The Stories We Tell: the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitution
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The Stories We Tell: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitution Kate Glover Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal August 2016 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctorate of Civil Laws © Katharine Glover, 2016 Table of Contents Table of Contents……………….……………………………………………………………………..…….i Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………..……………....ii Résumé……………………………………………………………………………..………………...……iii Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………..………..…………...…iv INTRODUCTION………………………...……………………………………………...………………..1 1. THE STORIES WE TELL………………………………………………………………………...…16 Introduction I. The Significance of the Court II. The Roles of the Court III. The Judges of the Court Conclusion 2. CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER…………………………………………..……………..66 Introduction I. Constitutional Interpretation II. Constitutional Disputes III. Constitutional Traditions Conclusion 3. THE SUPREME COURT IN CANADA’S CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER………………..…….133 Introduction I. Expectations II. Postures & Practices III. Commitments Conclusion 4. REFORM OF THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION……….……………….………….…171 Introduction I. The Design of the Court II. Constitutional Amendment and Court Reform III. The Complexity of Part V Conclusion CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………...……………..236 Bibliography…………………………………………………….……………………………………..…245 i Abstract This dissertation is a study of the Supreme Court of Canada and the constitution. At its heart is a dissatisfaction with the assumptions about the constitution that underlie existing accounts of the Court. These assumptions fail to adequately capture structural and lived realities of Canadian constitutionalism. As a consequence, our understandings of the Supreme Court’s role and significance in the constitutional life of the country are tidy, but incomplete in meaningful - indeed harmful - ways. To overcome these shortcomings, this dissertation offers a new account of the Court in Canada’s constitutional order. This new account begins by disrupting the assumptions that underlie the existing narratives. Two reorientations are central. First, the analysis in this dissertation attends to structural dimensions of the constitution, which have been in the shadow of rights-based constitutionalism since patriation. Second, the analysis draws on the insights of legal pluralism, which helpfully inform much constitutional knowledge in Canada but have not been adequately accounted for in understandings of the Supreme Court. This reorientation reveals matters that play a significant role in the Court’s institutional life but have been overlooked and undervalued in the existing accounts. In particular, these matters include the horizontal and shifting institutional framework within which the Court operates, the agonistic dimensions of constitutional disputes, and the multijural character of constitutionalism in Canada. Relying on a structural reading of the constitution, this dissertation tells a different story about the Supreme Court in Canada’s legal order. It first considers the present, urging a shift in expectations, attitudes, and practices in relation to the Court. It then imagines the future, arguing for an approach to Court reform that is sensitive to the aspirations of institutional design, and the possibilities and limits of constitutional amendment in Canada. ii Résumé La présente thèse est une étude de la Cour Suprême du Canada et de la constitution. Cette étude est motivée par une insatisfaction envers les suppositions sur la constitution qui sous-tendent les récits existants sur la Cour. Ces suppositions ne parviennent pas à saisir adéquatement les réalités structurelles et expérientielles du constitutionalisme canadien. Par conséquent, notre compréhension du rôle de la Cour suprême dans la vie constitutionnelle du pays est peut-être ordonnée, mais elle demeure significativement, et même nuisiblement, incomplète. Cette thèse présente un nouveau récit sur le rôle de la Cour dans l’ordre constitutionnel canadien. Ce dernier commence par défaire les suppositions qui sous-tendent les récits existants. Deux réorientations centrales s’imposent. Premièrement, les dimensions structurelles de la constitution, restées dans l’ombre d’un constitutionalisme basé sur les droits depuis le rapatriement, sont incorporées à l’analyse. Deuxièmement, le récit fait appel aux idées du pluralisme juridique, qui ont informé de manière utile l’étude du constitutionalisme canadien sans pourtant avoir été incorporées dans l’examen de la Cour suprême. Cette double réorientation révèle certaines questions ayant joué un rôle important dans la vie constitutionnelle de la Cour, mais qui ont pourtant été négligées ou sous-évaluées dans l’étude du sujet. Il s’agit en particulier du cadre institutionnel horizontal et en déplacement continu dans lequel la Cour opère, de la dimension combative des débats constitutionnelles, et du caractère multijuridique du constitutionalisme au Canada. Se fondant sur une lecture structurelle de la constitution, cette thèse présente un récit différent sur le rôle de la Cour suprême dans l’ordre juridique canadien. D’abord ancrée dans le présent, elle incite au changement dans les attentes, attitudes et pratiques liées à la Cour. Puis, tournée vers le futur, cette étude propose des pistes de réforme sensibles aux aspirations liées à la conception institutionnelle de la Cour, ainsi qu’aux limites et possibilités de l’amendement constitutionnel au Canada. iii Acknowledgements This dissertation was written under the supervision of two visionaries, Rod Macdonald and Hoi Kong. Rod taught me to be bold as a scholar, teacher and student, to invest in my intellectual capital, and to see the possibilities of law in all corners of life. This is a debt I can only repay by trying to help my students learn the same lessons. Rod did not live to see the final version of this dissertation and I am still trying to decipher some of his comments on early chapters, but his counsel informs each page. I hope he would have been proud. Hoi has taught me to be genuine, rigorous, and energetic in my scholarship and teaching. He could always extract the best version of my muddied thoughts; his advice always helped me see the way forward; his mental processor was always running at twice the speed of mine. I am truly grateful that Hoi was willing to take me on as a doctoral student mid-stream and that his door (and Skype line) have been perpetually open to me ever since. I have been fortunate for other extraordinary mentors during my doctoral studies. First, I was lucky to work with Daniel Jutras. The expertise he shared and the opportunities he extended (despite my disdain for football) were transformative and more generous than I could have imagined when I arrived at McGill. I will be constantly striving to live up to the example he sets. Second, I am thankful that I started at McGill Law during the tenure of Rosalie Jukier as Associate Dean of Graduate Studies. Rosalie is a master of professorial life and I am so grateful that I had the chance to learn some of my most formative lessons about being a law professor from her. I hope she didn’t dread our marathon co-author meetings and I will always be grateful that instead of turning me away when I changed my research topic in second year, she paired me with Rod. Third, I was lucky to start my doctoral studies on the heels of a clerkship with the Honourable Justice Abella at the Supreme Court of Canada. There is no greater inspiration to keep working through the puzzles of justice (whether in the courtroom or at the dining room table), and to find joy and humanity in the pursuit, than Justice Abella. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my dear friends and McGill colleagues, Jocelyn Stacey and Marika Samson, who are constant sources of insight and fun. Thank you also to Tina Piper, who was an encouraging and insightful member of my doctoral committee. This research was funded by a Vanier Canada Graduate Scholarship through the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the McGill Faculty of Law, McGill University, the O’Brien Fellowship Program, and the McGill Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. I am grateful to these institutions for their generous support. I presented ideas that are now part of this dissertation at the Osgoode Hall–Toronto Junior Faculty Forum (2016), the 17th and 19th Annual Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conferences (2014, 2016), the Comparative Law Workshop of the University of Ottawa’s Public Law Group and the Younger Comparativists’ Committee of the American Society of Comparative Law (2015), the Centre for Constitutional Studies’ Conference “Time for Boldness on Senate Reform” (2015), the General Meeting of the Canadian Law and Society Association (2015), and the Symposium on Constitution-Making and Constitutional Design at the Clough Centre for Constitutional iv Democracy (2014). Thank you to the organizers and audiences of these events for their feedback, insights and assistance, with particular thanks to the discussants of my work, Carissima Mathen, Cristina Rodriguez, and David Schneiderman. Earlier versions of some parts of this dissertation first appeared in the McGill Law Journal, the Supreme Court Law Review, the Constitutional Forum, and the academic blog “Double Aspect”. A version of Chapter 3 is forthcoming in the Review of Constitutional Studies. Thank you to the editors, publishers, and anonymous reviewers of these journals for their comments and support throughout. Thank you also to the