A Scheme for the Generation of Strong Cryptographic Key Pairs Based on Fcmetrics
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GPU-Based Password Cracking on the Security of Password Hashing Schemes Regarding Advances in Graphics Processing Units
Radboud University Nijmegen Faculty of Science Kerckhoffs Institute Master of Science Thesis GPU-based Password Cracking On the Security of Password Hashing Schemes regarding Advances in Graphics Processing Units by Martijn Sprengers [email protected] Supervisors: Dr. L. Batina (Radboud University Nijmegen) Ir. S. Hegt (KPMG IT Advisory) Ir. P. Ceelen (KPMG IT Advisory) Thesis number: 646 Final Version Abstract Since users rely on passwords to authenticate themselves to computer systems, ad- versaries attempt to recover those passwords. To prevent such a recovery, various password hashing schemes can be used to store passwords securely. However, recent advances in the graphics processing unit (GPU) hardware challenge the way we have to look at secure password storage. GPU's have proven to be suitable for crypto- graphic operations and provide a significant speedup in performance compared to traditional central processing units (CPU's). This research focuses on the security requirements and properties of prevalent pass- word hashing schemes. Moreover, we present a proof of concept that launches an exhaustive search attack on the MD5-crypt password hashing scheme using modern GPU's. We show that it is possible to achieve a performance of 880 000 hashes per second, using different optimization techniques. Therefore our implementation, executed on a typical GPU, is more than 30 times faster than equally priced CPU hardware. With this performance increase, `complex' passwords with a length of 8 characters are now becoming feasible to crack. In addition, we show that between 50% and 80% of the passwords in a leaked database could be recovered within 2 months of computation time on one Nvidia GeForce 295 GTX. -
Public-Key Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography EJ Jung Basic Public Key Cryptography public key public key ? private key Alice Bob Given: Everybody knows Bob’s public key - How is this achieved in practice? Only Bob knows the corresponding private key Goals: 1. Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob 2. Bob wants to authenticate himself Requirements for Public-Key Crypto ! Key generation: computationally easy to generate a pair (public key PK, private key SK) • Computationally infeasible to determine private key PK given only public key PK ! Encryption: given plaintext M and public key PK, easy to compute ciphertext C=EPK(M) ! Decryption: given ciphertext C=EPK(M) and private key SK, easy to compute plaintext M • Infeasible to compute M from C without SK • Decrypt(SK,Encrypt(PK,M))=M Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography 1. Computationally easy for a party B to generate a pair (public key KUb, private key KRb) 2. Easy for sender to generate ciphertext: C = EKUb (M ) 3. Easy for the receiver to decrypt ciphertect using private key: M = DKRb (C) = DKRb[EKUb (M )] Henric Johnson 4 Requirements for Public-Key Cryptography 4. Computationally infeasible to determine private key (KRb) knowing public key (KUb) 5. Computationally infeasible to recover message M, knowing KUb and ciphertext C 6. Either of the two keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption: M = DKRb[EKUb (M )] = DKUb[EKRb (M )] Henric Johnson 5 Public-Key Cryptographic Algorithms ! RSA and Diffie-Hellman ! RSA - Ron Rives, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman at MIT, in 1977. • RSA -
Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV
Background on AES-GCM-SIV Fixing the Security Bound Improving Key Derivation Final Remarks Reconsidering the Security Bound of AES-GCM-SIV Tetsu Iwata1 and Yannick Seurin2 1Nagoya University, Japan 2ANSSI, France March 7, 2018 — FSE 2018 T. Iwata and Y. Seurin Reconsidering AES-GCM-SIV’s Security FSE 2018 1 / 26 Background on AES-GCM-SIV Fixing the Security Bound Improving Key Derivation Final Remarks Summary of the contribution • we reconsider the security of the AEAD scheme AES-GCM-SIV designed by Gueron, Langley, and Lindell • we identify flaws in the designers’ security analysis and propose a new security proof • our findings leads to significantly reduced security claims, especially for long messages • we propose a simple modification to the scheme (key derivation function) improving security without efficiency loss T. Iwata and Y. Seurin Reconsidering AES-GCM-SIV’s Security FSE 2018 2 / 26 Background on AES-GCM-SIV Fixing the Security Bound Improving Key Derivation Final Remarks Summary of the contribution • we reconsider the security of the AEAD scheme AES-GCM-SIV designed by Gueron, Langley, and Lindell • we identify flaws in the designers’ security analysis and propose a new security proof • our findings leads to significantly reduced security claims, especially for long messages • we propose a simple modification to the scheme (key derivation function) improving security without efficiency loss T. Iwata and Y. Seurin Reconsidering AES-GCM-SIV’s Security FSE 2018 2 / 26 Background on AES-GCM-SIV Fixing the Security Bound Improving Key Derivation Final Remarks Summary of the contribution • we reconsider the security of the AEAD scheme AES-GCM-SIV designed by Gueron, Langley, and Lindell • we identify flaws in the designers’ security analysis and propose a new security proof • our findings leads to significantly reduced security claims, especially for long messages • we propose a simple modification to the scheme (key derivation function) improving security without efficiency loss T. -
Security + Encryption Standards
Security + Encryption Standards Author: Joseph Lee Email: joseph@ ripplesoftware.ca Mobile: 778-725-3206 General Concepts Forward secrecy / perfect forward secrecy • Using a key exchange to provide a new key for each session provides improved forward secrecy because if keys are found out by an attacker, past data cannot be compromised with the keys Confusion • Cipher-text is significantly different than the original plaintext data • The property of confusion hides the relationship between the cipher-text and the key Diffusion • Is the principle that small changes in message plaintext results in large changes in the cipher-text • The idea of diffusion is to hide the relationship between the cipher-text and the plaintext Secret-algorithm • A proprietary algorithm that is not publicly disclosed • This is discouraged because it cannot be reviewed Weak / depreciated algorithms • An algorithm that can be easily "cracked" or defeated by an attacker High-resiliency • Refers to the strength of the encryption key if an attacker discovers part of the key Data-in-transit • Data sent over a network Data-at-rest • Data stored on a medium Data-in-use • Data being used by an application / computer system Out-of-band KEX • Using a medium / channel for key-exchange other than the medium the data transfer is taking place (phone, email, snail mail) In-band KEX • Using the same medium / channel for key-exchange that the data transfer is taking place Integrity • Ability to determine the message has not been altered • Hashing algorithms manage Authenticity -
A Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm Using the KBRP Method
American Journal of Applied Sciences 5 (7): 777-782, 2008 ISSN 1546-9239 © 2008 Science Publications A Password-Based Key Derivation Algorithm Using the KBRP Method 1Shakir M. Hussain and 2Hussein Al-Bahadili 1Faculty of CSIT, Applied Science University, P.O. Box 22, Amman 11931, Jordan 2Faculty of Information Systems and Technology, Arab Academy for Banking and Financial Sciences, P.O. Box 13190, Amman 11942, Jordan Abstract: This study presents a new efficient password-based strong key derivation algorithm using the key based random permutation the KBRP method. The algorithm consists of five steps, the first three steps are similar to those formed the KBRP method. The last two steps are added to derive a key and to ensure that the derived key has all the characteristics of a strong key. In order to demonstrate the efficiency of the algorithm, a number of keys are derived using various passwords of different content and length. The features of the derived keys show a good agreement with all characteristics of strong keys. In addition, they are compared with features of keys generated using the WLAN strong key generator v2.2 by Warewolf Labs. Key words: Key derivation, key generation, strong key, random permutation, Key Based Random Permutation (KBRP), key authentication, password authentication, key exchange INTRODUCTION • The key size must be long enough so that it can not Key derivation is the process of generating one or be easily broken more keys for cryptography and authentication, where a • The key should have the highest possible entropy key is a sequence of characters that controls the process (close to unity) [1,2] of a cryptographic or authentication algorithm . -
Implementation and Performance Analysis of PBKDF2, Bcrypt, Scrypt Algorithms
Implementation and Performance Analysis of PBKDF2, Bcrypt, Scrypt Algorithms Levent Ertaul, Manpreet Kaur, Venkata Arun Kumar R Gudise CSU East Bay, Hayward, CA, USA. [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract- With the increase in mobile wireless or data lookup. Whereas, Cryptographic hash functions are technologies, security breaches are also increasing. It has used for building blocks for HMACs which provides become critical to safeguard our sensitive information message authentication. They ensure integrity of the data from the wrongdoers. So, having strong password is that is transmitted. Collision free hash function is the one pivotal. As almost every website needs you to login and which can never have same hashes of different output. If a create a password, it’s tempting to use same password and b are inputs such that H (a) =H (b), and a ≠ b. for numerous websites like banks, shopping and social User chosen passwords shall not be used directly as networking websites. This way we are making our cryptographic keys as they have low entropy and information easily accessible to hackers. Hence, we need randomness properties [2].Password is the secret value from a strong application for password security and which the cryptographic key can be generated. Figure 1 management. In this paper, we are going to compare the shows the statics of increasing cybercrime every year. Hence performance of 3 key derivation algorithms, namely, there is a need for strong key generation algorithms which PBKDF2 (Password Based Key Derivation Function), can generate the keys which are nearly impossible for the Bcrypt and Scrypt. -
A New Approach in Expanding the Hash Size of MD5
374 International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS) Vol. 10, No. 2, August 2018 A New Approach in Expanding the Hash Size of MD5 Esmael V. Maliberan, Ariel M. Sison, Ruji P. Medina Graduate Programs, Technological Institute of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines Abstract: The enhanced MD5 algorithm has been developed by variants and RIPEMD-160. These hash algorithms are used expanding its hash value up to 1280 bits from the original size of widely in cryptographic protocols and internet 128 bit using XOR and AND operators. Findings revealed that the communication in general. Among several hashing hash value of the modified algorithm was not cracked or hacked algorithms mentioned above, MD5 still surpasses the other during the experiment and testing using powerful bruteforce, since it is still widely used in the domain authentication dictionary, cracking tools and rainbow table such as security owing to its feature of irreversible [41]. This only CrackingStation, Hash Cracker, Cain and Abel and Rainbow Crack which are available online thus improved its security level means that the confirmation does not need to demand the compared to the original MD5. Furthermore, the proposed method original data but only need to have an effective digest to could output a hash value with 1280 bits with only 10.9 ms confirm the identity of the client. The MD5 message digest additional execution time from MD5. algorithm was developed by Ronald Rivest sometime in 1991 to change a previous hash function MD4, and it is commonly Keywords: MD5 algorithm, hashing, client-server used in securing data in various applications [27,23,22]. -
Security Policy: Informacast Java Crypto Library
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy InformaCast Java Crypto Library Software Version 3.0 Document Version 1.2 June 26, 2017 Prepared For: Prepared By: Singlewire Software SafeLogic Inc. 1002 Deming Way 530 Lytton Ave, Suite 200 Madison, WI 53717 Palo Alto, CA 94301 www.singlewire.com www.safelogic.com Document Version 1.2 © Singlewire Software Page 1 of 35 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library Abstract This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for InformaCast Java Crypto Library. Document Version 1.2 © Singlewire Software Page 2 of 35 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: InformaCast Java Crypto Library Table of Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 5 1.1 About FIPS 140 ............................................................................................................................................. 5 1.2 About this Document.................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 External Resources ....................................................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Notices ......................................................................................................................................................... -
Key Derivation Functions and Their GPU Implementation
MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY}w¡¢£¤¥¦§¨ OF I !"#$%&'()+,-./012345<yA|NFORMATICS Key derivation functions and their GPU implementation BACHELOR’S THESIS Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Brno, Spring 2015 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ cbna ii Declaration Hereby I declare, that this paper is my original authorial work, which I have worked out by my own. All sources, references and literature used or excerpted during elaboration of this work are properly cited and listed in complete reference to the due source. Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Advisor: Ing. Milan Brož iii Acknowledgement I would like to thank my supervisor for his guidance and support, and also for his extensive contributions to the Cryptsetup open- source project. Next, I would like to thank my family for their support and pa- tience and also to my friends who were falling behind schedule just like me and thus helped me not to panic. Last but not least, access to computing and storage facilities owned by parties and projects contributing to the National Grid In- frastructure MetaCentrum, provided under the programme “Projects of Large Infrastructure for Research, Development, and Innovations” (LM2010005), is also greatly appreciated. v Abstract Key derivation functions are a key element of many cryptographic applications. Password-based key derivation functions are designed specifically to derive cryptographic keys from low-entropy sources (such as passwords or passphrases) and to counter brute-force and dictionary attacks. However, the most widely adopted standard for password-based key derivation, PBKDF2, as implemented in most applications, is highly susceptible to attacks using Graphics Process- ing Units (GPUs). -
Authentication and Key Distribution in Computer Networks and Distributed Systems
13 Authentication and key distribution in computer networks and distributed systems Rolf Oppliger University of Berne Institute for Computer Science and Applied Mathematics {JAM) Neubruckstrasse 10, CH-3012 Bern Phone +41 31 631 89 51, Fax +41 31 631 39 65, [email protected] Abstract Authentication and key distribution systems are used in computer networks and dis tributed systems to provide security services at the application layer. There are several authentication and key distribution systems currently available, and this paper focuses on Kerberos (OSF DCE), NetSP, SPX, TESS and SESAME. The systems are outlined and reviewed with special regard to the security services they offer, the cryptographic techniques they use, their conformance to international standards, and their availability and exportability. Keywords Authentication, key distribution, Kerberos, NetSP, SPX, TESS, SESAME 1 INTRODUCTION Authentication and key distribution systems are used in computer networks and dis tributed systems to provide security services at the application layer. There are several authentication and key distribution systems currently available, and this paper focuses on Kerberos (OSF DCE), NetSP, SPX, TESS and SESAME. The systems are outlined and reviewed with special regard to the security services they offer, the cryptographic techniques they use, their conformance to international standards, and their availability and exportability. It is assumed that the reader of this paper is familiar with the funda mentals of cryptography, and the use of cryptographic techniques in computer networks and distributed systems (Oppliger, 1992 and Schneier, 1994). The following notation is used in this paper: • Capital letters are used to refer to principals (users, clients and servers). -
Computational Security and the Economics of Password Hacking
COMPUTATIONAL SECURITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PASSWORD HACKING Abstract Given the recent rise of cloud computing at cheap prices and the increase in cheap parallel computing options, brute force attacks against stolen password databases are a new option for attackers who may not have enough computing power on their own. We take a survey of the current availability and cost of cloud computing as it relates to the idea of computational security in the context of breaking password databases. Rather than look at just the increase in computing power available per computer, we look at how computing as a service is raising the barrier for password protections being computationally secure. We look at the set of key stretching functions meant to defeat brute force password attacks with the current cheapest cloud computing service in order to determine what amount of money and effort an attacker would need to compromise a password database. Michael Phox Zachary Sherin Adin Schmahmann Augusta Niles Context In password-based network security systems, there is a general architecture whereby the password is sent from the user device to a service server, which then hashes the password some number of times using a random oracle before storing the password in a database. Authentication is completed by following the same process and checking if the hashed password is correct. If the password is in the database, access permission is granted (See Figure 1). Figure 1 Password-based Security However, the security system above has been shown to have significant vulnerability depending on the method of password encryption. In contrast to informationally secure (intercepting a ciphertext does not yield any more information to change the probability of any plaintext message. -
TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (TLS) Lokesh Phani Bodavula
TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (TLS) Lokesh Phani Bodavula October 2015 Abstract 1 Introduction The security of Electronic commerce is completely in the hands of Cryptogra- phy. Most of the transactions through e-commerce sites, auction sites, on-line banking, stock trading and many more are exchanged over the network. SSL or TLS are the additional layers that are required in order to obtain authen- tication, privacy and integrity for all kinds of communication going through network. This paper focuses on the additional layer (TLS) which is responsi- ble for the whole communication. Transport Layer Security is a protocol that is responsible for offering privacy between the communicating applications and their users on Internet. TLS is inserted between the application layer and the network layer-where the session layer is in the OSI model TLS, however, requires a reliable transport channel-typically TCP. 2 History Instead of the end-to-end argument and the S-HTTP proposal the developers at Netscape Communications introduced an interesting secured connection concept of low-layer and high-layer security. For achieving this type of security there em- ployed a new intermediate layer between the transport layer and the application layer which is called as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). SSL is the starting stage for the evolution of different transport layer security protocols. Technically SSL protocol is assigned to the transport layer because of its functionality is deeply inter-winded with the one of a transport layer protocol like TCP. Coming to history of Transport layer protocols as soon as the National Center for Super- computing Application (NCSA) released the first popular Web browser called Mosaic 1.0 in 1993, Netscape Communications started working on SSL protocol.