Reconciliation and the Goguryeo/ Gāogōulì disputes between and

Citation of the final chapter: Hundt, David and He, Baogang 2016, Reconciliation and the Goguryeo/ Gāogōulì disputes between China and South Korea. In Kim, Mikyoung (ed), Routledge handbook of memory and reconciliation in East Asia, Routledge, Abingdon, Eng., pp.227-239.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of a chapter published by Routledge in The Routledge handbook of memory and reconciliation in East Asia in 2016, available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203740323

© 2016, the authors

Downloaded from DRO: http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30063741

DRO Deakin Research Online, Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B

Reconciliation and the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì Disputes between China and South Korea

David Hundt and Baogang He

Abstract:

Just as the failure to reconcile views of the past and to address historical injustice has damaged inter-state relations in East Asia, the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute has harmed relations between South Korea and China. In this chapter, we provide a detailed analysis of the dispute, and explore how this contestation has been reconciled through elite settlement, UNESCO's arbitration and the idea of shared history.

Key words: history disputes, Goguryeo/Gāogōulì kingdom, East Asia, reconciliation, territorial disputes

Introduction

History tends to be written for specific audiences, and the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì1 dispute between Korea and China is no exception. According to Chase, 'shared stories of the past are a primary source of national identity'.2 All histories are contemporary histories, or the history of ideas.3 In the eyes of Oakeshott,4 historians create history through their writing. If the writing of history is predominantly the remit of state elites, the facts at the heart of nationalist narratives may be fabricated and lack deliberative qualities. And if history is re-imagined and re-written free of competing voices, it is vulnerable to 'mythmaking'. That is, the 'divergence of national memories created by elite historical mythmaking' has 'perpetuated and reinforced the problems of history' 5 in relations between East Asian states. In China, for instance, 'historical writing... has been closely linked to elite political power'.6

East Asian history – particularly the legitimacy of national boundaries and political units – has been fiercely contested since the Pacific War (1941–45). The aftermath of the war witnessed the emergence and re-emergence of independent nation-states, which have appropriated that trauma and used it to forge new identities. History plays a significant role in nation building and the construction of identities, but it has also hindered regional integration. The nationalist politics of history is often deliberately subjective, and distorts the past.7 History may legitimate territorial claims, and nationalists often appeal to historical 'facts', but Renan noted a century ago 'Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation'.8

The Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute is a primary instance of history being a source of tension and animosity in East Asia. The names of the disputed kingdom are based on the same Chinese characters (高句麗) but are pronounced differently in each language. Both sides agree that Goguryeo/Gāogōulì survived for seven centuries, from about 37BC until 668AD. The kingdom is commonly agreed to have occupied territories that are now recognized as Manchuria in northern China and the Korean Peninsula. Goguryeo is of great historical importance to Korea, being one of the kingdoms (along

- 1 -

with Silla and Baekche) that were unified and formed the Goryeo dynasty (918– 1392AD). For Koreans, Goguryeo is intrinsically linked to nationhood and identity formation. China, in contrast, claims that Gāogōulì was but one territory that forms part of the multi-millennial, multicultural Chinese civilizational sphere. In this view, China is a super-state that has absorbed minority peoples. This is a political principle to which most Chinese people subscribe.9

The historical dispute involves the possession – both in the physical and spiritual sense – of cultural assets derived from long-extinct civilizations. China and the Koreas both claim to be the legitimate heirs to a kingdom that occupied certain parts of what are now northern China and the Korean peninsula. In addition to the Goguryeo–Gāogōulì dispute, there are other disputed issues such as the lineage of Confucius, the poet Qu Yuan, Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong, traditional medicine, calligraphy and the Dragon Boat (Dano/Duanwu, 端午) Festival between Korea and China.10 What makes the Goguryeo dispute unique is that in securing a claim to the history of an ancient civilization, governments have sought to eliminate competing claims in the present to their sovereign right to the territories where those civilizations existed – and all people, natural resources and other assets within those territories. What Koreans refer to as the Goguryeo kingdom encapsulates territory within China's present borders, but Koreans have not – as yet – sought to reclaim that territory. They have, however, sought to lay claim to the history of the kingdom. China is intent on preventing any claims by Korea to lands now under Chinese jurisdiction. Moreover, the dispute concerns historical memory and legacy: how an ancient kingdom relates to the present-day identities of China and Korea. In seeking to 'gain control of their past and explore their heritages',11 these two states have made competing and seemingly mutually exclusive claims about the history of the kingdom.

After the dispute erupted in an uncontrolled manner via online forums, leaders from both societies attempted to re-appropriate the debate and reach an elite settlement. This fits well a general pattern whereby national leaders and elites have been critical in handling the politicization of the past (see Chapter X in this volume), and the identity conflicts it causes. A collection of essays on the politicization of history confirmed that efforts by political leaders are critical in controlling the retelling of the past and in achieving justice.12 Germany took great efforts to face up to traumatic history of the World War II, openly made an official apology in dealing with the legacies of Nazi fascism.13 Japanese political leaders have also become more conscious of regional reactions to how history textbooks represent events of the war. In 1998, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi offered South Korean President Kim Dae-jung 'a written apology… for past sufferings' which Japan caused its neighbors prior to and during the war. Further, 'Kim accepted with sincerity this statement of Obuchi's recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it'.14 Unfortunately the momentum towards reconciliation did not continue. Former prime minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, made several visits to Yasukuni Shrine between 2001 and 2006, in order to secure the electoral support of right-wing groups such as the Association of Bereaved Families. The current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, also visited the shrine in December 2013. In a comprehensive study of the Pacific War, Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun (see Chapter X) argued that Yasukuni acts as a symbolic impediment to better relations with its neighbors.15 That is, visits to the shrine by Japanese leaders, and the vitriolic response from their Chinese and Korean counterparts, were not conducive to the resolution of history disputes.

- 2 -

In contrast, both China and South Korea have made a conciliatory effort to settle down the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì dispute; this result has not followed the prediction that 'a dangerous cycle of existential conflict is likely to ensue'.16 This chapter will study how Goguryeo/Gāogōulì became a source of tension between South Korea and how this issue is reconciled and managed. It proceeds as follows. The next two sections review how Chinese and Korean scholars have interpreted the history of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì, and thereby identify how the dispute is situated within the wider memory problems in East Asia. The chapter next analyzes how this seemingly intractable Goguryeo dispute was managed through a compromise between China and Korea. In the conclusion, we account for the three factors or mechanisms that facilitate the reconciliation of historical disputes.

Chinese perspectives on the kingdom

Tang-era (618–907AD) records referred to Goguryeo, Silla and Baekje as 'the three kingdoms east of the sea' (海東三國). The Han and Tang courts did not consider Korea to be part of China, and instead referred to it as an 'eastern barbarian' state.17 Similarly, Chinese records refer to the Balhae kingdom, the successor to Goguryeo, as a non- Chinese state. Balhae was referred to as 'the flourishing kingdom east of the sea' (海東 盛國), adding further weight to the claim that it was separate from China.18

In 1934, Lu Simian, a Chinese historian, wrote a book of Chinese nationalities including a lengthy discussion about Gāogōulì. He examined Chinese and Korean sources to trace the origin and evolution of Gāogōulì. Lu mentioned that the Han dynasty established a county government there.19 Fan Wenlan, a famous Marxist historian, endorsed the principle that because China is a multi-ethnic state, all minorities ought to be treated equally. He called Sui's war against Gāogōulì an invasion and regarded Tang-era Emperor Tachong's war against Goguryeo as unjust, which led his failure to conquer Gāogōulì in 644AD. 20 These two famous historians struggled with the historical question of how to treat Goguryeo. Both regarded it as one of China's nationalities, but they did not define Goguryeo as a 'Chinese regional dynasty' or a 'local kingdom under the auspices of the ruling authorities of ancient China'.

In the late 1990s, Chinese developed a revisionist view of the kingdom's history. At a symposium on Gāogōulì held at Tunghua University in 1998, Han Zhongfu proposed that Gāogōulì was a provincial state (a 'local regime') which an ancient Chinese tribe founded; and that it was a provincial Chinese state that later became a neighboring (non- Chinese) state, following the relocation of its capital from Jian to Pyongyang.21 Chinese historians 'cite the evidence of tribute and investiture' to argue that Goguryeo shared a 'subordinate relationship' 22 with China. They also, however, reflect China's long- standing self-image as a Confucian moral exemplar to other states, such as Korea. Chinese school textbooks in the 1930s and 1940s, for instance, referred to Gāogōulì and Balhae as kingdoms that Chinese culture 'assimilated' or 'absorbed'. Due to Sino- centrism, the distinction between ethnic minorities and foreign states is often blurred to Chinese eyes.23

In particular, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has organized the Northeast Project which focused on China's borders with the two Koreas, together with other

- 3 -

research projects on China's borders with Russia and Mongolia, as well as Tibet and Xinjiang. Importantly, three heads of the department of propaganda in three northeast Chinese provinces have been involved in the Northeast Project on Goguryeo.

In response to it, the Korean side berated China for 'stealing' Korean history, and responded by establishing the Goguryeo Research Foundation in 2004. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Culture chaired meetings relating to the history project, underlining the importance of the issue at that time.24

The dispute intensified due to the competing bids by China and North Korea to have Goguryeo artefacts listed by UNESCO as world cultural heritage sites. North Korea's bid to include Goguryeo murals in the north of the Korean peninsula listed by UNESCO as worthy of world heritage protection in 2003 elicited a response from China, which lodged a claim in relation to Gāogōulì castles and tombs located in Manchuria. The South Korean government supported the North's bid, supplying $100,000 a year in aid for the conservation of Goguryeo tombs. The dispute escalated when South Korean scholars viewed China's claim in light of the expanding Northeast Project, under the aegis of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which intended to strengthen Chinese claims to Gāogōulì. China refused to allow Korean survey teams to inspect Goguryeo sites and artifacts, and to verify or disprove Chinese assertions that the artifacts were of Chinese origin. Chinese scholars associated with the Northeast Project also claimed that Gojoseon, Gando and Balhae were of Chinese origin, which raised tensions with Korea even further.25

Arguably, the main motivation for Chinese claims to Gāogōulì was to strengthen its claims to its northeast territories for fear that a reunified Korea might seek to appropriate some parts of Manchuria. Specifically, China sought 'historical justification for the modern-day inclusion of ethnic Koreans and other minorities, as well as their territories' into the PRC. 26 Modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply exclusive sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population sharing a common language and culture, were applied to events that occurred at a time when borders and sovereignty were far looser concepts. 27 Yi In-cheol, of the Goguryeo Research Foundation, argued that 'Chinese history precisely is ''not'' the history of today's China… [this] vision of history… is utterly territory-centered… History is not the sum of past events taking place within a defined area of land, but an aggregate of human actions and affairs'.28

The main motivation of China's claim to Gāogōulì is territorial, but the driving force behind it has been associated with Chinese continuing struggle with its own modern conception of national identity. Given the fact that China inherited the territories of , modern China cannot build its nation upon a narrow Han nationalism. Consequently China has revised historical texts and historical evaluations. For example, Zen Guofan, who served the Qing and defeated a peasant rebellion was regarded as a Han traitor, but now is embraced as a great Chinese national hero.29 With regards to the Gāogōulì issue, even in the 1930s under the Republic of China, Gāogōulì was treated as an ethnic minority. Those scholars who hold the view that Gāogōulì is China’s minority regime just follow the intellectual extreme logic of China's national identity building without considering the feelings of Koreans.

- 4 -

Korean perspectives on the kingdom

Most Korean historians argue that Goguryeo was a kingdom inhabitants of the Korean peninsula founded, and that refugees from Goguryeo proceeded to found the Balhae and Goryeo kingdoms, forerunners to the modern Korean state. For these reasons, they contend that the kingdom was wholly or predominantly Korean.30 According to Cho Bob-jeong of Woosuk University, 'Korean history developed along the lines of Dangun Joseon-Gojoseon-Yemaek and Buyeo-Goguryeo-Balhae… the Korean view of history has been maintained for more than 1,000 years and the Chinese and Japanese history documents also support this part of Korean history'.31 Official Korean histories, such as the Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms and History of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk yusa and Samguk sagi) contain numerous references to the historical continuity of Goguryeo and modern Korean states. These histories refer to battles between Goguryeo and various Chinese regimes and therefore an assertion of Korean identity over the kingdom. In this view, Goryeo's naming was a clear indication that the new state was the successor to the northern origins of Goguryeo.32

For then-South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-moon, the Goguryeo issue 'is directly related to the roots and identity of the entire Korean people'.33 In other words, the issue relates to historical memory rather than territorial claims. According to one Korean writer, Manchuria 'disappeared from Korean history after the fall of the Balhae kingdom' 34 . Given that Goguryeo occupied a specific physical space, however, territorial aspects of the dispute are also relevant (cf. Chapter X for Koreans' imagination of Manchuria).

Korean historiography depicts Goguryeo as a powerful, independent Korean kingdom. Nationalist historians of the early 20th century, especially Shin Chae-ho, sought to promote a racially defined national identity at a time when Korea's very independence as a people and a state was under threat. For Shin, a homogeneous and inclusive Korean race could trace its historical trajectory back to its mythical Tangun founder, through Goguryeo, and onwards to modern Korea. 35 Korean nationalists have 'de-centered China', and emphasised the Manchurian region's centrality to Korean history and identity: the dynasties of Goguryeo, Gojoseon, Balhae and Goryeo can be traced to the region.36

Some Koreans regarded an article published in Guanming Daily as 'a declaration of war'. 37 Park Sun-young from Pohang University of Science and Technology, for example, asserted: 'China has declared a ''history war'', into which other countries, in particular Korea, find themselves unwillingly being drawn into'. The Northeast Project was a 'politically motivated undertaking' that aims to reinforce 'the political influence of the Chinese leadership in regard to assuring national integrity, unity and stability'.38 For another Korean historian, 'the project is not simple historical research. Its ultimate goal is to come up with weapons of historical theories for contemporary political needs',39 such as promoting a sense of unity among ethnic minorities in and combatting attempts by 'hostile forces' to interfere in what China claims are its internal affairs. Koreans also objected to claims by Chinese historians such as Geng Tiehua (a recipient of support from the Northeast Project), that because Goguryeo was an ancient tribe from northeast China, Korea did not have a legitimate claim to its cultural heritage, despite the transfer of the kingdom's capital to Pyongyang.40

- 5 -

A joint seminar by Korean academic societies in late 2003 was held in order to 'counter China's distortions of Goguryeo history'. 41 Korean scholars accused their Chinese counterparts of being in the service of an overtly political agenda. According to Yeo Ho-kyu (professor of history, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies), 'The theory of a unified multi-ethnic nation is nothing more than a ''territory-first historical outlook'' that attempts to determine the nature and course of history solely on the basis of contemporary domain, ignoring the legitimate movers and flows of history'.42

Korean scholars criticized publications sponsored by the Northeast Project for their 'selective and discriminate use of Chinese sources and disregard of epigraphic evidence'.43 Yi In-cheol claimed that Chinese scholars such as Liu Ju presented a misleading interpretation of Goguryeo history, and one that was intended to convey the impression that the kingdom was a provincial state of China. According to Yi, Goguryeo never entered into tributary relations with China.44 Claims that Goguryeo belongs rightfully to Chinese history, Korean scholars argued, rely heavily on a short passage in Jin Yifu's Comprehensive history of the Northeast (Dongbei Tongshi), a patriotic historiography written in 1941 when China was at war with Japan: the people of Goguryeo 'came from Puyo and they are a part of our ''zhonghua minzu [Chinese ethnicity].'' Koguryŏ is the oldest of the states established in the Northeast region'.45

Korean historians noted specific instances of what they claimed were a distortion of Goguryeo history, such as the kingdom's defiance of Chinese orders to join in military action against Xiongnu in 12AD. Ma Dejian argued that Goguryeo was subordinate to China, and that Goguryeo's leader was killed for defying China. 46 An alternative interpretation, however, was that Goguryeo defied the directive of China, retaliated against Chinese settlements, and killed a local governor.47 Another volume sponsored by the Northeast Project emphasized the tributary relations between China and Goguryeo, and downplayed the kingdom's resistance to Chinese invasions and attacks. 48 Korean scholars such as Im Ki-hwan, professor of history at Hanshin University, argued that tributary relations were 'a diplomatic formality' practiced throughout East Asia at the time (see Chapter X). It was 'logically inconsistent to single out Goguryeo' and treat it as a provincial regime.49

A defining feature of the Goguryeo dispute was the intensity of online discussions between Chinese and Korean netizens. South Korean netizens waged campaigns to press Korea's claims to Goguryeo. Chinese netizens responded in kind, leading to a series of highly charged online spats. Rather than engendering a more critical evaluation of the competing historical claims, online debates about the disputed kingdom resulted in the exaggeration of foreign threats, the demonization or mis-characterization of dissenting opinions, and the unwillingness and inability of nationalists to critically examine orthodox views of national history.50

Reconciliation: Shared History and Dual Legacy

Elite Compromise In early 2004 the South Korean minister for culture and tourism, Lee Chang-dong, criticized the 'heated media coverage' of the dispute.51 The South Korean and Chinese governments recognized the potential of the dispute to damage bilateral ties. According to Kim Tae-ho of Hallym University, 'Korea and China… understand that the issue, if

- 6 -

left alone, would destroy ties'.52 On 22 August 2004, Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from China, visited Seoul, and reached a verbal agreement with his counterpart from South Korea after nine hours of discussion.53 China agreed to 'make efforts to correct existing distortions' published on a state-run website, and avoid 'additional distortion of interpretation of Goguryeo's history', as the first steps to implementing the verbal agreement with South Korea. The Korean side monitored implementation of the agreement, and noted corrections to various websites and deletions of offending articles and signage in the vicinity of historical artefacts.54

Since this agreement, China has adopted the following measures including the alteration of the Foreign Ministry website's distorted contents in August 2004, the deletion of the People's Education Press website's distorted contents in September 2004, the correction of Xinhua News Agency website's introductory section in January 2005, and the deletion of Xinhua News Agency internet edition's distorted article in July 2005.55

The reconciliation between two governments has cooled down the scorching dispute. This relatively success is due to the prudent political elites from both China and South Korea. Wen Jiabao, the former Chinese premier, intervened in this matter and gave an order to settle the dispute. It is vital for both state leaders to make a compromise as East Asian states oversee the preparation of school history textbooks, and history as an academic discipline has been used to construct a linearity of collective memory.

The conciliatory idea of shared history The significance of Goguryeo to the formation of national identity in China and Korea contributed to the intensification of the dispute. It is mutually incompatible and irreconcilable for Korea to claim that the kingdom is solely Korean, and for China to argue that it is solely the inheritance of China. Rigidly dichotomous views of history (whereby Goguryeo is purported to belong solely either to China or to Korea) result only in the perpetuation of inter-state tensions. The solution lies in developing a reconcilable and agreeable idea by both sides. Such an idea is that of shared history and dual inheritance.

During a conference in 2004 held in Yanji, Li Sheng, a member of Northeast Project Expert Panel, expressed a conciliatory view of Gāogōulì: that China and Korea share the history of the kingdom.56 Jiang Mengshan is credited with proposing the theory of 'one history shared by two states' (一史两用論), or a 'dual inheritance' that more than one modern state can claim. According to Jiang, Gāogōulì ruled territories situated in modern-day Korea and China, its political, economic and cultural centre shifted from Jian to Pyongyang, its people moved to China after the fall of the kingdom, and it maintained tributary relations with various Chinese dynasties. Scholars who hold this position (most of whom are Korean–Chinese scholars from northeastern China) acknowledge the legitimacy of Korean claims, but maintain that the kingdom 'belongs first to Chinese history and then to Korean history'. For this reason, they argue, the history of Gāogōulì 'should be the ''one history shared by two states'''.57

Reconciliation requires the Korean side to be comfortable with the notion of shared history. Fortunately enough, there is limited and conditional support in Korea for this notion. For Park Doo-bok of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 'ancient history can be shared'. According to Park, 'complex historical processes… have

- 7 -

occurred during the development of human civilization', and 'existing national boundaries are also a product of such historical developments'.58 For another Korean scholar, it was completely understandable that the kingdom should be remembered differently by China and Korea: 'Chinese historians have clearly concluded that the history of Goguryeo is an integral element of Korean history and at the same time also a part of the history of China's northeastern region'. It would be 'unrealistic to attempt to separate the history of Goguryeo from China's historical boundaries, for as long as the northeastern region remains part of Chinese sovereign territory'.59 A new history textbook even urged Koreans to revisit their view of Balhae, and to see it as a multiracial empire founded by the heirs and refugees of Goguryeo which had previously subjugated the Mohe/Malgal people of northern China. In other words, Koreans were encouraged to shift somewhat from the conventional view of themselves as a culturally homogenous group.60

Consequently, the history of Goguryeo was reconsidered in less absolutist zero-sum terms. According to Lim Jie-hyun, professor of history at Hanyang University,

The battle is very unhistorical. In fact, it doesn't make sense to distinguish between Korean and Chinese surrounding the history. At that time, there existed neither China nor Korea. What existed was only Goguryeo. We have to return the history of Goguryeo to the folks of Goguryeo (not the Chinese or Koreans).61

The intense debates about relations between Goguryeo and various Chinese dynasties also had the useful effect of highlighting to scholars in both China and South Korea that it is difficult to draw clear and uncontestable links between the long-extinct kingdom and various Chinese dynasties. It is unrealistic and unfair to expect a group of people to willingly cede territories over which they have exercised ownership for a lengthy period of time purely based on competing historical claims.

The problem here is that modern conceptions of the nation-state, which imply exclusive sovereignty over a fixed territory and a population sharing a common language or culture, have been applied to events that occurred at a time when borders and sovereignty were far looser concepts. 62 It is questionable at best to apply the contemporary ideal-type conception of the nation-state to modes of political organization in the distant past, especially given that the Sino–Korean border was only formalized in its current terms early in the 20th century.63

International Implications China and South Korea are not the only two states to contest sovereignty of both past and present borders. As Wang reminds us, 'History education is no longer a domestic issue in East Asia'.64 To handle historical disputes successfully, it may be necessary to have mediation from the international community.65 In July 2004 UNESCO reached a decision that alleviated some of the tensions in the Goguryeo dispute: it accepted both sets of claims in relation to the remains of the capital cities, mountain fortresses and tombs that China and North Korea had submitted. Rather than declaring that Goguryeo belonged exclusively to either one side or the other, UNESCO had declared that both sets of claims had some validity.

- 8 -

The decision provided a degree of international legitimacy for the idea of shared history discussed above; and it helped to reconcile this historical dispute. In contrast, UNESCO's decision on the inscription of Preas Vihear temple on 8 July 2008 intensified the historical dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Thai Foreign Minister Nappadon Pattama initially supported Cambodia's bid for World Heritage Listing. However, the Thai Constitutional Court ruled that the foreign minister had violated Article 190 of Thailand's 2007 Constitution, which calls for a public debate and Cabinet-level approval. As a result Nappadon Pattama resigned over the listing of Preah Vihear by UNESCO on 10 July 2008. Since then Thai government has claimed its historical territories and even sent over 1,000 troops to defend the temple.

International arbitration helped facilitate a compromise in the Goguryeo/Gāogōulì case, but it was less effective in the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. Specific issues, such as the loss of several lives on the Thai and Cambodian sides, and the appointment of exiled former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra as an advisor to the Cambodian government,66 added a degree of tension to the temple dispute that was absent in the case of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì. Another difference was that the Thai–Cambodian dispute centered on a single tangible site, whereas the Sino–Korean case entailed a much wider expanse and range of artefacts. The temple dispute revolved around a single site, so international arbitration was in essence a 'zero-sum game' in which there could be only one winner. The notion of shared history, by contrast, was developed with the express intention of allowing both sides to 'win' insofar as they could incorporate the kingdom into their own historical accounts.

Conclusions

The outcome of the Goguryeo dispute was a compromise. Three sets of actors contributed to the partial reconciliation. At the international level, UNESCO's judgment that both sets of claims had some validity helped both sides to reach compromise. At the national level, state leaders in China and Korea cooperated to resolve the matter after parallel domestic dialogues – or perhaps more strictly, monologues – degenerated in such a way that bilateral relations were damaged. At the societal level, the Chinese scholars have developed the notion of the 'shared history' of Goguryeo/Gāogōulì; while some Korean scholars were comfortable with and supported it. These three sets of actors worked together to find and develop a fruitful way to resolve issues surrounding ancient kingdoms. So far both sides have managed to control the dispute; for example, the dispute over Goguryeo was not mentioned in the Modern History of East Asia, a historical textbook jointly produced by scholars and civil society from China, South Korea and Japan.67 The Chinese government has also respected the settlement reached in 2004. The prediction on a dangerous cycle of conflicts does not happen. The successful reconciliation of this dispute may offer valuable lessons to the other historical disputes in East Asia, and the key to reconciliation is the idea of shared history. In this world, East Asians have to share common and overlapping history to reduce conflicts.

Biographical Notes: David Hundt is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University. His research interests are the politics, security and political economy of the Asia–Pacific, and he has a particular interest in Korean Studies. His articles have appeared in

- 9 -

Australian Journal of International Affairs, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Journal of Development Studies, Political Science and Asian Perspective. His book, Korea's Developmental Alliance: State, Capital and the Politics of Rapid Development, was published with Routledge in 2009. His main current research project analyses the varieties of capitalism in East Asia.

School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood VIC 3125 Australia Email: [email protected]

Professor Baogang He is the head of Public Policy and Global Affairs program at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and tenured Full Professor and Chair of International Studies program since 2005, at Deakin University, Australia. After graduating with a PhD in Political Science from the Australian National University in 1994, Professor He has become widely known for his work in Chinese democratization and politics, in particular the deliberative politics in China. Professor He has published 50 book chapters, four books of which three are single-authored and 54 international journal papers. His publications are found in top journals including British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Peace Research and Perspectives on Politics.

Professor He Baogang The Head of Public Policy and Global Affairs School of Humanities and Social Science Nanyang Technological University 14 Nanyang Drive, HSS 05-04 Singapore 637332 Email: [email protected]

The authors are grateful to the editor for organizing this collection, and for providing timely and thoughtful feedback on an earlier version of the chapter.

Works Cited Alterman, E. 'Untangling Balkan knots of myth and countermyth', New York Times 31 July 1999, B1. Chase, T. 'Nationalism and the net: online discussion of Goguryeo history in China and South Korea', China Information 25/1, 2011, 61–82. Cho, B. 'Problems concerning China's research', Korea Herald 4 February 2004, 20. Choe, G. Jungguk ui Goguryeo-sa waegok (China's distortion of Goguryeo's history). Seoul: Sallim, 2004. Choi, S. 'Questions remain on verbal pact with China', Korea Herald 25 August 2004, 24. Collingwood, R.G. The idea of history. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946. Croce, B. History as the story of liberty. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941. Editorial. 'Contest over kingdom', Korea Herald 7 July 2004, 10. Editorial. 'Historical sovereignty', Korea Herald 11 January 2004, 32. Fan, W. A concise history of China (Zhongguo tongshi jianbian), Beijing: People's Publishers, 1965.

- 10 -

Geng, T. The 1560th anniversary of the King Hotae stele (Haotaiwang bei yi qian wu bai liu shi nian zai). Chinese Academy of Social Science, 2004. Go, S. 'Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daehan insik: sujikjeok insik-eul neomeoseo supyeongjeok insik-euro-ui baljeon jeonmang (China's perceptions of Korea: the prospects for advancing beyond vertical perceptions to horizontal perceptions', Gukka Jeollyak 12/4, 2006, 105–34. Gong, G.W. 'The beginning of history: remembering and forgetting as strategic issues', Washington Quarterly 24/2, 2001, 45–57. Gries, P.H. 'The Koguryo controversy, national identity and Sino–Korean relations today', East Asia 22/4, 2005, 3–17. Guo, Y. and He, B. 'Reimagining the Chinese nation: the Zeng Guofan phenomenon', Modern China 25/2, 1999, 142–70. Ha, D. 'Han–Jung jeongsang huidam-ui seonggwa-wa uimi (Results and significance of the Korea–China summit meeting)', Jeongse-wa Jeongchaek November 2006, 11–13. Ha, T. 'The spirit of Goguryeo in Manchuria (Goguryeo-ui hon sumswi-neun Manchu- beolpan)', Donga Ilbo 25 October 2011. Ham, S. 'A bias-free look at Korean history (Chiwoochin sigak geodeonaego bon uri yeoksa)', Hankyoreh Sinmun 19 February 2011. He, B. 'East Asian ideas of regionalism', Australian Journal of International Affairs 58/1, 2004, 105–25. He, B.and Hundt, D. 'A deliberative approach to East Asia's history disputes', Japanese Journal of Political Science 13/1, 2012, 37–58. He, Y. 'National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino–Japanese relations'. In P.E. Lam, ed., Japan's relations with China: facing a rising power. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, pp. 69–91. Heisler, M.O. 'The political currency of the past: history, memory and identity', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 14–24. Heisler, M.O. 'Challenged histories and collective self-concepts: politics in history, memory and time', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 199–211. Im, K. 'Goguryeo's relationship with China', Korea Herald 19 February 2004, 3. Jeong, J. 'History is the future (Yeoksa-neun mirae-da)', Joongang Ilbo 20 October 2012. Jiang, Y. 'China and South Korea reach five-point agreement on Goguryeo history', CVN 25 August 2004. http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2004/08/200408250300.shtml. Accessed 30 January 2014. Jin, H. 'Nationalism prevalent in Korean history textbooks, experts say', Korea Herald 7 May 2005. Jones, A. 'Nationalizing the past: Korea in Chinese history', Journal of Northeast Asian History 6/2, 2009, 103–39. Kim, J.B. 'A critique of the Chinese theory of ''one history shared by two states'' (一史 两用論) as applied to Koguryŏ history', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 6–26. Kim, J.B. 'The name ''haedong samguk'' (Three Kingdoms east of the sea) as recorded in traditional Chinese historical documents', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 1/1, 2005, 7–23.

- 11 -

Korea Herald. 'Q&A session with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon', Korea Herald 22 October 2004, 25. Lee, S. 'Internet rumors roil China–Korea ties', Asia Times 9 August 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JH09Ad02.html. Accessed 9 August 2008. Lee, S. 'The changing Korean ego in the Northeast Asia era (Dongbuka sidae Hangukin- ui ja-a byeonhwa)', Hanguk Jeongchihak Hoebo 46/1, 2012, 203–28. Li, D. 'On the issue of Gāogōulì historical research (Shilun Gāogōulì lishi yanjiu de jige wenti)', Guangming Daily 24 June 2003. http://www.chinazangnan.com/show.aspx?id=45&cid=19. Accessed 11 August 2008. Lu, S. A history of China's nationalities (Zhongguo minzu shi), Shanghai: World Publishers, 1989. Ma, D., ed. Continued essays on the history of Gāogōulì in ancient China (Gudai Zhongguo Gāogōulì lishi xulun). Chinese Academy of Social Science, 2003. MOFAT. 'Issues in Focus: Goguryeo', Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007. http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/hotissues/goguryeo/index.jsp. Accessed 14 August 2008. Mohan, P.N. 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 27–46. Moon, C. and Suh, S. 'Burdens of the past: overcoming history, the politics of identity and nationalism in Asia', Global Asia 2/1, 2007, 32–48. Northeast Asia History Foundation. 'Our mission', Seoul: NAHF, 2008. http://www.nahf.or.kr/eng/. Accessed 12 February 2014. Oakeshott, M. Experience and its modes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. Park, D. '''History of Goguryeo'' calls for fact-based research (''Goguryeo-sa'' silsa-gusi jeopgeun-eul)', Donga Ilbo 27 January 2004. Park, S. 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'': launch of a ''history war'''? Korean Historical Review June 2004. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Essays/view.asp?volume_id=36&content _id=62&category=G. Accessed 1 August 2013. Park, W. '''Goguryeo, China'' and ''Dokdo, Japan'''? Hankyoreh Sinmun 12 January 2004. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Society/view.asp?volume_id=32&conten t_id=502&category=D. Accessed 1 August 2013. Qian, F. 'Internationalizing the memory: the building and rebuilding of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial'. Paper presented at the University of Concordia, Canada, April 2009. Ryuichi, N. '''Dong Asia''-ui ganeungseong (The possibility of ''East Asia'')', Changjak- gwa-Bipyeong 131, 2006, 401–18. Schneider, C. 'The Japanese history textbook controversy in East Asian perspective', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 107–22. Schultz, E.J. 'How English-language scholarship views Kogoryŏ', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 80–94. Shin, G. Park, S. and Yang, D., eds. Rethinking historical injustice and reconciliation in Northeast Asia: the Korean experience. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006.

- 12 -

Strangio, S. 'Good relations on the horizon', Phnom Penh Post 7 July 2010. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-good-relations-horizon. Accessed 12 February 2014. Sun, J. 'Some issues regarding the study of ownership of Kogoryŏ', Dongjiang Journal 18/3, 2001, 20–5. Takahiko, T. 'The Yomiuri project and its results', Asian Perspective 31/1, 2007, 43– 60. Wang, Z. 'National humiliation, history education and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China', International Studies Quarterly 52/4, 2008, 783–806. Yanbian University. The question of Gāogōulì: a collection of historical papers (Gāogōulì lishi wenti yanjiu lunwenji), Yanbian University, 2005. Yi, I. 'Flawed arguments of Chinese historians', Donga Ilbo 13 August 2006. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Society/view.asp?volume_id=36&conten t_id=56&category=D. Accessed 1 August 2013. Yi, I. 'Review: Gāogōulì lishi wenti yanjiu lunwenji', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 141–51. Zabrovskaya, L. 'A brief history of the Sino–Korean border from the 18th century to the 20th century.' In R. Frank, J.E. Hoare, P. Köllner and S. Pares, eds, Korea Yearbook: politics, economy and society. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007, 283–97. Zhang, W. 'A review of issues on Korea's history of Koguryo', Journal of International Information 9, 2004, 27–31.

1 To the greatest extent possible, we use the Revised Romanization of Korean (RRK) system to transliterate Korean terms and names (see http://www.korean.go.kr/eng/roman/roman.jsp), and for Chinese terms and names, we use the Wade–Giles (WG) system (see http://www.loc.gov/catdir/pinyin/romcover.html). If authors romanize their names in ways that do not comply with these systems, however, we use their preferred spellings. And when authors who we cite use spellings that do not comply with the RRK or WG systems, we retain the original spellings. 2 T. Chase, 'Nationalism and the net: online discussion of Goguryeo history in China and South Korea', China Information 25/1, 2011, 62. 3 B. Croce, History as the story of liberty. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941; R.G. Collingwood, The idea of history. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946. 4 M. Oakeshott, Experience and its modes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933. 5 Y. He, 'National mythmaking and the problems of history in Sino–Japanese relations'. In P.E. Lam, ed., Japan's relations with China: facing a rising power. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006, p. 69. 6 Chase, 'Nationalism and the net', 64. 7 M.O. Heisler, 'The political currency of the past: history, memory and identity', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 14–24. 8 Cited in E. Alterman, 'Untangling Balkan knots of myth and countermyth', New York Times, 31 July 1999. 9 J. Sun, 'Some issues regarding the study of ownership of Kogoryŏ', Dongjiang Journal 18/3, 2001, 20– 5. 10 S. Lee, 'Internet rumors roil China–Korea ties', Asia Times 9 August 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JH09Ad02.html. Accessed 9 August 2008. 11 E.J. Schultz, 'How English-language scholarship views Kogoryŏ', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 89. 12 Heisler, The political currency of the past, and other articles published in Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617 (2008); G. Shin, S. Park and D. Yang, eds, Rethinking historical injustice and reconciliation in Northeast Asia: the Korean experience. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006.

- 13 -

13 M.O. Heisler, 'Challenged histories and collective self-concepts: politics in history, memory and time', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 199–211. 14 G.W. Gong, 'The beginning of history: remembering and forgetting as strategic issues', Washington Quarterly 24/2, 2001, 46, 50; see also C. Schneider, 'The Japanese history textbook controversy in East Asian perspective', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science 617, 2008, 107–22. 15 T. Takahiko, 'The Yomiuri project and its results', Asian Perspective 31/1, 2007, 43–60. 16 P.H. Gries, 'The Koguryo controversy, national identity and Sino–Korean relations today', East Asia 22/4, 2005, 14. 17 J.B. Kim, 'A critique of the Chinese theory of ''one history shared by two states'' (一史两用論) as applied to Koguryŏ history', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 7; Schultz, 'How English- language scholarship views Kogoryŏ', 90. 18 J. Jeong, 'History is the future (Yeoksa-neun mirae-da)', Joongang Ilbo 20 October 2012. 19 S. Lu, A history of China's nationalities (Zhongguo minzu shi), Shanghai: World Publishers, 1989, pp. 81–4. 20 W. Fan, A concise history of China (Zhongguo tongshi jianbian), Beijing: People's Publishers, 1965, pp. 2, 163. 21 S. Park, 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'': launch of a ''history war'''? Korean Historical Review June 2004. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Essays/view.asp?volume_id=36&content_id=62&category=G. Accessed 1 August 2013. 22 P.N. Mohan, 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 32. 23 A. Jones, 'Nationalizing the past: Korea in Chinese history', Journal of Northeast Asian History 6/2, 2009, 103, 117. 24 S. Go, 'Jungguk-ui Hanguk-e daehan insik: sujikjeok insik-eul neomeoseo supyeongjeok insik-euro-ui baljeon jeonmang (China's perceptions of Korea: the prospects for advancing beyond vertical perceptions to horizontal perceptions', Gukka Jeollyak 12/4, 2006, 112–13; Mohan, 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge'. The foundation was later renamed as the Northeast Asia History Foundation (NAHF), and in September 2006 re- launched with a stated mission of 'establishing a basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by confronting distortions of history that have caused anguish in this region and the world at large'. The NAFH, whose three main activities are 'historical research and reconciliation', 'preparation for an East Asian community', and 'historical dialogue and exchange', is the product of a more conciliatory attitude towards historical disputes in the region. See: Northeast Asia History Foundation, 'Our mission', Seoul: NAHF, 2008. http://www.nahf.or.kr/eng/. Accessed 12 February 2014. 25 Editorial, 'Contest over kingdom', Korea Herald 7 July 2004, 10; W. Park, '''Goguryeo, China'' and ''Dokdo, Japan'''? Hankyoreh Sinmun 12 January 2004. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Society/view.asp?volume_id=32&content_id=502&category=D. Accessed 1 August 2013. 26 Chase, 'Nationalism and the net', 64; see also W. Zhang, 'A review of issues on Korea's history of Koguryo', Journal of International Information 9, 2004, 27–31. 27 N. Ryuichi, '''Dong Asia''-ui ganeungseong (The possibility of ''East Asia'')', Changjak-gwa-Bipyeong 131, 2006, 401–18. 28I. Yi, 'Review: Gāogōulì lishi wenti yanjiu lunwenji', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 3/1, 2006, 150; see also I. Yi, 'Flawed arguments of Chinese historians', Donga Ilbo 13 August 2006. http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/Society/view.asp?volume_id=36&content_id=56&category=D. Accessed 1 August 2013. 29 Y. Guo and B. He, 'Reimagining the Chinese nation: the Zeng Guofan phenomenon', Modern China 25/2, 1999, 142–70. 30 G. Choe, Jungguk ui Goguryeo-sa waegok (China's distortion of Goguryeo's history). Seoul: Sallim, 2004; J.B. Kim, 'The name ''haedong samguk'' (Three Kingdoms east of the sea) as recorded in traditional Chinese historical documents', Journal of Inner and East Asian Studies 1/1, 2005, 7–23. 31 B. Cho, 'Problems concerning China's research', Korea Herald 4 February 2004, 20. 32 Schultz, 'How English-language scholarship views Kogoryŏ', 92; 88, 94. 33 Cited in Korea Herald, 'Q&A session with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon', Korea Herald 22 October 2004, 25; see also MOFAT, 'Issues in Focus: Goguryeo', Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2007. http://www.mofat.go.kr/english/political/hotissues/goguryeo/index.jsp. Accessed 14 August 2008. 34 T. Ha, 'The spirit of Goguryeo in Manchuria (Goguryeo-ui hon sumswi-neun Manchu-beolpan)', Donga Ilbo 25 October 2011.

- 14 -

35 Chase, 'Nationalism and the net', 65. 36 S. Lee, 'The changing Korean ego in the Northeast Asia era (Dongbuka sidae Hangukin-ui ja-a byeonhwa)', Hanguk Jeongchihak Hoebo 46/1, 2012, 203–28; Mohan, 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge', 36. 37 D. Li, 'On the issue of Gāogōulì historical research (Shilun Gāogōulì lishi yanjiu de jige wenti)', Guangming Daily 24 June 2003. http://www.chinazangnan.com/show.aspx?id=45&cid=19. Accessed 11 August 2008; MOFAT, 'Issues in focus'. 38 Park, 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'''. 39 Cho, 'Problems concerning China's research'. 40 Yi, 'Review', 145. 41 Park, 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'''. 42 Yeo, 'Chinese views on the origins of Goguryeo'. 43 Mohan, 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge', 36. 44 Yi, 'Review', 142, 144. 45 Jin cited in Kim, 'A critique of the Chinese theory of ''one history shared by two states'' (一史两用論) as applied to Koguryŏ history', 18. 46 D. Ma, ed., Continued essays on the history of Gāogōulì in ancient China (Gudai Zhongguo Gāogōulì lishi xulun). Chinese Academy of Social Science, 2003. 47 Mohan, 'China's nationalist historiography of the ''Northeast Project'' and the Australian response to its challenge', 32–3. 48 T. Geng, The 1560th anniversary of the King Hotae stele (Haotaiwang bei yi qian wu bai liu shi nian zai). Chinese Academy of Social Science, 2004. 49 K. Im, 'Goguryeo's relationship with China', Korea Herald 19 February 2004, 3. 50 Chase, 'Nationalism and the net', 61–63. 51 Cited in Editorial, 'Historical sovereignty', Korea Herald 11 January 2004, 32. 52 Cited in S. Choi, 'Questions remain on verbal pact with China', Korea Herald 25 August 2004, 24. 53 Y. Jiang, 'China and South Korea reach five-point agreement on Goguryeo history', CVN 25 August 2004. http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2004/08/200408250300.shtml. Accessed 30 January 2014. 54 MOFAT, 'Issues in focus'; see also Chase, 'Nationalism and the net', 61; Editorial, 'Contest over kingdom'; Korea Herald, 'Q&A session with Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon'. 55 MOFAT, 'Issues in focus'. 56 Yi, 'Review', 142; The question of Gāogōulì: a collection of historical papers (Gāogōulì lishi wenti yanjiu lunwenji), Yanbian University, 2005. 57 Jiang cited in Kim, 'A critique of the Chinese theory of ''one history shared by two states'' (一史两用 論) as applied to Koguryŏ history', 9; see also D. Ha, 'Han–Jung jeongsang huidam-ui seonggwa-wa uimi (Results and significance of the Korea–China summit meeting)', Jeongse-wa Jeongchaek November 2006, 12; Sun, 'Some issues regarding the study of ownership of Koguryo'; Park, 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'''; Yi, 'Review', 147. 58 D. Park, '''History of Goguryeo'' calls for fact-based research (''Goguryeo-sa'' silsa-gusi jeopgeun-eul)', Donga Ilbo 27 January 2004. 59 Park, 'China's ''Northeast Asia Project'''. 60 S. Ham, 'A bias-free look at Korean history (Chiwoochin sigak geodeonaego bon uri yeoksa)', Hankyoreh Sinmun 19 February 2011. 61 Cited in H. Jin, 'Nationalism prevalent in Korean history textbooks, experts say', Korea Herald 7 May 2005. 62 Ryuichi, 'The possibility of ''East Asia''', 406–10. 63 L. Zabrovskaya, 'A brief history of the Sino–Korean border from the 18th Century to the 20th Century.' In R. Frank, J.E. Hoare, P. Köllner and S. Pares, eds, Korea Yearbook: politics, economy and society. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007, 285–86. 64 Z. Wang, 'National humiliation, history education and the politics of historical memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China', International Studies Quarterly 52/4, 2008, 801; see also B. He, 'East Asian ideas of regionalism', Australian Journal of International Affairs 58/1, 2004, 105–25; C. Moon and S. Suh, 'Burdens of the past: overcoming history, the politics of identity and nationalism in Asia', Global Asia 2/1, 2007, 32–48. 65 F. Qian, 'Internationalizing the memory: the building and rebuilding of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial'. Paper presented at the University of Concordia, Canada, April 2009. 66 S. Strangio, 'Good relations on the horizon', Phnom Penh Post 7 July 2010. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-good-relations-horizon. Accessed 12 February 2014.

- 15 -

67 See B. He and D. Hundt, 'A deliberative approach to East Asia's history disputes', Japanese Journal of Political Science 13/1, 2012, 37–58.

- 16 -