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Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive : Prospects of a Proper Function-Based Approach

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Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive : prospects of a proper function-based approach Citation for published version (APA): Holland, van, M. (2013). Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive : prospects of a proper function-based approach. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven. https://doi.org/10.6100/IR759659 DOI: 10.6100/IR759659 Document status and date: Published: 01/01/2013 Document Version: Publisher’s PDF, also known as Version of Record (includes final page, issue and volume numbers) Please check the document version of this publication: • A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement: www.tue.nl/taverne Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at: [email protected] providing details and we will investigate your claim. Download date: 23. Sep. 2021 Extended Cogn ition and the Mark of the Cogn itive: Prospects of a proper function-based approach PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Technische Universiteit Eindhoven, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr.ir. C.J. van Duijn, voor een commissie aangewezen door het College voor Promoties, in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 13 november 2013 om r6 :oo uur door Marieke van Holland geboren te Amersfoort Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor en de samenstelling van de promotiecommissie is als volgt: voorzitter: prof.dr. A.G.L. Romme promotor: prof.dr.ir. A.W.M. Meijers copromotor( en): dr. W.N. Houkes dr.ir. K. Vaesen leden: prof.dr. W.A. l)sselsteijn prof.dr. E. Myin (Universiteit Antwerpen) prof.dr. A.M. Wikforss (Stockholms Universitet) Research for this thesis was made possible by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). © Marieke van Holland, 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this pubheation may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission in writing of the publisher. editors: Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers Van Holland, M. Extended Cognition and the Mark ofthe Cognitive: Prospects of a proper function-based approach Elly Takmastraat 48, 3813 MC Amersfoort A catalogue record is available from the Eindhoven University ofTechnology Library ISBN: 978-9o-J86-3466-r ISSN: I574-94IX Contents r Introduetion I 1.1. General introduetion I.2 Research question and aims 5 Relevanee 6 Concepts and method 7 Structure ofthe dissertation II 2 Extended Mind, Extended Cognition, and functionalism 2.1. Introduetion I5 2.2 Functionalism r6 Functionalism as a motivation for EM 23 Functionalism can't positively piek out (extended) cognitive systems Condusion 3 Cognitive tasks and boundary demarcation 39 }I. Introduetion 39 3·2 The approach- analysis 40 3·3 Against interaction-style criteria: EC 49 3-4 Problems with generic system boundary demarcation 54 3·5 Condusion 58 4 Proper functions and Rowlands' Mark of the Cognitive 6r Introduetion 6r Proper fundions - preeedeuts 62 Rowlands' Mark ofthe Cognitive 68 The ownership condition and the problem of cognitive bloat 73 Distinguishing cognitive from noncognitive processes 86 Condusion 5 Interlude: desideratafora criterion of the cognitive 93 5·r. Introduetion 93 5-2 Preliminaries 94 5·3 The desiderata 96 5-4 Looking forward roG vii 6 An etiological function-based approach: four scenarios 6.1. Introduetion I07 6.2 Millikan's account of proper fundion I09 6.) Applying Millikan's theory- introduetion rr6 6-4 Reasans for choosing proper functions, and a challenge II7 6.5 Two scenarios and their implications I2I 6.6 Condusion IJ4 7 Assessing TDr: problems for an etiological account Introduetion The top-down production scenario: two conditions Does TD1 accommodate cognitive extension? Assessing the practicability ofthe criterion Restrictions on the cognitive Condusion 8 Self-maintenance, an alternative approach to proper function 8.1. Introduetion r8r 8.2 The self-maintenance approach r8J 8.) Two objections 192 8-4 Disarming the objections 200 8.5 Condusion 206 9 Condusion Summary in the light ofthe research question 209 Results- three perspectives 2II Wider implications 2r6 Further research 2r8 References 221 viii Acknowledgements Wow, here it is. What it is and what you think of it I leave up to you. But the fact that you have it in your hands right now is sarnething I had not, at times, ciared to imagine. This dissertation has my name on it.YetI cannot let you go on to the pages that follow without giving a few (inadequate) worcis of thanks to those who have contributed to the writing of it- whether directly, by helping me flesh out ideas and commenting on my writings, or by supporting meinother ways. Many thanks are due, first, to those I have come to think of as my team of supervisors: Anthonie Meijers, Krist Vaesen, and Wybo Houkes. Krist was my daily supervisor, project partner, and first go-to-point for matters related to the project in the braadest sense. Krist's guidance was characterized not only by an eye for relevant questions and literature; his encouragement and sense of humor have, from the beginning, made a difference for me. Wybo's help in making methodological choices, and making them explicit, was invaluable in creating the thesis that lies before you. Of equal importance were his positive, "forward­ looking" outlook and his readiness to see the best potential in whatever I put before him. Anthonie, despite being a rather busy fellow, always gave his fullest attention when it mattered. When it came to my writings, Anthonie reminded me of the real questions and forced me to formulate my thoughts clearly. I would like to thank all three for their confidence; for giving me the time and room to proveto myself that I could. Thanks go out too to the other memhers of my doctoral committee, whohave kindly agreed to read and evaluate this thesis: Professors Asa Wikforss, Erik Myin and Wijnand Ijsselsteijn. And, of course, to the members of the Philosophy & Ethics group, past and present, and other residents of our corridor. Thanks for the nice discussions and conversations, fun outings, puns, and occasional advice. A specialshout out to my fellow PhD students: Auke, Maryam, Stefan, Bas, Sven, Litska, Christine, Cletus, Jilles, Inga; and visitors Mostafa, Joeri and ix Roseline. A diverse lot, some of whom I've shared more with than others; all friendly people whom I've enjoyed talking to very much. Thanks also to Rianne Schaaf, department secretary, whose door was always openfora little smal! (and somelimes big) talk. And to Kees van Overveld, with whom I had some very insightful conversations a bout creativity and independent thought. Outside of the university my family has been a souree of continua! support. Special thanks go out to my mom and dad, whohave been there for me uncondi­ tionally. Throughout an often stressful period I could not have clone without my friends\ who have forced me - variously - to relax, talk, do stuff, and more generally get out of my own head every once in a while. A bunch of real charac­ ters they are, which I wouldn't trade for the world. I apologize for falling asleep occasionally. Finally, there has been my love Edwin, whom I fear has had to suffer most from my bouts of absent-mindedness, and tries to keep me from worrying overmuch. Who can be remarkably sweet when he wants to; who can make me laugh out !oud. The usual suspects, who know l'm not going to name narnes and who know who they are anyway. x 1 Introduetion 1.1. General introduetion Consicier the following two examples. Jimmy is a real gadget freak. He always has the newest technologies, and en­ joys exploring the ins and outs of the latest tablet computers, smart phones, digital cameras, etc. Jimmy has almost become merged with his phone in particular. It contains all his friends' contact information, he keeps notes on it, and uses it to maintain his appointrnents. When people are arguing or wondering a bout some fact Jimmy is always the first to whip out his smart­ phone and look it up. Jimmy wouldn't know what to do without his phone. In fact, Jimmy feels he has become a bit lazy in remembering facts, because there is always his phone to tell him what he neecis to know. Janet is a bit more "old school". Janet is doing mathematica! exercises, but she refuses to use a calculator except for the most complicated of sums.
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