"Chinese trade with in missiles as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological systems and technologies 'i should be of continuing concern in the arms control i< and nonproliferation community."

SILKWORMS -SUMMITRY Chinese Arms Exports to Iran and U.S. - Relations Bates Gill ' I Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project Monterey Institute of International Studies *'

THE ASIA AND PACIFIC RIM INSTITUTE OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE OTHER AJC PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

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China continues to provide Iran with sys- tems and technologies that contribute to further development of Iran's cruise and capability, as well as to its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.

China has transferred complete systems for the HY-2 "" and the C-801 and the C-802 antiship cruise missiles. Deployed on aircraft, fast-attack seacraft, and land-based launchers, these weapons give Iran one of the most robust antiship capabilities of the Persian Gulf countries.

The U.S. government has on numerous occasions expressed strong concerns about Chinese exports to Iran. In recent years China has taken steps to stem the flow of sensitive weapons and technolo- gies to Iran. But more must be done by China to comply with the nonproliferation goals it has set for itself and dose the gap between policy and practice. ince the mid- to !ate-1980s, Chinese arms expedls to Iran have caused considerable con- cern within the international community, Sparticularly for the United States. Recently, in conjunction with the UiS.-China summit of October 1997, China apparently took a number of steps to curtail sensitive transfers to Iran as part of a broader, more positive trend in Chinese nonproliferation poli- cy. But numerous concerns persist that China contin- ues to provide Iran with systems and technologies that contribute to further development of its cruise and ballistic missile capability, as well as to its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. While China has taken a Within the international com- animosities. sftssssjss^^ munity, the United States has sus- Suspicions and difficulties have number of positive steps tained the greatest degree of oppo- likewise characterized U.S.-China in recent years to curtail sition to Chinese arms exports to relations in recent years. Across a Iran. Owing to its global security host of issues—trade, human its export of sensitive commitments, the United States is rights, Taiwan, and nonprolifera- weapons and technolo- the world's most prominent and tion—U.S. public opinion in the forceful advocate against the pro- 1990s took a largely negative turn gies to Iran, more needs liferation of advanced conventional against China, especially after Bei- to be done. and mass destruction weapons, jing violently crushed the student- especially to "countries of concern" led prodemocracy demonstrations that have clearly threatening agen- in spring 1989. das toward the United States and It is a matter of considerable its friends and allies. debate whether U.S. pressure and The United States views Iran attention has achieved positive with particular concern as a spon- results for U.S. nonproliferation sor of international terrorism, as a policy, for stemming Iranian pro- threat to vital U.S. security inter- liferant activities, for regional secu- ests in the Persian Gulf region, and rity, and for improved U.S.-China as a threat to U.S. friends and allies relations. It is clear that past in the , especially to actions by China and the probabil- Israel. U.S.-Iran relations are char- ity of persistent sensitive transfers acterized by deep suspicions and to Iran in the future leave open the ; ••;;} :•; •;-

door for realistic and continuing What are the broader strategic, political, and Concerns. economic motivations that drive Chinese arms Serious attention should be tfa^eWh'irf rT7:!ffiw those factors chanqori ovc brought to bear on these concerns time in a way conducive to diminished Sino-lranian for several reasons. First, the Iran- arms trade in the future? ian development and possible deployment of weapons of mass , y:t: destruction is contrary to widely What has been the extent and nature of Chi held international norms as codi- nese arms trade with Iran? What actions have been fied in international agreements. taken by the United States in response? Has China Second, an increasing military taken meaningful steps to curtail its arms trade capability for Iran, based in part on with Iran? its cooperation with China, may increase regional tensions and Has the nature of this trade changed signifi- instability. cantly over time? In what ways has this trade Third, China's arms trade with changed to make it more or less problematic for Iran has presented very serious international and regional security concerns? obstacles to improved U.S.-China relations. Until China halts a broad What steps can be taken by the international range of troubling arms-related community multilaterally, and by the United States activities with Iran, the issue will continue to undermine the kind of in particular, to address their concerns about Chi- respectful, constructive, and stable nese arms trade with Iran? relations these two major powers This study reaches the conclusion that, should seek. while China has taken a number of positive To assess the current and likely steps in recent years to curtail its export of future scope and nature of the sensitive weapons and technologies to Iran, China-Iran arms trade, and how it more needs to be done to reduce exports to affects larger international, region- Iran (and elsewhere) and to ensure that China al, and bilateral security concerns, can meet the nonproliferation goals it has set several important questions should for itself. be addressed: 3 Pre-1979 Ties Gulf, and favorably viewed the The governments of the Republic Shah's efforts to become, with U.S. of China and Iran established assistance, the most powerful mili- diplomatic relations in 1922. At tary force in Southwest Asia. the time, Iran was the first country Sino-Iranian relations continued of West Asia to recognize the post- to be strong as late as 1978. In dynastic government in China. September 1978, Mao Zedong's However, with the founding of the hand-picked successor, Hua Beijing increasingly saw People's Republic of China (PRC) Guofeng, led a high-ranking dele- in 1949, diplomatic relations gation to Tehran, the last visit by a Iran as a bulwark against between the two countries were cut head of state to Tehran before the Soviet expansionist aims off. Relations soured further when collapse of the Shah's rule. Iran joined with the majority in toward the Persian Gulf. the United Nations in 1951 to Establishing Ties condemn the PRC as an "aggres- with the Islamic Republic sor" nation for its part in the Kore- Diplomatic ties between China an War. Iran joined the Baghdad and Iran took some time to devel- Pact in 1955, and Beijing saw this op following the establishment of as one more move in the U.S.-led the Islamic Republic in March policy of encirclement to contain 1979. China had just launched its the communist bloc. punitive war against Vietnam and With the collapse of the Sino- was concerned about expanding Soviet relationship in the 1960s, Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. however, and with the increasing The new Iranian leadership was U.S. presence on China's border in suspicious of countries such as Southeast Asia, China stepped up China that had had close ties to its diplomatic efforts to establish the Shah. However, owing to friendly relationships in the devel- China's abiding concerns about oping world. In early 1970, Iran Soviet influence in Southwest abstained from voting on the reso- Asia, China took steps to reestab- lution to admit the PRC to the lish good relations with Iran. United Nations—the first time it The importance the Chinese had not voted against admitting placed on this relationship was the PRC—and in August of that demonstrated in the wake of the year the two countries established November 1979 seizure of U.S. formal diplomatic relations. In sev- diplomatic hostages in Tehran. In ering official ties with the Republic January 1980—a time of warming of China on Taiwan, Iran recog- relations between the United nized the PRC as "the sole legal States and China—China Government of China." abstained in the United Nations Beijing increasingly saw Iran as Security Council vote to sanction a bulwark against Soviet expan- Iran for the hostage-taking. sionist aims toward the Persian With the onset of the Iran- in September 1980, China profit-taking. Iran's revolutionary became one of Iran's closest inter- policies and strong stand against national partners. For China, outside influence meshed well with improved Sino-Iranian relations— China's policies during the 1980s including arms sales—served a of maintaining independence from range of strategic, political, and the superpowers while building economic interests. While the Chinese regional influence. leadership in Iran had dramatically However, with the breathtaking changed, the strategic rationale for shifts of the international environ- For China, improved Sino- strong Sino-Iranian ties had not. ment in the early 1990s, much of Iranian relations—includ- Indeed, following the Soviet inva- the strategic rationale for strong sion of Afghanistan, China was Sino-Iranian ties changed. China's ing arms sales—served a even more concerned to strengthen arms trade with Iran diminished, range of strategic, politi- ties with Iran. but China continues to provide Throughout the 1980s, diplo- Iran with sensitive weapons and cal, and economic inter- matic exchanges between the two technologies. These exports ests. Indeed, following countries intensified. During the increasingly involve technology year prior to the Iran-Iraq cease- transfers, dual-use trade, and scien- the Soviet invasion of fire in 1988, China acted as a go- tific assistance that are difficult to between, hosting high-level dele- monitor. Such transactions may Afghanistan, China was gations from Iran and Iraq in an help Iran to develop a greater even more concerned to effort to resolve differences indigenous capacity to produce and between the two combatants. deploy advanced conventional and strengthen ties with Iran. The end of hostilities between mass destruction weapons. Iran and Iraq in 1988 did not slow the steady development of the Chinese Arms Transfers China-Iran relationship. Chinese to Iran arms exports to Iran continued, The Chinese arms trade with Iran and moved beyond basic conven- has since the early 1980s involved tional weaponry to include cooper- conventional, missile, nuclear, and ation in ballistic missiles, advanced chemical weapons. With the cruise missiles, and possibly exception of Pakistan and possibly nuclear, chemical, and biological , China's arms trade assistance. with Iran has been more quantita- tively and qualitatively comprehen- Diminishing Rationale? sive and sustained than that with Contrary to widely held views, it is any other country. This trade has clear that Beijing's interest over the included the provision of thou- 1980s and early 1990s in building sands of tanks, armored personnel closer ties with Iran—including vehicles, and artillery pieces, sever- the provision of weapons—had as al hundred surface-to-air, air-to- much or more to do with strategic air, cruise, and ballistic missiles as and political considerations as with well as thousands of antitank mis- siles, more than a hundred fighter grams and problems, attitudes aircraft, and dozens of small war- toward nonprolifcration regimes, ships. In addition, it is widely and strategic viewpoints about the believed that China has assisted Persian Gulf and U.S.-China rela- Iran in the development of its bal- tions. listic and production capability, and has provided Iran Antiship Cruise Missiles with technologies and assistance in China's exports of antiship cruise the development of its clandestine missiles to Iran has caused substan- China appears to have chemical and nuclear weapons pro- tial concern both in the United made significant contri- grams. States and among Iran's neighbors Perhaps most importantly, in the Persian Gulf. In spite of butions to Iran's indige- China appears to have made sig- these concerns, China continuously nous military production nificant contributions to Iran's conducted cruise missile trade with indigenous military production Iran from the mid-1980s through capability through the capability through the provision of the mid-1990s. Recently, China's provision of scientific scientific expertise, technical coop- reported sale of C-802 cruise mis- eration, technology transfers, pro- siles to Iran triggered a strong reac- expertise, technical coop- duction technologies, blueprints, tion in the United States, leading eration, technology and dual-use transfers. Such trans- Congress to call for sanctions fers are difficult to monitor and against China. In the lead-up to transfers, production assess, but will likely make up a far the October 1997 U.S.-China summit, China apparently agreed technologies, blueprints, greater proportion of China's mili- tarily relevant transfers to Iran in to halt sales of antiship cruise mis- and dual-use transfers. the future. siles to Iran. Such transfers are diffi- Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully verify the precise extent and HY-2 ("Silkworm") Missiles ± cult to monitor and nature of Chinese arms transfers to During the Iran-Iraq War, one of China's most controversial arms assess. Iran. Open-source literature— which forms the basis of this transfers involved the HY-2 anti- study—while often extensive, has ship missile, commonly referred to numerous drawbacks and requires in the United States as the Silk- exacting analysis and considera- worm. The first of several HY-2 tion. Most of the reporting on shipments was delivered in the Chinese sales to Iran appears as summer of 1986, and Iran success- part of U.S. or Western analyses. fully test-fired an HY-2 missile in Open-source mainland Chinese February 1987. The vulnerability materials on arms trade to Iran are of U.S. naval vessels to antiship virtually nonexistent, though it is cruise missiles became especially possible to access mainland Chi- clear when the U.S.S. Stark was nese open sources to gain insights attacked by an Iraqi-fired into Chinese weapon systems, mil- missile in May 1987. In October itary R&D and production pro- 1987, an American-owned tanker under the Liberian flag and a despite overwhelming U.S. intelli- Kuwaiti tanker under the U.S. flag, gence evidence. the Sea Isle City, were hit by Silk- On the other hand, there were worm missiles. some indications that Beijing took The United States reacted steps to curtail HY-2 sales to Iran strongly to reports of the HY-2 after 1987, or at least privately "» The Silkworm sale. There were condemnations of informed U.S. officials that it China in U.S. news media, and the would take such steps. In early The HY-2 has a number of varia- Reagan administration lodged a March 1988 the U.S. State tions, including coast-, ship-, and formal protest. China reacted by Department received a pledge from air-launched versions. The missile issuing a blanket denial, calling the China that it would not sell anti- uses liquid fuel, has an approxi- allegation "groundless." When the ship cruise missiles to Iran. As a mate range of ninety-five kilo- United States confronted China result, in March 1988 the Reagan meters, reaches speeds of up to with strong evidence that Iran pos- administration relaxed restrictions 475 miles per hour, and carries a sessed the HY-2 missile, Beijing on the export of U.S. high technol- conventional high-explosive pay- claimed that these weapons had ogy to China. load of approximately 513 kilo- been supplied by North Korea. It Despite Beijing's assurances, grams. The HY-2 is not generally was possible that a number of HY- China continued to sell Iran HY-2 considered a very sophisticated 2s were indeed imported from missiles in 1988 and 1989. Fur- weapons system, even by Chi- North Korea, which received the thermore, Iran claimed in early nese standards. Based originally HY-2 and related technology from 1988 that it had developed the on 1950s technologies, the HY-2 China in the 1970s and had capability to manufacture HY-2s was first static tested in 1966 indigenously produced the missile and other antiship cruise missiles and first flight tested in 1969; since the early 1980s. However, indigenously. more advanced versions, the HY- despite Chinese denials, U.S. intel- Moreover, reports in the early 2A and HY-2B, were tested in ligence sources gathered further 1990s indicated that China's assis- the mid-1970s and certified in evidence that a number of HY-2 tance to Iran's HY-2 program was the mid-1980s. The overall missiles in Iran had been sold continuing. However, instead of development cycle of the missile directly by China. direct transfers of complete was a lengthy twenty years. On 22 October 1987, the Rea- weapons, it appeared that China gan administration froze any fur- was assisting Iran in improving its ther liberalization of technology indigenous missile production sales to China. This was the first capabilities. Some sources suggest time the United States had acted that, with Chinese assistance, Iran against a third country for supply- could develop turbojet or ing weapons to Iran. variations on the HY-2 missile, It is unclear if U.S. pressure had which would give the weapon a the desired effect. On the one longer range and greater accuracy. hand, it did not extract from China Nonproliferation and arms control any kind of public admission that specialists generally view this kind the HY-2 sale had ever taken of assistance with even greater con- place. Indeed, China's position cern than the transfer of complete remained publicly unchanged, systems. The C-801 Recent estimates state that Iran nese-built C-801 air-launched fields approximately 100 HY-2 cruise missiles from an F-4 fighter. The C-801 (termed the YJ-8 in missiles on eight to ten mobile This marked the first time that China), approved for use and launchers on the north side of the Iran had successfully test-fired air- export by the Chinese in the late Straits of Hormuz. The degree of launched missiles, a significant 1980s, marked a significant threat posed by the Iranian HY-2s improvement in Iran's military advance over the HY-2s. The YJ-8 is a matter of debate. During the capability. series was developed to have Iran-Iraq War, the HY-2 was con- solid fuel, longer ranges, and mul- sidered by many in the region to be C-802 Missiles 4 tiple launching modes, as well as a serious threat to the vital oil After the 1991 Gulf War, Iran fly at very low altitudes employing commerce in the Persian Gulf. embarked on a naval moderniza- frequency-hopping radar to com* However, the HY-2 was not a tion program which included the bat electronic countermeasures. state-of- the-art system even in import from China of the The first in the series was the C- 1986. According to Stanley Weeks, advanced C-802 antiship cruise 801, which has a range of eight a senior scientist at Science Appli- missile. The C-802 at the time, to forty-two kilometers, has a cations International Corporation, and to the present day, is China's solid propellant motor, and can be "The Achilles' heel of that system top-of-the-line antiship cruise launched from aircraft, ships, is its size and slowness, so you can missile (though China continues shore batteries, and submarines. see it and have more time to react." development of more advanced However, great concern was trig- versions). By mid-1997, Iran 4 The C-802 gered by unconfirmed intelligence reportedly possessed approximately reports in early 1992 that Iran was sixty ship-launched C-802s. In The C-802 (Chinese name: YJ-8A) outfitting a variant of the HY-2 addition, Iran deployed a number marks some important advances cruise missile with a nuclear war- of coastal C-802 batteries on over the C-801. Like the C-801, it head. Qeshm Island, a strategic point on can be fired from air, land, subma- the eastern side of the Arabian rine, or surface ship and employs C-801 Missiles •x peninsula. sea-skimming radar. But the C- In addition to the HY-2, China Reports of the C-802 sale trig- 802 is slightly lighter than the C- also exported the C-801 antiship gered a strong political reaction in 801 and employs a turbojet cruise missile to Iran during the the United States. As early as engine for an extended range of Iran-Iraq War. According to one March 1996, U.S. Arms Control approximately 95 to 135 kilome- source, Iran may have imported as and Disarmament Agency ters. The PRC first tested the C- many as 100 C-801s and eight (ACDA) director John Holum 802 cruise missile in 1990. In launchers in 1987-88. Another stated that the administration was 1994, reports stated that China source, from 1994, states that Iran considering imposing sanctions on was working on a more powerful at the time possessed about 200 C- China for the sale, which was version of the C-802 with a maxi- 801 missiles. China may also have alleged to violate the 1992 Iran- mum range of up to 180 kilome- provided Iran with the means and Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act. ters. know-how to produce the C-801 This act, which is also known as indigenously, with the Iranian C- the Gore-McCain Act, is targeted 801 equivalent termed the Tondar. at countries that transfer destabi- According to U.S. defense officials, lizing weapons, in quantitative and in June 1997 Iran tested two Chi- qualitative terms, to either Iran or Iraq. The Clinton administration cooperation on cruise missiles— eventually decided against impos- technical assistance and training, ing sanctions, reportedly because it production technologies, subcom- concluded that the number and ponents—will continue. type of missiles transferred were 4 M-7, M-9, and M-11 Missiles not "destabilizing." Ballistic Missiles As was the case with the HY-2, Like China's cruise missile sales, The M-7 {Western designation: CSS- the more long-term concern, from China's ballistic missile transfers to 8) is a short-range (150 kilometer) a nonproliferation and arms con- Iran have caused significant con- surface-to-surface missile based on trol perspective, may be the contri- cern in the West, and particularly the Chinese HQ-2 surface-to-air bution China is making to Iran's in the United States. While the missile. The two-stage, solid-propel- ability to produce the C-802, or primary concern with cruise mis- lant missile can carry a single-war- similar missiles, indigenously. Iran siles has been their implications for head payioad of !90kilograms. The already produces a long-range Iran's ability to control oil traffic in M-7 missile is derivedfrom the so- coastal defense antiship cruise mis- the Persian Gulf, or possibly to called "8610" project in China sile, reportedly derived from the threaten U.S. naval vessels, the which converted the HQ-2 into a C-801, or perhaps also the C-802. concern over ballistic missiles is surface-to-surface missile, a pro- Moreover, in July 1996 Asian based on their possible use in gram that probably started around intelligence reports indicated that attacks on land-based targets, and 1985 and became operational in China was assisting Iran with two particularly their possible use as the early 1990s. new antiship cruise missiles, called delivery systems for weapons of the Karus, which are also believed mass destruction. Targets in the The M-9, which is based on the to be based on the C-801 and/or region could include U.S. bases or Chinese DP-15:(Western designa- C-802. The same sources also state staging areas, population centers, tion: CSS-6), is a single-stage solid- that Iran has begun indigenously and, perhaps over the long term, fuel missile with a 600-kilometer producing a medium-range anti- targets in Israel. range. Most funding for the M-9 ship missile, the FL-10, which is project apparently came from Syria, although Syria was never able to based on the Chinese FL-2 or FL- M-Series Medium-Range purchase the missile because U.S. 7 and was developed with Chinese Ballistic Missiles 4- technical assistance. pressure on China led to the cancel- The Chinese M-9 and M-ll bal- lation of the deal. The M-9's 600- Owing to these political and listic missiles were developed for kilometer range places it clearly nonproliferation concerns, and export and most (though not all) of within the-parameters of the MTCR. with the U.S.-China summit on China's controversial ballistic mis- the near horizon, U.S. and Chinese sile sales and technology transfer The M-11 is based on the Chinese negotiators apparently reached an agreements have involved one of DF-11 (Western designation: CSS- agreement on China's sales of these two missiles. However, avail- 7), and is a two-stage solid-fuel cruise missiles to Iran prior to the able evidence suggests that while missile with a 300-kilometer range. October 1997 meeting of Clinton China and Iran may have discussed and China's president Jiang the transfer of complete M-9 and Zemin. However, the scope and M-ll missiles, it is likely that precise nature of the agreement China at most provided technical remain uncertain. It appears likely assistance in the development of that some forms of Sino-Iranian such systems. In the case of anoth- er M-series missile—the M-7—it received at least twenty M-7 mis- appears somewhat more credible siles from China. A later IISS pub- that China made direct transfers of lication, The Military Balance complete missiles to Iran. 1996/97, estimates that Iran has China has provided An agreement to transfer com- 200 M-7s. However, it is not plete M-11 missiles from China to entirely clear whether Iran has expertise, technology, Iran may have been imminent in directly imported all of its M-7s, or late 1991 and again in late 1992, whether it has converted—possibly and production equip- but the deal was apparently can- with Chinese assistance—some of ment related to the M-9 celed, modified, or postponed, the estimated 130 HQ^ surface- probably due to U.S. pressure on to-air missiles it imported from and M-11 programs. As a China. In November 1991, shortly China in the mid-1980s. result, Iran has devel- after China pledged that it would Since the M-7 is clearly a short- abide by the guidelines of the Mis- range missile, it is not covered by oped and produced vari- sile Technology Control Regime the MTCR, and its transfer, even if ants of these systems (MTCR), Secretary of State James it had not been a secret, would not Baker stated that the PRC had have been a violation of China's indigenously. pledged to cancel proposed M-11 nonproliferation commitments. sales to both Pakistan and Iran, as The available evidence suggests well as M-9 sales to Syria. In that China has provided expertise, October 1993, Defense News technology, and production equip- reported that China and Iran had ment related to the M-9 and M-11 signed a USS5-billion M-11 deal programs. As a result, Iran has that covered the transfer of 600 developed and produced variants of M-11 missiles. But Defense News these systems indigenously. As in did not indicate that any of these the case of antiship cruise missiles, M-lls had been deliv- ered. Presumably, the Chinese, in accordance with their MTCR com- mitments (but not nec- essarily motivated by them), did not provide complete M-11 missile systems to Iran. Media reports about M-11 transfers to Iran may have confused this missile with the M-7. The International Insti- tute for Strategic Stud- ies'(IISS) 1994 report 10 stated that Iran had ! Chinese M-11 Missile the transfer of expertise and pro- in producing solid-fuel rockets at duction technology generally Iran's Semnan facility. China has attracts less attention than the allegedly provided other assistance, transfer of complete systems, but including guidance technologies may have greater long-term signifi- and precision machine tools for cance for the military balance in Iran's indigenous ballistic missile the region. programs. China's most significant contri- In addition to possible indirect bution to Iran in the area of missile Chinese help with Iran's Scud pro- expertise, training, and technology gram, a number of indigenous •The Scud-B and Scud-C has been its assistance in the con- shorter-range Iranian missile and struction of missile production artillery rocket programs have The Scud-B missile, based: on thirty- facilities. Iran's largest missile fac- probably benefited from some level year-old Soviet technology,: has a tory, located near Isfahan, was of Chinese assistance. Two such range of approximately 300 kilome- originally built in cooperation with programs are the Oghab and Iran- ters with a payload of 800 kilo- North Korea, possibly with Chi- 130 artillery rockets. Iran is report- grams. The extended-range Scud-C nese assistance. Although it is not ed to have developed indigenously is believed to have a range of entirely clear when China became an extended range version of the approximately 500 to 550 kilome- directly involved with the Isfahan Iran-130, the Mushak-160, which ters and a: payioad of 700 kilo- missile complex, reports of Chi- has a range of 160 kilometers, and grams. According to IISS, Iran has nese involvement surfaced in the is reportedly receiving Chinese approximately 210 $cttd-8s and late 1980s. Beginning in 1987-88, assistance in the development of a Scud-Cs in service. the Isfahan facility served as the 200-kilometer range, 500-kilogram assembly site for Iran's Scud-B payload version, the Mushak 200. missile kits, which were imported China and Iran are also reportedly from North Korea. developing a new short-range bal- listic missile, the NP-110. This Scud and Indigenous Missile solid-fuel ballistic missile will have Programs ^ a range of approximately 105 miles Besides significant assistance to and allegedly draws from Chinese Iranian production of Chinese- assistance with rocket motors and designed ballistic missiles, and pos- advanced test equipment. sibly some transfers of complete However, to date, the longest- systems or components, China has range missile known to be reportedly provided Iran with deployed by Iran is the Scud-C, technical assistance for indigenous with a range of between 500 and missile programs as well. In addi- 550 kilometers. According to a tion to production assistance at report published by the Stockholm Isfahan, sources report that China International Peace Research Insti- has also helped build a ballistic tute (SIPRI), Iran originally missile plant and test range east of wished to have long-range missiles Tehran, and may also be involved in order to deter preemptive strikes from Israel. At present, Iran's plans ian nuclear facilities are under safe- for long-range missiles have been guards of the International Atomic curtailed, according to the SIPRI Energy Agency (IAEA). To date, study. based on its full-scope safeguards The most recent controversies agreement with Iran, the IAEA concerning Chinese technology finds that Iran is in full compliance The IAEA finds that Iran transfers to Iran's indigenous bal- with its obligations as an NPT listic missile programs concerned member not to develop nuclear is in full compliance with the alleged transfers of numerous weapons. its obligations as an NPT missile-related technologies, However, the United States has including sensitive gyroscopes, strongly persisted with China, member not to develop other advanced guidance system steadily gaining ground to bring nuclear weapons. technology, solid fuel technology, Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation and computerized machine tools. to an end. Most importantly, as Reports suggest that the solid-fuel, part of the negotiations running up gyroscope, and guidance technolo- to the U.S.-China summit of gy will be used in Iran's Zelzal-3 October 1997, Washington sought missile, which is currently under and received written assurances development. The Zelzal-3 is a from China that it would halt all solid-fuel missile with 1000-1500- new nuclear assistance to Iran. kilometer range. This was one price China had to pay so that the U.S.-China Peace- ful Nuclear Cooperation Agree- Nuclear Trade and ment of 1985 would go forward. Cooperation Nonetheless, prior to this agree- China's nuclear trade with Iran has ment, China provided Iran with a been a complicated but serious irri- range of nuclear-related assistance, tant in U.S.-China relations. The including alleged cooperation in United States has strongly urged uranium mining, uranium enrich- China in the past to halt ongoing ment and conversion technologies, nuclear cooperation with Iran, research reactors, production facili- arguing that virtually any form of ty blueprints, and technical train- nuclear assistance would contribute ing and assistance. to the development of Iran's clan- destine nuclear weapons program. •Nuclear Research Projects China and Iran, for their parts, China's nuclear cooperation with have since 1992 argued that Chi- Iran probably began in the mid- nese transfers of nuclear assistance 1980s. In 1985, China and Iran are fully legal, consistent with the signed an agreement on reactors provisions of Article 4 of the and reactor sites that the Chinese Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty government did not officially (NPT), which allows for peaceful acknowledge. It is generally 12 nuclear cooperation, and that Iran- believed that most of China's nuclear-related assistance to Iran in cooperation in November 1991, this early period involved the Isfa- when the Chinese Foreign Min- han nuclear complex, located in istry admitted that Chinese and central Iran. The Isfahan facility Iranian companies had signed con- began operations in 1984, but was tracts for the Chinese sale of the not declared a nuclear facility until calutron and the miniresearch reac- after a 1992 inspection by the tor in 1989 and 1991, respectively. Prior to 1991, China IAEA. But the Chinese Foreign Ministry China allegedly began assisting insisted that these items could be labeled all reports of operations at Iran's Isfahan nuclear used only for peaceful purposes, nuclear cooperation with research center shortly after it such as medical diagnosis and began operation. In 1985, the PRC physics research, and that the facil- Iran as "groundless" and ities would be under IAEA safe- may have supplied two subcritical "preposterous." China "training reactors" to the site (a 27- guards. The Chinese side further kilowatt miniature neutron source argued that the proposed 20- finally dropped its blan- reactor and a heavy water zero megawatt research reactor was too ket denial of Sino-Iranian power reactor). In addition, some small to pose a proliferation threat. fifteen nuclear engineers from the The 1992 IAEA inspection nuclear cooperation in Isfahan center were trained in generally concurred with the November 1991. China between 1988 and 1992, China-Iran position on the Isfahan and in the late 1980s China is project. The IAEA found that the believed to have sold Iran a small calutron at Isfahan did not appear electromagnetic separator called a to be part of a nuclear weapons calutron (used in uranium enrich- program, and was too small to be ment) for use at the Isfahan facili- used for uranium enrichment. The ty. In 1991, it was reported that IAEA also did not consider the China and Iran had struck a deal proposed 20-megawatt research under which China would sell a reactor project large enough to research reactor (20-30 megawatts) produce significant amounts of to Iran, to be located at the Isfahan weapons-grade nuclear material. site. Both the calutron and the Many in the United States were research reactors present prolifera- skeptical, and feared that the pro- tion concerns since they could be posed research reactor could be used for a nuclear weapons pro- used to create fuel for nuclear gram, according to the U.S. weapons. U.S. experts believe that Department of Defense. the reactor would be able to pro- Prior to 1991, China labeled all duce up to six kilograms of pluto- reports of nuclear cooperation with nium per year. Although the IAEA Iran as "groundless" and "prepos- does not consider this amount sig- terous," stating that "China has nificant, it is enough to manufac- struck no nuclear deals with Iran." ture one nuclear bomb. Because China finally dropped its blanket the United States believes that Iran denial of Sino-Iranian nuclear is pursuing a clandestine nuclear 13 weapons program, even this small The 300-megawatt reactor sale amount of weapons-grade material was not a clandestine arrangement. was enough to get Washington to China and Iran both insisted, pressure China to cancel the 20- repeatedly and publicly, that the megawatt reactor deal. Although reactors would be used only for the reactor project was reportedly peaceful purposes and would be already under way in the fall of subject to IAEA safeguards. How- Administration officials 1992, China canceled the deal in ever, U. S. government and military October 1992, citing "technical advised China that the officials were concerned that the reasons." reactors in question could be used sale of 300-megawatt The termination of the 20- to support what the U.S. views as a megawatt reactor deal did not stop clandestine nuclear weapons pro- reactors to Iran would be Sino-Iranian cooperation on small- gram in Iran. Specifically, the "highly imprudent and scale nuclear research and technol- transfer of the reactor and associat- ogy projects. In February 1993 ed technology would include the should be avoided." China and Iran signed an agree- equipment to manufacture nuclear ment under which the PRC would fuel rods, which could be used to provide Tehran with an HT-6B generate fissile material for nuclear Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor, to warheads. be located at Azad University in Therefore, the United States Tehran. In 1994, Chinese technical objected strongly to the 1992 teams made two trips to Tehran to China-Iran nuclear cooperation install, test, and fine-tune the reac- agreement, and administration tor, and in February 1995 Iran officials publicly advised China informed China that the reactor that the sale of 300-megawatt had successfully produced a 20- reactors to Iran would be "highly millisecond electromagnetic dis- imprudent and should be avoided." charge. Washington's objections did not have the desired effect, however. Nuclear Power Reactors Iranian officials condemned the At the same time that Washington United States for issuing such a was pressing Beijing to scrap the statement, and Beijing publicly 20-megawatt research reactor deal, rejected the U.S. appeal. China and Iran were negotiating Some U.S. experts were less an even larger sale of two 300- concerned about the reactor sale, megawatt pressurized water reac- since they did not believe China tors. China and Iran signed a would be able to complete the nuclear energy cooperation agree- reactors by 2002, the scheduled ment during Iranian president Raf- start-up date. When China con- sanjani's visit to Beijing. This structed its Qinshan-1 reactor in agreement cleared the way for the the late 1980s, the PRC had to sale of the 300-megawatt reactors, obtain key reactor components, 14 as well as other nuclear technology. including cooling pumps, steam generator tubing, instrumentation by U.S. analysts to be a sign that and control systems, and pressure Iran intends to use the enriched vessels, from Germany, Japan, and uranium in its clandestine nuclear other foreign suppliers. These sup- weapons program. Iran could pur- pliers have declared that they will chase enriched uranium for its not sell similar nuclear technology civilian reactors on the internation- to Iran and, without foreign assis- al market for a fraction of the cost Iran's desire to construct tance, China's ability to complete of developing an indigenous urani- the plants on schedule, or perhaps um enrichment capability. its own plants was taken to complete them at all, is ques- In September 1995, China's by U.S. analysts to be a tionable. The PRC claims that it ambassador to Iran conceded that will be able to produce all of these China was selling uranium enrich- sign that Iran intends to components indigenously by the ment technology and other nuclear time of the reactor's proposed technology to Iran. In early 1996, use the enriched uranium start-up date, but many Western China informed the IAEA of the in its clandestine nuclear experts are still skeptical. proposed sale of a uranium conver- On 27 September 1995, Chi- sion facility to Iran, and stated that weapons program. nese foreign minister Qian Qichen it planned to go ahead with the told U.S. secretary of state Warren sale under appropriate IAEA safe- Christopher that China had uni- guards. Washington, however, con- laterally decided to cancel the sale tinued to press China to scrap the of the two 300-megawatt power sale entirely. The plant was report- reactors to Iran. The reasons for edly close to completion by early the cancellation are unclear. U.S. 1997, and was scheduled to pressure may have played a signifi- become operational in 2000. But cant role in China's decision. with the agreement reached between the United States and Uranium Conversion and China in October 1997 to halt Enrichment Facilities Chinese nuclear assistance to Iran, Another area of possible nuclear it would appear that the UF6 con- cooperation between China and version plant project will not be Iran has been in uranium conver- completed with Chinese help. sion and enrichment. As early as Nevertheless, reports indicate that June 1994, reports indicated that China did agree to provide Iran Chinese nuclear experts were with the blueprints necessary for assisting with the construction of them to continue construction of uranium enrichment plants at the UF6 conversion plant. Rudan and Shiraz, including a Chinese-constructed uranium hexaflouride (UF6) plant. Cutting Off Nuclear Trade Although enriched uranium has with Iran civilian applications, Iran's desire to A year to eighteen months prior to construct its own plants was taken the planned U.S.-China summit of 15 October 1997, it became clear to a full member in October 1997. U.S. negotiators that China would Third, the United States wanted need to take several steps if the China to strictly adhere to its May proposed certification of the 1985 1996 pledge not to provide nuclear U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear Cooperation Agreement were to facilities. According to the U.S. go forward. The presidential certi- Arms Control and Disarmament U.S. negotiators sought fication that China was not assist- Agency in summer 1997, "current ing other countries' nuclear information does not provide a written assurances from weapons programs would allow for basis for concluding that China has China that it would not U.S. companies to initiate civil acted inconsistently with that nuclear trade with China, a market statement." provide nuclear-related estimated to range between US$15 Finally, U.S. negotiators sought assistance to Iran. and 50 billion over the course of written assurances from China that the next two decades. In 1996 and it would not provide nuclear-relat- 1997, U.S. officials worked with ed assistance to Iran. This was a China to gain several critical major concession needed to allow agreements that would smooth a the 1985 U.S.-China Peaceful presidential certification of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 1985 nuclear accord and help to go forward. assure improved U.S.-China rela- During the U.S.-China summit tions overall. in October 1997—on the day of First, Washington wanted the actual formal meeting between China to establish public regula- the two presidents—"authoritative, tions on nuclear exports that were written communications" were comprehensive, nationwide, provided confidentially to the included dual-use items, and were United States by China stating "catch-all." In September 1997, that China would provide no new under U.S. pressure, these regula- nuclear assistance to Iran. Under tions were formally approved and the agreement, China would be publicly announced in China. allowed to complete two existing Second, the United States want- projects which are not of prolifera- ed to see China join the Zangger tion concern to the United States: Committee, a group of nuclear the construction of a zero power suppliers who work together to research reactor that uses natural harmonize nuclear export controls uranium and heavy water and a and abide by a specific list of zirconium cladding production fac- nuclear technologies and equip- tory. Following completion of these ment which should be subject to projects, which is expected in a rel- careful monitoring and controls. atively short period, China appar- China sat in as an observer to the ently is not to provide new, follow- May 1997 meeting of the Zangger on assistance to them. Specifically, 16 Committee, and formally joined as the two sides agreed that China would not provide the power reac- obligations not to assist countries tors and LJF6 conversion plant in the development of chemical which were under discussion. weapons. Iran, too, has signed and With these assurances, the ratified the CWC, and is under an Clinton administration went for- international obligation not to ward to certify the 1985 U.S.- develop chemical weapons. China China Peaceful Nuclear Coopera- is not a member of the Australia tion Agreement. U.S. officials Group, a multilateral body of states noted that future nuclear trade that aims to discourage and with China would be reviewed on impede chemical and biological a case-by-case basis, and that Chi- weapons (CBW) proliferation by nese actions inconsistent with its harmonizing national export con- nonproliferation commitments trols on CBW precursors. The would result in a suspension or ter- United States invited China to join mination of the nuclear coopera- the Australia Group in May 1997, tion agreement. but the offer was declined. Negotiations with the Chinese Chemical- and Biological- over the past several years, and Related Transfers leading up to the U.S.-China sum- mit of October 1997, have not had Chemical Weapons the same kind of success in relation Iran began its pursuit of an offen- to chemical proliferation as they sive chemical weapons capability in have apparently had with nuclear- the early 1980s, in response to related exports. China has an enor- mustard gas attacks on Iranian mous chemical industry but lacks troops by the Iraqis. Iraqi attacks adequate means to monitor and against Iran caused approximately enforce export controls on the 50,000 casualties. According to the industry. Moreover, the dual-use U.S. Department of Defense, Iran nature of many chemical-related was able to deliver chemical agents exports makes the task of policing against enemy troops by 1987, and chemical weapons-related transfers has now produced hundreds of difficult, even for countries with tons of blister, blood, and choking greater export control experience. agents. Chinese exports of potentially China's contribution to this pro- troublesome chemical agents and gram is difficult to trace precisely technologies are likely to continue, from open sources. As an original though it appears the Chinese gov- Presidents Clinton and Jiang at signatory to the Chemical ernment is determined to closely Washington summit in October Weapons Convention (CWC) in monitor and prevent such exports. 1997 January 1993, and having ratified Iran ratified the CWC in Octo- the treaty and joined its governing ber 1997 and was required to sub- body as a founding member in mit within thirty days of ratifica- 1997, China is under the strictest tion a declaration describing the 17 chemical weapons and production verification provisions such as facilities it may possess. That dec- those in the NPT or CWC. laration and the possibility of Concerns about Chinese biolog- intrusive challenge inspections ical weapons exports derive in part allowed under the convention may from the belief that China itself Since 1984 China has result in some embarrassing revela- has such a capability. According to been a member of the tions for the Chinese. That alone a U.S. intelligence official, China may compel the Chinese govern- recently sold Iran dual-use equip- Biological Weapons Con- ment to improve its controls on ment and vaccines with both civil- vention (BWC), a 1972 chemical weapons- related and ian medical applications and bio- dual-use chemical exports. logical weapons applications. This agreement in which sig- report points to some of the prob- lems inherent in tracking biological natories agree not to Biological Weapons Similar serious concerns have been transfers for weapons use: the dual- develop, produce, stock- raised with regard to Chinese ship- use nature of most biological research and production activities pile, or acquire biological ments of biological weapons-relat- ed transfers to Iran. As in the case mean that they can be relatively agents or toxins. How- of chemical weapons, Iran began to easily turned over to weapons use, seriously consider the biological making it often very difficult to ever, the BWC at present weapons option in the early 1980s, differentiate between legitimate does not contain enforce- during the war with Iraq. The CIA and military end-uses has reported that Iran holds stocks ment and verification of biological agents and weapons, Encouraging Progress provisions such as those and there are a number of cases in which Iranian entities linked to Chinese trade with Iran in missiles in the NPT or CWC. military agencies have sought to as well as nuclear, chemical, and procure equipment and commodi- biological systems and technologies ties with the potential for biologi- is and should be of continuing and cal weapons production. However, focused concern in the arms con- the open-source evidence provides trol and nonproliferation commu- only limited substantiation of an nity, as well as in the United Iranian biological weapons pro- States. At the same time, one gram. Chinese involvement in that should not lose sight of the very program, if any, is even more diffi- encouraging steps China has taken, cult to verify from open sources. particularly over the past three to Since 1984 China has been a five years, to stem the flow of sen- member of the Biological Weapons sitive weapons and technologies to Convention (BWC), a 1972 agree- Iran. ment in which signatories agree The key to assuring that such not to develop, produce, stockpile, developments continue will be to or acquire biological agents or tox- clearly identify the cause and ins. However, the BWC at present source of possible breaches of Chi- 18 does not contain enforcement and nese nonproliferation commit- ments, and to work with the Chi- work with the United States that nese as well as with the interna- has frozen Pyongyang's nuclear tional community to steadily tight- weapons program (1994); China en China's ability to comply with went along with the indefinite the nonproliferation goals it has set extension of the NPT (1995); for itself. In short, it is a question China halted the provision of a of closing the gap between Chi- 300-megawatt Qinshan civil nese policy and Chinese practice. nuclear power reactor to Iran Given the degree of concern with (1995); China unilaterally placed a Iran, this process should focus to a moratorium on its nuclear testing large degree on Chinese transfers and signed the Comprehensive to that country. As the foremost Test Ban Treaty (1996); China advocate of nonproliferation reportedly agreed to stop exporting norms, and with critical security antiship cruise missiles to Iran and interests at stake in the Persian agreed with the United States to Gulf region, the United States will stop all nuclear-related assistance need to take the lead as this to Iran. These steps are part of a process goes forward. broader post-cold war trend that finds China increasingly integrat- Acceptance of Nonproliferation ing itself in the international com- Norms munity and accepting a greater role At least two broad trends would as a major power. suggest that the Chinese arms trade relationship with Iran will Weakening of Strategic and become more and more difficult to Political Ties sustain over the long term. The The second broad trend that sug- first involves China's slow but gests the difficulty of sustaining steady acceptance of global arms the Chinese arms trade relation- U.S. military specialists test for control and nonproliferation norms ship with Iran relates to a dimin- the presence of deadly microbes. beginning in the early 1980s and ishing strategic and political ratio- accelerating over the course of the nale for Sino-Iranian ties. Several mid-1990s" factors illustrate this likely trend. For example, in the 1990s alone, First, China's relationship with the China joined the NPT (1992); and Russia—the dif- China agreed bilaterally with the ficulties with which were a crucial United States to abide by the para- factor in initiating Sino-Iranian meters of the MTCR (1992); ties in the first place—has dramati- China signed onto the CWC cally changed. This process began (1993), ratified the treaty (1997), with the historic visit of Mikhail and joined the CWC's governing Gorbachev to China in May 1989 body as a founding member which set the two countries on a (1997); China urged North Korea path toward normalized relations to negotiate the Agreed Frame- and the eventual establishment of a 19 "strategic partnership" for China niches where it has some proven and Russia. "Soviet hegemony," expertise and into systems other "socialist imperialism," "strategic countries are less willing to export, encirclement," and "the tsars' age- such as cruise missiles, ballistic old push to warm waters" seem missiles, and nuclear-related tech- things of the past as Moscow and nologies. But even in these areas, Beijing continue to strengthen China probably cannot compete their relationship. with potential exports from Russia. Iran has been able to This first point relates to a sec- Fourth, as China's economic turn increasingly to ond. The strategic partnership modernization races forward in the between China and Russia has 1990s, so too its dependence on alternative sources of strengthened China's international foreign sources of energy has radi- weaponry. Russia finds position in relation to the United cally increased. As such, China States and other Western powers may be increasingly concerned in Iran a willing cash such as Japan with which China about the stability of the oil-rich customer that prefers presently has the greatest mid- to Persian Gulf region. This is an long-range concerns. In the past, argument that has been broached more sophisticated countries such as Iran could help by U.S. officials in their nonprolif- China to assert its independence eration discussions with the Chi- Russian arms to Chi- and gain regional influence in nese. Perhaps China has listened to nese weapons. China's relationship with major this argument, even as it seeks to powers. But this is a role that Rus- diversify its overseas energy sia can play far better. Given U.S. sources. dominance internationally since the end of the cold war, it makes Continuing Concerns sense that China would turn to Nevertheless, in spite of these more powerful and influential play- encouraging developments, a num- ers to meet its strategic goals. ber of serious questions and con- Third, the new international cerns remain. environment has meant that Iran First, concerned observers must has been able to turn increasingly ask whether the observed progress to alternative sources of weaponry. could have been expected in the Russia, its defense industries reel- absence of leverage afforded by the ing from the country's economic U.S.-China summit and other and political collapse, finds in Iran incentives and disincentives. For a willing cash customer that prefers example, it would appear that the more sophisticated Russian arms possibility of lifting U.S. sanctions to Chinese weapons. With the end against China had a role in Bei- of Soviet hegemonic intentions jing's decision to bilaterally agree toward Southwest Asia, Iran can to the MTCR and possibly to join establish a closer relationship with the NPT. Sanctions imposed for Moscow. As a result, Chinese Chinese missile exports to Pakistan 20 exports have shifted into narrower were lifted only after China reiter- ated its pledge to abide by the circumvention of U.S.-China com- MTCR, and accepted the "inher- muniques on this issue. Such ent capability" concept related to actions by the United States can be missile exports. seen in China as a justification for In other words, a question arises its proliferation activities. whether China has taken these Unfortunately, with pledges and steps only because of U.S. threats loosely worded agreements, it is and incentives or because it has often the spirit rather than the let- recognized it is in national and ter that is violated. This suggests international interests do so. There that more needs to be done to Constructive nonprolifer- is no clear answer to this question establish a frank and explicit dia- ation activities on the as the record appears mixed. It logue among China, the United seems to be the case that construc- States, and the international com- part of China emerge tive nonproliferation activities on munity on nonproliferation. More- when there is a signifi- the part of China emerge when over, a greater effort is needed to there is a significant degree of U.S. foster broader acceptance of the cant degree of U.S. pres- pressure, and when this pressure is "spirit" or norm of international representative of clearly established nonproliferation concepts. sure. international nonproliferation Third, there remain a number of norms. concerns as to how well the Chi- Second, in the past, there have nese can establish, implement, and been a number of occasions when enforce the explicit nonprolifera- China and the United States dif- tion commitments they have fered over their respective interpre- undertaken. Some of the positive tations of nonproliferation assur- steps China has taken—such as ances. This problem leaves the promulgating nuclear, chemical, door open for other sales or tech- and conventional weapon export nology transfers that do not fit controls, joining the CWC, and explicitly within the pledges that joining the Zangger Committee— China has made. For example, the will require a more robust and Chinese pledge not to sell more effective export control system in antiship cruise missiles to Iran may China. Such a system not only leave loopholes for other forms of requires the "hardware" of customs assistance to the Iranian cruise monitoring and enforcement at missile program. China accepts the export points, but also the "soft- original 1987 MTCR guidelines, ware" of accepting nonproliferation but does not accept subsequent concepts and norms throughout revisions to the regime. The Unit- the government and industrial ed States, too, has been accused of communities. It appears that in the not living up to its nonproliferation area of nuclear exports, China has pledges—as when it continues to taken a number of critical steps to provide Taiwan with increasingly establish a stronger set of controls. sophisticated weaponry in apparent It is less apparent that China has 21 taken similar steps in the areas of nese exports are and will likely chemical, biological, and missile continue to be increasingly in the exports. Even in the case of nuclear realm of technology transfers, sci- exports, China should take addi- entific assistance, production tech- tional steps to implement controls nologies, subcomponents, and on dual-use items and to require dual-use transfers. These transfers full-scope safeguards on its nuclear will be far more difficult to moni- exports. tor than exports of complete plants The stagnating defense- These export control difficulties or weapon systems, even if China related industries have are exacerbated by the fact that the has every intention to strictly Chinese defense industrial base is guard against illicit exports. This is been officially encour- facing enormous socioeconomic not just a problem for China, but is a universal nonproliferation dilem- aged to find new and technoindustrial difficulties. Responsible for the employment ma that all industrialized avenues for commercial and social well-being of hundreds economies face. As legitimately of thousands of workers and their traded commercial technologies in profit. This is a recipe for dependents, but with diminishing many cases have military applica- potentially troubling military procurement orders at tions, one can only expect that as home and abroad, some indus- China's economy grows, so too will exports of sensitive sys- tries—such as aerospace, nuclear its exports of potentially sensitive tems and technologies. technology, and chemicals—will systems and technologies. naturally seek money-making opportunities wherever they arise. Moreover, the economic boom of Policy Recommendations the past fifteen years in China has To address these many potential led to an export- and profit-hungry difficulties, while at the same time mentality throughout the govern- building on the positive nonprolif- ment and industrial communities eration measures taken by China that is inclined to avoid regulations will not be an easy task. Sensitive that might curtail potentially lucra- exports from China to Iran will not tive trade opportunities and foreign end overnight, and will likely con- currency earnings. The stagnating tinue over the short to medium defense-related industries are not term. However, the United States, immune from this trend, and in acting unilaterally and in coopera- fact have been officially encouraged tion with its allies and with China, to find new avenues for commer- can take a number of steps to fos- cial profit. This is a recipe for ter further positive progress in potentially troubling exports of Chinese nonproliferation practices. sensitive systems and technologies. Careful consideration must be Fourth, a problem emerging on given to craft policies that slow the horizon concerns the changing Chinese proliferant activities to nature of Chinese weapons and countries such as Iran while 22 military- elated exports. Such Chi- encouraging positive Chinese non- proliferation policies and actions. and procedures into the Chinese Such policies could be catego- arms control and nonproliferation rized in four ways. First, China has community has probably also had a taken positive steps forward when useful impact on the development the United States successfully sup- of more positive nonproliferation ports and gains a clear internation- practices on the part of the Chi- al consensus on nonproliferation nese. However, this type of com- issues and presents it as such to munication and dialogue should counterparts in China. The Chi- not be conducted for dialogue's Promising Chinese non- nese government has demonstrated sake alone. Rather, such communi- proliferating policies and its sensitivity to international con- cation and exchange should be cerns. When confronted with such effectively implemented to strongly activities seem to result an international consensus, Chi- and clearly convey both incentives when the threat or use of nese policy makers usually wish to and disincentives for certain be seen as taking part and support- desired Chinese policies. penalties is combined ing its goals. U.S. and international On a related point, programs of with positive incentives. policy should not overlook this research and training at the unoffi- important lever to gain Chinese cial level, as well as offers of assis- acceptance and adherence to non- tance and expertise at the official proliferation norms and proce- level, have supported the establish- dures. ment and growth of a nascent offi- Second, promising Chinese cial and unofficial nonproliferation nonproliferation policies and activ- community and culture in China. ities seem to result when the threat This process should be encouraged or use of penalties is combined by activities fostered by the United with positive incentives. Such States and other international incentives include the possibilities actors. of bilateral cooperation—such as Fourth, positive Chinese behav- with the U.S. nuclear and aero- ior has resulted when the United space industries—and opening the States has taken China policy more door to Chinese participation in seriously and devoted greater the development of multilateral resources to understanding the arms control policies. As noted complexities of U.S.-China rela- above, the United States should tions and China's emergent influ- work to gain the greatest degree of ence in the international commu- support possible from key allies nity. Yet far more needs to be done and other international actors in in this regard. A dedicated and the crafting of positive and nega- sustained effort is required within tive incentives to influence Chinese the U.S. government and within nonproliferation activities. the international community at Third, the slow but steady large to generate a greater under- process over the past decade of standing and effective set of poli- introducing international norms cies consistent with the increasing- 23 ly intricate and multifaceted rela- tionship they have with China. Ensuring Chinese adherence and Briefly, specific policies and public accountability to bilateral actions in these four areas are pledges and statements made to the noted below. United States. These would include its pledges regarding the Missile Technol- ogy Control Regime, its agreement to Solidifying Chinese adherence to support the achievement of a Fissile and compliance with the international Materials Cut-off Treaty, its suspension arms control and nonproliferation of plans to provide nuclear assistance regimes it has already joined. China to Iran, and its May 1996 pledge not should be held publicly and interna- to provide assistance to unsafeguard- tionally accountable to the commit- ed nuclear facilities. ments it has made to such agreements as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Ensuring and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention, and establishment of an effective export the Biological Weapons Convention. control system in China covering trans- fers of nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, conventional, and dual-use Gaining Chinese membership and exports. This must include the Chinese adherence to certain multilateral acceptance of increased accountability export control regimes. This would of China's central leadership for the include Chinese membership in the export activity of Chinese entities and Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Aus- individuals. In addition, when appropri- tralia Group. As in the case of the ate, this activity could include possible Zangger Committee, this process could U.S. and other international expertise start with offering China observer sta- to assist in the establishment of a tus before full membership. Considera- more effective export control system. tion should be given to involving the Chinese more directly in such multilat- eral export control groups as the Mis- Making clear public cases regard- sile Technology Control Regime and ing Chinese violations of its commit- the Wassenaar Arrangement. ments or activities in serious contra- vention of U.S. security interests. Such cases, when appropriate and consis- Encouraging China's requirement tent with U.S. law and regulations, of IAEA full-scope safeguards on the should include the imposition of penal- recipient country as a prerequisite for ties against the government, entities, its nuclear exports. or individuals in China for such viola- 24 tions or activities. Gaining internation- fication and reports associated with a al support for these actions is highly decision to go forward with the 1985 desirable, if possible. U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear Coopera- tion Agreement. Legislating requirements to gain greater Chinese adherence to interna- Promoting the understanding of tional nonproliferation norms and international nonproliferation norms in behavior. This might include mandatory China through continued intensive U.S. congressional reviews of decisions multilateral and bilateral dialogue and and activities between the United exchange at senior levels, as well as at States and China related to issues of unofficial, track II levels. This would proliferation concern. Examples of such include informing Chinese policy mak- requirements include the revised lan- ers about U.S. legislation and interna- guage for Section 2(b)(4) of the tional agreements, about what behav- Export-Import Bank Act which more ior will trigger sanctions and why, and strictly defines entities responsible for offering assistance to China regarding proliferation activities. Future legisla- the complexities and commitments tion could mandate the temporary sus- related to export controls, licensing, pension of certain trade or economic and control lists. cooperation activities (such as Export- Import Bank loans) pending a period Encouraging the development of to allow for a review by the adminis- the Chinese nonproliferation communi- tration and Congress of alleged Chi- ty. In this regard, it is especially impor- nese proliferation activities. tant to monitor the development of, and work closely with, the newly Continuing congressional oversight established Department of Arms Con- and consultation with the administra- trol and Disarmament within the Chi- tion to ensure the sense and concerns nese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. of Congress are integrated into U.S. nonproliferation policy toward China. Conducting sustained, frank, and Examples of this include: the require- regularized dialogue with China, at ment in Section 1306 of the FY 1997 official and unofficial levels, to discuss Defense Authorization Act for the the economic, political, and military administration to report to Congress costs of proliferation, and the relation- on China's nuclear- and missile-related ship between nonproliferation and transfers to Pakistan; the requirement security at the regional and interna- that Congress be given thirty days of tional level. This is especially important continuous session to review the certi- with regard to Chinese exports to Iran. 25 ation activities with Chinese authori- Increasing consultative dialogue ties. with our allies and other countries •*mmm which have high nonproliferation stan- Crafting and adopting a National dards to also engage and exert influ- Nonproliferation Education Act —per- ence on China with regard to nonpro- haps modeled after the National liferation, and to limit activities of pro- Defense Education Act—which would liferation concern in their relations meet U.S. and international nonprolif- with China. Of particular concern in eration goals by utilizing education as this regard are the military-technical a nonproliferation tool. This process collaborations between China and would apply in the United States and Russia and China and Israel. by fostering the development of non- proliferation cultures, norms, and polit- Improving U.S. intelligence and ical constituencies abroad, such as in analytical capabilities with regard to China, Russia, the former Soviet China and nonproliferation. This would republics, in the Middle East, and else- include improved capability to assess where. the Chinese arms control and nonpro- liferation decision-making process, It is not possible to implement all of detect violations, monitor and under- these policies at once. But such stand the effectiveness of the Chinese actions, developed steadily over time, export control system, enhance inter- will have the best success in stemming diction efforts, persuade China of pro- the flow of sensitive technologies from liferation dangers, and for use in intel- China to countries such as Iran, and ligence-sharing with allies. When help meet the nonproliferation goals of appropriate, greater efforts should be the United States, China, and the inter- made to share intelligence on prolifer- national community.

26 Postscript

Hostile to the United States, Israel, moderate Arab states, and forces of modernity and human rights throughout the Middle East, Iran's potential to threaten and influence its region has been magnified by its steady buildup of sophisticated arms. Among Iran's principal suppliers has been- and continues to be China.

The American Jewish Committee's Asia and Pacific Rim Institute first examined China's role in the Iranian weapons program in a June 1997 brief, Chinese Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Implications for the United States, Israel, and the Middle East. Outside of security and academic circles, China's involvement was little understood or appreci- ated. For this reason, APRI asked one of America's premier scholars in the field of China's defense industries and security policy, Dr. Bates Gill, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, to prepare a comprehensive review of China's cooperation with Iran. The result is Silkworms and Summitry: Chinese Arms Exports to Iran and U.S.-China Relations.

The American Jewish Committee, as part of its ongoing effort to spotlight threats to Israel's security, regional stability, and American strategic inter- ests, will continue to address policy issues of concern to the Jewish com- munity. Given the gravity of the threat, it was particularly appropriate that the Asia and Pacific Rim Institute's first commissioned study address the issue of the Iranian weapons acquisition program and China's pivotal role in it. Barry Jacobs Assistant Director The Asia and Pacific Rim Institute of the American Jewish Committee "it is one of the finest pieces of analysis that I have seen either classified or unclassified. Bates Gill has done a great service by providing so much comprehensive detail and analysis." Rep. Howard L. Berman (D.-Calif.)

" The American Jewish Committee has launched an effort to raise the world's consciousness about Iran's ominous nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions, which are inher- ently threatening to Israel and destabilizing to the region." Tom Plate, Los Angeles Times

The American Jewish Committee The Jacob Blaustein Building 165 East 56 Street New York, NY 10022-2746

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