actical Solutions A JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL TACTICAL TRAINING ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONALS

T FALL 2014

Alexandra Jones on Motorcycle Gangs and Extremism Fred T. Leland on Mindset and Winning Robert Trivino on The After Action Review George Williams on Integrating Police and Fire/EMS

I NDEX

C Tactical Solutions O N p.6 From The Editor T E DEPARTMENTS N Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

T p.38 Transformers: Motorcycle Gangs and Extremism S by A. Jones Leadership

p.7 The After Action Review—The Most Important Tool for Any Leader by R. Trivino

p.13 The End of SWAT as We Know It (But a Bright New Future) by L. Hayes

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

p.18 Integrating Police and Fire/EMS Within Active Shooter Response by G. Williams p.34 To Chase or Not to Chase? by Dr. R. Martinelli p.46 Mindset and Winning is About Much More Than Words, Isn’t it? by F. T. Leland

Tactical Solutions – FALL 2014 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 3 D Tactical Solutions I FALL 2014 T

S This journal is provided to members of the International Tactical Training Association-ITTA. The information presented EDITOR-IN-CHIEF is from various sources from which there can be no warranty or LAWRENCE LUJAN • C responsibility by the ITTA Corporation, or the publisher as to [email protected] the legality, completeness and accuracy. The information L described and portrayed in this journal is based upon the per- PRESIDENT sonal experience of the author. The author’s entire experience AARON CUNNINGHAM • may not be reported or otherwise verified. Nothing in this [email protected] journal should be construed as a substitute for a manufacturer’s A ADVANCED TACTICAL TRAINING - manual or for professional training. LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION MARK STEPHENSON • I The ITTA does not, by the presentation of any advertisement, [email protected] product evaluation, article or editorial, create any warranty, either expressed or implied. The opinions expressed in the edi- SECRETARY M torial and articles are those of the authors, and do not necessari- SUNG JOO LEE • [email protected] ly express the opinions or positions of the Board of Directors of GRAPHIC ARTIST the ITTA or employees. The individual author represents tac- E VANESSA M. tics discussed in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS. This publication should in no way be considered an endorsement or recommen- R dation by the ITTA Corporation. TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE is the digital Journal of the International All rights reserved. No portion of  
  Tactical Training Association. Written S may be reproduced without prior written permission from the by and for special operators, police ITTA Corporation. operators, and intelligence officers and for all those in the mission against Firearms Safety crime and terror worldwide. Always adhere to and obey firearms safety rules: TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE  !# "$##!$$ $ $ "$#!#$ # is published in  "#!-December, ! -March, #!-June,   $##$"#$$ "#$ $ $ #$ !#
" $ and  -September $$"$#$ " $" "$$ !# "$  $"$#"! For inquiries regarding advertising in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS, please email  ##$!$ #!$$$"#$"! #!$ $"$$"# [email protected] "! #!$ !$" $!# $"$ !# For inquiries regarding existing TACTICAL  #$  !#$$!$" !#"$ $ "$ $#$ " SOLUTIONS editions, please email TACTICAL SOLUTIONS at The individual manufacturer and retailer set the prices and [email protected] details for items featured in TACTICAL SOLUTIONS. They are subject to change without notice. Or Contact Us At: TACTICAL SOLUTIONS MAGAZINE P.O. BOX 59833, CHICAGO, IL 60659 USA Certain products featured in this journal may be subject to pro- Tel: 872-221-ITTA Fax: 872-221-5882 hibitions, restrictions or special licensing for sale, possession or interstate transport. Check with local and federal authorities CONTRIBUTING PHOTOGRAPHERS (Sgt. Craig Allen Hillsboro PD, Sgt. John Crosby regarding the legality of purchase, possession and transport. US Army, LCpl Matt Myers USMC, Msgt Scott Thompson USAF, )

Please direct all Editorial correspondence related to the ON THE COVER magazine to International Tactical Training Association ITTA, Active Shooter Drill, Hillsboro P.O. Box 59833, Chicago, Illinois 60659, United States of America Police Department, Oregon CONTRIBUTING WRITERS Alexandra Jones, Louis Hayes, Fred T. Leland, Dr. Ron Martinelli, Robert Trivino, George Williams FOLLOW US ONLINE 4 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS GET A GREAT DEAL, JUST CONTACT US @ [email protected] L Tactical Solutions E FALL 2014 T

T Autumn is upon us and the seasonal changes have begun. It’s time to break E out that cold weather gear and to get ready for cold weather operations. R Around the world we find a united coalition against the Islamic State (aka ISIL or ISIS) as well as against the Khorasan group. There are currently 50 from nations pledging support and to date, the United States and five Arab coun- the tries—Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates— E have conducted military strikes. Teamwork is the building block of all successful operations. Here we see it D at an international level and daily we see the fruits of it as we successfully I work with both our internal and external team members. T This month we discuss whether mindset and winning is about more than just words. We present an excellent overview on outlaw motorcycle gangs O (OMG) and a change from the traditional to the extreme. Any operator understands the importance of after action review (AAR) of operations— R they aid in our teams growth both at the individual and at the team level, so we bring to you an in-depth look at the AAR. The values of specialist or generalist operators are also discussed at length. Integration of the bomb tech was presented in our last edition and we bring to you now the integra- tion of the Fire/EMS to Active Shooter Response. And lastly we present to you discussion on whether to get into that foot chase or not.

So get ready to now expand your knowledge and tactical toolbox, remain that razors edge and to be ready to apply that skill when called upon.

Lawrence Lujan

Editor-in-Chief Tactical Solutions Magazine

6 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS L eadership THE AFTER ACTION REVIEW

The Most Important Tool for Any Leader

Written by Robert Trivino for. Most leaders reflect on their per- understand that the military uses the formance or tasks to identify key areas After Action Review (AAR) as a tool All organizations whether military or that were performed incorrectly and to help their units identify problems civilian conduct actions or execute most times leaders stop at this point. that need fixing. The Army has a plans in order to achieve an objective. They consider it a success once they publication called, "The Leader's Every plan of action has a desired out- have identified the area(s) that need Guide to The After-Action Reviews" come and many times we see the fixing and will try not to let that which guides Army leaders to under- result of hard work in a different light. action happen again. stand their purpose and how to devel- That is, the outcome was different I have a military background and op and conduct an AAR. This guide than what we envisioned or planned those that have one similar to mine defines the purpose of the AAR as, "to

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 7 L eadership

provide feedback essential to correct - dees must check their egos at the AAR ing training deficiencies." As a former doorway. If this does not happen, operational member and junior leader your AAR will be askew with atten - in the Tier 1 Army unit, it is my opin - dees looking to save face or to protect ion that my former unit has mastered their insecurities, instead of focusing all aspects of the AAR. This has on identifying the critical areas that equated to the unit's many successes. went wrong, and most importantly, It is due to my time assigned to this how to fix them. Finally, and proba - unit and seeing firsthand how the bly from its inception, a unique cul - AAR is utilized that I believe that the ture was created within the unit that vast majority of all organizations, mili - allows everyone serving in its ranks to tary and civilian, can improve their speak with candor about their actions. AARs or develop an AAR format for This very important concept is — it is their organization. ok to make a mistake. Armed with First, I want to talk about how the this concept, each member is comfort - AAR is viewed in my former unit. able admitting when they made a bad The AAR is a no holds barred, profes - decision, performed poorly, or sional discussion about a past event screwed something up. With this con - (real-world operation, small event, cept in mind, I must clarify one thing training, etc.). Everyone attending — if you continue to make the same one of our AARs understands several mistake then you will be reprimand - important personal issues. First and ed, counseled, and if need be, eventu - foremost is the fact that the AAR is ally fired. NOT a tool to embarrass, blame, com - I would like to move on to a very pare, or judge another member or part important concept that exits in the law of the organization. It is also very enforcement world and that is the important that everyone attending the concept of zero tolerance (automatic AAR must have thick skin; all atten - punishment for infractions of a stated

“If you are a leader and your police officers are afraid to make mistakes in training or are not willing to participate fully in fear of making a mistake then you must change the work environment or the culture that

your people operate in. Take a rule, with the intention of eliminating undesirable conduct-Oxford Dictionary). In my limited experience look at your organization and working with the LE community, this concept tends to permeate the work make a change, for the better.” environment to the point that most police officers can't afford to make a

8 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS mistake, even in training. Zero toler- your police officers are afraid to make for the better. ance should only be applied when an mistakes in training or are not willing I know based on my interaction in individual violates the law, willingly to participate fully in fear of making a training and working with the law breaks organizational rules, and mistake then you must change the enforcement community, that my for- knowingly neglects the organization's work environment or the culture that mer unit is an anomaly. Most organi- established legal, moral and ethical your people operate in. Take a look at zations do not have the—it's ok to standards. If you are a leader and your organization and make a change, make a mistake—concept as one of

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 9 L eadership

the bricks in their organization's foun- the mistakes of others and here is the implementing changes to tactics, or dation. I've learned that most LE per- key—we follow through to ensure we something as simple as ensuring all sonnel want to be correct and will don't make the same mistake again. vehicles are tanked up at the end of defend their position to protect their How do we do this? We attach the training day. Remember, in order image. This is a zero tolerance atti- responsibility and give ownership to to see the full benefits of your AAR, tude and your organization’s leader- solving the problem(s). For example, ensure that you identify someone that ship enforces it. If you are the leader after an AAR, most times it will be the has the responsibility to follow up on you must work to all the issues to the change this, if you are end. Also, leaders the "boss", then I recom- must supervise and mend you change it spot check to make immediately. Leaders “We've learned sure it gets done. must allow their people Here are some rec- to make mistakes, espe- ommended keys to cially in training. success for your Operationally, mistakes from our own AARs. Remember, will happen and it's the AAR must have important to capture honest, professional these mistakes, learn dialogue and it must from them and share mistakes and focus on the out- the information with come or the results everyone. of your event. You The AAR is the tool that want to focus on we use to fix all of our the mistakes of four main areas: problems in training, 1. Identify the real world missions, things that went deployment prepara- well and why. tion, and what have others and here 2. Identify you. It is common prac- things that went tice for teams to conduct wrong and why. AARs after all training 3. Collectively sessions. An AAR is is the key - we develop a plan to fix done after each and the problems that every run through the occurred. shoot house, whether it 4. Follow- was a live fire scenario follow through to through—supervise or a dry run for team and spot check to training, no event is too make sure it gets small for an AAR. It is done. utilized at all levels and ensure we don't for almost any event, In order to accom- any event that we want plish this leaders to improve upon. Most and subordinates people understand that make the same should take notes the Army's Tier 1 unit prior to, during, and functions well and are after an event—this hands down the best at is key. Try to con- what they do, so I want mistake again.” duct your AAR with to ask a question—How everyone that do you think we got to attended the event. that point? Well, I'll tell If everyone cannot you, we got here by making mistakes, senior non-commissioned officer that attend you must have representatives conducting AARs to fix problems, and is responsible for ensuring that all from each of the organizations that following through with identified identified issues are not just noted but participated. If there are multiple solutions to ensure that we didn't that identified solutions are also set in agencies that took part in the event make the same mistakes again. That place. This includes but is not limited you must include those external agen- is why we function so well. We've to changes to standard operating pro- cies so that everyone can benefit from learned from our own mistakes and cedures (SOPs), changes to policies, the process. For most LE deliberate

10 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS operations, you must allow time for ing the AAR may not always be a in order your sub elements to conduct their happy camper. Remember to be hon- 7. Post Assault own small team AAR’s before coming est with yourself, your people, and the • Covers team actions together for the formal AAR. This is task at hand. Most AARs will focus after the mission important and allows all team mem- on the negative aspects of an event. • Allow each team to bers (everyone on the ground) to voice Remember, the overarching theme respond in order their concerns and to provide input should be to focus on bettering the 8. Anything else that a team member based on what they saw and did. organization or the team. The follow- saw that needs to brought to every- Finally, I must say, do not air your ing is an example AAR format for a one's attention. organizations dirty laundry, unless it LE preplanned mission or deliberate 9. Leader(s) determine who is respon- is of benefit to the entire group. Keep operation. sible for following through on estab- these issues for your own internal Conduct Roll Call lished solutions to identified prob- AAR. If you do "call-out" someone 1. The leader reviews the situation and lems. Leaders must follow through, due to their performance, you must mission. spot check and support this person. try and use your organizations estab- 2. Planning process lished performance standards to • Start from initial notification gauge said performance. This will • Discuss leader actions If a team member identifies a prob- keep the person that is called out from • ID issues prior to issuing the plan lem, collectively attempt to find a becoming defensive. Once the poor • Allow each team to respond solution at that point. Do not bypass performance is identified try to link in order the problem until a solution is identi- the poor performance to follow-on 3. Infiltration to Target Area fied. If the group cannot find a solu- training. • Begin at the start point tion, take note and continue on, then Below is a recommended format for • End at the Last Covered & come back to this at the end. your AAR. Don't waste your time on Concealed Position (LCC) The AAR is a great tool, but you must antiquated methods such as asking in order use it to reap the benefits. Be honest everyone in the room for one good 4. Actions at (LCC) and open-minded and you will start thing and one bad thing that they saw • Allow each team to respond to see your organization improve if during the event. This does nothing in order you implement the AAR process into to help the process and will actually 5. Actions on target your everyday work environment. slow things and keep people from • Starts when teams depart the Sometimes, the best ideas come from thinking through the entire process. LCC - cover each phase separately, the newest person on the team Leaders must be responsible for con- this will help it flow, (Movement to because he or she brings a unique per- ducting the AAR and managing it. Do breach, breach, assault, clear, back spective to the environment free of not let it get out of control and spin clear, all secure, post assault) social norms and the organization's into a finger pointing session, remem- • Ends when leader calls ‘Exfil’ culture (which can sometimes hinder ber to focus on the outcome of the • Allow each team to respond our thought process). This fresh per- events and try to identify solutions to in order during each phase spective coupled with the experience problems. Do not finish your AAR of the process and knowledge of seasoned members without identifying solutions to prob- 6. Exfiltration from the target area of the organization is the key to posi- lems or establishing a second meeting • Starts at the command to tive change. Eventually, the AAR after some thought has been put to Exfil (Loading vehicles, PC will become second nature and your developing a solution. Finally, leaders movement) organization will change, for must understand that everyone leav- • Allow each team to respond the better. T About the Author

Robert Trivino is a Native American, Pueblo Indian, and a former United States Army Ranger and a 1st SFOD-D (Delta) unit member. His military service ranged from tactical ground missions to senior-level staff operations, including working at the highest levels within the Department of Defense and the Pentagon. He is the owner and President of Evergreen Mountain LLC, a compa- ny that specializes in providing cutting edge training in leadership, tactics and firearms.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 11

L eadership THE END OF SWAT AS WE KNOW IT (BUT A BRIGHT NEW FUTURE)

Written by Louis Hayes

The days of the SWAT "bread truck" are left to 1970s television shows. Any disparity between SWAT cops and patrol officers continues to shrink. The gap that separated revolver-carrying beat cops and armor-clad SWAT oper- ators has narrowed, evidenced by the superior equipment being deployed by everyday (and every night!) neigh- borhood police cars. Less obvious to the onlooker is the tactical training now available to patrol officers.

I have been saying it for years.   
  Those who sepa- rate SWAT movements and strategies from those of the rest of police units have fallen for the Specialist trap. Today's SWAT teams must train and prepare so their movements smoothly integrate into any police department unit, assignment, or division for any problem or incident. And this means an end to the way we've come to know SWAT. The vision

The military uses a phrase Force Multiplier. In civilian law enforce- ment, that term may not sit the best. Maybe a slight adjustment to  Multiplier or  Multiplier is more palatable to Americans. Regardless of the phrasing, the future of SWAT is: • Increase safe tactical options along a spectrum of strategies.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 13

L eadership

• Act as strategic and tactical such that there was an impenetrable was "supposed to in training"? leadership among other units. barrier that defined the upper limits of • Increase the effectiveness of tactical and weapons ability for patrol What is wrong with SWAT training? current manpower (patrol, K9, officers. There is another shortcoming: In a nutshell, it's too damned inflexi- narcotics, gang, investigations, etc.) that there are only two options for ble. The rigidity of formations or tac- • Deploy side-by-side with officers patrol (or other non-SWAT) units... tics requires a tremendous amount of with less tactical experience, practice (or is it choreogra- skills, and training. phy?). That's the recipe • Using existing first that makes SWAT responders as fellow extremely good at tacticians in teams for “Today's SWAT teams what they do - but the duration also why they exclude of incidents. others, hopefully inad- So instead of having must train and vertently, from their twenty SWAT operators tactics. Because the replace the first respond- movements are so ing patrol officers at a prepare so their rehearsed, they are not critical incident scene, the very adaptable when operators integrate them- trying to bring in oth- selves into leadership ers without the same positions among first movements smoothly level or exact type of responders. These SWAT training. These opera- operators can positively tors have painted affect the response and integrate into any themselves into a cor- actions of others, thereby ner, without the ability multiplying their effec- to conform or adjust tiveness. Instead of a full police department outside their "team." contingent of SWAT oper- This is most clearly ators serving high-risk proven by the inability warrants, a smaller group unit, assignment, or for different SWAT of tactical experts develop units to work along- the strategy and tactical side each other - their plan...and deploy ahead division for any tactics aren't compati- of or alongside originat- ble. I've seen this not ing units such as bomb, only between two narcotics, fugitive, or problem or incident. completely different detectives. In cases of local teams....but also active killers or terrorism, within the SAME ten SWAT operators are And this means an department's team no longer just ten individ- that has broken into uals on one team - they different platoons. are potentially the leaders end to the way we've Imagine two groups of for TEN TEAMS! operators wearing the same badge and patch, Making it happen come to know SWAT” under the same com- mander, which have But in order for this to morphed into two dis- become a reality, two changes must tinct animals that cannot play with take place. The first is that there must 1. Wait-for-SWAT each other! be a change in the (tactical) training 2. Balls-to-the-Wall methods for the general population of Part of the answer is   police officers. The second change is Those two strategies don't allow for a  This means that that SWAT must change the way they lot of "speeds" or options in between. SWAT and non-SWAT units alike must train and prepare. Lastly, there is a certain amount of agree upon a 
 "dance rehearsal" in police training  that guide their movements, for- What is wrong with non-SWAT tacti- that does not mesh well with even mations, responses, and tactics. The cal training?      minor changes in terrain, situation, concepts must be general or universal   - as uttered by a fellow manpower, or positioning. Recall your enough so that anyone can work and firearms instructor. The attitude was last felony car stop. Did it look like it communicate with anyone. There

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 15 L eadership

must be a highly-adaptable system so LEOpSys for all law enforcement. all the parts of the machine work That day should be sooner than later. together for the problem. Once spe- It just takes a little courage to make cialization or technique takes prece- the change. T dence over concept, there will be incompatibility and in-adaptability.

This doesn't mean that SWAT teams lower their standards. No, not at all, but the change to concept-based train- ing is a big one....especially for experi- We are all enced teams with lots of time together. I am also not suggesting that teams of patrol officers led by SWAT operators will function as effectively or efficient- ly as a same-sized group of SWAT teammates. But what I do claim is that on the same five patrol teams each led by SWAT operators have a higher potential for success than four pure patrol teams and one pure SWAT team. team. We We are all on the same team. We must train and prepare like it.

The deployment of full 30-man SWAT teams is becoming limited to hostage rescue and long-term standoffs. must train Otherwise, operators are being asked to compliment other units such as patrol, K9, narcotics, gang, investiga- tion, and fugitive teams. And the cohesion sucks. We have poorly trained our specialty units in ways and prepare that make them over-specialized, per- haps, a case of unintended conse- quences. The above-described future of tactical policing is on the horizon. We must acknowledge its arrival and like it make some much needed changes to our training methods.

One day we will have an overriding About the Author

Louis Hayes is a systems thinker for The Virtus Group, Inc., a firm dedicated to the development of public safety leadership. He is a co-developer of The Illinois Model™ law enforcement operations system (LEOpSys) and moderates several courses rooted in its theory and concepts. He is a 17-year police officer, currently assigned to a multi-agency tactical unit in Chicagoland. He is a patrolman first, then a tactical officer, then a SWAT operator, then a PointMan - in that order.

16 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

T actics Techniques and Procedures INTEGRATING POLICE AND FIRE/EMS WITHIN THE ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE

Written by George Williams Active Shooter events will likely be with us forever. If it is not the mentally ill seeking a sense of aggrandizement or revenge, it will be the Salafist bent on the world caliphate (and, unfortu- nately, our Mumbai and Beslan experiences are coming) or some other form of terrorist act (or act of war). In the past, the response has been seen solely as a law enforcement response. It was law enforcement’s job to get to the scene as early as possible to stop the suspect from harming any additional victims. After the scene was determined to be com- pletely safe—often taking more one-hour—firefighters and/or their EMS counterparts were then permitted access to the vic-

18 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 19

T actics Techniques and Procedures

tims who had been bleeding and dying from the moment of being shot.

Recognition is growing that the Fire Service with its Emergency Medical Services (EMS) capabili- ties brings life-saving skills that are just as necessary to preserve life as that of stopping the sus- pect’s rampage. Active shooter incidents now become a “Public Safety” response, integrating the police and fire/EMS services into an efficient and highly effective reply to any criminal mass casu- alty incident. How Public Safety responds to this high casualty incident means the difference between life and death for not only those victims who have not yet been shot or injured, but also for those who are wounded and facing life-threatening injuries.

In any response method, time has proven that the less complex- ity a method involves, the more likely it will work. Simplicity equals reproducibility. Complexity creates friction, and friction is the enemy of opera- tional success. Likewise, a sys-

22 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS

T actics Techniques and Procedures tem of response that is highly room) as quickly as possible death. Both methods operate intuitive and requires personnel (transport). Fire personnel, under the same time constraints: to operate within their existing escorted by armed police as some of the wounded will die no skill and knowledge sets is more security, enter the secure CCP matter what type of medical likely to be successful. A and implement their Mass intervention they receive. Most response method should be Casualty Incident (MCI) proto- of those who will inevitably die selected based upon its initial cols to process and transport the will expire within minutes of degree of training difficulty and most critically wounded as being shot. Others who are seri- expense, as well as the intensity quickly as possible to life-saving ously injured may die from and cost of sustainment training care. uncontrolled blood loss even necessary to maintain the capa-  The team consists of 2-4 though they might be saved by bility of personnel to effectively police officers and 2 paramedics early surgical intervention (e.g., respond. who are trained to move as a the TSA agent who was mur- team into a cleared hot zone dered on November 1, 2013 at Two Primary (although proponents of the RT Los Angeles International state that the team operates in a Airport). Others can tolerate Response warm zone, the requirement of delays of hours before their ballistic armor and moving injuries are life-threatening. It is Methods through cleared but unsecured this group of the seriously There are two primary methods areas argue against that assess- injured who will benefit most of integration being implement- ment). As the team encounters from life-saving represented by ed across the country: The use of wounded individuals, the para- the efficient and effective inte- a secure Internal Casualty medics stabilize and then trans- grated police-fire response. Collection Point (CCP) in a port the injured person in a tacti- “warm zone” inside the struc- cal manner to a CCP that is Internal CCP, ture, or the use of Rescue Teams secure, generally outside of the (RT, sometimes referred to as a structure. The team then re- or Rapid “Rescue Task Force”) to bring the enters the structure, tactically wounded out of the structure to clearing its way to the next vic- Response & a CCP in a cold zone. tim where the team’s efforts are Treatment repeated until the structure is 
   This is a proven cleared of wounded. Method (R2TM) life-saving option where the wounded are quickly moved to a Time is the enemy of the Active Dual Priorities secure area within the structure Shooter response. The more time for purposes of quickly assessing the suspect has privacy and can The R2TM response employs an and categorizing (triage), rapid safely hunt his victims, the integrated response of police and control of bleeding or clearing of greater number of casualties fire/EMS to achieve simultane- air passages (treatment), and there will be. And the longer it ous dual life-saving priorities: delivering that person to a defin- takes to get the wounded to • The rapid response by police to itive medical care facility (emer- definitive medical care, the more mitigate the imminent threat to gency surgery in an operating who will suffer a preventable life of the suspect(s).

24 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS • The mitigation of the wounded responding officers who are Stage location. through the safe and rapid intro- moving toward the indicators of As the location of the suspect is duction of fire/EMS personnel threat or the last reported posi- narrowed down, some officers into the scene to begin early tion of the suspect(s) typically pursuing mitigation efforts will Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) becomes a wave of officers who become redundant. These as protocols resulting in the rapid are responding from more dis- well as additional officers enter- transport of the injured. tant beats and nearby jurisdic- ing at this point transition their    tions. This typically occurs with- focus of efforts to life-saving in 5-7 minutes of the first officer efforts for the wounded. As The R2TM program operates entry. This late-arriving wave of soon as the location of the CCP is under the concept of a time-lim- officers transitions from suspect declared by the FOB/CCP super- ited response. Upon notification mitigation to victim life-saving visor, they begin moving the of a criminal mass casualty inci- tasks. wounded to the secured CCP in dent in-progress, on-duty officers • A police supervisor takes and the warm zone. If there is immediately respond and make secures a Forward Operating uncontrolled bleeding, the offi- entry, swarming the structure Base (FOB) within the structure. cers may tourniquet the wound through multiple ingress points. Security is established by up to before dragging or carrying the These officers, singly and in three officers. The FOB permits patient to the CCP. small teams of two or three (as better utilization of interior Firefighters, escorted by armed officers begin arriving simultane- resources prior to the establish- officers, make entry into the CCP, ously) quickly move toward ment of the Unified Command ideally within 10-15 minutes of threat indicators (shots, victims (UC). The FOB supervisor coor- the first officer’s entry. fleeing, etc.), generally to the last dinates responding officers, Ambulances are brought forward reported position of the suspect. directing responding officers to even as suspect mitigation efforts The intent is to mitigate the either make entry or, when there continue, protected by the offi- threat of the suspect, to control are sufficient numbers of officers cers on the security teams. Fire corridors and key architectural involved in suspect mitigation implements its Mass Casualty access points, and limit the efforts, to respond to Fire Incident (MCI) Protocols, a mobility of the suspect(s), deny- Staging. It is likely the FOB will process they are expert in and ing access to additional victims. transition into the Casualty require no additional training to Collection Point (CCP). perform well. Fire personnel simultaneously • Responding officers not stage nearby. Two crews merge already involved in suspect miti- The CCP concept is a functional into one apparatus with their gation efforts now report to fire option for many practical MCI trauma gear. The first arriv- staging to act as “Fire Security reasons: ing apparatus delivers two fire Teams.” These security teams •     lieutenants and six to eight fire- will provide security during   
 fighter/EMTs/paramedics. ingress of fire personnel into the   There is very little Depending upon the initial intel- CCP. cross-training required. Initial ligence as to the number injured, • A hasty Unified Command is training focuses on a slight para- this can expand to another—or created by the linking up of a digm shift for officers. While tra- even several—apparatus with Battalion Chief and Watch ditional police Active Shooter combined crews. What is at first Commander or shift supervisor. response training has solely a very limited number of This occurs at the Fire focused on locating and stopping

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 25 T actics Techniques and Procedures the threat, police are quickly more complicated, perishability     While Unified trained on requirements for increases, creating a greater need Command is vital to the success establishing an effective CCP for for recurring training and greater of the overall response, it is not fire/EMS to conduct their MCI. budget expenditures. There are required for suspect mitigation Other than this nod to extra- no formations to learn and forget efforts, the formation of Fire police duties, the disciplines— for either the police or fire. Security Teams, establishing a and their training—remain •       Fire Stage (where two fire com- intact. Police mitigate the sus- The early establishment of the panies merge with all of their pect’s threat (verify he is down CCP is a proven concept in mili- MCI gear into one apparatus), or by suicide or third-party action, tary combat operations and per- establishing a secure CCP. The shoot him, verify he has barri- mits rapid triage, treatment, and UC is not critical to initial police caded or has fled). Police con- transport for the wounded. If life-saving efforts until the duct security efforts to protect 18-year olds in combat can release point where fire is per- fire personnel as they transition understand and function with mitted to make entry into the inside to the warm zone/CCP this concept, police officers will CCP while protected by the secu- and as they conduct their MCI easily function and make it rity teams. The UC gives fire protocols. As we’ve seen in inci- work. The 2011 shooting of permission to make entry, com- dent after incident, officers carry Congresswoman Gabriel plying with fire protocols within and drag the wounded when Giffords along with the six dead the Incident Command System EMS is delayed—the CCP con- and 12 additional wounded is an (ICS). cept formalizes this naturally example. A married doctor and •    occurring behavior, requiring nurse already on-scene immedi- 
     armed officers to transition the ately set up triage, and because        wounded to the CCP. While sus- the location was in a parking lot,       Initial pect mitigation efforts are on- fire personnel and ambulances responding officers make inde- going, firefighters enter the had immediate access to the pendent entry into the structure warm zone (without the need of wounded. Congresswoman singly or in twos or threes. As ballistic protection) and conduct Giffords was operated on within additional officers arrive there their MCI. Protected by police 53 minutes of being shot, saving becomes an obvious point where security teams, ambulances pull her life. The early establishment additional personnel are not nec- up to the CCP entrance to receive of the hasty UC is likely. Unified essary to suspect mitigation the wounded ready for transport Command between police and efforts. Some who are inside the and are transported to a defini- fire is facilitated and established structure will turn to patient tive care facility. as early as the two field com- transfer to the CCP. Others •     Once the con- mand elements can respond to arriving at this point will become cept is explained to line, supervi- the Fire Stage location. This is an part of the Fire Security Teams. sory, management, and com- established priority for this Fire personnel have already mand personnel, the concept response method. staged and completed their inte- becomes intuitive, lessening the •     gration of crews and equipment degree of training perishability     into the primary response appa- that is inherent in any response       ratus. It is only now that the ICS method. As solutions become       catches up with the incident and

26 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS the need for command and con- Time is the enemy trol is exercised in releasing the security teams and fire personnel of the Active Shooter to make entry into the CCP. By now the hasty UC, consisting of response. a Battalion Chief and a police supervisor or Watch The more time the Commander, is up and suffi- ciently oriented to make the call. suspect has privacy Where problems are experienced within the R2TM/Internal CCP and can safely hunt his method is primarily due to train- ing scars from prior response victims, the greater methods requiring the thorough searching of every nook and number of casualties cranny of a structure before con- cluding that is clear and "safe." there will be. And the Training must stress to officers that their job is to create a rea- longer it takes to get sonably secure "warm zone" rather than a safe "cold zone." the wounded to How Rescue definitive medical Teams care, the more who Function will suffer

The Rescue Team (RT) functions a preventable death. under the concept of a time-lim- ited response. Officers make entry, either through rapid response (one or more officers Officers and trained and the corridor has been twice- interdicting the suspect(s)) or by equipped firefighters/EMS cleared (now considered a formation. Officers then locate report to the UCP. Teams of two “warm zone”), the RTs move to the wounded and twice sweep a firefighters who are specially the structure and make entry. corridor leading to a CCP on the trained in small unit movement Each RT moves as a team utiliz- exterior of the structure, search- and equipped with ballistic pro- ing specific trained formations ing and clearing each room and tection (helmets and vest) are that change given the architec- access to the corridor. The assigned to a team of two to four tural layout, possible threat area, Unified Command Post (UCP) is officers. Multiple teams are des- or some kind of obstacle. notified that the corridor is clear ignated and prepare for entry. and ready for patient extraction. As soon as the UCP is notified RTs encounter patients and treat

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 27 them in place, stabilizing them, ating room. based on medical need rather and then drag or carry them than individual diagnosis of while guarded by their law • ! !  !!  wounds and stabilization at the enforcement counterparts. After  !  ! ! ! location of wounding. Officers moving the patient to the exteri-  !! !  !   A are already operating in the hot or CCP, the RT returns, moving number of agencies boast they zone within the building. in formation, to the next patient. have at least one, and sometimes Officers, singly or in pairs, can At the CCP, firefighters/EMS two qualified RT firefighters on more easily and quickly transfer perform their Mass Casualty every shift in their city. Those patients to the CCP than can a Incident protocols the patients personnel, first, must respond slow moving tactical formation. are transported in order of the city or county-wide to the inci- This natural police behavior severity of their injuries. dent. If there 20 patients, 8 requires no direction by higher immediate and 12 delayed, how authority as evidenced in many While Rescue Teams may func- long before all 20 are triaged incidents where officers take the tion once they are finally estab- with one or possibly two teams initiative to move patients to lished and begin operating, how- operating in the incident? Triage EMS personnel rather than wait ever, there are a great deal of cannot efficiently occur if for fire and EMS to be released unanswered questions and prob- patients are being encountered into the scene. Every minute lems surrounding this concept individually by EMS first respon- waiting for command direction is that has been tried and failed in ders. The question should be, another minute the victims are the past: “How can we efficiently transi- bleeding out. • ! !! !! tion patients into the MCI  !!   For a process?” The only answer is to • !  ! ! patient who is bleeding severely get them quickly into the CCP  ! !  . In many RT from multiple gunshot wounds for MCI processing into the scenarios, the team members are (GSW), having two paramedics, Trauma Center. already in kit and linked up, and each having an MCI backpack appear at the ingress point of a filled with medical equipment, is • !  ! !  ! building. Where did the eight surpassed only by the patient    ! !! 
!  teams of four officers and two already having arrived at the  !! ! paramedics each find each other, trauma center. However, Mass  !! ! !  get assigned into teams, and who Casualty Incident protocols were ! !   Other assigned them to make entry developed to efficiently process than the control of arterial bleed- within minutes of the first offi- multiple trauma patients into the ing (which officers are capable of cers entering? In the midst of definitive care system as quickly controlling with tourniquets), the chaos and urgency of an as possible. Delaying transport patients are best served by their actual event, escort officers and to a trauma center by two para- rapid transfer to the CCP and RT firefighters must respond medics “staying and playing” into the MCI process. Studies from their respective locations causes other patients to be demonstrate that any delay in (their stations, the field, from denied these EMS professionals’ the arrival of a patient to defini- home), have a rally point (the help. The critically wounded are tive medical care results in a Command Post once it is set up), best served in this instance by lower survival expectation. receive assignments, stage until minimal EMS intervention and Patient survival depends upon a the CP is informed that a particu- rapid transport to a trauma oper- systematic triaging and transport lar corridor or area has been

28 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS twice swept, and then make and their route of travel. If com- mass confusion as well as the entry when released by com- munications are confused or the contradictory reports and misin- mand. This is unlikely to hap- radio repeaters shut down due to formation over the radio (“All pen in the early response stages. call volume (a common occur- units, reports of a second sus- rence), insertion of the RT must pect, description to follow.”), as • # "% #!%
 %#!$" be delayed. The RT’s depend- well as the information over- $ $% %#  ! $%#" ence upon early and clear com- whelm that will initially be pre- $ % "%$ "%$!% How munication from interior units is sented to the Command Post, long does it take in the real a major vulnerability to this con- how will the CP: 1) Be estab- world before the average CP is cept. Hinging this much on such lished in time to be a factor in established and, importantly, a fragile variable is not tactically the wounded’s survival? 2) functioning? The CP not only nor strategically wise. How will the CP assign team must be established, but the per- members to teams in a timely sonnel manning the CP must • $"%#"  ! #" manner? 3) How will the CP quickly get up to speed and ori- "$ ! %#%#"%#% $ determine what is a warm zone ent to an overwhelming amount  $%#% $%!$%%#" and what is not with any degree of information, enabling them to !#$ These incidents typically of accuracy? In the interior of then process detailed intelligence put a heavy demand on available many buildings it is easy—and from interior officers. Someone radio frequencies. It is not common—to become disoriented in the CP must then divert their unusual that radio repeaters shut to the cardinal directions. How attention from gathering and down during the midst of sus- will the officer be certain that the analyzing the information to pect search operations for many “west corridor” is properly iden- attend to forming and releasing seconds or even minutes. tified? the RT to respond. This takes Sometimes the structures them- time the wounded do not have. selves block radio communica- • !%! $%!##%%! $%!# Without a functioning CP, the RT tions and hamper operational $$% "%$ % "% $ %! $ cannot come into existence and tempo and coordination—espe- $#$%$ !! "%!$%%!# cannot be dispatched. cially in top-down management $"!$ From the moment the indi- • $%%#$% $%!$$ environments. RTs require strict vidual is wounded, he or she has %$ % "%$ %#"  coordination from the CP while been bleeding out. Some of ! #"%$!$$"%!$% "!$ #%" ! these incidents by their very these people are running out of "%!$% The RT model nature subvert clear communica- time. They have no luxury for assumes RT personnel will be tions. the time it takes to sweep and on-scene and linked up early in clear an entire hallway and each the incident response. It also • # "% "%#"!#%#% room leading to it, the same assumes that communications  %$% # $%$%!#%!$ number of officers could have with interior units and the CP #" #"% "% "# ! #" secured the hallway and transi- will be established early and will # $$%$$ $"$% "%!$$ tioned all of the wounded to the be clear regarding the status of  ! ! #"% "%#$% ! CCP. the operating area in which the #"  ! #" RT models RTs will operate. An RT will not permit teams to enter a section of • RTs are resource heavy. Even get the go-ahead to proceed a building only after the corri- the leanest RTs require two without clear communications dor(s) and adjacent rooms have police officers and two RT-quali- regarding where they are needed been twice-swept. Given the fied EMTs/paramedics. In an

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 29 incident where five teams are • $"#$ $"#! ! "  Transitioning needed due to the number of   !$$  $ !#$! $ # patients to the CCP for MCI pro- wounded, where will the ten  #" #$ "$ !# As in cessing is time-critical. The more equipped and trained firefighters HazMat responses, the hot zone people needed to respond to a come from? How long will it requires special PPE for the tech- single location for assignment, be take for them to report to the nicians to perform inside the granted permission to enter a scene when off-duty? It must be affected area, while support per- twice cleared area, move to the remembered that within 20 min- sonnel in the “warm zone” do location of a wounded individ- utes of the first responding offi- not because they are not present- ual, stabilize that individual, and cer, it is not unusual for public ly endangered by the environ- then move back to transfer that safety traffic jams to lock up ment. The need for ballistic PPE person to an external CCP, the every surface street for blocks— for the firefighters in the RT more friction there will be, ham- late arriving firefighters/EMS argues against the classification pering rescue operations. Four may have to walk for blocks to of “warm zone.” (or six) individuals moving in the get to the UCP before being rigid formations and collecting assigned—after they respond to • $#"!!#$ $ #$"# one patient at a time to transition their station for their turn-out #! $"#"" !$ " ! ! Fire to a distant CCP is not only inef- gear. personnel are not trained in ficient but is time consuming police tactics and small unit while people are bleeding unat- • $# #"$"# "#$    movement. This is a new skill tended and in need of a surgeon. #"!$" # !$  #! involving very low-frequency,
  This PPE represents a high-personal threat activities Time matters large budgetary expense: mini- where the likelihood of an indi- mally ballistic vests (sized to vidual actually being called upon each individual), ballistic hel- to perform these tactics is far less As Sgt. Craig Allen said, "US law mets, and ballistic eye protection. than the chance of any individ- enforcement wasted more than a Some teams are each being kitted ual officer getting into a shooting decade training officers to out with TEMS backpacks. on a particular shift. Nothing in respond to an Active Shooter in Maintenance and storage issues the firefighters’ daily work tasks formation and have nothing to soon arise. Where on the truck is will reinforce this training. As show for it. It's time we move in this PPE carried year round such, it will require intensive ini- the direction of life-saving and (especially when each vest and tial training. The perishability of abandon formations." This helmet is fit to an individual)? this training is high and team includes formations in any form. Who maintains it? Who tracks members must maintain this skill The concept of early interdiction the expiration dates of the PPE for the duration of their career of the suspect combined with the for replacement? Due to the lack with frequent—and expensive— early establishment of the CCP of incidence, this PPE may be sustainment training. and transitioning patients carted around for the duration of Additionally, as interest wanes or through the MCI protocols into that firefighter’s career and promotions, injuries, and retire- definitive medical care as rapidly never be used. As promotions, ments occur, new team members as is safely possible is a less com- injuries, and retirements occur, are required to be trained and plex, more intuitive method of additional ballistic PPE will be equipped. response. It is fast enough to required for the new RT fire mitigate the most common inci- members. • " !$"#$$! dent: the lone gunman in a gun-

30 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS free zone with complete access to • Police and Fire/EMS: Help more intuitive method. The inte- victims. It is also flexible enough people who have been victim- gration of police and fire is a life- to respond to the threat of multi- ized and injured. saving concept that should be ple suspects acting in multiple • Police/SWAT: Perform a final adopted and made as simple and locations. And it requires far less clearing of the structure. as intuitive as possible. This is recurrent training because there • Police: Evacuate and reunifica- best achieved when the police is little cross-training—officer tion. are tasked with police duties and and firefighters are asked to per- • Police: Investigate the fire with fire duties, and the two form their everyday tasks within crime(s). disciplines work together to the model: Rather than recreate a failed tac- achieve the overall goal of the • Police: Respond to a man with tic and instituting a complicated Public Safety response: a gun/shots being fired call. method requiring expensive life-saving. • Police: Provide security equipment that might never be against assault. used as well demanding exten- My thanks to Jeff Gurske and • Fire/EMS: Respond to a med- sive recurrent sustainment train- Roberto DiGiulio for their con- ical call with multiple trauma ing as well, success is more likely tributing to the content of this victims. when employing a less-complex, article. T

About the Author

Mr. George Williams is a Police Training Specialist and the Director of Training for CUTTING

EDGE TRAINING, LLC, in Bellingham, Washington. He has been a trainer of police overall since

1981 and a full-time trainer since 1987.He is responsible for the development and presentation of unique and varied training programs to SWAT, patrol, K9, and Police Administrators, as well as certifying instructors in Defensive Tactics, impact weapons, and shooting. His experience in train- ing law enforcement ranges from police academies, through municipal and county agencies to the state and federal government level. A SWAT tactics and weapons trainer, he has been a con- sultant to several dozen teams in the Western United States over two decades. Mr. Williams is a

California P.O.S.T.-certified Police Master Instructor. As a Police Training Specialist, he has person- ally trained officers from all 50 States and several U.S. Territories, as well officers from 14 foreign countries. He continues to serve as a police expert witness in federal and state courts throughout the US since 1991, and has authored two books and over 200 articles.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 31

T actics Techniques and Procedures TO CHASE

Written by Dr. Ron Martinelli

An officer detains an active parolee – and at least 19 of those officers or • If the suspect is psychotic; gang member for questioning and 38% were victims of ambush or sur- • If the suspect is under the influence during the detention the suspect sud- prise attacks according to the most of drugs - such as powerful stimu- denly runs. The officer chases the sus- recent statistics gathered by the FBI. lants, or PCP; pect for two blocks, observes the sus- The significant increase in officer • Where the suspect may be taking pect to be grabbing into his shorts deaths by gunfire is a disturbing trend the officer to - such as an area of pocket. The suspect yells out to the that has steadily risen since 1994 when ambush; officer that he is armed and will shoot only 10% of officers killed were as a • If there are other suspects the the officer. The officer tackles the sus- result of ambush attacks. More often officer is not aware of who can aid pect, there is a violent struggle for the than not, officers become emotionally the suspect. weapon and the officer shoots and captured in a pursuit event and have kills the suspect. an instinctive reaction, rather than a Officers need to remember that at the An officer attempts to affect an studied and planned response to same time that they are catching up to enforcement stop on a motorist for a resistance and chase without consider- the suspect, they are also reducing the hit and run accident. The driver fails ing the inevitability of suspect cap- "reactionary gap" between themselves to yield and stop at the first available ture. In other words, they chase the and the suspect. Reactionary gap is opportunity, drives to a park and then suspect until the suspect catches them. the distance between the officer and suddenly foot bails into the park. The Officers should remind themselves suspect, compared to the officer’s abil- lone officer chases after the suspect that what they often do not know ity to defensively react to something into the park where the officer is sub- about the people they are chasing and the suspect might do to them. Shorten sequently ambushed, shot and killed. the environment the foot pursuit takes the distance and the officer shortens The situations described above are place can seriously hurt or kill the offi- his/her reaction time. This is almost similar circumstances each resulting in cer. always dangerous for the officer. opposite tragic and deadly conse- What officers may not know about the The public sees so many foot pursuits quences. Why does this continue to suspect they are chasing include: on live television that they, and unfor- happen? • What if anything they may be want- tunately the officers themselves, fail to Foot pursuits by their very nature are ed for; realize just how inherently dangerous highly emotionally charged and dan- • If they are armed; these foot pursuits really are. The situ- gerous events that occur frequently in • What the suspect's martial arts or ation for the officer and suspect can police work. So far this year 50 officers fighting skills are; literally and irrevocably change in the have been killed by gunfire – a 32% • If the suspect is in better physical blink of an eye and can have fatal con- increase from the same time last year shape than the officer is; sequences for each.

34 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS OROR NOTNOT TOTO CHASE?CHASE?

In reviewing circumstances similar to their body’s own survival mechanisms or the fleeing suspect. the incident involving a Riverside during the chase. While running, an So what should the officer do when a police officer who was murdered fol- officer’s brain involuntarily “dumps” suspect runs from them? Here are a lowing a foot pursuit on the evening powerful internal chemical stimulants few officer safety enhancing tips: of November 7, 2010, 2006 FBI statis- such as adrenalin and epinephrine; • Do not wait! Get on the radio imme- tics on officers killed in the line of and pain-blockers such as endorphins diately and call for assistance; duty indicate that 38% of all officers and euphoric dopamine into their • Put out a good description of the killed in the U.S. occurred during a body. While the stimulants can make suspect and their direction of travel; crime in progress where the officer an officer stronger, they also create • SLOW DOWN and carry on a mov- was affecting an arrest and that 60% of visual distortions such as perceptual ing surveillance of the fleeing suspect all officers killed under such circum- narrowing (tunnel vision) and the loss from a distance that allows for a lot of stances were acting alone. Sixty-eight of near vision (inability of seeing the reactionary gap time; percent (68%) of those officers were front sights of a handgun). As the • If you lose sight of the suspect, stop, killed at night. Seventy percent (70%) body automatically pools blood and find cover/concealment, arm yourself of officers are killed by handguns fluids towards its core to prevent and set up a perimeter while waiting from distances of fifteen feet or less blood loss in the event of traumatic for back-up; and suspects are able to hit an officer injury; officers also lose control of • Check in with yourself and get back target 68% of the time compared to their fine and complex motor skills into forebrain cognitive processing. officers striking the suspect only 14% (ability to manipulate and grasp Get centered; reduce your breathing of the time. Other statistics show that objects such as OC, ECWs and and heart rate. Work on getting out of in a physical confrontation with a sus- batons); and most experience a dimin- tunnel vision and diminished hearing. pect, the officer ends up on the ished or a complete loss of hearing. Make a plan or review your plan and ground 86% of the time where 25% are Worse case scenarios I have personally then engage it; seriously injured and 12% are killed investigated have found officers to • Let the suspect tire out from run- with their own weapons such as reach a state of complete “hypervigi- ning; let them experience the reduced handguns and batons when the sus- lance” upon encountering their sus- vision and hearing instead of you; pect is somehow able to disarm the pects, where the pursuing officer • Call for a K-9 unit and or a helicop- officer. These are certainly not favor- becomes confused, panics, freezes, or ter if available to search for the sus- able survival statistics for the officer. have resorted to extreme and unneces- pect; Psychophysiologically, a pursuing sary uses of force. All of these symp- • Remember that it is usually not a officer immediately may fall victim to toms can prove deadly to the officer matter of if you will catch the suspect;

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 35 T actics Techniques and Procedures

just when you will catch them.

Suspects most usually go to ground and hide soon after an officer loses sight of them. Setting up a perimeter and using a K-9 and air support to find the suspect has historically proven to be the most successful method of capture. While an officer’s desire to protect the public and affect the arrest of a fleeing suspect is a selfless and courageous act, there is rarely a good reason for an officer to get injured or killed during a foot pursuit. Officers killed in the line of duty during foot pursuits should be a constant reminder to the public that police officers introduce themselves into dangerous situations on a daily basis. Unfortunately, this risk has become an all too frequent occurrence in our industry. If officers can just remember a few of these important tips, they will make it home safe and alive. T     

Officers become emotionally captured in a pursuit event and have an instinctive reaction, rather than a studied and planned response to resistance and chase without considering the inevitability of suspect capture. In other words, they chase the suspect until the suspect catches them.

About the Author

Dr. Ron Martinelli, Ph.D., BCFT, CFA, CLS is a former police officer and detective with over 22 years of street experience primarily with the San Jose Police Department. Dr. Martinelli is a for- mer director of a POST police academy, and a multi-certified use of force instructor who also is a CSI forensic criminologist and police practices expert specializing in officer-involved shootings and major uses of force. He is NCCM Board Certified in Forensic Trauma, a Diplomat with the Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, a Certified Force Analyst with the Force Science Center and a recognized member of the American College of Forensic Experts Institute. Dr. Martinelli is nationally recognized for his research on the subject of psychophysiology and stress-induced responses. He can be reached at (951) 719-1450 and at [email protected].

36 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS ELITE FITNESS MEETS THE COMBAT PROFESSIONAL

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Written by Alexandra Jones

The past decade Europe has seen an explosive growth in the number of motorcycle gangs (MCs), many of which are listed as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs[1] (OMGs), sometimes referred to as ‘One Percenters’. The One Percenters are more narrowly defined by ATF as (among other things) any group of motorcyclists whose activities bring them and their club into repeated and serious conflict with society and the law. These defini- tions assume that such clubs are bands of motorcyclists. In Europe, this is often no longer the case. They are at best hybrid gangs, and often – like the Black Jackets MC – glorified street gangs that are cloaked in the

38 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS colours of an MC, because the MC     
      , John rate resistance to mainstream soci- is a proven successful business Hagedorn states that gangs have ety and become social actors out- model. become institutionalized in social side society’s legal framework. environments, are globalized and Although the rapid expansion of It’s all can be found in increasingly glob- MCs is seen throughout Europe, alized urban spaces. Crucially in the expansion in Eastern Europe about the the context of the developments in appears to differ from the situation money – the European MC-scene, according in North-Western Europe (mainly to Hagedorn, gangs are ‘social The Netherlands, Germany and The FBI defines OMGs as organi- actors’ whose identities are formed Scandinavia, especially Denmark). zations whose members use their by (perceived) identity-based The MC-look-alikes in the North- motorcycle clubs as conduits for repression, participation in the West, an area that could also be criminal enterprises. The purpose underground economy, and con- described as the Meuse-Rhine-Elbe of an enterprise is to make money, structions of gender [2]. Where the delta, stand out from their sur- and any company set up with an goon squads were basically first roundings in that they are com- eye to maximizing profits and generation street gangs – and posed of young men who are eth- minimizing risks will seek an some OMG puppet clubs still are – nically and often religiously differ- organizational model so as best to the new MCs are at least second ent from mainstream society. This enable and support its aims. The generation gangs, and some of appears not to be the case in OMG offers bands of criminals a them have grown into third gener- Eastern Europe simply because successful business model that will ation ganghood. The issue with there aren’t nearly as many immi- do just that outside and sometimes these new style European MCs is grants there, and none of the inside of regular societal frame- that some of those which may still Eastern European countries has a works for conducting business. be characterized as second genera- colonial past. To the best of my tion gangs, have a political edge to knowledge Southern Europe does- them. Such motorcycle gangs n’t suffer from such an increase in Or is it? transform into true outlaw motor- motorcycle gang activity. It is true that a number of MC chapters Where the rapid expansion of the cycle gangs: gangs that incorpo- motorcycle gangs is in itself cause for concern, the situation has been aggravated by the emergence of gangs that either had a political agenda from the start or that have become politically sensitized. Consisting mainly of young men from ethnic minorities and socially marginalized groups such as Travellers, these MC-look-a-likes have evolved from goon squads into serious transnational criminal networks.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 39 40 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS have been established in Spain in the past decade, but these seem to have been predominantly estab- In spite of being called lished and ‘staffed’ by MCs from e.g. Germany and The an MC, they do not ride Netherlands. Gangs that are exem- plary for this new breed of not- bikes. He says that if they really-MCs: Dutch Satudarah MC with its core of Moluccans, the just were to ride around three Dutch MCs that unite Travellers and Romani, the on bikes wearing cuts Kurdish Median Empire MC, the Black Jackets MC and the and colours, they would Kamikaze Riders MC. At least two, and possibly three of these be a ‘carnival society’ MCs can be linked to terrorist groups: the Kamikaze Riders MC in Belgium are closely associated (Karnevalsverein) with jihadists currently active in Syria and Iraq, one of the Dutch Travellers MCs has an interesting is beyond the scope of this post. In The nexus between organized association with Northern Ireland Europe there lies a conceptual no crime and terrorism isn’t a new (Ulster), and with some consider- man’s land between Thrasher’s phenomenon; Sullivan and Elkus able caution Median Empire MC traditional ‘wild peer group’ of have explored the matter exten- in Germany might be linked to the unruly adolescents and the offi- sively in Global cities – global Kurdish PKK [3]. All the OMGs cially labelled ‘organized crime gangs, and Red Teaming Criminal mentioned above are very present group’ (OCG) consisting of adult Insurgency (2009). This post will on the internet, especially on males whose joint criminal activi- explore relations between some of YouTube. ties are structured, persistent and the most notable new OMGs and mainly driven by prospects of terrorism. financial gain. The outlaw motor- Where cycle gangs are commonly ana- No Surrender MC. The Travellers angels lyzed and tackled as if they were community in The Netherlands like most OCGs, i.e. exclusively has spawned three major OMGs in fear to economic enterprises. The new the past five years, one of which is tread OMGs, however, combine the eco- No Surrender MC. It has quickly nomic ambitions of the organized become an MC of mixed ethnic Where angels fear to tread crime groups with the drive for and social composition. One of its The very notion of gang is treach- territory of the street gangs and chapters is in The Hague. Last erous terrain, an academic mine- the quest for identity of the adoles- year the website of this particular field subject to political and police cent peer groups. They become chapter had its home page show- opportunism, discussion of which socio-political actors. ing its own logo next to the sym-

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 41 bol and colours of the local foot- ball club and interestingly, graffiti style red fist adjacent to the text: Loyalists/still/under siege/NO SURRENDER.

This is a clear reference to the out- lawed Red Hand Defenders, a loy- alist (i.e. Protestants loyal to the United Kingdom) paramilitary group that is now officially classi- fied as a terrorist group and as such has been banned. The RDH rejects the Good Friday Agreement and is held responsible for multi- ple killings. It is unclear why an OMG chapter from The Hague would associate itself with the RDH or flag its affinity with it. The website no longer shows this particular picture. support clubs is called ‘The and its affiliates are well known Median Empire MC, Germany. A Immortals’, referring to the elite for the sophistication of their number of years ago leading soldiers of the kings of Persia. One organization. They are a pervasive members of a notorious Kurdish of the clips posted on YouTube presence in Kurdish communities crime family in Germany estab- shows the frontman abroad, in Europe. Extortion and protec- lished several chapters of Mongols apparently in Kurdistan. He is tion are important sources of rev- MC Germany after they had been armed with an AK-47. In an inter- enue for the PKK as well as for turned down by the Hells Angels. view with the respectable OMGs. It is doubtful whether a A young Kurd called ‘Erhan’ or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in young man once in the PKK could ‘Azad’, originally from Iran, joined 2012 headman ‘Azad’ isn’t shy successfully leave the organization the Kurdish Mongols MC in about the nature of Median and establish his own gang which Germany but found them very Empire MC. In spite of being in some fields would compete much lacking in the brotherhood called an MC, they do not ride with the PKK. they so advertised. So he founded bikes. He says that if they just his own Kurdish MC, Median were to ride around on bikes In Antwerp and Brussels young Empire MC. The name Median wearing cuts and colours, they men and boys of often Moroccan Empire refers to the ancient would be a ‘carnival society’ descent have ganged up together empire that occupied the lands (Karnevalsverein). ‘Azad’ also says in a small MC which they call many Kurds consider ancestral that he ‘used to be’ an active mem- Kamikaze Riders MC. The name of Kurdish territory and which they ber of the PKK, the outlawed which refers both to their reckless strive to unite once more into a Kurdish organization classified as bike riding and to the Japanese Kurdish homeland. One of the a terrorist organization. The PKK suicide pilots of WW2. In this case

42 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS the word ‘streetgang’ is probably Sharia4Belgium, an extremist too strong; the group as an MC Muslim organization which was doesn’t seem particularly evolved disbanded in October 2012. Other but motorcycles actually do fea- members of Kamikaze Riders MC ture: Japanese motorcycles of on Facebook openly support jihad. course, not American ones. The Founding father Said Saouti can be bikers engage in street races. The found on social media as Said MC was begun by Said Saouti, a Deltabox III, or Said Kamikaze or Salafist preacher who names Kawaz: Anwar Al Awlaki, among others, Belgian websites dedicated to as his teacher. Saouti teamed up ities. Houssien was apparently monitoring links between Belgian with a good friend of his, planning to commit a terrorist jihadists and the war in Syria [4] Abdelouafi Elouassaki to found attack in Brussels. Hakim and have no qualms about the nature Kamikaze Riders MC. Abdelouafi, Houssien went to Syria to join the of the Kamikaze Riders MC: they who died in a motorcycle accident fight, in the course of which call the gang a dangerous jihadist in May 2013, had two brothers. Houssien was killed and Hakim motorcycle gang. Said Saouti may Those two brothers, Houssien and was grievously wounded. be a preacher, he is also a felon Hakim, were both suspected of Houssien Elouassaki was also one convicted for burglary and fire being involved with terrorist activ- of the frontmen of arms offences.

Badge of The Immortals – 135 support crew (of Median Empire MC)

Median Empire MC, probably chapter Dark City (= Cologne, Germany). Not a motorcycle in sight.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 43 I ntelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance

Conclusion: Leaders of radicalized Muslims and leaders of gangs in European cities are fishing for the same fish in the same ponds. They groom alienated boys and young men, generally from marginalized communi- ties such as ethnic or religious minorities, who are looking for pride, fulfillment of a particular sort of mas- culinity and generally somewhere to belong. Especially vulnerable are those who are (considered) social fail- ures, with a propensity to violence and no allegiance to mainstream society. Those gangs that succeed in com- bining the successful organizational model of the outlaw motorcycle gang with a cultural narrative create a robust and flexible framework through which to do business, which may not always be financial, viz the Kamikaze Riders. The diaspora of a great array of peoples through Europe’s cities lends these gangs an easy reach outwards to fellow communities elsewhere while at the same time importing into these cities the con- flicts from their homelands. These new MCs are organized on the basis of a shared heritage and a shared rejection of the society that surrounds them. As it is the nature of street gangs and jihadists to strive for con- trol over territory, they look to control not just hearts and minds but actual neighborhoods on which they will impose their own rules and where they can stave off fiscal and judicial intervention. T

[1]For the sake of brevity, no distinction is made between OMGs, One Percenter OMGs and their puppet clubs [2] John M. Hagedorn (ed.) (2007). Gangs in the Global City. Alternatives to Traditional Criminology. Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press. [3]All information in this post is OSINT. [4]http://mediawerkgroepsyrie.wordpress.com and http://emmejihad.wordpress.com

This article is reprinted with permission from Foreign Intrigue . (Posted 28 August 2014)

About the Author

Alexandra Jones has been a strategic crime analyst with the police in The Hague, The Netherlands for the past eight years. Her main interest is in criminal street gangs, network analy- sis, and threat assessments. Currently mainly charged with research and development assign- ments, she has also worked organized crime, homicide, and political extremism.

44 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS GET A GREAT DEAL

Just contact us @[email protected] T actics Techniques and Procedures Mindset

Written by Fred T. Leland, Jr. “It’s about mind over matter. I don’t mind and you don’t mat- ter.” ~Marine Corps Drill Instructor, Parris Island 1980 Mind over matter are words I heard chanted in my ear over and over again as I made efforts to push out hundreds of pushups, sit-ups, jumping jacks, complete obstacle courses and various challenges while attending Marine Corps Boot Camp some 32 years ago. Mind over matter is a concept I have believed in for much of my adult life since. It helped me in all my efforts to persevere in both my personal and profes- sional lives. It embellished the can or will do attitude. I have uttered to myself and out loud; I am, and I can accomplish what I think about. As a cop the mind over matter concept often came to surface over the years in the performance of my duties; “I will win, and I will run faster and further than the other guy. When I see the “PERP” running away, I will run him down and stop him. When he zigs I will zag. I will physically beat my opponent. When the “PERP” does not comply and wants to fight or kill me I will outmaneuver, out- Republic of Korea Marines and U.S. Marines participated in a 400-kilometer hike for the first time during fight and outdraw and out KMEP as part of the annual cold weather training the ROK Marines train in. 1st ROK Special Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st ROK Division, Company A, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by LCpl Matt Myers)

46 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS and Winning is About Much More than Words, Isn't It?

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 47 T actics Techniques and Procedures

Every situation is winnable, not because they will it to be so, but instead because they possess both the will and skill to win shoot my opponent. I will win mind, subconscious mind and nitions in the law enforcement every encounter and go home to physical skills so they work in world. We need to navigate my family at the end of my unison. ambiguous, uncertain and com- shift!” Really I will! I mean it! I I have come to the conclusion plex situations while exploiting just said it, didn’t I, so it will be that what we say, the words we opportunities and hence out- so? Or is there something more use or think about often do not comes we seek often change. We to mind over matter? What hap- match our actions. In other may seek a resolution through pens when the adversary you words, we do not walk the self- negotiation and win voluntary face does mind and suddenly talk and practice what we preach compliance. We may win you do matter? Isn’t there more or tell ourselves. In order for through physical force when substance to the winning mind- mindset to work we must live negotiation efforts fail. We in a set than mere words and does and breathe it. We must take worst case scenario may win not mind have to connect with ownership enthusiastically and through the use of deadly force. matter, the stuff you know create and nurture the winning Winning in any of these exam- (ideas, innovative and adaptive mindset so that it takes hold ples takes mindset, knowledge, tactics, techniques and proce- mentally in our decision making skills and sound tactics. dures) and are capable of apply- and transitions to the physical in Cops have to possess the win- ing if you are to win on the our actions. Mindset has to syn- ning mindset but they must also street? ergistically connect to the physi- possess confidence in their skills Now before you get crazy on me cal and be part of us always. The and abilities and how they can and start going off on how winning mindset is not some- apply them under the pressure important the winning mindset thing you just turn on when of real time real world condi- and positive self-talk is, to us things go bad. Mindset is always tions. They must be committed winning on the street let me say in the on position. This is why and dedicated to their mission, this, I WHOLEHEARTIDLY training must be realistic and and must be physically and men- AGREE! But it’s also about constant. tally prepared to do whatever is knowledge and skills. More Law enforcement officers who reasonable and necessary to importantly it’s about taking that possess a winning mindset know accomplish that objective. Their same knowledge and skills and that the only purpose for han- training allows them to under- applying it to the street and the dling dynamic encounters is to stand that every situation is situation we find ourselves in. win. Now we must keep in mind winnable, not because they will This takes conditioning the that winning as numerous defi- it to be so, but instead because

48 TACTICAL SOLUTIONS they possess both the will and skill to win. There is much misunderstanding at least in my mind about the true warrior spirit within law enforce- ment. There are many who think that the winning mindset is about machismo, about bravado. They think the winning mindset is about rushing pedal to the metal, to all the calls, or puffing up their chest, starting fights to show others how tough or how much of a man they are. They take rash actions and uncalculated risks. Professionals, however, do not need to start fights to show others how tough they are. They are confident in their skills and tactics, because they understand the connection and importance of mindset applied with skill. They understand that they must shape and reshape events with skill opera- tionally and that there is a time to fight and a time to talk. They know when wait for reinforcements or when they must go it alone. When they have to fight, they fight to win. They fight with stubbornness and intensity combined with skill they have created and nurtured through training and learning from every experience. When it’s over they walk away with their heads held high with integrity and honor knowing they used tactical methods they decided on. A decision they were able to make because they understood that it’s the mindset and physical connection (will and skill) that had them ready and pre- pared. Mind (will) and matter (skill) make the difference, don’t you think? T

About the Author

Fred T. Leland, Jr. is the Founder and Principal Trainer of LESC: Law Enforcement & Security Consulting (www.lesc.net). He is the author of “Adaptive Leadership Handbook: Innovative Ways to Teach and Develop Your People", written for police and security professionals, pub- lished in January 2014, and is available on Amazon. In addition to his work with LESC, Fred Leland is an active Lieutenant with the Walpole (MA) Police Department. He previously worked as a deputy with the Charlotte County (FL) Sheriff’s Department and before that spent six years with the United States Marines including as a squad leader in Beirut, Lebanon. Leland is an accomplished trainer with more than 28 years’ experience teaching law enforcement, military and security professionals. His programs of instruction include handling dynamic encounters; threat assessment; nonverbal communications; decision making under pressure; evolving threats; violence prevention; firearms; use of force; officer created jeopardy and adaptive lead- ership. He is also a 2004 graduate of the FBI National Academy Class 216, and a current instruc- tor for the Massachusetts Municipal Police Training Committee. Outcomes based training and education (OBTE) is his approach to creating and nurturing decision makers to observe, orient, decide and act while considering consequences.

TACTICAL SOLUTIONS 49