preliminary draft
The Roman Catholic Church and evolution theory: Intelligent design does not contradict Neodarwinian logic
Martin Potschka [email protected]
Neodarwinism has been challenged along two lines. One, by Creationists who take a literal reading of the Bible; such a-historical interpretations of the scriptures are not endorsed by the Roman Catholic Church and most other denominations. The second line focuses on intelligent design, claiming that there is evidence for irreducible complexity that only by executing a preexisting intelligent blueprint could have been provided. [Paley 1802; Johnson 1991, 2000; Behe 1996; Behe et al. 1999; Dembski 1998b, 1999, 2004; Berlinski 1996, 2001; Wells 2000; Campbell & Meyer 2003; Denton 1985, 1998; Colson & Pearcey 2001, DeWolf et al. 1999; Davis & Kenyon 1989]1 (For critical commentaries see [Pennock 1999, 2001; Eldredge 2000; Miller 1999; Forrest & Gross 2004; Ayala 2006].) People convinced of intelligent design are in a certain way creationists – they believe that God creates –, but they need not share the literal reading of the scriptures about how He has created it. The intelligent design hypothesis argues scientifically, but their case suffers from a lack of convincing evidence. This paper, however, focuses on a different problem: Proponents of intelligent design usually overlook the fact that the blueprint needs to be designed itself, i.e. has its own evolution. My paper is divided into 4 parts: 1. Science and Religion 2. Neodarwinism 3. Chance or choice 4. Evolution of intelligence The first part includes some arguments in support of religious concerns, the other parts rather present arguments in support of Neodarwinian science. That it is possible to have it both ways demonstrates, that the history of ideas on the subject is not yet completely written. It also demonstrates that we need to develop a theory of science that accommodates both of my arguments.
Science and Religion The first part of my paper deals specifically with the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards evolution theory. I am choosing the Roman Catholic Church as a counterpoint to science, because it maintains a doctrinal dogmatic corpus that can be easily referred to whereas with other Christian denominations there remains the ambiguity of different authors’ opinions. Besides the Roman Catholic Church there are a number of church councils that have issued statements, actually in favor of Darwinism, effectively claiming that evolution poses no threat to supernatural belief [Appleman 1970: 525-533, 613-623], but with little detailed reflection. The Roman Catholic Church never endorsed fundamentalist creationism but
1 Most of the mentioned authors are associated with Seattle’s Discovery Institute, a neoconservative Christian think tank. [Crews 2001] Besides its main trust on promoting intelligent design the institute also lobbies for taxt reduction and other neoconservative policies. The institute maintains contacts with the International Theological Institute in Gaming, Austria, and helped Cardinal Schönborn publish his article in the New York Times [Fleck 2005; Dean & Goodstein2005]. US President George W. Bush, Jr. supports Intelligent Design [Baker & Slevin 2005]. The US Republican Party is the only major political party in the western world that uses opposition to evolution as a part of its political platform [Miller 2006]. 1 always had a difficult relation with Darwinism [Spaemann et al. 1985; Beinert 2000b; Blank 2006; Kögerler 2006]. Some skeptics argue that they are not against evolution theory as a field of biology but against evolutionism as an ideology derived form it and against its misplaced application to social sciences. I shall present several epistemological arguments for differences between science and religion, and trace the historical conflict of the catholic faith with evolution theory which derives from disputes with Copernicus and Galileo. I shall discuss that all knowledge is based on hypotheses, and that church doctrine and science differ because they use different paradigms. I will provide three examples: the role of causa finalis; the fundamental interaction of mind and matter, specifically expressed in the notion of creatio continua; and a flawed usage of terms like “heaven”, “gravitation”, “purpose” and “chance” (due to illegitimate crossing of different hypotheses / discourses). Further differences will be discussed in the next section after summarizing Neodarwinism. Most fields of science differ from religion because they serve different subject matters and have different missions (but the mission of religion can be made into a Wissenschaft). They pursue different hypotheses and paradigms, but I assume that all share a common epistemology. There are a number of books that deal with the issue of science and religion and inevitably evolution plays some role in them [Pollack 2000; Haught 2001; Ruse 2000, 2005; Miller 1999; Gould 1999; Barbour 1997, 2000; Rolston 1986] Most of them view the church as responsible for human values and consider science to have different functions (thesis of the two magisteria). But let me start my own analysis.
About a year ago, on July 7th 2005, Cardinal Schönborn of the Roman Catholic Church supported the intelligent design hypothesis in an article written for the New York Times: “Evolution in the sense of common ancestry might be true, but evolution in the neo- Darwinian sense - an unguided, unplanned process of random variation and natural selection - is not. Any system of thought that denies or seeks to explain away the overwhelming evidence for design in biology is ideology, not science.” [Schönborn 2005] (cf. footnote 1). Schönborn here does not say that Darwin is or is not compatible with the Christian faith, but boldly that Neodarwinism in biology is wrong.This article is of great epistemological significance, because it insists, correctly I believe, that evolution theory like any scientific theory always remains a hypothesis. It would be wrong however to claim that evolution theory is less certain or of lower status than other physical theories like Newtonian mechanics, relativity theory or quantum mechanics.
In modern usage the term hypothesis refers to a speculation that is not yet sufficiently supported by factual evidence and differs in this regard from a theory, which is. When I say that all theory remains a hypothesis I use the term differently according to Scholastic roots with the following rather specific significance [Grant 1962ab; Nelson 1962]: In Galileo’s days a hypothesis was a mathematical contrivance for the purpose of calculation or prediction of planetary positions. Cardinal Bellarmine had already attempted to explain to Galileo, that nothing spoke against his constructions within the realms perception, but that they did not describe the world the way God had created it. Galileo’s view was naiv, believing that he had discovered how things are, church leaders told him – translated into modern idiom – that all he had done was constructing a model that was not the blueprint itself, and Galileo eventually admitted that he could not prove the (heliocentric) theory to be fact, while continuing to believe that such was possible in principle. At the time of Newton hypothesis had become to mean some kind of causal mechanism that explained the motion. People started to believe that hypotheses provided true mechanisms, and such opinions still exist today. Only those that promote constructivist epistemology follow the original deeper concerns of the church.
2 Following the church meant talking not positively but “ex suppositione” [Bellarmin in Gingrich 1982: 123] For Bellarmin, an hypothesis is hypothetical and always remains a contradiction to truth; it is wrong by nature because it does not refer to the whole, but it is useful. It is about conclusions derived from certain limited assumptions irrespective of whether the assumptions are true. And while the conclusions may match up with empirical evidence the latter does not prove that other assumptions might not serve the same purpose. More than one set of assumptions may lead to correct conclusions. Pietschmann [2006a] discusses this issue in detail giving supporting quotes from an opinion by Cardinal Bonifacio Caetani from 16162 [Gingrich 1982: 124] and from a letter by Cardinal Roberto Bellarmin to Paolo Antonio Foscarini, also from 16163 [Gingrich 1982: 123; Drake 1957: 162-164]. Finocchiaro [2005] distinguishes the probabilistic nature of an hypothesis (that there is only a probability for truth) from the instrumental notion of Bellarmin (that it is an instrument for convenient mathematical calculation, not a description of physical reality), but he does not engage himself with the modern framework of constructivist epistemology. Pope Urbans VIII’s confrontation with Galileo in 1633 was not the problem of planetary motions but the much deeper questions of the nature of truth and reality [Rowland 2001: 240]. Thus, the historical background to the term hypothesis is the attempt of the Church to distinguish human hypothesis from the “truth” of revelation. But can truth ever be found? Not according to the hypothetico-deductive principle described below. In the 17th century the Church of course believed in the existence of truth, but methods of theology have changed. Most Churches today subscribe to a historicizing, so-called text-critical, not a literal reading of the scriptures, which means that revelation is embedded in an historical ever changing context, because it addresses man as a concrete historical subject. At this point the notion of “truth” becomes obsolete; we only grasp our hypotheses about it. Revelation and science share the same epistemological status. In conclusion I don’t believe that there is truth to be known, in our ability to know truth, but even if there were truth somewhere, human science still would be limited to a hypothetical nature. (Please note that my argument here differs from [Pietschmann 2006a] who equates “truth” with “meaning” and “values”, something to be provided by religion but not by science.4) Pope John Paul II, in an attempt to reconcile the Church with the scientific community once stated, maybe too loosely, that Darwinism was more than an hypothesis5 [John Paul II 1996].
2 “If certain of Copernicus’ passages on the motion of the earth are not hypothetical, make them hypothetical; then they will not be against either the truth or the Holy Writ. On the contrary, in a certain sense they will be in agreement with them, on account of the false nature of suppositions, which the study of astronomy is accustomed to use as its special right.” (Caetani) 3 “First. I say that it appears to me that Your Reverence and Signor Galileo did prudently to content yourselves with speaking hypothetically (ex suppositione) and not positively, as I have always believed Copernicus did. <…> To demonstrate that the appearances are saved by assuming the sun at the center and the earth in the heavens is not the same thing as to demonstrate that in fact the sun is in the center and the earth in the heavens. I believe that the first demonstration may exist, but I have very grave doubts about the second.” (Bellarmin) 4 Some argue that biology actually does provide a definition of meaning, namely “it was selected” [Brent & Bruck 2006: 417]. More generally Wittgenstein equates meaning with “use” (to be explored by thought). 5 “4. Taking into account the state of scientific research at the time as well as of the requirements of theology, the encyclical "Humani Generis" considered the doctrine of "evolutionism" a serious hypothesis, worthy of investigation and in-depth study equal to that of the opposing hypothesis. Pius XII added two methodological conditions: that this opinion should not be adopted as though it were a certain, proven doctrine and as though one could totally prescind from revelation with regard to the questions it raises. He also spelled out the condition on which this opinion would be compatible with the Christian faith, a point to which I will return. Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as something more than just a hypothesis.” (John Paul II) The crucial sentence “Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as something more than just a hypothesis.” (in http://www.christusrex.org/www1/pope/vise10-23- 96.html) has also been translated as “Today, almost half a century after the publication of the Encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of more than one hypothesis in the theory of evolution.” (in 3 What he probably meant to say was that Neodarwinism is no less scientific that other scientific theories, and possibly he also implied that scientific theories and church doctrine are on equal footing epistemologically. And this is true. Scientific insight, the very educated guess that leads to a hypothesis according to Einstein (see below), comes from “an intrinsically unknowable place,” claims Robert Pollack. “There is only a semantic difference between scientific insight and what is called, in religious terms, revelation.” [Pollack 2000] Pius IX and the 1st Vatican council previously declared: „Even though faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason.” [Pius IX 1870] Similar statements had been made earlier on [Pius IX 1846; Congregation of the Index 1855].
If there is a fundamental difference between church doctrine and science it is the following: the church still refers to an lian world view and focuses on a causa finalis.6 "Omne agens agit propter finem" (everything that acts does so towards an end) [Thomas Aquinas 1266/73: II-I, 1,2; I, 44,4]. Thomas Aquinas even defines God as the final purpose of all being, God himself is the final cause, God is the future of the world. In contradistinction physics from the 17th century onwards reduced causa finalis to prior causes (causa efficiens), with Kant still presenting a teleological view, and with life sciences keeping up a teleological language until recently7 [Nissen 1997]. René Thom finally presented a satisfying model of causa finalis: in modern system dynamics the end point is called attractor; active is always only the momentary force. An “object” moves in the force field of other objects, which define the end point, and in his own force field, which modifies the endpoint. [Thom 1972]. The information about the future is contained in the field which results from all possible interaction partners that provide a “context” which attracts a “mechanical” system into well defined metastable states, called attractors. In other words, the boundary conditions define gradients for the evolution of the system. The final cause is reduced to a progression of efficient causes, however, finality is not denied, only the way it works is reconsidered.8 It is a conflict between
L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO - Edizione quotidiana - del 31 October 1996 - file 044w03.rtf). The french original reads: “Aujourd’hui, près d'un demi-siécle après la parution de l'encyclique, des nouvelles connaissances conduisent à reconnaitre dans la théorie de l'évolution plus qu'une hypothése.” The French means “more than a hypothesis“ and agrees with the first translation. 6 According to Aristotle there are four types of causes: causa materialis, causa formalis, causa efficiens, causa finalis. [Aristotle 347-335 BC: 983a24-33, 1013a24-1014a25; ca. 350 BC: 194b16-195b30, 198a14-198b9] Aristotle distinguished form (ειδοσ, hence idea) as structural from energy (force) as the source of movement. “By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance.” [Aristotle 347-335 BC: 1032b1] Form is the general or universal (the blue print), whereas matter individuates (i.e. creates the particular, but according to a form prescribing it). Hence form is to mean mind. The dualism of mind and matter originates in the dualism of form and matter. The ancients perceived matter as dead depending on form and energy. 17th century science has merged causa materialis and causa formalis (to the extent that they concern natural processes) into something material described by natural laws. This is more than just saying that Einstein demonstrated the equivalence of mass and energy. Matter without interactions does not exist in modern physics, nor do interactions without matter, hence material and form cannot be separated from one another, which was even true for Aristotele (hylomorphism). Some have called the natural laws themselves the form [Sheldrake 1989] – this form nonetheless is immanent to matter –, while still others reduce nature to a causa materialis – first of all it is material properties that are described by natural laws – without need for a separate form principle. A Cartesian dualism of matter and mind of course remained, but the mind did no longer have the role to direct matter. Note that in the case of human agents causa materialis (e.g. properties of construction materials) and causa formalis (e.g. architectural design by humans) are still separate entities. The difference here is that God is not considered to be the agent-architect of nature; nature is self sustained (cf. Weinberg body text below). 17th century physics also abolished causa finalis leaving causa efficiens as the only cause that modern usage of the word recognizes as being causal. 7 In the context of mind, goal directed actions are of course the rule, but modern science will refer to attractors not a separate final cause (cf. Thom below). 8 However this modified rendering of causa finalis does not preclude goal directedness. An attractor will last if its generating forces prevail. For example, the historical necessity of certan things to happen, including the point 4 two different sets of hypotheses or discourses, made more dramatic because God as a specific type of cause disappears from the plot. But science does not eliminate God, it may well never had considered it; it was a different discourse, one of theology, that had added such an interpretation of causa finalis. (I call this confusion of hypotheses, and more examples will follow). Hence we can reduce teleological arguments to efficient causes. But do we need teleological arguments to start with? More than any other scientific theory, evolution theory has made independent final, teleological and vitalistic hypothesis superfluous.
Another paradigmatic difference between church doctrine and science concerns the role of divine providence, the fact that God (call it intelligence or supermind, if you wish) continuously guides his creation (creatio continua9). Science in the past has performed precisely by excluding this view: "The only possible scientific procedure consists in assuming that no divine intervention takes place and then in seeing how far science gets on this assumption" [Weinberg 1992: 257].10 A concept of nature that does not invoke God will not depend on ends or purposes that bear on God. For many scientists this is mere methodological naturalism. It simply makes sense to use the simplest model possible. But there exists also metaphysical naturalism, which inevitably leads to a conflict with religion. Neodarwinism treated as methodological naturalism does not affect one’s belief in God, and this is probably the attitude most religious people hold. The conflict for creationist originates from the second kind of approach, even though the question of intelligent design is a legitimate question within a methodological framework. I discuss the metaphysical aspect of the problem with some examples (the heavens, gravitation, purpose, chance) below. It is often claimed that science rejects supernaturalism. The principal achievement of Neodarwinism is that it can explain evolution – or at least major aspects of evolution – without recourse to supernaturalism. But I hesitate to use this phrase, because what we call supernaturalism is not really outside nature, its only outside a particular definition of nature. A nature, defined as Weinberg does, per definition is devoid of supernatural means, with the categorical consequence that the supernatural is defined as that which is not natural. With a nature defined differently, nature would account for certain phenomena, like mind, but this would not count as supernatural. In any case, Darwin did exactly what Weinberg describes: In a letter to Lyell from 1859 Darwin writes: “I would give absolutely nothing for a theory of natural selection, if it required miraculous additions at any one stage of descent.” [quoted in Crews 2001] More than that, his theory replaced God as creator. Only later he adjusted his view and wrote the following addition to his second edition of Origin of Species11: “There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved.“ [Darwin 1859: 678] In the very beginning there still is an act of creation. However, from this primeval beginning the evolution unfolds itself according to Darwinian
omega [ Teilhard de Chardin ???; Scheffczyk 1963], is not denied and conceivably remains an attractor, but it is not given but made, it results from an overdetermined set of earlier dispositions. 9 As will become clear in my following text creatio continua is a subject that academic science should consider, but is in its current state not science itself but philosophy. The best place in a high school curriculum would be to cover it in a philosophy class, or – in countries where religion is taught in high schools – a class on religion. 10 Cf. [Lennox 2002]. 11 The second edition (1860) of which 3000 copies were printed, being a reprint from the standing type of the first (1859) with considerable resetting. Darwin described it in a letter of 21st December 1859 as "only a reprint, yet I have made a few important corrections" [Freeman 1965: 77] 5 laws. No more divine interventions are required.12 This is the image of the clock maker [Paley 1802] and it contradicts the notion of creatio continua. Thomas Aquinas here states that the creator is not only the origin of being but that he carries, maintains and guides the creation. Creatio continua is Schönborn’s principle argument against Neodarwinism and in favor of intelligent design.13 The scientific relevance of creatio continua is not so much a role for the hand of God in what amounts to an occasional miracle, but indirectly for an integral view on mind and matter. Creatio continua requires that mind (much like a Hegelian world spirit) influences matter on a routine basis (not like a clockmaker who occasionally repairs a clock he has made). There is ample evidence for such interaction in what is called psychosomatic medicine, and we are beginning to understand how it works on a molecular level. The kind of mind involved in psychosomatics may be the product of neurobiology and late in evolution. As such it is the subject of Schönborn’s broader concerns, it is , however, no conclusive evidence for intelligent design. What the church maintains however is far more fundamental: it concerns the role for a mind existing prior and independent of the nervous system (brain) and specifically not as an emergent phenomenon of matter. This point is best argued from the following: What the church calls soul is a complex considered by Christian faith to be immediately created by God and not inherited from one’s parents [Pius XII 1950]. This is to say, the origins of mind precede molecular evolution. There are scientific arguments in its favour too, at least supporting some early coevolution: like psychokinesis (mentally guided movement of matter) [Krippner 1977; Rhine 1970; Braude 1986].
12 Proponents of intelligent design are devided on the same issue. Behe believes that the devine designer infused design at the outset into the very first cells, whereas Dembski believes that he continuously intervenes in evolutionary development. [Crews 2001: 27] 13 The argument is not new. Already Richard Bentley, a theologian, tried to persudade Isaac Newton that science has to accommodate the principle of creatio continua: Order and motion in the universe had depended at all time upon the regular involvement of God's hand [Bentley 1692] Newton replies: “So then gravity may put the planets into motion, but without the divine power it could never put them into such a circulating motion as they have about the sun; and therefore, for this, as well s for other reasons, I am compelled to ascribe the frame of this system to an intelligent agent.” [Newton 1693: 20] 14 Their research actually confirms that expectation values for large statistic groups are described by the laws of nature as we have deciphered them, but that individual events can be influenced by mental intention. 6 The catholic dogma is best summarized as follows: „The Christian image of the world is one in which the world originated by means of a very complex evolution process, but that, after all, it originates at the deepest level from the Logos. In this respect it carries reason within itself.” [Benedict XVI 2000a: 119] I want to point out that this primordial reason simply may amount to the essence of natural laws, 15 but that there may also be more to it. There are two fundamentally opposed philosophical positions about the origin of the cosmos. For one, the first cause of being is the being itself. For the other the first cause of being is an earlier creative reason. “This ultimate question, as we have already said, can no longer be decided by arguments from natural science, and even philosophical thought reaches its limits here. In that sense, there is no ultimate demonstration that the basic choice involved in Christianity is correct.” [Benedict XVI 1999] Scientists certainly will concede that being includes reason in the form of natural laws. However, many will not agree that possibly mind and matter coexist in complementary fashion from the start. What remains undecided in any case, and remains a matter of belief, is whether being is preceded by a creative force. Creatio continua certainly demands at least a coexistence of matter and mind from the start and hence demands a role for the mind in prebiotic affairs. The sciences of physics and chemistry thus far have not provided any clues in this general direction. As noted above there may be a methodological reason for it. Weinberg elegantly states that science in the past simply assumed that no divine intervention takes place. Science has, for the time being, avoided to ask questions that might have provided a more integral view on matter and mind. What the idea of creatio continua tells is rather general and not only concerning evolution theory. What we might need as a first step is not a different theory of evolution but a more comprehensive theory of miracles [Corner 2007]. Miracles, after all, are not beyond science, as [Miller 1999] claims, but only require new scientific ideas that work. But miracles are occasional interruptions in the flow of events described by natural laws. As I stated above, that alone may not suffice: we need an entirely novel approach to the coexistence of matter and mind. The continued presence and action of God does not, however, contradict the theory of descent, which Schönborn explicitly supports (quoted above). The Vatican international theological commission stated: "While there is little consensus among scientists about how the origin of this first microscopic life is to be explained, there is general agreement among them that the first organism dwelt on this planet about 3.5-4 billion years ago. Since it has been demonstrated that all living organisms on earth are genetically related, it is virtually certain that all living organisms have descended from this first organism." [International theological commission 2004: 63] This report was underwritten by who then was Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI.
Facing continued criticism from scientists, Schönborn has somewhat repositioned himself and keeps silent his bold claim that biological theory of neodarwinism is wrong (raised in the New York Tomes and quoted earlier). He now emphasizes that he is not against evolution but against evolutionism, this being understood to be an ideology that applies neodarwinism to human nonbiological affairs in impermissible ways. Ironically the key problem of the Roman Catholic Church with the term chance (see below) is exactly such an “ism” and does not derive from scientific theory. Schönborn is now in line with pope Benedict XVI: „Nobody will seriously question the scientific evidence for microevolutionary processes. This is not the question that a believer will ask, not even the problems of macroevolution will be his focus, but he will question the generalization
15 One may also draw relations to Aristotle’s causa formalis (see footnote 6 and my remarks about St. Basil in the bodytext below.) 7 The Roman Catholic Church never denied natural history and always tried to maintain its doctrine without contradicting science. To this end Karl Rahner stated: "theology and science can in principle not contradict each other, since from the outset they differ in their subject matter and in their method." [Rahner 1981: 26] This is one of four positions that one may take. If science and religion have different missions, such independence (position 1) makes sense; it certainly eliminates the claims for conflict (position 2) without inviting dialogue (position 3). Rahner’s position is supported by Stephen Jay Gould, who speaks of two magisteria, or domains of authority that should be kept separate. [Gould 1999]. But I doubt that Rahner’s view advances intellectual progress and hence prefer an integral view (position 4). To me it seems unavoidable that science takes on issues previously reserved for theology. In a way one might say that science has grown self-sufficient, but only if science accommodates all possible discourses. Now, while the methods of the church may be exhausted by tradition, science certainly requires openness to new methods. One front of science these days deals with the interaction of matter and mind, and hence what I call the paradigm of creatio continua must be seriously entertained. Only if this is done and no evidence is found against current narratives of evolution can one be sure that the methods did not limit the conclusions. Steven Weinberg well explains the attitude of science in the past, but it may be time to seriously investigate the role of the mind in the functions of matter.
A third example for paradigmatic differences between the church and science at first seems only to bear historical interest. By arguing that Copernicus put the earth in the “heavens” (see footnote 3) Bellarmin confuses the terms of two different hypothesis: In his heliocentric model Copernicus merely presents a geometric model of orbits that differs from Ptolemy’s version with the earth at the center, but according to Ptolemy the space beyond the moon was implied to be the “Heavens” with laws differing from those on earth.16 Applying the old notion to the new model it seemed that the earth was in the “heavens” which then has theological ramifications and is odd, but actually the notion of heaven nowhere is part of Copernicus’ model.17 What is true, however is that Aristotle distinguished earthly and planetary conditions of motion whereas Galileo assumes that they are identical. So indeed science differs from a church that upheld the Aristotelian paradigms. I believe that the problem with the term “heaven” is a confusion between different systems of thought. It does, moreover, involve a level of interpretation that normally scientific theories do not provide. Pietschmann [2006b] calls this ontologization (a term which according to Whitehead’s relationalism is a fallacy of misplaced concreteness [Faber 2006: 180] and which only distorts the issue), others might want to call it metaphysical interpretation. Maybe it is simply what some claim that philosophy adds to the knowledge of individual disciplinary discourses (while I would argue that philosophy of this kind simply adds a different layer of discourse to the issue, hence it remains a confusion of terms). It reminds me of the historical difference between (natural) philosopher and mechanic artist [Shapin 2003: 15], though it was Newton – certainly one considered to be a philosopher – who refused to speculate what gravitation was (see below). What philosophy, and possibly theology does, is an overinterpretation and misrepresentation of the concepts of science, a transgression of the scope within which hypotheses work, an adding-on of a different type of discourse. It means that the level and types of discourse are shifted. It is a problem of defining the terms in excess of their operational consequences (which according to constructivist epistemology is limited
16 For Ptolemy the earth was built from 4 elements but the heavens were made by 5 elements. Ptolemy like views were common in the antique; see footnote 17 about a passage from the old testament about the sun being in the Heavens. For Aristotle the Heavens was the space beyond the stars. 17 The principal theological argument against Copernicus was a story in the old testament, when God held on the sun to allow the Jews conquer a city: “… So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and did not hasten to go down for about a whole day” (Jos 10:12-13 quoted from the New King James version). 8 to the matching-up with facts). In a scientific theory only operational consequences are binding. [Pietschmann 2006b] Thus the geometry of orbits is essential to astronomy while the label heaven, and in particular its double meaning of afterlife and kingdom-come are speculations outside the framework of the given hypothesis. The theological discourse about heaven is confused with a scientific discourse about astronomy. A similar confusion arose about Newton’s definition of gravitation, which was purely mathematical. As stated himself, the agent of gravitation remained undetermined. Newton speculated that it could be both material and immaterial in origin. In his 2nd letter to Bentley dated 17. Jan 1693, Newton writes: “You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent to matter. Pray do not ascribe that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know, and therefore would take more time to consider it.” [Newton 1693: 20] He resumes the issue in his 3rd letter to Bentley dated 25. Feb. 1693: “Gravity must be caused by an Agent acting constantly according to certain Laws; but whether this Agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the Consideration of my Readers.”18. [Newton 1693: 26] The case could not be decided by experiment and remained a philosophical afterthought. Einstein eventually provided an operational solution: he defined gravitation as the deviation from 180 degrees in the sum of angles of a (non-planar) triangle that is built by 3 light rays in vacuo (each one of which is bent by the masses present in space). [Pietschmann 2006b, cf. Schröder 2001] Another example of this kind of confusions in the very word “purpose” that is associated with the (former) concept of causa finalis. Biological systems have functions but they lack a purpose in a metaphysical sense. Besides, human being often long for and believe in purposes where there are none in the first place. It is this craving that actually defines the superadded meaning of the term “purpose”. At last, let me mention that the entire debate on evolution may be such a confusion. Maybe the focus of critique is not evolution but evolutionism, some kind of ideology derived from it. Whether a problem of definition or a confusion of terms, the church still continues this practice of crossing borders, as their reflections on the world “chance” illustrate (I shall discuss this below after defining Neodarwinism).
Neodarwinism Darwinism is an optimisation problem. The combination of variation and selection is the best and most simple approach and is of universal merit whenever optimisation of systems is the issue. It is not a special property of life. Why then do we have to use the complicated word Neodarwinism instead? Neodarwinism is first of all a shorthand for “synthetic theory of evolution”, the cumulative and eclectic effort of many scientists that reached consensus in mid 20th century.19 Our understanding of evolution processes, however has grown ever since and so neodarwinism itself has been continually revised; to avoid neologisms I will simply use the word neodarwinism for today’s theory, i.e. for the state of the art development of a theory that started with Darwin, and which differs in some details from Darwin’s original ideas (Darwin still lacked a detailed and molecular understanding of biology, did not know Mendelian inheritance, instead allowed inheritance of acquired characteristics – Lamarckism –, etc.) [Himmelfarb 1959]20. Darwin himself always called it: theory of descent with
18 Until as late as 50 years before Newton's mathematical treatment, gravitational phenomena were explained in terms of the anima mundi, the soul of the world or universe, i.e. an immaterial origin [Sheldrake 1987]. Desacrtes then introduced a mechanical proximity effect theory / local action theory (Nahwirkungstheorie), which stated that bodies can act on each other only through contact (theory of local motion) [Descartes 1644] and this had become the accepted materialistic view in Newton’s days, but Newton preferred action at distance. 19 In late 19th century Darwinism was out of fashion and Neo-Lamarckism was widespread. The term neo for Darwinism originates with Weismann who revived Darwinism. 20 Gertrude Himmelfarb wrote a classical biography of Darwin. She is not a Darwinist herself but rather highly critical of natural selection in particular. 9 modification.21 My approach might dissatisfy historians of science who prefer to group intellectual history by author. But science works in different ways, it is a multi-authored if not author-less project that continuously changes. My language may also dissatisfy contemporary scientists that at one point contradicted or expanded the synthetic theory and now find themselves under the same label that they once opposed. In Neodarwinism Darwin’s ideas are extended by germ line theory [Weismann 1886], Mendelian inheritancy [Mendel 1865; de Vries 1901; Hardy 1908; Weinberg 1908], modern concepts of population dynamics [Fisher 1930; Wright 1931; Haldane 1932], paleontological evidence [Simpson 1944], the concept of genes [Dobzhansky 1937; Mayr 1942; Huxley 1942], the chemical, physical and semiotic nature of genes (DNA double helix) starting with Watson & Crick [1953] and the Cold Spring Harbor symposium of 1966 [Cold Spring Harbor 1966] and expanding ever since, by selectively neutral nonadaptive forms of evolution [Kimura 1983], punctuated equilibria [Eldredge & Gould 1972], cooperation [Eigen & Schuster 1977-78], and more. Many critics of evolution take another approach and often only address Darwin and his version of ideas, but for modern science only the Neodarwinian state-of-the-art is relevant. The differences are only important from a historical point of view and will be omitted here. A useful general introduction to evolution theory is [Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995]. The paradigms that I take to represent Neodarwinian logic may be summarized as follows: 1. Existence of agents. 2. Heredity. 3. Variation (and accumulation of mutations). 4. Non-constancy of species (corollary to #3). 5. Cooperation (emerges via variation and selection). 6. Branching evolution from a single unique origin (corollary to #5). 7. Hierarchical organization and compartmentalization of hereditary base (emerges via variation and selection). 8. Evolution has a direction, is gradual(?) and provides limited optimisation 9. Selection (survival of the fittest) in isolation (in isolated populations). I shall now comment a little on these paradigms. 1. Existence of agents. It requires that the wholeness of relations can be meaningfully divided into units of preferential internal interactions and looser (or lacking) external coupling with the environment (itself other agent-units and further dependencies). An agent subject to Neodarwinian processes must have certain properties, i.e. must be capable of fulfilling the remaining set of paradigms. The unit of selection is always at some cooperative level, typically a single cell or a whole organism, and never the individual gene, as Dawkins [1976, 1982] claims. Also there is clearly cooperation, altruism and symbiosis among species, in which case the unit of selection may no longer be the individual organism but a larger system of interdependent highly coupled relations that competes with similar units, these units themselves being only loosely coupled. 2. Heredity. There is no evolution without preservation of what has been achieved (without memory), without a transfer of characteristics to their descendents. Preservation is perturbed by small random changes – variations – which occur in organisms through mutation and recombination of genes, and when these changes give an organism a greater chance of survival, they persist from one generation to the next through natural selection. Transfer of characteristics acquired during one’s lifetime is called Lamarckism. From all evidence that we have the genetic mechanism is not equipped to do that. However there may be related cases of neodarwinism (such as the evolution of individual and collective mind) where such restrictions do not apply; because there is no separate germline, but also because the
21 Darwin uses the word evolution for the first time in his 6th and last edition of Origin of Species (1872) [Freeman 1965: 80]. 10 mechanism of variation in genetics is so slow as to be irrelevant in one’s individual lifespan, but similar mechanisms in the brain (to be discussed below) may be much faster. 3. variation (and accumulation of mutations). Variation is undirected, often called random, and unable to anticipate the consequences of variation. To illustrate the process, lets consider several related ones; model 1: the flipping of coins. Take 100 coins and toss them; its extremely unlikely that all fall head-on. You may keep repeating the process until all coins simultaneously show heads. But there is a better strategy. Lets remove those coins that are head on, repeat tossing the rest, again collect those that are head on, and repeat this process until all 100 coins are head on. You will find that it takes much fewer steps to achieve the end – actually the route is quite probable – than waiting for your lucky chance in a single step selection. [Dembski 1998a: 58] As you see its not enough that variation occurs, there must be cumulative selection to preserve successful inventions (to cumulate mutations). There is a more complicated version of this process in which selection is delayed, an this is actually more true to the reality of evolution (genetic drift, i.e. the accumulation of neutral mutations without selection); hence model 2: Take again 100 coins and randomly select one coin that now is flipped over; next copy the pattern of coins and repeat the process with each set independently. Repeat this over many times but without any selection. Some coins that you have already flipped over will be returned to their original states, but not in the entire population. Repeat this procedure until one set shows all 100 coins head-on. Now exert selective pressure by choosing this one population with the largest number of head-ons. Even this model is not enough; model 3: There may be some internal grammar that makes certain pattern combinations more likely than others. The model for this type of variation is word golf: Instead of coins the textual range is provided by words. Now change one letter at a time, nonsense words formed in this process are immediately eliminated by selection. Words that make sense are accumulated for later selection [Nabokov 1962; Alexander 2001] Model 4: The actual process in sexual reproduction is still more complicated because populations become partly homogenized. But something like model 2 or 3 is the idea of accumulating mutations. However (model 5), some claim that there need not be external forces at all: once variations accumulate beyond a critical degree this by itself may trigger sudden change without depending on changes in the environment [Crutchfield 2002]. Even so the outcome is eventually selected. Evolution also requires the capacity to evolve. The mechanisms of “mutation” are not those primarily associated with the word (point) mutation, which is a passive process. Rather active and complex regulatory mechanisms seem to be involved that guide change, and many of these mechanisms are still not properly understood today. The genes that control the shape and location of body parts, for example, are highly conserved across species, indicating that the same small set of genes, if only part of a suitable (presumably hierarchical) genetic organization, can generate diverse forms. [Woolfson 2003: 33] Evolution essentially depends on regulatory events. Ultimately what creates diversity is the pattern in which genes are turned “on” and “off” [Carroll 2005; Carroll et al. 2001]. Evolution is largely the consequence of random mutation in genetic switches. Evolution then depends on new patterns of gene regulation rather than the creation of new genes. Suitable genetic organization also allows variation to accumulate silently without producing phenotypic consequences until mayor changes are due. My description illustrates that there is more than one model about how evolution works, however, they differ in details while preserving the general idea of Neodarwinian logic. In summary: Mutations accumulate continuously but species change abruptly (in consequence species themselves are not constant). Speciation is a problem of macroevolution and much detail remains to be discovered. Intelligent design advocates claim that there are gaps in the sequence of speciation that only intelligent design can explain. The most prominent example
11 here is the evolution of the eye. Speciation used to be a domain for paleontology but more recently molecular biology has provided us with a new instrument to trace ancient relationships by comparing the DNA of living species and the conclusions are not yet all in. Microevoluion (e.g. viruses that continuously excape the immune system of hosts and other selective pressures) on the other hand is surprisingly well understood at the molecular level and confirm Neodarwinian theory. Neodarwinism requires “variation”, not a particular mechanism to achieve it. Hence all the mechanisms suspected to exist for engineering genetic variation are in accordance with Neodarwinian logic as long as there is no intention at play that guides variation for a particular outcome while passing by selection. 4. Non-constancy of species (corollary to #3). Non-constancy of species is a consequence of variation. It means that there is not a limited number of fixed kinds (essences or types) each one forming a class; populations vary not by their essences but only by their mean statistical differences. These differences derive from continuous variation. 5. Cooperation (emerges via variation and selection). Darwin did not recognize the importance of cooperation, however, it is now a standard element of neodarwinism. Cooperation, i.e. on the molecular level mutual catalysis and formation of hypercycles [Eigen & Schuster 1977-78; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995: 50-54], is a very important feature of living systems, but it is a feature that is selected in the course of evolution and hence from a logical point of view it is not an independent principle. 6. Branching evolution from a single unique origin (corollary to #5). The genetic relatedness of species on a molecular level provides ample evidence that all species are related and not independently created. There may have been more than one first attempt, but chemical processes that are entirely independent compete for resources until one set of interdependent processes succeeds differentially and all others die out. What survives, shares a common system. No traces of potential alternatives have been found. Thus the fact that evolution branches from a single unique origin results from cooperation and the selection of those elements that cooperate. It is not a logically independent requirement. 7. hierarchical organization and compartmentalization of hereditary base (emerges via variation and selection). Hierarchisation of information is an essential strategy to reduce the number of mutations needed to produce novelty. Thus the phenotpye is far more complex than the genotype. The genetic loci are coupled via the phenotype and mutually facilitate or impede each other; variation at the genetic level itself remains unintentional but structures are created that improve the possible outcome of variation; somewhat misleading this has been called facilitated variation [Kirschner & Gerhart 2005: 219-224]. It is not necessary to presuppose this principle since it will be automatically selected in the course of evolution. 8. evolution has a direction, is gradual(?) and provides limited optimisation evolution. Complexity is the measure to describe the difficulty of a problem and it has become the key measure of progress.22 [Roche 2001; Gell-Mann 1994, 1995] It is a general observation of natural history that overall complexity increases over time, i.e. there is a natural tendency to increase complexity and this is the direction of evolution. Darwin and older versions of Neodarwinism assumed that evolution must be gradual (“natura non facit saltus”) but contemporary biology starts to question this assumption. When intelligent design advocates speak of irreducibly complexity they simply mean that a given transition is not gradual enough; there ought to be intermediate steps that are selected on their own and they claim that such selectable intermediates do not exist. Their conclusion then is that evolution must be guided (follow a blue print). Neodarwinism rules out creation ex nihilo (spontaneous generation) with experimental evidence provided by Pasteur, but it also rules out “guided” evolution, the helping hand from an intelligence outside the system of natural laws. There are
22 There is a fundamental difference between Shannon-information (reduction of uncertainty) and complexity: A random number has a high content of Shannon-information but is not difficult to generate, it has little complexity. 12 two lines of argument: While variation accumulates in small steps it does so with different speeds, faster is small populations (in niches with new selective pressures) than in larger ones which are homogenized by large scale interbreeding. This leads to the theory of punctuated equilibrium [Eldredge & Gould 1972; Gould 2002] that has replaced Darwin’s original gradualism (one rate of change), though it was never accepted by all biologists [Ayala 1989]. The standard argument against neodarwinism is that the fossil record lacks transitional intermediates. To this palaeontologists usually reply, that transitional intermediates are rare, both in number and time, and hence chances of finding them in the fossil record are extremely small. What is recorded are large populations and they tend to be rather homogeneous. Moreover, not all geological formations are equally suited to preserve fossils and hence some periods are better covered than others. I should add that there may be active biochemical mechanism that accelerate variation in times of stress similar to somatic hypermutability of B- cells (immune system) [Wang et al. 2004]. Furthermore the genotype may undergo gradual changes which are counterbalanced in the phenotype until some critical point is transgressed (buffered variation) [Waddington 1942; Hartman et al. 2001; Sangster et al. 2005; Cowen & Lindquist 2005]. The second line of argument points out that small changes in the genotype may result in large changes of the phenotype, depending on the network properties of the coupled system. There simply may be no or only a few transitional intermediates to start with. And finally: there are so many possibilities to explore (technically speaking the degrees of freedom are extremely large), so that nature is in a permanent state of limited optimisation. Almost any organ could potentially be improved. 9. selection (survival of the fittest23) in isolation (in isolated populations). It need not be the organism most adapted to the environment but possibly one most robust to withstand conditions, that is actually fit. The selection process is usually called natural (i.e. resulting from Natural Laws), but there are also social mechanism (e.g. sexual selection, the forces of cultural hegemony or – in economy – market forces). Using neodarwinism as a general paradigm independent of genetic mechanisms there may conceivably even be artifical selection (i.e. resulting from whatever rules are set). (Natural) selection acts solely by accumulating successive, favourable variations (Darwin). However, many features may simply arise because they are easy to produce rather than because they confer a selective advantage. They just happen to be around and sometimes they may turn out to be useful later on. Nor is it always adaptive fitness that counts, organisms create their own environments. [Lewontin 1998: 109] “Many features of organisms are the epiphenomenal consequences of developmental changes or the functionless leftovers from remote ancestors.” [Lewontin 1998: 81] But if choices are made between different variants, they are made by what is called natural selection. This is the ideologically most highly charged aspect of Darwinism and it has been pointed out that the idea shares common roots with liberal values (of early capitalism) and eugenics24. Darwinism supposedly teaches a “philosophy of conflict” and the “struggle for existence”. However it is often ignored that, whereas the creative invention of a paradigm depends on the personal life contexts of an author or scientist, the operational value of an hypothesis does not most of the time. The politics of the Victorian age provided Darwin with a certain environment and this might explain why evolution theory was discovered in mid- 19th century and in Europe (and not e.g. in the Asian culture of harmony), but the structure of the biological theory has its independent operational merits. Social Darwinism was indeed inspired by Darwin’s work, but Darwin himself largely rejected it. Let me point out some problems: While successfully working for molecular evolution, Neodarwinian logic need not
23 Darwin took the term “survival of the fittest” from Herbert Spencer and first used it in the 5th edition of Origin of Species (1869) [Freeman 1965: 79]. 24 Thomas Malthus [1798] Essay on the principle of population can be mentioned as one of the prominent contemporary influences on Darwin. 13 be valid to describe social phenomena where mechanisms of higher complexity might be engaged. This is an ongoing area of controversy.
In summary, abundant variation (chance) creates choices that are realized by elimination of inferior individuals (necessity).25 Neodarwinism thus is based on an interplay of chance and necessity, not on chance alone. We are the product of choice (a choice taken by natural selection), and not of chance (which is only a prerequisite). There actually is regularity behind chance events. But who is the agent that chooses. In Neodarwinian theory it is not an outside intelligence but the natural environment that selects, based on the laws of nature that rule matter. Neodarwinism presents the minimal means to achieve evolution but it does not rule out more sophisticated mechanisms, in particular more complex mechanisms that themselves evolved later during evolution. “If nature is all there is and matter had to do its own creating, then the Darwinian model is the best model we will ever have of how the job might have been done” [Johnson 2000], writes one of the key proponents of intelligent design. He thus acknowledges that within the intentions of science, neodarwinism is successful, he only demands that the theory is expanded to include intelligence of sorts. Scientists would certainly do this if they had sufficient evidence at hand that required such revision of theory. When I go along with Cardinal Schönborn and defend the ideas of creatio continua I do so not for evidences within biological evolution theory, but for unrelated albeit scientific aspects. In any case neodarwinism remains a successful minimalist program. Most of the arguments discussed in the creation – evolution debate concern details of the evolution mechanism (convergent evolution vs. common descent; individual vs. group selction; sociobiological vs cultural explanations of modern human traits; symbiosis; genetic shifts; gene flow between populations; pleiotropy (multiple effects from single genes), the missing fossil record, astonishment about and demystification of the complexity of biological structures, etc.). None of this shall be discussed in my present text. I am more inclined to a question of the following kind: why, in spite of being well established in the sciences, do nearly half the US people not “believe” in evolution [Dawkins 1989; Crews 2001: 26]. (Figures in Germany are similar [Standard 2005b]. Among 34 western nations – Europe, USA, Japan –, Turkey – the only islamic country in the survey – shows the lowest public acceptance of evolution theory [Miller 2006].) I suggest that most people only know an adulterated scientific doctrine and are not familiar with the scientific discourse proper on evolution. Many take their information from popular books like [Dawkins 1986] or [Dennett 1995], both thoroughly detested by creationists, or they take their information from pro-creationist narratives that mostly try to prove that Darwinism is wrong, some of remarkably poor quality [Johnson 2000; Stove 1995]. Does this literature misrepresent Neodarwinian logic? But I suppose that the majority has not read any books, and their judgement is guided by the daily press and conversation with friends. So some of the disbelief may result simply from poor and ideologically biased understanding. But these people are truly burdened with concerns, are ridden by existential angst, even if these concerns are not always warranted scientifically. There is a compulsion for meaning, even if there is no meaning to be found.
Chance or choice Let me therefore provide three counterpoints that illustrate why so many people find it hard coming to terms with neodarwinism: a preoccupation with the term “chance”, difficulty to accept that complexity may grow by itself, and the notion that God is eternal and timeless.
25 The emphasis on chance and necessity derives from the work of Monod [1970]; the emphasis on choice is my own. 14 Let me start with my general impression that Pope Benedict XVI shares Schönborn’s views on intelligent design.26 At a general audience27 on November 9th 2005 Benedict XVI said: “in the beginning was the creative Word <…> - this Word that created all things, that created this intelligent design which is the cosmos.” And quoting St Basil the Great, Bishop of Caesarea th of Cappadocia in the 4 century, [Basilius 378: 11 (§2.4)] he stated: “Some people <…> deceived by atheism <…> consider and seek to prove that it is scientific to think that all things lack guidance and order as though they were at the mercy of chance.” [Benedict XVI 2005] What the pope here criticises is not the scientific logic of neodarwinism that I have described above but a popular misconception about evolution theory. Here the accidental variation (accidens, a property non-essential to the substance, not planned but contingent; note that the philological root of the term points to a different discourse!) that actually leads nature to choose, as described above, is taken out of context (operational argument!) and presented as “at the mercy of chance”. The supposed role of chance in evolution is indeed a critical target for the Roman Catholic Church, as a recent book title testifies [Blank 2006]. However, “chance is a minor ingredient in the Darwinian recipe, but the most important ingredient is cumulative selection which is quintessentially non-random.” [Dawkins 1986: 49] . If anything it is natural selection that has replaced God, but not chance. The church still seems to operate in its medieval tradition, when there was no room for any chance at all: everything had its purpose [Sennett 1994: 258] (but see footnote 31). Furthermore, when St. Basil talks of chance he certainly does no have Neodarwinian logic in mind with its choices selected by a rule based nature. What St. Basil talks about is a hypothetical world where form (causa formalis) is replaced by chance. Greek philosophy distinguished causa materialis from causa formalis. Matter alone was perceived as being passive and depended on being formed from outside (see footnote 6). In modern interpretation St. Basil questioned the existence of a world without natural laws, a world that lacks order (i.e. form). Evidently St. Basil talks about something entirely different. Under the influence of 17th century science this Aristotelian issue has been reconsidered in substantial respects: it now included formal causes into the properties of material nature and the laws of nature describe the order inherent in matter not an order superadded to it. It is important to realize that modern science has not abolished the form (blue print) that used to be a separate power but included it into the properties of matter. This is not limited to simple properties but extends to emergent structures that are based in systems of relations (self-organizing systems) with properties not known to individual components. For example, pattern formation in reaction-diffusion systems (dissipative structures) is well known in chemistry and has been applied to explain pigment pattern formation [Nijhout at al. 1997; Meinhardt 1982; Turing 1952]. The same principles have previously been applied to cell positioning during embriogenesis; more recent evidence, however, suggests that in this case the ordering of cells does not reply on concentration gradients the way Meinhardt originally envisioned. Complex spatial patterns may emerge from a soup of simple “unintelligent” molecules based on laws of chemistry without any guiding plan other than the laws of nature (but as collective properties that the components taken separately do not possess). This has actually revised Darwin’s contention that the first act of evolution still was creational. “I believe
26 Not all Cardinals are happy with the role of the church in the debate on intelligent design. Cardinal Paul Poupard, head of the vatican Pontifical Council for Culture, on 3rd Nov 2005 warned that the church pay attention to science and not repeat the mistake made with Galileo. However he left no doubt that "the universe wasn't made by itself, but has a creator." [Winfield 2005] Poupard raised his cconcern just a few days before the pope, on November 9th 2005, gave support to Schönborn’s undertaking. 27 Incidentally, Cardinal Schönborn attended this general audience [Standard 2005a]. 15 The origin of life is a regular, albeit idiographic, process of nature as much as further evolution is a regular, again idiographic, process of nature. If the Earth's history could be set back to a more or less similar initial position and run again, many of the forms we know today would reappear [Fontana & Buss 1994]. Many scientists still remain sceptical and rather consider the history of natural evolution to be unique and unrepeatable. George V. Coyne, a Jesuit priest and former director of the Vatican observatory, even claims that God himself could not know with certainty that the evolution will lead to man [Spiegel 2000]. Does repeatability imply predictability and hence change the perspective? Coynes’s oppinion, of course, contradicts the view of God’s omniscience and has been criticized by Cardinal Schönborn for this reason [2006b]. But even if Basil’s quote is out of context, Benedict XVI presented a veritable message of his own about existential angst. With human touch Benedict XVI here voices a deep seated discontent with the underpinnings of the term chance. One is tempted to agree that the church indeed has a mission different from science, it does not provide mere explanations but reflects what these explanations mean, provides philosophical afterthoughts beyond what is observable, is guided by values, provides consolation. The primary task of the Church has to be to secure the belief of the common people, Benedict XVI repeatedly stated when he still was Cardinal Ratzinger and head of the congregation of faith. Though theology itself may also have a different, more scientific task, at least according to some who practice it [Beinert 2000a: 675]. But what is wrong with “chance” if it were not blown out of proportions in the first place. Indeed, people feel humiliated. But it is not the only humiliation that humans have to suffer: We are not in the center of the universe (Copernicus)28, and we are not in command of ourselves (Freud)29. Yet these humiliations are true. I personally take things for what they are and do not feel humiliated at all. And I am afraid that popular perception of Neodarwinian logic does not grasp the scientific essence of the concept. It is true, people are afraid of chance, and they feel displaced at least by the kind of evolution theory they know of. The discontent with the idea that we humans are the product of chance does not result from the scientific operational explanation but from an isolated and independent interpretation of the term chance, from values and ideas maintained independently of evolutionary theory. I am furthermore concerned that some intellectual fallacy prevents us from recognizing the nature of God. What is the problem of putting chance to use for valuable ends. In 1633 Pope Urban VIII argued against Galileo that God could have accomplished his ends in infinitely many ways and advised Galileo „You must not necessitate God“.30 It is better, not to tell God
28 An important aspect of this humiliation is the loss of a place for the heavens (see discussion above). It took the church some while to adjust their popular teaching to a heavens that is entirely immaterial. 29 “Human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the rpesent time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in his own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.” [Freud ???: 285] 30 Urban VIII repeatedly warned Galileo, it is an error to "impose necessity" on God. We have evidence of the strength of Urban VIII's conviction on this point from the Florentine ambassador to Rome, Francesco Niccolini, in his record of a papal audience just prior to Galileo's trial in 1633: “He
But let me change the subject. One of the central paradigms of science is the notion of complexity. It was Pasteur against advocates of spontaneous generation who showed that complexity could not originate from nothing, and it was Darwin who first introduced the idea that complexity may rise in small increments, but only in small increments. In this respect Cardinal Schönborn proclaims an astonishing counterpoint: „In the course of this becoming some really new things break through. Can "more" arise out of what is "less"? Can what is lower produce on its own power what is higher and more complex? It would be absurd to say such a thing, even if this is often said to be the case. Nothing in our experience lends support to the idea that what is lower, acting without anything that directs and organizes it, can all by itself, and quite by accident, produce what is higher.“ [Schönborn 2006a] Schönborn’s claim holds some truth shared by Leninists: The hierarchical order goes top down not bottom up. If you are in need of something you are better off to find a teacher who has mastered the requirements than tinkering around yourself. You can make large steps in this way transferring knowledge that already exist, whereas investing energy anew is taking many small steps. Or in Leninist dictum: You depend on revolutionaries, the underprivileged cannot escape their misery on their own. This also applies to evolution: the majority of genes, and more importantly of mind-stuff [Potschka 2004ab], are endowed from a pool that we inherit. Spontaneous creation of major elements is highly improbable. However our inheritance must have come into existence somehow at some point. This is to say, quite generally, how did the knowledge arise in the first place? Only by generations of humans trying to improve and accumulate knowledge. Evolution of complexity works in two ways: Preserving accumulated information and putting it to use (this is the part that Schönborn speaks of), and developing new information at a slow pace (this is what Neodarwinian logic wants to rationalize).There is ample experimental evidence that the idea of evolution in small steps of increasing
observation and reason and that makes all other explanations wrong” [Rowland 2001: 240] This is exactly the issue raised by constructivist epistemology outlined in the body-text: More that one set of hypotheses can lead to and predict the same natural phenomena. 31 This is supported by Thomas Aquinas: “The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow, but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore, whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the divine providence conceives to happen from contingency” [Thomas Aquinas 1266/73: I, 22,4 ad 1]. God is the first cause, the cause of all causes. He is also the cause of chance (contingency). Hence according to Thomas Aquinas, there is no problem with the assumption that something happens by chance. 32 I have met people who are disturbed by the idea that a loving and caring good would use disease, extinction and other sinister means of selection to solve a design problem. This is the well known the problem of theodize. The world is less than perfect and we ought to accept the facts. 17 complexity works. You may introduce some kind of intelligence as an alternative model. A practical consequence is that God as the creator has to be taken as supremely complex. And again we ask: How did his complexity develop? Introducing an omnipotent agent does not explain anything unless the agent itself is explained. I am not the first one to raise this criticism. Directed at the specific context of genetic mechanisms, Dawkins points out that “to explain the origin of the DNA/protein machine by invoking a supernatural Designer is to explain precisely nothing, for it leaves unexplained the origin of the Designer.”33 [Dawkins 1986:141]
For many this is not an easy question to ask. Raised in the tradition of classical ontology, God is eternal and time-less; this excludes a question about temporal developments in God. This is a consequence of the assumptions made in defining God in such a manner. In this case I can no longer ask a question about the origins. This is mainstream theology, but it is not the only opinion to be found. Generally speaking there was a tendency in mid 19th century romanticism that for the first time asked about the evolution of God. Today, one comes across process theology. Process Theology, which prominently features Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, promotes an integral view on mind and matter and claims that God himself becomes process, gains time-sensitivity and can grow [Faber 2006: 179, 183, 186]. God becomes a temporal immanence [Clarke & Long 1984]. God, however is not simply an evolutive emergence derived from the world, but is already incarnated in the world and hence is beyond the horizon of contemporary evolution theory. [Faber pers. comm.] (cf. my remarks on the human soul by Pius XII quoted earlier.) Process theology provides a framework to ask those kind of questions that in my opinion need to be addressed. But Process theology and modern science are not simply congruent. Thus process theology emphasises God as final cause [Faber 2006: 179], like Teilhard de Chardin’s point omega [Teilhard de Chardin ???; Scheffczyk 1963], in an effort not shared by science.
Evolution of intelligence To proceed, we must distinguish the need for an augmented more complex interpretation of evolution than that given by traditional Darwinism from a refutation of Neodarwinian logic. I will make no effort to discuss whether scientific evidence requires a more elaborated model of evolution, in particular one that includes an intelligent agent. I restrict myself in this final section to argue that regardless of whether we invoke some intelligence in the evolutionary process, this intelligence must have had its own evolution and there are good reasons to assume that at least the primitive first steps of this evolution were structurally Neodarwinian again. The best approach to address such matters is to speak ex suppositione. I do not talk how it really all happened (which indeed I cannot know), but consider the conclusions that can be drawn from a certain set of postulated assumptions. For example, we do not know the structural base of intelligence but if we assume that it resembles natural language, some conclusions are possible. In this approach observations on human intelligence are extrapolated to an intelligent agent. A good way to inquire into the logic of our mind is to investigate the structure and process of inventing scientific theories. According to the hypothetico-deductive paradigm of epistemology supported by Popper, Einstein and many others, inference from facts to principles is an impossibility. One is limited to guess hypothesis followed by deduction of outcome and then compare the outcome of the model with real facts. The process is repeated
33 italics added. 18 with different hypothesis until the model matches the factual intentions.34 [Kraft 1925; Popper 1935a, 1935b: 103; Einstein 1935] „The theorist’s method involves him using as his foundation general postulates or ‘principles’ from which he can deduce conclusions. His work thus falls into two parts. He must first discover his principles and then draw the conclusions which follow from them.“35 [Einstein 1914: 221]. “Psychologically the axioms are based upon the experiences. There is however no logical path from the experiences to axioms, but only an intuitive (psychological) connection, which is always subject to revocation”36 [Einstein 1952: 120] (see figure 1). I will comment on the “intuitive connection” below. Einstein has called the ideas free inventions of the mind [Einstein 1935], no more than educated guesses (‘analysis helps the educated to guess’). Educated guesses occur in response to exploratory observation but are not the product of induction or inference. Nor are they unique choices. On the contrary they are selected a posteriori by the usefulness of the predictions derived from them. And selection takes place within a particular historic context. What I have said about scientific epistemology has broader ramifications. Any goal directed action unconsciously is rooted in a trial-and-error procedure, a testing in virtual space before selecting and remembering the optimal action path (see Figure 2). Thus when our mind constructs theories it functions in part according to Neodarwinian logic. The process however is more complex than genetic evolution. Trial is the word for an intentional process and is the appropriate term for inventing theories, but evolution does not try: its variation is unintentional. Humans indeed are capable of intentional acts, something the mechanism of the genome from all that we know is not capable of (but otherwise the structural pattern is similar; see Figures 3 and 4). But it is easy to say “I want this or that” and difficult to know and manipulate the complex web of actions required to achieve my will. The execution of any intentional action remains trial and error. Cultural evolution which features intelligence nonetheless operates with higher complexity than genetics and with different mechanisms. But the difference essentially is the educated process of guessing. If we lacked any memory and intuition our guesses would be reduced to random variations, and we would be back to core neodarwinism. We therefore may conclude that the mechanism of cultural evolution (evolution of mind) incorporates Neodarwinian logic. What I have said is a matter of logic and does not assume a particular stance on issues of psychophysical parallelism; indeed I have nowhere specified the medium in which this logic is implemented, except to say that for sure it is not a matter of genetics. It is for my concerns simply a logical property of “intelligence”. What I have described here is a radical departure from Newton’s epistemology that is part of his famous slogan “hypothesis non fingo” [Newton 1726]. Now I have to admit, that there exist epistemological hypotheses different from this hypothetico-deductive constructivism even today. All the weight that supports constructivism is a support for my claim that our mind works by Neodarwinian principles, whatever arguments can be brought against may also contradict the claim I just made. What I have said about the hypothetico-deductive method is entirely consistent with Dennett who distinguishes three stages of evolution: Darwinian, Skinnerian and Popperian [Dennett 1995: 373-380]. Darwinian evolution refers to the genetic processes which first have been described by Neodarwinian logic. Skinnerian evolution is a state where creatures remember
34 John Paul II himself addressed such issues of epistemology in his opinion on Darwinism: “A theory is a metascientific elaboration, distinct from the results of observation but consistent with them. By means of it a series of independent data and facts can be related and interpreted in a unified explanation. A theory's validity depends on whether or not it can be verified; it is constantly tested against the facts; wherever it can no longer explain the latter, it shows its limitations and unsuitability. It must then be rethought.” [John Paul II 1996] 35 I have made a grammatical correction to the published translation. 36 my translation, the published English text is flawed. 19 the success or failure of their acts. Popperian evolution refers to creatures with an inner selective environment to preview candidate acts. Dennett gives a complete model of the role of neodarwinism in intelligence, but he does not link it to constructivist epistemology. It was indeed Popper who first realized the import of Darwinism for an inner selective environment: “Many years ago I visited Bertrand Russell <…> and he showed me a manuscript of his in which there was not a single correction for many pages. With the help of his pen he had instructed the paper. This is very different from what I do. My own manuscripts are full of corrections – so full that it is easy to see that I am working by something like trial and error; by more or less random fluctuations from which I select what appears to me fitting. We may pose the question whether Russell did not do something similar, though only in his mind, and perhaps not even consciously, and at any rate very rapidly. For indeed, what seems to be instructions is frequently based upon a roundabout mechanism of selection, as illustrated by Darwin’s answer to the problem posed by Paley.” [Popper 1978: 347]. “Real trial and error behavior may be replaced, or preceded, by imagined or vicarious trial and error behaviour.” [Popper 1978: 354] Popper already realized the importance of choice in Neodarwinian logic: “The selection of a kind of behaviour out of a randomly offered repertoire may be an act of choice, even an act of free will.” [Popper 1978: 348]. In matters of behaviour it is no longer the chemical laws of nature but the free will of an ego that chooses. Dawkins has developed similar ideas about the evolution of mind [Dawkins 1976: 62f]. My view is, however, at variance with authors like F. David Peat, who defers (what he considers to be) creativity to a primordial creative force, [Peat 1987: 207-208] akin to the actus purus of scholastic philosophy (cf. [Potschka 1996]), of which one may partake in states of mystical union. Peirce speaks of predispositions which help to abduct (i.e. guess by innate means) [Peirce 1901/03: 236, 238]. And for Pollock (already mentioned) they come from an “an intrinsically unknowable place,” the same place from which we receive a revelation [Pollock 2000]. Einstein alludes to an intuitive connection. To me this intuition derives from a phylogenic memory of ideas, related to what Freud calls the Id, that humanity has accumulated and which helps to guide variation in what remains a trial-and-error procedure [Potschka 2004a]. The transfer of accumulated pre-selected ideas in sudden flashes of understanding (Bohm [1980: 13] calls this intuition reason) is certainly a significant aspect of creative personality. Thus an imaginative and creative person can draw on a memory of previously successful hypotheses and has better guesses available for his inner selective environment. Or, if the situation is identical to a previously experienced one, the answer is already available, but only because the very Neodarwinian process has taken place beforehand and is remembered (please recall Cardinal Schönborn’s argument). This memory is not an individual one but is in part phylogenetic, it belongs to what in the context of this text is called “intelligence”. As much as humans draw guesses from this intelligence, they also provide information from their own mindful activities to this global intelligence, and thereby assists in the evolution of this intelligent agent. A mature intelligence has lots of useful memory available, an immature intelligence early in evolution bootstraps from mere chance variation. What seems like intentionality however is an inner mechanism of repeated trial-and-errors in an inner selective environment, thus is based on Neodarwinian logic. At the genomic level, organisms still have to die in reality, whereas in Popperian evolution the unit of selection only die in virtual space and the organism that hosts this inner selective mechanism is conscious to remember the outcome (note that the units of selection in both cases does not remember). This is the deep-structure of imagination and creativity. But the memory of genetics and the memory of brains is different. Brains do remember failures, whereas genomes only produce the line of successes. Brains keep logs on what they have done, whereas the genome is only the last entry of its undocumented log (only humans
20 can trace history when comparing genomes of different organisms but by using their brains not their genes). To qualify as an agent the assumed supreme intelligence must have a Popperian machine of its own. And it is this machine which remains independent of higher forms of life and precedes life. My model of human intelligence easily leads to a number of speculations concerning the attributes and evolution of the intelligent agent, which, I have argued, in some respects predates higher forms of life. There exist different hypotheses about the structure and attributes of this universal agent [Potschka 2004b, 2006]. At what point in time of evolution this intelligent agent ahs acquired the Popperian stage remains an open question for my present text; I will not follow this line of enquiry. There is some plausibility that the symbolic operations of an intelligent agent are human like. Firstly nobody has until now developed any different hypothesis about how else this may happen, except for the same neodarwininian logic cum memory. Secondly it is a presupposition of any theology that God in principle can be recognized by way and through his creatures [Beinert 2000a: 679]: “Ever since the creation of the world God’s invisible nature <…> has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made, subject to reason (intellect)” [Röm 1, 2037]. Intentionality, however, has to do with using attractors to guide the outcome and may have arisen before the brain did. Thus some kinds of prokaryotes are capable of chemotaxis, i.e. of intentional responses. But for the genome, to intentionally achieve mutations would imply mechanisms that have been branded as Lamarckian inheritance (intentionality being only one criterion of Lamarckism besides acquisition during ones lifetime, i.e. faster than the genome changes). No intentional mechanisms have been identified at the level of the genome. But they seem to exist in the realm of mind / intelligence. My general argument, however, readily reframes Lamarckism as a Darwinian problem; intentional acts resolve into sequential acts of trial and error. It is one thing to have the intention “I want to put my hand on this object” and to actually command the muscles to do precisely that which requires the coordination of many neuronal instructions whose interdependence is difficult to anticipate. Precise positioning in fact depends on an error detection and correction feedback to iterate the instructions independent of and prior to sensory feedback [Rodríguez-Fornells et al. 2002]. A related problem in theoretical physics is the three-body problem of gravitation, which also requires iterative solution [Valtonen & Karttunen 2006]. Let me remark that the motif described is rather common in biological functions, immunology too utilizes Neodarwinian logic [Jerne 1967; Tauber & Podolsky 1997; Hull et al. 2001], and possibly the neuronal system as well [Edelman 1987]. Trial and error determines protein assembly of microtubules that are part of the cytosceleton [Kirschner & Gerhrat 2005: 149- 153]. Neodarwinian logic is also found in behavior: for example, the exploratory behavior of ants when foraging for food follows random paths that are reinforced whenever food is found [Kirschner & Gerhart 2005: 153-155; Detrain et al. 1999]. In summary: Following the principle that complexity can only increase in small but variable increments (the key presumption of intelligent design advocates), we have considered how intelligence itself has been subject to evolution and conclude that bootstrapping intelligence in its initial stages was highly dependent on Neodarwinian principles of variation and selection. The Intelligent-design argument modifies but does not contradict Neodarwinian logic. Intelligent design therefore is no conceptual alternative to Darwinism (it only shifts the question to a different context), but it may add features to biology that remain to be discovered. If you wish, you may say: Theories about Intelligent design need to conform to Neodarwinian logic.
37 My translation of Rom 1,20 is based on the German Einheitsübersetzung 1980 and follows the Revised standard version 1952 as far as possible. 21 ---
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