staff. Six training programs were provided to the MLRWR to increase its capacity on integrated flood risk management.

15. All physical infrastructures targeted under Output 2 were generally completed. Ten km of embankment rehabilitation on the Pyanj River, Hamadoni segment, was completed, although done almost 3 years after the target date of completion. Additional flood embankment rehabilitation with a 1.5 km of O&M road was completed in December 2012. Heavy equipment for embankment maintenance was procured and deployed in April 2010 allowing Canal Chubek to satisfactorily undertake O&M of flood protection works, and to do O&M for irrigation and drainage canals. It should be noted, however, that some of the equipment procured were only suitable for lesser tasks of clearing irrigation and drainage canals rather than for the heavier flood protection O&M.

16. Nonphysical measures targeted under Output 3 were accomplished although with delays. Flood risk maps in four districts of the province were completed. The PCR (para. 21) indicated that these maps were timely completed in 2010 while the design and monitoring framework (DMF) (PCR, Appendix 1) stated that they were made available in 2012.The maps became the basis for the flood preparedness and evacuation and training procedures that were developed. These were later complemented by the procurement of equipment for the rapid response teams for the CES district offices by December 2010. A hydrometeorology network—comprising three climate stations and six river gauges, instead of the planned 10 of each—became functional in March 2012,13 while the Aivaj River gauges became operational almost 2 years after. Real-time flood forecasting models for the Pyanj, Yakhsu, and Kizilsu rivers became operational in December 2012 as planned. The training and new equipment enhanced Hydromet’s flood forecasting capability. Flood warning assessment—with an interval of 6 hours instead of the planned 3 hours—was introduced. The PCR reported that fixed and mobile communication stations were installed at the CES district offices as scheduled. The former, however, later became underutilized as staff opted to use more of their mobile devices for flood warning. It should be noted that the original project design did not envisage an automated flood warning system. Flood water depth forecasting—accurate to within 0.5 meter-—was expected under Output 3. This performance target was not included in the DMF of the PCR. The planned workshops on flood awareness were implemented together with a project financed by the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR). By October 2011, 95% of the village leaders had completed the 20 required workshops on flood awareness (as

13 The development of the hydrometeorology network was completed a year earlier but on a reduced basis to accommodate the rehabilitation of the Aivaj River. This followed the signing of the bilateral agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and , which led the former to request ADB to include the interstate Aivay River gauge. 6 compared to the target of 90%). 14 Feasibility studies on flood management for Vose and Kulyab rivers were also formulated.

17. Six training programs comprising study tours and on-the-job training were provided under Output 4 to support the PMO and PIOs in developing their project management competence and improving their O&M skills on the flood management system. While performance indicators were not prescribed, the PCR reported that technical capacity for system application and routine O&M of the flood management system were improved.

18. The project output and outcome indicator targets were largely met at project closing. At this stage, the needed legislative framework and a flood management system, comprising physical and nonphysical components, have been introduced. It is worth noting, however, that more work is needed to have the full envisaged project outcome realized to achieve an operational and well-maintained, effective, and sustainable flood management system. At project closing, there was uncertainty that the flood forecast and warning system would work as intended, however, no damage or breaches of the embankments have been reported and it is normal to require a number of hydrological seasons to establish good rating curves at the new river gauging stations. Overall, this validation assesses the project effective.

C. Efficiency of Resource Use in Achieving Outcome and Outputs

19. The PCR rated the project efficient. The economic reevaluation focused on the Hamadoni district’s shares of investment, the O&M expenditures, and the cost of the nonphysical measures, which accounted for 82% of the total project cost. The aggregate investments in flood control works yielded an economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 14.3%, lower than the appraisal estimate of 16.0%, but still above the 12.0% economic cost of capital. The lower EIRR stemmed from the inclusion of the district’s share of the nonphysical investments and the shorter economic life of 30 years for the analysis, instead of 40 years as adopted at appraisal. This return was considered robust as only the potential direct and quantifiable flood losses avoided were counted as benefits. These included valuations of lost or damaged agricultural crops, public infrastructure, and industrial and household assets on a “without and with project” basis. Shadow pricing approaches that were used aptly valued all costs and benefits at their economic prices. No attempt was made to compute the EIRR for the whole project. This validation, nevertheless, finds the assumptions and methodology used in the efficiency analysis plausible and appropriate.

20. The project implemented five changes in the scope of work and four loan reallocations as responses to flood damage sustained in the project areas. Start-up delays, ranging from 1 to 2 years, occurred largely due to the numerous small civil works contracts that were negotiated. Ten km of embankment rehabilitation on the Pyanj River was built at a cost of $20.04 million or $2.0 million per km (and designed at a standard that provides protection against floods with a 100-year return period). This validation notes that the project accomplished the rehabilitation in a more cost-effective manner than the 8.3 km target in the report and recommendation of the President (RRP) at a budget of $2.11 million per km. This validation concurs with the PCR rating of efficient for the project. While delays and cost overruns occurred during the early years of the project, the project resources were used in a fairly efficient manner.

14 ADB. 2008. Grant Assistance Report for Community Participatory Flood Management. Manila. 7

D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability

21. The PCR rated the project less than likely sustainable. No financial viability analysis for the project was undertaken. The flood management system developed and the hydrometeorology network installed were deemed technically suitable. What is less clear is how operational are these. The relationship between river flow and river height (rating curves) have yet to be established for the new river gauging stations. These are needed to accurately predict flows and to issue accurate early warnings. As these are not yet fully functional, there is a concern if these will be maintained. Similarly, the early warning communication network is in place but reported as not being used. Another concern is that many of the excavators purchased under the project are not fully suitable for the intended purpose. Some of Hydromet’s staff trained under the project left the agency leaving Hydromet with insufficient capacity to adequately update flood risk models and to process the data. In addition, the PMO staff’s improved capacity was not transferred well to the executing agency (PCR, para. 48). Finally, the PCR reported that there was uncertainty over the adequacy of O&M resources (para. 58). As these factors pose concerns over the sustainability of the system, accordingly, this validation assesses the project less than likely sustainable.

E. Impact

22. The PCR indicated that the project had a potentially significant overall impact on the environment and quality of life. At completion, local residents benefited from improved environment and better living standards with better safeguards for their houses, crops, and other assets. The project stimulated a climate conducive for investment in agriculture, industries, and social services. The project protected 65% of the district’s population and some 23,000 hectares of agricultural land from flooding (PCR, Appendix 7).In terms of institutional impact, the roles and responsibilities of the different water agencies became clearly defined under the amended Water Code. Nonetheless, it must be recognized at this point that while flood management system had been put in place, it is not clear how well it will be maintained. Overall project impact is assessed significant.

23. The project was classified as Category B under the ADB environment assessment. An initial environmental examination was prepared and an Environmental Management Plan was subsequently incorporated in the bidding documents and civil works contracts. Environmental monitoring was assessed as adequate and related technical and institutional requirements of the loan covenant were met. During construction, environmental monitoring reports showed that contractors complied with the recommended mitigation measures stipulated in the plan. Requirements of local inhabitants and environmental protection agencies were satisfactorily met. No adverse effect on the environment was recorded at completion. The PCR did not indicate any land acquisition and resettlement-related issue. The achievement of the Gender Action Plan was considered satisfactory.15

15 Of the PMO and PIO staff, 23 or 40% were women. On the 20 workshops on flood awareness, 1,228 persons participated, women accounting for 39% of total against the RRP target of 40%. Three flood evacuation drills were attended by 295 women, representing 33% of the total number of participants. 8

III. OTHER PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS

A. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency

24. The PCR rated the performance of the borrower, executing agency, and the implementing agencies satisfactory. It noted the government’s commitment to implement the project primarily by supporting legal and institutional reforms necessary to better integrate flood risk management. The government, through a presidential decree, rationalized the functions of flood management institutions so that their roles became more definitive and ensured that more funds were allocated for O&M. The borrower provided counterpart funds for civil works, equipment, capacity building, and project management. It closely steered the project through a high-level PSC. Although the implementation of some components was delayed, the enhanced technical capacities of the MLRWR and the implementing agencies were evident as the required civil works and equipment were largely procured and delivered within the budget. The agency tasked with flood forecasting, flood risks mapping, and flood warning system was strengthened although further capacity building was required. On the whole, this validation considers the performance of the borrower, executing agency, and implementing agencies satisfactory.

B. Performance of the Asian Development Bank

25. The PCR rated the performance of ADB satisfactory and this validation agrees with this rating. In implementing the project, ADB carried out 1 inception, 5 reviews, 1 midterm review, and 1 project completion review missions. ADB approved the government’s request for retroactive financing for civil works to facilitate timely project implementation. ADB reviewed and approved necessary adjustments to the project scope in response to government requests. ADB endorsed four loan reallocations so that the project could keep pace with increased costs of civil works and equipment. Continued supervision by ADB project officers and project analysts enabled ADB to effectively resolve implementation issues, support the PMO, and duly coordinate with the JFPR project.

C. Others

26. The collaboration with the JFPR project on the conduct of the flood awareness workshops was achieved. At the end of the project, more village leaders became aware of their roles in flood disaster mitigation and risk monitoring. A 2,600 hectare reforestation project was successfully carried out under the JFPR project to help improve the ecosystem. The PCR attributed this to a good working relationship between the MLRWR and the nongovernment organizations implementing the JFPR project.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment and Ratings

27. The PCR rated the project successful. The project was relevant to the government’s strategies and policy and to the ADB strategy for the Republic of Tajikistan. Changes in scope and subsequent reallocation of resources were justified and appropriate to achieve the targeted outputs and outcome. The project brought in funding to finance the required legal and institutional reforms, capital outlays, and capacity building activities. Commitment to deliver the prescribed outputs to enable the key flood management institutions to fulfill their respective mandate was adequate. However, there is a serious concern over the sustainability of the flood 9

management system stemming from staff turnover in the concerned agencies and adequacy of the procured O&M equipment and/or excavators, which need to be addressed. Overall, this validation rates the project successful (see table).

Overall Ratings Criteria PCR IED Review Reason for Disagreement and/or Comments Relevance Relevant Relevant Effectiveness in Effective Effective achieving outcome Efficiency in achieving Efficient Efficient outcome and outputs Preliminary assessment Less than likely Less than likely of sustainability sustainable sustainable Overall assessment Successful Successful Impact Significant Significant See paras. 22–23.

Borrower and executing Satisfactory Satisfactory agency Performance of ADB Satisfactory Satisfactory Quality of PCR Satisfactory See para. 31. ADB = Asian Development Bank, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, PCR = project completion report. Source: ADB Independent Evaluation Department.

B. Lessons

28. The PCR presented lessons valuable to ADB operations. Clarity of purpose and objectives, and enhanced processes and procedures helped ensure the government’s commitment and focus to implement the project, and fostered effective coordination among the various agencies involved. Willingness to accept management and technological changes and required reforms were necessary initial and/or baseline elements in the design and implementation of this project. This validation suggests another lesson—the need to undertake prior and proper due diligence on the technical and resource capabilities and commitment of partner institutions. This would determine their suitability when ascertaining the risks and sustainability of their involvement.

C. Recommendations

29. This validation endorses the general and project-related recommendations presented in the PCR. The PCR emphasized that the O&M of project-financed assets must be strictly monitored. With institutional and policy reforms introduced, the government needs to continue staff- and institution-building activities, and to allocate sufficient funds for O&M to ensure that all components of the flood management system work in a cohesive manner. A joint monitoring of Pyanj River flow, flood forecasting, and mitigation is recommended by the governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

A. Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization

30. The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit was established within the PMO, 2 years after the project loan became effective. The M&E unit also adopted the existing project performance 10 management system to undertake a periodic review of the project’s performance vis-a-vis the performance indicators agreed upon with ADB. Through the M&E unit, the government, in collaboration with local government units (i.e., jamoats), women’s associations, and nongovernment organizations, was also able to monitor the project’s impact on women. The M&E unit gathered baseline data on the number of residential and industrial establishments within the flood-prone areas, the potential cotton and non-cotton farm beneficiaries (e.g., cropping patterns, farm productivity, and income levels of those affected by potential flooding). These data helped quantify the economic benefits of the project during the project completion review.

B. Comments on Project Completion Report Quality

31. This validation finds the quality of the PCR satisfactory. It is consistent with the ADB Project Administration Instruction 6.07A, particularly in assessing the project’s ratings. The analysis was sufficiently aligned and supported by evidence gathered. However, the PCR could have been more forthcoming on the performance of the project in delivering the envisaged outcome and in assessing whether the flood management system at present is operational, effective, and well maintained. The PCR was candid in discussing potential issues on project sustainability. The lessons and recommendations were drawn from the report findings. The logic of the DMF was clear. The quantitative economic efficiency analysis in Appendix 6 was detailed and informative.

C. Data Sources for Validation

32. Data sources for this validation comprised the RRP, PCR, loan review mission reports, and project processing documents.

D. Recommendation for Independent Evaluation Department Follow-Up

33. The Independent Evaluation Department may conduct a project performance evaluation report. Since there are remaining concerns over the full achievement of the project outcome and its sustainability, a project performance evaluation would help assess the progress toward the sustainable operation of the flood management system in Kathlon province. The evaluation exercise should be done preferably following the flood season.