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Hostdb: the Best Damn Host2dns/DHCP Script Ever Written Thomas Limoncelli – Cibernet Corp

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Hostdb: the Best Damn Host2dns/DHCP Script Ever Written Thomas Limoncelli – Cibernet Corp HostDB: The Best Damn host2DNS/DHCP Script Ever Written Thomas Limoncelli – Cibernet Corp. ABSTRACT HostDB is a system for generating DNS zone files, BIND configurations, and ISC DHCP server configurations. It is extremely simple yet powerful, which makes it easy to deploy. It is not so complicated that it requires an SQL database or web server. It is not a single generation script but a complete system that includes tools for deploying the files that are generated. The system is written in Perl and shell and makes heavy use of make. The zone files that it generates look hand- made, except that they are clean. Powerful tools are also provided to aid in the conversion from legacy systems. HostDB is the third generation of my DNS maintenance systems and embodies not just superior software but also best practices in system administration. HostDB uses small tools that combine to achieve large goals. Initial deployment can be done in stages to reduce risk. Deployment of updates is fully automated. It rocks. Introduction Many generate zone files that are not pretty: hand- edited zone files would be more readable (if we only The goal of HostDB is to create a DNS zone had the time to maintain them that way!). HostDB generator that is full-featured without requiring com- fixes all these issues. It does this without introducing a plicated databases and web services. The system uses complicated syntax plus it generates your DHCP con- simple configuration files and automates deployment. figuration file ‘‘for free’’! The code is written in Perl, It is easy to deploy whether you are converting a legacy system one zone at a time or setting up a new shell, and make and is freely available. system from scratch. Setup time is fast. Really fast. The system can be Many small and medium sites (dozens or hun- used to generate zone files that can be individually dreds of machines) hand-edit DNS zone files. This is inserted into your legacy systems within minutes of an error-prone practice which requires a high skill installing the software. HostDB breaks from the Free level. The smallest typo can cause big outages. and Open Source Software (F/OSS) tradition of pro- viding a default configuration that is an arrogant dis- Many large sites (multiple IT teams, locations, play of the most complicated features. Instead the and internet connections) use DNS management sys- default configuration is a useful example that can tems that provide no revision control and very little often by used ‘‘out of the box’’ with only small audit trail of who made what changes. Many also changes. Documentation is included for migrating require external (outside the firewall, or ‘‘public’’) from a legacy system in small steps with plenty of zone files to be maintained by hand, which adds the testing along the way. risk that they will become out of date with internal (inside the firewall, or ‘‘private’’) zones. Audience The problem with most DNS generation scripts HostDB seeks to fill the void between simple is that they are either too simplistic to be useful or so DNS zone generation scripts and massive DNS/DHCP complicated that they are intimidating to install. The database-driven applications. It is perfect for a site that simple ones are fine for doing an initial conversion is starting fresh, or for one that currently hand-edits from /etc/hosts to zone files that will be hand-edited in zone files and wishes to introduce automation. the future. Many are ‘‘point tools’’ that require a lot of integration work. The complex ones are so unwieldy The learning curve and installation curve for that small sites find them too scary to install. Most HostDB is very small. Thus, it is appropriate for sites don’t handle complicated DNS idioms such as having that do not have the need, expertise, or resources special MX records for mail servers, proper handling required by systems that have a web-based front-end of multi-homed hosts, or templates for ranges of simi- or use a SQL database as the backend. larly named hosts. They don’t handle generating dif- HostDB is good for sysadmins that need an ferent zone files for inside the firewall versus outside extremely good solution but don’t have a lot of time. the firewall (i.e., ‘‘host hiding’’) resulting in hand- Migration from a legacy system is extremely easy edited external zone files that are prone to errors. because the files that are generated are put into a 19th Large Installation System Administration Conference (LISA ’05) 209 HostDB: The Best Damn host2DNS/DHCP Script Ever Written Limoncelli repository before they are copied to their final destina- deployed as well, making it possible to maintain the tion. Thus, comparisons between the legacy zones and all files related to DNS and DHCP configuration for the HostDB-generated zones can be done as part of multiple servers around a network from one central acceptance testing. Tools for comparing zones are pro- administration host. vided. Individual zone files can be put into service Major tools are written in Perl, with many helper permitting an incremental deployment methodology programs in BASH shell. Shell glues them together in (rather than a ‘‘flash-cut’’), thus reducing risk. a way that is easy for sysadmins to understand. The HostDB is not appropriate for extremely large system tries not to re-invent the wheel, thus it uses organizations with many separate IT groups or sites standard UNIX tools: make, SSH, sed and awk. Sed with complicated dynamic DNS configurations. Their and awk have been feeling ignored lately so we threw needs would be better served with other, larger, sys- some work their way. tems. It doesn’t directly support a sophisticated autho- rization schemes, a web-based interface, or assistance How to Configure for dynamic DNS updates. However, HostDB does There are three configuration files. Each encap- have some hooks that make it easy for simple dynamic sulates information that would be updated by a partic- DNS to be used. Also, large organizations are often ular audience. The format is either simple or compli- composed of many smaller IT organizations which cated based on the audience as summarized in Table 1. would find HostDB entirely appropriate. These orga- nizations often have one team that manages all inter- The syntax of hostdb.txt is simple because a non- net connectivity and HostDB is excellent for maintain- DNS expert needs to be able to edit it without intro- ing the related DNS zones. ducing errors. Rather than designing a syntax by and At this time HostDB has no support for IPv6. for DNS experts, much effort was spent in designing a I’m okay with this. syntax that made sense to the junior engineers that would be using the system. The filename ends with What Does It Do? ‘‘.txt’’ to facilitate non-UNIX admins editing these files through non-UNIX tools like Notepad. I have seen many exceptional DNS/DHCP con- figuration management systems that provide excellent zoneconf.txt requires a little more knowledge of web front ends and are so powerful that implementa- how DNS zones work, which is appropriate because tion requires an SQL database. HostDB isn’t one of this file should only be edited by a person with those. advanced DNS knowledge. HostDB lets you track all DNS and DHCP infor- destinations.txt is extremely simple because it mation about all your hosts in a single, simple file. simply states where files are to be copied after they From that file, it generates DNS zones, BIND configu- are generated. It permits files to be renamed as they ration files (named.conf) and host entries that can be are copied, which makes inserting a generated file into included in an ISC DHCP server configuration a pre-existing legacy system very easy. (dhcpd.conf). Two helper configuration files guide Standard UNIX protections can be used to con- zone creation and file deployment, but they are basi- trol who can edit these files. They are all plain ASCII cally static after the system is stable. files, appropriate for maintaining under revision con- The system generates the complete zones and trol systems like RCS, SCCS, CVS or Subversion. configurations. No hand-editing after the fact is Any system administrator maintaining key files such required. Thus, automation using make and other tools as these without a revision control system is taking an is possible. undue risk. Revision control means knowing what The system handles complicated DNS idioms changed when. When a change is introduced that such as: causes an outage, one can undo a change, investigate • Special MX records for mail servers. who made the change, mentor them so they do not • Proper DNS records for multi-homed hosts and repeat the mistake, and optionally ridicule them during routers. staff meetings. • Templates for ranges of similarly named hosts. DNS Zone Generation • Host-hiding (generating different zones for DNS zones are generated using ‘‘mkzones’’. external DNS servers). Mkzones parses the entire hostdb.txt file, storing the • Clean, human-readable zone files are generated important bits into various data structures. It then reads (as if they were human-generated, but neater) zoneconf.txt which is ‘‘executed’’ line by line, setting HostDB includes a tool called ‘‘mkdestinations’’ options and generating zones as instructed. Because of which generates a Makefile that will efficiently deploy this design, an option can be set one way before a par- (push) individual files to local and remote hosts. It ticular zone is generated and then another way before recognizes zone files and treats them specially to pre- the next zone is generated.
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