ISSUE BRIEF 04.18.14 Vigilantism in Mexico: A New Phase in Mexico’s Security Crisis Gary J. Hale, Nonresident Fellow in Drug Policy

INTRODUCTION THE RISE OF SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

The violent struggle between rival Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto took office drug cartels and other criminal groups has in December 2012. He quickly announced left tens of thousands dead and towns plans to reduce drug-related crime and across Mexico paralyzed with fear. With general violence,2 but aside from the 2014 overwhelmed police forces relatively arrest of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán and powerless to control drug-related murders other kingpins, meaningful reductions of and kidnappings, a growing number of crime and violence remain elusive. National vigilante organizations, or self-defense polls show that perceptions of insecurity groups, aim to restore order—but now are higher today than they were in 2013.3 even they are fighting, and killing, among The administration’s failure to improve themselves. citizen safety has led to the rise of vigilante groups determined to defend their families The rise of these vigilantes is yet another and towns. test for the Mexican government. Will people continue to take security matters into their In the Western Mexico state of Michoacán, own hands? How long will they operate as for example, the drug-trafficking Sinaloa independent security units? Cartel has fought a protracted battle against the local criminal cartel known as In Michoacán, In Michoacán, what started as a cooperative the Knights Templar to retain control of what started as a agreement between self-defense groups Michoacán’s lucrative maritime ports. Weary and the federal government has become a of the violence, residents took up arms to cooperative agreement tug-of-war over which group will ultimately form self-defense groups focused on the between self-defense provide security in Western Mexico. In one removal of the Knights Templar—which had groups and the federal incident, police in March 2014 found two also been extorting protection payments, government has charred bodies—believed to be members kidnapping for ransom, or taking over the become a tug-of-war of a self-defense group—in the back of a property of local residents. pickup truck. Days later, Mexican federal over which group will police arrested Hipólito Mora, leader of The self-defense groups in Michoacán ultimately provide a prominent, rival self-defense group.1 and elsewhere in Mexico have performed security in Western Internecine fighting among the vigilante most of the public safety functions usually Mexico. groups only means trouble for their future— associated with the police, including the and the government that deputized them as establishment of checkpoints, arrests, the armed, rural defense forces. staging of perfunctory “trials,” the use of RICE UNIVERSITY'S BAKER INSTITUTE // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.18.14

corporal punishment, and, in some cases, the need to “defend” national resources or enforcing the penalty of forced labor by the assets of the people. criminal suspects held in makeshift jails.

COMPLICATED SCENARIOS LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE SELF- DEFENSE GROUPS Although it is possible to outline three distinct types of self-defense groups, Interviews with public safety officials4 in informal structures and overlapping Guerrero State and Mexico City and public interests leave room for cooperation media reports reveal the existence of among all three. Such alliances could be three types of self-defense-styled groups motivated by a common desire to challenge in Mexico. The first appears to consist of the government. Alternatively, any two State governments are legitimate, grassroots self-defense groups. groups could clash and create a more paralyzed by a body The other two types operate under the guise complicated scenario. This is even more politic that dictates of grassroots self-defense groups to conceal plausible because there is some evidence other, less civic-minded motives. that factions of the 20,000-person strong adherence to the legitimate self-defense groups have national mantra that all Independent, grassroots self-defense groups been infiltrated by the group they want is well—that the country are primarily composed of frustrated citizens to eradicate, the Knights Templar. This is not on fire while the who have taken up arms to protect their theory is further reinforced by the fact that Michoacán landowners have complained house is burning. villages, crops, and personal and community assets from criminal organizations. that self-defense groups have expropriated These groups focus on the prevention lands and orchards originally taken from and punishment of local crimes such as them by the Knights Templar. extortion, kidnapping, theft, and rape. Their formation may have had the unintended positive consequence of forcing Mexico’s THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE leaders to act. The Peña Nieto administration has allowed Criminal and drug-trafficking organizations some self-defense groups to operate within operating as self-defense groups are well- a loose government charter. Some groups in armed, outfitted with automatic weapons, Michoacán have been deputized, operating long rifles, body armor, and other defensive either independently or alongside government equipment. Criminal organizations are the forces. This recognition does not exempt the only logical source of such sophisticated government from responsibility for abuses or weaponry. In some towns, locals have violations of law committed by the vigilantes, denounced these groups as illegitimate self- either as independent citizens under the defense forces.5 loose supervision of government forces or as criminals operating under the false flag Insurgent organizations like the “Fuerzas of a self-defense group. Thus, the federal Armadas Revolucionarias-Liberación del government has tried to step in and perform Pueblo” (FAR-LP) effectively operate as self- its public safety functions; however, it may defense groups. For example, the FAR-LP— not fully understand the complex web of local unhappy with structural reforms in Mexico— relationships, alliances, and potential conflicts. announced its intention to attack PEMEX facilities if energy reforms went through.6 It is Over time, self-defense groups may establish not known, but is reasonable to expect, that themselves as permanent citizen-soldier the FAR-LP will become a self-defense group, forces, operating independently of the but with a markedly different purpose—a federal government. Already some groups deduction based on FAR-LP manifestos that in Michoacán are resisting government 7 allege oppression and exploitation of the authority, refusing to disband. If this were to masses through government corruption and occur on a larger scale, dissolution would be 2 VIGILANTISM IN MEXICO: A NEW PHASE IN MEXICO’S SECURITY CRISIS

more difficult as self-defense groups become self-policing may emerge in Mexico. In the part of the fabric of rural society. interim, self-defense groups are writing the newest chapter of Mexico’s security For the federal government, the best case strategy—a self-help playbook dictated by scenario is that self-defense groups lose the masses and imposed on a perplexed and momentum, especially if federal police and ineffective government. military forces grow in number and establish Self-defense groups a more permanent presence in violence- Conversely, the perpetuation of self- are writing the newest prone areas. The eventual rise of a planned defense groups without command, control, chapter of Mexico’s federal paramilitary gendarmería may and coordination could create a lawless security strategy— someday supplant army and navy troops in society in certain regions of Mexico. The the field—and, theoretically, self-defense continued operation of self-defense groups a self-help playbook groups—but the evolution of this new force without formal training and government dictated by the appears to have stalled and may not be as supervision may also spur human rights masses and imposed forthcoming as initially advertised.8 violations and implicate the federal on a perplexed and government in such crimes. ineffective government. DOMESTIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS The failure of the government in Michoacán9 points to a disturbing trend: A pointed example of the symbiosis between the inability of states and even the federal the United States and Mexico is the port government to perform its functions, of Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, which particularly the provision of public the Mexican Navy wrested away from safety. There are several reasons for this. criminal gangs in November 2013.11 The port Corruption and intimidation have led to is an essential component of the China- the calcification of public safety efforts. North America supply chain. Interruptions Police forces are overwhelmed by crime could create a domino effect on business and relatively powerless to control, much operations stretching from North America to less reduce, criminality. State governments the region’s broader trade networks. The United States are paralyzed by a body politic that dictates must consider a adherence to the national mantra that all is In the other direction, iron ore, zinc, and well—that the country is not on fire while other minerals are exported from Mexico regional security the house is burning. Additionally, Mexico to China and elsewhere in Asia via the port strategy that includes lacks the necessary coordination between of Lázaro Cárdenas. Crime is therefore both helping Mexico secure federal, state, and local governments for a an internal and external threat; it affects its critical ports and 10 coherent security strategy. multinational corporations that contribute supply chains against to Mexico’s economic success. In addition The state-federal failure is highlighted by to obstructing trade, events in Michoacán disruption by criminal the frequent use of the military to perform could have a negative effect on intermodal elements. police functions normally conducted by business jobs in Mexico. Conversely, municipal and state police departments— when public safety is assured and trade as well as the inability of the federal is fluid, jobs increase in Mexico, fewer government to recruit, train, equip, and field undocumented migrants seek employment the hybrid paramilitary gendarmería in the in the United States, and less stress is placed strength of numbers required to replace on social services and border infrastructure military forces and remove them from in both countries. domestic policing roles.

If self-defense groups operate with well- CONCLUSION established goals and objectives and are successfully incorporated into a thoughtful Insecurity in Mexico affects prosperity in public safety bureaucracy, a new form of North America. The three signatories of 3 RICE UNIVERSITY'S BAKER INSTITUTE // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.18.14

the North American Free Trade Agreement 4. The officials are a former federal police (NAFTA) must work together on areas of officer working for the state of Guerrero and common interest to ensure free and secure a current state public safety official in Mexico regional trade. Events in Michoacán and City, both of whom requested anonymity to the response of Mexico’s leaders to self- safeguard their employment. defense groups can arguably become a 5. “Self-defence leader arrested for national security issue for the United States murder,” El Universal; “Opponent of Mexico’s and an economic issue for the NAFTA region. Cartels Is Detained in Vigilantes’ Deaths,” New The United States must consider a regional York Times, March 13, 2014, http://www. security strategy that includes helping Mexico nytimes.com/2014/03/13/world/americas/ secure its critical ports and supply chains opponent-of-mexicos-cartels-is-detained- against disruption by criminal elements. in-vigilantes-deaths.html?_r=0. 6. “Empresas Que Exploten PEMEX Serán The United States may also consider linking Objetivo Militar: FAR-LP,” Origen, December immigration reform with the development 31, 2013, http://origenoticias.com/?p=14017. of substantive, well-defined public safety 7. “Vigilantes say Mexico government reforms by the Mexican government in key persecuting them,” Associated Press, March logistical areas like Michoacán, Guerrero, and 17, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/vigilantes- Mexico’s northern border states. mexico-government-persecuting- them-012449967.html. Self-defense groups have emerged as 8. Gary J. Hale, “Paramilitary power in the purported remedy to insecurity in Mexico: A strategy shift in Mexico’s drug Michoacán and other states, highlighting war,” Baker Institute Blog, July 25, 2012, the failure of the Mexican government to http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2012/07/ maintain good and lasting public order, as violence-in-mexico-is-a-paramilitary- well as strengthen public safety and justice force-the-answer/. institutions. On any given day, it is difficult 9. “Michoacán: Mexico’s failed state?” to determine whether criminals or the BBC News, January 17, 2104, http://www.bbc. government has the upper hand. Members com/news/world-latin-america-25774430. See more issue briefs at: of citizen groups fending for themselves 10. Pena Nieto, “Primer Informe de www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs should be of serious concern to those Gobierno,” Section 1.1, “Promover y fortalecer This publication was written by a responsible for the future of trade policy and la gobernabilidad democratica [Promote and researcher (or researchers) who economic integration in North America. strengthen democratic governability].” participated in a Baker Institute project. 11. “Michoacán: Mexico's failed state?” Wherever feasible, this research is BBC News; “The Port of Lazaro Cardenas,” reviewed by outside experts before Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ it is released. However, the views ENDNOTES expressed herein are those of the Port_of_L%C3%A1zaro_C%C3%A1rdenas. individual author(s), and do not 1. “Self-defence leader arrested for necessarily represent the views of murder,” El Universal, March 11, 2014, http:// Rice University’s Baker Institute. www.eluniversal.com.mx/in-english/2014/ AUTHOR michoacan-autodefensas-revolt-mora- © 2014 Rice University’s Baker Institute arrest-84615.html. Gary J. Hale is the nonresident fellow

This material may be quoted or 2. Enrique Peña Nieto “Primer Informe in drug policy at the Baker Institute. reproduced without prior permission, de Gobierno [First State of the Union He was formerly chief of intelligence in provided appropriate credit is given to Address],” September 2, 2013, http://www. the Houston Field Division of the Drug the author and Rice University’s Baker presidencia.gob.mx/informe/. Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Institute. 3. Instituto Nacional de Estadística DEA intelligence chief at the U.S. Embassy y Geografía (INEGI), “Encuesta Nacional in Mexico City. Cite as: Hale, Gary. 2014. Vigilantism in Mexico: de Seguridad Publica Urbana,” April 8, A New Phase in Mexico’s Security Crisis. 2014, http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/ Issue Brief no. 04.18.14. Rice University's contenidos/espanol/prensa/comunicados/ Baker Institute, Houston, Texas. percepcionsp.pdf.

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